EN BANC

[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002.]

SARIO MALINIAS , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ ,
respondents.

De Lima-Bohol & Menez Law Offices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Florante Miano for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Sario Malinias, a candidate for Governor of Mountain Province in the May
11, 1998 elections, led before the respondent COMELEC a complaint against
respondents Victor Dominguez, Teo lo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose
Bagwan, who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers. Petitioner Malinias alleged: that private respondents denied him his
right to be present during the canvassing in violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No.
6646; that his supporters were blocked by the checkpoint set up by private respondents;
that respondents Corpuz and Tangilag, o cers of the PNP, entered the canvassing room
in blatant violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881; that respondents engaged in partisan
political activity in violation of Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881. In support of his charges,
petitioner presented the "mass a davits' executed by his supporters. The COMELEC
dismissed petitioner's complaint and his subsequent motion for reconsideration for
insu ciency of evidence to establish probable cause against private respondents. Hence,
petitioner elevated the matter before the Supreme Court.
In dismissing the petition, the Court found no proof that the COMELEC issued the
assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. The evidence relied upon by petitioner
to support his charges consisted mainly of a davits prepared by his own supporters. The
Court cannot accept at face value the a davits of petitioner's own supporters, being self-
serving. As the Court has often stated, "reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits."
The Court further held that it has limited power to review ndings of fact made by
the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions
for election offenses. Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, it may not review the factual ndings of the COMELEC,
nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION; ELABORATED. — For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or
resolution in a capricious and despotic manner. "There is grave abuse of discretion
justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical
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 exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law." Such is not the situation in the instant
case. The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for
insu cient evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; RELIANCE SHOULD NOT BE PLACED ON MERE AFFIDAVITS. —
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that the
same are insu cient to justify a nding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges
consisted mainly of a davits prepared by his own supporters. The a davits of Malinias'
own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be accepted at face value under the
circumstances. As this Court has often stated, "reliance should not be placed on mere
affidavits."
3. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMELEC MAY NOT BE REVIEWED BY
THE SUPREME COURT ABSENT PROOF OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
ARBITRARINESS OR ERROR OF LAW. — We nd that there is no proof that the COMELEC
issued the assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has
limited power to review ndings of fact made by the COMELEC pursuant to its
constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions for election offenses. Thus,
where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law,
this Court may not review the factual ndings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence.
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; SECTION 25 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646; NOT
VIOLATED BY RESPONDENTS IN CASE AT BAR. — Malinias charged private respondents
with alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646, quoted, as follows: . . . . "Sec.
25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. — Any registered political party,
coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be
present and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one
counsel may argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have the right to
examine the returns being canvassed without touching them, make their observations
thereon, and le their challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers." In the
present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents
denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that
Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private
respondents prevented him from entering the canvassing room. As found by the
COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated actively in
the canvassing. Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were
prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias
claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only
able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance
of the Provincial Capitol Building. This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear
and convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen
from entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement
rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER MUST SHOW THAT HE SUFFERED PREJUDICE BY
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 THE FAILURE OF HIS SUPPORTERS TO ATTEND THE CANVASSING; CASE AT BAR. — In an
analogous case where a political candidate's watcher failed to attend the canvass
proceedings, this Court held: "Another matter which militates against the cause of
petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of the failure of his
watcher to attend the canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what substantive issues
would he have raised? Petitioner does not disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher
was present, the result of the canvassing would have been the same?" There is therefore
no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v.
Comelec, 102 SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that "in the
absence of any jurisdictional in rmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the
conclusion reached by the respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its
competence is entitled to the utmost respect, . . . ." There is justi cation in this case to
reiterate this principle."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A CRIMINAL ELECTION OFFENSE. — Surprisingly, the
COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not
punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely
highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections,
aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing
of election returns. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646, which speci es the election offenses
punishable under this law, does not include Section 25.
7. ID.; ID.; COMELEC; HAS POWER TO DEPUTIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS. — Malinias further claims that, in
violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint set-up at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of
the COMELEC's ruling. Malinias' supporters who were purportedly blocked by the
checkpoint did not con rm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias. Moreover, the police
established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the rearms ban during the
election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained power of
the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
8. ID.; ID.; B.P. BLG. 881; SECTION 232 THEREOF; NOT PUNISHABLE AS A
CRIMINAL ELECTION OFFENSE. — Again, the COMELEC and private respondents
overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly
enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically
states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this
act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a
criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an
election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICTLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS;
RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. —
Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict
interpretation in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts
mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P.
Blg. 881. Since Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as
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 crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict interpretation means that private respondents
cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section 232.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION THEREOF WARRANTS IMPOSITION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES. — This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of
Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition of administrative
penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend
to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any o cer or employee the
COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision. Also, under the
Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the
suspension or removal of any government o cial or employee found guilty of violation of
election laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 261 (I) THEREOF; NOT VIOLATED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN CASE AT BAR; PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY; DEFINED. — Malinias
asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating Section 261
(i) of B.P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political activity. This provision
states: "Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public o cers and employees. — Any o cer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political o ces; any o cer, employee,
or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now
exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order, if he is a peace o cer." Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 de nes
the term "partisan political activity" as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public o ce." Malinias asserts that, in setting up
a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the
canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and to
counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they did so
to enforce the COMELEC's rearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968,
among others. There was no clear indication that these police o cers, in ordering the
setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there proof
to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in implementing
the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily
deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. The act
of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their
avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing
site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no
showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of
the other candidates.
12. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS ;
RULE; CASE AT BAR. — Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private
respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is
a non-criminal act. "It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed
in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle
that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare
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 tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. . . . The rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human
mind. They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They
proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made speci ed enumeration
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and con ne its terms to
those expressly mentioned." CIDTcH

DECISION

CARPIO , J : p

The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) en banc 2 dated June 10, 1999 and
October 26, 2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the complaint 3 led by petitioner
Sario Malinias ("Malinias" for brevity) and Roy S. Pilando ("Pilando" for brevity) for
insu ciency of evidence to establish probable cause for violation of Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 6646 4 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. 5
The Facts
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate
for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. 6
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the
second oor of the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11,
1998 to May 15,1998. 7
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando led a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of
B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teo lo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas
Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez ("Dominguez" for brevity) was then
the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teo lo Corpuz
("Corpuz" for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in
Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag ("Tangilag" for brevity) was then the Chief of
Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc,
and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and
Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their
supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from
entering the capitol grounds.
In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law
Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged
unlawful acts.
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 "3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns
for congressional and provincial returns located at the second oor of the
Provincial Capitol Building the public and particularly the designated
representatives/watchers of both a ants were prevented from attending the
canvassing.
xxx xxx xxx

4. That the aforementioned "Mass-a davits" support our allegations in

this a davit-complaint that we and our supporters were prevented from
attending the provincial canvassing because of the illegal checkpoint/blockade
set-up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt. Province and as an
evidence to these allegations, Certi cation of the Police Station is hereto attached
as Annex "D" and a davits of supporters hereto attached as Annex "E", both
made an integral part of this a davit-complaint; and that said "mass-a davits"
show that the Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic) candidates and
their representatives/watchers prevented because of barricade, closure of
canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the
people, the candidates or their representatives from attending the canvassing; 8

In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-
called "mass a davits" uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1)
prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing
area, and (3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They
likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to
be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other
candidates except those of Dominguez. 9
Consequently, the COMELEC's Law Department conducted a preliminary
investigation during which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-
Affidavit.
In their Counter-A davit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a
checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol Building, to wit:
"3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang,
Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only
checkpoint set up in the province. There are other checkpoints established in other
parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban and other pertinent rules
issued by the Commission on Election during the election period.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in
response to earlier information that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass
proceedings which were being conducted in the second oor of the Provincial
Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this had happened in the
past elections. In fact, during the canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large
group of individuals identi ed with no less than a ants-complainants Roy S.
Pilando and Sario Malinias was conducting a rally just in front of the capitol,
shouting invectives at certain candidates and their leaders. This group likewise
were holding placards and posted some in front of the capitol building.
xxx xxx xxx" 10
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 After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELEC's Law
Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of probable cause. 11
In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insu ciency of evidence to establish probable
cause against private respondents. On October 26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed
Malinias' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.
The Comelec's Ruling
In dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC ruled as
follows:
"As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy
Pilando was present during the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass. He even
participated actively in a discussion with the members of the Board and the
counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed that the
lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates and
representatives of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time or
another during the canvass proceedings. The minutes does not indicate any
charges of irregularities inside and within the vicinity of the canvassing room.
Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998,
checkpoints were established in the entire country to effectively implement the
rearms ban during the election period from January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998.
In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14) checkpoints established by the
Philippine National Police way before the start of the campaign period for the
May 11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang,
Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan,
Mountain Province was not established as alleged only upon request of
Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way before the commencement
of the campaign period. Granting arguendo that the Congressman did make a
request for a checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the
same was already existing.

Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from the

PNP Provincial Director at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants'
a davit-complaint. However, said person by the name of Mr. Palicos was never
presented to a rm the truth of the contents and the signature appearing therein."
12

Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC dismissed
Malinias' Motion for Reconsideration. 13
The Court's Ruling
The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing Malinias and Pilando's complaint for insu ciency of evidence to establish
probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and
261 (i) of B.P. 881.
We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

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 For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a
capricious and despotic manner.
"There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of
certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act at all in contemplation of law." 1 4

Such is not the situation in the instant case. The COMELEC dismissed properly the
complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insu cient evidence, and committed no grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 6646, quoted, as follows:
"Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. — Any
registered political party, coalition of parties, through their representatives, and
any candidate has the right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of
the election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may argue for each political
party or candidate. They shall have the right to examine the returns being
canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon, and le their
challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission. No
dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers."

In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private
respondents denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no
showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that
private respondents prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even
participated actively in the canvassing. 15 Malinias failed to show that his rights as a
gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend
the canvassing. Malinias claimed that even though Pilando was present during the
canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and
passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building. 16 This allegation,
however, is not supported by any clear and convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was
purportedly prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to
the veracity of this statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidate's watcher failed to attend the
canvass proceedings, this Court held:
"Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he
has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to
attend the canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what substantive issues
would he have raised? Petitioner does not disclose. Could it be that even if the
watcher was present, the result of the canvassing would have been the same?"
There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that respondent
Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing its questioned
decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec , 102 SCRA 853, this
Court has invariably followed the principle that "in the absence of any
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 jurisdictional in rmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion
reached by the respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its
competence is entitled to the utmost respect, . . . ." There is justi cation in this
case to reiterate this principle." 17

Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after successfully
evading the policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have
easily complained of this alleged unlawful act during the canvass proceedings. He could
have immediately reported the matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation
of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646. However, Pilando opted simply to raise questions on
alleged irregularities in the municipal canvassing. 18 While he had the opportunity to
protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen against his person, it is quite
surprising that he never mentioned anything about it to the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A.
No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election
offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or
candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or
irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section 27 1 9 of R.A. No. 6646, which
specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include Section 25.
Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by
a checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid
of any basis to merit a reversal of the COMELEC's ruling. Malinias' supporters who were
purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not con rm or corroborate this allegation of
Malinias.
Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the
rearms ban during the election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the
constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. 20
Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room
in blatant violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the
a davit of his supporters who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz
(only) enter the canvassing room. 21 Malinias likewise contends that "Corpuz and Tangilag
impliedly admitted that they were inside or at least within the fty (50) meter radius of the
canvassing room as they were able to mention the names of the persons who were inside
the canvassing room in their Counter-Affidavit." 22
The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as
follows:
"Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. — It shall be
unlawful for any o cer or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
including the Philippine Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any
peace o cer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an extra-legal police
agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or
police organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus,
o ces, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or operated security,
investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing identical or similar
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 functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are held
by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fty meters from such room:
Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems
necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace
o cers for their protection or for the protection of the election documents and
paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of peace
and order, in which case said policemen or peace o cers, who shall be in proper
uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough
to be easily called by the board of canvassers at any time."

Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262
of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons
referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses
criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264
of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and
262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number
of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an
end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are
canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the
natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one's own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the
legislature would not have made speci ed enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and con ne its terms to those expressly
mentioned." 23

Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict
interpretation in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts
mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261 2 4 and 262 25 of
B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as
crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict interpretation means that private respondents
cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section 232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any
sanction. Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly
warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend to the President the
imposition of disciplinary action on any o cer or employee the COMELEC has deputized
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 for violation of its directive, order or decision. 26 Also, under the Revised Administrative
Code, 27 the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the suspension or removal
of any government o cial or employee found guilty of violation of election laws or failure
to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that
the same are insu cient to justify a nding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges
consisted mainly of a davits prepared by his own supporters. The a davits of Malinias'
own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be accepted at face value under the
circumstances. As this Court has often stated, "reliance should not be placed on mere
affidavits." 2 8
Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did Pilando and the
representatives of other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this alleged
wrongful act during the canvassing? Malinias' contention that Corpuz and Tangilag
impliedly admitted they were inside the canvassing room because they mentioned the
names of the persons present during the canvassing deserves scant consideration as the
same is not supported by any evidence.
Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly
violating Section 261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political
activity. This provision states:
"Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public o cers and employees . — Any o cer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political o ces; any o cer,
employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force,
special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other
para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who,
directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a
peace officer."

Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 de nes the term "partisan political activity" as
an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
to a public o ce." 29 Malinias asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang,
Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and
Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they
did so to enforce the COMELEC's rearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
2968, among others. 30 There was no clear indication that these police o cers, in ordering
the setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there
proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in
implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that private
respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during
the canvassing.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in
accordance with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the
vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity.
There was also no showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds
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 favored the election of the other candidates.
In summary, we nd that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed
resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited power to
review ndings of fact made by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to
investigate and prosecute actions for election offenses. 31 Thus, where there is no proof of
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the
factual ndings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own ndings on the su ciency of
evidence. 3 2
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public
respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. CTDAaE

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., are on official leave.

Footnotes

1. Since the instant petition is grounded on grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC, the same is considered as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 64.

2. Composed of Harriet O. Demetriou as Chairperson with Manolo B. Gorospe, Luzviminda

G. Tancangco, Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, Japal M. Guiani and Julio F. Desamito as
Commissioners.
3. Docketed as E.O. 98-262.

4. Otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law.

5. Otherwise known as The Omnibus Election Code.

6. Rollo, p. 17.
7. Ibid., pp. 61-72.
8. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
9. Ibid., pp. 19-24.
10. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
11. Rollo, p. 14.
12. Rollo, pp. 14-16.
13. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
14. People vs. Marave, 11 SCRA 618 (1964).
15. Rollo, pp. 15, 32-33.
16. Rollo, p. 32.

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 17. Quilala vs. Commission on Elections, 188 SCRA 502 (1990).

18. Rollo, pp. 73-79.

19. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646 provides as follows: "Election Offenses. — In addition to the
prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Section 261 and 262 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Any person who causes the printing of o cial ballots and election returns by any
printing establishment which is not under contract with the Commission on Election and
any printing establishment which undertakes such unauthorized printing.

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper veri cation and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
(c) Any member of the board of election inspectors who refuses to issue to duly
accredited watchers the certificate of voters provided in Section 16 hereof.

(d) Any person who violates Section 11 hereof regarding prohibited forms of election
propaganda. Any chairman of the board of canvassers who fails to give notice of
meetings to other members of the board, candidate or political party as required under
Section 23 hereof.

(e) Any person declared a nuisance candidate as de ned under Section 69 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, or is otherwise disquali ed, by nal and executory judgment, who
continues to misrepresent himself out, as a candidate, such as by continuing to
campaign thereafter, and/or other public o cer or private individual, who knowingly
induces or abets such misrepresentation, by commission or omission, shall be guilty of
an election offense and subject to the penalty provided in Section 262 of the same code.

20. See Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

21. Rollo, p. 23.
22. Petition, pp. 7-8.

23. Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, (1990), pp. 160-161, citing the cases of Canlas
vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139 (1958); People
vs. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245 (1978); People vs.
Lantin, 30 SCRA 81 (1969); Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162
(1976); Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 (1980); Lerum vs. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652
(1950); Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540 (1982).

24. See Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881.

25. Section 262 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides as follows: " Other election offenses. — Violation
of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections of this Code shall
constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122,
123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184,
185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234,
235, 236, 239, and 240."

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 26. See People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (1989).

27. See Section 2 (3), Title I (C), Executive Order No. 292.
28. Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, 171 SCRA 468 (1989) citing Pimentel, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, 140 SCRA 126 (1985).
29. See Section 79 of B.P. Blg. 881.
30. Rollo, pp. 15-16.
31. Section 2 (6), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
32. Domingo vs. Commission on Elections, 313 SCRA 311 (1999).

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