FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 170724 : January 29, 2007]

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SAN LORENZO
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines seeks the reversal and setting aside of
the Decision1 dated May 23, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No.
73996, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of December
7, 2005, dismissing the Republic's appeal from an
earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Danao City, which ordered the
registration of title in the name of herein respondent
San Lorenzo Development Corporation over a
64,909-square meter parcel of land in Barangay
Maslog, City of Danao, Province of Cebu.

The facts:

On November 13, 1997, respondent San Lorenzo

Development Corporation filed with the MTCC of
Danao City an application for registration of title to
a parcel of land, described as Lot 1 of the
Consolidation-Subdivision Plan, Ccn-07-000094,
being a portion of Lots 3151, 3152, 3158, 3159,
3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre,
situated in Barangay Maslog, City of Danao,
Province of Cebu, with a total area of 64,909 square
meters, more or less. The application was docketed
in the MTCC as LRC No. 100.

On November 14, 1997, the MTCC issued an Order

setting the application for initial hearing on March
5, 1998. The Order required that a copy thereof be
furnished the Commissioner, Land Registration
Authority, for notice and for the necessary
publication to be made.

On December 11, 1997, the Solicitor General

entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner
Republic and deputized the City Prosecutor of
Danao City to appear in the case. On the same date,
the Republic filed its opposition to the application.

On February 24, 1998, another Order was issued by

the MTCC resetting the initial hearing of the
application to June 15, 1998. This was followed by
an Order of May 15, 1998, resetting anew the initial
hearing to September 23, 1998.

During the initial hearing, the respondent

corporation, through counsel, offered in evidence
the following documents to prove or establish the
jurisdictional facts of the case, to wit:

- The Petition for Registration containing seven (7) pages and

Exhibit "A" mandatory annexes designated as A-1 to A-3;
Exhibit "A-1" - Lot Plan No. Ccn-07000094 of Lot 1 comprising Cad. Lot Nos.
3151, 3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161;
Exhibit "A-2" - Technical Description of Lot No. 1;
Exhibit "A-3" - Certification of Non-requirement of Surveyor's Certificate;
Exhibit "B" - Order resetting date of Initial Hearing to September 23, 1998;
Exhibit "B-1" - Newspaper Clipping;
Exhibit "C" - Affidavit of Publication issued by Banat News;
Exhibit "D" - Certificate of Publication issued by the Land Registration
Authority;
Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Posting issued by the Court Sheriff;
Exhibit "F" - Certificate of Publication issued by the NPO;
Exhibit "F-1" - Copy of Notice of Initial Hearing;
Exhibit "G" - Copy of the Indorsement addressed to the Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Danao City, from Salvador Oriel, Chief, Docket
Division, Land Registration Authority, dated July 7, 1998; and
Exhibit "H" - Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Thereafter, the case was called aloud in open court
to determine whether there were other oppositors
aside from the Republic. There being none, the
court issued an Order of General Default on
September 23, 1998.

Respondent corporation, to prove that it and its

predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land applied for in the concept of an owner
peacefully, continuously, adversely and notoriously
for a period required under the law, presented six
(6) witnesses. The six, who were predecessors-in-
interest of composite portions of the subject parcel
of land, provided testimonies to the effect that they
had been in possession of the land, and had
subsequently sold their respective parcels thereof to
the respondent. Their testimonies were supported
by tax declarations and deeds of sale.

On October 12, 2001, the trial court rendered its

decision3 granting the respondent's application for
registration of title, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is

hereby rendered ordering the issuance of title to Lot
1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision of Plan Ccn-07-
000094, being a portion of Lot 3152, 3151, 3158,
3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre,
situated in the Barangay of Maslog, Danao City,
Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu, containing an
area of SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED NINE (64,909) square meters, for and
in the name of San Lorenzo Development
Corporation, with principal office address at
Ground Floor, Stanford Tower Condominium, 1870
M.H. Del Pilar Street, Malate, Metro Manila.

Upon finality of this Decision, let a corresponding

decree of registration be issued in favor of applicant
in accordance with Sec. 39 of PD 1529.

SO ORDERED.

On November 7, 2001, petitioner Republic filed a

Notice of Appeal, therein making known that it was
elevating the case to the CA. In the CA, the
Republic's appellate recourse was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 73996.

In the herein assailed decision4 of May 23, 2005,

the CA-Cebu City dismissed the Republic's appeal.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the same court in its equally assailed
resolution5 of December 7, 2005, the Republic is
now before this Court via the instant petition raising
the following issues:

1. Whether or not the defective and/or want of

notice by publication of the initial hearing(s) of the
case a quo vested the trial court with jurisdiction to
take cognizance thereof; andcralawlibrary

2. Whether or not deeds of sale and tax

declarations/clearances constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title
through adverse occupation under C.A. No. 141.

In the matter of jurisdiction, petitioner Republic

maintains that the MCTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the case on account of its failure to
conduct the initial hearing thereof within the period
fixed in Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, which
mandates that the date and hour of initial hearing
shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90
days from the date of the Order. In the Republic's
own words:6

After a series of postponements, the trial court

finally set the initial hearing of the case on
September 23, 1998 in an order issued on May 15,
1998 xxx. The notice of initial hearing, however,
was issued only on June 6, 1998.

Pursuant to Section 23, P.D. 1529, the initial

hearing of the case must have to be not earlier than
forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90)
days from the date of the order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing. The Order having been
issued on May 15, 1998, the initial hearing should
have been set not earlier than June 29, 1998 (45
days from May 15, 1998 and not later than August
13, 1998 (90 days from May 15, 1998).
Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled
and actually held on September 23, 1998, some
forty-one (41) days later than the prescribed period.

Even if counted from June 8, 1998 (date of notice

of hearing), still the hearing on September 23, 1998
is seventeen (17) days late than the prescribed
period of ninety (90) days, the last day of which fell
on September 6, 1998.

It is noteworthy that both parties invoke the

decision of the Court in Republic v. Manna
Properties, Inc.,[7] decided January 31, 2005,
albeit each cites different portions thereof, and for
different purposes. The common reliance on said
case is well-placed as it is, indeed, of a similar
factual setting. Furthermore, that case tackles the
same two (2) issues presently raised: compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration, and proof of possession for the
requisite period.

A careful reading of Republic v. Manna Properties,

Inc. will support a finding in favor of the
respondent but only as regards the issue of
jurisdiction. Speaking on that issue, the Court in
Manna Properties, Inc., wrote:

The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie
with the land registration court. After an applicant
has filed his application, the law requires the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing
date. The notice of initial hearing is a court
document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by
the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the
clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration
Authority]. This involves a process to which the
party applicant absolutely has no participation.

Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases,

the applicant must strictly comply with the
jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the
applicant complied with the jurisdictional
requirements.

The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at

fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90-
day maximum period. x x x.

We have held that "a party to an action has no

control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court
acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of such official in the
performance of his duties."8 A party cannot
intervene in matters within the exclusive power of
the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party
if the trial court errs on matters within its sole
power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act
or omission over which the applicant has neither
responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant
has complied with all the requirements of the law.

Moreover, it is evident in Manner Properties, Inc.

that what is more important than the date on which
the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient
notice of the registration proceedings via
publication. In fact, in its memorandum,9 petitioner
Republic "concedes (a) that respondent should not
be faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted
on September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-day
period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent might
have substantially complied with the requirement
thereunder relating to the registration of the subject
land."10 Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, we find
for the respondent, in that its application for
registration was rightfully given due course by the
MTCC.

However, on the more important issue of lack of

evidence of possession on the part of the respondent
for the period required by law, the balance must tilt
in favor of the petitioner.

Very evident from Republic v. Manna Properties,

Inc. is that the reckoning date under the Public
Land Act11 for the acquisition of ownership of
public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that
evidence of possession from that date or earlier is
essential for a grant of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,
provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Similarly, Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 - the

Property Registration Decree - provides, inter alia,
as follows:

Section 14. Who may apply. - The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

1. Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Here, in support of its application for registration,

the respondent corporation submitted a certification
from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) that the parcel of land
sought to be registered forms part of the general
area classified as alienable and disposable public
land under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
467 dated June 7, 1938. It also submitted tax
declarations and/or clearances, the earliest of which
is in the year 1964 for Lots 3150 and
3160; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1948 for Lots 3152,
3159 and 3161.

The respondent's application was granted by the

two (2) courts below on the premise that, reckoned
to date, possession of the subject parcel of
land since the declaration of alienability and
disposability on June 7, 1938 was more than fifty
(50) years already. Adverse possession for at least
thirty (30) years had long been completed. This
reasoning was fraught with errors.

First, the law, as mentioned earlier, requires that the

possession of lands of the public domain must be
from at least June 12, 1945 for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. Through the years, Section 48(b), supra, of the
Public Land Act has been amended several times.
The case of Republic v. Doldol[12] provides a
summary of these amendments:

x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141

provided for possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already
been amended by Presidential Decree 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended

by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the
possession and occupation of the piece of land by
the applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
heretofore cited.

As the law now stands, a mere showing of

possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient.
It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Second, the acceptance by the courts a quo of the

CENRO certificate of alienability and disposability
as evidence of possession since the date of said
certificate is patently erroneous. According to the
CENRO certification, the subject land was
alienable and disposable public land since June 7,
1938. This certification does not in any way
indicate that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the property as
far back as 1938.

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant

must prove two things, to wit:

1. That the land is alienable public land;

andcralawlibrary

2. That his open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation of the same
must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act.13

All that the CENRO certificate evidences is the

alienability of the land involved, not the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof by the respondent or its
predecessors-in-interest for the period prescribed by
law.

As in Manna Properties, Inc., while the Court

acknowledges tax declarations as sufficient basis
for inferring possession, the tax declarations
presented by the respondent in this case do not
serve to prove their cause:

The 1945 tax declaration must be presented

considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material
to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. x x x Unless the date and
month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance
with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be
established.14
Here, the earliest of the tax declarations presented
by the respondent was in the year 1948 for Lots
3152, 3159 and 3161; 1963 for Lot 3151;
and 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160. At best, the
respondent corporation can only prove possession
since said dates. This does not constitute the
evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141, as amended.

Lastly, while it is true that the issue of whether or

not the respondent corporation has presented
sufficient proof or the required possession raises a
question of fact, which ordinarily cannot be
entertained in a petition under Rule 45, one of the
exceptions to that rule is when, as here, the
evidence on record does not support the
conclusions of both the trial and the appellate
courts.

On the whole, we find merit in the petition.

WHEREFORE,the instant petition is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the decision dated May 23, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No.
73996, as reiterated in its resolution of December 7,
2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
application for registration filed by respondent San
Lorenzo Development Corporation is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican,
with Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico
A. Lanzanas, concurring; Rollo, pp. 39-46.

2
 Id. at 47-48.

3
 Id. at 63-69.

4
 Supra note 1.

5
 Supra note 2.
6
 Petition, pp. 19-20; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

7
 G.R. No. 146527, 450 SCRA 247.

8
 Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921
(1918).

9
 Rollo pp. 150-185.

10
 Id. at 170.

11
 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

12
 G.R. No. 132963, September 10, 1998, 295
SCRA 359, 364.

13
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998,
August 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567.

14
 Supra note 6 at 261.

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DECISIONS
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