Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
ABAD , J : p
This case involves the application of the Howey test in order to determine if a
particular transaction is an investment contract.
The Facts and the Case
Prosperity.Com, Inc. (PCI) sold computer software and hosted websites without
providing internet service. To make a pro t, PCI devised a scheme in which, for the
price of US$234.00 (subsequently increased to US$294), a buyer could acquire from it
an internet website of a 15-Mega Byte (MB) capacity. At the same time, by referring to
PCI his own down-line buyers, a rst-time buyer could earn commissions, interest in
real estate in the Philippines and in the United States, and insurance coverage worth
P50,000.00.
To bene t from this scheme, a PCI buyer must enlist and sponsor at least two
other buyers as his own down-lines. These second tier of buyers could in turn build up
their own down-lines. For each pair of down-lines, the buyer-sponsor received a
US$92.00 commission. But referrals in a day by the buyer-sponsor should not exceed
16 since the commissions due from excess referrals inure to PCI, not to the buyer-
sponsor.
Apparently, PCI patterned its scheme from that of Golconda Ventures, Inc. (GVI),
which company stopped operations after the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) issued a cease and desist order (CDO) against it. As it later on turned out, the
same persons who ran the affairs of GVI directed PCI's actual operations.
In 2001, disgruntled elements of GVI led a complaint with the SEC against PCI,
alleging that the latter had taken over GVI's operations. After hearing, 1 the SEC, through
its Compliance and Enforcement unit, issued a CDO against PCI. The SEC ruled that
PCI's scheme constitutes an Investment contract and, following the Securities
Regulations Code, 2 it should have rst registered such contract or securities with the
SEC.
Instead of asking the SEC to lift its CDO in accordance with Section 64.3 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 8799, PCI led with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari against the SEC with an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP 62890. Because the CA did not act promptly on
this application for TRO, on January 31, 2001 PCI returned to the SEC and led with it
before the lapse of the ve-day period a request to lift the CDO. On the following day,
February 1, 2001, PCI moved to withdraw its petition before the CA to avoid possible
forum shopping violation. SHacCD
WHEREFORE , the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision dated
July 31, 2003 and the resolution dated June 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 62890.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
11.See also United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 US 837 (1975); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F. 2d 476 (1973).