G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 year at ₱2,500.00 a month, ₱50,000.

00 as indemnity for the support of

Renato Torres, and the further sum of ₱300,000.00 as moral damages;
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of ₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
DECISION
income for three years at ₱45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of
PANGANIBAN, J.: ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of her death, the sum of ₱22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of ₱20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil ₱1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of ₱100,000.00 for moral
liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the damages;
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as hospital expenses,
executory.
doctor’s fees of ₱170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the
The Case [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of amount of ₱1,000,000.00;
Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical expenses, ₱2,000.00
from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La as loss of income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47 as medical expenses,
follows:
₱800.00 for loss of income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as medical expenses,
the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."
₱4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings of ₱1,400.00 as well as
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5 moral damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00;

The Facts h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as hospital expenses,

₱14,530.00 as doctor’s fees, ₱1,000.00 for medicines and ₱50,000.00 as
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise: moral damages;
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for medical expenses, ₱87.00
guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple for medicines, ₱1,710.00 as actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was damages;
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven
(11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows: a. to pay the heirs j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for hospital bills, ₱500.00
of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus for medicine, ₱2,100.00 as actual damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income
the sum of ₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
 Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed
by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-
became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was
Ace Van, the amount of ₱250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the
the employer’s subsidiary liability.
totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of
₱22,698.38 as actual damages;’ Hence, this Petition.

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of The Issues
accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
judgment against accused had become final and executory.
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth
of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the
independently of the accused.
dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which "B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA
was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8
filed in behalf of accused.
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal
from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave The Court's Ruling
due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, The Petition has no merit.
[petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the Main Issue:
OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents’] brief on the ground Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on
appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted) accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its
appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had
Ruling of the Court of Appeals jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution that of the accused-employee.
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in We are not persuaded.
the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary
civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes Appeals in Criminal Cases
conclusive and enforceable.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute thus:
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
will be placed in double jeopardy."
 The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on
appeal.
the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7
right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have
of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."

"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
the appeal." executory.17

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
innkeepers, as follows:
relief.
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and committed by them or their employees.
during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by
promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified
the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal
in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
Procedure]. x x x"
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed
the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given
them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are
persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees." some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not
to Article 103 which reads: be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included
therein.
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." Having laid all action.
these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than
petitioner.
once for the same act or omission.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
prosecution. even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
protect the remaining civil interest therein.
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
criminal action.
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the
"x x x xxx x x x" criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be employee.
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
to the employee.
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from not interpose an appeal." Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
circumstances is not possible.
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having
instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory.
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of The Court in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy Petitioner’s granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he
appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he
intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA and will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment
from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s rendered against him. x x x."
finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence." An appeal from
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.
reduce the penalty it imposed. Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal
case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-
right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher
now final.
than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted
out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to
modification without his consent. As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
jeopardy. participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that
petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
subsidiary.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
the latter’s insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s
subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive ipso facto attaches.
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
subsidiary liability of the employer.
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal its accused-employee.
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to
competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
cannot be separated from that of the employee. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is
highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of No Deprivation of Due Process
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has
incident to and dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In
not been satisfied due to insolvency.
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the
But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also
party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination his employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability,
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions
part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
SO ORDERED.
provisions of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal requirements
must be strictly complied with.

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as

merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be
followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that
the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of
the right to appeal.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions
of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag
to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
petitioner’s driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La
Union x x x." Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a
finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his
duties.