SPOUSES NILO RAMOS and ELIADORA RAMOS, Petitioners,  vs.

RAUL OBISPO and pertinent to the mortgage failing which they will be constrained to refer the matter
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,Respondents. to their lawyer for the filing of appropriate legal action against Obispo and FEBTC. 4

G.R. No. 193804               February 27, 2013 There being no action taken by FEBTC, petitioners filed on October 12, 1999 a
complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with damages against FEBTC and
DECISION Obispo. Petitioners alleged that they signed the blank REM form given by Obispo
who facilitated the loan with FEBTC, and that they subsequently received the loan
VILLARAMA, J.: proceeds of ₱250,000.00 which they paid in full through Obispo. With their loan fully
settled, they demanded the release of their title but Obispo refused to talk or see
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated them, as he is now hiding from them. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds of
January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82378 which Quezon City, petitioners said they were surprised to learn that their property was in
reversed and set aside the Decision 2 dated January 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial fact mortgaged for ₱1,159,096.00. Petitioners thus prayed that the REM be declared
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38988. void and cancelled; that FEBTC be ordered to deliver to them all documents
pertaining to the loan and mortgage of Obispo; and that FEBTC and Obispo be
The facts follow: ordered to pay moral damages and attorney’s fees.5

Petitioner Nilo Ramos and respondent Raul Obispo met each other and became best In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim, FEBTC averred that
friends while they were working in Saudi Arabia as contract workers. After both had petitioners agreed to execute the REM over their property as partial security for the
returned to the Philippines, Ramos continued to visit Obispo who has a hardware loans obtained by Obispo with a total principal balance of ₱2,500,000.00. Since the
store. Sometime in August 1996, petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) obligation secured by the REM remains unpaid, FEBTC contended that it should not
in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC)-Fairview Branch, be compelled to release the mortgage on the subject property. FEBTC further
over their property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64422 asserted that petitioners are guilty of laches and their claim already barred by
(369370) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. The notarized REM secured credit estoppel. Under its cross-claim, FEBTC prayed that in the event of judgment
accommodations extended to Obispo in the amount of ₱1,159,096.00. On even rendered in favor of petitioners, Obispo should be made liable to answer for all the
date, the REM was registered and annotated on the aforesaid title.3 claims that may be adjudged against it plus all damages it suffered.6

On September 17, 1999, FEBTC received a letter from petitioners informing that On motion of petitioners, Obispo was declared in default for failure to file any
Obispo, to whom they entrusted their property to be used as collateral for a responsive pleading despite due receipt of summons which he personally received.
₱250,000.00 loan in their behalf, had instead secured a loan for ₱1,159,096.00, and
had failed to return their title despite full payment by petitioners of ₱250,000.00. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the petitioners and against the
Petitioners likewise demanded that FEBTC furnish them with documents and papers respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the SO ORDERED.8
plaintiffs and against defendants Raul J. Obispo and Far East Banking Trust Company
(now Bank of the Philippine Islands) as follows: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

a) Declaring the real estate mortgage in favor of defendant Far East Bank & Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
Trust Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands) null and void; court when:

b) Ordering defendant FEBTC (now BPI) to cancel the encumbrance on I

Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-64422 [369370] and release and surrender
the Owners Duplicate copy thereof to the herein plaintiffs; IT SET ASIDE THE DECISION DATED JANUARY 29, 2004 RENDERED BY BRANCH 82 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BY UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE
c) Ordering defendants Obispo and FEBTC (BPI) to pay the plaintiffs jointly REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AND RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE
and severally the sum of ₱200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages; ACCOMMODATION MORTGAGORS OF RESPONDENT RAUL OBISPO DESPITE THE
FACT THAT NO CONSENT TO SUCH EFFECT WAS GIVEN BY THEM AND THE
d) Ordering defendants Obispo and FEBTC (BPI) to pay the plaintiffs, jointly PREPARATION THEREOF WAS ATTENDED BY FRAUDULENT ACTS OR
and severally the sum of ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees, and MISREPRESENTATIONS;
the cost of suit.
II
The cross-claim set forth by defendant FEBTC (BPI) against its co-defendant Obispo is
hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit. IT DISREGARDED EXISTING LAWS AND CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT DECLARING
THE RESPONDENT BANK AS NOT A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH DESPITE THE
SO ORDERED.7 CONTRARY FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT; and

FEBTC appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the III
complaint, holding that petitioners were third-party mortgagors under Article 2085
of the Civil Code and that they failed to present any evidence to prove their IT DISREGARDED EXISTING LAWS AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT LIKEWISE
allegations. The appellate court thus decreed: DELETED IN ITS DISPUTED DECISION THE AWARD OF DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND COST OF SUIT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS.9
WHEREFORE, the assailed January 29, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 82 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38988 is hereby REVERSED and SET The petition has no merit.
ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the Complaint of plaintiffs-appellees in
Civil Case No. Q-99-38988.
The validity of an accommodation mortgage is allowed under Article 2085 of the Civil with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised
Code which provides that "[t]hird persons who are not parties to the principal Rules on Evidence.11
obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property." An
accommodation mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a recipient of the loan, Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
otherwise that would be contrary to his designation as such.10 evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
In this case, petitioners denied having executed an accommodation mortgage and Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability
claimed to have executed the REM to secure only their ₱250,000.00 loan and not the of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
₱1,159,096.00 personal indebtedness of Obispo. They claimed it was Obispo who than that which is offered in opposition thereto.12
filled up the REM form contrary to their instructions and faulted FEBTC for being
negligent in not ascertaining the authority of Obispo and failing to furnish petitioners As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction
with copies of mortgage documents. Obispo initially gave them ₱100,000.00 and the must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary
balance was given a few months later. After supposedly completing payment of the care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. 13 The
amount of ₱250,000.00 to Obispo, petitioners discovered that the REM secured a Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient
bigger amount. Because of the alleged fraud committed upon them by Obispo who evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence.14Moreover, fraud is not
made them sign the REM form in blank, petitioners sought to have the REM annulled presumed – it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.15
and their title over the mortgaged property released by FEBTC. In other words, since
their consent to the REM was vitiated, judicial declaration of its nullity is in order. In this case, petitioners’ testimonial evidence failed to convince that Obispo
The deceived them as to the debt secured by the REM. Petitioners’ factual allegations
are not firmly supported by the evidence on record and even inconsistent with
RTC granted relief to petitioners while the CA found the subject REM as a valid third- ordinary experience and common sense.
party or accommodation mortgage due to petitioners’ failure to substantiate their
allegations with the requisite quantum of evidence. While petitioners admitted they knew it was from FEBTC they will secure a loan, it
was unbelievable for them to simply accept the ₱250,000.00 loan proceeds without
We sustain the decision of the CA. seeing any document or voucher evidencing release of such amount by the bank
containing the details of the transaction such as monthly amortization, interest rate
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of and added charges. It is difficult to believe petitioners’ simplistic explanation that
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the they requested documents from Obispo but the latter would not give them any.
strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by Such failure of Obispo to produce any receipt or document at all coming from the
their opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been bank should have, at the first instance, alerted the petitioners that something was
given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. The extent of amiss in the loan transaction for which they voluntarily executed the REM with their
the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved own property as collateral. Not only that, despite being aware of the absence of any
document to ascertain if Obispo indeed filled up the REM contract form in Corollarily, mortgagors desiring to attack a mortgage as invalid should act with
accordance with their instructions, petitioners accepted the supposed loan proceeds reasonable promptness, and unreasonable delay may amount to ratification. 17
in the form of personal checks issued by Obispo who claimed to have an account
with FEBTC, instead of checks issued by the bank itself. These alleged checks were As to petitioners’ assertion that they have settled their loan obligation by paying
not submitted in evidence by the petitioners who could have easily obtained copies ₱250,000.00 to Obispo, we note that said amount represents only the principal loan.
or record proving their issuance and encashment. Does this mean petitioners assumed that FEBTC granted their loan free of interest?
Or was there any special arrangement with Obispo in consideration of the mortgage
Another disturbing fact is why, despite having signed the REM contract in their name for the latter’s benefit? Again, why was there no evidence of such check payments
as mortgagors, petitioners did not go directly to the bank to pay their loan. One is allegedly made by petitioners to Obispo, presented in court? This hiatus in
also tempted to ask how petitioners could have possibly arrived at the amount of petitioners’ evidence raises serious doubt on their principal allegation that they
amortization payments without having seen any document from FEBTC pertaining to never consented to the third-party mortgage approved by FEBTC, leading to the
their loan account. Such conduct of petitioners in not bothering to appear before the conclusion that there was, in fact, an agreement between Obispo and petitioners to
bank or directly dealing with it regarding their outstanding obligation strongly use the latter’s property as collateral for the former’s credit line with said bank.
suggests that there was no such loan account in their name and it was really Obispo
who was the borrower and petitioners were merely accommodation mortgagors. It bears stressing that an accommodation mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a
recipient of the loan, otherwise that would be contrary to his designation as such.
But assuming for the moment that petitioners really entrusted to Obispo the We have held that it is not always necessary that the accommodation mortgagor be
remittance of their payments to FEBTC, it is difficult to comprehend that they apprised beforehand of the entire amount of the loan nor should it first be
continued making payments to him despite the latter’s not having complied at all determined before the execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of the
with their repeated demands for the corresponding receipt from the bank. These debtor.18This is especially true when the words used by the parties indicate that the
demands for bank documents apparently had gone unheeded by Obispo for mortgage serves as a continuing security for credit obtained as well as future loan
about one year and three months – the same period before petitioners were able to availments.
make full payment.16 Such considerably long period that petitioners remained
indifferent and took no prompt action against their alleged defrauder, Obispo, truly Here, petitioners as owners signed the REM as mortgagors and there is no evidence
defies the normal reaction of ordinary individuals giving rise to the inference that it adduced that suggests fraud or irregularity in its execution. Petitioners are not
was indeed Obispo who was the borrower/debtor and petitioners were just contracting parties whom the law considers ignorant or disadvantaged but former
accommodation mortgagors. overseas workers with sufficient education as to be well-aware of the consequences
of their personal decisions, consistent with the legal presumption that a person
Assuming arguendo that the REM was invalid on the ground of vitiated consent and takes ordinary care of his concerns. Hence, it can be reasonably inferred from the
misrepresentation by Obispo, petitioners’ unjustified failure to act within a facts on record that it was more probable that petitioners allowed Obispo to use
reasonable time after Obispo repeatedly failed to turn over the mortgage their property as additional collateral so as to avail of his existing credit line with
documents, constitutes estoppel and waiver to question its defect or invalidity. FEBTC instead of petitioners directly applying for a separate loan.
With the dearth of evidence to back up petitioners’ story, the CA found implausible From all indications, the failure of defendant Obispo to pay his loan resulted to the
the alleged legal infirmities in the execution of the REM. The appellate court thus prejudice of plaintiffs-appellees which may have led them to disown the Real Estate
aptly observed: Mortgage they executed in favor of defendant-appellant FEBTC to accommodate the
loan of defendant Obispo.19 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x it was defendant Obispo who obtained credit accommodation from defendant
FEBTC which he secured with the mortgage of the subject property. The property At this juncture, we underscore anew that the Court has always maintained its
mortgaged was owned by plaintiffs-appellees, considered a third party to the loan impartiality as early as in the case of Vales v. Villa,20and has warned litigants that:
obligations of defendant Obispo with defendant-appellant FEBTC. It was, thus, a
situation recognized by the last paragraph of Article 2085 of the Civil Code x x x. The x x x The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior any
Real Estate Mortgage admittedly signed by plaintiffs-appellees, on its face, explicitly more than it protects the strong because he is strong. The law furnishes protection
states that it is for the security of "credit accommodations obtained by Raul De Jesus to both alike – to one no more or less than the other. It makes no distinction
Obispo," the principal of which is fixed at ₱1,159,096.00. between the wise and the foolish, the great and the small, the strong and the weak.
The foolish may lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law
While plaintiffs-appellees claim that they sought the help of defendant Obispo in will give it back to them again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and
securing the loan from defendant-appellant FEBTC, and not to secure the loans extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him
obtained by defendant Obispo himself, they failed to present any evidence, except from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. x x x 21
for their bare assertion, that they indeed gave their title to defendant Obispo
purportedly to facilitate their loan with defendant-appellant FEBTC. It is axiomatic There being valid consent on the part of petitioners as accommodation mortgagors,
that under the Rules on Evidence a party who alleges a fact has the burden of no reversible error was committed by the CA in reversing the trial court’s decision
proving it. A mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of which declared the REM as void and awarded damages to petitioners.
proving his allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.
A preponderance of the evidence is essential to establish the invalidity of a
It may be argued that having received the amount of ₱250,000.00, plaintiffs- mortgage, and it has been said that clear and convincing proof is necessary to show
appellees became parties to the principal obligation and as such, the provision of the fraud, duress, or undue influence.22 Any relevant and material evidence otherwise
last paragraph of Article 2085 no longer applies. While it is undisputed that plaintiffs- competent is admissible on the issue of the validity of a mortgage.23 Petitioners
appellees received the amount of ₱250,000.00, the record, however, reveals that utterly failed to present relevant evidence to support their factual claims and offered
they received the said amount not from defendant FEBTC but from defendant no explanation whatsoever. Such omission is fatal to their cause.
Obispo. It could be inferred that the ₱250,000.00 given by defendant Obispo to
plaintiffs-appellees was some form of remuneration in lending their title to him as WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of
security for his credit line with defendant-appellant FEBTC. merit.1âwphi1 The Decision dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 82378 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
xxxx
With costs against the petitioners. That on or about the period covering the months of February 1997 up to April 1998
or immediately before or subsequent thereto in Quezon City, Philippines and within
SO ORDERED. the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior Agustin, Cesar
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo,
Associate Justice Joebert Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo, Letecia D. Londonio,
Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  vs. ROSARIO "ROSE" Bermejo for a consideration ranging from ₱2,000.00 to ₱32,000.00 or a total amount
OCHOA, Accused-Appellant. of ₱124,000.00 as placement fee which the complainants paid to herein accused
without the accused having secured the necessary license from the Department of
G.R. No. 173792               August 31, 2011 Labor and Employment.3 (Emphases supplied.)

Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303, this time charging Ochoa with three counts
DECISION of estafa, committed separately upon three private complainants Robert Gubat
(Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior Agustin (Agustin), respectively. The
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Information in Criminal Case No. 98-77301 accuses Ochoa of the following acts
constituting estafa:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated March 2, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888, which affirmed with modification That on or about March 3, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
the Decision2 dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused did then and there
Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303. The RTC found accused- willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan to
appellant Rosario "Rose" Ochoa (Ochoa) guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, as one ROBERT GUBAT for a consideration of ₱18,800.00 as placement fee, knowing
defined and penalized under Article II, Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of that she has no power, capacity or lawful authority whatsoever and with no
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas intention to fulfill her said promise, but merely as pretext, scheme or excuse to get
Filipinos Act of 1995," in Criminal Case No. 98-77300; and of the crime of estafa, as and exact money from said complainant, as she did in fact collect and received the
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in amount of ₱18,800.00 from said Robert Gubat, to his damage and
Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. prejudice.4 (Emphases supplied.)

The Information filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-77300, The two other Informations for estafa were similarly worded as the aforequoted
charged Ochoa with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as Information, except as to the name of the private complainants and the amount
follows: purportedly collected by Ochoa from them, particularly:
 Docket No. Private Complainant Amount Collected for Taiwan in two weeks or in March 1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that the
total application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00, and the
Criminal Case No. 98-773025 Cesar Aquino ₱19.000.00 downpayment was ₱50,000.00. Gubat was able to actually pay Ochoa
₱18,800.00 as reservation fee at the agency; processing fee for Gubat’s
Criminal Case No. 98-773036 Junior Agustin ₱32,000.00 papers at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Malacañang, and Embassy
of Taiwan; and medical examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to
As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against Ochoa before Gubat three receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and April 6, all in the year
the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, 1998, in the amount of ₱5,000.00 each or a total of ₱15,000.00. Gubat
joint trial of the four criminal cases ensued. started to worry when he was not able to leave for abroad as Ochoa
promised and when she failed to show up at their arranged meetings. When
The prosecution presented as witnesses Cory Aquino (Cory) of the Philippine Gubat was finally able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised him that he
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and private complainants Gubat, Agustin, would be leaving for abroad soon. Despite Ochoa’s renewed promise, Gubat
Francisco Pascual (Pascual), Rosemarie Bermejo (Rosemarie), Cesar, Christopher was still not able to leave the country. Gubat then demanded that Ochoa
Bermejo (Christopher), Joebert Decolongon (Decolongon), and Fernando Rivera return his documents and money. When Ochoa failed to comply with his
(Rivera). demand, Gubat filed a report against Ochoa at Barangay (Brgy.) San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. On May 21, 1998, he met the other
According to private complainants, they were recruited by Ochoa from January to private complainants7 who had similar complaints against Ochoa. When
March 1998 for various jobs in either Taiwan or Saudi Arabia, under the following nothing came out of the confrontation with Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome,
circumstances: Gubat and the other private complainants filed a joint complaint against
Ochoa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).8
1. In the second week of February 1998, Ochoa was introduced to Robert
Gubat, a licensed electrical engineer and a resident of Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas, 2. The paths of Junior Agustin and Ochoa crossed on February 2, 1998.
through a certain Nila, Gubat’s neighbor, who had a pending application for Agustin, a farmer, was staying at the home of Pascual, his cousin, at No. 4
work abroad with Ochoa. Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. When Ochoa arrived at Pascual’s home,
during their conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her applicants was Pascual introduced Ochoa to Agustin as a recruiter for overseas workers in
already leaving for Taiwan. Per Ochoa’s instruction, Gubat met with Francisco Taiwan. Interested in working abroad, Agustin submitted his bio-data to
Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoa’s house in San Bartolome, Ochoa at the latter’s residence at Phase 1, Lot 3, San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Novaliches, Quezon City, and personally introduced Gubat to Ochoa. Gubat Quezon City. Ochoa promised Agustin that he would be fielded as a factory
submitted his résumé to Ochoa, which Ochoa would bring to Axil worker in Taiwan for three years, earning a monthly salary of ₱18,000.00.
International Agency where Ochoa was working as a recruiter. Right after Ochoa then informed Agustin that the total placement fee for Taiwan is
browsing through Gubat’s résumé, Ochoa informed Gubat that as an ₱80,000.00. Agustin initially paid Ochoa the sum of ₱28,000.00 as processing
engineer, Gubat was qualified to work as a factory supervisor and could leave
fee. Ochoa then promised that Agustin could leave for Taiwan in two months. May 21, 1998, Pascual and the other private complainants filed a complaint
However, the two months passed, but there was still no overseas before the NBI.10
employment for Agustin. Agustin was compelled to file a complaint against
Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. Agustin met the 4. Rosemarie Bermejo came to know of Ochoa through Rivera, a friend of
other private complainants during the barangay hearing on May 21, 1998. Rosemarie’s mother. Rosemarie first met Ochoa at the latter’s home in
Ochoa was also present at said hearing. Given the unsuccessful barangay Quezon City sometime in January 1998. Rosemarie was promised by Ochoa
hearing, Agustin and the other private complainants lodged a complaint employment for three years in Saudi Arabia as clerk/typist, earning
against Ochoa before the NBI.9 US$400.00. Rosemarie was also instructed by Ochoa to have a medical
examination and secure a passport and NBI clearance. Rosemarie and her
3. Francisco Pascual, presently jobless and a resident of Gulod, Novaliches, brothers, who also applied for jobs abroad, were accompanied by Ochoa to
Quezon City, learned from a neighbor of one Mrs. Bermejo that her son was the St. Peter Medical Clinic in Malate, Manila for their medical examination
being helped by Ochoa, a recruiter, to find a job abroad. Pascual went to Mrs. on February 27, 1998. Rosemarie and her brother each handed over to
Bermejo’s house in January 1998, and met Ochoa for the first time. Ochoa Ochoa ₱2,600.00 for their medical examinations, and it was Ochoa who gave
invited Pascual to apply for a job abroad, saying that the latter could leave the payment to the clinic. Rosemarie and her brothers then spent ₱55.00
within two weeks. During Pascual’s visit at Ochoa’s house at Blk. 1, Lot 1, San each to secure NBI clearances for travel abroad. In addition, Rosemarie gave
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ochoa promised Pascual employment as Ochoa ₱5,500.00 on April 17, 1998; and although not secured by a receipt,
a driver salesman in Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of ₱18,000.00. said payment was witnessed by Rosemarie’s mother and Imelda Panuga, the
Ochoa told Pascual that the placement fee would be ₱7,000.00 and that landlord of Rosemarie’s mother, who lent Rosemarie the ₱5,500.00. During
Pascual should already have his medical examination so that the position in their initial meeting in January 1998, Ochoa said that Rosemarie could
Saudi Arabia could be reserved for him. Since his visa had not yet arrived, already leave for abroad in two weeks. Since Rosemarie was not able to
Pascual did not pay any placement fee to Ochoa. Pascual did undergo complete the requirements, her departure for Saudi Arabia was moved to
medical examination at St. Peter Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila, for which April 19, 1998. On April 19, 1998, Ochoa requested Rosemarie to go to the
he paid ₱2,600.00 to Ochoa. Pascual though did not receive the results of his office of Al Arab Agency located at Jalandoni Building, Ermita, Manila, to
medical examination because according to Ochoa, the same was withheld by which Ochoa was purportedly connected. Rosemarie waited at the Al Arab
the clinic. Despite Ochoa’s promises, Pascual was not able to leave for Saudi Agency until noon, but no one came to pick her up. Later, at the same day,
Arabia. At that time, Pascual was still employed as a Field Coordinator with Ochoa invited Rosemarie to her house for the birthday celebration of her
Selecta, but because of his frequent absences, spent following-up on his father. There, Ochoa explained that Rosemarie was unable to leave for Saudi
application for work abroad, he was fired. Pascual filed a complaint against Arabia because the Al Arab Agency has yet to secure Rosemarie’s Overseas
Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. As nothing Employment Certificate (OEC). Ochoa advised Rosemarie to stay at the
happened during the confrontation with Ochoa at the barangay hearing on rented apartment of Rosemarie’s mother because it was close to Ochoa’s
house and would be more convenient as Rosemarie could leave for abroad
any day soon. When none of Ochoa’s promises came to fruition, Rosemarie, Bermejo (Raymundo), Christopher’s sister and brother, respectively, also
together with the other private complainants, first sought redress from Brgy. failed to leave for work abroad as promised by Ochoa, Christopher,
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and then from the NBI. 11 Rosemarie, and their mother went to see Ochoa at an office at the Jalandoni
Building, Ermita, Manila. Ochoa explained that Christopher and his siblings
5. It was Pascual who introduced Cesar Aquino, a resident of Cubao, to could not leave yet because there are other documents that still need to be
Ochoa at the latter’s residence in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, accomplished. Ochoa said that she would just notify Christopher and his
sometime in February 1998. When Cesar directly asked Ochoa if she was a siblings of their scheduled departure. When they still did not receive any
recruiter, the latter answered in the affirmative. Cesar applied to work as a notification from Ochoa, Rosemarie, Raymundo, and their mother returned
factory worker in Taiwan. Ochoa told Cesar that as a factory worker, he could to the office at the Jalandoni Building and found out that their placement
earn at least ₱15,000.00 a month. On March 13, 1998, Cesar handed over fees were not given to said office. Christopher joined the other private
₱17,000.00 to Ochoa to cover his processing fee and medical examination. complainants in filing a complaint against Ochoa before the NBI. 13
On the same day, Cesar had his medical examination at St. Peter Medical
Clinic. Ochoa then promised that Cesar could leave two weeks thereafter. 7. Joebert Decolongon is a resident of Sta. Maxima, Gulod, Novaliches,
When two weeks had passed and he was not able to leave for Taiwan, Cesar Quezon City, and works as a bus conductor.lawphi1Decolongon was
demanded that Ochoa return his money. Ochoa failed to comply with Cesar’s introduced to Ochoa by Rivera, Decolongon’s friend, at Rivera’s house on
demand, and Cesar instituted a complaint against Ochoa at Brgy. San Villareal Street, Gulod, Novaliches. Ochoa informed Decolongon that there
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. At the hearing attended by Ochoa, was a vacancy for the position of janitor in Saudi Arabia, with a monthly
Cesar, and the other private complainants before the Barangay Lupon, Ochoa salary of 800 Saudi Riyals. Decolongon submitted his application, birth
signed a Kasunduan, agreeing to return the money to private complainants. certificate, and passport to Ochoa. Ochoa also went to Decolongon’s house
Again, Ochoa failed to fulfill her promise to return the money paid by Cesar, and collected from Decolongon’s wife the initial amount of ₱2,000.00 as
thus, the latter, together with the other complainants, filed a complaint with placement fee. The rest of Decolongon’s placement fees would be paid by
the NBI.12 one-month salary deduction. Trusting Ochoa, neither Decolongon nor his
wife demanded a receipt. When Ochoa failed to deploy Decolongon for
6. Christopher Bermejo met Ochoa at the house of his mother in Novaliches, employment abroad, Decolongon too filed a complaint against Ochoa before
Quezon City in January 1998. Also present at the house were Fernando Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. Without a successful
Bermejo, Christopher’s brother, and Richard Luciano. Ochoa promised that resolution at the barangay level, Decolongon joined the private complainants
after a week, Christopher would already be deployed to Saudi Arabia as an in filing a complaint against Ochoa before the NBI.14
accountant, earning 250-350 Saudi Riyals. As a result, Christopher
immediately resigned from his job at the Development Bank of the 8. Sometime in January 1998, Ochoa was accompanied by a certain Amy to
Philippines (DBP). Christopher’s mother paid Ochoa ₱5,000.00 as processing Fernando Rivera’s residence at 27 Villareal Street, Novaliches, Quezon City.
fee for Christopher’s application. A week passed and Ochoa failed to send Ochoa first talked to Rivera’s mother who had previously worked abroad.
Christopher to Saudi Arabia for work. When Rosemarie and Raymundo Ochoa then also offered work to Rivera, either as tea boy or janitor in the
 army in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Rivera chose to work as a tea boy, with a salary Ochoa stated under oath that she was employed by AXIL International Services and
of 800 to 1,000 Saudi Riyals. Ochoa said that Rivera would be deployed in the Consultant (AXIL) as recruiter on December 20, 1997. AXIL had a temporary license
first week of February 1998. Ochoa required Rivera to submit NBI clearance, to recruit Filipino workers for overseas employment. Ochoa worked at AXIL from
passport, and pictures, but Rivera submitted only his NBI clearance. In 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and was paid on a commission basis. She admitted recruiting
January 1998, Rivera paid Ochoa ₱2,000.00 as she would be the one to private complainants and receiving from them the following amounts as placement
secure Rivera’s passport. In March 1998, Rivera handed over his ring and and medical fees:
necklace, worth of ₱10,000.00, to Ochoa to cover his processing and medical
examination fees. Rivera did not require a receipt from Ochoa because he Private Complainant Amounts Collected
trusted Ochoa, who was his mother’s friend. When Rivera failed to leave in
February 1998, Ochoa explained that Rivera’s departure was postponed until Robert Gubat ₱18,000.00 for placement and medical fees17
March 1998 due to Ramadan. After the period of Ramadan, Rivera was still
not able to leave for Saudi Arabia. Rivera then filed a complaint against Junior Agustin ₱22,000.00 for placement and medical fees18
Ochoa before Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. Ochoa promised Francisco Pascual ₱ 2,000.00 for medical fee19
to return to Rivera his jewelries and ₱2,000.00, but Ochoa did not appear at
the barangay hearing set on April 30, 1998. Thus, Rivera and the other Rosemarie Bermejo ₱ 2,600.00 for medical fee20
private complainants proceeded to file a complaint against Ochoa before the
NBI.15 Cesar Aquino ₱ 19,000.00 for placement and medical fees21

Christopher Bermejo ₱ 2,600.00 for medical fee22

Cory C. Aquino of the POEA authenticated the Certification dated June 3, 1998,
issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo (Mateo), Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, Joebert Decolongon ₱ 6,000.00 for medical fee23
that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA
to recruit workers for overseas employment. Cory identified Director Mateo’s Fernando Rivera ₱ 2,000.00 for medical fee24
signature on the Certification, being familiar with the same. The Certification was
issued after a check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for certification from Ochoa claimed though that she remitted private complainants’ money to a person
the NBI. Cory, however, admitted that she did not participate in the preparation of named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but AXIL failed to issue receipts because the
the Certification, as the NBI’s request for certification was through a counter private complainants did not pay in full.25
transaction, and another person was in charge of verification of counter
transactions.16 On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
Ochoa testified on her own behalf. No. 98-77300) and three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-
77302, 98-77303). The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Junior Agustin in the amount of
Twenty-Eight Thousand (₱28,000.00) Pesos.26
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-77300, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO
"ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL Ochoa filed a Notice of Appeal27 in which she stated her intention to appeal the RTC
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, defined and penalized in Section 6 in relation judgment of conviction and prayed that the records of her case be forwarded to the
to Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042, and sentences her to life Court of Appeals. Ochoa’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 24147 before the
imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos. Court of Appeals.

2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO In a Resolution28 dated August 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Ochoa’s First
"ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Motion for Extension of Time to file her brief.
ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, Ochoa filed her Appellant’s Brief on September 4, 2000 29 while the People, through
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee’s Brief on March 1, 2001. 30
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify complainant Robert Gubat in the amount of The Special Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred (₱18,800.00) Pesos. Decision31 dated June 17, 2002 affirming the appealed RTC decision dated April 17,
2000. Ochoa filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 32 which the People opposed for
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO being bereft of merit.33
"ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised In its Resolution34 dated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no
Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, ratiocinating thus:
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as We affirmed this judgment on 17 June 2002. While neither the accused-appellant
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Cesar Aquino in the amount of nor the Office of the Solicitor General representing the people ever raised the issue
Seventeen Thousand (₱17,000.00) Pesos. of jurisdiction, our second look at the suit proved worthwhile because we came to
realize that we mistakenly assumed jurisdiction over this case where it does not
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO obtain.
"ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised It was error to consider accused-appellant’s appeal from a trial court judgment
Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, imposing life imprisonment in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 for illegal recruitment
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum in a large scale. Consequently, the judgment we rendered dated 17 June 2002 is null
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor
and void. No less than Article VIII, §5(2)(d) of the Constitution proscribes us from (c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
taking jurisdiction— Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is impose[d], shall be by
xxxx filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Even if only in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 was the penalty of life imprisonment
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower court in: meted out, we still cannot consider the appeal of the verdict in Criminal Case
Nos. 98-77301 to 98-77303 for as the Supreme Court clearly clarified—
xxxx
An appeal of a single decision cannot be split between two courts. The splitting of
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher… appeals is not conclusive to the orderly administration of justice and invites possible
conflict of dispositions between the reviewing courts. Specifically, the Court of
§17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reiterates – Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a judgment imposing an
indeterminate sentence, if the same ruling also imposes reclusion perpetua, life
SECTION 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. imprisonment and death for crimes arising out of the same facts. In other words, the
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases in which the
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, penalty imposed below is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, even if the
modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments same decision orders, in addition, a lesser penalty or penalties for crimes arising out
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in— of the same occurrence or facts.

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is life It will be seen that Robert Gubat, private complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-98-
imprisonment; and those involving offenses which, although not so punished, arose 77301, Cesar Aquino, private complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77302 and
out of the same occurrences or which may have been committed by the accused on Junior Agustin, private complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77303 were also the
the same occasion as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of private complainant in the illegal recruitment in a large scale suit, docketed as
whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300. As gleaned from the charges, the estafa cases were
whether they have been tried jointly or separately; x x x. intimately related to or arose from the facts and occurrences of the alleged illegal
recruitment. Clearly, we have no recourse but to refuse cognizance over the estafa
§3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise declares – cases as well.35

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –

Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reduced the award of damages in Criminal Case No. 98-77301 and increased the
dismiss the same and merely ordered its transfer to us: prison sentence in Criminal Case No. 98-77303. The decretal portion of said Decision
reads:
While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the dismissal of appeals filed
before the wrong court, the Supreme Court has in practice allowed the transfer of WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
records from this Court to the highest court. In which case, we shall subscribe to this
practice in the interest of substantial justice. I. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 98-77300finding
appellant Rosario Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision is declared NULL and VOID. We Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l)
order the TRANSFER of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303 to and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 and sentencing her to life
the Supreme Court for proper action.36 imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is AFFIRMED.

In the Resolution37 dated September 17, 2003, we accepted Ochoa’s appeal and II. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, finding appellant guilty
informed both Ochoa and the OSG to file their respective additional briefs. Ochoa’s beyond reasonable doubt of estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby,
appeal was then docketed as G.R. No. 159252. ordered to indemnify Robert Gubat in the amount of P15,000.00 only as and
by way of actual damages.
On August 17, 2004, Ochoa’s counsel filed an explanation stating that he had
nothing more to add since he had already written and filed all necessary pleadings, III. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77302, finding appellant guilty
complete with all the necessary research and arguments. 38 beyond reasonable doubt of estafa is AFFIRMED.

In the meantime, People v. Mateo39 was promulgated on July 7, 2004, where we held IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, finding appellant guilty
that an appeal from the decisions of the RTC, sentencing the accused to life beyond reasonable doubt of estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby,
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, should be made to the Court of Appeals. Thus, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
in our Resolution40dated March 11, 2005, the Court ordered the transfer of the MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS OF prision
records of G.R. No. 159252 to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merit. We mayor as maximum.41
likewise directed the Court of Appeals to raffle the said case to any of its regular
divisions. Ochoa’s appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:

When Ochoa’s appeal was before the Court of Appeals a second time, it was The lower court erred:
docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated
March 2, 2006, affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated April 17, 2000. a. In admitting Exhibit "A" – the POEA Certification – when it was already
The appellate court essentially affirmed the findings of fact and law of the RTC, but excluded during the bail hearing
 b. In shifting the burden of the accused to prove that there was no illegal (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
recruitment documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
c. In finding that there was estafa recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.
d. By not limiting liability of the accused to civil liability only 42
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
We find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals decision. three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
Illegal recruitment in large scale individually or as a group.

Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant
provision broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code 43 and gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send
provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their
i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a money in order to be employed.44 All eight private complainants herein consistently
syndicate. declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa
required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows: passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various
amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, 45 Cesar,46 and Agustin.47 Despite private
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers complainants’ compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any Ochoa contends that Exhibit "A," the POEA certification – which states that Ochoa, in
such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall overseas employment – was already rejected by the RTC during the hearings on bail
likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a for being hearsay, and should not have been admitted by the RTC after the trial on
non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority: the merits of the criminal cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not
become admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the
xxxx prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should
be acquitted.
Ochoa’s contention is without merit. whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court,
since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People, 48 wherein we rejected a similar Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The
argument raised by petitioner therein against a certification issued by an officer of necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's
the Professional Regulation Commission: attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his
duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's documentary the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.
evidence, consisting of Exhibits "A," "C," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," "M," "N," "O,"
"P," "Q" and "R" and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the Exhibit "A," or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by
following reasons: Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or
did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is
(1) Exhibit "A," which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore
confirming that petitioner's name does not appear in the registry books of licensed presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to
civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence. 49
identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was PRC
Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA
execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the
when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial. prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateo’s subordinate at the POEA Licensing
Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; x x x. Branch, to verify Dir. Mateo’s signature.

xxxx Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the
admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail hearings,
that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify rejected the certification for being hearsay because at that stage of the proceedings,
as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or nobody testified yet on the document. However, as the trial progressed, an officer of
heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the document. It does
proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence
rejected during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the evidence.
exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the document. Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and
Nevertheless, she could testify on the veracity of the document because she is one criminally liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL
of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so, she could testify and that she had turned over the money she received from private complainants to
whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears stressing that Ms. Aquino is AXIL.
familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the latter is her superior.
Moreover, as testified to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a We are not convinced. Ochoa’s claim was not supported by any corroborating
certification is made, the office checks first whether the name of the person evidence. The POEA verification dated September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir.
requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed agency by checking Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a
their index and computer files. placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had already expired.
Said verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL.
As found in the office’s records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither Strangely, for an alleged employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears basic evidence of employment, such as appointment papers, identification card (ID),
stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private complainants were
because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate, an issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that Ochoa
officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present
the document. Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the veracity any proof that private complainants’ money were actually turned over to or received
of the statements stated therein could be ascertained.50 by AXIL.

More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by the RTC to
disregard the POEA certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a the evidence of the prosecution, over that of the defense. As is well-settled in this
licensee or holder of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment. jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non- the prosecution witnesses than the accused’s denial and explanation concerning the
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal commission of the crime.51 Likewise, factual findings of the trial courts, including
recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among their assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, are entitled to great weight and
such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such
expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the trial
actually take place without the worker’s fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the
private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to Court to defer to the trial court’s determination according credibility to the
reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not prosecution evidence.52 Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the
able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own. prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Estafa
Court.53
We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large same evidence proving Ochoa’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also
scale, that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. established her criminal liability for estafa.
Here, there are eight private complainants who convincingly testified on Ochoa’s
acts of illegal recruitment. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa
In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in
verdict of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal People v. Cortez and Yabut54that:
recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
and a fine of not less than ₱500,000.00 nor more than ₱1,000.000.00 shall be estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
imposed when the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus: recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
Sec. 7. Penalties. – accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s
twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime
(₱200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00). of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. 55

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
sabotage as defined herein. means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

Since the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱1,000,000.00 imposed on xxxx
Ochoa by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law,
we similarly sustain the same.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
means of other similar deceits. not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 56 Both It was established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, Gubat was
elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. defrauded by Ochoa in the amount of ₱15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302,
Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Cesar paid Ochoa the sum of ₱17,000.00; and in Criminal Case No. 77-98303, Agustin
Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send handed over to Ochoa a total of ₱28,000.00.
said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to
two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the payment of The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when
placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised the amount of the fraud is over ₱12,000.00 but not exceeding ₱22,000.00, is prision
that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1
even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving day to 8 years). If the amount of fraud exceeds ₱22,000.00, the aforementioned
application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain ₱10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.1avvphi1
recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all.
Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range
and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere
placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to
were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money. 4 years and 2 months).57 Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 98-
77301 and 98-77302 were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While the
315 of the Revised Penal Code: minimum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303was increased by the Court of Appeals
to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, it is still within the range of the
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision
view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the dated March 2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888, affirming
Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of with modification the Decision dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court,
the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud exceeds ₱12,000.00, the Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303, to read as
time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be follows:
divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this
computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision 1. In Criminal Case No. 98-77300, accused-appellant Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is
mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale,
days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in Section 6(l) and
months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 (m), in relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, and is sentenced to
days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos (₱1,000.000.00);
of ₱22,000.) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to
8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not 2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, accused-appellant Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is
exceed 20 years.58 found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and
penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts of fraud were more than sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months,
₱12,00.00 but not exceeding ₱22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken from the medium eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 indemnify private complainant Robert Gubat in the amount of Fifteen
months, and 20 days). Thus, the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) as actual damages;
actually imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case
Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 are proper. 3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, accused-appellant Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and
As for determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, we take into penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
consideration that the amount of fraud was ₱28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months,
exceeded ₱22,000.00, the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years; but eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
since the amount of fraud exceeded ₱22,000.00 by only ₱6,000.00 (less than indemnify private complainant Cesar Aquino in the amount of Seventeen
₱10,000.00), no incremental penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the Thousand Pesos (₱17,000.00); and
maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. 98-
77303 is within the maximum period of the proscribed penalty, we see no reason for 4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, accused-appellant Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is
disturbing the same. found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and
 penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Junior Agustin in the The facts follow.
amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱28,000.00).
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
SO ORDERED.
school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu
City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay, Mandaue
City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to
Carmen's family home in Cebu City.7In September 1975, Benjamin passed
the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a
residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology
after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program
for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital,
owned by Carmen's family, as member of its active staff, 10 while Carmen
worked as the hospital's Treasurer.11

[G.R. NO. 166562 : March 31, 2009] The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9,
1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, v. CARMEN M. VELEZ- 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on
TING, Respondent. July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

DECISION On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
NACHURA, J.:
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorariseeking to set aside the
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and
only became manifest thereafter.13
its December 13, 2004 Resolution2in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate
court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City,
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with consisted of the following manifestations:
his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee 1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult and his profession;
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate 2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
of their house.15Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin's job as drinking;
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other 3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
tried to talk to her husband about the latter's drinking problem, but to pay the same; and cralawlibrary

Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24
financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm.
would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. 17 He rarely stayed He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19 drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied
being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. 25 As for
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that
would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez
friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to finance his 26
anesthesiologist.  In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave
gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their his family financial support within his means whenever he could and
family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned
just to be able to pay off his gambling debts. 22 Benjamin only stopped money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who
going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played
caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
would be banned from the gambling establishments.23
During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking and
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses' children from 1987 to find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to
1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab
psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
Oñate's evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin's deposition because the latter xxx
had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South
Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate SO ORDERED.37
concluded that Benjamin's compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and
physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA
from a personality disorder.32 rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial
court's finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only on theories
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra and not on established fact,39contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos
evaluated Benjamin's psychological behavior based on the transcript of v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared Molina.41
by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South
Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's) interview with Benjamin's brothers. 34 Contrary Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
to Dr. Oñate's findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina
with petitioner's personality, considering the latter's good relationship decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35 years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and the admissions made by Benjamin Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with
in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari 43 with this Court. In a
Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities directed the CA to resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.45 On
to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by
ruling and sustaining the trial court's decision.47 the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate
Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno's discussion on the historical
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48 Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

Hence, this petition. The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English
For our resolution are the following issues: Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases; application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and cralawlibrary
reasoning used to reach the decision."

III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the
and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and
jurisprudence. precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."
Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
We find merit in the petition. the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
I. On the issue of stare decisis. countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
issues,50necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51 States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.
The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the
same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution. In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the
stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked
- constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association,
shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the
limited resources. prior decision and its merits.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It
economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the
to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all
inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related fours" with another.57
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
rule of significant application or justification.53 by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, 54 and opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non the course of the proceedings.
respicit."
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated
marriage under Article 36. distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
We have not. disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation
a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were
of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the "defects" to be incurable.
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
the court during the pre-trial conference.60 evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent's allegation
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
gravity and incurability of a party's alleged psychological incapacity, then contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that
such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by petitioner's behavior is a positive indication of a personality
the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in
III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity. Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,
to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more as well as his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the brothers.64Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's
date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the findings.
trial court's and the appellate court's rulings declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio. Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking and
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he
36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent's testimony,
significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 62 
υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
ςηαñrοblεš νιrâ€
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case,
the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December
13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.