Topic: Manner of Acquiring Jurisdiction

Over the Res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation)

Rule 14 (Summons) Section 15. Extraterritorial service

CASE 75

Idonah Slade Perkins vs. Dizon, Eugene Arthur Perkins, and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, G.R. No. 46631, November 16, 1939
(xxx Ponce Enrile for respondent Perkins)

Facts: On July 6, 1938, Eugene Arthur Perkins (respondent) sued 1 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, a domestic firm, together with Idonah Slade
Perkins and George Engelhard, two nonresidents, who were summoned by publication. The service of
summons was based on section 398 of Act 190 which provides that service of summons by
publication may be made on a nonresident in "an action which relates to, or the subject of which is,
real or personal property within the Islands, in which such person defendant or foreign corporation
defendant, has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists wholly or in part in excluding such person or foreign corporation from any interest therein,
service of summons maybe made with publication."

Eugene Arthur Perkins in his complaint prayed that Engelhard and Idonah Slade Perkins, "be
adjudged without interest" in certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
and be excluded from any claim involving such shares.

Idonah Slade Perkins challenged the court's jurisdiction over her person. Judge Dizon overruled her
objection. She filed a certiorari  proceeding wherein she prayed that the summons by publication
issued against her be declared void and that Judge Dizon be permanently prohibited from taking any
action in the case.

Issue: Whether/not CFI Manila has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the present petitioner as
a non-resident defendant in order to validly try the case.

Ruling: Yes, the lower court had jurisdiction to try the case even if it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Idonah Slade Perkins. The judgment would be confined to the  res. No personal
judgment could be rendered against the non-resident.

The action filed by Eugene Arthur Perkins against the two non-residents was a quasi in rem  action
and not an action in personam. In that action plaintiff Perkins sought to exclude Idonah Slade Perkins
from any interest in property located in the Philippines consisting shares of stock in a
domestic sociedad anomina or public limited company. The judgment of the court in the case would
settle the title to the shares of stock and to that extent it partakes of the nature of a judgment in
rem. The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be entertained by a
Philippine court. Where, however, the action is in rem or quasi in rem  in connection with property
located in the Philippines, the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident is non-essential.

In order that the court may exercise power over the  res, it is not necessary that the court should take
actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody
when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly
recognized by law.

1
for dividends amounting to P71,379.90 on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name, payment
of which was being withheld by the company; and, for the recognition of his right to the control and
disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others.
CASE 76

MACAHILIG vs Heirs of Grace MAGALIT, G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA Decision and
Resolution dated Oct. 15 and Dec. 28, 1999, respectively.

Facts: (Fishpond Case) On Feb. 5, 1965, Pepito MAGALIT, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M.
Magalit (now substituted by her heirs as respondents), filed a Fishpond application with the then
Philippine Fisheries Commission -- now Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) for 11
hectares of land situated in the Batan Aklan. On April 1972, Bernardo MACAHILIG, deceased husband
of petitioner, filed with the BFAR a Fishpond Application for 5 of the 11 hectares which Magalit had
previously applied for. Macahiligs application failed to submit all the requirements and was denied.
Macahilig protested Magalits application on November 1976, contending that for a period of 20 years,
he had been in actual possession of the 5-hectare area included in Magalits application.

On August 22, 1979, BFAR organized a ordered a committee to determine the rights over the
disputed area and concluded that MACAHILIG was merely MAGALIT’s laborer and caretaker. On June
6, 1980, BFAR Director rendered an Order dismissing the protest of MACAHILIG who elevated the
disposition to the Office of the President but was still denied.

IAC Order: That the petitioner or anybody acting in his behalf is/are to vacate the subject property in
question, and to turn it over to the heirs of Pepito Magalit, considering that the challenged decision
has long become final and executory on May 2, 1984 yet.

Magalit possessed a superior right than that of petitioners husband, whose application was rejected
by BFAR, Presidential Assistant Lazaro and the IAC. 

(Civil Case) Later on, Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the RTC of Kalibo Aklan for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution. On August 1990, the heirs of Pepito Magalit, filed a Motion praying
that the trial court properly implement said IAC Decision by ordering Spouses Macahilig to turn over
to her the possession of Lot 4417, which had an area of 2.0805 hectares, more or less. Dr. Magalit
contended that the Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because the spouses had refused to give up
the fishpond in question.

On October 9, 1992, Dr. Magalit filed a Petition for Contempt Against Melina Macahilig, alleging that
on November 29, 1985, Bernardo Macahilig had refused to turn over Lot 4417 to her.

Petitioner filed with the CA, on August 12, 1993, a Petition for Certiorari  alleging that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders dated June 18 and July 14, 1993. CA
ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued a Writ of Execution
ordering the delivery of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit. The records show that the fishpond application of
petitioners husband was rejected by the BFAR, and that petitioner did not present any other evidence
to prove her right of possession over the disputed property.

On the other hand, Dr. Magalits claim was based on the Decision in the Fishpond Case, which upheld
her right -- as the surviving spouse of the applicant -- to possess the ten hectares of land awarded to
him, including Lot 4417 which covered an area of more or less 2.0805 hectares. The disputed lot was
included in the area awarded to Dr. Magalit because of the report of the commissioner appointed by
the trial court to settle the issue. Petitioner had not objected either to the said appointment or to the
Report.

Issue: Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over Lot 4417?

Ruling: Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of
the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents predecessors in interest. Without taking
actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential jurisdiction or potential
custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution
directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.

Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417 when it issued its
September 17, 1992 Order. We disagree. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the
court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.

The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 is evident from the fact that the trial
court proceeded to hear and determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in the Fishpond Case.

Petitioner contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the turnover of Lot
4417 to Dr. Magalit, because of its earlier ruling that it had no jurisdiction over said property.

It is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court.  She clearly
submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517.  We cannot allow her
to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation
in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its
jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its
jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against ones opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel
effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that
thereby causes loss or injury to the latter.
In relation to CASE 76

CHESTER DE JOYA,  vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006
(Criminal Case)

Facts: (Petition dismissed) This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to
nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner for violation
of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Is one who continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction entitled to
seek relief?

Ruling: No. His continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more
reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place
the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive
stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be
remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court
acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner:  This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:  This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the
parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case : This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in
the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their
implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation).  This is
acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it
in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the
court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-
resident defendant.

Justice Regalado continues to explain: