CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGEST
GROUP 3

Rommel P. Abas
Diosa Mae T. Andot
Jason A. Ampong
Cielo Bonachita
Yenyen O. Empenado
Angelle Mae M. Gambuta
Dancelo C. Gacutan II
Glenn Kirby A. German
Mary Jean A. Olaso
Renato F. Tolinero, Jr.
1. Appointment

a. CSC v De la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737 August 31, 2004

b. Aquino v CSC, 208 SCRA 240

2. Power to Review Appointments

a. Bongbong v. Parado 57 SCRA 623

b. Mantala v. Salvador G.R. No. 107646 February 13, 1992

c. Debulgado vs. CSC, 237 SCRA 184

d. University of the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. No. 132860 April 3, 2001

3. Jurisdiction of CSC: Article IX - B Sec 2 (1)

a. University of the Philippines v. Regino 221 SCRA 598

b. Career Executive Service i. PEZA v. Mercado GR No. 172144

4. Rights of Public Officer

a. Dimaandal v. COA 291 SCRA 322

b. Civil Liberties v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

c. Monroy v. CA, GR No. L-23258

d. Rodriquez v. Tan, 91 Phil 724

e. Malaluan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996

5. Constitutional Provisions on Salaries

a. Article VI, Sec 10

b. Sec. 6, Article VII

c. Sec. 10, Article VIII

d. Sec. 8, Article IX - B

6. Right to Salary in case of Preventive Suspension

a. Gloria v. CA GR No. 131012

b. David v. Gania G.R. No. 156039. August 14, 2003

 1. Appointment

G.R. No. 158737 August 31, 2004

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DELA CRUZ

DOCTRINE:

The rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so
strictly interpreted as to curtail an agency’s discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee
possesses other qualifications required by law.

It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In the appointment or promotion of employees,
the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance,
education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority.
Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be
respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the
appointing authority.

The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of issuance
of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the
protest against it.

FACTS:

Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC,

presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety
Division. But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO).

Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional
appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that
respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.

Then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit.
Dissatisfied, Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR.

The CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the
approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. ATO Director Gilo
wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the order recalling respondent's appointment, citing
several reasons in support thereof.

Strangely, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo granted Director Gilo's request and affirmed the
approval of respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.

Calamba requested the CSC to implement the previous ruling of the CSC-NCR. The CSC
treated Calamba’s request as an appeal and granted the same.
 Acting on the request for reconsideration filed by respondent, the CSC denied the motion for
reconsideration of Saturnino dela Cruz.

Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was granted by the
appellate court and approved his appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office.

ISSUES

I. Whether Saturnino was short of the required number of years of work experience for the
contested position as of the date of the issuance of his appointment; and

II. Whether the power to appoint is discretionary.

RULING:

I.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, respondent has sufficiently complied with the required
experience standards. The work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his
appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing,
directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years
prior to his appointment.

Respondent is deemed to have satisfactorily complied with the experience requirement for
the contested position when he was designated Chief of the ATO Operations Center and Acting Chief
of the ATO Aviation Safety Division. Having held said positions from 1993 to the present, respondent
may be considered to have acquired the necessary experience for the position.

II.
Yes, it is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority.

In the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only
their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and
seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final
choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not
substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.

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 G.R. No. 92403 April 22, 1992
VICTOR A. AQUINO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCTRINE:

The acts of the head of a department or office making the appointment and the
Commissioner of Civil Service acting together, though not concurrently, but consecutively, are
necessary to make an appointment complete.

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes
a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution,
and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

The moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised and the appointee
assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment cannot be revoked by the
appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified than the first
appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the minimum
qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-B, Section 2
par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is
allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.

FACTS:

Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS
Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.

Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional
appointment to private respondent as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional
Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.

Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence
of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.

Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision
sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued
a permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.

In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking
the appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her position under her previously
approved appointment.

In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings
in previous jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground
that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.

ISSUE:
 Whether public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of
San Pablo City as it found private respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.

RULING:

No, the right to security of tenure of the private respondent to the contested position had
already attached. While it is true that the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in
making his choice in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the
civil service, the Court, however, cannot give a stamp of approval to such a procedural irregularity in
extending appointments, as in the instant case, to the prejudice of the right to security of tenure of
the incumbent to the position.

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes
a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution,
and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

Said appointment cannot also be revoked on the ground that the protestant is more
qualified than the first appointee. The protest must be for a cause or predicated on those grounds
provided for under Sect 19 (6) of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), namely: 1) that the appointee is not
qualified; 2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and 3) in case of appointment transfer,
reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written
special reasons or reason given by the appointing authority.

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 2. Power to Review Appointments

G.R. No. L-30361 June 28, 1974

BONGBONG vs. PARADO

DOCTRINE:

The fact that the petitioners were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any
security of tenure or permanence in, any specific station on general principles, they may be
transferred as the exigencies of the service require. They ordinarily have no right to complain against
any change of assignment.

Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding must be able to
show that he is entitled to the office. Absent such an element, he cannot prevail. His action must be
dismissed. Well-known is the principle, in litigations of this nature, that the plaintiff will succeed
only when he proves his right to the office. A quo warranto proceeding must be brought by the
proper person at the proper time, one who "does not claim to be entitled" not being "the proper
party to raise that issue.

FACTS:

While the petitioner was appointed as the Rural Health Physician in the Bureau of Rural
Health Units Projects, he took his oath of office as Municipal Health Officer of Palompon, Leyte.
Thereafter, he was directed by respondent Parado, the Provincial Health Officer, to proceed to
Kananga, Leyte, as its Municipal Health Officer.

Petitioner protested, but he was reminded that "his appointment did not specify any place
or town of assignment and there is already a Municipal Health Officer in the Municipality of
Palompon.  The decision of respondent Parado assigning petitioner in Kananga was thereafter
approved by the Regional Health Director.

Respondent Alfredo Esporlas was relieved to his duties as Municipal Health Officer of
Kananga, Leyte on October 31, 1962 and assigned to and assumed duty as Municipal Health Officer
of Palompon, Leyte, almost one year previous to the effectivity of petitioner's appointment which
transfer was made pursuant to the request of respondent Dr. Esporlas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Bongbong is entitled to the position of Municipal Health Officer of
Palompon, Leyte.

RULING:

No.

Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding must be able to
show that he is entitled to the office. Absent such an element, he cannot prevail. His action must be
dismissed. Well-known is the principle, in litigations of this nature, that the plaintiff will succeed
only when he proves his right to the office. A quo warranto proceeding must be brought by the
proper person at the proper time, one who "does not claim to be entitled" not being "the proper
party to raise that issue.
 In the present case, where, from the very stipulation of facts, the appointment of petitioner
was only for what of Rural Health Physician, without any specific designation of place, with
respondent Esporlas being shown as having been assigned to and assuming the duty of Municipal
Health Office of Palompon, Leyte, almost one year previous to the effectivity of petitioner's
appointment. The Ibañez doctrine calls for application, “the fact that the petitioners were not
appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific
station on general principles, they may be transferred as the exigencies of the service require. They
ordinarily have no right to complain against any change of assignment.”

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 G.R. No. 101646 February 13, 1992
MANTALA vs. SALVADOR

DOCTRINE:

Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in the civil
service — including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation," and, of course, employment status
and qualification standards — are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
The Constitution declares the Commission to be "the central personnel agency of the Government,"  
having power and authority to administer the civil service;  to promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices;  and to render decision in "any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution,"
which decision, or order or ruling "may be brought to the Supreme Court on  certiorari  by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

FACTS:

Dr. Mariquita J. Mantala, a private medical practitioner, was given by the Secretary of Health
a temporary appointment to the then vacant position of Division Chief, Medical Division III,
Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the TB Control Service, Office of Public Health, of the
Department of Health.

That temporary appointment was shortly made subject to a formal protest filed by Dr. Julia
P. Regino with the Committee on Evaluation and Protest of the Department of Health. Dr. Regino
claimed that it was she to whom the appointment should have been extended since the post of
Medical Officer III then held by her was next-in-rank to the office in question, and moreover she had
been in the service for thirty-five years. However, the Committee on Evaluation and Protest ruled
adversely to her and upheld the Health Secretary's appointment of Dr. Mantala as Division Chief.

Dr. Regino appealed to the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service Commission. The Board
rendered a in Dr. Regino's favor.

On January 8, 1990, Secretary Bengzon made Dr. Mantala's appointment as Division Chief
permanent. He also filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision of the Merit
Systems Board which was, however, denied.

Secretary Bengzon thereupon took the case up to the Civil Service Commission. The
Commission dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Merit Systems Board in Dr.
Regino's favor.

On a motion for reconsideration, however, the Commission, upheld Dr. Mantala's

appointment.

Dr. Regino instituted an action of quo warranto and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court
against Dr. Mantala, Secretary Bengzon and other officials of the Department of Health, claiming
that having an established right to the position of Division Chief in question, she should be installed.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari in which it is prayed that the Regional Trial
Court's decision be reversed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service has jurisdiction involving contested appointments or
promotions.

RULING:

Yes.

Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in the civil
service — including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation," and, of course, employment status
and qualification standards — are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
The Constitution declares the Commission to be "the central personnel agency of the Government,"  
having power and authority to administer the civil service;  to promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices;  and to render decision in "any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution,"
which decision, or order or ruling "may be brought to the Supreme Court on  certiorari  by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Even on the merits, Dr. Regino's cause fails. For one thing, the Commission's conclusion —
"that insofar as overall rating of the qualification, attitude and performance (was concerned), Dr.
Mantala outscored Dr. Regino" — is basically a factual one and may not be reviewed on  certiorari;
and its legal opinion — that the appointing authority is not limited to promotion in filling up
vacancies but may opt to fill them by the appointment of persons with civil service eligibility
appropriate to the position — is entirely in accord with law. For another, the now firmly established
doctrine is that the discretion exercised by the appointing power in extending an appointment to a
given position to one of two or more employees possessing the requisite minimum qualifications for
the position, will not generally be interfered with and must be sustained, and the Civil Service
Commission has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believes that another
employee is better qualified, for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested
sole in the appointing authority. 

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 G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994
CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCTRINE:

While the appointee may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hardworking, that
circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in respect of the original
appointment. The Court is aware of the difficulties that the comprehensive prohibition against
nepotism would impose upon petitioner Victoria and others similarly situated. The prohibition is not
intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The purpose of the law which shines
through the comprehensive and unqualified language in which it was cast and has remained for
decades is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the
matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.

A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such
appointment. The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment
initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Section 20
of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear that notwithstanding the initial
approval of an appointment, it may be recalled if it is in violation of other existing civil service law,
rules and regulations.

Facts:
Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T.
Debulgado, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. The
appointment came about after considering three (3) other employees of the City Government.
Before the said promotion, she had been in the service of the City Government for about 32 years.
She joined the City Government on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk, before she was
married to Rogelio. Through the years, she rose from the ranks until finally on 1 October 1992, she
assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of  San
Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position.

On 16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) received a letter
from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention
to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. The CSC directed its
Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment of petitioner Victoria. The
CSC then resolved to recall the approval of the promotion by Director Escobia of the Bacolod City
CSC-Field office after a report was made by Director Caberoy of the Iloilo City CSRO No. 6 affirming
the fact the relation of the petitioners as husband and wife.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against
nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. Petitioners
also asserted that the CSC had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally
revoking her appointment. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 21 July 1993.

In this petition for Certiorari, the basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition
against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional
appointments. They believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City
Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the prohibition no longer
applied to her promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that the promotion was not
motivated by personal reasons of petitioner Mayor since petitioner Victoria deserves to be
promoted to General Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service to the City
Government. Petitioner Mayor also claimed that the promotion was of honest intention having been
concurred by the Sanggunian and after an informal consultation with one Gregorio C. Agdon, a
supervising personnel specialist in CSC’s Bacolod Office, affirmed that promotional appointment is
not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

Issues:

1. Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the legal prohibition against nepotism, or

whether that prohibition applies only to original appointments to the Civil Service; and

2. Whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the
promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria after the Commission, through
Director Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment, without giving an
opportunity to petitioner Victoria to explain her side on the matter.

Ruling:

Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 defines nepotism as all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of
the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. The word "relative" and members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The
definition shall be read in conjunction with Section 1 Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing rules
which says that all appointments in the career service shall be made only according to the merit and
fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations. It further provides that
all original appointments and personnel actions shall be in accordance with these Rules and with
other regulations and standards that may be promulgated by the Commission. The same section
defines personnel action any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service
which includes promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment,
reassignment, demotion and separation. The definition of personnel action is reiterated in Section 1
Rule VII of the same rules.

While the appointee may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hardworking, that
circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in respect of the original
appointment. The Court is aware of the difficulties that the comprehensive prohibition against
nepotism would impose upon petitioner Victoria and others similarly situated. The prohibition is not
intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The purpose of the law which shines
through the comprehensive and unqualified language in which it was cast and has remained for
decades is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the
matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.

The court concluded that Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain
and ordinary language: it refers to “all appointments” whether original or promotional in nature. The
public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither
authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a
distinction there. It follows, therefore, that the appointment of Victoria is within the prohibited class
of appointments.

On the second issue, the court ruled that the action taken by the CSC was not of a
disciplinary measure upon petitioners. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only
examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the
appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The action of
the CSC was only in implementation of Sec. 59 Book V of EO No. 292. Because the promotional
appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being
contra legem. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of
such appointment. The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment
initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. Section 20
of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear that notwithstanding the initial
approval of an appointment, it may be recalled if it is in violation of other existing civil service law,
rules and regulations.

The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of
its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional
appointment of petitioner Victoria being void “from the beginning.” The approval issued by Director
Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that appointment. Therefore, that there was
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC.

Petition for Certiorari DISMISSED for lack of merit.

-0–
 G.R. No. 132860 April 3, 2001
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCTRINE:

The CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies.
Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their
concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law. In short, on its own, the CSC does not
have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

FACTS:

Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence
without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the
Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for
Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP). When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP
requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty
and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De
Torres did not report to work.

After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB
that he was reporting back to duty. However, De Torres was informed that in the absence of any
approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised
to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision.
Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did
not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of
Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the
employment status of Dr. De Torres.

The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De Torres was already on
AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year
was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of
Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De
Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation
from the service.

The CA upheld the decision of the CSC.

ISSUE:

WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his
prolonged absence without official leave is valid.

RULING:

The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
was in effect at the time. The provision states:

"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an
employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one
year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the
service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave
of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails
to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service."

UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service,
if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue
herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In
the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP.
He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the
possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period.
UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued
by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only
retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was
promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of
UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise
its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.

Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his
absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more
precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised
Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its
personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally
enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed
that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its
functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their
concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not
have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De
Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.

-0–
 3. Jurisdiction of CSC: Article IX-B Sec 2 (1)

G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGINO

DOCTRINE:

Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless

of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987
Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the
scope of the Civil Service

FACTS:

Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator of UP was dismissed from service after being found
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for a leakage of the final examination questions. After his
appeal with UP Board of Regents was denied, he sought for relief with the Merit System Board
(MSB). UP1 filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the part of MSB which was denied.
MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered for his reinstatement and backwages. UP moved to
reconsider but was denied. UP appealed the decision with the Civil Service Commission. With the
new counsel of record, UP filed its second MR which was likewise denied. Pamplina filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Execution which was opposed by the petitioner. The Commission
granted the motion. Pamplina was not yet reinstated and so he filed a petition for Mandamus before
the RTC of Quezon City which granted ordering the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari contending that under its charter, it enjoys not only academic freedom but
also institutional autonomy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction of the case.

RULING:

Yes.

The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in
administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that
the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides
that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposititon of a penalty of  suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or  dismissal from office."

Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless

of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987
Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the
scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:
 The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.

As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil

Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special
law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD
607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

-0–
 G.R. No. 172144 March 09, 2010
PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND LILIA B. DE LIMA VS. GLORIA J. MERCADO

DOCTRINE:

Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent

appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board.

FACTS:

Respondent was appointed as Group Manager for Policy and Planning of PEZA on September
16, 1998. Her appointment was temporary in nature. On May 16, 1999, respondent was promoted
to the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning. Her appointment indicated the
same as on permanent basis, but with the following annotation: NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS
HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO OR CSEE ELIGIBILITY. CESO is the acronym for Career Exercutive Service
Officer, while CSEE is the acronym for Career Service Executive Eligibility.

On June 1, 2000, petitioner Lilia B. de Lima, in her capacity as PEZA Director General, by letter
of even date, advised respondent of the termination of her appointment effective on the closing
hours of the day. On even date, petitioner PEZA Board convened in an executive session and passed
a Resolution appointing Wilhelm G. Ortaliz (Ortaliz), a CESO eligible, as Deputy Director General for
Policy and Planning effective immediately.

In the main, respondent alleged in her complaint that her degree in Master in National
Security Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career Executive Service (CES)
eligibility; that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8748, which amended R.A. 7916 or the  PEZA Charter, did away
with the CES eligibility requirement for the position of Deputy Director General; and that the
termination of her appointment was actuated with bad faith to entitle her to moral and exemplary
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MNSA degree automatically confers on Respondent’s CES eligibility,
which supplements her permanent status.

RULING:

NO. By respondent's attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred automatic CES
eligibility. It was, as above-quoted portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as
"equivalent to passing the Management Aptitude Test Battery." For respondent to acquire CES
eligibility and CES rank, she could "proceed to the second stage of the eligibility examination
process . . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in accordance with existing policies and
regulations"; and that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other stages of the CES
eligibility examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could "qualify for appointment to CES
ranks," PROVIDED that she meets and complies "with other requirements of the CES Board and the
Office of the President to qualify for rank appointment."

Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had not
undergone the second, third  and fourth  stages of the CES eligibility examinations prior to her
appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the time her appointment
was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by the CES Board. Not being a CES
eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of
her appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible by Ortaliz, were not illegal.

Respondent's subsequent  passing in late 2000 of the CES examinations did not retroact to
consider her a CESO at the time her appointment was terminated on June 1, 2000.

-0–
4. Rights of Public Officer

G.R. No. 122197 June 26, 1998

ZOSIMO M. DIMAANDAL vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

DOCTRINE:

Designation is mere imposition of additional duties on the officer or employee to be

performed by him in a special manner. It does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant
upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position.

FACTS:

Dimaandal held a position as Supply Officer III and was designated by the governor as Acting
Assistant Provincial Treasurer. Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in salary and
Representation and Transportation Allowance RATA, however, the Provincial Auditor disallowed his
claim.

The COA argued that Dimaandal was merely designated, and thus, he is not entitled to
receive additional salary and that the governor who appointed him was not the duly competent
authority who can designate him to such position.

ISSUES:

Whether the designation of Dimaandal is valid.

Whether Dimaandal is entitled to the difference in salary and RATA by reason of his
designation to other office.

RULING:

No. Section 471 of R.A. 7160 do not authorize the Provincial Governor to appoint nor even
designate one temporarily in cases of temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial
office. That power resides in the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance.

Necessarily, petitioner's designation as Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by

the Governor being defective, confers no right on the part of petitioner to claim the difference in the
salaries and allowances attached to the position occupied by him.

The right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial Treasurer is based on the assumption that
the appointment or designation thereof was made in accordance with law. Considering that
petitioner's designation was without color of authority, the right to the salary or an allowance due
from said office never existed. Stated differently, in the absence of such right, there can be no
violation of any constitutional right nor an impairment of the obligation of contracts clause under
the Constitution.

-0–
 G.R. No. 83896             February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOCTRINE:

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.

FACTS:

Two petitions were consolidated per resolution to be resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1
hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who
is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or

controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct
contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section
3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue
of Section 8, Article VIII. Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along
with the other public officials from holding any other office or employment during their tenure.

ISSUE:

Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

RULING:

No.
 The Constitutional Commission saw it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices
or employment in the government. Such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article
VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or
employees from holding other offices or employment. It is quite notable that in all these provisions
on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in
the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers either public and private office or employment. These prohibitions imposed
on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President
and his official family as class by itself and to imposed upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his
official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz when he commented,
"We actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they
exercise more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for because
there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in
Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that
all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.  On its face, the language of Section
13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.   Verily,
wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to
be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution"
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit:  the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
-0–
 G. R. No. L-23258, July 01, 1967
Roberto R. Monroy vs. CA

DOCTRINE:

Section 27 provides that “Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an
office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,"... makes the forfeiture automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Hence, in the
case at bar, the moment and act of filing are considered.  Once the certificate is filed, the seat is for-
feited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

FACTS:

Monroy was the incumbent Mayor when on September 15, 1961, his he filed a certifi cate of
candidacy Representative in the forthcoming elections. Three days later, petitioner filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. But on September 21, 1961, respondent, then the vice-
mayor took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor on the... theory that petitioner had forfeited the
said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monroy was still the municipal mayor after filing the certificate of candidacy.
RULING:
NO. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore the petitioner to his
position. Section 27 provides that “Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an
office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,"... makes the forfeiture automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Hence, in the
case at bar, the moment and act of filing are considered.  Once the certificate is filed, the seat is for-
feited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
Monroy will be replaced as Municipal Mayor by his Vice Mayor Del Rosario upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
-0–
 GR. No. L-3913, August 7, 1952
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ SR. vs. CARLOS TAN

DOCTRINE:

A senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a
result of an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and is
entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the
position. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction.

Where the Senate Electoral Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or ignored altogether, an
important claim for damages in connection with an election protest — a matter incident to the
power and authority given to the Tribunal by the Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases
is ample and unlimited — the clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified. This matter cannot be
passed upon in another action for recovery of said damages in accordance with the principle of res
judicata.

The averment in a complaint that "defendant usurped the office of Senator of the
Philippines" is a conclusion of law — not a statement of fact - when the particular facts on which the
alleged usurpation is predicated are not set forth therein. Such averment cannot be deemed
admitted by a motion to dismiss.

FACTS:

Rodriguez, the plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of P18,400 as
salaries and allowances, and the sum of P35,524.55 as damages, upon the plea that the latter
usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from
December 30, 1947, to December 27, 1949.

Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the
Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries,
emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400.

That protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the
office; and that by reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of
P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.

On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand, that the
judgment rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest case is a bar to this action under
the principle of res judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any reservation the
claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in prosecuting the protest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant (Tan), who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and
discharged the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has
received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal?

RULING:

No.
 The Supreme Court is inclined to uphold the point of view of the defendant. There is no
question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator.
He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was
proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he
took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position.
Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it
cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances
which our Constitution provides for the position (Article VI, Section 14)

This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in
connection with positions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a
result of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation during their
incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary
rule has been upheld.

Another reason that may be invoked in opposition to the claim of the plaintiff is the principle
of res judicata. It appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against
the defendant before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on the merits
the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio.

In SC’s opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a denial of the relief. This is a matter
which can be considered as an incident to the power and authority given to the Electoral Tribunal by
our Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases is ample and unlimited (Sanidad Et. Al. v.
Vera Et. Al., Case No. 1, Senate Electoral Tribunal), and when the Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio,
or ignore altogether, this important claim, the clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified.

The petition is denied.

-0–
 G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996
LUIS MALALUAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EVANGELISTA

DOCTRINE:

Any damage suffered due to the execution of judgment pending appeal, may be said to be
equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury inflicted
without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for
which the law provides no remedy.

When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case
being an election protest involving the office of mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is
dismissible on that ground because the right to the office no longer exist, unless the rendering of a
decision on the merits would be of practical value.

FACTS:

Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and
Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. However, the petitioner filed an election
protest with the RTC who then declared him to be the elected mayor of Kidapawan by granting the
order of execution pending appeal. The respondent then appealed to the COMELEC which reversed
the RTC’s decision finding the respondent to be the duly elected Mayor and ordered Malaluan to
vacate the office. The COMELEC further asserted that since petitioner was adjudged the winner in
the elections only by the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely
of an order granting execution pending appeal, the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal
manner as a usurper.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is considered usurper?

RULING:

No. The court held that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an
elective office under color of election thereto.  It matters not that it was the trial court and not the
COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral
process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding
repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no
less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a
winning candidate's right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem
petitioner, therefore, to be a "de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office
and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus "legally entitled to the emoluments of
the office."

Furthermore, as to the damages claimed by the respondent the court held that according to
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual
and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot
be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if
any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the execution of judgment pending
appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage
without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of
a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. 

-0–
5. Constitutional Provision on Salaries

a. Section 10 of Art VI. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

b. Section 6 of Art. VII. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the
President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during
their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive
during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.

c. Section 10 of Art. VIII. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

d. Section 8 of Art. IX-B. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any
kind from any foreign government.
6. Right to Salary in case of Preventive Suspension

G.R. No. 131012 April 21, 1999

GLORIA VS. CA

DOCTRINE:

No right to salaries for preventive suspension pending investigation even if employee is

exonerated, however, they are entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending
appeal if eventually they are found innocent/

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigations (§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§
47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.  It is a measure intended to

enable to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing
the latter from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not
finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the
respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of
the

FACTS:

Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October
1990, during the teachers' strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were
administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of
Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4) refusal to perform
official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
(7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was
concluded before the lapse of 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as
charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service, while respondents
Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months.

Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which
found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on him a six-
month suspension. 3 The other respondents also appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was
dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on time.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the MSPB with
respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of
violation of reasonable office rules and regulation.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 in this Court. Pursuant to Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the case referred to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
decision (1) affirming the decision of the CSC with respect to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and
Elizabeth Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor
Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
only and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.

Private respondents moved for a reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, while maintaining
its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment
of salaries during their suspension "beyond ninety (90) days."

Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a
reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of private
respondents' salaries during the period of their appeal. 

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not employees are entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of
suspension.

2. Whether or not employees are entitled to compensation for the period of their
suspension  pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

RULING:

1. NO.

No right to salaries for preventive suspension pending investigation even if employee is

exonerated. As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents
their salaries, allowances, and other benefits "beyond the ninety (90) day suspension." In other
words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension  pending
investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension  pending appeal in the event the
employee is exonerated.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigations (§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§
47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.  It is a measure intended to

enable to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing
the latter from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not
finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the
respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of
the

The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be
considered "unjustified," even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of
salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office
requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the
conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated.
 2. YES.

But although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended  pending
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries if they are exonerated, we do not
agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their
suspension  pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only
means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other
hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4)
states that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed,  i.e., if he is not
exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or
dismissal.

It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he

should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay
as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it
is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended. Indeed, to sustain the
government's theory would be to make the administrative decision not only executory but final and
executory. The fact is that §47(2) and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending appeal
under Rule 39, §2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, §5 provides that in the event the executed
judgment is reversed, there shall be restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may
require.

Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries
for the period of preventive suspension. We have said that an employee who is exonerated is not
entitled to the payment of his salaries because his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot but
unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be found innocent of
the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But through an employee is considered
under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension
is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding
90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to
reinstated with full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent
of five years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed. 

The SC affirmed the decision of the CA with modification that the award of salaries to private
respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

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 G.R. No. 156039           August 14, 2003
HON. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID vs. ZENAIDA D. PANGANDAMAN-GANIA

DOCTRINE:

The real party-in-interest is the person who would be allegedly dismissed from work, for it is
he who would be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is
present, available and competent to bring the matter on appeal.

FACTS:

Respondent is a Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao
State University (MSU). She has been holding this position after the confirmation of her appointment
by the MSU Board of Regents. Thereafter, a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her
place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work. She
verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not submitted to the
Civil Service Commission for attestation. The Civil Service Commission declared her removal from
office as illegal, exonerated her from the charge of being on absence without official leave and
ordered her reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU but
disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the illegal
dismissal. MSU moved for reconsideration of CSC Resolution, while respondent moved for its early
execution. Respondent did not seek a review of any of the resolutions of the CSC including the order
denying back salaries and other benefits for the period she was out of work. She instead pursued her
prayer for reinstatement but MSU refused to employ her back. Hence, she was compelled to file a
second motion for the execution of CSC Resolution. Eventually, respondent for the first time
questioned the portion of CSC Resolution prohibiting the payment of back wages and other benefits
to her for the period that her employment was terminated, and moved for the modification of the
resolution by granting her the relief prayed for which was denied. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed the instant petition for review allegedly in behalf of the petitioners to which respondent filed in
her own behalf a Comment claiming that the CSC cannot be a party-petitioner in a case where its
decision is the subject of review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is a real party-in-interest in the case at bar.

RULING:

No. This Court held that the situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and
indispensable often involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being
notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and the
like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness for the government
which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals
favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and
unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to
protect the integrity of the civil service system.

The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental
to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish
a career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate
all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability.

Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision does not preclude the
private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for review.
In the case of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, this Court held that the real party-in-interest in a
case involving the non-renewal of the appointments of contractual employees would be the person
who was allegedly dismissed from work and not the CSC, for it is he who would be benefited or
injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is present, available and competent to
bring the matter on appeal. Like a judge whose order or decision is being assailed, the CSC should
not be joined in the petition as it is not a combatant in a proceeding where opposing parties may
contend their respective positions without the active participation of the CSC.

In the case at bar, the CSC is not the real party-in-interest as this suit confronts the Decision
of the Court of Appeals to award back wages for respondent arising from an illegitimate personnel
and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is different from an administrative disciplinary proceeding
where the injured party is the government. This Court fail to see how the assailed Decision can
impair the effectiveness of government, damage the civil service system or weaken the
constitutional authority of the CSC so as to authorize the latter to prosecute this case. As a rule, the
material interest for this purpose belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal and the
execution of the Decision devolves upon it.

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