G.R. No. 148821 July 18, 2003 The People of The Philippines, Appellee, JERRY FERRER, Appellant. Brief Summary
G.R. No. 148821 July 18, 2003 The People of The Philippines, Appellee, JERRY FERRER, Appellant. Brief Summary
G.R. No. 148821 July 18, 2003 The People of The Philippines, Appellee, JERRY FERRER, Appellant. Brief Summary
BRIEF SUMMARY:
Appellant was tried under an information for rape of his step-daughter Mary Grace. When
arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, appellant, through counsel filed an undated Urgent
Motion for Medical Treatment which the trial court granted. On the scheduled pre-trial hearing, appellant
and his PAO counsel, failed to appear in court. The trial court then ordered the immediate issuance of a
warrant to arrest appellant and allowed the prosecution to present evidence in absentia. Thereafter, the
trial court set the dates for the presentation by the defense of its evidence. Notices were sent for the
following scheduled hearing dates. However, neither appellant nor his counsel appeared on said dates.
Thus, at the hearing of 24 July 2000, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to submit the case for
decision, since the prosecution had long rested its case and the defense had no witnesses to present.
Hence, this petition for automatic review.
FACTS:
Mary Grace Belonio was born on July 6, 1984, at Banisilan, North Cotabato. Her father is Felix
Belonio while her mother is Felipa Pataksil Belonio. The couple were however separated and when
Mary Grace was barely one (1) year and six (6) months old.
Felipa started living as a common law wife of the accused Jerry Ferrer together with Mary Grace
and her other children in one house at Mother Catutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur.
Felipa was a "sari-sari" item vendor and normally left home as early as 3:00 o'clock in the morning
for said business and return home at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Jerry Ferrer (common law
husband) is a blacksmith and stay home with the child victim Mary Grace.
In October of 1995 while the mother (Felipa) was away attending to her business, the accused Jerry
started his criminal design to have carnal knowledge by committing rape on Mary Grace. It was
Monday afternoon at 2:00 o'clock in October 1995 that Jerry called his step-daughter Mary Grace
[to] go upstairs of their house at Catutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur. With the use of his scythe in
intimidating the girl, Jerry started touching the girl who was resisting but was no match to the
strength of her step-father who was at the same time placing his scythe at the neck of the girl to
prevent resistance. The accused undressed the girl by pulling the latter's short pant[s] down and
her panty. The accused pushed the girl to lie down. The accused, then pulled down his short pant[s]
and took out his penis into the girl's vagina. The girl felt the pain that day. On Friday of that same
week in the evening while his common law wife Felipa (mother of the victim) was away, the
accused succeeded in consummating the crime of rape upon Mary Grace. The accused repeatedly
did the sexual assault upon Mary Grace until in 1977, the victim got the courage to reveal the said
rape to her mother that resulted in the filing of this case. The Medical Certificate issued by Dr.
Benjamin Bajarla following [the] medical and physical examination on the victim on December 17,
1997 showed laceration of the girl's hymen at 3:00 o'clock; 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions.
It further appears from the evidence that the victim was therefore 11 years old at the time of the
commission of rape upon her.
Appellant was tried under an information3 for rape which was filed on 17 February 1998. When
arraigned on 16 June 1998, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, appellant, through counsel Atty. Moh'd Hassan Macabanding of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), filed an undated Urgent Motion for Medical Treatment. He alleged that he
was suffering from an unknown internal sickness which had already claimed the life of another
detention prisoner. Afraid that he would suffer the same fate, appellant prayed for his immediate
medical treatment at the Provincial or City Hospital which was granted by the trial court and
ordered his temporary release.
On the scheduled pre-trial hearing, appellant and his PAO counsel, failed to appear in court. The trial
court then ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant to arrest appellant and allowed the
prosecution to present evidence in absentia.
Thereafter, the trial court set the dates for the presentation by the defense of its evidence. Notices
were sent for the following scheduled hearing dates However, neither appellant nor his counsel
appeared on said dates. Thus, at the hearing of 24 July 2000, the trial court granted the
prosecution's motion to submit the case for decision, since the prosecution had long rested its case
and the defense had no witnesses to present.
Thus, the trial court rendered on 28 November 2000, a decision which consisted of a five-page
summary of the testimonial and documentary evidence and which abruptly concluded, that based
on said evidence, the prosecution proved the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt requiring
the imposition of the death penalty.
In his Appellant's Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as res ipsa loquitor violative of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. He argues that the decision failed to distinctly point out
the applicable law on which it is based and that there is nothing in the decision that would show
how the trial court arrived at its conclusion convicting him of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court failed to comply with the rudimentary requirements
of due process and the constitutional provisions that vouchsafe the same.
RULING:
YES.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,33 we had occasion to caution magistrates to be more circumspect and
diligent in heeding the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which states:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
and its statutory expression in Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Judgment; definition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper
penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based.
Tested against these standards, we withhold approbation on the trial court's decision at bar for its
palpable failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates. Except for the narration of the
prosecution's evidence, there is nothing to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of
the evidence and no reason given why it concluded that said evidence proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court's decision is brief, starkly hallow, vacuous in its content and trite
in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing. Its inadequacy speaks for itself. Inevitably, we
agree with the appellant that the trial court decision res ipsa loquitor violates both Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
(The crime of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. The records are hereby REMANDED to said court for further
proceedings and for the proper rendition of judgment in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.)
G.R. No. 154182 December 17, 2004
EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Summary:
Edgar Teves was the Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental. Teresita is Edgar’s wife. They are being sued for
violation of Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to the issuance of a business
permit/license for Edgar’s cockpit. The Sandiganbayan convicted the spouses for the possession of pecuniary
interest in the business enterprise but absolved them of the charge in relation to the issuance of a business
permit/license. Hence, this petition.
Facts:
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and
set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in Valencia.
1. Edgar and Teresita Teves are married. In 1983, Edgar registered for the operation of a cockpit. This was
renewed in 1989. By January of 1990, he turned over the management of the cockpit to Teresita. However,
Edgar was also the Mayor of Valencia during 1988 to 1998. Thus, the Spouses were charged with violating
Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for Edgar’s alleged unlawful intervention in the
issuance of a business license/permit for his cockpit.
2. On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita
Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
a) The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest
in the said business enterprise on the grounds that:
i. nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said
cockpit;
ii. as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the "owner/licensee" of the cockpit; and
iii. since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their
property relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
b) Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This
pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law.
c) The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance
of a business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on or
about 4 February 1992 for not being well-founded.
3. On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
a) At first, SC denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
b) But upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, SC reinstated the petition.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting them.
1. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in
the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
a. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different
from the offense with which they were charged.
b. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for,
violation of the LGC of 1991.
c. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not
prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them.
2. Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit in
1992 was not proved.
a. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since Mayor Teves was the cockpit operator and licensee in
1989, said interest continued to exist until 1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the conjugal
property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary interest thereof was direct. But under
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.
Respondent’s Contention:
1. The existence of prohibited interest of the petitioner is by itself a criminal offense under Section 89(2) of the
LGC of 1991. It is necessarily included in the offense charged against the petitioners, i.e., for violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which proscribes the possession of a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which the person possessing
the financial interest intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or any
law from having any interest.
a. The use of the conjunctive word "or" demonstrates the alternative mode or nature of the manner of
execution of the final element of the violation of the provision. Although the information may have
alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in
the accusation to allow proof thereof. There was, therefore, no violation of the constitutional right of
the accused to be informed of the nature or cause of the accusation against them in view of
the variance doctrine, which finds statutory support in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
1) Whether Edgar Teves can be held liable for intervening in his official capacity for the issuance of a business
permit/license.
2) Whether Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit.
3) Whether or not the petitioners can be convicted considering that it was not charged in the information.
Ruling:
1. No, Edgar cannot be held liable for the charge of intervening in relation to the issuance of a
business permit/license for his cockpit.
The Court enumerated the essential elements of a violation of Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. Having a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction;
3. Such public officer either:
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
In this case, no intervention can be ascribed to Edgar as he cannot be said to have intervened in his official
capacity. He is charged for an act that occurred at or about February 4 of 1992. The law governing the issuance of
cockpit licenses is the Local Government Code of 1991. Under this law, the Mayor is not a part of the Sangguniang
Bayan, which has the authority to issue the license. This is contrary to the previous governing law (BP 337) where
the Mayor is the presiding officer.
2. Yes, Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit.
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law provides that “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the crime of violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction;
3. He either:
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in
connection with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or any law.
Moreover, Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 states that “Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary
Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…”. [Emphasis
supplied].
In this case, although he is not liable under the first mode since the Sandiganbayan found that the charge
against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center is "not well-founded" however, Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit,
which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. This is because even if the ownership of petitioner
Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon for the reason
that they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In this case, the elements of the offense charged, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit
license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or
not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
Thus, it is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting
the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged,
or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this
case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court
Facts:
Petitioners are members of PNP on special detail with the NBI. They were charged with murder for
killing the suspects during a buy-bust operation. Petitioner Jaylo was assigned to head the team that would
conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip Needham. It involves a 10-kg of
heroin. While they succeeded in the conduct of buying the said drugs from the suspects, however, versions of
the prosecution and defense diverged, particularly on the manner of the arrest. According to prosecution,
Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. According to the defense, Jaylo and his men only
retaliated when the suspects draw their firearms after a speeding blue-green car came and burst of gunfire
ensued. However, for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and the attendance of any of the alleged
qualifying circumstances, as well as the failure of the defense to prove the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed
was homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, none of the accused appeared
despite notice. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal
docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision. In the assailed Resolution,
the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the
arrest of the convicted accused. The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the
judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the
promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the
remedies available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction, including the filing of
a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the accused to appear during promulgation will lost their remedies
available under the Rules including the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
Yes, the failure of the accused to appear during promulgation without justifiable cause will lost their
remedies available under the Rules.
Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states in part: “In case the accused fails to appear at the
scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause,
he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”
Here, the promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice.
The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a
copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the
arrest of the accused ifthe judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused
shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their
possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a
judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in
court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
RULE 126 – Search and Seizure
People of the Philippines, petitioner, vs Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr., respondent
G.R. 248395 January 29, 2020
SUMMARY:
P/Supt Ajero, the OIC of Kidapawan City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant
against private respondent Gabiosa before Executive Judge Balagot, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In support of his application, Ajero attached the Affidavit of his witness, PO1 Geverola, who conducted the
entrapment operation.
Subsequently, Judge Balagot conducted his preliminary examination where he questioned only PO1
Geverola. Satisfied that there is probable cause, Judge Balagot issued the warrant. However, Gabiosa claimed
that the warrant should be quashed, because Judge Balagot only examined PO1 Geverola (witness). According
to him, the complainant must have also been examined because of the use of “and” in the constitutional
provision stating “after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.”
The RTC denied the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration. However, the CA
granted Gabiosa’s petition for certiorari and set aside the RTC ruling. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied, thus the instant petition.
FACTS:
On January 20, 2017, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero (P/Supt Ajero), OIC of
Kidapawan City Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner before
the Executive Judge Arvin Sadiri Balagot (Judge Balagot). In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero
attached the Affidavit of his witness Police Officer 1 Rodolfo Geverola (PO1 Geverola). On the basis of
said Affidavit, Judge Balagot conducted preliminary examination to PO1 Geverola. Judge Balagot then
issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 after finding a probable cause. Thereafter, said search warrant
was served against petitioner.
Gabiosa filed a Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated January 20, 2017) and Suppression of
Evidence claiming that the issuance of search warrant is grossly violative of his fundamental
constitutional and human right. The RTC denied the motion and explained that the judge was not
mandatorily required to examine both the complainant and his witness. The RTC opined that the judge
need not examine the complainant if the probable cause was already established upon examination of
one of the witnesses.
On Gabiosa’s contention that the search warrant was invalid because the questions
propounded by the judge were mere rehash of the averments in the affidavit, the RTC ruled the same
to be untenable. The RTC explained that as a requirement, the judge must examine the witness under
oath or affirmation. The rule does not prescribe what particular form of questions the judge must ask
from the witness. What is important is that the judge must satisfy himself personally that there is
probable cause to warrant the issuance of warrant of arrest. Thus, asking the witness the same
questions which will illicit the same facts as stated in his affidavit will not matter for as long as the
examination is under oath and the witness’ answers were based on his personal knowledge or
observation. Gabiosa sought reconsideration of the trials court’s denial of Motion Quash but the same
was denied.
Undeterred, Gabiosa filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash. The CA granted Gabiosa’s Petition and declared
the search warrant as null and void. In effect, the search conducted in its authority is rendered void
and any evidence gathered were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The CA reasoned
that the text of the Constitution used the work “and” instead of “or” or “and/or”, which thus “shows
its clear intent to really require both applicant and the witness to be personally examined by the
issuing judge.”
The PP, through the OSG, filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether of nor the CA erred in the granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa.
RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari considering that the RTC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in affirming the validity of the search warrant.
Under the law, a search warrant to be valid must have the following requisites: 1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; 2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; 3) the
judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
and 4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized. Jurisprudence also provides that there is no need for a judge to examine both the applicant
and the witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause.
Here, the Court ruled that the conclusion of the CA that the intent of the Constitution that both
the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined by the judge before any
warrant may be issued, is neither supported by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the
right. It is immaterial whether the judge examined the complainant only, or the witness only, and not
both the complainant and witness/es. The primordial consideration is that the judge is convinced that
there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual’s privacy. Judge Balagot was able to satisfy
this requirement upon his examination of PO1 Geverola. In addition, it would be fruitless exercise to
insist that the judge should have examined the complainant, P/Supt Ajero, as well as he admittedly did
not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that constitute the probable cause. P/Supt Ajero
was the complainant only because he was the OIC of the Kidapawan Police Station but it was never
alleged that he participated in any prior surveillance conducted. Thus, the CA erred in ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in upholding the validity of the search warrant.
(Additional Facts: According to the CA, Judge Balagot failed to propound probing and searching questions on
the witness and that the questions were superficial and perfunctory. The Court ruled however that this
conclusions are unsupported and contrary to what transpired based on the transcript of the examination.)
June 7, 2017G.R. No. 200370
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Summary:
Mario Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. According to the prosecution, a concerned
citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later
identified as Veridiano was on his way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. The chief of
police instructed to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. At around
10:00am, they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked passengers to disembark. The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officer recovered from
Veridiano a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana, which was later on tested
positive for marijuana. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He
was then brought to the police station. RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Veridiano appealed the decision of
the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA affirmed the guilt of
Veridiano. Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied. Veridiano filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Facts:
1. In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,
Mario Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
a. That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of
dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
2. On October 9, 2008 Veridiano was arraigned.
a. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
b. Trial on the merits ensured
3. According to the prosecution, at about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned
citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police
Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.
a. PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3
Alvin Vergara who were both on duty.
b. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a
checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
c. The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
d. At around 10:00am they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna.
e. They flagged down the jeepney and asked passengers to disembark.
f. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for
possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets
4. The police officer recovered from Veridiano a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana
a. PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.
b. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.
c. He was then brought to the police station.
5. At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who
also placed his initials.
6. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally
brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory.
7. The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.
RTC Ruling:
Found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana
Veridiano appealed stating that he was illegally arrested and argued that the teabag is
inadmissible as evidence for being the fruit of the poisonous tree
CA Ruling:
CA rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.
That he was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in his possession
Veridiano argues that the tea bag was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
That he was merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension.
Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
I. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.
II. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against Petitioner.
Ruling:
I. No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
There are three grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Under Rule 113 Sec. 5 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest
because he was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a
passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. Furthermore, the warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since the law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.
In People v. Aruta, the Supreme Court explained that the language of the
Constitution implies that "searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest." The requirements of a
valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Section 4 of Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
However, People v. Cogaed clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when
searches are reasonable even when warrantless." The following are recognized instances of
permissible warrantless searches laid down in jurisprudence:
(1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,"
(2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"'
(3) "search of a moving vehicle,"
(4) "consented warrantless search[es],"
(5) "customs search,"
(6) "stop and frisk," and
(7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."
In this case, since there was no lawful arrest, there could not be a valid warrantless
search incidental to the arrest since the arrest was invalid. Furthermore, petitioner in this
case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police
officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Moreover,
petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Also, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the
accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar
activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover,
the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the
accused.
RULE 126, SECTION 4
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD
Facts:
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed a Sworn Application for a
Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of
the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that
respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would
call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by
purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for
the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money
collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's personal account; 32% to the sales
office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales;
and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted
estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H.
Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents' former
employees who actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations
used by respondents in their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be searched. On 26
March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City,
issued Search Warrant No. 01-118. On 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same.
On June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was
issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under
the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that
search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Further, it failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.
On May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it violated the
requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. It
added that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo divining what
specific provision was violated by respondents; and that even estafa under the RPC contemplates
multifarious settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the application thereto as
well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in particularization. Aggrieved, petitioner,
through the OSG elevated an appeal before the CA. On September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling
of the RTC. Hence, petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void because it violates the requirement
that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only.
Ruling:
Yes, the Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void because it violates the requirement
that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only.
Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites
for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC). First, violation of the SRC is not an
offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law and the charge of "estafa
under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime. Second,
the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to
operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the
application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.
Third, the two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the other. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of
the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person
acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will
not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC is malum prohibitum, in which there is no
necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of
criminal intent is necessary. Finally, in Columbia case, the Court ruled that a search warrant which
covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. But
in this case, it is not applicable since the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state
one specific offense. It included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several
penal provisions and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways. Hence, Search Warrant
No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific offense.
G.R. No. 188794, September 02, 2015
Facts:
Pursuant to the enforcement of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, drug paraphernalia and plastic sachet containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” were found in the possession of Ogayon, Two (2) Informations were filed against him for
violations of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Relaying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. The RTC rendered a joint
judgement convicting Ogayon of the two (2) criminal charges against him.
Ogayon appealed to the CA. He questioned the validity of the search warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued
that the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination of the applicant
for search warrant and his witnesses.
Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it nevertheless upheld the
search warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection against the warrant during the trial.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant.
Held:
No, the CA did not err in finding that Ogayon has waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his
failure to make a timely objection against the search warrant's validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural rule
that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:l
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search
warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the
action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in
another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court, [emphasis ours]chanrobleslaw
We find the CA's casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over
compliance with the safeguards for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights; their
non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the constitutional
requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy
of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.