Universal Robina Corporation vs.

Lim
 0

A court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as
it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on
the basis of the pleadings. 
Supplemental Pleadings
 0

Section 6.   Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse
party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading. (Rule 10, Rules of Court)

************

What is a supplemental pleading?

Supplemental pleading is one which sets forth transactions, occurrences, or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. (Sec. 6, Rule 10)

What is the purpose in allowing supplemental pleading?

● The purpose of the rule is that the entire controversy might be settled in one action; to avoid
unnecessary litigation; prevent delay, unnecessary repetition of effort; unwarranted expense of
litigants; to broaden the scope of the issues in an action owing to the light thrown on it by facts,
events and occurrences which have accrued after the filing of the original pleading; to bring into
record the facts enlarging or charging the kind of relief to which plaintiff is entitled. It is the policy of
the law to grant relief as far as possible for wrongs complained of growing out of the same
transaction and thus put an end to litigation. (Sps. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge,  G.R. No. 169551,
January 24, 2007)

● The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and to
avoid the cost delay and waste of separate action.

Does filing of supplemental pleading requires leave of court? What are some of the factors that
the court will consider in allowing a supplemental pleading?

Yes. The filing of supplemental pleadings requires leave of court. The court may allow the pleading
only motion with notice to all parties and upon such terms as are just. [Example: Motion for Leave
to File Supplemental Complaint] (Rule 10, Sec. 6)
The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but is
discretionary on the court. Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1) resulting prejudice
to the parties; and (2) whether the movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to
be denied. What constitutes prejudice to the opposing party depends upon the particular circumstance
of each case. An opposing party who has had notice of the general nature of the claim or matter
asserted in the supplemental pleading from the beginning of the action will not be prejudiced by the
granting of leave to file a supplemental pleading. A motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading
may be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches which causes substantial prejudice to the
opposing party. (Sps. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge)

When should a supplemental pleading be answered?

A supplemental pleading should be answered within 10 days from the notice of the order admitting
the same,  unless a different period is fixed by the court. (Rule 13, Sec. 7)

What would be the basis of the adverse party in filing an answer to the supplemental pleading?

Under Rule 15, Sec. 9, a motion for leave to file a pleading or motion shall be accompanied by the
pleading or motion sought to be admitted. So the motion carries a copy of the supplemental pleading.
When the adverse party received the order admitting the supplemental pleading, he already had with
him a copy of the supplemental pleading. That is why, the 10 day period is counted from the receipt
of the order admitting the supplemental pleading. 

Does the failure of a party to answer a supplemental complaint a ground to declare him in
default?

No. Because the answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental complaint if
no new or supplemental answer is filed. (Rule 13, Sec. 7)

Does the supplemental pleading supersede the original pleading?

No. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the
primary pleading. A supplemental pleading exists side by side with the original. It does not replace
that which it supplements. (Young vs. Sps. Sy,  G.R. No. 157745, September 26, 2006)

A supplemental complaint/pleading supplies deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, not to

entirely substitute the latter.

Can a party file a supplemental pleading although the facts occur before the commencement of
the suit?

Although the facts occur before the commencement of the suit if a party does not learn of their
existence until after he has filed his pleading, he may file a supplemental pleading. (Sps. Lambino vs.
Presiding Judge)

Should the cause of action in the supplemental complaint/pleading be the same as that stated in
the original complaint/pleading? What must the court do if the cause of action stated in the
supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original
complaint?

● The cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint must be the same as that stated in the
original complaint. Otherwise, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint. [Asset
Privatization Trust v. CA (1998)]

● A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the
original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint. The
supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related
to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. (Sps. Lambino vs.
Presiding Judge)

● As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the
primary pleading. A supplemental pleading exists side by side with the original. It does not replace
that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is
to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the
action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy
referred to in the original complaint. (Young vs. Sps. Sy)

● When the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of
action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint;
the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading,
but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. However, in Planters Development Bank
v. LZK Holdings and Development Co., the Court held that a broad definition of causes of action
should be applied: while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the
cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleading technically
states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a factor to be considered by
the court in the exercise of its discretion; and of course, a broad definition of cause of action should
be applied here as elsewhere. (Young vs. Sps. Sy)

● A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the
original cause of action set forth in the original complaint. (Ada vs. Baylon,  G.R. No. 182435, August
13, 2012)

Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence
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May amendment be allowed to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence?

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court states that “defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.” However, Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court allows the amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
What are the two intances when pleadings may be amended to conform to the evidence?

Section 5, Rule 10 envisions two scenarios, namely:

1. when evidence is introduced in an issue not alleged in the pleadings and no objection was
interjected; and
2. when evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection
was raised.
When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it
had been raised in the pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be
admitted where its admission will not prejudice him. (Sps, Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion, G.R. No.
172825, October 11, 2012)

●  In the event that a party presents evidence on a matter not in issue, the adverse party has a reason
to object. Common reason dictates that a party cannot breach the basic procedural rule that the trial
can deal only with matters raised by the parties in their pleadings. Neither can a court render
judgment on a matter not in issue because a judgment must conform to the pleadings and the theory
of the action under which the case was tried. But when issues not raised in the pleadings are tried
with the express or implied consent of the parties, such as when no objection is made by either, such
issues not raised shall be treated as if they had been put in issue by the pleadings.

● Applying Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was
tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised
in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no
amendment had been ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the
issue. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124518, December 27, 2007)

Bar questions:

In a complaint for a sum of money filed before the MM Regional Trial Court, plaintiff did not
mention or even just hint at any demand for payment made on defendant before commencing
suit. During the trial, plaintiff duly offered Exh. "A" in evidence for the stated purpose of
proving the making of extrajudicial demand on defendant to pay P500,000, the subject of the
suit. Exh. "A" was a letter of demand for defendant to pay said sum of money within 10 days
from receipt, addressed to and served on defendant some two months before suit was begun.
Without objection from defendant, the court admitted Exh. "A" in evidence. Was the court's
admission of Exh. "A" in evidence erroneous or not? Reason.  (Bar 2004)

Suggested answer:

The admission of Exh. "A" was not erroneous. Since it was admitted without objection from the
defendant, it is as if the matter of demand was raised in the pleadings (Sec. 5, Rule 10, Rules of
Court).

In a situation where issues not raised in the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of
the parties, Sec. 5 of Rule 10 authorizes the amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence
upon motion of a party at any time, even after judgment. If the parties fail to amend the pleadings,
such failure will not affect the trial of these issues because such issues are treated as having been
raised in the pleadings of the parties (Sec. 5, Rule 10, Rules of Court). This provision under the Rules
virtually authorizes an implied amendment of the pleadings.

A complaint was filed by the counsel for Superior Sales (an entity without a juridical
personality) against Mr. Garcia on a money claim for goods delivered. Mr. Garcia did not file a
motion to dismiss. Eventually, trial was held and his liability was established through several
invoices, each of which uniformly showed on its face that Mr. Tan is the Proprietor of Superior
Sales. After Superior Sales had rested its case, Mr. Garcia filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that since there is actually no person properly suing as plaintiff, no relief can be
granted by the court. On the other hand, the counsel for Superior Sales filed a motion to amend
the complaint to make it conform to the evidence, that the real party plaintiff is Mr. Tan. The
court denied said motion on the ground that it was filed too late and instead, dismissed the
case.  Did the court act correctly? (Bar 1992)

Suggested answer:

The court did not act correctly. Although there was a defect in the designation of the plaintiff because
it had no juridical personality to sue, this defect was cured when the defendant did not object to the
evidence that it was Mr. Tan who was the proprietor of the business and in whose favor the defendant
is liable. This matter of Mr. Tan being the aggrieved party and thus, the real party-ininterest as
plaintiff, was tried with the consent of the defendant. An amendment to conform to the evidence is
but proper under the circumstances. The contention of the court that the motion was filed too late is
with no legal basis. Under Sec. 5 of Rule 10, the motion to amend may be presented at any time,
"even after judgment."

**********
. Is there a need to serve new summons after a complaint is amended?

● It depends. 
1. If the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons,  even if new causes of action
are alleged. The summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have
its legal effect. 
2. Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons
for the amended complaint must be served on him. (Philamlife vs. Breva, G.R. No. 147937.
November 11, 2004)

● If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must be served upon him as regards the
amended complaint, otherwise the court would have no power to try the new causes of action alleged
therein, unless he had lodged an answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended complaint to
the defendant by registered mail is not equivalent to service of summons in such case. However, if
the defendant had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that he was already in
court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon him,
personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him.

● Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus
deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the
service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the defendants
have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the
amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes
of action are alleged. After it is acquired, a court's jurisdiction continues until the case is finally
terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has been
validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the
change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended
complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial
court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the amended
complaint is required. (Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64.
July 6, 1999)

● If the defendant had appeared in the action, service of an amended complaint (which introduces a
new cause of action) in the same manner as any other pleading or motion is sufficient, even if no new
summons is served. In the instant case, summons on the first amended complaint was properly served
on PAN-ASIATIC. After which, the company filed several motions for extension of time within
which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions
were granted by the trial court. With the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively
appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new
summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being sufficient. (Pan-
Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62781, August 19, 1988)

2. When an additional defendant is impleaded in the action, is it necessary that summons be

served upon him? (Bar 1999)

Yes. Summons must be served upon the defendant who has not yet appeared before the court under
the original complaint. It is necessary to acquire jurisdiction over his person otherwise the judgment
will be void as to him, unless he voluntarily appears in the action (Sec. 20, Rule 14, Rules of
Court). The new defendant cannot be deemed to have already appeared by virtue of summons under
the original complaint in which he was not yet a party.

3. M filed a case against ABC company. ABC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that the
employee who received the summons in Davao City was not among those authorized under the
Rules to receive summons for a corporation. M filed an Amended Complaint alleging that
summons and other court processes could also be served at its principal office in Ermita,
Manila. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias
summons to be served at ABC's main office in Manila. The alias summons was properly served.
Since at the time the complaint was amended no summons had been properly served on the
ABC and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons should have been issued on the
amended complaint. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case considering that what
was issued was not a new summons but an alias summons?

It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an original or an alias summons as long as it
has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the
requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the
prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both
as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules,
and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its
principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but
more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first
summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original
complaint. (Philamlife vs. Breva)

What are formal amendments? 

Formal amendments consist of defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or
typographical errors.

When can formal amendments be made? 

Formal amendments can be made at any stage of the action, upon motion of the party or the court
motu proprio, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
● Amendments of pleadings may be resorted to subject to the condition that the amendments sought
do not alter the cause of action of the original complaint. Amendment of pleadings may be resorted
to, so long as the intended amendments are not inconsistent with the allegations in the initial
complaint, and are obviously intended to clarify the intrinsic ambiguity in it with respect to the time
of accrual of the cause of action. xxx. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This rule applies with more
reason and with greater force when, as in the case at bar, the amendment sought to be made refers to
a mere matter of form and no substantial rights are prejudiced. Indeed, the rule on amendment of
pleadings need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the
objecting party.

In the case at bench, while the date indicated in the original complaint was February 13, 1986, there
is no denying that the actual date of the incident was really February 3, 1986 when the subject cargo
was actually withdrawn from the pier and delivered to the Hotels warehouse. All the supporting
documents offered in evidence refer to this date and no other. Contrary to Bormahecos stand, the
actual date of the loss was well within the coverage of the insurance policy. Surely, Bormaheco could
not have been misled or surprised by the correction of the error. Neither could it have been
prejudiced by the correction of the said date for this was merely a typographical mistake purely
technical. (Bormaheco, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 156599, July 26, 2010)

● Facts: In its first amended complaint, respondent DVSHA alleged that it is a registered
association. However, it failed to attach to its complaint the supporting certificate of registration, as
well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws. In their answer, petitioners promptly assailed
respondents lack of personality to sue. The trial court, desiring to determine if indeed respondent has
the capacity to sue, directed respondent to amend its complaint anew by attaching thereto the
necessary documents.

Held: Sections 1 and 4, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

SEC. 1. Amendments in general. Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the
name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined
without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.

SEC. 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or
typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on
motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.  

Here, the amendment of respondents complaint at the instance of the trial court merely involves the
designation of respondent as a proper party, i.e., whether it has a juridical personality and, therefore,
can sue or be sued. We note that when respondent amended its complaint by attaching the required
supporting documents, such amendment did not change its cause of action. Nor was its action
intended to prejudice petitioners. Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the amendment of the complaint. (Godinez vs. CA, G.R.
No. 154330, February 15, 2007) 
 Before the service of a responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading,
regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced (substantial
amendment). 

A filed a complaint against B. B filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Can A still amend the
complaint as a matter of right?

Yes. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading and its filing does not preclude the exercise of
the plaintiff's right to amend his complaint.
If the motion to dismiss is granted by the court, can the plaintiff still amend his complaint as a
matter of right?

● Even if the motion to dismiss is granted by the court, the plaintiff may still amend his complaint as
a matter of right before the dismissal becomes final as long as no answer has yet been served.

● The policy in this jurisdiction is that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in
the interests of substantial justice. Thus, amendments of the complaint may be allowed even if an
order for its dismissal has been issued so long as the motion to amend is filed before the order of
dismissal acquired finality. (Sps. Tirona vs. Judge Alejo, G.R. No. 129313. October 10, 2001)

Example:

A filed a complaint for sum of money against D. D filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action because it was alleged that debt is already due and demandable at the time
the complaint was filed. A filed an amendment to the complaint to correct the deficiency in its
allegation. The amendment is a matter of right and hence, cannot be refused by the court.

A filed a case against X, Y and Z. X filed his Answer while Y and Z have not yet filed their
Answer. May A still amend his complaint as a matter of right?

Yes. Where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants,
but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

What is the remedy of a party if the court refuses to admit and amended pleading when its
exercise is a matter of right?

The remedy is mandamus. 

A examined his amended complaint and found that there are still some deficiencies thereunder
which he now wanted to correct. Can A validly file a second amended complaint without leave
of court?

 No. Because the right to amend without leave of court can be exercised only once.

Does Sec. 2 of Rule 10 apply to pleadings filed before the Court of Appeals?

No. Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court refers to an amendment made before the trial court, not
to amendments before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to
admit or deny amended petitions filed before it. (Navarro Vda. de Taroma vs. Taroma, G.R. No.
160214, December 16, 2005) 

When should you file an Answer to an amended complaint?

When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the
same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within ten
(l0) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the
answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed. (Sec. 3, Rule 11, Rules of Court)

However, new material allegations in the amended complaint which are not specifically denied are
deemed admitted. (Hence, the need to file an answer).

When the complaint is amended, 2 situations may arise:

1. If the complaint merely corrects or modifies the original complaint, then the action is deemed
commenced upon the filing of the original complaint;
2. If the amended complaint alleges a new cause of action, then the new allegedly cause of
action is deemed commenced upon the filing of the amended complaint. (Laggui Remedial Law
Reviewer)
88888888
Kinds of amendment:
1. Amendment as a matter of right 
2. Amendment by leave of court
3. Substantial amendment
4. Formal amendments

Implication of amendments to docket fees

● If the docket fees were already paid for the original pleading, the any increases in the new fees
because of the amendment will serve as a lien on the judgment. (PAGCOR vs. Lopez, ADM.
MATTER NO. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005)

 Is there a need to serve new summons after a complaint is amended?

● It depends.

1. If the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons,  even if new causes of action
are alleged. The summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have
its legal effect. 
2. Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons
for the amended complaint must be served on him. (Philamlife vs. Breva, G.R. No. 147937.
November 11, 2004)

When an additional defendant is impleaded in the action, is it necessary that summons be

served upon him? (Bar 1999)

Yes. Summons must be served upon the defendant who has not yet appeared before the court under
the original complaint. It is necessary to acquire jurisdiction over his person otherwise the judgment
will be void as to him, unless he voluntarily appears in the action (Sec. 20, Rule 14, Rules of
Court). The new defendant cannot be deemed to have already appeared by virtue of summons under
the original complaint in which he was not yet a party.

Can you amend your cause of action or defense?

Before the service of a responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading,
regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced (substantial
amendment). [Section 2, Rule 10]

After a responsive pleading has been filed, amendment may substantially alter the cause of action or
defense. This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [Valenzuela v.
Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 (2001)]

If there is inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, amendment
may be refused. (Siasco vs. CA, G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999)

●  Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the
new rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should
only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals)

● The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the
defense is substantially altered. Such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant;
it also delays the action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there
are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that [a]mendments to pleadings
are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case
may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or
prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a
refusal of permission to amend. (Siasco vs. CA)

● The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the
amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed
when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and
in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of
a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby
giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts
and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary
expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend. (Tiu vs
PBCom, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009)
888

What are the requisites for amendments by leave of court?

1. Motion filed in court;
2. Notice to the adverse party;
3. Opportunity to be heard afforded to the adverse party.

Substituting an actionable document

● Substituting an actionable document which is appended to the complaint is akin to an amendment

and must therefore be done with leave of court if answer has already been served on the
plaintiff. (Tiu v PBCom)

● Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or by taking the adverse party by
surprise which might justify a refusal of permission to amend. (Tiu v PBCom)

Instances when amendment by leave of court not allowed:

1. when cause of action, defense or theory of the case is changed;

2. amendment is intended to confer jurisdiction to the court;
3. amendment to cure a premature or non-existing cause of action;
4. amendment for purposes of delay
88
2. What is the effect of the amendment on admissions made in the original pleading?

● Admissions made in the original pleadings cease to be judicial admissions. They are to be
considered as extrajudicial admissions.

● Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings
and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader
as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.
If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered.

Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission,
which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer.

In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no
longer forms part of the record. (Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844. April 27, 2000) 

3. What about the claims or defenses alleged in the superseded pleadings?

If they are not incorporated in the amended pleading, they shall be deemed waived.

Bar Question 1993

In an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land filed in the Regional Trial Court, the
defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint
that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former
owners thereof.

Subsequently, the defendant changed his lawyer and, with leave of court, amended the answer.
In the amended answer, the abovementioned admission no longer appears. Instead, the alleged
ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with the allegation that the defendant
is the owner of the land for the reason that he bought the same from the plaintiff's parents
during their lifetime.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision upholding the defendant's ownership
of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission
contained in his original answer. Is the contention of plaintiff correct?

Suggested answer:

The contention of the plaintiff is not correct. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of Court). The amended pleading, therefore, is deemed withdrawn
and no longer part of the record and the admissions therein are no longer under the category of
judicial admissions. Admissions in superseded pleadings may however be received in evidence
against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions provided they are offered in evidence.

888
May amendment be allowed to correct a jurisdictional
defect?
 0

Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect before a responsive pleading is served

A fair reading of jurisprudence recognizes the right of a pleader to amend his complaint before a
responsive pleading is served even if its effect is to correct a jurisdictional defect. The argument
that the court cannot allow such type of amendment since the court must first possess jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint before it can act on any amendment has no application
upon an amendment that is made as matter of right.  (Riano, Civil Procedure, Book 1, The Bar
Lecture Series)

Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect after a responsive pleading is served

An amendment of the complaint to correct a jurisdictional error cannot be validly done after a
responsive pleading is served. The amendment this time would require leave of court, a matter
which requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The exercise of this discretion requires the
performance of a positive act by the court. If it grants the amendment, it would be acting on a
complaint over which it has no jurisdiction. Its action would be one performed without jurisdiction.

The situation is vastly different from an amendment as a matter of right. Here, the court does not
act. The admission of the amendment is a ministerial duty of the court. It requires no positive action
from the court. Since it would not be acting in this regard, it could not be deemed as acting without
jurisdiction. (Riano, Civil Procedure, Book 1, The Bar Lecture Series)

Bar Question:

On May 12, 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
collection of P250,000.00. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the action since the claimed amount of P250,000.00 is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

Before the court could resolve the motion, the plaintiff, without leave of court, amended his
complaint to allege a new cause of action consisting in the inclusion of an additional amount of
P200,000.00, thereby increasing his total claim to P450,000.00 The plaintiff thereafter filed his
opposition to the motion to dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over
his action. Rule on the motion of the defendant with reasons. (Bar 2005)

Suggested answer.

The motion to dismiss should be denied. The amendment was made before a responsive pleading
was served on the plaintiff. The pending motion to dismiss did not affect the right of the plaintiff to
amend his complaint as a matter of right because a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
The amendment correcting a jurisdictional defect was proper because no responsive pleading has
been served at the time of the amendment. The rule that a complaint cannot be amended to confer
jurisdiction on a court where there was none applies only to an amendment made after a
responsive pleading has been served.
**********

Amendments in General
 0
Section 1. Amendments in general. — Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an
allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits
of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner. (Rule 10, Rules of Court)

***********

How do you amend a pleading?

Amendment is made by:

1.  Adding an allegation or the name of a party;
2. Striking out an allegation or the name of a party;
3. Correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect.

Why is amendment allowed? 

Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order
that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner
without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a
single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. (Swagman Hotels and Travels, Inc. vs. CA,
G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005) 

Kinds of amendment:
1. Amendment as a matter of right 
2. Amendment by leave of court
3. Substantial amendment
4. Formal amendments

Implication of amendments to docket fees

● If the docket fees were already paid for the original pleading, the any increases in the new fees
because of the amendment will serve as a lien on the judgment. (PAGCOR vs. Lopez,  ADM.
MATTER NO. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005)

 Is there a need to serve new summons after a complaint is amended?

● It depends.

1. If the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons,  even if new causes of action
are alleged. The summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have
its legal effect. 
2. Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons
for the amended complaint must be served on him. (Philamlife vs. Breva, G.R. No. 147937.
November 11, 2004)
When an additional defendant is impleaded in the action, is it necessary that summons be
served upon him? (Bar 1999)

Yes. Summons must be served upon the defendant who has not yet appeared before the court under
the original complaint. It is necessary to acquire jurisdiction over his person otherwise the judgment
will be void as to him, unless he voluntarily appears in the action (Sec. 20, Rule 14, Rules of
Court).  The new defendant cannot be deemed to have already appeared by virtue of summons under
the original complaint in which he was not yet a party.
******

Instances when amendment by leave of court not allowed:

1. when cause of action, defense or theory of the case is changed;

2. amendment is intended to confer jurisdiction to the court;
3. amendment to cure a premature or non-existing cause of action;
4. amendment for purposes of delay
88
Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect before a responsive pleading is served

A fair reading of jurisprudence recognizes the right of a pleader to amend his complaint before a
responsive pleading is served even if its effect is to correct a jurisdictional defect. The argument that
the court cannot allow such type of amendment since the court must first possess jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint before it can act on any amendment has no application upon an
amendment that is made as matter of right. (Riano, Civil Procedure, Book 1, The Bar Lecture Series)

Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect after a responsive pleading is served

An amendment of the complaint to correct a jurisdictional error cannot be validly done after a
responsive pleading is served. The amendment this time would require leave of court, a matter which
requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The exercise of this discretion requires the
performance of a positive act by the court. If it grants the amendment, it would be acting on a
complaint over which it has no jurisdiction. Its action would be one performed without jurisdiction.

The situation is vastly different from an amendment as a matter of right. Here, the court does not act.
The admission of the amendment is a ministerial duty of the court. It requires no positive action from
the court. Since it would not be acting in this regard, it could not be deemed as acting without
jurisdiction. (Riano, Civil Procedure, Book 1, The Bar Lecture Series)

Bar Question:

On May 12, 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the collection of P250,000.00. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the action since the claimed amount of
P250,000.00 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

Before the court could resolve the motion, the plaintiff, without leave of court, amended his
complaint to allege a new cause of action consisting in the inclusion of an additional amount of
P200,000.00, thereby increasing his total claim to P450,000.00 The plaintiff thereafter filed his
opposition to the motion to dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over his action. Rule on the motion of the defendant with reasons. (Bar 2005)

Suggested answer.

The motion to dismiss should be denied. The amendment was made before a responsive pleading was
served on the plaintiff. The pending motion to dismiss did not affect the right of the plaintiff to
amend his complaint as a matter of right because a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
The amendment correcting a jurisdictional defect was proper because no responsive pleading has
been served at the time of the amendment. The rule that a complaint cannot be amended to confer
jurisdiction on a court where there was none applies only to an amendment made after a responsive
pleading has been served.
88
May a complaint be amended to cure a failure to state a cause of action?

Yes. If the complaint failed to aver the fact that certain conditions precedent were undertaken and
complied with, the failure to so allege the same may be corrected by an amendment of the
complaint. Section 5 of Rule 10 applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in
the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial and was not objected to. The provision also
covers situations where, to conform to evidence not objected to by the adverse party, the pleadings
are sought to be amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of
action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial.

For example, a complaint filed by a guarantor to collect a sum of money from the debtor fails to state
a cause of action if the complaint does not allege that the creditor of the debtor has been paid by the
guarantor even if in fact there was payment. However, if during the course of the proceedings,
evidence is offered on the fact of payment without objection from the debtor, the defect in the
complaint was cured by the evidence. The plaintiff may then move for the amendment of his
complaint to conform to the evidence. (Dean Riano)

Where the complaint was filed at a time where no cause of action has yet accrued in favor of
the plaintiff, may the complaint be amended to cure the defect?

● No. The reason for this is plain: There is no cause of action to cure where there is none in the first
place.

● Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order
that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner
without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a
single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations
wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party.
Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during
the trial.

However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the
time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For
example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the cause
of action depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the
complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be
amended thereafter. Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni, this Court upheld the trial court in taking
cognizance of an otherwise defective complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the
plaintiff during the trial. In that case, there was in fact a cause of action and the only problem was the
insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. Court of
Appeals.

It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of
action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a
groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the
defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the
public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature. (Swagman Hotels and Travels, Inc.
vs. CA, G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005) 

Misjoinder of Causes of Action

 0

When is there a misjoinder of causes of action?

There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are
not met. Section 5 provides

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Is misjoinder of causes of action a ground for dismissal of an action?

● No. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of
action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately. (Sec. 6, Rule 2, Rules of Court)

● Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately. (Ada vs. Baylon,  G.R. No. 182435, August 13,
2012) 

What if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance? May the court simultaneously adjudicate all the erroneously joined causes of
action?

A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may be
adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of action.

It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause
of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication
rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity. (Ada vs. Baylon)
88
Splitting a Cause of Action
 0

Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action.

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (Rule 2, Rules of Court)

What is splitting a single cause of action?

●  Splitting a single cause of action is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of
action

● It is the practice of dividing one cause of action into different parts and making each part the
subject of a separate complaint (Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287). 

● In splitting a cause of action, the pleader divides a single cause of action, claim or demand into
two or more parts, brings a suit for one of such parts with the intent to reserve the rest for another
separate action. It also occurs when a party brings a suit for each part of the same action that was
split. (Quadra vs. CA, GR 147593, July 31, 2006)

Is splitting a single cause of action allowed by the Rules?

No. Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides: "A party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action"

Why is splitting a single cause of action not allowed?

The practice of splitting a single cause of action is discouraged because it breeds multiplicity of suits,
clogs the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as an instrument of harassment, and
generates unnecessary expenses to the parties.

Does the rule against splitting a single cause of action apply only to complaints?

The rule against splitting a single cause of action applies not only to complaints but also
to counterclaims and cross-claims.

Examples:

● The act of a defendant in taking possession of the plaintiff's land by means of force and
intimidation constitutes a single act of dispossession but gives rise to two reliefs: (a) recovery of
possession, and (b) damages arising from the loss of possession. Both of these reliefs result from a
single wrong hence, constitute but a single cause of action. Each of them cannot be the subject of
two separate actions. It is procedurally erroneous for the, plaintiff to file an action to recover
possession and another action for damages. Both remedies must be alleged and claimed in only one
complaint. To file a separate action for each relief is to split a single cause of action. (Dean Riano)

● An action for forcible entry should include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also
claims for damages arising out of the forcible entry. The claim for damages cannot be filed
separately.

● The same principle applies to an action to recover the possession of a land. The action must also
include the recovery of the fruits already taken from the land and appropriated by the defendant. A
suit for the recovery of the land and a separate suit to recover the fruits will not be sustained.

● A single act may sometimes violate several rights of a person. Nevertheless the plaintiff has only
one cause of action regardless of the number of rights violated. If a car owner sustains injuries to
his person and damage to his car as a result of the negligent driving of the defendant, two rights of
the plaintiffs have been violated, namely, his personal right to be safe in his person and his property
right to have his car intact and free from any damage. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff can
only file a single action for the recovery of damages for both types of injuries. Filing an action to
recover damages to his person and later for damages to his car would be splitting a single cause of
action. If however, a passenger in the same car was also injured, the injuries to the passenger gives
rise to a cause of action separate and distinct from those sustained by the car owner because
distinct rights belonging to different persons have been violated. The injured passenger may file a
suit against the defendant separate from the suit filed by the car owner.

● A tenant illegally ejected from the land is entitled to two reliefs - one for reinstatement and
another for damages. Since both reliefs arose from the same cause of action, they should be alleged
in one complaint.

●  An action for the recovery of taxes should also include the demand for surcharges resulting from
the delinquency in the payment of said taxes. The non-payment of taxes gave rise to two reliefs: (a)
the recovery of the unpaid taxes; and (b) the recovery of the surcharges resulting from non-
payment of the taxes. These two reliefs are results of a single cause of action and which should be
pursued in a single complaint.

● A bank cannot file a civil action against the debtor for the collection of the debt and then
subsequently file an action to foreclose the mortgage. This would be splitting a single cause of
action.

●An action for annulment of the sale of certain shares of stock should include a claim for the
recovery of accrued dividends (Bar 1996).

● A contract which requires the performance of several obligations at different times, like an
obligation to be performed on an installment basis, gives rise to divisible independent obligations.
Each obligation not performed when due and upon proper demand gives rise to an independent
cause of action. In other words since the failure to pay an installment constitutes a distinct cause of
action, each installment that falls due can be the subject of a separate suit. If there is already a
pending suit based on a default of a previous installment and during such pendency an installment
falls due and is not paid, the latter may, as an alternative move, be incorporated in the pending suit
by filing a supplemental pleading.

● In a contract of lease which provides for the payment of rentals in separate installments, each
unpaid installment constitutes an independent cause of action. However, when at the time the
complaint is filed, there are several installments already due, all of them constitute but a single
cause of action and should be included in a single complaint.

● A claim for partition of real property and a claim for compensation for the improvements thereon
constitute a single cause of action. An action for partition alone will bar a subsequent action for the
recovery of compensation on the improvements.

Anticipatory breach

● Where the parties enter into a contract for the delivery of a specified amount of goods every
month for a period of ten years and the defendant expressed his intention not to make any
deliveries under the contract, the breach is total and there can only be one action. This is an
unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract and even if assuming that the performance
thereof is not yet due, the renunciation goes to the whole contract and shall be treated as a
complete breach that will entitle the injured party to bring his action at once. This anticipatory
breach committed by the defendant entitles the plaintiff to only one cause of action for damages.

● Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale and
delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the second
year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas
tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. because it was asking for a higher price than what had been
previously stipulated by them. The price of its tar products had gone up. We held that:

even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic deliveries are not yet due, if
the obligor has already manifested his refusal to comply with his future periodic obligations, the
contract is entire and the breach total, hence, there can only be one action for damages. (Danfoss,
Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation,  G.R. No. 143788, September 9, 2005) 

Examples where there is no splitting a single cause of action

● It has been held however, that an action to collect the amount of the loan will not preclude a
subsequent action for the rescission of the mortgage based on violation of the conditions of the
mortgage.

● However, an action for the reconveyance of title over property does of include a cause of action
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. They are distinct causes of action. Hence, the pendency of
an action for reconveyance of title does not divest the Municipal Trial Court of its jurisdiction to try
an ejectment case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. What is involved in an ejectment
case is possession de facto or material possession. In an action for reconveyance, the issue is
ownership.
What is the effect of splitting a single cause of action?  (Bar 1998;1999)

If two or more suits are instituted for a single cause of action, "the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any of one is available as a ground for dismissal of the others" (Sec. 4, Rule 2). The
remedy of the defendant is to file a motion to dismiss.

Hence, If the first action is pending when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed
based on litis pendencia, i.e., there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause (Sec. 1[e], Rule 16). If a final judgment had been rendered in the first action when the
second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on res judicata, i.e., that the cause of
action is barred by a prior judgment (Sec. 1[f], Rule 16).

Bar Questions:

A purchased a lot from B for P 1,500,000.00 He gave a down payment of P500,000.00, signed a
promissory note payable thirty days after date, and as security for the settlement of the
obligation, mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B
commenced suit to recover from A the balance of P1 million. After securing a favorable judgment
on his claim, B brought another action against A before the same court to foreclose the mortgage.
A now files a motion to dismiss the second action on the ground of bar by a prior judgment. Rule
on the motion. (Bar 1999)

Suggested answer.

The motion to dismiss must be granted. The action to foreclose the mortgage tantamounts to
splitting a single cause of action. One cannot file an action to collect the indebtedness and then file
another action for foreclosure.

Raphael, a warehouseman, filed a complaint against V Corporation, X Corporation and Y

Corporation to compel them to interplead. He alleged therein that the three corporations claimed
title and right of possession over the goods deposited in his warehouse and that he was uncertain
which of them was entitled to the goods. After due proceedings, judgment was rendered by the
court declaring that X Corporation was entitled to the goods. The decision became final and
executory.

Raphael filed a complaint against X Corporation for the payment of P100,000.00 for storage
charges and other advances for the goods. X Corporation filed a motion to. dismiss the complaint
on the ground of res judicata. X Corporation alleged that Raphael should have incorporated in his
complaint for interpleader his claim for storage fees and advances and that for his failure to do so
he was barred from interposing his claim. Raphael replied that he could not have claimed storage
fees and other advances as in his complaint for interpleader because he was not yet certain as to
who was liable therefore.

Resolve the motion with reasons.  (Bar 2005)

Suggested answer.

The motion to dismiss should be granted. When the complaint for interpleader was filed, Raphael
should have incorporated the claim for storage charges and other expenses. They are part of
Raphael‘s cause of action which he may not split. The filing of the interpleader is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the second case (Sec. 4, Rule 2). It is akin to a compulsory counterclaim
which, if not set up, is barred (Sec. 2, Rule 9). The law also abhors the multiplicity of suits; hence,
the claim for storage fees should have been made part of his cause of action in the interest of
complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents (Arreza vs. Diaz, 364 SCRA 88 [2001]).

While cruising on a highway, a taxicab driven by Mans hit an electric post. As a result thereof, its
passenger, Jovy, suffered serious injuries. Mans was subsequently charged before the Municipal
Trial Court with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

Thereafter, Jovy filed a civil action against Lourdes, the owner of the taxicab, for breach of
contract, and Mans for quasi-delict. Lourdes and Mans filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on
the ground of litis pendency, that is, the pendency of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

Resolve the motion with reasons. (Bar 2005)

Suggested answer.

The action for breach of contract against the taxicab owner cannot be barred. This is not a case of
splitting a single cause of action. The suit against the owner is based on breach of contract of
carriage separate and distinct from the cause of action arising from the crime. A contract is a source
of obligation separate and distinct from a crime (Art. 1156, Civil Code of the Philippines).

The civil action based on a quasi-delict is likewise not barred. Its source is likewise separate and
distinct from the crime. A quasi-delict is a separate source of a civil obligation and is independent of
the criminal act committed by the defendant (Art. 1156; Art. 2177, Civil Code of the Philippines).

X brought an action against Y for the recovery of certain shares of stocks. After the case was
decided in favor of X, he filed another action for the recovery of the dividends that had already
accrued even when the first action was filed. Is the second action for the recovery of dividends
proper? (Bar 1996)

Suggested answer:

The second action is not proper. There was a splitting of a single cause of action.

When X filed an action to annul the sale of the shares, he should have included therein the recovery
of the dividends that had accrued.
**
hat is the Omnibus Motion Rule?
 0

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a

pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived." (Rule 2, Rules of Court)

What is the Omnibus Motion Rule?

The Omnibus Motion Rule is a procedural principle which requires that every motion that attacks a
pleading, judgment, order or proceeding shall include all grounds then available, and all objections
not so included shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 15, Rules of Court). 

What objections are not deemed waived even if not included in the motion?

Under Sec. 1, par. 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), the following objections are not deemed waived
even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer:

1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 

2. that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis
pendencia); 
3. that the action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata); and 
4. that the action is barred by the statute of limitations (prescription) 

What is an example of a motion that is subject to the omnibus motion rule?

A motion to dismiss is a typical example of a motion subject to the omnibus motion rule, since a
motion to dismiss attacks a complaint which is a pleading. 

A motion to dismiss must invoke all objections which are available at the time of its filing. If the
objection which is available at the time is not pleaded in the motion, that, ground is deemed
waived. It can no longer be invoked as an affirmative defense in the answer which the movant may
file following the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Example:

Q: X filed a motion to dismiss invoking (1) the complaint's failure to state a cause of action and (b)
the court's of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Two objections available at the
time the motion is filed, namely, improper venue and prescription were not included in the motion.
The motion to dismiss was denied. May X still allege in his Answer as defenses improper venue and
prescription? 
A: Improper venue is deemed waived because it was available as a defense at the time the motion
was filed but was not invoked. Prescription, on the other hand, is not waived and can still be
interposed as an affirmative defense in the answer. It is a defense that is not deemed waived under
the explicit provisions of Sec. l of Rule 9.

Jurisprudence:

● Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a
pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a
pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus
motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from
the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its
application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or
prescription. (Sps. De Guzman vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 169292, April 13, 2011)
hat is the Omnibus Motion Rule?
 0

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a

pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived." (Rule 2, Rules of Court)

What is the Omnibus Motion Rule?

The Omnibus Motion Rule is a procedural principle which requires that every motion that attacks a
pleading, judgment, order or proceeding shall include all grounds then available, and all objections
not so included shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 15, Rules of Court). 

What objections are not deemed waived even if not included in the motion?

Under Sec. 1, par. 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), the following objections are not deemed waived
even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer:

1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 

2. that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis
pendencia); 
3. that the action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata); and 
4. that the action is barred by the statute of limitations (prescription) 

What is an example of a motion that is subject to the omnibus motion rule?

A motion to dismiss is a typical example of a motion subject to the omnibus motion rule, since a
motion to dismiss attacks a complaint which is a pleading. 

A motion to dismiss must invoke all objections which are available at the time of its filing. If the
objection which is available at the time is not pleaded in the motion, that, ground is deemed
waived. It can no longer be invoked as an affirmative defense in the answer which the movant may
file following the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Example:

Q: X filed a motion to dismiss invoking (1) the complaint's failure to state a cause of action and (b)
the court's of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Two objections available at the
time the motion is filed, namely, improper venue and prescription were not included in the motion.
The motion to dismiss was denied. May X still allege in his Answer as defenses improper venue and
prescription? 

A: Improper venue is deemed waived because it was available as a defense at the time the motion
was filed but was not invoked. Prescription, on the other hand, is not waived and can still be
interposed as an affirmative defense in the answer. It is a defense that is not deemed waived under
the explicit provisions of Sec. l of Rule 9.

Jurisprudence:

● Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a
pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a
pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus
motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from
the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its
application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or
prescription. (Sps. De Guzman vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 169292, April 13, 2011)
88
Remedial Law Notes

Verification of Pleadings
 0

Sec. 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings

need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading. (Rule 7, Rules of Court)
Are pleadings required to be verified?

As a general rule, pleadings need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring
the same. (Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court)

Examples of pleadings that require verification are: 

1. all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; 
2. petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions
of law under Rule 41, Section 2; 
3. petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42, Section 1; 
4. petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section
5;
5. petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1; 
6. petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; 
7. complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4;
8. application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section
4; 
9. application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1; 
10. application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; 
11. petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional
commissions under Rule 64, Section 2; 
12. petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
13. petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; 
14. complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1;
15. petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; 
16. all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; 
17. complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation; and 
18. petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code. (Vallacar Transit,
Inc. vs Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011)

How is a pleading verified?

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," shall
be deemed insufficient. (Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court)

What is the significance of verification?

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. (Martos et al. vs. New San Jose Builders, Inc.,   G.R. No.
192650, October 24, 2012)

Who should verify a pleading?

● The party does not need to sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer, or any person
who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. (Cebu
Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010)

● Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. (Fernandez vs. Villegas,
G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014)

What is the effect of non-compliance with the requirements on or submission of a defective

verification?

● A pleading required to be verified but lacks the proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading (Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of'Court). Hence, it produces no legal effect (Sec. 3, Rule 7, Rules of
Court).

● An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow
such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. xxx. (Sec. 3, Rule 7, Rules of Court).

A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and belief
produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
remedied. (Negros Oriental Planters Association vs. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. 179878, December
24, 2008)

●Non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.

Verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure the
assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply
order the correction of the pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the
rules. (Fernandez vs. Villegas)

● Time and again, we had espoused the doctrine that provisions of the Rules of Court should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.  Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, or the verification for that matter “should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.”  While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the
ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must
not be met at the expense of substantial justice.  This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine
that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its
frustration.  A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. 
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities. (Zarsona Medical Clinic vs. PHIC, G.R. No. 191225,
October 13, 2014) 
88
Voluntary Appearance
 0

Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Rule 14, Rules of Court)

When is jurisdiction over the person of the defendant required?

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required only in actions in personam. And this is
mandatory.

How is jurisdiction over the person of the defendant acquired?

Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through:

1. a valid service of summons or 

2. the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. 
Stated otherwise, without a valid service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. When
the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court over the defendant will be null and void for lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant.

When is a person deemed to have made a voluntary appearance? 

● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. (Prudential Bank vs. Magdamit,  G.R. No. 183795, November
12, 2014)
● By seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a
party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness
to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts
jurisdiction. (PCIB vs. Sps. Dy,  G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009)

● A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in

whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. (PCIB vs. Sps. Dy)

When is a person not deemed to have made a voluntary appearance? 

Voluntary Appearance, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a
party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

1. Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

2. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
3. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court
for resolution. 
Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that respondents have acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17, 2003, when they filed their Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute. Significantly, the motion did not categorically and expressly raise the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue. (Prudential Bank vs. Magdamit)

Problems:

1. B was not summoned. Upon hearing, however, that he was sued, he filed in court a motion for
extension of time to file the answer which the court granted. B did not file the answer. The
plaintiff now moves that B declared in default. B opposes the motion saying that the court has
not acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was not summoned. Is the contention of B
correct?

No, because when B filed a motion for extension of time to file the answer, he prayed for a relief
and that is the extension of the time. By so filing the motion, he voluntarily recognized the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.

2. B, the defendant was not validly summoned. He nevertheless filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person. He prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint. The motion was denied. Is B deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by filing this motion to dismiss?
No, because precisely he contested the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

3.  Suppose B files a motion to dismiss on several grounds, the foremost of these is that, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no valid summons was served on him. In
addition, he also invoke improper venue and the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute
a cause of action. The motion was denied, is B deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court?

No, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Sec. 20, Rule 14, Rules of
Court)

4. R filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Thereafter, he filed a
Motion to Dismiss stating as one (1) of the grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction.  Is R deemed
to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court?

Although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the
lack of personal jurisdiction, it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an
appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication.
Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to
file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the summons by
publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in
his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He
is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. (Go vs. Cordero, G.R. No.
164703, May 4, 2010)

4. S was not validly served with summons. However, he filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. Did the trial court acquired jurisdiction over S?

Yes. Even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him when
he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. This was
equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant (Santos v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, 566 SCRA 272, 280).
88

What is the totality rule?

 0

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. —  A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Rules of Court)

What is the totality rule?

Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Sec. 5[d], Rule 2)

Example:

● D is the debtor of C for P350,000.00 due on January 5, 2007. D likewise owes C P350,000.00 due
on February 13, 2007. Both debts are evidenced by distinct promissory notes. D has not paid the
debts despite demand. Each debt is a separate cause of action because each is the subject of a
different transaction. However, under the rule on joinder of causes of action, C may file a single suit
against D for the collection of both debts, despite the claims being actually separate causes of actions
and having arisen out of different transactions.

In case C decides in favor of a joinder, the suit shall be filed in the RTC because the total amount of
the debts is within that court's jurisdiction. Under the Rules, when the claims in all the causes of
action are principally for the recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction (Sec. 5[d], Rule 2, Rules of Court). This situation follows the so-called totality test for
purposes of jurisdiction. (Dean Riano)

P sued A in the RTC-Manila to recover the following sums: (1) P200,000.00 on an overdue
promissory note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for
damages to his car, and (4) P100,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Can A move
to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter?
Explain. (Bar 2002)

A cannot move for the successful dismissal of the case. Under the totality rule, the aggregate amount
of the claim under the causes of action joined is P 430,000.00, an amount well within the jurisdiction
of the RTC. The claim for attorney's fees and litigation expenses and costs are not to be included in
determining the jurisdictional amount.

Where the cause of action accrues to one plaintiff against one defendant, the provisions of Sec. 5 of
Rule 2 allow a party to assert in one pleading as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party provided he does not join special civil actions or those subject to special rules. No
special civil action is involved under the facts.

Note:

The totality rule applies only to the MTC – totality of claims cannot exceed the jurisdictional amount
of the MTC. There is no totality rule for the RTC because its jurisdictional amount is without limit.
Except in tax cases where the limit is below P1 million. Amounts of P1 million or more fall within
the jurisdiction of the CTA. (Justice Magdalangal De Leon)

TAGS:

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

 0

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. —  Parties in interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.  (Rule 3,
Rules of Court)

When is joinder of parties becomes compulsory?

● Normally, a joinder of parties is permissive (Sec. 6, Rule 3); however, the joinder of a party

becomes compulsory when the one involved is an indispensable party. (Sec. 7, Rule 3)

● Well-settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. It is a condition sine
qua non to the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain finality. One who is not a party to a case is not bound by any
decision of the court; otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. (Lagunilla and
Monis vs. Velasco and Monis,  G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009) 

Does the failure to join an indispensable party results in the outright dismissal of the action?

● The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of
the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such
times as are just. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with a lawful
court order. (Lagunilla and Monis vs. Velasco and Monis)

● Indispensable parties must be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. Whenever it appears to

the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the
duty of the court to stop the trial and to order the inclusion of such party. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. (Uy vs. CA,  G.R. No.
157065, July 11, 2006)

Who has the responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties?

The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the

petitioner/plaintiff. (Moldes vs. Villanueva,  G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005)

TAGS:

ermissive joinder of parties

 0

Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. —  All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed
or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (Rule 3,
Rules of Court)

What is the rule on joinder of parties?

● The rule contemplates a situation where there are two or more persons in whom a right to relief
exist or against whom a right to relief exist. These two or more persons can join in one complaint or
can be joined as defendants in one complaint provided that there exist between them a question of
law common to both of them. As the term suggests, joinder is not mandatory. It may be availed of
by parties as plaintiffs if they want to. If they do not want to join as parties, they cannot be
compelled. (Laggui)

Several plaintiffs vs. 1 defendant

1 plaintiff vs. several defendants

What are the requisites of 

Permissive joinder of parties requires that:

a. the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; 
b. there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and 
c. such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and
venue. (Pantranco vs. Standard Insurance Company, Inc.,  G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005)

Example 1:

A, B and C are owners of adjoining houses. X is a driver of a gasoline tanker. X struck a Meralco Post,
resulting to its explosion. The fire burned the houses of A, B, and C. A can sue X for the loss of his
house. B can sue X for the loss of his own house. C can sue X for the burning of his own house.
There will be now, 3 complaints against X. On the other hand, A, B and C or A and B alone, or A and
C, or B and C, sued X in one complaint. A and C sued X in one complaint, B and C sued X in one
complaint, or better still, they joined in one complaint against X.

Q.   Can they validly do that?

A.   Yes, they have each a separate cause of action against X. Under the rule on joinder of parties, all
of them can join in only one complaint.

Q.   Why?
A.   Right to relief exists in favor of all of them, A, B and C.

Q.   What is the basis of their right to relief of A against X?

A.   The basis of the right of A against X is the negligent act of X in driving.

Q.    What is the basis of the right of B against X?

A.    The same. The negligent act of X.

Q.    What is the basis of the right of relief of C against X?

A.    The same, the negligent act of X in driving.

If A, B and C filed separately the case, there will be only one issue that the court will resolve, which
is common to all of them. So they can join as parties. This is the rule on permissive joinder of
parties.

Q.   Can A, B and C be required or compelled to join in one complaint?

A.   No. whether they will join or they will not join is a matter of them alone to decide. They cannot
be forced to join.

Example 2:

C is the creditor of D for P350,000.00 and also of E for P375,000.00. Both debts are due and have
been contracted separately. May C join D and E as defendants in the same complaint? No. Where a
party sues two or more defendants, it is necessary for the causes of action to arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and that there should be a common question of law or fact.
The debt of D is a transaction different from the debt of E.

Example 3:

P is a passenger in a bus owned by O and driven by D. Because of the negligence of D, P sustained

injuries when the vehicle fell into a ditch by the roadside. May P join O and D as defendants in the
same complaint based on torts? Yes. The liability of O and that of D arose out of the same accident
which gives rise to a common question of law or fact. Note that the existence of a contractual
relationship does not preclude a suit based on tort. O may be sued under a quasi-delict, as an
employer of D if P so desires (Art. 2180, Civil Code; Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155).

Example 4:

If A and B both sign a promissory note for P1 million and bind themselves to be jointly liable for the
debt in favor of C, there are two distinct obligations within the same promissory note, namely: (a)
the obligation of A to C for P500,000.00; and (b) the obligation of B to C for P500,000,00. Under Art.
2108 of the Civil Code, unless otherwise indicated by the obligation or by law, the debt or credit
shall be presumed divided into as many equal shares as there are creditors or debtors. In other
words the obligation under the promissory note in the illustration is joint, not solidary. If the
obligation is joint, C may sue A alone or sue B alone. This is because the debts are separate and
distinct causes of action. May C however, join A and B under one complaint and thereby join the
causes of action against them? Yes. The debt of A and the debt of B arose out of the same
transaction, i.e., the same promissory note and would necessarily give rise to a common question of
law or fact.
88
Remedial Law Notes

Lucas vs. Fabros Case Digest
 0

The motion for reconsideration prohibited by Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary
Procedure is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court
after trial on the merits of the case. The order of dismissal issued by respondent
judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Lucas charged Judge Fabros with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion. She
alleged that she was a defendant in an ejectment case pending before the sala of said judge. Judge
Fabros dismissed the ejectment case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the
Preliminary Conference. However, she granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal order. Lucas averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary
Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the
rule, granted the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Did Judge Fabros erred in granting the motion for reconsideration?

Held:

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Thus,

"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.

xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the
merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15,
1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment
rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously
not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such
order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she
guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the
present complaint. (Lucas vs. Fabros,  A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000)
88
Remedial Law Notes

Ponciano vs. Judge Parentela Case Digest
 0

An answer which asserts a compulsory counterclaim need not include a certificate of

non-forum shopping since such pleading is not initiatory in character.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Respondents Ildefonso and Leonora Clamosa filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against petitioners Claro and Gloria Ponciano for unpaid cost of labor and materials incurred by them
in repairing petitioners house.

Petitioners filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim, claiming that they have paid the total
contract price agreed upon; that despite this, the work of private respondents was defective; and that
private respondents abandoned the renovation before it was completed. Petitioners asserted that they
are entitled to be paid P250,000 to complete the renovation, and damages.

Upon motion of private respondents, the trial court ordered that petitioners counterclaim be stricken
off from the record for failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which requires an
affidavit of non-forum shopping for all initiatory pleadings in all courts. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing, among others, that since their counterclaim is compulsory in nature, it is not
an initiatory pleading and therefore, does not fall within the scope of said circular. However,the trial
court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not an answer which asserts a compulsory counterclaim must include a certificate of non-
forum shopping.

Held:

No. The real office of Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb
the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is an act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is
primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a
claim for relief.

There is no doubt that the counterclaims pleaded by petitioners in their answers are compulsory in
nature. The filing of a separate action by petitioners would only result in the presentation of the same
evidence as in Civil Case No. TM-601. Proceeding from our ruling in Santo Tomas University
Hospital, petitioners need not file a certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not
initiatory in character, and therefore, are not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. (Ponciano vs. Judge Parentela, G.R. No. 133284. May 9, 2000)
88


Alvarez vs. Judge Diaz Case Digest
 0

Any motion with a notice of hearing that is not addressed to all parties, in violation of
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, is a mere scrap of paper which should not
be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Spouses Garcia filed an action for forcible entry against Alvarez. After hearing, Judge Diaz ruled in
favor of the plaintiff spouses. Spouses Garcia then moved to execute the judgment. The notice of
hearing of the motion for execution, however, was addressed only to the clerk of court and not to the
parties:

The Clerk of Court

MTC Branch 37
Quezon City

Kindly include this motion in your calendar for February 3, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning during which
the matter and parties may be heard. Signature Illegible.
Sgd. C.A.L

Judge Diaz granted the motion for execution. Alvarez filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Diaz for abuse of authority. Respondent judge argues that although the notice of hearing attached to
the motion for execution was addressed only to the clerk of court, a copy of the Motion for Execution
was nonetheless sent to the counsel of Alvarez. This was confirmed by Atty. Conrado A. Leao, who
testified that he personally delivered a copy of the Motion for Execution to counsel of Alvarez.

Issue:

Should Judge Diaz have acted upon the the motion for execution?

Held:

No. Even if there was no perfected Notice of Appeal and payment of the supersedeas bond,
respondent judge should not have granted plaintiff's Motion for Execution because it was fatally
defective. Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 5. Notice of Hearing. ― The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.

It is well-settled that any motion with a notice of hearing that is not addressed to all parties, in
violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, is a mere scrap of paper which should not be
accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance.

If personal service of the motion was made upon complainant's counsel, then proof of service thereof
consisting of any of the following should have been presented to the court, together with the Motion
for Execution:

Section 13. Proof of service. ― x x x [1] a written admission of the party served, [2] the official return of the
server, or [3] the affidavit of the party serving containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
service x x x.

None of the above was presented. Thus, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
which mandates the "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of service thereof," the motion for execution should not have been acted upon by the respondent
judge. (Alvarez vs. Judge Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283. March 3, 2004)
88

Bacelonia vs. CA Case Digest

 0
An answer which asserts a compulsory counterclaim need not include a certificate of
non-forum shopping since such pleading is not initiatory in character.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

After the presentation of the second witness of plaintiff, the Bacelonias filed a motion to be
dropped as defendants from the civil case involving quasi-delict, as their other co-defendants have
admitted responsibility to the accident. The trial court denied the motion and scheduled the
reception of defense evidence.

On January 31, 2000, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order
denying their motion and set the date of hearing thereof on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 am.

The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. Petitioners elevated the denial before the CA which
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Was the denial by the trial court of the motion for reconsideration, proper?

Held:

Yes. Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:

Section 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days  after the filing of the
motion. 

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was beyond the
period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15,
Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the motion shall be
scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of
Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and
consideration of the court. (Bacelonia vs. CA, G.R. No. 143440. February 11, 2003)
88

Tiu vs. Middleton Case Digest

 0

Pre-trial is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties
cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not
contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by
the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses
from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses
may no longer be modified during the trial, without the consent of the parties
affected.

* * * * * * * * 
Facts:

The Middletons filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, accounting and
damages against Tiu before the RTC of Oroquieta City.  Before the commencement of the trial, the
court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial Conference stating in part: The parties are warned that
witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to
testify at the trial x x x. In his Pre-Trial Brief, Tiu averred that he would be presenting six witnesses,
but he did not name them. 

In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted
or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that the defendant (Tiu) will present six
witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were
named. Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however naming
them. 

Trial ensued, and the Middletons presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, Tiu
called a certain Antonia as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the
Middletons objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because Tiu had failed
to name her in his pre-trial brief. Sustaining the Middletons, the lower court then issued the
assailed orders. Hence, the present recourse. 

Issue:

Can a judge exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not included in the pre-
trial?

Held:

Yes. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. It is essential in the
simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the
role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and
other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice
to this effect. 

In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted
or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that [t]he defendant will present six witnesses. It
made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named.
Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however naming them.
Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it
necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.

Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the
pre-trial order. Section 7 of the same Rule states:

SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. -- The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof,
the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action
taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the
parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define
and limit the issues to be tried.  The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of action,
unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. 

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses shall control
the subsequent course of action. The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the
Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke
the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and
summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order
allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the
trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest
injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules. (Tiu vs. Middleton, G.R. No. 134998.
July 19, 1999)
8888
Remedial Law Notes

Vera vs. Rigor Case Digest
 0

The Rule mandatorily requires the parties to seasonably file their briefs and failure to
do so shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The pre-trial and its governing
rules are not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Respondent Ernesto Rigor filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against
petitioner Dr. Emmanuel Vera. During the pre-trial conference, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement, hence, the trial court terminated the pre-trial and set the case for initial hearing.
During the initial hearing, the trial court, upon manifestation of petitioner’s counsel, realized that
respondent failed to file a pre-trial brief.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint raising as ground respondent’s failure to file a pre-
trial brief. The trial court issued a Resolution granting the motion and dismissing the complaint.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court.
Issue:

May a civil case be dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to file a pre-trial brief?

Held:

Yes. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that the parties
shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt
thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs. Failure
to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Corollarily, Section 5 of the same Rule states that the failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial
shall be cause for dismissal of the action.

Clearly, the above Rule mandatorily requires the parties to seasonably file their briefs and failure to
do so shall be cause for the dismissal of the action.

While the trial judge erroneously proceeded with the trial conference, the fact remains that
respondent did not file a pre-trial brief. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 quoted above, such failure is a
cause for dismissal of the action. We have to emphasize that pre-trial and its governing rules are not
technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with.

Obviously, since respondent did not file a pre-trial brief, it follows that the trial judge failed to
conduct the pre-trial conference in accordance with Rule 18. In fact, he did not issue the required pre-
trial order stating the various matters which should have been included therein. Indeed, the trial judge
showed his ignorance of the Rules, specifically Rule 18. And by failing to take appropriate steps to
enable the parties reach an amicable settlement, the trial judge showed his gross inefficiency. (Vera
vs. Rigor, G.R. No. 147377, August 10, 2007)
888
Remedial Law Notes

Ong vs. Mazo Case Digest
 0

●The time-honored cry of fishing expedition can no longer provide a reason to

prevent a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party's case
through the discovery procedures. 

● The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discovery is that they
enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an
amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 
Respondents Lanuevo and Tomilloso filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Ong before the
RTC of Guiuan, Eastern Samar. The complaint arose from a vehicular accident whereby a bus owned
by petitioner and driven by Caramoan allegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by Lanuevo, with
Tomilloso as her passenger at the time.

After she filed her Answer, petitioner served written interrogatories upon respondents. She later filed
a motion to direct respondents to answer the interrogatories. RTC denied the motion upon the ground
that such constituted a “fishing expedition” which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial
conference. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion.

Held:

Yes. This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of the various modes or
instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even
before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not
only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this
ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery, depositions,
interrogatories, and requests for admissions without much court intervention since leave of court is
not necessary to put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint has been served. The
rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to
discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expeditethe
trial of the case.

Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his opponent, as
what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a fishing expedition, is to
disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that
the time-honored cry of fishing expedition can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party's case through the discovery procedures. (Ong
vs. Mazo, G.R. No. 145542. June 4, 2004)
88
Dela Cruz vs. Andres Case Digest
 0

Petition for relief from judgment can only be filed in the MTC or RTC. Neither the
Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the
remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Sps. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title and/or reconveyance with damages against
Sps. Andres. Sps. Dela Cruz won in the MTC but lost in the RTC.

Sps. Dela Cruz filed a petition for review with the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the
petition since the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed not signed by them but by their
counsel, Atty. Villarosa, in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

The petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for relief from judgment praying that the dismissal
of their petition for review be set aside since the gross negligence of their previous counsel did not
bind them. The appellate court, however, denied their petition. It ruled that petitioners were bound
by the action of their counsel as well as by his mistake or negligence.

Issue:

Can petitioners avail of a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from
a judgment of the CA due to their counsel’s negligence when he signed the Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping?

Held:

No. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment, final order or other proceeding was
taken against the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

While the law uses the phrase any court, it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional
Trial Courts. The procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
promulgated by this Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court
nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
Court of Appeals.

Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of a petition
for relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In
seeking to reverse the appellate courts decision denying their petition for relief from judgment by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.

Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the merits of this petition, the same must still be
denied. What petitioners counsel did in this case was to attach an improper Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping to their petition for review with the appellate court. While this omission can
plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the
annulment of the proceedings below.

For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
clients cause must be shown. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived
of his day in court, the result of which is that he is deprived of his property without due process of
law. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process. Here, the case underwent a full-blown trial. Both parties were adequately heard,
and all issues were ventilated before the decision was promulgated.

It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from judgment, meritorious defenses must be
accompanied by the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there being neither excusable
nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of due process, meritorious defenses cannot alone be
considered.

While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in stone, it is equally true that strict compliance
with the Rules is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Dela Cruz vs. Andres,  G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007)

TAGS:

Honoridez vs. Mahinay Case Digest

 0

Only pending actions involving a common question of law or fact may be

consolidated.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC of Cebu City for declaration of nullity of a mortgage deed
and for damages, with an application for a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to prevent
the foreclosure sale of the subject parcel of land. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
23653. Petitioners alleged that in 1994, they mortgaged said parcel of land to Jocelyn Joy Sorensen,
and that the mortgage deed imposed an exorbitant, unconscionable interest of 5% per month.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that the same parcel of land was earlier
mortgaged to Felimon Suarez in 1993, but they were required to execute a deed of sale instead. They
claimed that when the secured obligation had matured, Sorensen offered to help redeem the property
and did pay the sum for such purpose, as well as the taxes involved. It was after such payment that
petitioners executed the mortgage in favor of Sorensen.

During the course of the proceedings, Atty. Makilito Mahinay filed a Motion to Intervene, claiming
that in an earlier case, Civil Case No. CEB-11086, he and petitioners entered into a compromise
agreement wherein he was given the preferential right to buy the lot in issue in the event that
petitioners decide to dispose of it. Later on, he discovered that petitioners executed a deed of sale
over the same lot in favor of Suarez, thereby prompting him to file an action for specific performance
against petitioners and Suarez. The subsequent action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16335, was
decided in Mahinay's favor, with the RTC finding that the contract between Suarez and petitioners
was a sale and not an equitable mortgage, ruling that Mahinay is entitled to redeem the lot from
Suarez, and ordering Suarez to execute a deed of conveyance and to transfer the lot to Mahinay for
the same consideration as in the deed of sale between Suarez and petitioners. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory in 2001.

Petitioners and Sorensen opposed the motion for intervention, claiming that Suarez could not have
sold the lot to Mahinay because Suarez had not purchased it and become its owner in the first place.
Thereafter, Mahinay filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the answers failed to
tender an issue.

Petitioners then filed three motions: (1) Motion to Defer Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2)
Motion for Consolidation, and (3) Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint and Admit Third
Party Complaint. In the first motion, they claimed that they were able to redeem the lot from Suarez
long before the decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 had come out, thus rendering the
aforementioned decision moot and academic. According to petitioners, such redemption is a
supervening event which rendered the decision unenforceable. In the second motion, they argued that
the determination of whether such redemption is a supervening event is a common issue in the case a
quo and in Civil Case No. CEB-16335. In the third motion, petitioners claimed that there is a
necessity to implead Suarez in order to preserve and protect their ownership over the lot.

The RTC denied the three motions.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in not consolidating Civil Case No. CEB-23653 with Civil Case No. CEB
16335?

Held:

No. Under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, only pending actions involving a common
question of law or fact may be consolidated. Obviously, petitioners cannot make out a case for
consolidation in this case since Civil Case No. CEB-16335, the case which petitioners seek to
consolidate with the case a quo, has long become final and executory; as such it cannot be re-litigated
in the instant proceedings without virtually impeaching the correctness of the decision in the other
case.  Public policy abhors such eventuality.

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein
should be laid to rest. (Honoridez vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 153762. August 12, 2005)
Honoridez vs. Mahinay Case Digest
  0

Only pending actions involving a common question of law or fact may be

consolidated.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC of Cebu City for declaration of nullity of a mortgage deed
and for damages, with an application for a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to prevent
the foreclosure sale of the subject parcel of land. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
23653. Petitioners alleged that in 1994, they mortgaged said parcel of land to Jocelyn Joy Sorensen,
and that the mortgage deed imposed an exorbitant, unconscionable interest of 5% per month.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that the same parcel of land was earlier
mortgaged to Felimon Suarez in 1993, but they were required to execute a deed of sale instead. They
claimed that when the secured obligation had matured, Sorensen offered to help redeem the property
and did pay the sum for such purpose, as well as the taxes involved. It was after such payment that
petitioners executed the mortgage in favor of Sorensen.

During the course of the proceedings, Atty. Makilito Mahinay filed a Motion to Intervene, claiming
that in an earlier case, Civil Case No. CEB-11086, he and petitioners entered into a compromise
agreement wherein he was given the preferential right to buy the lot in issue in the event that
petitioners decide to dispose of it. Later on, he discovered that petitioners executed a deed of sale
over the same lot in favor of Suarez, thereby prompting him to file an action for specific performance
against petitioners and Suarez. The subsequent action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16335, was
decided in Mahinay's favor, with the RTC finding that the contract between Suarez and petitioners
was a sale and not an equitable mortgage, ruling that Mahinay is entitled to redeem the lot from
Suarez, and ordering Suarez to execute a deed of conveyance and to transfer the lot to Mahinay for
the same consideration as in the deed of sale between Suarez and petitioners. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory in 2001.

Petitioners and Sorensen opposed the motion for intervention, claiming that Suarez could not have
sold the lot to Mahinay because Suarez had not purchased it and become its owner in the first place.
Thereafter, Mahinay filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the answers failed to
tender an issue.

Petitioners then filed three motions: (1) Motion to Defer Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2)
Motion for Consolidation, and (3) Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint and Admit Third
Party Complaint. In the first motion, they claimed that they were able to redeem the lot from Suarez
long before the decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 had come out, thus rendering the
aforementioned decision moot and academic. According to petitioners, such redemption is a
supervening event which rendered the decision unenforceable. In the second motion, they argued that
the determination of whether such redemption is a supervening event is a common issue in the case a
quo and in Civil Case No. CEB-16335. In the third motion, petitioners claimed that there is a
necessity to implead Suarez in order to preserve and protect their ownership over the lot.

The RTC denied the three motions.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in not consolidating Civil Case No. CEB-23653 with Civil Case No. CEB
16335?

Held:

No. Under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, only pending actions involving a common
question of law or fact may be consolidated. Obviously, petitioners cannot make out a case for
consolidation in this case since Civil Case No. CEB-16335, the case which petitioners seek to
consolidate with the case a quo, has long become final and executory; as such it cannot be re-litigated
in the instant proceedings without virtually impeaching the correctness of the decision in the other
case.  Public policy abhors such eventuality.

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein
should be laid to rest. (Honoridez vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 153762. August 12, 2005)
8

Remedial Law Notes


Villena vs. Payoyo Case Digest
 0

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary

estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends
on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery and
installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90
days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. Payoyo paid the downpayment. Another
contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and Villena also paid the 50%
downpayment. Despite demand, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the
appliances. 

Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena posits
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money
in the amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.

Payoyo, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint as the
allegations therein show that it is actually a case for rescission of the contracts. The recovery of a
sum of money is merely a necessary consequence of the cancellation of the contracts.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.

Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of money with damages, is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it
is actually for breach of contract.  A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts.  An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an
action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.  The averments in the complaint show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of
the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to
deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. While the respondent
prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or
cancellation of the contracts. (Villena vs. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007)

TAGS:

Remedial Law Notes


Rivera vs. Del Rosario Case Digest
 0

The filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the
amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly
authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The
party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not
automatically lost.

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Respondents filed a complaint for nullity of contract of sale and annulment of the transfer certificates
of title against petitioners. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed with
modification the RTC decision. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
SC.

Petitioners contend, among others, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing fees
respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was
worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid filing
fees amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the doctrine in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion and attach a certification from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Quezon City.

Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct amount of docket fees when
they filed the complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they could not be faulted because the
clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also add
that since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the lower court,
they cannot raise the same on appeal.

Issue:

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency in the amount of
filing fees paid by respondents?

Held:

Yes. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v.
Asuncion, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the
payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the
claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay
the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.

Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed the
complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it
before the trial court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees
through this petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the
Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the
instant case. (Rivera vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004)
88
Heirs of Delos Santos vs. CA Case Digest
 0

Service of decisions must be made to the counsel on record if a party appears by

counsel. Service of decisions by registered mail should be made by depositing the
copy of the decision in the office, in a sealed envelope, addressed to the party's
counsel at his office. 

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Del Rosario filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Delos Santos with the RTC of Legazpi
City. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Del Rosario.

On April 2, 1998, the postman attempted to deliver a copy of an adverse decision to the office of
Atty. Olaybal, counsel for petitioner Del Rosario. At that time, the office of Atty. Olaybal was closed
since he was then suffering from influenza. The postman instead delivered the copy of the decision
to Bernadeth Faye Alamares, who was a clerk in an office adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. Alamares
received the Decision and signed the corresponding registry return card.

On 17 April 1998, a Friday, Atty. Olaybal reported for work. Alamares subsequently turned over the
mails she received, including the decision, to Atty. Olaybal. Atty. Olaybal asked from Alamares the
exact date when she received the Decision. Alamares replied that to her recollection it was before
the holidays, referring to 9 April 1998 (Bataan Day). Atty. Olaybal concluded from Alamares'
recollection that she received the decision on 8 April 1998 and mistakenly thought that the end of
the reglementary period to perfect an appeal fell on 23 April 1998.

On 20 April 1998, the next business day, Atty. Olaybal filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal of
the decision.

The trial court, however, dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.

Atty. Olaybal filed a Petition for Relief pleading mistake and excusable negligence for failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period and praying that the appeal be given due course.

The trial court dismissed the Petition for Relief and issued a writ of execution. The CA affirmed the
Orders of the RTC.

Issue:

Was the service of the trial court's decision valid and binding on petitioners?
Held:

No. Section 2 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. xxx Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. xxx 

Section 7 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in
the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known,
otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is
available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. 

Section 9 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions
shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication
has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served
upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party. 

Therefore, service of decisions must be made to the counsel on record if a party appears by
counsel. Service of decisions by registered mail should be made by depositing the copy of the
decision in the office, in a sealed envelope, addressed to the party's counsel at his office.

In this case, the postman served a copy of the trial court’s decision on Alamares who was neither an
associate nor employee of Atty. Olaybal. The records show that Alamares was then an employee of
Asaphil Corporation whose office is adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. There is nothing in the records
showing Atty. Olaybal authorized either Alamares or Ashapil Corporation to receive mails addressed
to him or his law office.

Since there was no valid service of the trial court's decision on Alamares on 2 April 1998, we shall
reckon the fifteen-day period within which to perfect the appeal from 17 April 1998, when Atty.
Olaybal actually received a copy of the trial court's decision. Consequently, Atty. Olaybal filed the
notice of appeal within the reglementary period when he filed it on 20 April 1998.

Order of the RTC was annuled and Notice of Appeal was reinstated. (Heirs of Delos Santos vs. CA,
G.R. No. 139167. June 29, 2005)
888
Remedial Law Notes

Ello vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest
 0

The requirement under Section 11, Rule 13 is mandatory. Any violation of this Rule
may be cause for the court to consider the paper as not filed. However, such
discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking
into account the following factors: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3)
"the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11".

* * * * * * * * 

Facts: 

Respondents filed with the MTCC a complaint against the petitioners for forcible entry. The MTCC
dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish that they have brought the instant
case within one year from entry of petitioners.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision and ordered the petitioners to vacate the lots and
deliver the same to the respondents.

Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for review. The petition was dismissed outright on the ground
that it does not contain the affidavit of service required by Section 11 of Rule 13.

Petitioners promptly filed a motion for reconsideration attaching therewith the affidavit of service
executed by Gabriel M. Manasan. In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners averred that they
failed to append to their petition the affidavit of service due to an excusable oversight considering the
time constraint in filing the petition with voluminous annexes and that there would be a denial of
substantial justice if their petition would be dismissed merely by reason of technicality. Still
unconvinced, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright petitioners’
petition for review on the sole technical ground that it does not contain the affidavit of service as
required by Section 11 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

Held:

Under Section 11, Rule 13, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be
had, which must then be accompanied by written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall
likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to
append the affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the CA. The SC note, though
that petitioners, upon receipt of the CA’s challenged Resolution dismissing outright their petition due
to such omission, promptly filed a motion for reconsideration, readily acknowledging their
procedural lapse and attaching therewith the required affidavit of service. Significantly, the affidavit
of service shows that the petition for review was filed with the CA thru Registered mail. This mode
of filing is permitted under Section 11 Rule 13 since it is obviously impractical for petitioners and
their counsel, who are all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, to personally file their petition in
Manila. Clearly, the affidavit of service is a substantive compliance with the requirement under
Section 11.

It bears stressing that petitioners’ procedural lapse in not appending such affidavit to their petition
did not in any way thwart the laudable objective of Section 11, i.e., to quell the lawyers’ unethical
practice of deliberately resorting to delays in the filing and service of pleadings, motions and other
papers. Indeed, the evil sought to be prevented by the new rule is absent here. Also, there is
absolutely no indication from petitioners’ omission that they demonstrated their contempt for the
Rules.

Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure," which exception is present here. (Ello vs. CA, 460 SCRA 406, G.R. No.
141255, June 21, 2005)
88

Robinson vs. Miralles Case Digest

 0

The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully,

and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the
Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.
887
2. There was no valid service. Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G.
Domingo, Jr. was furnished copies of the requests. This is not sufficient compliance with the Rules."

The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of
Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon the party. This is so because the
attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in
all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is
obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly
prosecution of a partys case. However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly
provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service must be made
directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid. 

Section 1 of Rule 26 provides that the request for admission should be served on the party to whom
the request is directed. Hence, the request for admission made by Duque was not validly served
and therefore, Spouses Bonifacio cannot be deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters
upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary judgment rendered by the RTC has no
legal basis to support it. (Duque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002)
888
t did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore,
it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof
of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service.  It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in
the circumstances authorized by statute.

Summons by publication improper

The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is

in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s
person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the
individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the
instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed
against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession
thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific
performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on Sps. Boyon properly,
the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands
that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. (Sps. Patrick
Jose & Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen Boyon & Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369.   October 23, 2003)
\
88
omualdez-Licaros vs. Licaros Case Digest
 0

Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected by any other means the judge
may consider sufficient. Summons by publication and at the same time furnishing
respondent with a copy of the Order as well as the corresponding Summons and a
copy of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage at her given address in the
US thru the Department of Affairs held valid. In actions in rem and quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential provided
that the court acquired jurisdiction over the res.
 * * * * * * * * * 

Facts:

Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in
1979, they agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children left
for the United States. 

In 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Margarita, based on psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then residing in the United States,
the court ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and at
the same time furnishing Margarita a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a
copy of the petition at her address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all
at the expense of Abelardo. Margarita was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive
pleading. On November 8, 1991, the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was declared null and void.

Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty.
Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros"
inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati on November 8, 1991.

Margarita filed a petition for review on certiorari, insisting that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never
validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:

Yes. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service
of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person
unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are
directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or
quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in
the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court
considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition
affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of
summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes
family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may
be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effectedunder any of three modes: (1)
by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of
the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also
with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.

The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service (service by publication and furnishing her
with a copy of the Order, Summons and a copy of the petition at her address in California thru the
Department of Foreign Affairs) does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of
Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider
sufficient."

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule.
After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of
summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule
14. (Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs. Abelardo Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003)
888
Remedial Law Notes

Meliton vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest
 0

Dismissal thereunder Sec. 2, Rule 17 is without prejudice, except when otherwise

stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the
court. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim duly
interposed in an Answer and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits
thereof.

***********

Facts:
Ziga filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of land against Meliton on
the ground of breach of contract. She alleged that Meliton failed to pay the monthly rentals due,
constructed a concrete wall and roof on the leased premises and subleased the property without her
consent. 

Meliton filed an answer and set up counterclaims for the recovery of the value of her kitchenette
constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by Ziga. 

Subsequently, Ziga filed a motion to dismiss her complaint alleging that her cause of action had
become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. The counterclaims of Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. 

Meliton later filed a complaint against Ziga for the recovery of the amounts involved in her
counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
prior judgment.

The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dismissal of the counterclaims in the earlier case
is not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims
for failure of Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the said dismissal does not constitute a bar to the
filing of the later complaint. 

The CA reversed the RTC's decision and ordered the dismissal of the case stating that the failure of
the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal
therefrom rendered the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their counterclaim
by another action.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature

2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in another
action.

Held:

1. The counterclaims of petitioner are compulsory in nature. 

Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises
out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

The "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged
in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where
they involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.

In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present.
The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Private respondents's complaint was for
rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner's breach of her obligations under the said contract.
On the other hand, Petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the
improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises, as well as for the
filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded.

Both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as
well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. That
contract of lease pleaded by private respondentconstitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both
parties for recovery of their respective claims.

2. Petitioners are not barred by res judicata.

In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits;
and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action. 

The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of private respondent,
plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when
otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court.
The order of dismissal of the first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, does
not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should
apply to a counterclaim duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits
thereof.

In the order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by
reason of the fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the
docket fees. The said dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata,  there having been no consideration and adjudication of
the case on the merits.

The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had
not been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on
the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims
is not res judicata and will not bar the filing of another action based on the same causes of
action. (Sps. Lydia and Virgilio Meliton vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101883 December 11, 1992)
Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Luyaben Case Digest
 0
Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case
in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive.
88
Brgy. San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor Case Digest
 0

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within

the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.

***********
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. 

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
888

Bautista vs. Maya-Maya Cottages Case Digest

 0

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered
dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final.

The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the
absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory
is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the
Rule.  Records show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint
in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent, as a
plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed,
provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final, as in this case.
88
When the defendant and his counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and
no compromise agreement was reached by the parties despite the opportunity given
them by the court, the Court should have issued a "preliminary conference order"
defining the issues in the case as provided in Section 6. Thereafter the parties should
have submitted their affidavits and other evidence as provided in Section 7 of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. 

● Only when the defendant failed to answer the complaint may the Court proceed to
judgment.

Only when the defendant failed to answer the complaint may the Court proceed to judgment. Thus
does Section 5 provide:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer complaint, cross-claim or
permissive counterclaim within the reglementary 10-day period herein provided, the court motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein except as to the amount of damages which
the Court may reduce in its discretion.

In this case, since Ravelo did file an answer to the complaint, the trial court may not declare him as
in default (despite his absence and that of his counsel at the pre-trial conference) because a motion to
declare the defendant in default is a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (h) of the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

It is the policy of the law to have every litigated case tried on the merits. It is for this reason that
judgment by defaults are generally looked upon with disfavor. A judgment by default may amount to
a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious consequence
necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set
aside." (Lesaca vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96432, October 21, 1992)
*******
Alegar Corporation vs. Alvarez Case Digest
 0

The purpose of summons, which is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that
an action has been commenced against him, was sufficiently met when such
defendant or respondent filed his answer and participated in all the proceedings of
the case. 
88
d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages. (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

Are there limitations on the judgment that the court may render where the defendant is declared
in default?

Yes. The limitations are:

1. The judgment cannot award an amount in excess of what was prayed for in complaint;
2. The judgment cannot be different in kind from that prayed for in the complaint.
3. The judgment cannot award unliquidated damages.

● If the defendant filed his answer, the judgment may be different from what has been prayed
provided that judgment is sustained by the evidence.

Example: A filed a damage suit against B for 1M. B filed his Answer. During the trial, the evidence of
the plaintiff shows a right to recover 1.5M. May the court award A 1.5M? Yes.

But suppose B did not file an Answer and was declared in default. Can A recover 1.5M? No. The
court has no authority to grant the latter amount despite the evidence. This is because under the
Rules, "A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different
in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages" (Sec. 3[d], Rule 9, Rules of Court). 

Mangelen vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 88954, October 29, 1992

Section 5, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(c), Rule 9] of the Rules of Court provides that judgment entered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.
Consequently, an award of exemplary damages should not have been made since it was not even
prayed for. Besides, the complaint is for beach of contract. Exemplary damages may only be
awarded therein if private respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. There is no finding whatsoever on the matter.

There is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence presented ex-
parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence presented ex-parte and against a
defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to appear at the hearing. In the former, section
5 of Rule 18 provides that the judgment against the defendant should not exceed the amount or to
be different in kind from that prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the amount
or be different in kind from the prayed for. Read: Mangelen vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest 

Pascua vs. Florendo

G.R. No. L-39047, April 30, 1985

A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by
defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against
him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, of course,
presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically
incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice
requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented
should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed .
And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in
kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.

Diona vs. Balangue

G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to
and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds
the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent
surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who
was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to
conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same
is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed
the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed
that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he
known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in
the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to
safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.
This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting
idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the
opportunity to be heard thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties
does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she
alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof.
She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence
nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis
and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not
informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe
that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s general
prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." To repeat, the
court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related
thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action. Besides, even assuming
that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during
trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance
with applicable jurisprudence.

TAGS:
DEFAULT
Can a defendant who failed to file his own Answer be
declared in default even if Answers were filed by his co-
defendants?
 0

(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of
action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the
court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented. (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

Where there are two or more defendants, some of whom answered and some did not, but the
cause of action is common to all of them, how will the court proceed to try the case?

Example: A filed a case against B, C and D. The cause of action is common to all defendants. Only B
answered.

Q. Can C and D be declared in default even if B filed an Answer?

A. Yes. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefore, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default.” [Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court]

Q. Can C and D participate in the trial?

A. No. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part
in the trial. [Section 3(a), Rule 9]

Q. Does this mean therefore that the trial will no longer affect C and D?
A. No. C and D will be declared in default for their failure to file an Answer but the decision shall be
rendered against them on the basis of B’s answer. The answer filed by B inures to the benefit of C
and D. It is as if this answer filed by B was filed not only for B but also for C and D. So, if B wins for
instance, C and D might also win. If B looses, C and D also loose.

Q. May the court divide the case by first dismissing the same as against the non-defaulted
defendants and thereafter hearing it ex parte as against the defaulted defendants and rendering a
default judgment against them?
A. No. This is an unfair procedure and deprives the defaulted defendants of due process as they are
thereby denied the benefit of the answer and the evidence which could have been presented by
their non-defaulted co-defendants, and which could be considered in favor of all. Moreover, Section
3(c), Rule 9 provides that "the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and
render judgment upon the evidence presented". It is obvious that under this provision the case is
tried jointly not only against the defendants answering but also against those defaulting. (Tanhu vs.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098, August 29, 1975)

Note:

● The rule does not apply where the defending parties are jointly sued or impleaded under separate
causes of action.
● Where a co-defendant filed his answer died and the case was dismissed as to him, the answer he
filed does not inure to the benefit of the defendant who did not file his own answer. Neither will
the rule apply where the defenses alleged by the defendant who answered are personal to
him. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol 1. citing Luzon Surety Co, Inc. vs. Magbanua, G.R.
No. L-41804, July 30, 1976)

Jurisprudence:

● The proper mode of proceeding where a complaint states a common cause of action against
several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a formal default order
against him, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the others. The defaulting defendant
merely loses his standing in court, he not being entitled appear in the suit in any way. He cannot
adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing. If the case is finally decided in the
plaintiff's favor, a final decree is then entered against all the defendants; but if the suit should be
decided against the plaintiff, the action will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike. In other
words the judgment will affect the defaulting defendants either favorably or adversely.  (Tanhu vs.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098, August 29, 1975)

● Where a complaint states a common cause of action against several defendants and some appear
to defend the case on the merits while others make default, the defense interposed by those who
appear to litigate the case inures to the benefit of those who fail to appear, and if the court finds
that a good defense has been made, all of the defendants must be absolved. In other words, the
answer filed by one or some of the defendants inures to the benefit of all the others, even those
who have not seasonably filed their answer. (Bueno v. Ortiz, L-22978, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1151)

● Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted respondents may present which would be
applicable to the situation of the defaulted respondents should inure to the benefit of the
latter. (Pinlac vs. CA, G.R. No. 91486. January 19, 2001)

● Section 7 of Rule 35  [now Section 3(a), Rule 9] provides that when a complaint states a
common cause of action against several defendants, some of whom answer, and the others make
default, the court shall try the case against all upon the answer thus filed and render judgment
upon the evidence presented by the parties in court'. It is obvious that under this provision the case
is tried jointly not only against the defendants answering but also against those defaulting, and the
trial is held upon the answer filed by the former; and the judgment, if adverse, will prejudice the
defaulting defendants no less than those who answer. In other words, the defaulting defendants
are held bound by the answer filed by their co-defendants and by the judgment which the court
may render against all of them. By the same token, and by all rules of equity and fair play, if the
judgment should happen to be favorable, totally or partially, to the answering defendants, it must
correspondingly benefit the defaulting ones, for it would not be just to let the judgment produce
effects as to the defaulting defendants only when adverse to them and not when favorable. (Tanhu
vs. Ramolete)

● In all instances where a common cause of action is alleged against several defendants, some of
whom answer and the others do not, the latter or those in default acquire a vested right not only to
own the defense interposed in the answer of their co-defendant or co-defendants not in default but
also to expect a result of the litigation totally common with them in kind and in amount whether
favorable or unfavorable. The substantive unity of the plaintiffs cause against all the defendants is
carried through to its adjective phase as ineluctably demanded by the homogeneity and
indivisibility of justice itself. Indeed, since the singleness of the cause of action also inevitably
implies that all the defendants are indispensable parties, the court's power to act is integral and
cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment
against the rest. Considering the tenor of the section in question, it is to be assumed that when any
defendant allows himself to be declared in default knowing that his co-defendant has already
answered, he does so trusting in the assurance implicit in the rule that his default is in essence a
mere formality that deprives him of no more than the right to take part in the trial and that the
court would deem anything done by or for the answering defendant as done by or for him. The
presumption is that otherwise he would not have seen to it that he would not be in default. Of
course, he has to suffer the consequences of whatever the answering defendant may do or fail to
do, regardless of possible adverse consequences, but if the complaint has to be dismissed in so far
as the answering defendant is concerned, it becomes his inalienable right that the same be
dismissed also as to him. It does not matter that the dismissal is upon the evidence presented by
the plaintiff or upon the latter's mere desistance, for in both contingencies, the lack of sufficient
legal basis must be the cause. x x x.

The effects, therefore, of a failure to file a separate Answer when other co-defendants (against
whom a common cause of action was alleged) had already filed theirs, are limited to the following:

1. While the non-answering defendants may be declared in default, the court would still try the case
against them on the assumption that they are deemed to have adopted the Answer of the
answering defendants; and

2. If declared in default, the defaulting party is deprived of no more than the right to take part in
the trial. Consequently, the result of the litigatilitigation, whether favorable or unfavorable, shall
affect and bind the defaulting party and the answering defendant with equal force and
effect. (Grageda vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 169536, September 21, 2007)

A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC

The procedure in declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages is provided for in A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Section 8 of said Rule states:

Sec.8. Answer. x x x

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the
public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Ancheta vs. Ancheta

G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her
in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between
the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.

88

Remedial Law Notes


What are the effects of a declaration of default?
 0

(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

What are the effects of a declaration of default on the defendant?

A party declared in default loses his standing in court. He cannot —

1. participate in the proceedings

2. present his defense
3. adduce evidence on his behalf
4. cross-examine the witness of the plaintiff
5. object or refute evidence or motions filed against him.

● A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or
cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the
court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him. (Otero vs. Tan,  G.R. No.
200134, August 15, 2012)

Is party in default entitled to notices of subsequent proceedings?

Yes. While the defendant can no longer take part in the trial, he is nevertheless entitled to notices
of subsequent proceedings (Sec. 3[a], Rule 9, Rules of Court). 

Can a party in default take the witness stand for his co-defendants?

Yes. There is nothing in the rule which disqualifies a party declared in default from taking the
witness stand for his co-defendants. "Loss of standing" must be understood to mean only the
forfeiture of one's rights as a party litigant and not a disqualification from being a witness.
As opposed to a party litigant, a witness is merely a beholder, a spectator or onlooker, called upon
to testify to what he has seen, heard, or observed. As such, he takes no active part in the contest of
rights between the parties. Cast in the cited role of witness, a party in default cannot be considered
as "part in the trial." He remains suffering the effects of an order of default.

A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by his co-defendants who have the standing and
the right to present evidence which the former may provide. The incidental benefit giving the party
in default the opportunity to present evidence which may eventually redound to his advantage,
through his co-defendants, is of minor consequence. Of greater concern or importance is the
preservation of the right of non-defaulting defendants to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in their behalf. There is no reason why the non-defaulting defendants
should be deprived of the testimony of the party in default and thereby also suffer the
consequences of the latter's omission. (Cavili vs. Florendo,  G.R. No. 73039, October 9, 1987)

888
Remedial Law Notes

Declaration of Default
 0

Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

What are the grounds under which a party may be declared in default?
1. Failure to answer within the time allowed therefor; (Sec 3, Rule 9)
2. Failure to serve a copy of the answer to the adverse party. 
● The defendant who files his answer in court in time but failed to serve a copy thereof upon the
adverse party may be validly declared in default (Gonzalez vs. Francisco, 49 Phil. 747, Banares vs.
Flordeliza, G.R. No. L-29355, July 20, 1928)

Can the court motu proprio declare a defendant in default?

No. There must be a motion to that effect by the plaintiff with notice to the defending party
and proof of failure by the defendant to file his responsive pleading despite due notice. (Sec 3, Rule
9)

● Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party in
default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in
default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) the
claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by
the Rules of Court. (Sablas vs. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007)
● The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default as the rules leave it up to the
claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not under any circumstances act as
counsel of the claiming party. (Sablas vs. Sablas)

What is the effect of failure to file an answer under the Rule on Summary Procedure? Will the
defendant be declared in default?

Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the defendant who fails to file an answer within the
reglementary period is not to be declared in default. Instead, the court motu proprio, or
on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for.

Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the plaintiff is prohibited from filing a motion to declare the
defendant in default (Sec. 19[h], 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure). 

What are the requisites before a party may be declared in default? (Bar 1999)

The following are the requisites before a party may be declared in default:

1. The court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defending party either by
service of summons or voluntary appearance;
2. The defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed therefor;
3. There must be a motion to declare the defending party in default filed by the claiming party; 
4. The defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
5. There must be proof of the failure to file the answer; (Sablas vs. Sablas)
6. There must be a hearing of the motion to declare the defendant in default. (Hearing of the
motion is required by Sec. 4, Rule 15)

Should the court admit an answer which is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the
defendant is declared in default?

● It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to
be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. (Sablas vs.
Sablas)

● The rule is that the defendants answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of
default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as default judgments are generally
disfavored. (Trajano vs. Cruz, L-47070, Dec. 29, 1977).

● Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in
default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be
admitted. (Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr., 225 Phil. 397, 1986).

● The policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence,
judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending parties are able
to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof.
The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved.
Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal
conclusions can be reached by the courts. (Sablas vs. Sablas)

What follows after the court has validly declared the defendant in default?

Under the rules, when a party is declared in default, the court may do either of two things:

1. to proceed to render judgment, or

2. to require the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte.
The court need not personally receive the evidence if it decides to hear the evidence of the plaintiff.
The reception of the evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court (Sec. 3, Rule 9).

Are the complainants automatically entitled to the relief prayed for once the defendants are
declared in default?

● Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for once the defendants are
declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief
is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. (Gajudo vs.
Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006)

● The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of
the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that
would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its
rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented
does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the
defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. (Gajudo vs.
Traders Royal Bank)
88
What is a cross-claim?

A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. The
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is liable or maybe liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant (Sec.
8, Rule 6, Rules of Court).

While a counterclaim is asserted by a defending party against a claimant, a cross-claim is asserted

by a defending party against a co-defending party so that the latter may be held liable for the claim
which the claimant seeks to recover from the cross-claimant.

Example:

A and B obtained a loan from X in the amount of 1M. A turned over all the proceeds of said loan to
B. If X sues A and B for the collection of the loan, A may file a cross-claim against his co-defendant B
by asserting that it is B who is the actual and true debtor and hence, should be ultimately liable for
the payment of the loan.

Where must a cross-claim be set up?

A cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained in said
answer. (Sec. 8, Rule 11, Rules of Court)

What happens if the defending party fails to set up a cross-claim?

When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or

excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or
cross-claim by amendment before judgment. (Sec. 9,  Rule 11, Rules of Court)

It has to be set up in the action because if' not set up it shall be barred  (Sec. 2,  Rule 9, Rules of
Court)

Note however, that the cross-claim that shall be barred if not asserted is the cross-claim
already existing at the time the answer is filed, not the cross-claim that may mature or may be
acquired after service of the answer. As to the latter, Sec. 9 of Rule 11 declares that it may, by leave
of court, be set up by way of a supplemental pleading.

When should a cross-claim be answered?

A cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service (Sec. 4, Rule 11, Rules of Court).

TAGS:
CROSS-CLAIMKINDS OF PLEADINGSRULE 6

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Declaration of Default

What is a cross-claim?

A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. The
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is liable or maybe liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant (Sec.
8, Rule 6, Rules of Court).

While a counterclaim is asserted by a defending party against a claimant, a cross-claim is asserted

by a defending party against a co-defending party so that the latter may be held liable for the claim
which the claimant seeks to recover from the cross-claimant.

Example:

A and B obtained a loan from X in the amount of 1M. A turned over all the proceeds of said loan to
B. If X sues A and B for the collection of the loan, A may file a cross-claim against his co-defendant B
by asserting that it is B who is the actual and true debtor and hence, should be ultimately liable for
the payment of the loan.

Where must a cross-claim be set up?

A cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained in said
answer. (Sec. 8, Rule 11, Rules of Court)

What happens if the defending party fails to set up a cross-claim?

When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or

excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or
cross-claim by amendment before judgment. (Sec. 9,  Rule 11, Rules of Court)

It has to be set up in the action because if' not set up it shall be barred  (Sec. 2,  Rule 9, Rules of
Court)

Note however, that the cross-claim that shall be barred if not asserted is the cross-claim
already existing at the time the answer is filed, not the cross-claim that may mature or may be
acquired after service of the answer. As to the latter, Sec. 9 of Rule 11 declares that it may, by leave
of court, be set up by way of a supplemental pleading.

When should a cross-claim be answered?

A cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service (Sec. 4, Rule 11, Rules of Court).

CROSS-CLAIMKINDS OF PLEADINGSRULE 6
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88
What is a supersedeas bond?
 0

What is a Supersedeas Bond?

Supersedeas Bond is a bond that the court requires from the defendant in an ejectment case who
wants to stay the immediate execution of the adverse judgment during the pendency of the
appeal. (Sec. 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court)

Why is it required?

● Such bond is required to assure the payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal
is found frivolous. (Sps. Badillo vs. Hon. Tayag, G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003)

● The supersedeas bond secures the payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed
judgment. It answers only for rentals as fixed in the judgment and not for those that may accrue
during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be
made by the defendant. The supersedeas bond and the monthly deposits are primarily designed to
ensure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals or the compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, should the inferior courts decision in his favor be affirmed on appeal.
Hence, if no bond was filed or no monthly deposit was made, the plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the premises. To allow the defendant in an ejectment case to continue his possession
without any security for the rentals would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not be able to
recover the back rentals when the judgment in his favor becomes final and executory. In that event,
his claim for rentals would be illusory and ineffectual. (Ricafort vs. Judge Gonzales, A.M. No. RTJ-03-
1798. September 7, 2004)
How is the amount of the superseades bond computed?

● The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the 

1. unpaid rentals, 
2. damages and 
3. costs which accrued down to the time of the judgment. (Sec. 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court)
● The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which
accrued before the decision was rendered. The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during
the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by
the defendant. (Sps. Marciano Chua and Chua Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

● The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing
down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be
determined from the judgment of said court. (Cordova vs. Labayen, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033, October
10, 1995)

Are attorney's fees covered by a superseades bond?

No. Attorney's fees are not covered by a supersedeas bond.

The damages that may be recovered in an action for ejectment within the meaning of Section 8,
Rule 72, refer to the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property to which
the plaintiff is entitled which generally is measured by the fair rental value of the property. It cannot
refer to other kind of damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property. Consequently, the attorney's fees in question cannot be considered as
damages. (Castueras vs. Hon. Bayona, G.R. No. L-13657, October 16, 1959)

While the ejectment suit was pending before the Municipal Court, Juan Santos religiously
deposits all current rentals. In due time, the judge ordered Juan Santos to pay all rents until he
vacates the premises as well as attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.000. Maria Cruz moves
for immediate execution on the ground that Juan Santos did not deposit the attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 and he did not put a supersedeas bond for the award. Should the court grant
immediate execution? Decide with reasons. (Bar 1990)

The court should not grant immediate execution. A supersedeas bond covers rentals in arrears up
to the time of the judgment. Since there are no unpaid rentals, there is no reason for the bond.
Also, the Rules do not require a deposit for attorney's fees, so execution may be stayed.

Is superseades bond required if the judgment does not make any pronouncement on the
pecuniary liability of the defendant?

The supersedeas bond covers the monetary judgment of the lower court. If the judgment does not
make any pronouncement the pecuniary liability of the defendant, the bond should not be
required. 
When should superseades bond be filed?

● As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the
rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant
perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the
judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond
should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. (Sps. Marciano Chua and Chua
Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

Where should the supersedeas bond be filed?

The bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the RTC,
before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal. (Sps. Marciano
Chua and Chua Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

What is the effect of failure to post a superseades bond?

The foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately
executory. It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas
bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites are mandatory and
concurrent. Thus, if not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. (Republic vs. Sps.
Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007)

When the State litigates, is it required to put up a bond?

There is a rationale for requiring a losing party to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay the
immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. Such bond is required to assure the
payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal is found frivolous.

When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or controlled

corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State litigates, it
is not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond — either directly or indirectly
through its authorized officers — because it is presumed to be always solvent. The State is not
required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it is capable of paying its obligation.  (Sps. Badillo
vs. Hon. Tayag, G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003)
TAGS:
EJECTMENTRULE 70

RELATED POSTS


Forcible entry vs. unlawful detainer

August 04, 20170


Demand in unlawful detainer cases

August 04, 20170

What is a supersedeas bond?

 0

What is a Supersedeas Bond?

Supersedeas Bond is a bond that the court requires from the defendant in an ejectment case who
wants to stay the immediate execution of the adverse judgment during the pendency of the
appeal. (Sec. 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court)
Why is it required?

● Such bond is required to assure the payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal
is found frivolous. (Sps. Badillo vs. Hon. Tayag, G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003)

● The supersedeas bond secures the payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed
judgment. It answers only for rentals as fixed in the judgment and not for those that may accrue
during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be
made by the defendant. The supersedeas bond and the monthly deposits are primarily designed to
ensure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals or the compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, should the inferior courts decision in his favor be affirmed on appeal.
Hence, if no bond was filed or no monthly deposit was made, the plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the premises. To allow the defendant in an ejectment case to continue his possession
without any security for the rentals would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not be able to
recover the back rentals when the judgment in his favor becomes final and executory. In that event,
his claim for rentals would be illusory and ineffectual. (Ricafort vs. Judge Gonzales, A.M. No. RTJ-03-
1798. September 7, 2004)

How is the amount of the superseades bond computed?

● The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the 

1. unpaid rentals, 
2. damages and 
3. costs which accrued down to the time of the judgment. (Sec. 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court)
● The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which
accrued before the decision was rendered. The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during
the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by
the defendant. (Sps. Marciano Chua and Chua Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

● The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing
down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be
determined from the judgment of said court. (Cordova vs. Labayen, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033, October
10, 1995)

Are attorney's fees covered by a superseades bond?

No. Attorney's fees are not covered by a supersedeas bond.

The damages that may be recovered in an action for ejectment within the meaning of Section 8,
Rule 72, refer to the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property to which
the plaintiff is entitled which generally is measured by the fair rental value of the property. It cannot
refer to other kind of damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property. Consequently, the attorney's fees in question cannot be considered as
damages. (Castueras vs. Hon. Bayona, G.R. No. L-13657, October 16, 1959)
While the ejectment suit was pending before the Municipal Court, Juan Santos religiously
deposits all current rentals. In due time, the judge ordered Juan Santos to pay all rents until he
vacates the premises as well as attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.000. Maria Cruz moves
for immediate execution on the ground that Juan Santos did not deposit the attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 and he did not put a supersedeas bond for the award. Should the court grant
immediate execution? Decide with reasons. (Bar 1990)

The court should not grant immediate execution. A supersedeas bond covers rentals in arrears up
to the time of the judgment. Since there are no unpaid rentals, there is no reason for the bond.
Also, the Rules do not require a deposit for attorney's fees, so execution may be stayed.

Is superseades bond required if the judgment does not make any pronouncement on the
pecuniary liability of the defendant?

The supersedeas bond covers the monetary judgment of the lower court. If the judgment does not
make any pronouncement the pecuniary liability of the defendant, the bond should not be
required. 

When should superseades bond be filed?

● As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the
rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant
perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the
judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond
should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. (Sps. Marciano Chua and Chua
Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

Where should the supersedeas bond be filed?

The bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the RTC,
before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal. (Sps. Marciano
Chua and Chua Cho, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998)

What is the effect of failure to post a superseades bond?

The foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately
executory. It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas
bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites are mandatory and
concurrent. Thus, if not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. (Republic vs. Sps.
Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007)

When the State litigates, is it required to put up a bond?

There is a rationale for requiring a losing party to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay the
immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. Such bond is required to assure the
payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal is found frivolous.

When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or controlled

corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State litigates, it
is not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond — either directly or indirectly
through its authorized officers — because it is presumed to be always solvent. The State is not
required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it is capable of paying its obligation.  (Sps. Badillo
vs. Hon. Tayag, G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003)

TAGS:
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond;
and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. (Acbang vs.
Luczon, G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014)

● The periodic deposits are designed to cover all rentals from the judgment of the MTC until the
final judgment of the appellate court. Thus, even if an appeal has been perfected but the required
periodic deposits are not made, execution may be obtained upon proper motion with notice despite
the posting of a supersedeas bond because said bond covers only back rentals declared in the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. The bond does not answer for rentals that accrue during the
appeal process.
88

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair rental value of the property and
attorneys fees and costs.

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action. (CGR Corporation vs. Treyes,  G.R. No.
170916, April 27, 2007)

What is the rationale for limiting the kinds of damages recoverable in ejectment cases?

The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that
of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff
could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of
the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to
his loss of material possession. (Teraa vs. De Sagun,  G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009)

May an action for recovery of damages be joined with an action for ejectment?

An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with the action
for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for
unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the
two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

a. The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
b. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
c. Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
d. recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Teraa vs.
De Sagun)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair rental value of the property and
attorneys fees and costs.

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action. (CGR Corporation vs. Treyes,  G.R. No.
170916, April 27, 2007)

What is the rationale for limiting the kinds of damages recoverable in ejectment cases?

The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that
of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff
could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of
the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to
his loss of material possession. (Teraa vs. De Sagun,  G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009)

May an action for recovery of damages be joined with an action for ejectment?

An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with the action
for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for
unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the
two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

a. The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
b. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
c. Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
d. recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Teraa vs.
De Sagun)

88

Persons bound by the judgment in ejectment cases

 0

Who are bound by the judgment in ejectment cases?

As a rule, the judgment in an ejectment case is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and
given an opportunity to be heard. This is because an ejectment suit is an action in personam.
However, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded in certain instances
as in the following:

1. A sublessee is bound by the judgment against the lessee because his right to the premises is merely
subsidiary to that of the lessee.

2. A guest or a successor in interest, the members of the family of the lessee or his servants and
employees are likewise bound by the judgment even if not impleaded in the suit for ejectment.

3. Trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate
the judgment; and

4. Transferees pendente lite and other privies of the defendant.

Persons bound by the judgment in ejectment cases

 0

Who are bound by the judgment in ejectment cases?

As a rule, the judgment in an ejectment case is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and
given an opportunity to be heard. This is because an ejectment suit is an action in personam.
However, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded in certain instances
as in the following:
1. A sublessee is bound by the judgment against the lessee because his right to the premises is merely
subsidiary to that of the lessee.

2. A guest or a successor in interest, the members of the family of the lessee or his servants and
employees are likewise bound by the judgment even if not impleaded in the suit for ejectment.

3. Trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate
the judgment; and

4. Transferees pendente lite and other privies of the defendant.

88
Maria Cruz may still file an unlawful detainer case. The failure to vacate after a demand to pay and
vacate gave rise to a cause of action in favor of the lessor. The subsequent payment did not cure his
unlawful withholding of possession of the premises. Hence the lessor can now file an action for
ejectment. 
88

The basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

The basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
88

This allegation of the complaint clearly shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner
to pay her overdue rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in
writing was on March 27, 2002. Respondent thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. 

Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages," the
allegations therein show that respondent’s action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. (Barrazona vs. RTC, G.R. No. 154282, April 7, 2006)
88

ummons upon defendant whose identity or

whereabouts are unknownummons upon defendant
whose identity or whereabouts are unknown
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. (Santos vs. PNOC,  G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)

This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. (Santos vs. PNOC,  G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)
8
Remedial Law Notes

Summons upon residents temporarily out of the
Philippines
 0

A. In any action, service of summons upon a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of
the country, may, by leave of court be effected out of the Philippines as under the rules on
extraterritorial service in Sec. 15, Rule 14 by any of the following modes: 
1. by personal service as in Sec. 6, 
2. by publication in a news paper of general circulation together with a registered mailing of a
copy of the summons and the order of the court to the last known address of the defendant, or 
3. by any manner the court may deem sufficient.
B. The defendant may however, also be served by substituted service (Montalban vs. Maximo, 22
SCRA 1070). This is because even if he is abroad, he has a residence in the Philippines or a place of
business and surely, because of his absence, he cannot be served in person within a reasonable time.

Case:

● Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time
of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

 Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
(Emphasis supplied)

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of
extraterritorial service, thus:

SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. ─ When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent
by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.  Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons, she
was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be made only
by publication.

We do not agree.

In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also,
it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be
availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines.
Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 

In Montalban v. Maximo, we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the
court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for
substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.

x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling
where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where
he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of
one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to
protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that
may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with
his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against
him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts.  He
cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his
dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him.
There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams
make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.

Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint
may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of
the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be
left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance
with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction. 

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule
presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left
and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in
some way give him notice thereof. (Palma vs. Galvez,  G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010)
Remedial Law Notes

Summons upon residents temporarily out of the
Philippines
 0

A. In any action, service of summons upon a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of
the country, may, by leave of court be effected out of the Philippines as under the rules on
extraterritorial service in Sec. 15, Rule 14 by any of the following modes: 
1. by personal service as in Sec. 6, 
2. by publication in a news paper of general circulation together with a registered mailing of a
copy of the summons and the order of the court to the last known address of the defendant, or 
3. by any manner the court may deem sufficient.
B. The defendant may however, also be served by substituted service (Montalban vs. Maximo, 22
SCRA 1070). This is because even if he is abroad, he has a residence in the Philippines or a place of
business and surely, because of his absence, he cannot be served in person within a reasonable time.

Case:

● Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time
of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

 Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
(Emphasis supplied)

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of
extraterritorial service, thus:

SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. ─ When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent
by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.  Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons, she
was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be made only
by publication.

We do not agree.

In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also,
it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be
availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines.
Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 

In Montalban v. Maximo, we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the
court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for
substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.

x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling
where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where
he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of
one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to
protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that
may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with
his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against
him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts.  He
cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his
dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him.
There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams
make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.

Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint
may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.

We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of
the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be
left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance
with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction. 

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule
presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left
and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in
some way give him notice thereof. (Palma vs. Galvez,  G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010)
88

Special Civil Actions: Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and

Similar Remedies
Rule 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1. Who may file petition - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

Section 2. Parties. — All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. 

Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive
order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the
party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. 

Section 4. Local government ordinances. — In any action involving the validity of a local government
ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be
similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor
General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. 

Section 5. Court action discretionary. — Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section
1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights
and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not
necessary and proper under the circumstances.

Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. — If before the final termination of the case, a breach or
violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary
action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. (Rule 63,
Rules of Court)
Types of Actions:

Rule 63 covers two types of actions:

(a) petition for declaratory relief, and

(b) similar remedies.

The similar remedies are:

(a) action for reformation of an instrument;

(b) action to quiet title; and
(c) action to consolidate ownership, under Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

What is the subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief?

The subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief is any of the following:

1. a deed;
2. a will;
3. a contract or other written instrument;
4. a statute;
5. an executive order or regulation;
6. an ordinance; or
7. any other governmental regulation (Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court).

●The enumeration of the subject matter is exclusive. Hence, an action not based on any of the
enumerated subject matters cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

● An action for declaratory relief to ask the court to declare his filiation and consequently
his hereditary rights is improper. The action is not based on a deed, a will, statute or any of those
enumerated as the subject matter of the petition

●An action for declaratory relief to seek judicial declaration of citizenship to correct a previous
unilateral registration by petitioner as an alien is improper, the action not being founded on a deed,
contract or any ordinance (Obiles vs. Republic, 92 Phil. 864). An action for declaratory relief is not
proper to resolve doubts concerning one's citizenship.

● A petition for declaratory relief is not proper for the purpose of seeking enlightenment as to the
true import of a judgment. The remedy is to move for a clarificatory judgment.

● A petition for declaratory relief is not proper to assail a judgment. A party could appeal and
employ other remedies under the Rules of Court before or after the judgment has become final and
executor.
● Even if the subject is one enumerated under the Rules, where the contract or statute is clear in its
terms and there is no doubt as to its meaning and validity , a petition for declaratory relief is
improper. There would be no need for construction or a declaration of rights thereunder.

Who may file a petition for declaratory relief?

1. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the
decedent.

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

2. Any person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or
other governmental regulation

may before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the RTC to determine any question of
construction or validity arising and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder  (Sec 1, Rule
63).

Who shall be made parties to the action?

1. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be
made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, prejudice the
rights of persons not parties to the action. (Sec 2, Rule 63).

2. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and
shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. (Sec 3, Rule 63).

3. In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the

corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly
notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor
General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (Sec 4, Rule 63).

What court has jurisdiction over declaratory relief?

The subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief raises issues which are not capable of
pecuniary estimation and must be filed with the appopriate Regional Trial Court (Sec. 19[11, BP
129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition with the Supreme Court which has no
original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief.

When should a petition for declaratory relief be filed?

The petition for declaratory relief should be filed before there occurs any breach or violation of the
deed, contract, statute, ordinance or executive order or regulation. (Sec 1, Rule 63)  It will not
prosper when brought after a contract or a statute has already been breached or violated.

What is the appropriate remedy if there has already been a breach?

● If there has already been a breach, the appropriate ordinary civil action, not declaratory relief,
should be filed.

● Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action (Malana vs. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303,
September 17, 2009). Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued
in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a
judgment or final order.

Will the action for declaratory relief be dismissed if the breach occurs after the action has been
constituted and during the its pendency?

When the breach occurs not before the filing of the petition for declaratory relief but after the
action has been constituted and during its pendency, the action is not to be dismissed but may
be converted into an ordinary action and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may
be necessary or proper (Sec 1, Rule 63).

What are the requisites of an action for declaratory relief ?

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:

1. The subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,

executive order or regulation or ordinance;
2. The terms of said document or the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3.  There must have been no breach of said document;
4. There must be actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
5.  The issue must be ripe for judicial determination [e.g. administrative remedies already
exhausted]; and
6. Adequate relief is not available thru other means or other forms of action or
proceedings. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1)

What is the purpose of the petition?

● An action for declaratory relief is brought to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a contract or a statute for their guidance in the enforcement or
compliance with the same.

● The purpose of the petition is to ask the court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the subject matter, and for the declaration of rights and duties therein (Sec. 1,
Rule 63, Rules of Court). Thus, the purpose is to seek for a judicial interpretation of an instrument or
for a judicial declaration of a person's rights under a statute and not to ask for affirmative reliefs like
injunction, damages or any other relief beyond the purpose of the petition as declared under the
Rules. It is not brought to settle issues arising from a breach because after the breach of the
contract or statute, the petition can no longer be brought.

● It has been held that in an action for declaratory relief, the question raised is a question of
"construction" or "validity" arising under an instrument or statute. The object is to terminate
uncertainties in an instrument or statute and the judgment of the court cannot extend beyond a
declaration of the rights and duties of the parties to the action and cannot provide corrective
reliefs.

● It is the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative reliefs in a petition for declaratory
relief that it has been held that when the main case is for declaratory relief, a third-party
complaint is inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff
against him. Accordingly, this relief cannot be granted because in a declaratory relief, the court is
merely interpreting the terms of the contract. It has also been held however, that a petition for
declaratory relief may entertain a compulsory counterclaim as long as it is based on or arising from
the same transaction, subject mater of the petition.

Does the court have discretion to refuse to act on the petition for declaratory relief?

Yes. In declaratory relief, the court is given the discretion to act or not to act on the petition. It may
therefore, choose not to construe the instrument sought to be construed or could refrain from
declaring the rights of the petitioner under the deed or the law. A refusal of the court to declare
rights or construe an instrument is actually the functional equivalent of the dismissal of the petition.

What are the grounds for the court to refuse to exercise declaratory relief?

The court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where:
1.  A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the
action; or
2.  The declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances as
when the instrument or the statute has already been breached (Sec 5, Rule 63).

Does the court have discretion to refuse to act with respect to actions described as `similar
remedies'?

No. The court does not have the discretion to refuse to act with respect to actions described as
`similar remedies'. Thus, in an action for reformation of an instrument, to quiet title or to
consolidate ownership, the court cannot refuse to render a judgment. (Sec 5, Rule 63)

Does judgment in action for declaratory relief entail any executory process?

There is nothing to execute in the judgment of the court the way judgments in ordinary civil actions
are executed. This is because the judgment in a declaratory relief is confined either to an
interpretation of a deed or a declaration whether or nor the petitioner has or does not have rights
under the law. As a general principle therefore, the judgment in a declaratory relief is said to stand
by itself and no executory process follows as of course. It is unlike the judgment in an ordinary civil
action which is coercive in character and enforced by execution.

Justiciable controversy

The traditional concept of cause of action in ordinary civil actions, as earlier mentioned does not
apply to a declaratory relief where no specific right of the plaintiff has as yet been violated because
the action is brought before a breach of the deed or law occurs.

The absence of a breach should not however, be taken to mean that the petition need not involve a
controversy. A justiciable controversy is in fact indispensable for the propriety of the petition. It
need not be a controversy consisting of an actual violation of a right by another but one with the
"ripening seeds" of a controversy. The controversy must be one that is not merely imagined or one
that is academic or theoretical.

A justiciable controversy is required because the court, in a petition for declaratory relief is not
called upon to render a mere `advisory opinion' which unlike a judicial proceeding, has no res
judicata effect and requires no controversy of whatever degree.

Courts are not called upon to resolve questions as a "pure academic exercise."

For example, a person who impugns a statute must be one who could show that he will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of a statute (Cabarle vs. Tagle, G.R. No. 113475,
February 15, 1994). An actual injury is not necessary. In declaratory relief, all that is required is an
impending violation of the plaintiff's rights.

What is the proper recourse to assail the validity of an executive order?

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial,
quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.  Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. (Galicto vs. Aquino,  G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012)

A student files an action for declaratory relief against his school to determine whether he
deserves to graduate with Latin honors. Is this action tenable? (Bar 1998)

Suggested answer:

The action is not tenable. To be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief, the subject of
the petition must be a deed, will, contract, written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. Whether or not the student is to be conferred
Latin honors is not a proper subject of the petition.

SIMILAR REMEDIES

What court has jurisdiction over actions described as "similar remedies"?

● The MTC exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00 outside Metro
Manila or does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila. 

● The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

 Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. 

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under
this Rule. 
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action
for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2)
an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require
that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action
for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00, thus:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-
48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. (Malana vs. Tappa,
G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009)
Special Civil Actions: Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and
Similar Remedies
Rule 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1. Who may file petition - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

Section 2. Parties. — All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. 

Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive
order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the
party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. 

Section 4. Local government ordinances. — In any action involving the validity of a local government
ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be
similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor
General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. 

Section 5. Court action discretionary. — Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section
1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights
and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not
necessary and proper under the circumstances.

Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. — If before the final termination of the case, a breach or
violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary
action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. (Rule 63,
Rules of Court)

Types of Actions:

Rule 63 covers two types of actions:

(a) petition for declaratory relief, and

(b) similar remedies.

The similar remedies are:

(a) action for reformation of an instrument;

(b) action to quiet title; and
(c) action to consolidate ownership, under Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

What is the subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief?

The subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief is any of the following:

1. a deed;
2. a will;
3. a contract or other written instrument;
4. a statute;
5. an executive order or regulation;
6. an ordinance; or
7. any other governmental regulation (Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court).

●The enumeration of the subject matter is exclusive. Hence, an action not based on any of the
enumerated subject matters cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

● An action for declaratory relief to ask the court to declare his filiation and consequently
his hereditary rights is improper. The action is not based on a deed, a will, statute or any of those
enumerated as the subject matter of the petition

●An action for declaratory relief to seek judicial declaration of citizenship to correct a previous
unilateral registration by petitioner as an alien is improper, the action not being founded on a deed,
contract or any ordinance (Obiles vs. Republic, 92 Phil. 864). An action for declaratory relief is not
proper to resolve doubts concerning one's citizenship.

● A petition for declaratory relief is not proper for the purpose of seeking enlightenment as to the
true import of a judgment. The remedy is to move for a clarificatory judgment.

● A petition for declaratory relief is not proper to assail a judgment. A party could appeal and
employ other remedies under the Rules of Court before or after the judgment has become final and
executor.

● Even if the subject is one enumerated under the Rules, where the contract or statute is clear in its
terms and there is no doubt as to its meaning and validity , a petition for declaratory relief is
improper. There would be no need for construction or a declaration of rights thereunder.

Who may file a petition for declaratory relief?

1. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the
decedent.

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

2. Any person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or
other governmental regulation

may before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the RTC to determine any question of
construction or validity arising and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder  (Sec 1, Rule
63).

Who shall be made parties to the action?

1. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be
made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, prejudice the
rights of persons not parties to the action. (Sec 2, Rule 63).

2. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and
shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. (Sec 3, Rule 63).

3. In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the

corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly
notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor
General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (Sec 4, Rule 63).

What court has jurisdiction over declaratory relief?

The subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief raises issues which are not capable of
pecuniary estimation and must be filed with the appopriate Regional Trial Court (Sec. 19[11, BP
129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition with the Supreme Court which has no
original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief.

When should a petition for declaratory relief be filed?

The petition for declaratory relief should be filed before there occurs any breach or violation of the
deed, contract, statute, ordinance or executive order or regulation. (Sec 1, Rule 63)  It will not
prosper when brought after a contract or a statute has already been breached or violated.

What is the appropriate remedy if there has already been a breach?

● If there has already been a breach, the appropriate ordinary civil action, not declaratory relief,
should be filed.

● Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action (Malana vs. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303,
September 17, 2009). Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued
in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a
judgment or final order.
Will the action for declaratory relief be dismissed if the breach occurs after the action has been
constituted and during the its pendency?

When the breach occurs not before the filing of the petition for declaratory relief but after the
action has been constituted and during its pendency, the action is not to be dismissed but may
be converted into an ordinary action and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may
be necessary or proper (Sec 1, Rule 63).

What are the requisites of an action for declaratory relief ?

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:

1. The subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,

executive order or regulation or ordinance;
2. The terms of said document or the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3.  There must have been no breach of said document;
4. There must be actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
5.  The issue must be ripe for judicial determination [e.g. administrative remedies already
exhausted]; and
6. Adequate relief is not available thru other means or other forms of action or
proceedings. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1)

What is the purpose of the petition?

● An action for declaratory relief is brought to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a contract or a statute for their guidance in the enforcement or
compliance with the same.

● The purpose of the petition is to ask the court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the subject matter, and for the declaration of rights and duties therein (Sec. 1,
Rule 63, Rules of Court). Thus, the purpose is to seek for a judicial interpretation of an instrument or
for a judicial declaration of a person's rights under a statute and not to ask for affirmative reliefs like
injunction, damages or any other relief beyond the purpose of the petition as declared under the
Rules. It is not brought to settle issues arising from a breach because after the breach of the
contract or statute, the petition can no longer be brought.

● It has been held that in an action for declaratory relief, the question raised is a question of
"construction" or "validity" arising under an instrument or statute. The object is to terminate
uncertainties in an instrument or statute and the judgment of the court cannot extend beyond a
declaration of the rights and duties of the parties to the action and cannot provide corrective
reliefs.

● It is the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative reliefs in a petition for declaratory
relief that it has been held that when the main case is for declaratory relief, a third-party
complaint is inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff
against him. Accordingly, this relief cannot be granted because in a declaratory relief, the court is
merely interpreting the terms of the contract. It has also been held however, that a petition for
declaratory relief may entertain a compulsory counterclaim as long as it is based on or arising from
the same transaction, subject mater of the petition.

Does the court have discretion to refuse to act on the petition for declaratory relief?

Yes. In declaratory relief, the court is given the discretion to act or not to act on the petition. It may
therefore, choose not to construe the instrument sought to be construed or could refrain from
declaring the rights of the petitioner under the deed or the law. A refusal of the court to declare
rights or construe an instrument is actually the functional equivalent of the dismissal of the petition.

What are the grounds for the court to refuse to exercise declaratory relief?

The court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where:

1.  A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the

action; or
2.  The declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances as
when the instrument or the statute has already been breached (Sec 5, Rule 63).

Does the court have discretion to refuse to act with respect to actions described as `similar
remedies'?

No. The court does not have the discretion to refuse to act with respect to actions described as
`similar remedies'. Thus, in an action for reformation of an instrument, to quiet title or to
consolidate ownership, the court cannot refuse to render a judgment. (Sec 5, Rule 63)

Does judgment in action for declaratory relief entail any executory process?

There is nothing to execute in the judgment of the court the way judgments in ordinary civil actions
are executed. This is because the judgment in a declaratory relief is confined either to an
interpretation of a deed or a declaration whether or nor the petitioner has or does not have rights
under the law. As a general principle therefore, the judgment in a declaratory relief is said to stand
by itself and no executory process follows as of course. It is unlike the judgment in an ordinary civil
action which is coercive in character and enforced by execution.

Justiciable controversy

The traditional concept of cause of action in ordinary civil actions, as earlier mentioned does not
apply to a declaratory relief where no specific right of the plaintiff has as yet been violated because
the action is brought before a breach of the deed or law occurs.
The absence of a breach should not however, be taken to mean that the petition need not involve a
controversy. A justiciable controversy is in fact indispensable for the propriety of the petition. It
need not be a controversy consisting of an actual violation of a right by another but one with the
"ripening seeds" of a controversy. The controversy must be one that is not merely imagined or one
that is academic or theoretical.

A justiciable controversy is required because the court, in a petition for declaratory relief is not
called upon to render a mere `advisory opinion' which unlike a judicial proceeding, has no res
judicata effect and requires no controversy of whatever degree.

Courts are not called upon to resolve questions as a "pure academic exercise."

For example, a person who impugns a statute must be one who could show that he will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of a statute (Cabarle vs. Tagle, G.R. No. 113475,
February 15, 1994). An actual injury is not necessary. In declaratory relief, all that is required is an
impending violation of the plaintiff's rights.

What is the proper recourse to assail the validity of an executive order?

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial,
quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.  Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. (Galicto vs. Aquino,  G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012)

A student files an action for declaratory relief against his school to determine whether he
deserves to graduate with Latin honors. Is this action tenable? (Bar 1998)

Suggested answer:

The action is not tenable. To be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief, the subject of
the petition must be a deed, will, contract, written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. Whether or not the student is to be conferred
Latin honors is not a proper subject of the petition.

SIMILAR REMEDIES

What court has jurisdiction over actions described as "similar remedies"?

● The MTC exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00 outside Metro
Manila or does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila. 
● The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

 Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. 

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under
this Rule. 

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action
for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2)
an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require
that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action
for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-
48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. (Malana vs. Tappa,
G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009)
88
What is partition? 

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong.

Partition presupposes the existence of a co-ownership over a property between two or more

persons. The rule allowing partition originates from a well-known principle embodied in the Civil
Code of the Philippines that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Because of
this rule, he may demand at any time the partition of the property owned in common (Art. 494,
Civil Code).

What are the instances when a co-owner may not demand partition?

1. There is an agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided for a certain period
of time but not exceeding 10 years (Art. 494, Civil Code).

2. When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not exceeding 20 years (Art.
494,  Art. 1083, Civil Code).

3. When partition is prohibited by law  [ex. ACP, party wall] (Art. 494, Civil Code).

4. When the property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would render
it unserviceablefor the use for which it is intended (Art. 495, Civil Code).; or

5. When the condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand partition has not yet
been fulfilled (Art. 1084, Civil Code).

Who may file an action for partition?

The action shall be brought by the person who has a right to compel the partition of real estate (Sec
1, Rule 69) The plaintiff is a person who is supposed to be a co-owner of the property or estate
sought to be partitioned. 

Who should be made defendants in actions for partition?

All persons considered as co-owners and interested in the property to be partitioned are

indispensable parties to the action and must be impleaded. [Sepulveda v. Pelaez (2005)]

Where should an action for partition be filed?

●  Actions for partition should be filed in the RTC of the province where the property or part thereof
is situated. If several distinct parcels of land are situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in
the RTC of any of said provinces. [Pancho v. Villanueva,(1956)]

●  Because the issues to be determined by the court are incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
action shall be filed in the RTC and since it is an action which involves interest in real property, it
shall be brought in the place where the property is situated.

When should an action for partition be filed?

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. (Art. 494, Civil
Code)

Does an action for partition prescribe?

● The rule is that the action for partition does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly
or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code).

●  The right of action to demand partition does not prescribe [De Castro v. Echarri (1911)], EXCEPT
where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership [Cordova v. Cordova (1958)] in which case, acquisitive prescription
may set in.

● If a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership and makes known such repudiation to the other co-
owners, then partition is no longer a proper remedy of the aggrieved co-owner. He should file
an accion reivindicatoria, which is prescriptible. [Roque v. IAC (1988)]

What must be alleged in the complaint?

1. The plaintiff shall state in his complaint, the nature and extent of his title, an adequate
descriptionof the real estate of which partition is demanded, and shall join as defendants all
other persons interested in the property (Sec. 1, Rule 69). 

2. He must also include a demand for the accounting of the rents, profits and other income from
the property which he may be entitled to (Sec. 8, Rule 69). These cannot be demanded in another
action because they are parts of the cause of action for partition. They will be barred if not set up in
the same action pursuant to the rule against splitting a single cause of action. 

● When the allegations of the complaint allege that the plaintiff asserts exclusive ownership of the
party sought to be partitioned, the nature of the action is not one for partition. It is an action for the
recovery of property.

How shall partition be made?

Partition may be made in either of two ways:

1. By agreement of the parties; or

2. By judicial proceedings under the Rules of Court (Art. 496, Civil Code).

● If the co-owners cannot agree on the partition of the property, the only recourse is the filing of an
action for partition.

What are the two stages in every action for partition?

1. Determination of the propriety of partition - This involves a determination of whether the

subject property is owned in common and whether all the co-owners are made parties in the case.
The order may also require an accounting of rents and profits recovered by the defendant. This
order of partition is appealable. [Miranda v. Court of Appeals(1976)]

If not appealed, then the parties may partition the common property in the way they want. If they
cannot agree, then the case goes into the second stage. However, the order of accounting may in
the meantime be executed. [De Mesa v. CA (1994)]

2. The actual partitioning of the subject property - This is also a complete proceeding and the order
or decision is appealable. 

When there was a prior partition, the fact that the share of each co-heir has not been technically
described and the title over the whole lot remains uncancelled does not negate such partition.
There can be no partition again because there is no more common property. [Noceda v. CA (1999)]

Order of partition
During the trial, the court shall determine whether or not the plaintiff is truly a co-owner of the
property, that there is indeed a co-ownership among the parties, and that a partition is not legally
proscribed thus, may be allowed. If the court so finds that the facts are such that a partition would
be in order, and that the plaintiff has a right to demand partition, the court will issue an order of
partition.

Partition by agreement

1.  After the issuance of the order of partition, the parties will then be asked if they agree to make
partition of the property among themselves.

2.  If they agree, proper instruments of conveyance will be executed to effect the partition.

3. After the execution of instruments of conveyance, the court shall confirm the partition through a
final order.

4.  The final order of partition and the instruments of conveyance shall be registered with the
Registry of Deeds where the property is situated. (Sec. 2, Rule 69)

5. If they do not agree, there will be a partition by commissioners. 

Partition by court-appointed commissioners

1. If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding
them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property
as the court shall direct. (Sec. 3, Rule 69)

2. If the commissioners determine that the property cannot be divided without prejudice to the
interests of the parties, the court may order that the property be assigned to one of the parties
willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts as the commissioners
deem equitable. Instead of being so assigned, an interested party may ask that the property be
sold, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the property at a public sale  (Sec.
5, Rule 69)

3. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to
the partition. Upon the filing of such report, copies thereof shall be served by the clerk of court
upon all interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file
objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire (Sec. 6, Rule 69).

4.  The court, may, upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance with the
same. The court may, instead of accepting the report, recommit the same to the commissioners for
further report of facts. It may also accept the report in part or reject the report in part or it may
render such judgment that shall effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate (Sec. 7, Rule
69). Under Sec. 7, the court cannot render judgment on the report forthwith upon its receipt of the
same. The rule mandates that a hearing must be conducted before a rendition of a judgment.

5.  The proceedings had before the commissioners shall not bind the parties or pass title to property
until the court shall have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered judgment
thereon (Sec. 6, Rule 69).

6.  A certified copy of the judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which
the real estate is situated (Sec. 11, Rule 69)

Subject of appeal

A reading of the Rules will reveal that there are actually three (3) stages in the action each of which
could be the subject of appeal, to wit: (a) the order of partition where the propriety of the partition
is determined; (b) the judgment as to the accounting of the fruits and income of the property; and
(c) the judgment of partition. The action hence, admits multiple appeals and would require a record
on appeal.

Can there be partition if there are expenses to be paid from the estate?

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. The determination of the expenses like those related to the deceased's final illness
and burial which are chargeable to the estate cannot be done in an action in partition. Thus, the
heirs have to first submit their father's estate to settlement because in estate settlement
proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate
must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties
may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond
conditioned on the payment of the estate's obligations.

TAGS:
PARTITIONRULE 69SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Remedial Law Notes


Special Civil Actions: Rule 65 - Quo Warranto
Rule 66
Quo Warranto

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated
or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)

Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the
action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person;
but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the
action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)

Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. — Upon application for
permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall
direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if
permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all
interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor
in his own name. (6)

Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. — When the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who
claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is
unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or
franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise
determined, in the same action. (7a)

Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the
action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the
Supreme Court. (8a)

Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence. — The
court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in
the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein
consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil
matter pending in the court. (9a)

Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the respondent is found guilty of usurping into,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires. (10a)

Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages.
— If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public
office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon
himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the
books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment
relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he
may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged
entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by
such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)

Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose,
nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)

Section 12. Judgment for costs. — In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or
the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires.
(17a)  (Rule 66, Rules of Court)

What is quo warranto?

● Quo warranto literally means: By what authority. It is an extraordinary legal remedy whereby the
State challenges a person or an entity to show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises
a public franchise.

The object is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the office.

●  It is a special civil action commenced by a verified petition against the following:

(a) a person who usurps a public office, position or franchise;

(b) a public officer who performs an act constituting forfeiture of a public office; or

(c) an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority to do so (Sec. 1, Rule 66).

Who may file a petition for quo warranto? 

1. Solicitor General or the public prosecutor

a. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or
when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that an action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise can be established by proof against:

(i) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(ii) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or

(iii) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

b. The Solicitor General or the public prosecutor may commence the action at the instance of another
person. In this case, leave of court is necessary (Sec. 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court).

2. Private person - any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. (Sec. 5, Rule 66). He may maintain the action without the
intervention of the Solicitor General and without need for any leave of court. In bringing a petition
for quo warranto, he must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly being held by another.
It is not enough that he merely asserts the right to be appointed to the office. He must assert that he
is entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by another.

● By analogy with Sec. 5, it has been held that a public utility may bring a quo warranto action
against another public utility which has usurped the rights of the former granted under a
franchise. (Cui vs. Cui,  G.R. No. 39773. April 9, 1934)

How is quo warranto commenced?

A quo warranto proceeding is commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, by a public prosecutor, or by
a private person in his own name where he claims to be entitled to the public office or position
alleged to have been usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

What court has jurisdiction over quo warranto cases? 

1. Supreme Court
2. Court of Appeals
3. Regional Trial Court

Where should the petition for quo warranto be filed (venue)?

1. The petition may be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or where any of
the respondents resides.

2. When the action is commenced by the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (Sec. 7, Rule
66).

When should the action for quo warranto be filed?

● An action for quo warranto in relation to a public office must be filed within one (1) year after the
cause of the ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose (Sec. 11, Rule
66).

● The period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, with the
result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set
up in the answer or motion to dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas,  G.R. No. L-2041, November 3, 1948)

● An action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues, and the
pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year
period (Palma-Fernandez vs. De La Paz,  G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988). No one is compelled to
resort to administrative remedies since public interest requires that the right to public office should be
determined as speedily as possible.

Right to damages

If the petitioner is adjudged to be entitled to the office, he may sue for damages against the alleged
usurper within one (1) year from the entry of judgment establishing his right to the office in
question (Sec. 11, Rule 66).

Quo warranto against corporations

●Although a quo warranto proceeding may be brought against an association which acts as a

corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act (Sec. 1[c], Rule 66), the petition may be brought only against a de facto corporation, not a de
jure corporation. The latter corporation has no defect in its incorporation and exercises corporate
powers because it was organized in full compliance with the laws (Black's, 5th Ed., 382). There is
therefore, no reason to attack its existence and its exercise of corporate powers.

A de facto corporation is one which in good faith claims to be a corporation, was organized in
accordance and pursuant to a valid law, and assumes corporate powers because it was issued a
certificate of incorporation. Traditionally, it has been referred to as a corporation which exists in fact
but not in law. Under the law, its right to exercise corporate powers, shall be inquired into by a
collateral attack in a private suit to which such corporation may be made a party (Sec. 20,
Corporation Code of the Philippines). Hence, its exercise of corporate powers may be inquired into
and its corporate existence attacked by a quo warranto proceeding.

Observe that under the Securities and Regulations Code of 2000 (R.A. 8799), that all the powers of
the Securities and Exchange Commission enumerated under Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
were transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) and the same law also enumerates as one
of the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to "suspend, revoke * * * the
franchise, or certificate of registration of corporations * * * upon any of the grounds provided by law
(Sec. 5.1[m], R.A. 8799).

● It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out
a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court,
adopting Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule
66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated, while [a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as
amended).

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation.

As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains
the phrase or an office in a corporation created by authority of law which was found in the old Rules.
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act
as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners
to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated. (Calleja vs. Panday,  G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006)

Bar Questions:

A group of businessmen formed an association in Cebu City calling itself Cars Co. to
distribute/sell cars in said city. It did not incorporate itself under the law nor did it have any
government permit or license to conduct its business as such. The Solicitor General filed before
a Regional Trial Court in Manila a verified petition for quo warranto questioning and seeking
to stop the operations of Car Co. The latter filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
of improper venue claiming that its main office and operations are in Cebu City and not in
Manila. Is the contention of Cars Co. correct? (Bar 2001)

Suggested answer.

The contention of Car Co. is not correct. While as a rule, a petition for quo warranto filed before the
RTC should be brought in the place where the respondent resides, this rule shall not apply when the
petition is filed by the Solicitor General who is given the prerogative to file the petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

If the principal of a public high school is illegally replaced by another, is it a requirement that
before he can go to court on a quo warranto, he should first exhaust administrative remedies?
(Bar 1980)

Suggested answer.
No. There is no such requirement under Rule 66. The action has to be brought within one (1) year
from the cause of ouster from office or the right to hold the office arose. A quo warranto proceeding
is one of the instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.

Remedial Law Notes


Special Civil Actions: Rule 65 - Quo Warranto
Rule 66
Quo Warranto

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated
or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)

Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)

Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the
action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person;
but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the
action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)

Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. — Upon application for
permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall
direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if
permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all
interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor
in his own name. (6)

Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. — When the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who
claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is
unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or
franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise
determined, in the same action. (7a)

Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the
action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the
Supreme Court. (8a)

Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence. — The
court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in
the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein
consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil
matter pending in the court. (9a)
Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the respondent is found guilty of usurping into,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires. (10a)

Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages.
— If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public
office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon
himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the
books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment
relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he
may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged
entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by
such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)

Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose,
nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)

Section 12. Judgment for costs. — In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or
the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires.
(17a)  (Rule 66, Rules of Court)

What is quo warranto?

● Quo warranto literally means: By what authority. It is an extraordinary legal remedy whereby the
State challenges a person or an entity to show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises
a public franchise.

The object is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the office.

●  It is a special civil action commenced by a verified petition against the following:

(a) a person who usurps a public office, position or franchise;

(b) a public officer who performs an act constituting forfeiture of a public office; or

(c) an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority to do so (Sec. 1, Rule 66).

Who may file a petition for quo warranto? 

1. Solicitor General or the public prosecutor

a. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or
when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that an action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise can be established by proof against:

(i) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(ii) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or

(iii) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

b. The Solicitor General or the public prosecutor may commence the action at the instance of another
person. In this case, leave of court is necessary (Sec. 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court).

2. Private person - any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. (Sec. 5, Rule 66). He may maintain the action without the
intervention of the Solicitor General and without need for any leave of court. In bringing a petition
for quo warranto, he must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly being held by another.
It is not enough that he merely asserts the right to be appointed to the office. He must assert that he
is entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by another.

● By analogy with Sec. 5, it has been held that a public utility may bring a quo warranto action
against another public utility which has usurped the rights of the former granted under a
franchise. (Cui vs. Cui,  G.R. No. 39773. April 9, 1934)

How is quo warranto commenced?

A quo warranto proceeding is commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, by a public prosecutor, or by
a private person in his own name where he claims to be entitled to the public office or position
alleged to have been usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

What court has jurisdiction over quo warranto cases? 

1. Supreme Court
2. Court of Appeals
3. Regional Trial Court

Where should the petition for quo warranto be filed (venue)?

1. The petition may be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or where any of
the respondents resides.
2. When the action is commenced by the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (Sec. 7, Rule
66).

When should the action for quo warranto be filed?

● An action for quo warranto in relation to a public office must be filed within one (1) year after the
cause of the ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose (Sec. 11, Rule
66).

● The period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, with the
result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set
up in the answer or motion to dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas,  G.R. No. L-2041, November 3, 1948)

● An action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues, and the
pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year
period (Palma-Fernandez vs. De La Paz,  G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988). No one is compelled to
resort to administrative remedies since public interest requires that the right to public office should be
determined as speedily as possible.

Right to damages

If the petitioner is adjudged to be entitled to the office, he may sue for damages against the alleged
usurper within one (1) year from the entry of judgment establishing his right to the office in
question (Sec. 11, Rule 66).

Quo warranto against corporations

●Although a quo warranto proceeding may be brought against an association which acts as a

corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act (Sec. 1[c], Rule 66), the petition may be brought only against a de facto corporation, not a de
jure corporation. The latter corporation has no defect in its incorporation and exercises corporate
powers because it was organized in full compliance with the laws (Black's, 5th Ed., 382). There is
therefore, no reason to attack its existence and its exercise of corporate powers.

A de facto corporation is one which in good faith claims to be a corporation, was organized in
accordance and pursuant to a valid law, and assumes corporate powers because it was issued a
certificate of incorporation. Traditionally, it has been referred to as a corporation which exists in fact
but not in law. Under the law, its right to exercise corporate powers, shall be inquired into by a
collateral attack in a private suit to which such corporation may be made a party (Sec. 20,
Corporation Code of the Philippines). Hence, its exercise of corporate powers may be inquired into
and its corporate existence attacked by a quo warranto proceeding.

Observe that under the Securities and Regulations Code of 2000 (R.A. 8799), that all the powers of
the Securities and Exchange Commission enumerated under Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
were transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) and the same law also enumerates as one
of the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to "suspend, revoke * * * the
franchise, or certificate of registration of corporations * * * upon any of the grounds provided by law
(Sec. 5.1[m], R.A. 8799).

● It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out
a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court,
adopting Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule
66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated, while [a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as
amended).

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation.

As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains
the phrase or an office in a corporation created by authority of law which was found in the old Rules.
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act
as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners
to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated. (Calleja vs. Panday,  G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006)

Bar Questions:

A group of businessmen formed an association in Cebu City calling itself Cars Co. to
distribute/sell cars in said city. It did not incorporate itself under the law nor did it have any
government permit or license to conduct its business as such. The Solicitor General filed before
a Regional Trial Court in Manila a verified petition for quo warranto questioning and seeking
to stop the operations of Car Co. The latter filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
of improper venue claiming that its main office and operations are in Cebu City and not in
Manila. Is the contention of Cars Co. correct? (Bar 2001)

Suggested answer.

The contention of Car Co. is not correct. While as a rule, a petition for quo warranto filed before the
RTC should be brought in the place where the respondent resides, this rule shall not apply when the
petition is filed by the Solicitor General who is given the prerogative to file the petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

If the principal of a public high school is illegally replaced by another, is it a requirement that
before he can go to court on a quo warranto, he should first exhaust administrative remedies?
(Bar 1980)

Suggested answer.

No. There is no such requirement under Rule 66. The action has to be brought within one (1) year
from the cause of ouster from office or the right to hold the office arose. A quo warranto proceeding
is one of the instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.

Remedial Law Notes


Special Civil Actions: Rule 65 - Quo Warranto
Rule 66
Quo Warranto

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated
or without lawful authority so to act. (1a)

Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof, must commence such action. (3a)

Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the
action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person;
but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the
action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)

Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. — Upon application for
permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall
direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if
permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all
interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor
in his own name. (6)

Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. — When the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who
claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is
unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or
franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise
determined, in the same action. (7a)

Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the
action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the
Supreme Court. (8a)

Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence. — The
court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in
the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein
consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil
matter pending in the court. (9a)

Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the respondent is found guilty of usurping into,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires. (10a)

Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages.
— If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public
office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon
himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the
books and papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment
relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he
may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged
entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by
such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)

Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose,
nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)

Section 12. Judgment for costs. — In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or
the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires.
(17a)  (Rule 66, Rules of Court)

What is quo warranto?

● Quo warranto literally means: By what authority. It is an extraordinary legal remedy whereby the
State challenges a person or an entity to show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises
a public franchise.

The object is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the office.

●  It is a special civil action commenced by a verified petition against the following:

(a) a person who usurps a public office, position or franchise;

(b) a public officer who performs an act constituting forfeiture of a public office; or

(c) an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority to do so (Sec. 1, Rule 66).

Who may file a petition for quo warranto? 

1. Solicitor General or the public prosecutor

a. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or
when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that an action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise can be established by proof against:

(i) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(ii) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or

(iii) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

b. The Solicitor General or the public prosecutor may commence the action at the instance of another
person. In this case, leave of court is necessary (Sec. 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court).

2. Private person - any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. (Sec. 5, Rule 66). He may maintain the action without the
intervention of the Solicitor General and without need for any leave of court. In bringing a petition
for quo warranto, he must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly being held by another.
It is not enough that he merely asserts the right to be appointed to the office. He must assert that he
is entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by another.

● By analogy with Sec. 5, it has been held that a public utility may bring a quo warranto action
against another public utility which has usurped the rights of the former granted under a
franchise. (Cui vs. Cui,  G.R. No. 39773. April 9, 1934)

How is quo warranto commenced?

A quo warranto proceeding is commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, by a public prosecutor, or by
a private person in his own name where he claims to be entitled to the public office or position
alleged to have been usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

What court has jurisdiction over quo warranto cases? 

1. Supreme Court
2. Court of Appeals
3. Regional Trial Court

Where should the petition for quo warranto be filed (venue)?

1. The petition may be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or where any of
the respondents resides.

2. When the action is commenced by the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (Sec. 7, Rule
66).

When should the action for quo warranto be filed?

● An action for quo warranto in relation to a public office must be filed within one (1) year after the
cause of the ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose (Sec. 11, Rule
66).

● The period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, with the
result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set
up in the answer or motion to dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas,  G.R. No. L-2041, November 3, 1948)

● An action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues, and the
pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year
period (Palma-Fernandez vs. De La Paz,  G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988). No one is compelled to
resort to administrative remedies since public interest requires that the right to public office should be
determined as speedily as possible.

Right to damages

If the petitioner is adjudged to be entitled to the office, he may sue for damages against the alleged
usurper within one (1) year from the entry of judgment establishing his right to the office in
question (Sec. 11, Rule 66).
Quo warranto against corporations

●Although a quo warranto proceeding may be brought against an association which acts as a

corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act (Sec. 1[c], Rule 66), the petition may be brought only against a de facto corporation, not a de
jure corporation. The latter corporation has no defect in its incorporation and exercises corporate
powers because it was organized in full compliance with the laws (Black's, 5th Ed., 382). There is
therefore, no reason to attack its existence and its exercise of corporate powers.

A de facto corporation is one which in good faith claims to be a corporation, was organized in
accordance and pursuant to a valid law, and assumes corporate powers because it was issued a
certificate of incorporation. Traditionally, it has been referred to as a corporation which exists in fact
but not in law. Under the law, its right to exercise corporate powers, shall be inquired into by a
collateral attack in a private suit to which such corporation may be made a party (Sec. 20,
Corporation Code of the Philippines). Hence, its exercise of corporate powers may be inquired into
and its corporate existence attacked by a quo warranto proceeding.

Observe that under the Securities and Regulations Code of 2000 (R.A. 8799), that all the powers of
the Securities and Exchange Commission enumerated under Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
were transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) and the same law also enumerates as one
of the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to "suspend, revoke * * * the
franchise, or certificate of registration of corporations * * * upon any of the grounds provided by law
(Sec. 5.1[m], R.A. 8799).

● It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out
a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court,
adopting Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule
66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated, while [a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as
amended).

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation.

As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains
the phrase or an office in a corporation created by authority of law which was found in the old Rules.
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act
as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners
to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated. (Calleja vs. Panday,  G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006)

Bar Questions:

A group of businessmen formed an association in Cebu City calling itself Cars Co. to
distribute/sell cars in said city. It did not incorporate itself under the law nor did it have any
government permit or license to conduct its business as such. The Solicitor General filed before
a Regional Trial Court in Manila a verified petition for quo warranto questioning and seeking
to stop the operations of Car Co. The latter filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
of improper venue claiming that its main office and operations are in Cebu City and not in
Manila. Is the contention of Cars Co. correct? (Bar 2001)

Suggested answer.

The contention of Car Co. is not correct. While as a rule, a petition for quo warranto filed before the
RTC should be brought in the place where the respondent resides, this rule shall not apply when the
petition is filed by the Solicitor General who is given the prerogative to file the petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

If the principal of a public high school is illegally replaced by another, is it a requirement that
before he can go to court on a quo warranto, he should first exhaust administrative remedies?
(Bar 1980)

Suggested answer.

No. There is no such requirement under Rule 66. The action has to be brought within one (1) year
from the cause of ouster from office or the right to hold the office arose. A quo warranto proceeding
is one of the instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.
88

Remedial Law Notes


Special Civil Actions: Rule 62 - Interpleader
Rule 62
 Interpleader

Section 1. When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. (1a, R63)

Section 2. Order. — Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the
conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may
direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court. (2a, R63)

Section 3. Summons. — Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants, together with a copy
of the complaint and order. (3, R63)

Section 4. Motion to dismiss. — Within the time for filing an answer, each claimant may file a motion to
dismiss on the ground of impropriety of the interpleader action or on other appropriate grounds specified
in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is denied, the movant may file
his answer within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. — Each claimant shall file his answer setting forth his claim
within fifteen (15) days from service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each of the
other conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as provided by these Rules. If any claimant
fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in default and thereafter
render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter.

The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. (4a, R63)

Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-
trial has been conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their
respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, R63)

Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. — The docket and other
lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation
expenses, shall constitute a lien or change upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall
order otherwise. (6a, R63) (Rule 62, Rules of Court)

What is an interpleader?

Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession or has an obligation
to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the
defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the
obligation. (Beltran vs. PHHC,  G.R. No. L-25138, August 28, 1969)

What is the purpose of interpleader?

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. (Beltran vs. PHHC)

1. A classic example is that of a warehouseman who has custody of goods claimed to be owned by
two or more persons who do not have the same interests. He may file an action for interpleader for
the court to determine the rightful owner. The basis of the need to file an interpleader in the case
of a warehouseman is actually the substantive law provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law.
Under said law, where a warehouseman delivers the goods to one who is not in fact entitled to
possession, the warehouseman shall be liable for conversion (Sec. 10, Warehouse Receipts Law). He
may also be sued for damages for non-delivery if he refuses to deliver the goods. Hence, Sec. 17 of
the same law authorizes the warehouseman to require all known claimants to interplead to shield
him from liability. (Dean Riano)

2. Another usual example is the case of a lessee who may commence a complaint for interpleader
when he is confronted with adverse claimants on the rentals due and he is in doubt as to which of
them should be the rightful recipient.

Recall that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, a cardinal principle to be observed for the
validity of payment or performance is that payment must be made "to the person in whose favor
the obligation was constituted" (Art. 1240, Civil Code of the Philippines). This means that as a rule,
payment to the wrong person is not a valid payment and does not extinguish the obligation. Where
two or more persons who do not represent the same interests claim the right to collect, the debtor
will have to file an action for interpleader to effect the extinguishment of his obligation. (Dean
Riano)

What are the requisites of interpleader?

1. There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests to a property in the
custody or possession of the plaintiff.

2. The plaintiff has NO CLAIM upon the subject matter of the adverse claims, or if he has an interest
at all, such interest is NOT DISPUTED by the claimants.

3. The subject matter of the adverse claims must be one and the same.

What court has jurisdiction over an interpleader case?

1. MTC - If the subject matter of the action is personal property, valued at not more than
P300,000.00 outside Metro Manila, and in Metro Manila, at not more than P400,000.00, the
Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction.

2. RTC - If the subject matter is real property with an assessed value at not more than P20,000.00
outside Metro Manila, and in Metro Manila, at not more than P50,000.00, the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction.

When should the interpleader be filed?

An action for interpleader should be filed within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen
without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by
laches or undue delay. (Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won, G.R. No. L-23851,  March 26,
1976)
If the the allegations of the complaint do not show conflicting claims between or among the
persons required to interplead, what would be the ground for the dismissal of the complaint for
interpleader?

It is believed that where the allegations of the complaint do not show conflicting claims between or
among the persons required to interplead, the complaint for interpleader is subject to dismissal on
the ground of impropriety of the interpleader, not a failure to state a cause of action under Rule 16
because the meaning of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions cannot apply to an interpleader.
Besides, for an interpleader to be proper such conflicting claims must exist (Sec. 1, Rule 62, Rules of
Court). Conversely, there is impropriety where no such adverse claims can be found from the
reading of the complaint. (Dean Riano)

Procedure:

1. Filing: A complaint for interpleader is filed by the person against whom the conflicting claims are
made. The docket, other lawful fees, costs and other litigation expenses shall be paid by the
complainant; but these will constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless
the
court hold otherwise.

2. Court Order: Upon filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct
that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.

3. Summons: Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants, together with a copy of the
complaint and order.

4. Motion to Dismiss: Within the time for filing an answer (15 days), each claimant may file a
motion to dismiss on the grounds specified in Rule 16 and on the ground of impropriety of the
action for interpleader.

The period to file an answer is interrupted or tolled by the filing of the motion to dismiss. If the
motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period to answer, but which
shall NOT BE LESS THAN 5 days in any event from the notice of denial of the motion.

5. Answer: Each claimant shall file his answer within 15 days from service of the summons, serving
a copy thereof upon each of the other conflicting claimants, who may file their reply thereto.

If claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in
default and render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter.

6. Other pleadings: The parties may file counterclaims, crossclaims, third-party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto.

7. Pre-trial: A pre‐trial will be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court.

8. Determination: Court shall determine conflicting claimants’ respective rights and adjudicate their
several claims.

Bar Questions:

LTA, Inc. is the lessee of a building owned by Mr. Tenorio paying rental of P10,000.00 a month.
The owner died on May 10, 1988 and since then, LTA has not paid the monthly rentals, now
amounting to P40,000.00 because two women are both claiming to be widows of Tenorio and are
demanding rental payments. What legal action may LTA's counsel take, before what court and
against whom to protect LTA's interest? (Bar 1996)

Suggested answer.

LTAs counsel should file an action for interpleader against the two women and pray that the court
resolve their conflicting claims. The action should be filed in the Municipal Trial Court because the
subject of the action is an amount within the jurisdiction of said court. Note: When the question
was asked, jurisdiction was with the Regional Trial Court. At that time the jurisdictional amount for
the RTC was an amount exceeding P10,000.00.

A lost the cashier's check she purchased from XYZ Bank. Upon being notified of the loss, XYZ Bank
immediately issued a "STOP PAYMENT" order. Here comes B trying to encash the same cashier's
check but XYZ Bank refused payment. As precautionary measure what remedy may XYZ Bank
avail of with respect to the conflicting claims of A and B over the cashier's check? Explain. (Bar
1996)

Suggested answer:

XYX Bank should file a complaint for interpleader and leave unto the court the resolution of the
conflicting claims of A and B. Note: The examiner made reference to "conflicting claims." This is a
clue as to what the examiner desires as an answer. The examinee should therefore, refrain from
making assumptions or unnecessary analysis.

H insured his life with X Insurance Co. and designated W as beneficiary. The policy provided that
the beneficiary could be changed by a written notice designating the new beneficiary sent by the
insured and received by X Insurance Co. before the death of the insured. After the death of H, Q
demanded from X Insurance Co. the proceeds of the policy, claiming that she had been
designated as the beneficiary by H as may be seen from a copy of a written notice signed by H and
allegedly received by X Insurance Co. before X's death. W who is also demanding from X
Insurance Co. the proceeds of the policy, claims that the signature of H appearing on the written
notice is forged. As counsel for X Insurance Co., what advice would you give to your client and
why?  (Bar 1978)

Suggested answer:

I would advice my client not to pay either of the claimants in the meantime and instead file a
complaint for interpleader against them and let the court resolve their conflicting claims (Sec. 1,
Rule 63, Rules of Court).

What courts have jurisdiction over the following cases filed in Metro Manila?
xxx
(d) An action for interpleader to determine who between the defendants is entitled to receive the
amount of P190, 000.00 from the plaintiff.

Suggested answer.

(d) The action shall be filed in the Metropolitan Court in Metro Manila. The amount of P190, 000.00
not being in excess of P400, 000.00, is within the jurisdiction of said court. (Bar 1997)

Interpleader Case Digests:

Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won

Arreza vs Diaz
Beltran vs PHHC
Maglente vs. Padilla
Ocampo vs. Tirona
RCBC vs Metro Container Corporation