PFR Digests

CASE DIGESTS
PERSONS & FAMILY

RELATIONS
Prepared by:
Anne Lizeth R. Vallarit
2019-1-003007
AUDIT
Submitted to:
Prosecutor Edna Conde
PERSONS & FAMILY
[CASE DIGESTS] RELATIONS
JERRYSUS L. TILAR VS. ELIZABETH A. TILAR AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 214529 July 12, 2017, PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Jerrysus L. Tilar filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of his wife’s (Elizabeth) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Elizabeth failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required
the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his
Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion
between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with Jerrysus and his witness testifying.
The RTC issued its assailed Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Jerrysus filed a
petition for review directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the
provision of the Family Code.
RULING: YES. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The State is mandated to
protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the
nation.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family
Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be
invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which Jerrysus filed before the RTC falls
within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
1
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer on the ground of lack of consent. Albios submitted that the marriage
was contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio and was of the view that the parties
married each other for convenience only. The OSG filed an appeal before the CA, and the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio
RULING: NO. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the... sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, and that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
2
PERSONS & FAMILY
RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014, BRION, J.
FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's
officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was
not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty. The decision was affirmed
by both the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
RULING: YES. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of
the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
3
PERSONS & FAMILY
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
4
PERSONS & FAMILY
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, AND SY CHUN YEN VS. AIDA SY-GONZALES,
MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, AND HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988, CORTES, J.
FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he
was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
and alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor
the filiation of her children to him. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that
she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee. Probate court ruled that Sy
Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy
Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate court’s judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales
et al are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
RULING: NO. For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law as a question
of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the case
at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For
failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
5
PERSONS & FAMILY
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely
a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for divorce which was granted
and took effect in February of 1992. On October that year Lucia married Maria Lumbago also in
Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for nullity of marriage in Regional
Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony actually took place. He
was later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial question. The
civil case is a prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the
motion for reconsideration of the prosecution. The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of Appeals, the
trial court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took place.
No appeal was taken from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the Court of
Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner committed bigamy.
RULING: NO. The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v. Bobis was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. The Supreme
Court need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is moot and academic.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.
6
PERSONS & FAMILY
FACTS: Respondent requested CENOMAR finding that she is married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean national. Thus she filed a petition for Cancellation of Entries in Marriage Contract. The
court granted the petition in favor of the respondent. The petition for the reconsideration of
the assailed marriage contract on the grounds that there was no clerical spelling, typographical
and innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it fall within the provision of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and granting the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of entries in marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING: YES. Aside for the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that
"even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves
of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
7
PERSONS & FAMILY
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS: The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void.
RULING: YES. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3).
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The RTC is correct in holding that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
8
PERSONS & FAMILY
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO V. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008, TINGA, J.
FACTS: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They applied for a marriage license
in September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the wedding despite
of absence of marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on
the same day. However, they did not live together as husband and wife. In November 1995,
Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and supported the child on her own. Annabelle then filed a
complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig. In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to
financially support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied that they are married and
claimed that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake.
The trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage is valid.
RULING: NO. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit
when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered
as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant
case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at
all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
9
PERSONS & FAMILY
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011, CARPIO, J.
FACTS: Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage was still subsisting when
he contracted a 2nd marriage with Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with
Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the Decision of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
ISSUE: Whether the 2nd marriage is bigamous and null and void ab initio.
RULING: YES. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35 of the
Family Code, it is void ab initio. Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his
marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his two marriages were
not conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be used
as a defense.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the
date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code
of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
10
PERSONS & FAMILY
REX M. TUPAL v. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO

AM No. MTJ-14-1842, Feb 24, 2014, LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge
Remegio V. Rojo.
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license.
He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to... the contracting parties.[3]
He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties' marriage. These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City, including nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by
Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties' marriages.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined P9,000.00 and
sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt more severely.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.
RULING: YES. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries
public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities.
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
their courts' territorial jurisdiction. Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties'
affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties' marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to
examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties'...
affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge's official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the
duty to examine the parties' requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer... notarized
the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit's
statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false
11
PERSONS & FAMILY
statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to... admit that
he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they
will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a

private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity." The affidavit of... cohabitation, even if it serves a
"public purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
12
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

April 24, 2018, G.R. No. 221029, PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro
from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE: 1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
RULING: 1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as
to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding
should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since
doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection
clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by
the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce
proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards
to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
13
PERSONS & FAMILY
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino
family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all
forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The
State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited
to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that
the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
14
PERSONS & FAMILY
In this case, the Court

RHODORA remanded
ILUMIN RACHO,the A.K.A.
case to"RHODORA
the court ofRACHO
origin for further proceedings
TANAKA," vs. and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
SEIICHI law on divorce.
TANAKA
G.R. No. 199515, THIRD DIVISION, June 25, 2018, LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro
Manila. They lived together for nine years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged
that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured
a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in the
Philippines and had it authenticated by the DFA. She was informed that by reason of certain
administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines to report the documents
for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce.
She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry before the
RTC but the latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. Racho filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the SC but the latter deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. On March 16, 2012,
petitioner submitted her Compliance, attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in Japan.
ISSUE: Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the
fact that a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.
RULING: YES. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino
may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign
spouse's national law. The second paragraph provides that where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio,
the court established the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this
jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree
and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact
before trial courts.
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul
Takayama. This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance
15
PERSONS & FAMILY
Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. Upon appeal to
this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce,
certifying that the divorce has been accepted.
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state
any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no
other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute
and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry.
16
PERSONS & FAMILY
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL

REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 226013, SECOND DIVISION, July 02, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009. Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3)
months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly
quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older
than Luzviminda. As such,she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City
Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and
duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012. In view of the
foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and
Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her
passport and for her to be able to marry again.
The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to
the national law of the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino
spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.
RULING: NO. Pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages
between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless
of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen –
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground
that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory.
17
PERSONS & FAMILY
J.STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 224015, SECOND DIVISION, July 23, 2018, PERALTA
FACTS: Petitioner Stephen Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in
Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After 2 years, the parties, by agreement, obtained
a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013,
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. In its
Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce
between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.On November 25, 2015, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and
recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the
following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. This is because the
divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by
Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said
divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the second requisite for the application of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not present because the petitioner gave
consent to the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband.
RULING: YES. In Republic v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the
application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law."
We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must
actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature
and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision,
therefore,
18
PERSONS & FAMILY
should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding.
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that
despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is
assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception
provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai
had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
In the instant case, the OSG does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the
same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on
divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those
matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
19
PERSONS & FAMILY
MARLYN MONTON NULLADA v. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA,

AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO
G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019, A. REYES, JR., J.
FACTS: The action arose from a Petition for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce
decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila.
She claimed that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as
evidenced by a Report of Marriage3 that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.
The document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the
then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship,
however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual
agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to assail the Decision1 dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832, that denied the recognition of
a foreign divorce that was obtained by petitioner Marlyn Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with
Japanese national Akira Ito (Akira).
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s argument is meritorious.
RULING: YES. Under Art. 26 of the Family Code, all marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Underscoring ours)
Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended
in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize
the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan
solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
20
PERSONS & FAMILY
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
21
PERSONS & FAMILY
LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.
FACTS: Leouel Santos is a member of the Army who met Julia in Ilioilo City. On September 20,
1986, the two exchange vows before the RTC of Iloilo, which was shortly followed by a church
wedding.
Sometime in 1988, Julia decided to leave for US to work as a nurse, despite the pleas to
dissuade her otherwise. Seven months have passed since her leaving for US before Julia made
her first call to Santos promising that she will return home after the expiration of her contract.
However, Julia did not make good of her promise despite Santos even going over to US in one
of his trips under the auspices of the Philippine Army to persuade Julia to come back to the
Philippines.
Julia’s persistent refusal to return home and her alleged failure to communicate with Santos for
a period of five years have prompted the latter to file an annulment case stating as a ground
the psychological incapacity of Julia under Article 36 of the Family Code. According to Santos, a
wife who does not care to inform her husband of her whereabouts for five years and does not
communicate with him is psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether Julia was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the annulment of her
marriage with Santos under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING: NO. In the words of the Supreme Court, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Accordingly, the factual setting of the case at bench had in no way measure at all, to the
standards required to decree the marriage as null and void. While the court recognizes that
Santos is undeniably aggrieved, even desperate in his current condition, regrettably, however,
neither law nor society itself can have all the answers to every individual problem.
22
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel
had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING: NO. The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and
gentleness on Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”
23
PERSONS & FAMILY
Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag

G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001, QUISUMBING J.
FACTS: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return
home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she
resisted, would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him.
Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at
date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the
marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court
of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino
Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not
having been proven to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court
ISSUE: Whether the immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the
marriage null and void.
RULING: NO. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in
which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
24
PERSONS & FAMILY
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.
25
PERSONS & FAMILY
LENI O. CHOAA vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA

G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002, PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl
Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he
filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows
latter’s psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not
only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not
in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient
and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained
about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and
lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively,
constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and

incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an
incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.
The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
26
PERSONS & FAMILY
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON

G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003, CARPIO, J.
FACTS: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children.
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they had
frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, wasa
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister‘s
house or would play tennis the whole day. When the family had crisis due to several
miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on
the pretext of re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily
leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The
respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with theessential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until
the present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found in the psychological examination
conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and therespondent Diana claims that
petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.
RULING: YES. since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her
act or omission as seen infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF
ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage – petition does not
need to show root cause sinceonly experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of
physical incapacity.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated
27
PERSONS & FAMILY
in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.
The elements of Psychological incapacity are:
(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
28
PERSONS & FAMILY
GERRY S. MOJICA v. GENERALI PILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 222455, September 18, 2019, CARPIO, ACTING C.J.
FACTS: Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City
but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25,
1997.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on
the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
who is already married to another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING: 1st issue: The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support
the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of
Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
29
PERSONS & FAMILY
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.
30
PERSONS & FAMILY
OSCAR P. MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.
FACTS: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the
fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. The trial court granted her petition.
ISSUE: Is the action of the husband tenable?
RULING: NO. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment”
or “estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same
rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
31
PERSONS & FAMILY
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS: Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo died intestate.
He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6
(registered in the name of Teofilo) were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents for the declaration of
nullity of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. But before the parties
could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for summary
judgment.
RTC rendered judgment: defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license.
In the appeal, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: 1) Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
2) Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage. Yes if the
marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff is a real
party-in-interest.
RULING: I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
32
PERSONS & FAMILY
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration
of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have
been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor
sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13.
Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require
the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
33
PERSONS & FAMILY
party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec. 2(a)].
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to
bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its
application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage? NO. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
34
PERSONS & FAMILY
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs.

ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, NACHURA, J.
FACTS: On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te a freshman in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They
left Manila and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for only a month and they
could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that
she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles
place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and
told her that they should live with his parents but she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City, for
the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court
ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in
the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the
Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for
review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only
because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological
incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING: YES. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.
35
PERSONS & FAMILY
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be

personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
36
PERSONS & FAMILY
BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, NACHURA, J.
FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married
each other after several years. Years after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he
practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six
children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have
their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated.
She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that
Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that
he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity.
However, Oñate merely based her findings on the statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate
was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already
working as an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He
also presented his own expert witness to disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to
personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate.
Also, Benjamin submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and the
transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same.
Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.
RULING: NO. The totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage 18 years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted
a party at the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew
37
PERSONS & FAMILY
that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence presented prove such defects to be incurable. The evaluation of the
two psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in determining whether to declare
the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was not convinced
that the opinions proved by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological evaluations.
38
PERSONS & FAMILY
JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, BRION, J.
FACTS: Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support them, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd
jobs and Angelito refused to work and were most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to
find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years
later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological
incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally
examined by the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it
and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36
of the Family Code.
RULING: The Court fined the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The

psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate
39
PERSONS & FAMILY
a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must
be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do
not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty
in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
40
PERSONS & FAMILY
DANILO A. AURELIO vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011, PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both
she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their
respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of
psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.
Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack
of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of
his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His
moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards
set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC
denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
RULING: First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent
were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover,
a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature
as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
41
PERSONS & FAMILY
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.”
42
PERSONS & FAMILY
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th
child, Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home
and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had
three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged
that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves the
children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She
leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and 3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he
saw half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu
Disorder and that it “may have been evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in
her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is
rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to
the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became
secondary.
ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity
RULING: No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not proven because she was only
dating other men. Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual
infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
43
PERSONS & FAMILY
GLENN VIÑAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS

G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015, REYES, J.
FACTS: Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
Clinical Psychologist. The doctor found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable
of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary
Grace’s personality was assessed through the data gathered from Glenn and his cousin and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. The
doctor then concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist or

psychiatrist is fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING: No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a

psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In the case of Mary Grace, however, the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently
prove the root cause, gravity, incurability of Mary Grace’s condition and that it existed at the
inception of marriage.
Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.
44
PERSONS & FAMILY
ROBERT F. MALLILIN vs.

LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC. On March 7, 1996, RTC denied the petition. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC
decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family
Code."
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such
marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such... incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope
with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however,
she did not appear during the trial.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING: "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed... and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of
the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment
of... the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)

juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
45
PERSONS & FAMILY
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern

Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by... the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it
is subject to the law on evidence.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
46
PERSONS & FAMILY
ROLANDO D. CORTEZ, PETITIONER, v. LUZ G. CORTEZ

G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019, PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married on March 5, 1990. On June 9, 2003, petitioner
filed an Amended Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his and
respondent's psychological incapacity. On July 9, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision ruling in
favor of the validity of marriage between the two. On November 5, 2015, the CA affirmed the
said decision. The CA gave credence to respondent's claim that he and respondent had an
initially loving and harmonious relationship that turned sour after petitioner decided to be with
another woman. It found that the totality of the established facts and circumstances did not
prove psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid?
RULING: YES. We find no error was committed by the CA when it concurred with the RTC's
finding that petitioner failed to show that he and respondent were both psychologically
incapable of knowing and performing their marital and parental obligations. A perusal of the
records would show that such finding is supported by the evidence.
We find that the medical report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits incapacitated
him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the report
established that because petitioner was forced to marry respondent without love, he had no
intention to do his full obligations as a husband. Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Notably, petitioner admitted that it was only when he learned in 1994 that respondent had a
child prior to their marriage in 1990 that he stopped giving support to respondent and their two
children; that because of the abandonment case filed against him and the threats coming from
respondent's brothers if he would stop supporting respondent and the children that he entered
into a compromise agreement with respondent regarding the financial support for their
children; that despite giving support, however, he refused to live with respondent. Petitioner's
showing of ill-will and refusal to perform marital obligations do not amount to psychological
incapacity on his part.
47
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus FLORIE GRACE M. COTE

G.R. No. 212860, SECOND DIVISION, March 14, 2018, REYES, JR., J.
FACTS: On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace
Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage, the
spouses were both Filipinos and were blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel Manongdo, who was
born in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. The petition was
granted on the same day.
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the
divorce before the RTC. Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract, hence,
she also impleaded the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO).
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry.
The RTC ruled that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he obtained the divorce
decree. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the RTC, believing that the petition was
covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and denied
the appeal because the notice was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion. The CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a case involving recognition of
a foreign decree of divorce.
RULING: YES. It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family
courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to
a Filipino citizen.
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino
citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot
automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a
48
PERSONS & FAMILY
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
49
PERSONS & FAMILY
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on
the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by
respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with
the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring
the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement
of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code”
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No.
even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on
February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
RULING: NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
50
PERSONS & FAMILY
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
51
PERSONS & FAMILY
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706,March 29, 1995, QUIASON, J.
FACTS: This case is a complaint against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Judge Brillantes became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in 1965,
albeit without marriage license. In December 4, 1991, he married Yolanda De Castro in civil rites
in Los Angeles, California.
In the same month, complainant Lupo Atienza with whom Yolanda De Castro has two children,
saw Judge Brillantes sleeping in his house in No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,
Metro Manila. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told him
that De Castro has been cohabiting with Judge Brillantes.
Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him since his first
marriage was in 1965 and therefore not covered by the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even without a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
RULING: NO. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted without a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous void marriage shall make the subsequent marriage
void ab initio. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for the retroactivity of the Family Code
provided that it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws. As a general rule, no vested right may arise from procedural laws.
Article 40 is a rule of procedure, hence it has no vested right and therefore cannot be violative
of rights vested in other laws. Therefore, it has retroactive effect and is thus applicable to
respondent's marriage to Ongkiko in 1965.
52
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
FACTS: Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a
violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she
conducted a diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC
granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code?
RULING: Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends
on the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in
determining the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives
and friends could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find
Jerry’s name in the patient’s directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria
Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was
not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality
of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside
for utter lack of factual basis.
53
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.

February 10, 2016, G.R. No. 199194, DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS: On November 4, 2008 Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition[5] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of OzamizCity-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, They later became
sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.
However, they lived together as... husband and wife for a month only because he left to work
as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did
not receive any communication from Netchie.[14] He likewise had no idea about her...
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter
had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.[16] He returned home after his contract expired.
He then... inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also
did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so... he could contract another marriage
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie's aunt,
Consuelo Sande. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC's
judgment granting Jose's Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie.
ISSUE: Whether Jose’s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death shall be granted.
RULING: YES. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of...
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
54
PERSONS & FAMILY
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case
basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that... his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a... mere passive
one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was already
dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's parents while he was still out of the country, but did
not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home,
he was not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie's relatives
and friends;
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead,
was corroborated by Jose's older brother, and by Netchie's aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and... that after this,
there had been no information as to Netchie's whereabouts.
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC's finding that Jose's Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code,
in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose's pathetically anemic efforts
to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had... inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie's whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he... sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces,... cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search.
55
PERSONS & FAMILY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUDYSON C. CATUBAG

G.R. No. 210580, SECOND DIVISION, April 18, 2018, REYES, JR., J.
FACTS: Prior to their marriage in 2003, Ludyson Catubag and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with
each other as husband and wife. Their union begot two children. To meet the needs of the
family, Ludyson took work overseas while Shanaviv stayed in the Philippines to tend to the
children. On 2003, Ludyson and Shanaviv got married. Ludyson returned overseas to continue
his work.
On 2006, while working abroad, Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their
house and never returned. The relatives took care of the children. Ludyson came back to the
country to look for his wife. He proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their
close friends and relatives, but they too could offer no help. He travelled as far as Bicol, where
Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate her. Ludsyon subsequently sought
the help of BomboRadyo Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the
Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance.
After almost 7 years of waiting and with the desire to marry again, Ludsyon filed a petition to
have his wife declared presumptively dead.
ISSUE: Whether Ludyson complied with the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code
RULING: NO. Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive
death to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code
2. The present spouse wishes to remarry.
3. The present spouse has a well founded belief that the absentee is dead.
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee
Notably, the records reveal that Ludyson has complied with the first, second, and fourth
requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully
discharged the burden of establishing a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
56
PERSONS & FAMILY
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 230751, THIRD DIVISION, April 25, 2018, VELASCO JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo). Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and
he never made contact or communicated with the petitioner or to his relatives. That according
to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission, he was already
declared missing since 1979. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary
for any news regarding her beloved husband, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to
his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was
assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army. Weeks became years and years
became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades
of waiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, especially with a
meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the
benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive.
That one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least a
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court. That this petition is being filed not
for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of
the Philippines (Republic).
The RTC declared Wilfredo absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari. The CA rendered a
decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the
RTC. The CA concludes that the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the
basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant
petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and
not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct when it concludes that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been
dismissed by the RTC.
RULING: YES. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an
action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was
57
PERSONS & FAMILY
not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.”
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.
58
PERSONS & FAMILY
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, AND MARIO C.

HERNANDEZ
GR No. 126010, Dec. 08, 1999
FACTS: Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were married and had three children.
Lucita, petitioner, filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City a petition for annulment on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the respondent, Mario. The petitioner claimed that the
respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household. Respondent engaged in drinking sprees, gambled and
womanized at which came a point that he had an illegitimate child.
Petitioner also added in her petition full custody of her three children, Php 9,000 monthly
financial support for the children, sole ownership of the parcel of land purchased during their
marriage as well as of the jeep which private respondent took when he left his family.
RTC dismissed the petition. This decision was affirmed by the CA.Lucita Estrella Hernandez,
petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, and Mario C. Hernandez
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was psychologically incapacitated at the time of his
marriage to the petitioner
RULING: NO. The petitioner failed to provide evidence proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated. The respondent’s habitual alcoholism, womanizing and
cohabitation with those he’s had extra-marital affairs with do not constitute psychological
incapacity. Art. 36 of the Family Code requires that incapacity must be psychological, not
physical, although the manifestations or symptoms are physical.
As for the other claims prayed for by the petitioner, the Court believed that those should be
litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or
custody of children.
59
PERSONS & FAMILY
DAVID B. DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL

G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel and the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. The civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did
not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she
married and with whom she had two children.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a
petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 149.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General... appealed. The Court of
Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11]
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the.
term "psychological incapacity?
RULING: In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such... an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
60
PERSONS & FAMILY
Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny
the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably,
there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide... the
specific answers to every individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioner's marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
61
PERSONS & FAMILY
MANUEL G. ALMELOR vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH
254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR
G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this
was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida
complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw
Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their
conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del
Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that
she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had
a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even
before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of
Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the
Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
RULING: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s
peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and
62
PERSONS & FAMILY
proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.
63
PERSONS & FAMILY
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: In 1988, Orly married Lilia. In 1992, Orly filed an annulment case of their marriage on
the ground that he was forced to marry Lilia becaue he received phone calls from a certain Ka
Celso, a member of NPA, who threatened him to be killed if he won’t marry Lilia. He also
claimed that he was defrauded by Lilia by making him believe that he was pregnant. Lilia denied
these allegations, claiming Orly freely cohabitated with her and showed 14 letters as proof of
Orly’s affection and care towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there really was fraud in obtaining Orly’s consent to marry Lilia
RULING: No. It is obvious that Orly seeks to annul his marriage because of a pending bigamy
case filed by Lilia. Also, Orly’s contentions were not concretely established, taki8ng in
consideration that he is a security guard who is knowledgeable of self-defense. His allegation
that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is a lie. Also, it took him four years
to file an action, which only supports Lilia’s contention that he freely cohabitated with her.
64
PERSONS & FAMILY
65
PERSONS & FAMILY
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs. REY C. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS: Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Rey’s house in
Occidental Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her
home in Tondo. Rey then left for Riyahd where he was working. He never contacted his wife
since he left. About a year and a half, Veronica was informed that her husband is coming home.
But she was surprised that he did not go directly to her in Tondo but to his house in Mindoro
instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating
his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the
investigation. Dr. Tayag testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. RTC denied. CA also denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential

marriage obligations
RULING: SC denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses
to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at
bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his
marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad.
Petitioner was actually seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based
on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. he Court declared that “psychological incapacity” under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage.
66
PERSONS & FAMILY
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her.
In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to
his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he
died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits
of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by
the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on
SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.
RULING: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.
67
PERSONS & FAMILY
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each
party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two
were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed
by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is
presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages
earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
68
PERSONS & FAMILY
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS: William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3
children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC
on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.
RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision when herein petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The highlight was on December 14, 1995 when the
respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into
a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye,
stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking her to leave the
conjugal house.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.
RULING: No, It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to
in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute
the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
69
PERSONS & FAMILY
JudgmentL.affirmed.
ENRICO PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C.
PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION
(CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994, VITUG, J.
FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February
15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on
March 17, 1980.
ISSUE: Whether the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis is null and void.
RULING: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon
a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88)
is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action
for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
70
PERSONS & FAMILY
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and
if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.”
71
PERSONS & FAMILY
SIOCHI VS GOZON,ET AL
G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS: Elvira Gozon filed a case of LEGAL SEPARATION (LSEP) against her husband Alfredo.
Later, she filed a notice of lis pendens (a public notice informing the community that a
particular property is subject to litigation and that will prospective purchasers of the property
will be bound by any judgment affecting it) over a 30, 000 sq.meters lot in Malaiizbon
registered in the name of “Afredo Gozon married to Elvira Gozon”.
While the LSEP case was pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement to sell said lot to Mario
Siochi for 18M. Mario gave a DP of 5M with an agreement that Alfredo as the exclusive owner
of the property, will secure the exclusion of the property in the LSEP case and secure the
removal of notice of lis pendens. After giving the down payment, Mario took possession of the
property.
Later, the LSEP case was granted, the CPG (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) was declared
dissolved and liquidated; the land declared conjugal. Alfredo being the offending spouse, the
net profit of his share shall be forfeited in favor of their daughter, Winifred.
Alfredo later donated the land to Winifred. Through SPA, Alfredo sold the land to Inter-
Dimensional Realty for 18M wherein the latter obtained the TCT in their name free from
annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Mario Siochi then filed a case for specific performance,
damages and the annulment of the donation and sale.
The CA decided that sale between Mario and Alfredo is void. Share of Alfredo (offending
spouse) was forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred. Alfredo must pay the 5m DP to Mario
with damages. Winifred has the option of either to dispose of the land or not.
ISSUE: Whether Alfredo’s (offending spouse) entire share of said conjugal property shall be
deemed forfeited as effect of the LSEP case.
RULING: No. As provided under Art 63 (2) of Family Code— “The decree of legal separation
shall have the following effects:
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the NET PROFITS earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in favor of common
children , or if there are none, to the children of the guilty spouse in previous marriage, if there
are none, to the innocent spouse.
72
PERSONS & FAMILY
Pursuant to this Article, Alfredo’s share of the conjugal property is not entirely forfeited in favor
of their common child, but only his share of the NET PROFITS earned from said conjugal
property.
73
PERSONS & FAMILY
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. NO. 155409, June 8, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS: Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship turned bitter when Virgilio discovered
that Dita had a paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her paramour. The
two were convicted of the crime charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages before the RTC, imputing psychological incapacity on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio
and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their
conjugal properties without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of
nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement
by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The
respondent Judge denied the motion.
ISSUE: 1.Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to the instant case?
2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant case?
3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from
sharing in the conjugal properties?
RULING: 1. No. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case. Article
43 of the Family Code refers to a subsequent marriage that is terminated because of the
reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal
separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought
to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.
2. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and
does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are
expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
3. The contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law
and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
74
PERSONS & FAMILY
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which
was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to
the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code
75
PERSONS & FAMILY
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO vs. RITA C. QUIAO

G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012, REYES, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four
children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint
against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55,
thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent
spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of
Article 129 of the Family Code.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court.
By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
“Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and
debts.”
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that net
profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.
RULING: In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
76
PERSONS & FAMILY
So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to
the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
77
PERSONS & FAMILY
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001, PARDO, J.
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending
a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
RULING: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years
of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still
has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice,
he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.
78
PERSONS & FAMILY
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right. Coverture is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
79
PERSONS & FAMILY
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of
First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic,
on the same... date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
husband and wife until 1987.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the...
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding and
ruling: EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on
July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic
did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the
condominium unit; and to the law books.
RULING: Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to... follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad. Pursuant to the... nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
80
PERSONS & FAMILY
Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types
of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such... defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous was void; properties acquired during their
marriage... were governed by the rules on co-ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but in the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as... determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention
in this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio.
Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would... govern. But this
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it
applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there... still exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This
void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of... money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for
this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
81
PERSONS & FAMILY
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such... valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if
both parties were in bad faith.
82

PFR Digests

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PFR Digests

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PFR Digests

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS & FAMILY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio

RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and

LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner committed bigamy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO V. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO

ISSUE: Whether their marriage is valid.

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

REX M. TUPAL v. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO

An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

In this case, the Court

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL

J.STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA v. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA,

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s argument is meritorious.

LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag

LENI O. CHOAA vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and

DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON

ISSUE: Whether petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.

The elements of Psychological incapacity are:

GERRY S. MOJICA v. GENERALI PILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

OSCAR P. MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA

ISSUE: Is the action of the husband tenable?

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs.

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be

BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING

ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The

DANILO A. AURELIO vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO

VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

GLENN VIÑAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist or

RULING: No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a

ROBERT F. MALLILIN vs.

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern

ROLANDO D. CORTEZ, PETITIONER, v. LUZ G. CORTEZ

ISSUE: Is the marriage valid?

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus FLORIE GRACE M. COTE

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR