G.R. No.

171631               November 15, 2010 notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of
not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or
vs. alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents. parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
DECISION
was no other oppositor to the application.
PERALTA, J.:
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default6 against
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), presented their evidence in support of their application.
dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of
Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application for registration and
the decision states:
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R.
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65
Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
(Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and
land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five
Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less,
an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Decree.
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the SO ORDERED.7
annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00- Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018- decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that
01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest.
1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their
patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous,
Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner
property for the year 2003 has been paid. since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to
present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob 4 dated June 18, 1987, petition raising the following grounds:
executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and
Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent I
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay 5 dated March 10, 1979. In THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE
parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
II
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than
fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE
disposable land of the public domain. WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents
jurisdictional requirements of the law. and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public,
and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the
following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their
concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
Doctrine. alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
Jan. 03, 1968.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present
evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the
subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-
subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision
1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the
sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of inalienable public domain.
the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a
petition for review under Rule 45. In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating
The petition is meritorious.
in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.10 It proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the
or grave abuse of discretion.11 Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to
public domain. submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides: Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court held
that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
personally or through their duly authorized representatives: Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, land is alienable and disposable.
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the
earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification
and convincing evidence.13
from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public still inalienable public domain.20
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of
reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or
the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the
through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15 Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their
testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-interest'
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939,21 testified that since he attained the
00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM
age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C.
them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the
Torres with the following annotation:
subject property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land.24

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no

specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began
actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the
subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who
earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence
was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and
that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the
period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but
must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership and possession of the land.26

Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued

in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best,
respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only
in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.28

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear

picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain;
and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their
application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and
confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela
Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight
hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's
vs. approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents. Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been
filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents. therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
BIDIN, J.: citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a
classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before
vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned
court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
registration over the lots in question. depending on the evidence.

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, As found by the trial court:
as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase,
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide
of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of
and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered
have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of (Rollo, p. 26)
which reads as follows:
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable
Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development
and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada. by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it
had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument
registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor,
annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way. Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25) land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
the following ratiocination:
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had
citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and
could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the
argues:
subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of
money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm 17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax
owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established of ownership. (citing cases)
as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of 18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more
particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not,
title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec.
later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession.
cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior
the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession
11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28) prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still
be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, (The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15) fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, land and becomes private property. . . .
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
provides. No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads: than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not Land Act as by free patent . . .
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for x x x           x x x          x x x
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit: As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
xxx xxx xxx acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by patent.
wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed
supplied) by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
As amended by PD 1073: conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño,
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in- ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the (Emphasis supplied)
case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this
land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC,
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the
214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the
private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn,
land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218
have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private
SCRA 41 [1993]).
respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the
[1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and
been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA
Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be
gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under
establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the
was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for
the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of
A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister the applicant to prove its positive averments.
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land
were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable
the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and
the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their
forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of
ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis. which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never
We disagree. present in the case of private respondents. . . .

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were . . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land
property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The xxx xxx xxx
land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their
the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax
before us on review and we reversed.
Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such
manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May
not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property,
information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of
respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in- the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the application . . .
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or xxx xxx xxx
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld
because they were American citizens at the time of their application
for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such no vested rights over the parcel of land.
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born
of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in
their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private
1880.
respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended)
the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a)
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this
Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
supplied) information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads: apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the
register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application
Pambansa may provide. for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant
is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
provision of which provides:
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of
of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to
the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall decree of registration is yet to be issued.
not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential hereby AFFIRMED.
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or
SO ORDERED.
rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what
the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no
longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were

natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance
with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,

must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides:

Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his
spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of [G.R. NO. 160421 : October 4, 2004]
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented by their Attorney- (g) the lot does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed and
in-Fact, GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE river bank protection.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
(5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the land involved is not
DECISION covered by any land patent or by land application pending issuance of
patent.14
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
(6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR that the subject lot
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the January 16, 2003 falls within Alienable and Disposable lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 which reversed the Batangas, per BFD LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925.15
September 7, 1998 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed is (7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR that Plan Ap-04-010485,
the appellate court's October 17, 2003 resolution3 denying petitioners' Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San
motion for reconsideration. Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of
nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey.16
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an There being no opposition to the petition from any private individual, an
application for registration of title over a 23,209 square meter Order of General Default was issued by the trial court.17
lot,4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-
010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision granting the
Province of Batangas, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise petition for registration. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
known as the Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General
alternative that their petition for registration be granted pursuant to
Default, this Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.5
Tomas Cadastre on plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor of and in the names
Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres for the amount of of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of
P6,943,534.40.6 The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased 1322 Palm Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.
parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. Maria, born on October 22, 1917,
Once this Decision shall have become final let the corresponding decree of
declared that since 1945, her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She
registration be issued.
became aware of her father's possession of the subject lot in the concept of
owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the subject SO ORDERED.18
lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita,7 who
testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came to know The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The sisters added that during the Appeals contending that petitioners failed to - (1) offer in evidence the
lifetime of Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the
tenant. After his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption that subject
hired farmers.8 property forms part of the public domain.19

Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences ' On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the sole ground of failure to offer in evidence the original tracing
(1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan9 and Technical Description10 of Lot 806, both cloth plan of the land.20
certified by Land Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view of their
compliance with all the substantive and procedural requirements for
(2) Tax Declarations11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955, 1968, 1974, 1980, registration, save for the submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be
1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name of Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name remanded to the trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth
of Rosita Guevarra and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip and plan. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed no objection to
Ester Recto). petitioners' motion for reconsideration.21
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998 from the Municipal On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;12 reconsideration.22 Hence, the instant petition praying for the remand of the
case before the trial court.
(4) Report13 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating, among In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the interest of
others, that ' justice, he will not to oppose the petition.23
(a) the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
under Project No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582 and released and certified as such on
December 31, 1925; (Emphasis, supplied) SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an application for registration
(b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor within the forest zone; of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(c) the lot is not within a previously issued patent, decree or title.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
(d) there is no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
or any other person;
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
(e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 021-02166-A in the name of a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
the predecessor-in-interest and that there is no difference in area;
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
(f) the lot is agricultural in nature; andcralawlibrary amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply the property for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by law
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for
must show that - (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.24 domain having been released and certified as such on December 31, 1925. As
further certified by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within
petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior to them their father, an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor within a
had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners. Maria, forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed,
having been born on October 22, 1917, and Rosita on October 29, 1922, and riverbank protection.28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet
were 13 years of age when they became aware of their family's possession of the requisite for original registration of title, to wit: open, continuous,
Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
capable and competent to perceive their father's possession of Lot 806 in the disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be earlier.
worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue, having personally heard the Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, granting the petition for registration on the ground of petitioners' failure to
her findings deserve the highest respect.25 submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the
submission of the tracing cloth is a mandatory requirement for
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for the year registration.29 However, it was held that while the best evidence to identify a
1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note that said 1948 Tax Declaration piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from
cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472),26 thus substantiating the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence could also provide
petitioners' possession of Lot 806 through their predecessor-in-interest even sufficient identification.30 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court ruled
prior to said date. At any rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lot's technical
that the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now
mean that possession by the previous owners thereof did not commence in the Land Management Bureau of the DENR)32 are sufficient to identify the
1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony supporting possession for the land applied for registration, thus '
required period is credible, the court will grant the petition for registration.
Pertinent portion of the decision, reads ' On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v.
Reyes, where it was held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land
Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a
possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue of statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the identification of the
credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better land sought to be registered. As what was submitted in the case at bar to
position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses identify the subject property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the
testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected
better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's appreciation of the the same as insufficient.
witness' testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest
respect. We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it
observed that in that case the applicant in effect "had not submitted
xxx anything at all to identify the subject property" because the blueprint
presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast '
'[A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at
the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement
known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four of the law as the subject property was sufficiently identified with the
years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director
As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this
usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the
the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with
testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age, it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that
can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make applicant has provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully subject property. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a child's competence as
a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v.
capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did Intermediate Appellate Court, where we held that while the best evidence to
not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness' identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence
may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at could also provide sufficient identification. This rule was bolstered only
the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until recently in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioner's claim that declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession since it
appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling
occasion to see Listana possessing the land. that Exhibit "O," the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was
sufficient for the purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was
found by the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic
engineer. It bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission, and was
re-verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974 pursuant
to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration
Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the
following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality (Amadeo) and
province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square
meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions
signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration
Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
necessary for a proper and definite identification of the land sought to be
registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth
plan is required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan was
recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from
the probative value thereof. x x x.

In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of
the plan (Exhibit "R")33 and the technical description (Exhibit "S")34 thereof
both approved by Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the
Land Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously
approved isolated survey.35 Petitioners also submitted before the Court of
Appeals a certified true copy36 of the original tracing cloth plan as well as a
certification37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the fact that
the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester film is on file with
their office. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the decision of the trial court solely on the ground that
petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.

Having met all the requirements for registration of title including the
presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the land sought to be
registered, there is no more need to remand the case before the trial court
for the presentation of the tracing cloth plan.

WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 are reversed and set aside.
the September 7, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 156888             November 20, 2006

PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, would be needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to do
vs. this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner, Victoria
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondent. Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to plaintiffs Santiago and
Mateo.4
DECISION
Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends that
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed
The Case
herself of the housing privilege accorded to the latter’s employees; that due
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 3 to said privilege, she was allowed to lease a housing unit6 inside the Subic
December 20021 and 7 January 20032 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated
of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002 entitled if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002,
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract concluded; that since said contract
Bay Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent
application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA
the complaint for lack of cause of action. Housing Policy, she and her family were asked8 to vacate and return
possession of the subject housing unit.
The Facts
On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[9] against
This case stemmed from a Complaint3 for Recovery of Possession of Property, respondent SBMA from ousting petitioner Santiago and his family from the
filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner premises of the subject housing unit within seventy two (72) hours from
Pedro R. Santiago against respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority receipt. Further, it was likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any
(SBMA) on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales, other acts that would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the
Branch 74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a Writ premises they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the issuance of
In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that:
On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA filed a Motion
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator of the to Dismiss10 the abovementioned complaint on the argument, inter
estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order, dated February, alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of action.
1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter of the Settlement of the
Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In denying and
Regional Trial Court at Iriga City x x x. dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and complaint respectively, the RTC stated that since the alleged right of
xxxx complainant Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo
de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in esse.
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,12 which required
parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic) certificate of title all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
01-4-Protocol x x x. Act,13 within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 August
1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as
xxxx
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of the RTC read:
and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R.
Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a
Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land
valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the fact that said title was
of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.
never registered under Act 496, the land Registration Act (later PD 1529),
xxxx plaintiffs still claim that they have a cause of action.

By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago is The court is not convinced.
presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land consisting of 2.5 hectares,
The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based on the
more particularly the improvements located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.
ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property evidenced by a
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly the enabling
of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, defendant is claiming clauses of PD 892, said type of title can no longer be utilized as evidence of
possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly, defendant ownership. Verily, Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as
is using these two parcels of land for its (sic) own commercial and other indubitable evidence of land ownership. (Citation omitted.)
purposes.
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the simply because the court can take judicial notice of the applicability of PD
property from the defendant so that she could comply with her contractual 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to the case at
commitments to her co-plaintiffs. bench.14

xxxx Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the
second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003.
[D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over the parcels
of land described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago The Issues
was informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant that he
should vacate the premises he and his family are occupying since defendant
Hence, petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort to this Court by way of a speak, his right to recover possession is anchored on the alleged ownership
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as of Victoria M. Rodriguez, which right to the claimed parcel of land is not in
amended, raising the following issues:15 esse. As such, petitioner Santiago is equally bound by the final and executory
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
I.
Nevertheless, even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous error, we
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF would be hard pressed to find fault in the assailed orders of the RTC. The
OWNERSHIP OF LANDS; present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in
the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that
II.
the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR CLAIMS ON ownership over real property.
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE SPANISH TITLE; and
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago
III. anchor their right to recover possession of the subject real property on claim
of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de
OF AN ANSWER, WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY Torrenos. Promulgated on 29 April 2005, in the aforementioned Evangelista
PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP. Case, we categorically stated that:

In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for resolution by P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don
the Court the question of whether or not the RTC committed reversible error Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens
in denying the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an
as well as dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. allegation in petitioners’ Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest
complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do
The Court’s Ruling so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish
As the appeal of respondent Santiago involves only questions of law, the
title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
Court took cognizance of the instant petition.16
proceedings.
Petitioner Santiago maintains that "x x x P.D. No. 892 merely disallowed the
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest
use of Spanish titles as evidence of land ownership in any registration
title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested. (Citation
proceedings under the Torrens system. In other words, Spanish titles can still
omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings
be used as evidence of land ownership in any other proceedings except
under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and
registration under the Torrens system. Since the instant case is not one for
recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are
registration under the Torrens system, but x x x who should be entitled to the
prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in
possession thereof, then the presentation as evidence of land ownership of
some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or
the Spanish title in question is permissible." As to the non-presentation of
quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule
the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos, petitioner Santiago had this to say:
otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and
As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a defendant moving give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the
to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of action is regarded as having courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of
admitted all the allegations thereof, at least hypothetically". (sic) The registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause
Complaint specifically alleged that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great- confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
great-great granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late eliminate.
spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in his lifetime
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his
ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas
name under that certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de
clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore,
deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such admissions, then WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the
there would be no more need, at least at this stage of the case, for the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In other words, the inadmissibility of ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
the title, as argued by the defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no possession; . . .
more need to present this title in view of the admissions."
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject
Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their
Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent SBMA, however, stresses ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation omitted.)
that "Spanish titles can no longer be countenance as indubitable evidence of
land ownership by sheer force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D. This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of possession
892 in expressly providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession of only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out,
the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be utilized as proof or evidence Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still
of ownership x x x." lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation omitted.)
A priori, before the Court goes into the resolution of the fundamental issue Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for
raised by the instant petition, a critical matter must be dealt with – the fact registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit
that the assailed orders of dismissal of the complaint and denial of the proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount
motion for reconsideration, respectively, of the RTC had already become final the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same
and executory against Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the property by virtue of prescription.
case. It must be remembered that petitioner Santiago is merely the alleged
lessee of part of the claimed parcel of land. In the scheme of things, so to
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the Tesalona;27 and Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court
statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or of Appeals,28 it is quite evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in
phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different taking heed of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions
from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the
considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general use of Spanish titles to evidence ownership are concerned. For it is the better
provision may have a limited application if read together with other practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
provisions of the statute. (Citation omitted.) certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same.291âwphi1
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and
harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute. (Citation The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in
applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.30 This is
(i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said
Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. that such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual obedience thereto."31 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
possession of the real property. However, if such land registration and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual diminished.32
possession.
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration under the
Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the
Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six months from the date of
Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976.33 If not, non-
remove a cloud on or to quiet title. compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.

The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling
ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of
in either the Land Registration Decree (Citation omitted.) or the Public Land land ownership.34 And, without legal or equitable title to the subject
Act.42 Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the
immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish same. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It
title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by
Property. which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.35
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the
petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to action.
state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it
is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of Anent the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion to
the action.19 Dismiss, respondent SBMA already admitted all the allegations of the
complaint such that the question of whether or not the subject Spanish Title
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue was inadmissible or not had become immaterial.
of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of
herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the We do not agree.
aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the
issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that Basic is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on lack of cause
a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any of action, the question posed to the court for determination is the sufficiency
attempt to relitigate the same issue. of the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action. It is beside the point whether or not the allegations in the complaint
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents are true, for with said motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the
and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming arguendo that
8 of the Civil Code, to wit: the facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the court to
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution complaint.
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Consequently, by anchoring their right to recover possession of property on
With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in tandem with the subject Spanish title that has been divested of any legal force and effect
the Court’s pronouncements in numerous cases, i.e., Director of Forestry v. in establishing ownership over the subject real property, the complaint filed
Muñoz;20 Antonio v. Barroga;21 Republic v. Court of Appeals.;22 National by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals;23 Carabot v. Court of Santiago was correctly dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action.
Appeals;24 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;25 Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;26 Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel
In fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the Spanish title of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The issue has been settled and this Court’s final
decision in the said cases must be respected.36 This Court’s hands are now
tied by the finality of the abovementioned decisions. The Court has no
alternative but to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed 3 December 200237 and 7 January 200338 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No.
126-0-2002, are hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018 Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages because the decision in the
land registration case did not definitively and conclusively adjudicate the
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION ownership of the Subject Property in favor of any of the parties.

SUPREMA T. DUMO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE The heirs of Trinidad thereafter filed their collective Answer, where they
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. denied the material allegations in the complaint.

DECISION Additionally, Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land,
covered by Advance Plan of Lot Nos. 400398 and 400399 with a total area of
CARPIO, J.:*
1,273 square meters (LRC Case No. 270-Bg). Dumo alleged that the lots
The Case belonged to her mother and that she and her siblings inherited them upon
their mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. with Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from
Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo (Dumo) challenges the 28 January 2014 her siblings. Dumo traces her title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased
Decision1 and the 19 May 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo's
CA-G.R. CV No. 95732, which modified the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand, purchased the properties
Court (RTC), Branch 67, Bauang, La Union, in Civil Case No. 1301-Bg from Carlos Calica.
for Accion Reivindicatoria3 and LRC Case No. 270-Bg for Application for Land
Registration.4 The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the
ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in
The Facts the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land
registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a and Damages.
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the heirs of Bernarda M. Trinidad The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and filed its
(Trinidad), namely, Leticia T. Valmonte, Lydia T. Nebab, Purita T. Tanag, opposition for the State in the land registration case.
Gloria T. Antolin, Nilo Trinidad, Elpidio Trinidad, Fresnida T. Saldana,
Nefresha T. Tolentino, and Dumo. The plaintiffs are the heirs of Marcelino The Ruling of the RTC
Espinas (Espinas), who died intestate on 6 November 1991, leaving a parcel
On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the Subject
of land (Subject Property) covered by Tax Declaration No. 13823-A, which
Property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal
particularly described the property as follows:
of Dumo's land registration application on the ground of lack of registerable
A parcel of land located [in] Paringao, Bauang, La Union classified as title, and ordered Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots to
unirrigated Riceland with an area of 1,065 square meters covered by Tax the heirs of Espinas. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
Declaration No. 13823-A, bounded on the North by Felizarda N. Mabalay; on
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is rendered:
the East by Pedro Trinidad; on the South by Girl Scout[s] of the Philippines
and on the West by China Sea and assessed at P460.00.5 In LRC Case No. 270-Bg: Ordering the dismissal of the land registration on
[the] ground of lack of registerable title on the part of Suprema Dumo.
The Subject Property was purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 19 October 1943. Espinas exercised acts of In Civil Case No. 1301-Bg: Declaring the Heirs of Marcelino Espinas as the
dominion over the Subject Property by appointing a caretaker to oversee and owners of the lots subject of [the] application; ordering the applicant-
administer the property. In 1963, Espinas executed an affidavit stating his defendant Suprema Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots in
claim of ownership over the Subject Property. Espinas had also been paying question to the Heirs of Marcelino Espinas.
realty taxes on the Subject Property.
SO ORDERED.7
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of
Partition with Absolute Sale over a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration The RTC found that based on the evidence presented, the heirs of Espinas
No. 17276, which particularly described the property as follows: had a better right to the Subject Property. In particular, the RTC found that
based on the records of the Bureau of Lands, the lot of Espinas was
A parcel of sandy land located [in] Paringao, Bauang, La Union, bounded on previously surveyed and approved by the Bureau of Lands and when the
the North by Emiliana Estepa, on the South by Carlos Calica and Girl Scout[s] survey was made for Trinidad, there was already an approved plan for
Camp and on the West by China Sea, containing an area of 1[,]514 square Espinas. Also, the RTC found that the tax declarations submitted by Dumo in
meters more or less, with an assessed value [of] P130.00.6 support of her application failed to prove any rights over the land.
Specifically, the tax declaration of Mabalay, from whom Dumo traces her
Finding that the Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of
title, showed that the land was first described as bounded on the west by
Trinidad included the Subject Property, the heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint
Espinas. The subsequent tax declaration in the name of Trinidad, which
for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages to protect their
cancelled the tax declaration in the name of Mabalay, showed that the land
interests (Civil Case No. 1301-Bg). The heirs of Espinas also sought a
was no longer bounded on the west by Espinas, but rather, by the China Sea.
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Writ of Partial Execution of the
The area of the lot also increased from 3,881 to 5,589 square meters. All of
Decision in Civil Case No. 881, a Forcible Entry complaint filed by the heirs of
the subsequent tax declarations submitted by Dumo covering the lot in the
Trinidad against them.
name of her mother stated that the lot was no longer bounded on the west
In the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages, by Espinas, but rather, by the China Sea. The RTC held that the only logical
Dumo, one of the defendants therein, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res explanation to the inconsistency in the description of the land and the
judicata. Dumo argued that Espinas had already applied for the registration corresponding area thereof is that the lot of Espinas was included in the
of the Subject Property and that such application had been dismissed. The survey conducted for Trinidad.
dismissal of the land registration application of Espinas was affirmed by the
The RTC also rejected the theory of Dumo that the lot of Espinas was eaten
CA, and attained finality on 5 December 1980.
by the sea. The RTC found that during the ocular inspection, it was
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Dumo was denied by the RTC, which held that established that the lots adjoining the lot of Espinas on the same shoreline
the land registration case cannot operate as a bar to the Complaint for were not inundated by the sea. To hold the theory posited by Dumo to be
true, the RTC reasoned that all the adjoining lots should also have been D. THAT FURTHER, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING, THE
inundated by the sea. However, it was established through the ocular HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN,
inspection that the lots adjoining the property of Espinas on the same IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
shoreline remained the same, and thus the Subject Property had not been THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE THEREFOR, AGAIN, WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM
eaten by the sea. THE RESPONDENT, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF HER FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.10
The Ruling of the CA
The Ruling of the Court
The CA rendered its Decision dated 28 January 2014, affirming the RTC's
decision dismissing the application for land registration of Dumo, and finding Essentially, Dumo argues that the CA committed a reversible error because
that she failed to demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in interest (1) the issue of whether she was in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possessed the property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of possession of the land since 12 June 1945 was not an issue in the RTC; (2) the
her application for land registration. requirement of possession and occupation from 12 June 1945 is not essential
to her application since she has acquired title over the land by prescription;
The CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that (3) she has proven that the land applied for has already been declared
the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of Espinas. The CA found that alienable and disposable; and (4) her right to due process was violated since
since the property still belonged to the public domain, and the heirs of the issues considered by the CA were not properly raised during the trial.
Espinas were not able to establish their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of We find that none of Dumo's arguments deserve any merit.
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to
declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property. Going beyond the issues raised in the RTC and due process of law

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA reads: Dumo argues that the issue of whether the possession started on 12 June
1945 or earlier was never raised in the RTC. She also argues that no issue was
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the raised as to whether or not the land that she seeks to register is alienable
assailed Joint Decision issued by the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED in that and disposable. Thus, Dumo argues that the CA erred, and also violated her
the Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria (Civil Case No. 1301-Bg) filed by right to due process, when it considered these issues in determining whether
plaintiffs-appellees is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action. or not the application for land registration should be granted.

The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. We do not agree.

SO ORDERED.8 In an application for land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has
the burden of proving, by clear, positive and convincing evidence, that her
Dumo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and subsequently, an alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required
Omnibus Motion for Entry of Judgment and to Resolve, asking the CA to issue by law.11 Thus, it was upon Dumo to prove that she and her predecessors-in-
an entry of judgment insofar as the civil case is concerned and to declare the interest possessed and occupied the land sought to be registered in the
land registration case submitted for resolution without any nature and duration required by law.
comment/opposition. The CA denied both motions in a Resolution dated 19
May 2015.9 Dumo cannot validly argue that she was not afforded due process when the
CA considered to review the evidence she herself offered to support her
Hence, this petition. application for land registration. On the contrary, she was given every
opportunity to submit the documents to establish her right to register the
The Issues
land. She simply failed to do so.
In this petition, Dumo seeks a reversal of the decision of the CA, and raises
When Dumo filed with the RTC the application for registration of her land,
the following arguments:
she was asking the RTC to confirm her incomplete title. The requirements for
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 14 of Presidential
WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT WENT Decree No. 1529 (PD No. 1529), which provides:
BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED, THEREBY VIOLATING OR CONTRAVENING THE
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN, AMONG OTHERS, "LAM V. CHUA,
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
426 SCRA 29; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. FRANCO, 471 SCRA
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
74; BERNAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 225 SCRA 119; PROVINCE OF QUEZON V.
MARTE, 368 SCRA 145 AND FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
259 SCRA 120." been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND [REGISTRATION], IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST FAILED TO PROVE (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE, AND ADVERSE POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF under the provision of existing laws.
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE CONCEPT OF [AN] OWNER FROM JUNE 12,
1945 OR EARLIER, THEREBY VIOLATING OR CONTRAVENING THE RULING OF (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VERSUS COURT beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
OF APPEALS, 448 SCRA 442."
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
C. THAT, IN ANY EVENT, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING, THE provided for by law.
HONORABLE COURT OF AP[P]EALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN,
IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT FAILED TO CONSIDER xxxx
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT 'A' WHICH WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT
Thus, it is necessary in an application for land registration that the court
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS DISPOSIBLE [sic] AND ALIENABLE TO WHICH
determines whether or not an applicant fulfills the requirements under any
THE RESPONDENT MADE NO OBJECTION[.]
of the paragraphs of Section 14 of PD No. 1529.
Simply put, when Dumo filed her application for the registration of the lots Section 182719of the Revised Administrative Code of 191720 merely
she claims to have inherited from her mother and bought from her siblings, authorizes the Department Head to classify as agricultural lands those forest
the issue of whether she complied with all the requirements was the very lands which are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural purposes.
crux of the application. It cannot be argued that because the Republic failed Section 1827 does not authorize the Department Head to classify agricultural
to oppose or raise the issue in the RTC, the CA may no longer consider this lands as alienable and disposable lands as this power is expressly delegated
issue. On the contrary, the classification of the land sought to be registered, by the same Revised Administrative Code of 1917 solely to the Governor-
and the duration and nature of the possession and occupation have always General.
been, and will always be the issues in an application for land registration. It
would truly be absurd for Dumo, or any other applicant for land registration, The existing administrative code under the 1987 Philippine Constitution is
to expect the courts to grant the application without first determining if the Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This existing
requisites under the law have been complied with. code did not reenact Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. Nevertheless, in the absence of incompatibility between Section 1827
The CA had every right to look into the compliance by Dumo with the of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and the provisions of the
requirements for the registration of the land, and we find that the CA Administrative Code of 1987, we can grant that Section 1827 has not been
correctly found that Dumo has acquired no registerable title to the lots she repealed.21 This is in view of the repealing clause in Section 27, Final
seeks to register. Provisions, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

Registration of land under Section 14(1) Section 27. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
To reiterate, under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, Dumo had the burden of accordingly.
proving the following:
The authority of the Department Head under Section 1827 of the Revised
(1) that the land or property forms part of the alienable and disposable Administrative Code of 1917 is merely to classify public forest lands as public
lands of the public domain; agricultural lands. Agricultural lands of the public domain are, by themselves,
not alienable and disposable. Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 provides:
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and Section 1827. Assignment of Forest Land for Agricultural Purposes. – Lands in
occupation of the same; and public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the
Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests
or earlier.12 to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied)
The first requirement is to prove that the land sought to be registered is
There is nothing in Section 1827 that authorizes the Department Head to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. This is because under the
classify agricultural lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
Regalian Doctrine, as embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, lands
domain. The power to classify public lands as agricultural lands is separate
which do not clearly appear to be within private ownership are presumed to
and distinct from the power to declare agricultural lands as alienable and
belong to the State.13 Thus, in an application for land registration, the
disposable. The power to alienate agricultural lands of the public domain can
applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the State owns
never be inferred from the power to classify public lands as agricultural.
the land applied for, and proving that the land has already been classified as
Thus, public lands classified as agricultural and used by the Bureau of Plant
alienable and disposable.14 To overcome the presumption that the land
Industry of the Department of Agriculture for plant research or plant
belongs to the State, the applicant must prove by clear and incontrovertible
propagation are not necessarily alienable and disposable lands of the public
evidence at the time of application that the land has been classified as
domain despite being classified as agricultural lands. For such agricultural
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
lands to be alienable and disposable, there must be an express proclamation
Classification of lands of the public domain may be found under Article XII of by the President declaring such agricultural lands as alienable and disposable.
the 1987 Philippine Constitution. More specifically, Section 3 of Article XII
Agricultural land, the only classification of land which may be classified as
classifies lands of the public domain into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,
alienable and disposable under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, may still be
(3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks.15 Of these four classifications, only
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes which would prohibit the
agricultural lands may be alienated and disposed of by the State.
alienation or disposition of such land. Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides:
The 1987 Philippine Constitution also provides that "agricultural lands of the
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
which they may be devoted."16 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
classification of lands of the public domain is first and foremost provided by
public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
the Constitution itself. Of the classifications of lands of the public domain,
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
agricultural lands may further be classified by law, according to the uses it
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,
may be devoted to.
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
The classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural lands, as well President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
as their further classification into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
domain, is a legislative prerogative which may be exercised only through the established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
enactment of a valid law. This prerogative has long been exercised by the concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession
legislative department through the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
141 (CA No. 141) or the Public Land Act of 1936.17 Section 6 of CA No. 141 Assembly. (Emphasis supplied)
remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification of
Thus, to be alienable and disposable, lands of the public domain must be
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands of the public
expressly declared as alienable and disposable by executive or administrative
domain.18
proclamation pursuant to law or by an Act of Congress.
Even if the Department Head has the power to classify public forest lands as similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. (Emphasis
agricultural under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, supplied)
this does not include the power to classify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The power Similarly, under Section 6 of CA No. 141, the existing law on the
to further classify agricultural lands as alienable and disposable has not been matter, only the President can classify lands of the public domain into
granted in any way to the Department Head under the Revised alienable or disposable lands, thus:
Administrative Code of 1917. This authority was given only to the Governor-
Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
General under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
superseded by Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2874 (Public Land Act of
public domain into —
1919), and as in turn further superseded by Section 6 of CA No. 141 (Public
Land Act of 1936), which is the existing specific provision of law governing (a) Alienable or disposable,
the classification of lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable (b) Timber, and
lands of the public domain. This delegated power is a discretionary power, to (c) Mineral lands,
be exercised based on the sound discretion of the President.
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class
Under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, the to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
classification of lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable (Emphasis supplied)
lands of the public domain could only be made by the Governor-General.
While Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 gave to the Thus, under all laws during the American regime, from the Revised
Department Head the power to classify public forest lands as public Administrative Code of 1917 up to and including CA No. 141, only the
agricultural lands, the very same law in its Section 64 expressly reserved to Governor-General or President could classify lands of the public domain into
the Governor-General the power to declare for "public sale x x x any of the alienable and disposable lands. No other government official was
public domain of the Philippines." Section 64 of the Revised Administrative empowered by statutory law during the American regime. Under the
Code of 1917 provides: 1935,22 197323 and 198724 Philippine Constitutions, the power to declare or
classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable lands
Section 64. Particular powers and duties of Governor-General of the belonged to Congress. This legislative power is still delegated to the
Philippines. – In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor- President under Section 6 of CA No. 141 since this Section 6 was never
General of the Philippines shall have such specific powers and duties as are repealed by Congress despite successive amendments to CA No. 141 after
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the the adoption of the 1935, 1973 and the 1987 Philippine Constitutions.25
powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
Under Section 13 of PD No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Among such special powers and duties shall be: Code of the Philippines, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary has been delegated by law the discretionary
(a) x x x
power to classify as alienable and disposable forest lands of the public
xxxx domain no longer needed for forest reserves. Section 13 of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, which was enacted on 19 May 1975,
(d) To reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any provides:
of the public domain of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines the use of which
is not otherwise directed by law, the same thereafter remaining subject to Section 13. System of Land Classification.– The Department Head shall study,
the specific public uses indicated in the executive order by which such devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the
reservation is made, until otherwise provided by law or executive order. proper and accurate classification and survey of all lands of the public
domain into agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
(e) To reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or mineral, timber or forest, and grazing lands, and into such other classes as
service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the now or may hereafter be provided by law, rules and regulations.
(Philippine Islands) Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law; and thereafter such land shall not be subject to sale or other disposition In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through inter-bureau
and shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order action the present system of determining which of the unclassified lands of
until otherwise provided by law. the public domain are needed for forest purposes and declare them as
permanent forest to form part of the forest reserves. He shall declare those
x x x x (Emphasis supplied) classified and determined not to be needed for forest purposes as alienable
and disposable lands, the administrative jurisdiction and management of
Likewise, under Section 9 of RA No. 2874, the classification of lands of public which shall be transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided, That mangrove
domain into alienable and disposable lands could only be made by the and other swamps not needed for shore protection and suitable for fishpond
Governor-General, thus: purposes shall be released to, and be placed under the administrative
jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Section 9. For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of
Resources. Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue
the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
to remain as part of the public forest. (Emphasis supplied)
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows: Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "x x x.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. x x
(a) Agricultural
x." Thus, the unclassified lands of the public domain, not needed for forest
(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes. reserve purposes, must first be declared agricultural lands of the public
domain before the DENR Secretary can declare them alienable and
(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes. disposable. Under the foregoing Section 13 of PD No. 705, the DENR
Secretary has no discretionary power to classify unclassified lands of the
(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses. public domain, not needed for forest reserve purposes, into agricultural
lands. However, the DENR Secretary can invoke his power under Section
The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 to classify forest lands into
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
agricultural lands. Once so declared as agricultural lands of the public
classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
domain, the DENR Secretary can then invoke his delegated power under classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Section 13 of PD No. 705 to declare such agricultural lands as alienable and Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
disposable lands of the public domain. Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
This Court has recognized in numerous cases the authority of the DENR alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
Secretary to classify agricultural lands of the public domain as alienable and verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
disposable lands of the public domain.26 As we declared in Republic of the must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Philippines v. Heirs of Fabio,27 "the DENR Secretary is the only other public Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
official empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land as alienable and disposable." land is alienable and disposable.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, as the President's and the DENR Secretary's discretionary To repeat, there are two (2) documents which must be presented: first, a
power to classify land as alienable and disposable is merely delegated to copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of the DENR and
them under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705, respectively, they may not certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records,
redelegate the same to another office or officer. What has once been and second, a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or
delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated or redelegated by the PENRO based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
the original delegate to another, as expressed in the Latin maxim — Delegata The requirement set by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N
potestas non potest delegari.28 Thus, in Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,29 this Properties, Inc. that both these documents be based on the land classification
Court ruled: approved by the DENR Secretary is not a mere superfluity. This requirement
stems from the fact that the alienable and disposable classification of
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General
agricultural land may be made by the President or DENR Secretary. And while
Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself
the DENR Secretary may perform this act in the regular course of business,
and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive
this does not extend to the CENRO or PENRO – the DENR Secretary may no
Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the
longer delegate the power to issue such certification as the power to classify
implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions
lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable lands is in itself a
or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having
delegated power under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no
choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial Moreover, we have repeatedly stated that a CENRO or PENRO certification is
body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the not enough to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the property
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari —a sought to be registered because the only way to prove the classification of
delegated power cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification the land is through the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason or the President himself. This Court has clearly held:
the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power
for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
authority cannot be a subject of delegation. (Emphasis supplied) alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the power to classify agricultural the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands of the public subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
domain is exercised "by law" or through legislative enactment. In accordance verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
with Section 6 of CA No. 141, this power is delegated to the President who applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
may, based on his sound discretion, classify agricultural lands as alienable classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
and disposable lands of the public domain. This delegated power to so the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
classify public agricultural lands may no longer be redelegated by the prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
President – what has once been delegated may no longer be delegated to because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
another. Likewise, the same discretionary power has been delegated "by prove that the land is alienable and disposable.34 (Emphasis supplied)
law" to the DENR Secretary who, of course, cannot redelegate the same to
his subordinates. A CENRO or PENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the land sought to be registered it is the original
As it is only the President or the DENR Secretary who may classify as classification by the DENR Secretary or the President which is essential to
alienable and disposable the lands of the public domain, an applicant for land prove that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. This has been
registration must prove that the land sought to be registered has been consistently upheld by this Court in subsequent land registration cases.
declared by the President or DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable land Recently, in Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas,35 which cited Republic of
of the public domain. To establish such character, jurisprudence has been the Philippines v. Lualhati,36 the Court rejected the attempt of the applicant
clear on what an applicant must submit to clearly establish that the land to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land through PENRO
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. or CENRO certifications. The Court held:

In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,30 this Court has held [N]one of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court
that an applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of and disposable lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and
the official records. Additionally, a certificate of land classification status Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the
or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the land. In fact, in Republic v. Lualhati, the Court rejected an attempt to prove
DENR and approved by the DENR Secretary must also be presented to prove the alienability of public land using similar evidence:
that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable and
disposable) and that it falls within the approved area per verification through Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land
survey by the PENRO or CENRO.31 In Republic of the Philippines v. Roche,32 we sought to be registered has been classified as alienable or disposable land of
clearly stated: the public domain. The records of this case merely bear certifications from
the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land
[T]he applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO certifications,
however, do not even make any pronouncement as to the alienable and PENRO must follow the law as laid down by this Court in Republic of the
character of the lands in question for they merely recognize the absence of Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.43 It is not this Court that should amend its
any pending land patent application, administrative title, or government ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc.44 to conform to
project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly the administrative rules of the DENR, CENRO, or PENRO reversing the final
declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and disposable ruling of this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
lands of the public domain, these certifications remain insufficient for Inc.45 The authority given by the Administrative Order of the DENR to the
purposes of granting respondent's application for registration. As CENRO and PENRO to issue certifications of land classification status does not
constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that and cannot reverse the clear requirement laid down by the Court for
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must applicants of land registration to submit the certified true copy of the original
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and classification approved by the DENR Secretary to prove the alienable and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and disposable character of the land.
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or To repeat, in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1) of
CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls PD No. 1529, the applicant has the burden of proving that the land sought to
short of the requirements for original registration in order to show the be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In turn,
alienable character of the lands subject herein. (Emphasis supplied) the best evidence of the alienable and disposable nature of the land is the
certified true copy of the original proclamation made by the President or
In this case, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove DENR Secretary, in accordance with CA No. 141 or PD No. 705. Submitting a
that the land she seeks to register is alienable and disposable land of the mere certification by the CENRO or PENRO with references to the original
public domain. classification made by the President or the DENR Secretary is sorely
inadequate since it has no probative value as a public document to prove the
Response to the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa alienable and disposable character of the public land.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa suggests that Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, public documents are:
certifications of land classification status issued by the CENRO and PENRO
should be deemed sufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
of the property if these certifications bear references to the land authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
classification maps and the original classification issued and signed by the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
DENR Secretary. This suggestion clearly undermines the requirements set by
this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.37 where the (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
Court expressly stated that it is not enough for the CENRO or PENRO to testaments; and
certify that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable.
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
What is required from the applicant in a land registration proceeding is to
law to be entered therein.
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that In turn, for the record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved Section 19, Rule 132 to be admissible, it must be evidenced by an official
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Quite clearly, publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
the Court definitively stated that to prove that the land is alienable and custody of the record, or by his deputy.46Moreover, to be prima
disposable, the applicant must present a certified true copy of the original facie evidence of the facts stated in public documents, such documents
classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the proclamation made by must consist of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
the President. Only the certified true copy of the original classification by a public officer.47 This requirement can be satisfied only if a certified true
approved by the DENR Secretary or the President will prove to the courts copy of the proclamation by the President or the order of the DENR Secretary
that indeed, the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. classifying the land as alienable and disposable is presented to the trial court.
That the certifications of the CENRO or PENRO contain references to the Quite clearly, certifications by the CENRO or PENRO do not comply with the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary is not enough to prove conditions for admissibility of evidence. The CENRO or the PENRO is not the
that the land is alienable and disposable. Mere references made in the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or
certifications to the classification of land as approved by the DENR Secretary DENR Secretary classifying lands as alienable and disposable lands of the
are simply insufficient. The trial court must be given a certified true copy of public domain. Thus, the certifications made by the CENRO or PENRO cannot
the classification made by the DENR Secretary or the President because it is prove the alienable and disposable character of the land, which can only be
the only acceptable and sufficient proof of the alienable and disposable ascertained through the classification made by the President or DENR
character of the land. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Secretary, the only public officials who may classify lands into alienable and
Inc.,38the Court required the submission of the certified true copy of the disposable lands of the public domain. The Concurring and Dissenting
land classification approved by the DENR Secretary precisely because mere Opinion alleges that the CENRO serves as a repository of the land
references made by the CENRO and PENRO to the land classification were classification maps, and as such, authorizes the CENRO to issue certified true
deemed insufficient. For instance, CENRO and PENRO may inadvertently copies of the approved land classification maps. While the CENRO may issue
make references to an original classification approved by the DENR Secretary certified true copies of these land classification maps, these maps are not the
which does not cover the land sought to be registered, or worse, to a non- required certified true copy of the original proclamation or order classifying
existent original classification. This is the very evil that the ruling in Republic the public land as alienable and disposable. Moreover, these maps are not in
of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.39 seeks to avoid. Justice Caguioa's the possession of the officials who have custody of the original proclamation
suggestion resurrects the very evil banished by this Court in Republic of the or order classifying the public land as alienable and disposable. Again, the
Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. 40 best evidence of the alienable and disposable nature of the land is the
certified true copy of the classification made by the President or the DENR
Decisions of this Court form part of the legal system of the Philippines 41 and
Secretary – not the certified true copy issued by the CENRO of its land
thus the CENRO, PENRO, and the DENR must follow the decision made by
classification maps.
this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc.42The ruling of
this Court requiring the submission of the certified true copy of the original It is also worthy to note that in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
classification as approved by the DENR Secretary cannot be overturned or Properties, Inc.,48 we have already discussed the value of certifications issued
amended by the CENRO or PENRO or even by the DENR. The DENR, CENRO, by the CENRO or PENRO in land registration cases:
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not possession or occupation started after 12 June 1945, this does not bar the
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence grant of an application for registration of land.
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer", such as Again, we do not agree with Dumo.
entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
To determine whether possession or occupation from 12 June 1945 or earlier
captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies
is material, one has to distinguish if the application for the registration of
or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
land is being made under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Section 14 of PD No.
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
1529. The relevant paragraphs provide:
public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by
adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
therein. personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they under the provision of existing laws.
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.49 (Emphasis supplied) xxxx

The certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO, by itself, does not prove the Thus, it is clear that if the applicant is applying for the registration of land
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The under paragraph 1, possession and occupation of the alienable and
certification should always be accompanied by the original or certified true disposable land of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the should have commenced from 12 June 1945 or earlier. If, however, the
President. applicant is relying on the second paragraph of Section 14 to register the
land, then it is true that a different set of requirements applies, and
Substantial Compliance with the Requirements of Section 14(1) possession and occupation from 12 June 1945 or earlier are not required.

Dumo argues that the Certification from the Regional Surveys Division, which The reliance of Dumo on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 50 is
was formally offered as Exhibit "A" and not opposed by the Republic, should misplaced. The pronouncement of the Court in relation to the phrase "June
be considered substantial compliance with the requirement that the 12, 1945 or earlier" was that the alienable and disposable classification of the
applicant must submit the certified true copy of the original classification of land need not be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that as long as such land
the land as approved by the DENR Secretary. is classified as alienable and disposable when the application is filed, then the
first requirement under the law is fulfilled. The Court held:
We do not agree.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
The fact that the Republic did not oppose the formal offer of evidence of character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
Dumo in the RTC does not have the effect of proving or impliedly admitting 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
that the land is alienable and disposable. The alienable and disposable "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
character of the land must be proven by clear and incontrovertible evidence. phrase "under a bona fide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,
It may not be impliedly admitted, as Dumo vehemently argues. It was the qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
duty of Dumo to prove that the land she sought to register is alienable and are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
disposable land of the public domain. This burden would have been proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
discharged by submitting the required documents – a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
the legal custodian thereof, and a certificate of land classification status petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
issued by the CENRO or the PENRO based on the approved land classification adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
by the DENR Secretary. Without these, the applicant simply fails to prove declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the alienable and susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
disposable lands of the public domain and thus, it may not be susceptible to possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
private ownership. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the land is presumed Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
to belong to the State as part of the public domain. giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
Another requirement under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 is to prove that the be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, yet even considered an independent state.
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bonafide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
In this case, the CA found that Dumo and her predecessors-in-interest have disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
been in possession of the land only from 1948, which is the earliest date of State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
the tax declaration presented by Dumo. This fact is expressly admitted by release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
Dumo. Thus, from this admission alone, it is clear that she failed to prove her government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
and her predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation of the land for to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
the duration required by law — from 12 June 1945 or earlier. possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
Dumo, however, argues that it does not matter that her possession dates
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
only back to 1948 because this Court has allegedly stated that even if the
prerogative over the property.51
Thus, it did not state that the possession and occupation from 12 June 1945 domain. In Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the
or earlier are no longer required. It merely clarified when the land should Philippines,58 we stated:
have been classified as alienable and disposable to meet the requirements of
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529. The property sought to be registered must be Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application public uses are non-alienable and shall not be subject to disposition,
for registration.52 This does not require that the land be declared alienable although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No.
and disposable from 12 June 1945 or earlier. 141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared
open for disposition by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Registration of land under Section 14(2)
Under CA No. 141, the power given to the President to classify lands as
Dumo also argues that she has the right to register the land because she and alienable and disposable extends only to lands of the public domain. Lands
her predecessors-in-interest have already acquired the land through of the public domain are public lands intended for public use, or without
prescription. She states that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been being for public use, are intended for some public service or for the
in possession and occupation of the land for fifty-six (56) years, and thus she development of national wealth. Lands of the public domain, like alienable or
has already acquired ownership of the land by prescription. disposable lands of the public domain, are not private lands. Article 420 of
the Civil Code provides:
Again, we disagree.
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
It is true that under Section 14 of PD No. 1529, one may acquire ownership of
the land by prescription. Particularly, paragraph 2 of Section 14 provides that (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
"those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
the provision of existing laws" may file an application for registration of title of similar character;
to land. The existing law mentioned in PD No. 1529 is the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,53 we applied (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
the civil law concept of prescription as embodied in the Civil Code to intended for some public service or for the development of the national
interpret Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529. This Court held: wealth.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, Classifying lands as alienable and disposable does not take away from the
as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly fact that these lands still belong to the public domain. These lands belonged
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of to the public domain before they were classified as alienable and disposable
prescription under the Civil Code – ordinary acquisitive prescription and and they still remain to be lands of the public domain after such
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is classification. In fact, these lands are classified in Section 3, Article XII of the
completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession... for thirty years, 1987 Philippine Constitution as "[a]lienable lands of the public
without need of title or of good faith."54 (Boldfacing and underscoring domain." The alienable and disposable character of the land merely gives the
supplied) State the authority to alienate and dispose of such land if it deems that the
land is no longer needed for public use, public service or the development of
Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 puts into operation the entire regime of national wealth.
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137.55 Article 1113 provides that "[p]roperty of the State or any of its Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are those that are to be
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of disposed of to private individuals by sale or application, because their
prescription." Thus, it is clear that the land must be patrimonial before it may disposition to private individuals is for the development of the national
be susceptible of acquisitive prescription. Indeed, Section 14(2) of PD No. wealth. Thus, homesteads, which are granted to individuals from alienable
1529 provides that one may acquire ownership of private lands by and disposable lands of the public domain, are for the development of
prescription. agriculture which would redound to the development of national
wealth. However, until the lands are alienated or disposed of to private
Land of the public domain is converted into patrimonial property when there individuals, they remain "alienable lands of the public domain," as
is an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no expressly classified by the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth.56 Without such declaration, acquisitive prescription does not start to Lands of the public domain become patrimonial property only when they are
run, even if such land is alienable and disposable and the applicant is in no longer intended for public use or public service or the development of
possession and occupation thereof. We have held: national wealth. Articles 421 and 422 of the Civil Code expressly provide:

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
State.
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly In turn, the intention that the property is no longer needed for public use,
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the public service or the development of national wealth may only be
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive ascertained through an express declaration by the State. We have clearly
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law held:
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.57 Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
Mere classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable does not development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
make such land patrimonial property of the State – an express declaration by into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
the State that such land is no longer intended for public use, public service or classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
the development of national wealth is imperative. This is because even with dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
such classification, the land remains to be part of the lands of the public prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive only as follows, and not otherwise:
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the (1) For homestead settlement;
President is duly authorized by law.59 (Emphasis supplied)

Without an express declaration that the land is no longer needed for public (2) By sale;
use, public service or the development of national wealth, it should be
presumed that the lands of the public domain, whether alienable and (3) By lease; and
disposable or not, remain belonging to the State under the Regalian
Doctrine. We have already recognized that the classification of land as
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
alienable and disposable does not make such property patrimonial. In Dream
Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development
Authority,60 the Court held: (a) By judicial legalization; or

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis
susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
supplied)
Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby In turn, Section 48 of the same law provides for those who may apply for
become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title by judicial application:
they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion: xxxx

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if x x been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
x it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
national wealth." bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
development of national wealth. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that for lands of the public domain,
The alienable and disposable character of public agricultural land does not
one may apply for an administrative grant from the government, through
convert the land to patrimonial property. It merely gives the State the
homestead, sale, lease or free patent, or apply for the confirmation of their
authority to alienate or dispose the agricultural land, in accordance with law.
title in accordance with the conditions provided under Section 48(b) of CA
It is only when (1) there is an express government manifestation that the
No. 141. PD No. 1529 provides for the original registration procedure for the
land is already patrimonial or no longer intended for public use, public
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. It must also be
service or the development of national wealth, or (2) land which has been
noted that the wording in Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 is similar to that found
classified as alienable and disposable land is actually alienated and disposed
in Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529. The similarity in wording has already been
of by the State, that such land becomes patrimonial.
explained by this Court when it recognized that Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529
In the present case, Dumo not only failed to prove that the land sought to be works in relation to Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 in the registration of
registered is alienable and disposable, but also utterly failed to submit any alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
evidence to establish that such land has been converted into patrimonial
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
property by an express declaration by the State. To repeat, acquisitive
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
prescription only applies to private lands as expressly provided in Article
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
1113 of the Civil Code. To register land acquired by prescription under PD No.
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
1529 (in relation to the Civil Code of the Philippines), the applicant must
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
prove that the land is not merely alienable and disposable, but that it has
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
also been converted into patrimonial property of the State. Prescription will
has been in "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
start to run only from the time the land has become patrimonial.61 Unless the
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is expressly converted
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect
into patrimonial property, there is no way for acquisitive prescription to set
or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation
in under Article 1113 of the Civil Code.
of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
However, another mode of prescription specifically governs the acquisitive title.
prescription of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. CA No.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of
141 provides for the modes of disposing alienable and disposable agricultural
the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
lands of the public domain:
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the
Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the
possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well
as provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. 62 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, the applicant for registration of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain claims his right to register the land under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141 and the procedure for registration is found under Section 14(1) of
PD No. 1529 which provides that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier" may file in the proper court their application for land registration.
The basis for application of judicial confirmation of title over alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is not acquisitive prescription under the
Civil Code, but rather, the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 48(b)
of CA No. 141.

To summarize the discussion and reiterate the guidelines set by this Court
in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,63 we state:

1. If the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
sought to be registered under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier, the applicant must prove that the land has been classified by
the Executive department as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. This is covered by Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of CA No. 141.

While it is not necessary that the land has been alienable and disposable
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, the applicant must prove that the President or
DENR Secretary has classified the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain at any time before the application was made.

2. If the occupation and possession of the land commenced at any time after
12 June 1945, the applicant may still register the land if he or his
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the requirements of acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code after the land has been expressly declared
as patrimonial property or no longer needed for public use, public service or
the development of national wealth. This is governed by Section 14(2) of PD
No. 1529 in relation to the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary or

extraordinary, applies only to private property. Thus, the applicant must
prove when the land sought to be registered was expressly declared as
patrimonial property because it is only from this time that the period for
acquisitive prescription would start to run.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the CA committed no reversible error in

finding that Dumo had no registerable title over the land she seeks to
register. She failed to prove her right under either Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of PD No. 1529. She failed to prove that the land she seeks to register
was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. She failed to prove
her and her predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Thus, she has no right under Section 14(1) of PD No.
1529. While she argues that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the land for 56 years, she failed to prove that
the land has been expressly declared as patrimonial property. Therefore, she G.R. No. 159595             January 23, 2007
also has no right under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of vs.
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be
or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. reconstructed.
It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion
deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below. of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to
land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years
Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional from the time the right of action accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the
Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment
1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge
acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of
improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is
their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.
since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of
corresponding decree of registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that
the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking
to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the
Negros Oriental.3 judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before
the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of
Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one- Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the
half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of
Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become
Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set
purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7)
1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute years.
Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of
that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12
subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been
issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a
corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of
precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
Philippines in December of 1941.
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in
case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5 the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6 finding merit in because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the
Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the
registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court
in its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x x x
the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been
is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as
reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title.
or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14 The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner,
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the
decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall
Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that be sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of
case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, registration book.
barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was
content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v. rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or
and Poras17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations
right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order
writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19 directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the
corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these
the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance
namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare
decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with
and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is
insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property
prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the
registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality
whenever practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that would simply frustrate such goal.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law
Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings. from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in
itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action
the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
arguments of the Republic.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a
to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure
Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the
registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be
Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that
such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration
or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to
no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of
and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration. years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented
decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation
does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or
application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than
fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily registration.
understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for
the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez?
title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in
land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads: those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to
overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts,
directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the
within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the present case.
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed
from an original action for land registration, but from a successful motion by by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption
the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no
private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25
land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that
prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability
course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of
that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases
prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a
Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement
judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said
the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or
the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much
the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in
the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion stating the obvious.
Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the
revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the
1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the
rules of prescription.
adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration
still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final
execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own
contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a
rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology
It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not dissuade from our
Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by
the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case. the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by
Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land
even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all
therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the
filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to
was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing
accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the
able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the
property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic
obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.
prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title
only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period SO ORDERED.
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the
petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the
execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that
score.

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein
were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979
judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the
earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their
pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their
interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other
application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment
within the five (5) -year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that

negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract
from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the
judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have G.R. No. 231116, February 07, 2018
entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already
been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CLARO YAP, Respondent.
Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a
"ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the DECISION
judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said
VELASCO JR., J.:
that their right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was
indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same Nature of the Case
property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the
general presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding
 In its September 20, 2011 Order,13 the RTC admitted petitioner's evidence
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the and deemed the case submitted for decision.
Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the October 20, 2011 RTC Ruling
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6, granting
respondent's petition for registration of a parcel of land located in Carcar,
The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was able
Cebu.
to prove his ownership and possession over Lot No. 922. As such, it granted
The Facts the petition and ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to
cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new copy thereof, and on the basis of
such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in the name of Andres
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition3 for cancellation Abellana, as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The dispositive
and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of the Carcar portion of the October 20, 2011 Decision states:
Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. His petition alleged the WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of the petitioner Claro
following: Yap. The Land Registration Authority thru the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on
1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34) square meters is covered by November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new copy thereof in the name of
Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez, and on
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez; the bases of the new copy of Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres Abellana, as
2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon Yap by virtue of inheritance administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.
and donation and that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said lot since Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the petitioner, Claro Yap,
June 12, 1945, or earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being possessors with the re-issued copy ofDecree No. 99500 and the copy of its title upon
in good faith in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years; payment of any appropriate fees.

3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922, based on the certification SO ORDERED.14
from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, there is no showing or
Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under the
proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the said lot;
name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration15 stating that the new decree and OCT should be issued
4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs of
under his name instead of Andres Abellana.
Porfirio Yap; and

On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting Lot No. 922, or
(OSG), filed its Comment16 mainly arguing that Yap's petition and motion
any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, in
should be denied since the Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.
possession, reversion or expectancy, other than Yap.4

In its Joint Order17 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied Yap's motion ruling
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an
that the law provides that the decree, which would be the basis for the
Order5 dated August 3, 2010 setting the case for hearing on August 3, 2011
issuance of the OCT, should be issued under the name of the original
and ordering the requisite publication thereof. Since no oppositors appeared
adjudicate. Likewise, the RTC also denied the OSG's motion finding that the
before the court during the said scheduled hearing, the RTC issued another
records of the case show that it was furnished with copies of the Petition as
Order6 setting the case for hearing on petitioner's presentation of evidence.
well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration.18
During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the
The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap's petition
following documents, among others, as proof of his claim:
should have been denied due to insufficiency of evidence and failure to
1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized implead indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez and/or
officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA);7 Andres Abellana.

2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot CA Ruling
No. 922;8

3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling finding that
of title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been issued;9 the pieces of evidence submitted by Yap were sufficient to support the
petition. It ruled that since it has been established that no certification of
4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap title or patent had been issued over Lot No. 922, the RTC did not err in
with Deed of Donation;10 ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 in the name of Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.19
5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar
indicating that the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax As regards the OSG's argument on non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
Declarations for Lot No. 922 since 1948; CA highlighted that it is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Nevertheless,
it ruled that the heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan Rodriguez were not
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002;11
deprived of the opportunity to be heard as the proceeding before the RTC
7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and was an in rem proceeding. Thus, when the petition was published, all persons
including the said heirs were deemed notified.20
8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is no Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by the OSG on appeal, it
existing public land application for Lot No. 922.12 also noted that it was too late to raise the same due to the latter's failure to
file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision or submit a comment
on the merits of Yap's Partial Motion for Reconsideration.21 The dispositive land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
portion of the CA decision reads: lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment, which may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 20, years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, in LRC REC. NO. Lot Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such
No. 922, Cad. 30, Carcar City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
SO ORDERED.22 and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially the same
party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition
arguments but this time also advancing the theory that Yap's action had
or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
already prescribed.
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
The Issue proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the RTC correctly oust him therefrom.
ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and
the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
No. 922. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
The Court's Ruling possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
We deny the petition.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal;23 the general rule being that the appellate court is not
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the
OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON
courts below.24
A DECISION WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY
CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case.
LIMITATIONS.

There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law
may order or issue a decree
that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment
The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied due to Yap and
error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
his predecessors' failure to file the proper motion to execute Decree No.
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
99500 as prescribed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.25 It also
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
subscribes that the petition is now barred by the statute of limitations26 since
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
nine (9) decades had already passed after the issuance of the said decree in
decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed cannot
November 1920 without any action brought upon by Yap or his predecessors-
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be
in-interest.27
registered. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that Decree No. 99500 The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v.
has attained finality and the decision granting the issuance thereof was not de Banuvar30 and reiterated by the Court in the more recent Ting v. Heirs of
appealed or modified. Diego Lirio31 wherein We ruled that a final judgment confirming land title and
ordering its registration constitutes res judicata against the whole world and
The foregoing arguments are specious. the adjudicate need not file a motion to execute the same, thus:

Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on November 29, In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu pursuant to the court's with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of
decision in Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 58.28 The the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration
issuance of the said decree creates a strong presumption that the decision in in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It
Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and executory. Thus, it is incumbent becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from
upon the OSG to prove otherwise. However, no evidence was presented to a judgment of confirmation and registration.
support its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 and the issuance
of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality. The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's
approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been confirmed by judicial application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on
declaration several decades ago does not, however, give room for the the whole world including petitioner.
application of the statute of limitations or laches, nor bars an application for
the re-issuance of the corresponding decree. xxxx

In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla,29 the Court elucidated the raison The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
d'etre why the statue of limitations and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
Court do not apply in land registration proceedings, viz: within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly
affirmed. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute
Registration Law32 from the time decisions in land registration cases become that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued
perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is there a need to have it
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil cancelled and re-issued?
Procedure.33
Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD
The propriety of cancellation and reissuance of Decree No. 99500, to serve 1529 which states that: "The original certificate of title shall be a true copy
as basis for the issuance of an OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been of the decree of registration." This provision is significant because it
sufficiently proven in the instant case contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old
decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the corresponding
The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap's petition is not barred by OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while
the statute of limitations, there-issuance of Decree No. 99500 is still the decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past
improper due to the total lack of evidence presented before the court.34 Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of the law which
states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of registration.
We disagree. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of
a new one is necessary.
At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by enumerating and
discussing in detail, yet again, the pieces of evidence proffered in the instant xxxx
case. This matter had already been passed upon and settled by the courts a
quo and it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Yet, 4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in
even if We take a second look at the facts of the case, the Court is still representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still he under
inclined to deny the petition. the name of the original adjudicate.

Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 was It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the
issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent. The
Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be
during the proceedings before the court that no OCT was ever issued prohibited from filing the necessary petition.
covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential Decree No.
152935 or the "Property Registration Decree" provides that the original As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There is, decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be the same as that of the
therefore, a need to cancel the old decree and a new one issued in order for original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor modified;
the decree and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other. hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicate. (Emphasis and
underscoring in tlie original)
In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez,36 the Court enunciated the necessity of the
petition for cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, if no OCT had Based from the foregoing, the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of
been issued pursuant to the old decree: Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its original
1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for cancellation adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and {or issuance of OCT pursuant to Rodriguez.
that re-issued decree.
Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings and the
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R No. ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show that the CA's decision was
123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing arbitrarily made or that evidence on record was disregarded.
a petition for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such decree
and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued decree. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491 is
"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to hereby AFFIRMED.
admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter
to his Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court,
ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one
for re-issuance of decree under the following guidelines:

Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the
lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus [G.R. NO. 163751 : March 31, 2006]
motion should have been heard as a motion to reissue the decrees in order
to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard ANECITO CALIMPONG and wife [NARCISA YGUAS], * Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
in their opposition. FILOMENA GUMELA represented by FLAVIA MOLINA, Respondent.

Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the DECISION
amended petition subject to the private respondent's being given. the
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing Complying with the order issued on December 10, 1927 by Auxiliary Judge
evidence shall be given the parties." Mariano Buyson Lampa of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in
Cadastral Case No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 757 for the registration, in
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, of Lot No. 3013
be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the same is
of the Cadastral Survey of Dipolog (the lot) located in Anastacio, Polanco, To the complaint of the heirs, the spouses Calimpong alleged in their
Zamboanga del Norte in the names of Filomena, Dionisio, Eusebio, Victoria, September 3, 1993 Answer with Counterclaim7 that, inter alia, assuming that
Fortunata, Serapio, Hipolito, Victor, Romualdo and Miguel, all surnamed the lot was adjudicated to the Gumelas, "the same ha[d] been considered
Gumela1 who were therein decreed "the owners in fee simple" of the lot, long abandoned because neither the adjudicatee[s] nor any of the heirs have
Decree No. 342638 was issued on October 19, 1928, as attested by Enrique pursued the titling of the land, cultivation, improvement and possession." In
Altavas, Chief of the General Land Registration Office. Despite the issuance of any event, the spouses Calimpong informed that a Free Patent and an OCT
the decree, it appears that no certificate of title was issued and registered in over the lot had already been issued in the name of Calimpong by the
the names of the Gumelas. Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.

By the claim of the Heirs of the Gumelas (the heirs), they hired an overseer The heirs thus filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint8 impleading as
in-charge of the cultivation of the lot. additional defendants PENRO and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte, seeking as additional reliefs the nullification of OCT No. P-33780 and
In 1992, the heirs agreed to partition the estate of their predecessors-in- Free Patent No. 09721093961.
interest which includes the lot. They soon learned, however, that the lot was
being occupied by Anecito Calimpong (Calimpong). The amended complaint9 was admitted by the Dipolog RTC, by Resolution10 of
February 8, 1994.
It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over
the lot, which application he followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his After trial on the merits, the trial court, by Decision11 of February 28, 2001,
possession was "disturbed" by the heirs. rendered judgment in favor of the heirs. It held that, among other things, the
title of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to their predecessors-in-interest
The heirs thus filed on July 27, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of by the government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant, the lot ceased
Dipolog City a complaint2 for quieting of title, damages, with prayer for to be part of public domain as it had become private property, hence, not
preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife. subject to free patent application. It thus concluded that the free patent and
the title issued to Calimpong were null and void. The decretal portion of the
In the meantime, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
trial court's decision reads:
(PENRO) Hilarion L. Ramos approved Calimpong's Free Patent application, by
Order3 of August 17, 1993, in light of the following findings: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court declares the herein plaintiffs
being the hereditary successors of the adjudicatees mentioned in the
1. That the applicant is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and is
Decree (Exhibit "L"), are the rightful owners of Lot No. 3013, Cad. Survey of
otherwise qualified to acquire public lands through Free Patent;
Dipolog under Cad. Case No. 5, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. 757, situated at
2. That the land applied for has been classified as alienable and Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte and, as prayed for in the
disposable and is subject to disposition under the public land laws; complaint, in order to remove clouds cast on it by the claim of the
defendants Free Patent No. 09721093961 issued by the PENRO of
3. That upon investigation conducted by Deputy Public Land Inspector Zamboanga del Norte, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780
Marciano I. Carangan, whose report was duly indorsed by LMO-III Designate, issued by said office and the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
Ramon S. Pacatang, it was found out that the land applied for has been del Norte, are hereby declared null and void; the defendants are hereby
occupied and cultivated by the applicant himself and/or through his ordered to turn over the peaceful possession of the land in question unto
predecessor-in-interest, since July 4, 1945 or prior thereto; plaintiffs; the plaintiffs, upon proper petition filed in Court, may ask the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte to cause the issuance of a
4. That the Notice of the acquisition of the land by the Applicant under this Certificate of Title under the same terms and conditions as stated in the
application has been published in accordance with Law and that no person Decree issued to Lot No. 3013, with such decree as basis thereof.
has proven a better right to the land applied for;
No damages awarded, the same not being proved.12 (Underscoring
5. That the claim of the applicant is in all other respects, complete and there supplied)cralawlibrary
is no records in this office or any obstacle to the issuance of patent;
andcralawlibrary On appeal, the appellate court, by the challenged Decision13 of January 26,
2004, affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
6. That there is no adverse claim involving the land applied for still pending
determination in this office; (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary Hence, the present petition of the spouses Calimpong (hereafter petitioners)
faulting the appellate court in:
Accordingly, the Order disposed as follows:
1. . . . [not] holding that [they are the] true and real owners of the land in
WHEREFORE, the occupation and cultivation of the land applied for as question[.]
described in the caption hereof is hereby confirmed and this application is
then hereby entered in the records of this office as Free Patent Entry No. 2. . . . [not] declaring . . . Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 .. as valid
372. and legally issued[.]

As the applicant has already complied with all the requirements of the law 3. . . . giving weight to the alleged title in the name of respondent's
for the issuance of the corresponding patent to the land, it is also predecessors in interest which was not found or existing in the records of the
hereby ordered that the necessary patent be prepared for the issuance in Register of Deeds neither presented or offered in evidence by them[.]
favor of the Applicant.4 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
4. . . . appreciating in respondents' favor their inability to show proof that
On August 17, 1993, Patent No. 09721093961 was issued to Calimpong which they ever filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of said title, if at all, it
was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte for actually existed[.]
registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.5
5. . . . failing to consider respondents' alleged payment of taxes to the land
On August 19, 1993, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-337806 was started only in 1993 at the time that this case had already been instituted in
issued by and registered in the Register of Deeds for the Province of court[.]
Zamboanga del Norte in the name of Calimpong.
6. . . . [not] holding that laches, more than prescription, applies in this case[.]
7. . . . resolving that the existing Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately
petitioners coupled with the latter's actual possession, not the ghost, alleged owned. The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land
title of the respondents' predecessors[-]in[-]interest, should entitle the Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public
indefeasibility of the torrens system[.]14 domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee
The petition fails. title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and
cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as
It is undisputed that the lot was judicially adjudicated and an order for the
the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner
registration of the lot in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of the heirs
in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions of the
(hereafter respondent) as "owners in fee simple" was issued on December
text thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 18
10, 1927, and that a decree of registration was issued on October 19, 1928,
to wit: Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot, Free
Patent No. 09721093961 issued on August 17, 1993 by the PENRO of
xxx
Zamboanga del Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued on
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in August 19, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of petitioner Calimpong are null and void.
said Filomena Gumela, Dionisio Gumela, . . . subject, however, to such of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
[e]ncumbrances mentioned in article 39 of said Law as may be subsisting,
and to a first lien in favor of the Insular Government to guarantee the
payment of the special taxes assessed pursuant to the provisions of section
18 of Act 2259, as amended.

Witness the Honorable Mariano Buyson Lampa, Auxiliary Judge of said Court,
the 10th day of December, A. D., nineteen hundred and twenty-seven.

Issued at Manila, P.I, the 19th day of October A. D. 1928, at 10:03 a.m.

x x x x15

Nothing in the records shows that the order of adjudication was appealed,
questioned or set aside.

In De la Merced v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held:

. . . [T]he title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the

expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such appeal having been perfected. The certificate
of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer
be necessary.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the

issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No.
395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of
irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said
adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial
decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become from that
time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse
possession.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Following the immediately-quoted pronouncement in De la Merced, the title

of ownership on the adjudicatees, the Gumelas-predecessors-in-interest of
respondent, was vested on December 10, 1927.

Whether a certificate of title was issued in the name of respondent's

predecessors-in-interest is immaterial. For, following De la Merced, the title
of ownership on respondent's predecessors-in-interest was vested as of G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998
1927. The lot, for all intents and purposes, had become from said date
registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession and SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their
was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau of attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioner,
the DENR (formerly the Bureau of Lands) to subject it to free patent. vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private
respondents' predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the
Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a
free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to PANGANIBAN, J.:
private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises
not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the
subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical
title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply
issue such decree? to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;

The Case After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. — 7237, is covered
for mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex "F" hereof. Said TCT No.
in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the
title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located
The Facts
because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by
of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the
the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order
trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing
dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the
thus: 3
same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No.
applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . . . .
title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the
declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
petition be dismissed for being premature.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent
issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of
motion, dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To
legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave.,
this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995,
Manila.
which ordered: 8
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
. . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04
issued an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the
September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the
corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence,
Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in
petitioners filed this action for mandamus. 5
detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993
1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of (the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot
Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68),
decree: 6 described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a
portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the
following comments are respectfully submitted: On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with
the above resolution, to which was attached a letter, dated November 27,
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, 1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Division, which states: 9
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal
was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada; With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is
a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S.
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land 1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de
per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
subdivision plan is Annex "A" hereof; 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September
14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively; It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the
Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "B" hereof, requesting for a certified duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene
true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the
Compania Agricola de Ultramar; integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio
Migriño, et. al.).
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex "C" hereof, per Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Annex "D" hereof;
Issue
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical
description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "E" hereof,
requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final
issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having
Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68). become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside.
They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
The Court's Ruling Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory,
the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
The petition is not meritorious.
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy? title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section
32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
"unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the laws specifically This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four reasons why decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order
the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to
perform" because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
"jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in
not the duty of the LRA to "take the cudgels for the private persons in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered
possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595." Rather, it by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues
property subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third, to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
title, because of "the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila
to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its
titles. 12 Fourth, the State "consented to its being sued" in this case[;] thus, duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
case "as final and make provision for its satisfaction." 13 may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the
integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends
that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer
of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as
for the same land is null and void." 14 On the question of whether the LRA administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of
can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in
cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez 15 which held: 16 ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of
the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally
adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer
compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act
decreed to and titled in the name of another. 496 which provides:
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant
alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every
under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only
we declared in an early case, "(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Emphasis Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
supplied.) disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
proper remedy for three reasons.
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the
Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and
it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to
final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any
Appeals: 17 person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in
procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation
or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil.,
by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39). 227, 234:

However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated
M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must
stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained
Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel
3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits
S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In
other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's refusal to issue a decree of registration become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be
is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the
trial court void. General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance
void, 19 since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason
of land only once. 20 Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a
issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes
principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21 vs. De Villa, supra). . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable
Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et sought to be compelled is clear and complete. 24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules
al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said: inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious,
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in
lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an
appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question
avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable
the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously by mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its own
decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners. judgment and understanding of the law. 28

In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its
the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of
already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said
rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as
and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of herein discussed.
another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of
first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with
covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.
declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land
system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of
the efficacy of the registration law. registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act SO ORDERED.

The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of

courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto
vs. Nable: 22

Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral

court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions,
G.R. No. 142549               March 9, 2010

FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title

(OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two
(1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En
Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an
area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican."1 What we
have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest and most extensive land- The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a
grabbing incidents in recent history."2 letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st
Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-119 issued to all Registers
one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be
determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the
equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22
forty-five (45) years. September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the
Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the
Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to
(LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ
Order3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Deeds, copy attached, stating the following:
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of
Finality on March 12, 1998. xxxx

On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement
claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor
alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated
of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and 8 January 1998.
Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and
accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate
OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate
Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.10 (Emphasis ours.)
of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
(TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,4 reiterated
issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication
the prior registration rule. perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds
of Caloocan City.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted
the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of
respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the
transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One
Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
(105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing
subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among "certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was
the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property. issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued
or registered on May 3, 1917.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated October 21, 1997 issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the
and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated December 30, 1997 that the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had previously
following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the Register of issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were
Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned
proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No.
interest in the property, is approved. 994.11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being
directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co- kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." We quote the last
owners for the following lots, namely: portion of said letter-reply:
xxxx As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register
of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this
was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there
Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.6
were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo
Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8
awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens
petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a
Deeds to comply with the Order.
stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of 4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.17
land registration.
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being
of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he
from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an
by the issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not
persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not
subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely a real party-in-interest in this case.
sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance
with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering land Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department
previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several
CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February
which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain
invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with
Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer certificates transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee
of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original
pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City
874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates
every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the
legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of
Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large."12 and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have
participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department,
Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other
Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of units and attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such
Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final
power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate."18
highest Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona
claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of
which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely
on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and
on "what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General
well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the
amend, modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo
Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered Estate. He alleges that based on this committee’s report dated August 27,
the Order of no effect.14 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies,
procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ,
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles
issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of
1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an
without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or
contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of supplanted any judgment of this Court.
the highest degree."15
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18,
ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her
avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no rights and interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent
"plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA
than this action." Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner’s counsel to present
petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as
denial of the petition: the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19

1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is
latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice. a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where
petitioner’s claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court,
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was
however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for
pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee
petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the
created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting
amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be
an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or
denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid
modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score alone,
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.20
Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has
Indorsement was issued.
to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of public
respondents’ failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new
respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the transfer certificates of title in their names.25
court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents Public respondents claim the following as facts:
affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not charged with any improper act,
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25,
but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall
1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the
require private respondent’s active participation. 22
Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3,
any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been
x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The
partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y
complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular
Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason,
issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent
Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino
by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after
Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose
the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y
and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is entitled de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz,
to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C- Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y
424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y
because of the wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following Patiño, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo
provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument: Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa
Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their
RULE 65 respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE
PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA
xxxx MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D",
and its faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy
attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall
be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same
officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-
disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue enumerated true owners.
for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the
RULE 39 undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the
questioned Order of the lower court.
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending
the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.26

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and
thereof, with notice to the adverse party. enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a
writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this
controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful for
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that
public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act
did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the
being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does
issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that
not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the
doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, acts of the respondent.
which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No.
substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.27 It is nonetheless 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be
likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning
judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
already taken in the exercise of either.28 virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine,
and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.35
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if
compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents’ issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s request?
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917,
Authority29 instructive, to wit: and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title,
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on
Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the
duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the title or the date when the title took effect.
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917
integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts
xxxx doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.

x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or
inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at
the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this bar.36 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1
case, mandamus cannot issue.30 (Emphasis ours.)
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a
officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same declaring as follows:
parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the
issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the
compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the
there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot
of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they
the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces
find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter- of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by
reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept
Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports
his refusal to grant petitioner’s request.31 There was, therefore, sufficient must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will
basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given have the discretion to accept or reject them.
the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only
anchored their rights, did not exist. be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by xxxx
this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
succeeding resolution33 in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the
Resolution.37
question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to
rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged
at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions as to the
status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by
the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date
this Court34 which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated
of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April
differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No.
1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date
C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title.
of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in
the 2007 Manotok case:
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No.
C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of
different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money,
should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that
the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and
her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit
earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack
of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellee.

ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO GAYARES, Petitioners-Appellants, v.
RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.

Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.

Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The prime purpose

of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final,
irrevocable, and indisputable.
2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the offspring of the interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer
Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as established in the asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners,
Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purpose of the Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this
Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1 of the municipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases,
Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had during
the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued the
following decree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. — Many precautions are taken to guard against
injustice. "It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, the
following lots be adjudged and registered in the names of those persons
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The whose names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with the
first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes following conditions: . . .
the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court. The second action is
the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the "Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library
Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a
copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. The third and last On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing
action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. decree in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. — For a decree to exist in legal "The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having
contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-called become final on September 21, 1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of
decree by the Land Registration Office. the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to the
lots adjudged by said decision.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published in
the Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for the "An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as
registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 21, follows, the decrees thereon, must be suspended until further order by this
1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, the court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
time for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final. On July
23, 1917, before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-called "Lot No. 521.
technical decree, V and G ask that the case be reopened to receive proof
relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial court. Held: Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the
That since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 21, 1916, Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez
has become final, and since no action was taken within the time provided by and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez,
law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their
is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda
Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete ignorance of
7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. — Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that
Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare. the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.
Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-motion, asking the
8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. — The General Land Registration court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares.
Office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being a
the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, the
Sec. 174.) court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that counsel
for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme
Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of
evidence.
DECISION
In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear that
counsel for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as provided for
MALCOLM, J. : in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they asked to be
relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. As a matter of fact, they could not well claim fraud because all the
The principal question which this appeal presents is — When does the
proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of chicanery. As a
registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially
matter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of the Code of Civil
under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System,
Procedure would not get them anywhere because more than six months had
become final, conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions are
elapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case. The issue
— At what stage of the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legal
fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court has
contemplation? Does it exist from the moment that the court, after hearing
jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemental
the evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and then, or later
decree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance on September 21,
decrees the land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the Chief of the
1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have become final, petitioners
Land Registration Office transcribes the adjudication in the prescribed form?
may no bring their appeal before this court, because the time for the filing of
their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings did not
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
become final until the formal decree was issued by the Land Registration
Office, then it was proper for them to ask for a reopening of the case, and it
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran,
would, consequently, be just as proper for this court to order the trial court
Province of Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands,
to permit the same.
on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in the Official
Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all
OPINION. (Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 177.) This latter decree contains the
technical description of the land and may not be issued until a considerable
The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated, time after the promulgation of the judgment. The form for the decree used
to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable. by the General Land Registration Office concludes with the words: "Witness,
Incontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must accordingly be the Honorable (name of the judge), on this the (date)." The date that is used
taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good as authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when, after hearing the
reason, may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of the
cost of possible cruelty which may result in exceptional cases, it does become land.
necessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce registration laws. No
stronger words can be found than those appearing in Section 38 of the Land The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is said that: "Every decree of judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . . . It shall be certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government is ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated, the
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the
notice, or citation, or included in the general description ’To all whom it may running of the time for the interposition of a motion for a new trial or for the
concern,’ Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the title prepared
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of the technical
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree description. If an unknown individual could wait possibly years until the day
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a technical description of a
(Court of First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entry of piece of land, the defeated party could just as reasonably expect the same
the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the so-called unknown is a
interest."cralaw virtua1aw library party just as much as the known oppositor for notice is to all the world, and
the decree binds all the world.
While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, they
become even more incisive and peremptory when we come to consider the Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of this
offspring of this system, here known as the Cadastral System. Under the court in the case of Tambunting v. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . That case
Torrens System proper, whether action shall or shall not be taken is optional and the instant case are not the same. In the Tambunting case the contest
with the solicitant. Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the was really between two parties each claiming to have a Torrens title; here
part of the Government, titles for all the land within a stated area, are one party has the title and the other is seeking to oust him from his fortress.
adjudicated whether or not the people living within this district desire to In the Tambunting case the declaration of ownership but not the decree of
have titles issued. The purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act registration had issued; here both declaration and decree have issued. The
(NO. 2259), is to serve the public interests, by requiring that the titles to any doctrines announced in the decision in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz ([1910], 17
lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the indefensibility of land titles under
the Torrens system are much more applicable and can, with as much reason,
Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessive be applied to the cadastral system.
interference with private property constitutes due process of law and that
the Acts providing for the same are constitutional, a question not here As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
raised, yet a study of the law indicates that many precautions are taken to conclusive and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
guard against injustice. The proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
When the lands have been surveyed and plotted, the Director of Lands, judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been
represented by the Attorney General, files a petition in court praying that the taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of
titles to the lands named be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
the petition is then published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
in both the English and Spanish languages. All persons interested are given providing for fraud.
the benefit of assistance by competent officials and are informed of their
rights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able
and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the arguments relative to the applicability of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of
various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the bases of Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the case would
original certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No. 2259, Sec. 11.) make unprofitable any discussion of this question.
Aside from this, the commotion caused by the survey and a trial affecting
ordinarily many people, together with the presence of strangers in the It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
community, should serve to put all those affected on their guard. Negros of September 21, 1916, has become final, and that no action was
taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — dismissed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of
receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This
again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment
of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor, has as
one of his duties "to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases."
G.R. No. L-17757             May 30, 1962

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.

Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.

Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No.
946), upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of
the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.

As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3, The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if
1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claiming there was actually a petition for review of the decision of December 26,
ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The
the cadastral court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought fact of the matter is that Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public
and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950- land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December
1956. 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Manila for
Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their and 2044, was declared a public land and was the object of a homestead
ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. application by the respective concessionaries (p. 21, rec. of exhibits). . . .
3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and
their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was
daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated December
cause with the defendants. 26, 1923 (Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that
Lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after
notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for the
making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of Title
issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2).
No. 425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los
Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public
decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the
No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared
the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said
that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on December 17, lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in
1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have
that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was
the name of Ezequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one
which was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate
declared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the costs.
after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original
Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the
therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was basis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of
null and void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the the Philippine Islands v. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the
name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title
Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by
latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when
years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the receiver the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not
to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for prevail over the cadastral court's decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in
the agricultural years 1953-1955. favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.

Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of
the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for the Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
reception of additional evidence.
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus: the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in
favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925,
The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated "Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those
Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in Transfer Certificate of orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding
Title No. 1971 and original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property
Lot 3-6". They, however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?
decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, entitled "Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be
al.," (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the considered:
issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec. of
exhibits). By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was
No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;
less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over the said lot.
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925
The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of
the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to
1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;
a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the
defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without
1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of
there was no decree issued pursuant thereto. which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a
homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral
1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the Philippine
which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot Islands v. Abural,1 said:
at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates
That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision —
1952. the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of
convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This
of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered
registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
registry of deeds had been accomplished. This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment
of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 sec. 174.) . . . .
are:
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is
decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon performed is the mere formulation of technical description. . . .
and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern". conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been
for reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree povided no providing for fraud.
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of
said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is
with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the
decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land
Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.
shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of
titles hereinafter mentioned. (Emphasis supplied.) As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance
to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the
It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already
a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested
which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents
the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land. and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could
not be acquired by adverse possession.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only
to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with
lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes: costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.

SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the
province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court,
for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may
designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and
proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same
rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same
manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect.
All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts
thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original
certificates of title in favor of said persons which shall have the same effect
as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under
the Land Registration Act, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)