A comprehensive analysis on War in Afghanistan-

CSS Current Affairs

Afghanistan has stayed less a homogenous state and more a montage of feuding ethnicities and warring
tribes bound by strings of self-interest and foreign subservience. (CSS Current Affairs)

Having written nearly two dozen analyses on Afghanistan since 2010, I can give you two good and one
not-so-good news today. First of all, the Afghan war of past 17 years is coming to an end. President
Barack Obama’s words resonate to recall: “I think Americans have learned it’s harder to end wars than it
is to begin them.” Secondly, Daesh (the so-called Islamic State) has no future in the region. Similar to my
prediction in spring 2017 (Radical Islamism: Understanding Extremist Narrative and Mindset) about
Daesh’s elimination in Iraq, I foresee the terrorist group’s total rout in Afghanistan (though it would first
need the U.S.-led coalition forces to leave).

Read more: Pakistan’s Jihadist cauldron: From national asset to national millstone

However, one cannot be certain about Afghanistan’s internal security and stability, taking into account
Afghan nation’s historic ethnic distrust and tribal discord. ‘Washing blood with blood’ this time some 17-
year-old ‘scores’ need to be settled too. In An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815) Mountstuart
Elphinstone (the East India Company’s administrator who negotiated with the Afghan ruler Shah Shuja)
had noted, “To sum up the character of the Afghans in a few words: their vices are revenge, envy,
avarice, rapacity, and obstinacy.”

Washington’s Revision of Stance

Taliban have always been insistent on a direct dialogue with the United States and the departure of
foreign forces from Afghanistan to end their insurgency. The two demands are now being met. Amid
reports of President Trump getting frustrated with stalemate in the ongoing war, the U.S. has not only
showed its willingness to talk with the Taliban and discuss withdrawal of foreign troops, but the U.S.
special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Alice Wells, has already reportedly met with the Taliban
representatives in Doha, Qatar, resulting in some “very positive signals.”

However, it’s too early to rejoice. Washington still seems ambivalent about its departure, carrying the
stigma of another failed war from the “graveyard of empires.” Eminent British journalist, Christina Lamb,
records in her book Farewell Kabul: From Afghanistan to a More Dangerous World: “Maybe we hadn’t
been chased out as in previous wars, but Afghanistan would always be remembered as a failure, in the
same breath as Vietnam and Gallipoli.”

The indecision, or reluctance, if your will, is reflected in NATO’s Brussels summit in July 2018, pledging to
continue to train, fund and assist Afghan security forces until 2024 – an extension of its earlier
commitment to contribute US1$ billion annually until 2020 at the Warsaw summit in 2016.

While Taliban stick to their list of demand: 1) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan; 2)
Removal of the names of their leaders from the UN terror-watch list; 3) Release of prisoners; and 4)
Allowing Afghan people to decide their political issues per their religion, culture and traditions, the U.S.
remains preoccupied with the: 1) Survival of its setup created after 2001’s Bonn agreement, including
Afghan government and a democratic constitution; 2) Country going-down in another civil-war (similar
to that of 1992); and 2) Rise of global terrorism from Afghan soil once again (after al-Qaeda).

Read more: Afghanistan’s Managed Chaos: US Strategic Regional Designs

However, with the U.S. secretary of state, Mike Pompeo expressing his readiness to participate and
support the peace talks on his surprise visit to Kabul on 9 July 2018, a graceful exit seems already being
planned.

The Taliban Factor in Changing Thought

A revision of thought in the U.S. mind has probably occurred after it saw that while a military strategy
against the Taliban remained unsuccessful, al-Qaeda’s reincarnation has taken place in the shape of
Daesh in Afghanistan.

While a political settlement with the Taliban was always encouraged by all and sundry, it belatedly
dawned upon Washington that “Taliban are part of the social fabric” of the country, who “believe in the
nationhood of Afghanistan, in contrast to other militant groups like Islamic State,” as noted by Alice
Wells, the special U.S. envoy. Taliban’s open letter in February 2018 addressed to the American people
further helped in softening the U.S. stance and developing a better understanding about the group.
The Eid-ul-Fitr ceasefire observed by the Taliban rank and file further demonstrated its unity of
command, putting to rest any suggestion of (mainstream) Taliban infighting or factionalization. A BBC
study in January 2018 had found Taliban openly operating in Afghanistan’s 70 percent districts, fully
controlling 4 percent of the country and demonstrating their overt presence in another 66 percent
territory (see FDD’s Long War Journal’s interactive map of Taliban control of districts here).

Foreign Forces’ Disappointing Report Card in Afghanistan

Amid quite a few American failures in Afghanistan, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) gave a poor report card to the U.S. led coalition forces in April 2018 for acute
deficiencies in the Afghan National Defence and Security Force (ANDSF). SIGAR noted, for instance:
“Despite US government expenditures of more than $70 billion in security sector assistance to design,
train, advise, assist, and equip the ANDSF since 2002, the Afghan security forces are not yet capable of
securing their own nation.” Afghan territory keeps slipping out of the hands of Western-trained
Afghanistan’s six field and one commando corps spread countrywide: 201 Corps, garrisoning Kabul; 203
Corps, Gardez; 205 Corps, Kandahar; 207 Corps, Heart; 209 Corps, Mazar-i-Sharif; and 215 Corps at
Lashkargah.

Moreover the jittery manner in which the Afghan gunship helicopters killed 36 innocent villagers,
including 30 children and wounded 71 others at Dasht-i-Archi in Kunduz province on 2 April 2018,
demonstrated the level of training of Afghan soldiers imparted by the foreign forces. There had been a
rationale behind denying Afghan security forces the use of gunships or fighter jets as they then begin
settling their personal scores, tribal disputes and ethnic feuds themselves.

Lastly, the staggering 1.17 million war crime claims collected by the International Criminal Court (ICC) at
The Hague must have also unnerved the stakeholders in Afghanistan. Unlawful and illegal atrocities,
including killings of unarmed prisoners by not only the Taliban and Daesh, but also involving Afghan
security forces and government-affiliated warlords, the U.S.-led coalition and foreign and domestic spy
agencies constitute war crimes in Afghanistan. Under immense international and domestic pressure,
investigations have already begun in Australia and New Zealand with the U.S. and U.K., also likely to
come under ICC’s scrutiny.

U.S. Rapprochement with Pakistan

Having threatened Pakistan with dire consequences – including cross-border attacks and hot pursuit
operations on Pakistani soil – Washington has since stepped back from its bully (discussed in my last two
papers entitled: America’s Waterloo: ‘Scapegoating’ Pakistan for Failures in
Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s Managed Chaos: US Strategic Regional Designs).

In February 2018, seventeen U.S. intelligence agencies had warned the Congress about a nuclear-armed
Pakistan slipping-out of America’s influence into China’s sphere, becoming a threat to Washington’s
strategic interests in the South Asian region. Since an antagonized – and uncooperative – Islamabad
remains detrimental to Washington’s interests, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, John Sullivan,
changed his tone during a visit to Kabul the same month, clearly conveying to the Afghan leadership that
America has no intentions of severing ties with Pakistan or launching military strikes inside its territory.

In fact, it had been Pakistan’s army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who told the Americans point-
blank at the 54th Munich Security Conference in February 2018 to stop blaming Pakistan for its
problems in Afghanistan and instead search for the reasons for its failures. The Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), a leading British security think-tank, found the general’s confidence in his celebrated
“Bajwa Doctrine” – standing up against the U.S. intimidation, demanding Pakistan to “do more.” In his
address at the nation’s Defence Day in September 2017, the army chief thundered: “[N]ow … the world
must do more.”

Pakistan’s defiance worked. Washington not only guaranteed to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, but Alice Wells also acknowledged Pakistan and Taliban having legitimate
grievances, saying, “Pakistan has an important role to play in helping stabilise Afghanistan.”

In a related development, President Trump elevated Washington’s ambassador to Islamabad, David

Hale, to under secretary of state for political affairs, a position which grants the diplomat more sway to
implement president’s new Afghan strategy. Mr. Hale, who has been performing his ambassadorial
responsibilities since 2015, seems to have the confidence of Pakistan’s Army and its intelligence
establishment as he strongly supports normalization of ties between India and Pakistan. The
ambassador played a lead role in bringing-back Washington-Islamabad relations from a breaking point
after President Trump slammed Pakistan (while outlining his new Afghan strategy on 21 August 2017)
followed by his “lies and deceit” New Year’s tweet, condemning Pakistan for supporting the Taliban.
Pakistan’s defiance worked. Washington not only guaranteed to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, but Alice Wells also acknowledged Pakistan and Taliban having legitimate
grievances, saying, “Pakistan has an important role to play in helping stabilise Afghanistan.”

In a rare coincidence, a U.S. drone targeted and killed Pakistan’s most wanted terrorist, Mullah Fazlullah,
the head of Pakistan’s bête noir, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, in Afghanistan on 15 Jun 2018. Pakistan
had long demanded action against the fugitive terrorist who had masterminded one of the most heart-
wrenching terrorist attacks in Pakistan killing 132 school children in December 2014. Demonstrating a
modified outlook towards Pakistan – long accused for harbouring the Afghan Taliban – not only
President Ashraf Ghani picked up the phone to announce the news to Pakistan’s army chief, but in an
equally rare admission U.S. defence secretary, James Mattis, took credit for Fazlullah’s elimination.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Bonhomie

With the change in American attitude towards Pakistan, surprisingly, the hostile statements coming
from Afghan officials, blaming Pakistan for every terrorist attack on Afghan soil, also stopped. It looks
that a flurry of high-level exchanges – with a few shrouded in complete secrecy – along with the
Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Committee (PAJC), a Track-II diplomatic initiative, played a meaningful role in
warming-up their bilateral relations. Pledging to make a “fresh start,” the Afghan deputy foreign
minister, Hekmat Khalil Karzai, visiting Pakistan admitted, “Pakistan is not part of the problem but
solution.”

I believe, it has been Pakistan’s army chief, General Bajwa’s astute military diplomacy – mentioned
above as the “Bajwa Doctrine” – and some of his out of box initiatives that brought a much needed thaw
in the conflict. The general, beyond doubt, has given some ‘extraordinary assurances’ to the other
parties to the conflict with regards to the Taliban, to ensure its ‘niche’ in mainstream Afghan politics.

Having huge stakes in Afghanistan, Pakistan has always pushed for a political settlement with the Taliban
granting the militia some political accommodation in the future setup of the country. Pointing out
such reconciliation in the past, through which a former rebel leader was not only accommodated in the
political setup in Kabul but his name was also expunged from the UN terror list, Pakistan’s former
ambassador to the U.S., Aizaz Chaudhry stated: “There’s a precedence for this [political reconciliation] in
the rehabilitation of Gulbadin Hekmatyar.”
Criticising the disastrous militaristic approach of Washington and Kabul, Pakistan’s national security
adviser, Lt. Gen. (Ret’d) Nasser Janjua also stated at a seminar: “Afghanistan is a story of pains. It is a
story of injuries. It is a wound of the world and also of region which should be healed as quickly as
possible. Every investment has been made to win Afghan war but, unfortunately, we have not invested
in winning peace.”

In my view, the revived bonhomie between Kabul and Islamabad – ending a hostile rhetoric and blame-
game from Afghanistan – has resulted from ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity’
(APAPPS) signed between the two countries on 15 May 2018. Ostensibly approved by Washington and
Beijing, the APAPPS is a Pakistani initiative carrying seven principles: 1) Pakistan’s commitment toward
supporting an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process; 2) Undertaking actions
against fugitives and irreconcilable elements posing security threats to either sides; 3) Denying use of
their respective territory by any country, network, group or individuals for anti-state activities against
the other; 4) Placing a joint supervision, coordination and confirmation mechanism to realise agreement
pledges; 5) Avoiding territorial and aerial violations; 6) Refraining from public blame game, utilizing
instead APAPPS platform for the resolution of issues; and 7) Operationalize six working groups including
the ones on security and intelligence cooperation.

In all likelihood, APAPPS carries some hidden pledges that have brought a sea-change in Afghan attitude
and behaviour. An obstinate and fire-breathing President Ghani immediately softened his stance.
Pleading the Taliban to come forward and “save the country,” Ghani not only offered
significant concessions to the insurgents (details here), but also recognized the militia as a political party
at the second round of ‘Kabul Process’ on 28 February 2018. The president further climbed down
through his Eid-ul-Fitr ceasefire offer – unexpectedly reciprocated by the Taliban for the first time in the
17-year-old conflict (by Pakistan’s persuasion or arm-twisting). Another ceasefire is expected at the Eid-
al-Qurban on 22 August 2018.

A Collective Front against Daesh

As seen in Daesh’s defeat in Iraq and Syria – and al-Qaeda’s earlier trouncing in Afghanistan – no terror-
group can withstand the might of a state, carrying monopoly over violence. Daesh in Afghanistan is a
combination of three elements: 1) Those militants who retreated from the Middle East and found
sanctuaries in the lawless and ungoverned areas of Afghanistan; 2) The left-over elements of al-Qaeda
who, after losing hope in Aiman-al-Zawahiri’s uncharismatic leadership to advance their Islamic cause
(sic), swore allegiance to Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi; and 3) The local criminal bands such as Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Islam, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and anti-Shia
Jaish-ul-Adal and Lashkar-e-Jhangavi al-Aalmi. Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North
Waziristan (tribal area) in June 2014 had uprooted and pushed these terror-franchises into Afghanistan,
only to come together under the banner of Daesh.

President Barack Obama had told cadets at West Point in May 2014: “[T]oday’s principal threat no
longer comes from a centralized al-Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized al-Qaeda
affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in countries where they operate.

Not being an apologist for Taliban, I have always maintained that had the Taliban given some political
accommodation in Afghanistan, Daesh could never have established its foothold in the country.

As highlighted in my abovementioned paper on Islamic extremism, these terror-groups not only seek

power and prestige through their acts, but some of them genuinely aspire to fulfil Prophet Muhammad’s
(peace be upon him) prophesy about the last battle of Islam, the Ghazwa-e-Hind, to be fought in
Khorasan – present day Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia. Unsurprisingly, Daesh in Afghanistan
calls itself Wilayat-e-Khorasan.

Not being an apologist for Taliban, I have always maintained that had the Taliban given some political
accommodation in Afghanistan, Daesh could never have established its foothold in the country. Daesh’s
(anti-Shia and anti-minorities) sectarian overtone had alarmed the Taliban right from the beginning. As
Taliban’s foot-soldiers began to break ranks to join Daesh, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, then Taliban’s
deputy chief, had warned al-Baghdadi through a letter on 16 June 2015 to stay out of Afghanistan.

However, Alice Wells, the U.S. special envoy doesn’t seem to concur with Taliban’s anti-Daesh
hypothesis. During a discussion at the U.S. Institute for Peace she rejected the notion by saying: The U.S.
was “disturbed by some countries justification of the Taliban as a fighting force against the Islamic State
– Khorasan. I think we see a tendency to exaggerate the IS-Khorasan threat as a pretext to almost justify
a hedging behaviour.”

Former President Hamid Karzai has, however, raised serious questions about the rise of Daesh and
extremism in Afghanistan, blaming the U.S. for using Daesh as its “tool.” In a surprise move, Washington
further blocked a Pakistani request at the UN Security Council’s sanctions committee to declare Daesh-
linked Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s head, Abdul Wali (alias Umer Khalid Khurasani) a globally designated terrorist in
May 2018.
Worried about Daesh’s spillover in its backyard, the Central Asian Republics, Russia also
keeps warning about the northern Afghanistan becoming a “resting base” of international terrorism and
a “bridgehead” for establishing its “destructive” caliphate in the region.” Russian envoy to the UN, Vasily
Nebenzya, told the Security Council in June 2018 that “[Daesh] has up to 10,000 fighters in its ranks, and
is already active in at least nine out of [Afghanistan’s] 34 provinces … constantly consolidating its
position in the north of the country, turning it into a springboard for the expansion into Central Asia.”

In fact, in its naivety and indecent haste to crush the Taliban militarily, Washington largely ignored the
threat of Daesh spreading its tentacles in Afghanistan and becoming a global threat since 2014. United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has totaled-up a record number of 1,692
fatalities in the first six months of 2018, attributing 52 percent of civilian casualties in Afghanistan to
Daesh’s suicide and complex attacks.

However, fortunately, the regional countries like Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan have woken-up to the
threat of Daesh to their internal and regional stability. The extraordinary secret meeting of heads of the
intelligence agencies of the four countries in Pakistan on 11 July 2018 demonstrated their collective
resolve to eliminate Daesh in Afghanistan. The huddle took place as a follow-up of an earlier
meeting between Pakistan’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen (Ret’d) Nasser Janjua, secretary of Iran’s
Supreme National Security Council, Rear Admiral Shamkhani and secretary of the Security Council of
Russian Federation, Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev in Russia in April 2018.

Afghanistan’s Internal Squabbling

Three elements remain fundamental for any insurgency to sustain and find its justification: 1) A
grassroots support among the people; 2) Alienation of masses towards the sitting government, and, 3)
Foreign/outside support. Therefore, even if we cross-out the alleged support of Pakistan, Iran and Russia
to the Taliban, there has been abundant proof of disillusionment among Afghan people towards their
‘constitutionally-incongruous’ – and corrupt to boot – Afghan ‘national unity government.’

Lauding Taliban’s code of conduct – La’iha – Shadi Hamid, Vanda Felbab-Brown and Harold
Trinkunas find in their book Militants, Criminals, and Warlords: The Challenge of Local Governance in an
Age of Disorder, that “conflicts over land and water and tribal feuds have escalated after the end of the
Taliban regime as a result of weak and institutional rule and power usurpation. The post-Taliban formal
courts have not been able to stop or resolve such conflicts. Worse, the courts became corrupt and
themselves a tool of land expropriation.” The authors keep noting: “The Taliban has moved to fill the
gap by providing free mediation of tribal, criminal, and personal disputes. Afghans report a great degree
of satisfaction with Taliban verdicts, unlike those of the official justice system, where petitioners often
have to pay considerable bribes.”

Despite President Ghani’s peace overtures, an intra-Afghan dialogue under his government remains an
impossible proposition. Calling the Afghan officials as foreign “puppets,” Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah
Mujahid has already rejected the High Peace Council’s talks offer. The reason behind Taliban’s
reluctance to join mainstream politics and accept the constitution is its undemocratic credentials.
Despite Taliban’s grassroots support base in the rural areas, the militia knows full well it has no chance
of winning at the ballot in the cities. Thus, until the Afghan Loya Jirga figures out an alternate
arrangement for Taliban’s political representation and power, Afghanistan will stay in turmoil.

‘Washing blood with blood’ this time some 17-year-old ‘scores’ need to be settled too

Another hindrance is factionalization among the insurgent groups. With too many tongues, you don’t
know whom to speak, or how many to please. Though the small splinter group led by Mullah
Mohammad Rasool backs peace talks, the Fidai Mahaz led by Mullah Najeebullah keeps rejecting a
dialogue. Even Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the head of Taliban’s mainstream group stays in two
minds under pressure from younger fighters who keep consolidating their hold over new districts every
day.

However, fortunately, the regional countries like Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan have woken-up to the
threat of Daesh to their internal and regional stability.

Furthermore, in his vain effort to establish Kabul’s central control and to cleanse the Afghan democratic
system and improve governance, Mr. Ghani, of late, has been sidelining powerful Afghan warlords
accused of human rights abuses and narcotics trade. However, demonstrating lack of political acumen
and proper familiarity with Afghanistan’s history and culture, a technocrat president has exacerbated
ethnic fault-lines.

First of all, having denied his Uzbek vice-president, General Abdul Rasheed Dostum to return to
Afghanistan from his self-exile in Turkey for 14 months – after allegations surfaced of
Dostum torturing his political opponent – Ghani had antagonized the powerful Junbish-i-Milli (political
party) and almost four million Uzbek voters in the northern Afghanistan. Despite Sarwar Danish, the
second vice president, negotiating Dostum’s return on 22 July 2018, the political fate of the warlord of
yesteryears harbouring presidential ambitions, who, Mr. Ghani had branded a “remorseless killer” in
2009, is still not clear.
Ghani further stoked ethno-nationalism by impulsively sacking his non-Pashtun governors and other
senior officials:

First, as the president dismissed the governor of the Balkh province, Atta Mohammad Noor, in
December 2017, the so-called “King of the north” eyeing to be the next Afghan president, refused to
oblige. Despite handing over the province to an ally in March 2018, Noor’s insubordination
demonstrated limits to Ghani’s powers.

Secondly, kicking up a constitutional crisis, a second provincial governor, Abdulkarim Khaddam of the
northern Samangan province also defied a whimsical president by refusing to step down in February
2018.

Third, a competent administrator and a person of high repute, Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal, was
also sent packing on corruption charges and security deterioration in the Nangarhar province in May
2018.

Fourth, sparking violent protests Ghani’s Shaheen 209 Corps further arrested Nezamuddin Qaisari, a
powerful militia commander and district police chief of the Faryab province on flimsy grounds.

Finally, the president unsuccessfully tried to remove the popular and influential police chief of Kandahar,
a so-called general named Abdul Raziq Achakzai, only to be retorted back: Ghani’s government “cannot
fire me.” Condemned by the Human Rights Watch as “Kandahar’s torture-in-chief” and a notorious drug
smuggler, Raziq had been an unknown foot-soldier trained by the U.S. contractors only to rise as a local
hero against Taliban.

Among many of Afghanistan’s misfortunes the Ghani-Abdullah national unity government will find
prominence in history chronicles. Such an anomaly did not allow necessary checks and balances to be
instituted, making the governance fail on all accounts. Under lack of proper oversight of US$10 billion by
34 donor nations and agencies, SIGAR’s head, John Sopko, found Afghanistan flooded with more money
than it could absorb, exacerbating corruption and fuelling a drawn-out conflict.
Conclusion

As the Afghan war soon enters its 18th year, U.S. must be reckoning how laborious it is to fight someone
else’s war with alien culture, history and geography. In the fog of insurgencies and civil-wars the
collateral damage cannot be avoided. Yet it brings a bad name to the liberators when immense
international pressure comes for mistaken-identity attacks. While SIGAR’s May 2018’s report highlighted
U.S. forces dropping 1,186 munitions in Afghanistan between January and March 2018, it
also cited UNAMA’s collected figures of 2017 attributing 6,768 civilian casualties (2,303 deaths) to anti-
government forces and 2,108 civilian casualties (745 deaths) to pro-government forces.

The shrinking of Afghan security forces by nearly 11 percent is another indicator of loss of people’s faith
in a futile war. The loss of numerical strength of the Afghan National Defence and Security forces
(ANDSF) and the territory held by them had panicked the Pentagon to the extent that the department of
defence classified the public data, instructing SIGAR not to release the information. Left with no choice,
SIGAR complainedto the U.S. Congress on 30 April 2018 about receiving inaccurate data from the U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.

As the Afghan war soon enters its 18th year, U.S. must be reckoning how laborious it is to fight someone
else’s war with alien culture, history and geography.

In my last paper on Afghanistan (mentioned above), I had concluded that probably it is America’s long-
term strategic interests that do not allow it to take leave from the region. However, the time for the U.S.
forces to depart Afghanistan has arrived, letting the regional countries to tackle – and eliminate – Daesh.
China seems to be seeking a military base at Wakhan border in Afghanistan for the same purpose.

Notwithstanding, U.S. secretary of state, Mike Pompeo describing American footprint in Afghanistan as

a “humble mission” with objective to leave after “greatly diminishing the threat to [U.S.] homeland that
may emanate from there,” Senator Rand Paul, argued at the secretary’s congressional confirmation
hearing that now was the time to leave as “all those terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan” who had
participated in the 9/11 attacks, had been eliminated and some of the soldiers fighting there were not
even born when 9/11 happened.

The scenes of conviviality and affection seen during the last ceasefire between the Taliban fighters and
government security officials show a kind of war-fatigue on both sides. While the Afghan government
remains adamant not to budge for power sharing, the ordinary Afghans are fed up with the prolonged
conflict – as demonstrated through the 700km long march by dozens of peace protesters from Helmand
to Kabul chanting slogans such as “We want peace” and “stop fighting” during the fasting month of
Ramadan (June 2018).

Despite more than 100 Muslim scholars from around the world pleading “mutual understanding and
direct peaceful negotiations” among “Muslim Afghan[s]” at the Saudi city of Mecca on 11 July 2018, the
‘Islamic diplomacy’ is unlikely to convince the Afghan government or the insurgents. On 7 March 1993,
Saudi King Fahd had also sponsored a peace accord between the warring Afghan Mujahedeen leaders,
who all swore at the Holy Ka’ba to end their fighting, only to break their vow upon returning to
Afghanistan. Similarly, the Trilateral Ulema Conference, a conclave of Islamic scholars from Indonesia,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, denouncing violent extremism, terrorism, and suicide attacks as against the
Islamic principles on 11 May 2018 may also fail to pacify the historic vengeance in Afghan blood.

The killing of 15 Taliban fighters by Daesh rivals means intensified fighting among the militant groups in
the coming days. Considering Daesh a major threat to global security, effort should be made to reconcile
with the Taliban at priority – who have publicly pledged not to house al-Qaeda again or pursue any
global agenda – and eradicate the menace of terrorism and Islamic extremism once and for all from the
region.

With elections for Wolsei Jirga (lower house) – oft postponed since 2015 – scheduled for 20 October
2018 and a new presidential election next year, the anomaly of ‘national unity government’ is going to
be thankfully over. However, the elections are not panacea of Afghanistan’s peace and stability until the
country’s political fundamentals are first corrected.

The problem is that historically the ‘differences’ among various Afghan ethnicities have been treated as
‘disputes’ – not resolved through ‘discussions.’ While worries abound about Afghanistan descending
into another ethnic conflict or a civil-war after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, the security
ownership taken by the regional countries should be satisfying. The collective resolve shown by Russia,
China, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran means Daesh will not be allowed to fester further or spillover into those
countries. Period.

However, it is the Afghans who have to sort out their internal issues themselves. At another place in her
book Farewell Kabul, Christina Lamb quotes an elderly Afghan observing pensively, “War never leaves
this land.” However, it is time the Afghans bring an end to the four-decade long conflict and open a new
chapter towards mutual understanding and harmony, progress and prosperity. For once, Afghans must
prove Alexander Cockburn wrong for reinforcing the myth that Afghanistan is “nothing but mountains
filled with barbarous ethnics with views as medieval as their muskets.”

It was for such redefining moments in the history of nations that T.S. Eliot had said: “What we call the
beginning is often the end. And to make an end is to make a beginning. The end is where we start from.”