Excerpt : 1. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985. [*EN BANC.

] LORENZO
M. TAÑADA , ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners, vs . HON. JUAN C. TUVERA , in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO,
in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents. 28 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera FERNANDO, C.J.,
concurring with qualification: TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: MELENCIO-
HERRERA, J., concurring: PLANA, J., separate2. opinion: PETITION to review
the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. The facts are stated
in the opinion of the Court. ESCOL1N, J.: Invoking the people’s right to be
informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
[1“Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded
the citizens subje...] as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the3. , 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-
713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964, 997, 1149-1178,
1180-1278. 3. c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 65. 4.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839VOL. 136,
APRIL 24, 1985 35 Tañada vs . Tuvera 1. 1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-18894. petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally
and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question [2Anti-Chinese League vs . Felix, 77 Phil.
1012; Costas vs . Aldanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs . City Mayor, 16 SCRA
151; Palting vs . San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs . Comelec,
95 SCRA 392.] said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being “aggrieved parties”
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote: “SEC. 35. entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately
or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.” 36 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera Upon the other hand,
petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance6. rule may well lead to
error.’ VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 37 Tañada vs . Tuvera “No reason exists
in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it
is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent
the people in cases of this character.” The reasons given by the Court in
recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be7. ;
Askay vs . Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.] this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date—for then the date of 38 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication—but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect. Respondents’ argument, however, is logically correct only insofar
as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily8. of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course. The issue posed is not one of first
impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs . Governor General,
[316 Phil. 366, 378.] this Court held that while the general rule is that “a
writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large,” and “it is for the public officers exclusively to apply
for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs . Boardmen,
79 M.e., 469”, nevertheless9. provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: “Art.
2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x x x” The
interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court’s construction
of said article. In a long line of decisions, [4Camacho vs . Court of Industrial
Relations, 80 Phil. 848; Mejia vs . Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs . Encarnacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs .
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 107710. Perhaps at no time since the
establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985
39 Tañada vs . Tuvera the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of11. need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned. [6People vs . Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640;
Balbuena et al. vs . Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.] It is
needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public
nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio 40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera Teehankee
said in Peralta vs . COMELEC [782 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.]: “In a time
of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions12. light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These quesVOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985
41 Tañada vs . Tuvera tions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.” Consistently with the
above principle, this Court in Rutter vs . Esteban [993 Phil. 68.] sustained
the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued
in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of13. petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs . Baxter Bank [8308 U.S. 371, 374.] to wit: “The courts below
have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I.
L. Ry. Co. v14. the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her
letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official
Gazette of the presidential i...] Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these
unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs . Angeles, [11129 SCRA 174.] the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that “publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.” The cogency of this15. 42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.”
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect. SO ORDERED. Relova, J., concur. Fernando, C.J., concurs in a
separate opinion expressing the view that without publication, a due process
question may arise but that such publication need not be in16. , until due
publication thereof. Cuevas, J., I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice
and Justice Plana. Alampay, J., I subscribe to the opinion of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Plana. VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985
43 Tañada vs . Tuvera FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the
ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur
insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette for unpublished “presidential issuances” to have binding
force and effect. I shall explain why. 1. 1. It is of course true that without
the requisite publication, a due17. applicable to this case. Thus: “The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may
be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such 44 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera 1. notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise.” [1Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He
mentioned in this connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution
and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution18. be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its
ex post facto character becomes evident. [5Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.] In civil cases
though, retroacVOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 45 Tañada vs . Tuvera 1. tivity
as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree
or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution may not always be19. would be, in my opinion, to
go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad
Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. 46 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tañada vs . Tuvera TEEHANKEE, J.,
concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a
body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court20. following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,” i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce
refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the
Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it “shall take
effect [only] one VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 47 Tañada vs . Tuvera year
[not 15 days] after such publication.” [2Notes in brackets supplied.] To
sustain respondents’ misreading that “most laws or decrees specify the date
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official21. has
consistently stressed that “it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,”
[1People vs . de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 31, 1959, per the late Chief
Justice Paras.] citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated
in earlier cases that “before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.”
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2
of22. . . . and no general law shall be in force until published.” See also
State ex rel. White vs . Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, cit...] It may be
said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected op 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED23.Tañada vs . Tuvera parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the
publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.” Two things may be said of
this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect

Less Excerpts
Case Title : LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents. 
Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to
the President. 
Syllabi Class :Mandamus|Statutes|Constitutional Law|Statutes|Due Process

No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.*

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

_______________

* EN BANC.

28

28

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tañada vs. Tuvera

Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the
publication in the Official Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest in
mandamus case.—The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in
the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude
their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the
present situation where the President may on his own issue laws.—The clear object of the above-quoted
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

Same; Same; Same.—Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance than at this time when the people have bestowed upon
the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la denoroinación
genérica de leyes, se comprenden también los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.”

Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the
words “shall be

29

VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985

29

Tañada vs. Tuvera

published.”—The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be
published in the Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those which affect only a particular class of
persons need not be published.—The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of
general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances of general application is a
matter of due process.—It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public
nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application which have not been
published shall have no force and effect.—The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of
the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done
in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency
of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.

30

30

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tañada vs. Tuvera

Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette may have consequences which cannot be ignored.—Similarly, the implementation/enforcement
of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.”

Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been
published. It is undisputed that none of them has been implemented.—From the report submitted to
the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive. 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:

Statutes; Due Process; I am unable to concur insofar as the opinion written by Justice Escolin would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished Presidential
issuances to have a binding force and effect.—It is of course true that without the requisite publication,
a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the
existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there
is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is to be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force
and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend
itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity
unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past “presidential issuances.”

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Tañada vs. Tuvera

Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

Same; Same; The Civil Code rule on publication of statutes is only a legislative enactment and does not
and cannot have the force of a constitutional command A later executive or legislative act can fix a
different rule.—Let me make clear therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to
affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette.
The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
“unless it is otherwise provided.” Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic
Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

Same; Same; I am unable to agree that decrees not published are devoid of any legal character.—Nor
can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Statutes; Unless laws are published there will no basis for the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith.—Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification
for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of
the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
“Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”

32

32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tañada vs. Tuvera

Same; Respondent’s theory that a Presidential Decree that fixes its date of effectivity need not be
published misreads Art. 2 of the Civil Code.—Respondents’ contention based on a misreading of Article
2 of the Civil Code that “only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity” is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code
is that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,” i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same
Article 2 provides otherwise that it “shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication.” To sustain respondents’ misreading that “most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity”
would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code’s indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or
an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication
which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Statutes; When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the Decree, but becomes effective only 15 days after
publication in the Gazette, it will not mean that the Decree can have retroactive effect to the expressed
date of effectivity.—I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date
of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that
when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive
effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., separate opinion:

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Due Process; The Constitution does not require prior publication for laws
to be effective and while

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Tañada vs. Tuvera

due process require prior notice, such notice is not necessarily publication in the Official Gazette.—The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication
of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Same; Same; Same; C.A. 638 does not require Official Gazette publication of laws for their effectivity.—
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity,
laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply “An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette.” Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and
defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette, among them, “important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines” and “all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability.” It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts
are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only “important” ones “of a public nature.”
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

ESCOL1N, J.:

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of

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the 1973 Philippine Constitution,1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180,
187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248-251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501. 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964, 997, 1149-1178, 1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-

_______________

1 “Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,
access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.”

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1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918,
1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457-471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611-647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120,
122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being “aggrieved parties”
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

“SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.”

_______________

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor,
16 SCRA 151; Palting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

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Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General,3 this Court held that while the general rule is that “a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,”
and “it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469”, nevertheless, “when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].”

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:

“We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator
is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason ‘that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error.’

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3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

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“No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.”

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
“Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x x x”

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court’s construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date—for then the date of

_______________

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17
SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.

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publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication—but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents’ argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

“Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of tne Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability: [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. x x x”

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for

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the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves
of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la
denominación genérica de leyes, se comprenden también los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dietadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad.”5

The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in the
Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio

_______________

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

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Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC7:

“In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.”

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank8 to wit:

“The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects—with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
ques-

_______________

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

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tions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles,11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that “publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.” The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that “the government, as a matter of policy, refrains

_______________

9 93 Phil. 68.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been
submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

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from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.”

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

     Relova, J., concur.

     Fernando, C.J., concurs in a separate opinion expressing the view that without publication, a due
process question may arise but that such publication need not be in the Official Gazette. To that extent
he concurs with the opinion of Justice Plana.

     Teehankee, J., files a brief concurrence.

     Makasiar, J., concurs in the opinion of Chief Justice Fernando.

     Aquino, J., no part.

     Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

     Abad Santos, J., I concur in the separate opinion of the Chief Justice.

     Melencio-Herrera, J., see separate concurring opinion.

     Plana, J., see separate opinion.

     Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.

     De la Fuente, J., Insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

     Cuevas, J., I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice and Justice Plana.

     Alampay, J., I subscribe to the opinion of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Plana.

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FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished “presidential issuances” to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true
that what is decided now applies only to past “presidential issuances.” Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: “The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such

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notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise.”1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: “In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.”2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government “must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.”3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level
of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, “if it is unknown and unknowable.”4 Publication, to
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems
could arise. Previous transactions based on such “Presidential Issuances” could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is
contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a
criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.5 In civil cases though,
retroac-

_______________

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in this connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of
the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

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tivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There
must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity.6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication
is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its
Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, “unless it is otherwise
provided.” Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does
not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

_______________

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

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TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that “it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that
a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation,”1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that “before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.”

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3
of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly published) that “Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.”

Respondents’ contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that “only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity” is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that “laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided,” i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a
law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it “shall take
effect [only] one

_______________

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 31, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

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year [not 15 days] after such publication.”2 To sustain respondents’ misreading that “most laws or
decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity”3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code’s indispensable
and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of
15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to
be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the
date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

SEPARATE OPINION

PLANA, J.:

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.** It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected op

_______________

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents’ comment, pp. 14-15.

** See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 21: “The legislature shall provide publication of all
statute laws . . . and no general law shall be in force until published.” See also State ex rel. White vs.
Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

48

48

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tañada vs. Tuvera

parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for
their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.” Two things may be said of
this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity,
laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply “An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette.” Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and
defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette, among them, “important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines” and “all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability.” It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts
are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only “important” ones “of a public nature.”
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136
SCRA 27, No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

VOL. 136, APRIL 25, 1985

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In Re: Milagros Santia

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I
beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Respondents ordered to publish all unpublished presidential issuances in the Official Gazette.

——o0o—— Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, No. L-63915 April 24, 1985