1

LANDTITS: Chapter 5 Publication, Opposition of and Default (S23) In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general
Republic of the Philippines
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official
SUPREME COURT
Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well
Manila
considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the
instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
THIRD DIVISION requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.
 
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of
1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: 8
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 
1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision
vs.
of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette,
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural.
Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court
would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land
registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
PANGANIBAN, J.:
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
land registration case mandatory or directory?
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of
Statement of the Case Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged
thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19,
1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel
anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court
from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule
registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased
and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
The Issue
surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado,
Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. abuse of discretion"10 in holding —

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private . . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No.
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes
due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued. Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of
initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in
The Facts
the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a notice requirement of due process." 11
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch
with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official
Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who
was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants. In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals
ruled:13
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed
the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the . . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it
continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
1938.
 2
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative
upon the court. since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it rem.  17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
justified its disposition in this wise:14 land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required
with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were
the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but
to make any objection of the application for registration.
the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who
institutes an action for recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title
The Court's Ruling against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can
best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world"
— who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and
We find for petitioner.
effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application
should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that
Newspaper Publication Mandatory before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and
registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice
and opportunity to oppose.
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days
due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
1. By publication. —
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, mailing and posting.
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse;
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
x x x           x x x          x x x registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms have been duly complied with.
that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No
respondents. costs.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the SO ORDERED.
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind
the publication requirement.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Manila
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a SECOND DIVISION
statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context G.R. No. 171631               November 15, 2010
in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic
vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means vs.
of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA
would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices PAZ, Respondents.
to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree,
include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land."
Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning,
 3
DECISION Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their
application.
PERALTA, J.:
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
portion of the decision states:
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of
for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R.
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration Decree.
of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon
land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan,
payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the
Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084,
issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
(Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-
D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special SO ORDERED.7
power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz
to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in
and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084)
its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed
with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No.
the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show
27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical
possession of the subject property through themselves and their
Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5)
predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the
Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual,
June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept
Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the
of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that
subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public land
respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the
appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer,
subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for
public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
the year 2003 has been paid.

I
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18,
1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE
claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession
of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987.
Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they,
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the II
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more
than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF
the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS
WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, DOMAIN.9
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners,
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is
period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The
and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent Doctrine.
and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for;
and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to
belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for
present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious,
the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the application.
continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations,
Default6 against the whole world except as against the Republic. dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued
 4
in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable
presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not
taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that
survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally,
respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under
Rule 45.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan
The petition is meritorious.
stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act
misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 11 the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
the public domain.
indeed alienable and disposable.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court
Decree provides:
held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.
In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been
kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12,
certification from the proper government agency to establish that the
1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than
subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
clear, positive and convincing evidence.13
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the
subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. 20
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However,
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or their testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-
claim) is alienable or disposable.15 interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that
since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
of this case belonged to them. 22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about the
00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234,
same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
land.24
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City
began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose
on Jan. 03, 1968.
testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents
Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced. Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of
acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same
on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the
a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and
factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. 25 An
subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and
applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions
 5
of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines,
land.26 from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration
issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to
1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of
What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for
by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide registration over the lots in question.
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad.
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before
s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San
June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest
Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any
other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 28 citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear
picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors- An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have
in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision
possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said
was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over
domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now
thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street,
earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9,
property under PD 1529 should be denied. Canada.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as
represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of
twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based
situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED. on the following ratiocination:

SO ORDERED. In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still
Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its
former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of
private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the
rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid
for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant
action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been
passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought
Republic of the Philippines to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
SUPREME COURT The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of
Manila title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of
EN BANC Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to
the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership
over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional
  prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact
that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994 taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land
in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11,
1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's
DE VEGA, respondents. approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents. Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been
filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not

BIDIN, J.: acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
 6
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now
Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for
occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title
would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding,
xxx xxx xxx
the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

As found by the trial court:
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona- to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the (Emphasis supplied)
confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are
sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them
As amended by PD 1073:
to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26) Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only
means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan"
a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of
duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978
title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said
(Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in
period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents'
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945,
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land
citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in
sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required
1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them.
length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired
(Rollo, p., 27)
by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in
turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937.
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-
and argues: interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA
tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before
evidence of ownership. (citing cases) the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents)
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director
possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court,
NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987),
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .

The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner,
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act 
possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
what the law provides. petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141)
land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
reads:
under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
 7
x x x           x x x          x x x In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of
the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
reversed.
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent. This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do
considering possession of public land which is of the character and not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory
duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real"
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil.
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
890 [1946]):
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
(Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA
of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the
602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than
Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212
30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on
U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the
such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
(National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
interest began in 1880.

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
Court, supra)
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that
the Director of Lands to dispose of. (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both
Cariñ o and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for
the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178
the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149
SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals,
SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a
able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-
certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have
interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-
possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and
interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements
disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive
thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit
averments.
executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally
offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to
sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and
was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land
Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry
interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their
imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of
ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis. which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which
he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession
was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
We disagree.
 8
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
xxx xxx xxx purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional
urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those
already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their
authorized.
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered
by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will
and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other
— in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what
the Cariñ o and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino
died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground
they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties
relied upon in their application . . .
as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could
be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in
xxx xxx xxx view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be
registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation
before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested
thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.
right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to
a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
merely because they were American citizens at the time of their
application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land,
their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in
were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer
such a manner that the property has been segregated from public
and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens,
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time
they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is
important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their
held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for
addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong registration of title must perforce be approved.
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapiñ as mother.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,
must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact to Section 6, which provides:
that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under
this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be province or city where the property is located a sworn statement
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the
mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his
intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen;
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
Act.
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to
apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang application for registration of title before a land registration court should
Pambansa may provide. not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court
approving the application for registration has become final that a decree
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the
of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of
relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by
the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration,
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the
a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to
or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. be issued.
In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from SO ORDERED.10
is hereby AFFIRMED.
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is
SO ORDERED. alienable and disposable and that he complied with the requirements of
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-
Manila entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was able
to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is
within the area considered by the Department of Environment and
SECOND DIVISION Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
G.R. No. 171514               July 18, 2012
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous,
vs. adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent. law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land
Registration Act.11

Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosa’s failure to prove that

his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period
DECISION required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabel’s
possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier
REYES, J.: as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa
came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that
transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision 1 dated in his name was for the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa
November 11, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated February 13, 2006 of the and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456. than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such
possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application 3 for Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa’s failure to present the original
land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his
meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines 13 and
support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission
Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of
as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he the land subject of the application.15
purchased the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July
4, 1970 and the latter’s other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and
(c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey
property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years. plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.16
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-000893 4 
to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and
and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that
survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañ ez, Chief of the Map Projection possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it
Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to
2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within private. Thus:
Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax
declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabel’s name – Tax The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:
Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 – to prove that she had been in
possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had
been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully
presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of established valid title over the subject land and that he and his
the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and
years 1978, 1980 and 1985 – Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more
010717 .8 than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established
jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
Petitioner opposed Espinosa’s application, claiming that: (a) Section jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that
Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosa’s predecessor- occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his
in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate
tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs.
predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
required by law.

b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment 9 granting Espinosa’s latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141),
petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which states: but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result in
inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over
Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay Cabangahan, "Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact
and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more." 17
Section 39, P.D. 1529.
 10
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary a) whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially
evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
and location of the property can be established by other competent
evidence.

Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While

b) whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the
the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes may
geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that
be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission,
the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration
on the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October Our Ruling
10, 1986). The said case provides further:
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa’s application
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b)
to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence
necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate
against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where
This Court is of a different view.
no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been shown
by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were
found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs Based on Espinosa’s allegations and his supporting documents, it is
of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained therein." patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is
based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation
to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra¸ the
and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or
Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the
earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary,
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and
cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory
that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for
requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to
thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should
one’s application for registration. However, such pronouncement need
have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases
without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of the tracing
cloth plan. Sec. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
x x x: x x x x

xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by
other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the
advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499, (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the under the provision of existing laws.
lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused. 18
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts’ disposition of
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property this case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes
is alienable and disposable: that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of
the PLA originally states:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the
duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
domain.19 confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its
Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006. xxxx

Petitioner’s Case (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CA’s assailed
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since
decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D.
No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory
to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of
blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.
identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the
Director of Lands.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of
the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial
Issues confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:

The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
following issues: claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
 11
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
The CA’s reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 23 
is misplaced considering that the application therein was filed on October
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said
for possession and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 24 The
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of petition for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that
P.D. No. 1073 states: time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48(b) as
amended by R.A. No. 1942.
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 25 the applicants therein entered into
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and filed their application on
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. in-interest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the
effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the
prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement
prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
for possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted
period was already completed.
under Section 14(1) thereof.

Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section

P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower courts
under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No.
held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that
1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back
Isabel’s possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945.
to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been
That in view of the established fact that Isabel’s alleged possession and
acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073.
occupation started much later, the lower courts should have dismissed
That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already
Espinosa’s application outright.
been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied
because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v. In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text
Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as follows: of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were instances wherein
applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably,
However, as petitioner Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and
such reason does not obtain in this case.
occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran
from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and
doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only
operation of law, then upon Abejaron’s satisfaction of the requirements private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles
of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. public use, public service or intended for the development of national
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official declaration to
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, prescription:
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public
for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this
48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations omitted)
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to
title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property
the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis supplied)
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for
two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated development of the national wealth or that the property has been
under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the application. acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.27
in-interest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30)
years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is nothing
on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied
of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not
possession and occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly
contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabel’s name was for the year alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held
 12
by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s
observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
12, 1945. For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no
longer earmarked for public service or the development of national
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at
domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners
least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation
alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
prior to the conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not
be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period.
Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the Therefore, even if Espinosa’s application may not be dismissed due to his
development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are
disposable, possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced
ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of
State’s if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier. the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic
engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services
(LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the
the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who
survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would
conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v.
overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable
Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can
public domain.
be established by other competent evidence apart from the original
tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of technical description:
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and
as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof
property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
by pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
plan and a duly executed technical description of the property—which
claim) is alienable or disposable.28
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits
and extent of the property sought to be registered. 33
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in
Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as
engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the
evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of the property
positive government act that would remove the property from the
applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, 34 this
controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and sufficient
to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the domain as follows:
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No.
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
part of the inalienable public domain. PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as
declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or the President’s proclamation
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
record.1â wphi1 These facts must be established to prove that the land is
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
alienable and disposable.35 (Citation omitted)
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits
of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No.
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the
are owned by the State. . . ."
other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to
prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the
case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
application for registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New)
 13
located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED for appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. proceedings.5

SO ORDERED. Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and
received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently
presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a
Republic of the Philippines Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and
SUPREME COURT ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Manila Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941
SECOND DIVISION Decision.1avvphi1.net

G.R. No. 159595             January 23, 2007 The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in
main that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed.
The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before
vs. the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent. by the appellate court in its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision,
the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of
judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special"
proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also
DECISION noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first
request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had
TINGA, J.: been established that the original records in the 1941 case had already
been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether
prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the
registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches
Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the
unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought
rulings of the courts below. within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8 Further,
Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that
a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be
Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations. 9 It bears
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941
on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees.
rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned Neither does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or
as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the otherwise still belonged to the State.
decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,
together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors
who had established their title to their respective lots and their The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of
continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government
decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because
lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to the judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years
Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on
Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3 Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the
other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the
eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after
Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her the judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent
undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners'
the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.
adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses
Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of
Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more
evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters
Spouses Abierra.4 the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the
statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case." 12
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a
possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of
registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for
Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
issued by the Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a
the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
of 1941. proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory
is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
(OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
 14
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue,
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a the decree of registration.
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No.
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments;
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of
hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding
1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the
to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in
party desires to oust him therefrom.
order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to PD No. 1529 reads:
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall,
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
xxx
certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from
entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title
issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration
filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land
ordered to be registered.14 Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title
shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with
the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.
inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5)
years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar,
et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above- applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title.
cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that
Court some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to
emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras 17and Manlapas and issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court
Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the
subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause
the land never prescribes.19 the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof
to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the
officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the
discretion of amendment or review.
rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been
repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier,
the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in
namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, 20 Cacho v. Court of the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party
Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow
decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real
employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional
doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
(5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to
land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration
whenever practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes
Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become
that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From
final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by
Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that
the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there
current arguments of the Republic.
would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar
circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds
not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The
Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with
such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is
by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic
proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains
consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of
by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of
decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed
effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to
 15
bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have
allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to
sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez.
prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the
registration. judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of
registration over the same property accorded to a different party.
The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of
judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is
Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and
homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by
laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was
a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as
intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any
well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the
express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed
continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25
by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that
marked both Sta. Ana and the present case.
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal
viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise
rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say,
from an original action for land registration, but from a successful motion
those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing
by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to
of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches
a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose
bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case,
in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that
especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified,
prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in
whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This
the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately
qualifier stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general
peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the
rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.
issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and
the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an
observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the
years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to
perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale the adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that
provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of
the State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that
the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the a final decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very
filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a
the applicability of the rules of prescription. defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this
faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not
dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent
susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration
on still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the
notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-
proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a
interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay,
corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court
following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration
to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land
Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all that
registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was
Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the
promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule
original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her
in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original
prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu court and the
proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property
involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the
registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a
Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.
different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a
decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24 On the other
hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in
the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of
SO ORDERED.
certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches
arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final
judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two
(2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as
guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the execution of the Republic of the Philippines
judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score. SUPREME COURT
Manila

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title
are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in SECOND DIVISION
part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the
petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title G.R. No. 168913             March 14, 2007
pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have
stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches
of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, 
diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their vs.
inability to oppose the other application for registration or to seek HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA,
enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5) -year AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A.
reglementary period. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma

that negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract
from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the DECISION
judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have
entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already
been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 16
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No.
N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not
of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of
Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of
of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having
claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and
all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29,
by the Land Management Services of
1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982
directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court;
Lirio. and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for
they instead submitted to the court a mere special work order. 11
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. 1 Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration
court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was
its duty.
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio,
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David,
Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch 21 officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling attention to the December 10, sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be
1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in
on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and
issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary
ground of res judicata. 31ªvvphi1.né t
and cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in
Court reading:
LRC No. 1437-N.

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and

Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 4 it
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as
The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; 5and as no action
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of
statute of limitations[,]
the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment passé [d] into extinction."6
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
of res judicata.7

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule

The petition fails.
39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
Decree provides:
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28,
1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – UNENFORCEABLE.
The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory
court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers
entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied) to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
registration proceedings, the
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. 10

ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be

The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed
court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and
is binding on the whole world including petitioner. by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party
 17
had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an
oust him therefrom. Order dated August 3, 2010 setting the case for hearing on August 3,
2011 and ordering the requisite publication thereof. Since no oppositors
appeared before the court during the said scheduled hearing, the RTC
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
issued another Order6 setting the case for hearing on petitioner’s
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
presentation of evidence.
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. following documents, among others, as proof of his claim:

1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA);
2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot No.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, 922;
DENIED. 3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate of
title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been issued;9
4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap with
Deed of Donation;
5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar indicating
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting. that the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax Declarations for Lot No.
922 since 1948;
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002;
7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and
SO ORDERED. 8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is no existing public land
application for Lot No. 922.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT, Manila In its September 20, 2011 Order,13 the RTC admitted petitioner’s
THIRD DIVISION evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

G.R. No. 231116 February 7, 2018 RTC Ruling

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
… Petitioner The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was
versus able to prove his ownership and possession over Lot No. 922. As such, it
CLARO YAP granted the petition and ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of
… Respondent Cebu to cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new copy thereof, and on the
basis of such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in the name
DECISION of Andres Abellana, as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The
dispositive portion of the October 20, 2011 Decision states:
VELASCO, JR, J:
Nature of the Case
WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of the petitioner Claro
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Yap. The Land Registration Authority thru the Register of Deeds of the
the Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of
Province of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the October 20,
November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new copy thereof in the name of
2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6,
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez, and on
granting respondent’s petition for registration of a parcel of land located
the bases of the new copy of Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original
in Carcar, Cebu.
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres Abellana,
as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.
The Facts
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition3 for
Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the petitioner, Claro
cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of
Yap, with the re-issued copy of Decree No. 99500 and the copy of its title
the Carcar Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding Original
upon payment of any appropriate fees.
Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. His petition
SO ORDERED 
alleged the following:

Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under the
1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34) square meters is covered
name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion for
by Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of
Reconsideration15 stating that the new decree and OCT should be issued
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez;
under his name instead of Andres Abellana.
2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon Yap by virtue of
On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
inheritance and donation and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
(OSG), filed its Comment16 mainly arguing that Yap’s petition and motion
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
should be denied since the Republic was not furnished with copies
said lot since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription
thereof.
being possessors in good faith in the concept of an owner for more than
thirty (30) years;
In its Joint Order dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied Yap’s motion
ruling that the law provides that the decree, which would be the basis for
3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922, based on the
the issuance of the OCT, should be issued under the name of the original
certification from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, there is
adjudicate. Likewise, the RTC also denied the OSG’s motion finding that
no showing or proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the said lot;
the records of the case show that it was furnished with copies of the
Petition as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs
of Porfirio Yap; and
The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap’s
petition should have been denied due to insufficiency of evidence and
5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting Lot No. failure to implead indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan
922, or any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, Rodriguez and/or Andres Abellana.
in possession, reversion or expectancy, other than Yap.
CA Ruling
 18
In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla, the Court elucidated the raison
In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC’s ruling finding d’etre why the statue of limitations and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
that the pieces of evidence submitted by Yap were sufficient to support Court do not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
the petition. It ruled that since it has been established that no
certification of title or patent had been issued over Lot No. 922, the RTC We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
did not err in ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 in the name above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
As regards the OSG’s argument on non-joinder of indispensable parties, enforce the judgment, which may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and
the CA highlighted that it is not a ground for dismissal of an action. after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
Nevertheless, it ruled that the heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
Rodriguez were not deprived of the opportunity to be heard as the proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
proceeding before the RTC was an in rem proceeding. Thus, when the civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
petition was published, all persons including the said heirs were deemed the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
notified. reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by the OSG on establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings,
appeal, it also noted that it was too late to raise the same due to the the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
latter’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
or submit a comment on the merits of Yap’s Partial Motion for judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October
20, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, in LRC REC. NO.
Lot No. 922, Cad. 30, Carcar City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
SO ORDERED.
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially the same adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
arguments but this time also advancing the theory that Yap’s action had further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
already prescribed.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
The Issue
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A
DECREE OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the RTC APPELLEES BASED ON A DECISION WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET
correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re- BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN
issuance thereof, and the issuance of the corresponding Original BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 922.
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the
The Court’s Ruling law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue
We deny the petition. a decree. The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the
At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot be raised for second assignment error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in
the first time on appeal; the general rule being that the appellate court is character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the
not authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised adverse party.Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty
in the courts below. both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the
court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case. therefore has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the whom the land is ordered to be registered. (Emphasis supplied)
court may order or issue a decree
The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos
The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied due to Yap v. de Banuvar and reiterated by the Court in the more recent Ting v. Heirs
and his predecessors’ failure to file the proper motion to execute Decree of Diego Lirio wherein We ruled that a final judgment confirming land
No. 99500 as prescribed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.It title and ordering its registration constitutes res judicata against the
also subscribes that the petition is now barred by the statute of whole world and the adjudicate need not file a motion to execute the
limitations since nine (9) decades had already passed after the issuance same, thus:
of the said decree in November 1920 without any action brought upon by
Yap or his predecessors-in-interest. In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private
land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that Decree No. 99500 title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
has attained finality and the decision granting the issuance thereof was registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
not appealed or modified. whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
The foregoing arguments are specious. period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.

Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on November 29, The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu pursuant to the court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
court’s decision in Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and
58. The issuance of the said decree creates a strong presumption that the is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and executory. Thus, it
is incumbent upon the OSG to prove otherwise. However, no evidence xxx
was presented to support its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case
No. 1 and the issuance of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality. The December 10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been confirmed by within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
judicial declaration several decades ago does not, however, give room for
the application of the statute of limitations or laches, nor bars an For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the
application for the re-issuance of the corresponding decree. rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been
repeatedly affirmed. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the
Property Registration Law32 from the time decisions in land registration
 19
cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. because it contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If
From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by the old decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 corresponding OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present
Rules of Civil Procedure. Administrator while the decree upon which it was based shall bear the
signature of the past Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear
The propriety of cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500, intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the
to serve as basis for the issuance of an OCT covering Lot No. 922, had decree of registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old
been sufficiently proven in the instant case decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.

The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap’s petition is not barred xxx
by the statute of limitations, the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 is still
improper due to the total lack of evidence presented before the court. 4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in
representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still
We disagree. be under the name of the original adjudicate.

At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by enumerating and It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the
discussing in detail, yet again, the pieces of evidence proffered in the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent. The
instant case. This matter had already been passed upon and settled by heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be
the courts a quo and it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence prohibited from filing the necessary petition.
all over again. Yet, even if We take a second look at the facts of the case,
the Court is still inclined to deny the petition. As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the
new decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be the same as that
Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 of the original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor
was issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as modified; hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicate.
Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
during the proceedings before the court that no OCT was ever issued
covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. Based from the foregoing, the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of
152935 or the “Property Registration Decree” provides that the original Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its original
is, therefore, a need to cancel the old decree and a new one issued in adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
order for the decree and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other. Rodriguez.

In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez,36 the Court enunciated the necessity of Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings and the
the petition for cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, if no ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show that the CA’s decision was
OCT had been issued pursuant to the old decree: arbitrarily made or that evidence on record was disregarded.

1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED The Decision
cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and for dated March 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491 is
issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree. hereby AFFIRMED.

In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R SO ORDERED.
No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy
of filing a petition for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of
such decree and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued Republic of the Philippines
decree. SUPREME COURT
Manila
“Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to
admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the EN BANC
matter to his Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P.
Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the G.R. No. 123346               March 31, 2009
lower court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to
hear it as one for re-issuance of decree under the following guidelines:
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) CORPORATION, Petitioners, 
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and vs.
the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to reissue the
decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
respondents being heard in their opposition.
G.R. No. 134385               March 31, 2009
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept
the amended petition subject to the private respondent’s being given the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner, 
already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert vs.
existing evidence shall be given the parties.” HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA
may be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR,
same is valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
dispute that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some MALABON, Respondents.
instances, a copy of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether
or not an OCT is issued pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, RESOLUTION
why is there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?

TINGA, J.:
Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD
1529 which states that: “The original certificate of title shall be a true
copy of the decree of registration.” This provision is significant
 20
In the Court’s Resolution dated 14 December 2007, 1 the Court constituted into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry our
a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the instant case on jurisdiction into effect.
remand. The Special Division was composed of three Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would
Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate
not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the
Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructed the Special
Court’s action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In
Division to proceed as follows:
any event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed
Report and discusses its other substantive segments which are not
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the quoted.
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the
Resolution.
issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis
for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the
Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based
I.
on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be
presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the
Special Division in its Report.
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title
to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as
recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they DIMSON v. ARANETA
are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
and Araneta? [SC-G.R. No. 134385]

iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz- On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then
Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they Court of First Instance ["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for
are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in Recovery of Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7
favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included
Manotoks? Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.

iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is
expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 the absolute owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo.
on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169,
acquired by the Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly,
its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation. DIMSON had transferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ
by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November
1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the
discovered that the subject property was being occupied by
conflicting claims of title should prevail.
ARANETA wherein an "agricultural school house" is erected
and that despite repeated demands, the latter refused to
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvements
Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with thereon.
Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and
SO ORDERED.2 countered that it is the absolute owner of the land being
claimed by DIMSON and that the real properties in the
Araneta Compound are "properly documented and validly
The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with
titled." It maintained that it had been in possession of the
the Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty
subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims
Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok
of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly barred by
Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of
prescription.
Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were
directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in
Report3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted evidence, among others, certifications from the Land
the sealed Report to this Court. Registration Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and
26538, covering the disputed property, are in the names of
ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered
Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary
TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered
matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion beseeching
owner of the land described therein.
that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that they may
submit their comments and objections thereon in accord with the
principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court." We deny the On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision
motion. upholding the title of DIMSON over the disputed property xxx

It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court
Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was
Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case later consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the
to a commissioner "by written consent of both parties," whereas in the inter-related issues of the two cases.
cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the consent of the
parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-
Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the
G.R. CV No. 41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of
adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power
DIMSON finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed
under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of
land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals
proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry
likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the
 21
Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and allegedly covered an approximate area of 19,565.43 square
Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, which declared null and meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred
void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994 to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de
registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA Venta dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261,
failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be covering an area of 871,982 square meters was issued in the
nullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that would name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso.
warrant the annulment thereof.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261,
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for was issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was
Reconsideration And/Or New Trial espousing therein as later replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children.
basis for its entreaty the various letters from different The property was then subdivided and as a result of which,
government agencies and Department order No. 137 of the seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six (6),under the
Department of Justice, among others. names of each of the children while the remaining title was
held by all of them as co-owners.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were
denied by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court Eventually, the properties covered by said seven
ordered DIMSON to maintain status quo until the finality of certificates of title were expropriated by the Republic of the
the aforesaid judgment. Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided by
the National Housing Authority ["NHA"], into seventy-seven
(77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified vendees. As it
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the
turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of
Supreme Court. Refuting the factual finding of the trial court
these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was
and the Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there in
purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3
May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the
Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon
there were subsequent certifications issued by the agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a
government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ commission composed of three commissioners tasked to
Committee Report and the Senate Committees’ Joint Report resolve the conflict in their respective titles. Accordingly, the
which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had created Commission convened on the matter in dispute.
been issued on 3 May 1917.1avvphi1
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San
CLT v. MANOTOK Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report
["THE MAJORITY REPORT"] finding that there were inherent
technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211,
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
from which the MANOTOKS derived their titles (also on TCT
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro
Victoriano submitted his Individual Final Report ["THE
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial MINORITY REPORT"] dated 23 October 1993.
Court ["RTC"] A COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer
Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages
After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the
against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro
parties filed their respective comments/objections thereto.
Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN
Upon order of the trial court, the parties filed their respective
RD"].
memoranda.

In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered

Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report,
owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City
the RTC, on 10 May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 177013, a
CLT and ordered, among others, the cancellation of the
derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary
certificates of title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988, it had
acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I.
Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on
Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITO’s title was , in turn, a direct appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28
transfer from DIMSON, the registered owner of TCT No. September 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of a Decision, except as to the award of damages which was
Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court of First deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, but
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557. said motion was denied by said appellate court in its
Resolution dated 8 January 1996. After the denial of their
Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a Petition
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the
for Review before the Supreme Court.
validity of their titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No.
994 covering over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a
portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
contented that the title of CLT was an offspring of an
ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review,
by way of attorney’s fees to its predecessor-in- interest, Jose
separately filed by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Niñ o
B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this connection, further
Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., ["STO. NIÑ O"], were
contended that the portion of Lot 26, subject of the present
consolidated.
controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro
Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there was nothing
more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court
conveyed to Dimson. were the report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28
August 1997 and the Senate Committee Report No. 1031
dated 25 May 1998 which concluded that there was only one
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the
OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on 3 May
MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT
1917.
No. 994, had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and
Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue of an
Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210
 22
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE CLT EVIDENCE
SUPREME COURT 2005 DECISION"], the Supreme Court,
through its Third Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and
In its Offer of Evidence, 5 CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared the titles
testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the case filed by CLT
of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
against STO. NIÑ O in Civil Case No. C-15491, ["CLT-STO NIÑ O CASE"].
These pieces of evidence include, among others, the Majority and
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of the
and ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the evidence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIÑ O CASE
factual and legal findings of the trial courts, which had consisting of various certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer, tax
heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles. declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of
Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed correspondence.
by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the
fact that the same were accorded the highest degree of
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
respect and, generally, should not be disturbed on appeal.

The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate and

Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because
DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued to them and their
the Supreme Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within
vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the Gonzalezes,
its function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita
weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax declarations and
parties.
real property tax receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville
Development & Housing Corporation; ["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case No.
THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION 15045; this Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between
CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and
16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and the billing statements of SSHG Law
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their
Office. They also submitted in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental
respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court
Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix
2005 Decision.
B. Lerio, Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a
copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT
Office of the Solicitor General ["OSG"] intervening on behalf No. 177013 of CLT.6
of the Republic, the Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14
December 2007 ["THE SUPREME CCOURT 2007
DIMSON EVIDENCE
RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and
categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917,
which was the basis of the propriety claims of CLT and In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence, 7 DIMSON submitted the
DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to these cases, various
the cases to this Special Division of the Court of Appeals for certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision
reception of evidence. plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia
showing the relative positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the
Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of
between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture;
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following
copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some of the titles held by
binding conclusions:
ARANETA; several letter-requests and official receipts.

"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the

ARANETA EVIDENCE
record, that mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date
which should be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title,
It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT No. 26538;
No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. 13574. It also marked in
on (19)* April 1917, although such dated cannot be considered evidence the certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and
as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land Registration
Commission and the Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of
Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified
dated (19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent.
true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574
The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference
in the name of ARANETA; certifications issued by Atty. Josephine H.
to an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the
Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of Malabon city-Navotas; certified
validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This
true copy of Judge Palma’s Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557;
error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and
Circular No. 17 (which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as
CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is
of 19 February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owner’s duplicate
placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective
copy of OCT No. 994.89
titles.

III.
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the
cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to determine the
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in following issues based on the evidence:
MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims to
setting the same as or similar to that at bar.4
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May 1917:

II.
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and
Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court 2005 Decision, are borne by
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said
before the Special Division. The Report names the evidence submitted to claims?
the Special Division for its evaluation:
 23
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muñ oz- We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear
Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated
they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject 19 April 1917.
properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of
the Araneta and the Manotoks?
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayo’s Order dated 18 October dated
18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos.
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate.
expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 Pertinently, with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot
on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the titles 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the
acquired by the Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its instrument.
title acquired by the government through expropriation?
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the 19th day of April in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the
conflicting claims of title should prevail. Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume NA  page NA  , as Original Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No. ______
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals
was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to
claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA,
thereto. One set of properties was disputed between CLT and the which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is
Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the concerned.14
Heirs of Dimson.
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now disputed Lot
order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the
Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to certificate of title issued to DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the
register in his name properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as
Sayo’s order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge the OCT which they emanated had already been declared inexistent. 15
(later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muñ oz-Palma of the CFI of
Rizal. Dimson’s titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any
19 April 1917.10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare
explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April 1917.
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169,
At the same time, it rejected CLT’s explanation that the transcription of
which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by
the erroneous date was a "typographical error."
TCT No. 13574 and 26538.11 Araneta was then and still is in possession of
the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title, OCT No. 994
dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-
possession against Araneta. interest CLT, had failed to present evidence before this Court to prove
that there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of
their respective titles with regard to the date of registration of OCT No.
Another property in Dimson’s name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the
994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been a
Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the
typographical error in the transcription of its title. 16 On the other hand,
same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-
while DIMSON had refused to categorically assert that there had been
177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19
such a typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their
April 1917.12 Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property
failure to proffer any reason or argument which would otherwise justify
covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their
why their title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court
titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting,
to conclude that they simply had no basis to support their proprietary
as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.1avvphi1
claim.

It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the
on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their
erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT 994, DIMSON are left
claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that
without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings before
evidence not presented during the proceedings below, which would
the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the
effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the
opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims to title based
disputed properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had
on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT
previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity of
No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division:
their title.17

Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT

Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly
refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that their previous
constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was allegedly
postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the
sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muñ oz Palma. On that issue, the
supposed validity of their titles, that which emanated from OCT 994 of 19
Special Division made the following determinations:
April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the
Supreme Court has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims
on the basis of other evidentiary proofs: It should be recalled that in their appellee’s brief in CA-G.R.CV No. 41883,
therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied the falsity of TCT No. R-
15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can be
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this
determined by a controlling decision."18 Jose Dimson expounded on his
special proceedings, by way of the evidence already presented before and
reliance as follows:
such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there
had only been an error in the course of the transcription or registration
of their derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to "In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case,
validate or substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on Jose B. Dimson’s (as private respondent) title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot
19 April 1917.13 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917,
is overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940
derived from the same OCT 994, registered on May 3, 1917.
Were they able to discharge such burden?

(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson’ (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT
A.
No. R-15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978, is overlapping with
 24
defendant-appellant’s title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought
OCT No. 994."19 here, I checked the records, there were so many pages missing and the
pages were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there
is a certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo.
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or
annotation on their respective certificates of title, the present inquiry
then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Atty. Directo:
Judge Cecilia Muñ oz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil
Case No. 4557 ["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayo’s Order dated 18
That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised
October 1977 ["SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be validated and
why it is missing.
authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary claims of both
DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
Court:
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD
ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit: We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muñ oz Palma.

"Whether the factual and legal bases of Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order Atty. Contreras:
and Sayo’s 18 October 1977 Order are true and valid. Assuming they
are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject
May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our
properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims
original vault LRC application no. N-4557 but the applications were
of Araneta and the Manotoks?"
certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leañ o involving Navotas property
because I was wondering why they have the same number. There should
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced be only one.
from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point out that their title was
issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557
Atty. Directo:
and entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994.
DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere
microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number?
DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities which voided the titles of
the ARANETA in the previous proceedings and focused on the burden of
Atty. Contreras:
ARANETA to present evidence to defeat their titles.

No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. As
petition after decree record.
we see it, Sayo’s 18 October 1977 Order, which apparently confirmed
Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of
the manner by which it was arrived at. Atty. Ignacio:

It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case.
ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Clerk of
Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No. 4557 xxxxxx
for purposes of determining the genuineness and authenticity of the
signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order granting the confirmation.
A certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, appeared Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palma’s 13 June
and manifested in open court that the records pertaining to the petition 1966 Order had been recalled by a subsequent Order dated 16 August
for Substitution of names of Bartolome Rivera, et al. could no longer be 1966, ["RECALL ORDER"],21 wherein the trial court dismissed the motion
located inasmuch as they had passed hands from one court to another. filed by DIMSON on the court’s findings that " x x x whatever portion of
the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed of by the
previous registered owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records Bartolome Rivera and his assignees, as a result of which there is no portion
of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that he had not seen the that is left to be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson."
original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on
the Order duly proven because all that was presented was an unsigned
duplicate copy with a stamped notation of "original signed." Equally However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution
perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file of the Recall Order considering that its original or even a certified true
pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil case. 20 Thus: copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying
on it despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so.
"Atty. Directo:
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever
issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the DIMSON titles over the
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that
Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to determine the genuineness the supposed "share" went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson
and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that
which order was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose
the reason why we want to see the genuineness of the signature of Judge Dimson of "25% of whatever share of Bartolome Rivera has over Lots 25,
Palma. 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject to availability of undisposed
portion of the said lots."22
COURT:
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that, based on the
duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original signed. assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and "(C)onsidering that
the share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent
of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of
Atty. Directo:
Vidal will inherit only 197, 405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x
1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their share. 23 Even if we are to base the
That is the reason why we want to see the original. 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would
appear that Jose Dimson would only be entitled to more or less five
(5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on TCT No.
Court:
15169 of Dimson which covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000
 25
square meters),24 it is undisputable that the total properties eventually of Jose Dimson was to establish his ownership over the subject parcels of
transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the subject of the case was the
share. confirmation of Jose Dimson’s claim over the purported rights of Rivera
in the disputed properties. The case did not partake of the nature of a
registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the
What is more, Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that "x x
requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land registration case,
x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose Dimson, the same
therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action before Judge Sayo to seek
shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land
"confirmation" of Palma’s Order dated 13 June 1966.
Registration Commission as correct and in accordance with previous
orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this court
for final approval. So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the
statute of limitations in land registration cases, 30 as well as Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not submit
judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or
Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268 which allegedly was
extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases, is clearly not
the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove that the same
applicable in the present case. The legal consequences of laches as
had been duly approved and certified correct by the Land Registration
committed by DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of Rule
Commission. What was submitted before the RTC and this Court was only
39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the
the Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the stamp
confirmation of DIMSON’s title, if any, should fail.
of approval of the LRC. Even an inspection of the exhibit for CLT does not
bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at the very least, proven the
authenticity of the DIMSON title. Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they
derive the validity of their certificates of title from the decreased Jose
Dimson’s 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera
Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in proving
["RIVERA"] as an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"].
the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of the allegation of contending
However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of
parties that since the survey plan upon which the land titles were based
Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land
contained the notation "SWO," meaning that the subdivision plan was
Registration
only a product of a "special work order," the same could not have passed
the LRC. Neither was it duly certified by the said office. 25
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old
on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities
and 4496).31 It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years
attending Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169.
old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other
hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not
originally surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911, October 4-21 and ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Rivera’s alleged grandmother, was
November 17-18, 1911." Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts
original survey is reflected as "Sept. 8-27, 1911" and nothing more. 26 The existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim
variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSON’s titles are all a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.32
direct transfers from OCT No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully
adopted the mother lot’s data. Unfortunately, no explanation for the
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice
variance was ever offered.
Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007
Resolution. To wit:
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates
that not only was the date of original registration inexistent, but the
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate
remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been presented
with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT
prior to the issuance of the said transfer certificate. This manifest from
No. R-17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the
the notations "NA" on the face of DIMSON’s title meaning, "not available."
other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-
It bears emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to
15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was
the purchaser without the production of the owner’s duplicate is illegal
supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on
(Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer any right to the
April 19, 1917.
purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]).
The Registrar of Deeds must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or
voluntary instrument if the owner’s duplicate is not presented in Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that
connection therewith. (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated
Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927]. 27 October 18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement which
admitted the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September
2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title
the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in
emanating from one common original certificate of title were issued on
Civil Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25%
different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it
of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were
would be safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier
undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de
date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of
la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the
registration.28 Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to include the
properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed
same land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive registration,
by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate
and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder or whose claim is derived directly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No.
thereof. x x x"29 994, particularly the following entries, showed:

xxx AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: Queda cancelado el presente

Certificado en cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93
metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No.
el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P
25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly confirming the
Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el
Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de
filed the Motion only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after
Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22.
obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name.
Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge
Palma was not a simple land registration case wherein the only purpose Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 29, 1918
 26
Fecha de la inscripcion — September 9, 1918 Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the
MANOTOKS failed to submit "new" competent evidence and,
therefore, dwelling on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOK’s
10.50 AM
titles, "the findings and conclusions of the court-appointed
commissioners as adopted by the trial court, then upheld by
AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: — Queda cancelado el presente the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995
Certficado el cuanto a una extencion superficial de 871,982.00 and finally affirmed in the Supreme Court’s Decision dated 29
metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de November 2005, therefore stand, as there is no reason to
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con disturb them."
Deogracias Quinones el segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha
expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Libro T-
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge
22.
Palma and Judge Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of
their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered
Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 25, 1918 by the MANOTOKS’ titles and those covered by the
expropriation proceedings did not property pertain to and
were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains
Fecha de la inscripcion – September 9, 1918
that the MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of
their titles the expropriation undertaken by the Government
10:50- AM as a means of staking their claims.

Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of
has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total land covered by TCT No. T-177013 36 located in Malabon,
area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Caloocan City and designated as "Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC
Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made Swo-5268." TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is
on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim,
undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Estelita Hipoloto executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of
had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not this transfer, Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17994 37 was cancelled and
transmit anything to CLT. in lieu thereof, CLT’s TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-
17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the
deceased Dimson who was allegedly the registered owner of
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No.
the subject land on the basis of TCT No. 15166.
26 of the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of
title was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land
Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd- In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the
5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a
How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON
therefore perplexing, to say the least. necessarily upended CLT’s propriety claims. As earlier
highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the strength of
Hipolito’s title and that of DIMSON’s TCT No. 15166.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside
Remarkably and curiously though, TCT No. 15166 was never
by the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for
presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of
the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens
titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand
system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply
proceedings remain damning to CLT’s claim of ownership.
disregarded them.33

Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried

The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the
annotations identical to those of DIMSON and consequently
validity of Jose Dimson’s titles, which he obtained consequent to the 1977
included the defects in DIMSON’s title, the fact that whatever
Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition
typographical errors were not at anytime cured by
to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by
subsequent compliance with the administrative
Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge
requirements or subjected to administrative correction
Muñ oz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
bolsters the invalidity of the CLT title due to its complete and
sole dependence on the void DIMSON title.38
B.
IV.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and
their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of DIMSON, on the
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of
other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail
the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special Division to
considering that their titles were issued much earlier than the titles of
ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and
the latter.
Araneta, titles which had been annulled by the courts below. Facially,
these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their valid mother
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were
even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership raised as to the validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of
from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis-à -vis the inexistent 19
they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same April 1917 OCT No. 994.
from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as
it evaluated CLT’s claims.
A.

For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted
level, it maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from
the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimson’s claim over that
where its claim emanates. It argued that its case against the
of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and
MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIÑ O, was never decided
26539, from which Araneta derived its titles, thus:
based on the doctrines laid down in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals 34 and
Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.35 Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose
Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have acquired TCT 13574
and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other
documents related thereto:
 27
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the
both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has Decree No. value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land
4429 and Record No. 4429. Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.

However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents
Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for Ordinary presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of said defendant,
Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the
Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.) said defendant Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in
possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its
documents marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have Decree No.
they needed for presentation before this Court.3940
4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in Court of First Instance,
Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna, respectively.
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions,
and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title was wholly valid.
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not
We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division,
annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994, where they were said to
thus:
have originated.

As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has

3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement
established by direct evidence that its titles were validly derived from
Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was only registered and
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it
was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange
asseverates that these were unfounded and thus, labored to refute all of
Commission only April 29, 1953 when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was
them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo
executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of
Orders which was the basis of DIMSON’s titles.
Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947
(Exh. M0. So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly
given a special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to
execution of the said two (2) documents, the said Philippine Land OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the titles submitted, its
Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered. predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon ["RATO"], one of the
co-heirs named in OCT No. 994, who was allotted the share of nine and
five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma.
Maysilo Estate.41 For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the
Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in Court if only to
derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the title of
have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
RATO need to be reassessed.

5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5

Verily, attesting to RATO’s share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O-994
defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant Araneta
of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of OCT no. 994, records the following:
cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was never explained. TCT
6196 was not even presented in Court.
"12343/O-994 – Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - - Queda cancelado el
presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension superficial de
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was
1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-
cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282 sq.m.
3, an virtud del auto dictado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Riza,
de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had expedido el
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35 del Libro de
when the registration of the document entitled Novation of Contract, Certicadads de Transferencia.
Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N)
and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the
Date of Instrument – Julio 28, 1924.
said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N
and N-1).
Date of Inscription – Agosto 1, 1024 – 10:19 a.m.
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title shall be entered, SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds
no memorandum shall be made upon any certificate of title by the
register of deeds, in pursuance of any deed or other voluntary
Agosto 19, 192442
instrument, unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented for such
endorsement.
In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT
No. 869243 which covers "Lote No. 25 A-3 del plano del subdivision, parte
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected
del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible), "Hacienda de Maysilo," situado
on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538 (Exhibit 7-
en el Munisipio de Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x x x." 44 The parcel of
defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the
land covers an approximate area of "UN MILLION CUATROCIENTOS
encumbrances annotated in the Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting
CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con
the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o menos." As
reflected under Entry No. 14517….T-8692, 45 the parcel of land covered
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4- under this certificate of title was subdivided into five (5) lots under
defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T 6196 Victoneta, subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First Instance of
Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT 26539) and Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858 and 21859
TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x) which could have referred to the Deed (sic) were issued.
of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before
Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company,
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title
with Date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
issued in RATO’s name, 46 cancelled TCT No. 8692 47 with respect to the
property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857, 48 was a derivative of OCT
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of
Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 Record No. 4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No.
(Exhibit M) does not appear. 2653849 and TCT No. 2653950which were both issued in the name of Jose
Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
 28
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This
covered a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of the subdivision is being questioned inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree
plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for
area of 581,872 square meters.51 Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of
cancelled by TCT No. 6196 52 whose registered owner appears to be a Laguna.
certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square
meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere
a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C.
typographical error and did not have any effect on the validity of their
title. It further contended that the number "4429" was the case number
As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the of Decree No. 36455 and was used interchangeably as the record number.
name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title were traced from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and
thereof, TCT No. 13574 was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of
Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETA’s predecessor-in-
Agriculture on 20 May 1949. 53 It covers a parcel of land designated as
interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETA’s
section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-
predecessors-in-interest and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind of
3-C. It has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters.
this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of
rendering the previous titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries.
No. 6196 is the following: Fraud is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.60The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome
the presumption of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the
"Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 – SALE in favor of the ARANETA
court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass. 61
INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the property described
in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13574, page 74, Book T-345 in The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore,
the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of 1949 of Inc.62 acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title,
Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Biñ as). specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and "it is certainly
believable that such variance in the copying of entries could be merely a
typographical or clerical error." In such cases, citing with approval the
Date of Instrument – May 18, 1949
decision of the appellate court, the technical description in the title
should prevail over the record number.63
Date of the Inscription – May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m.54
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the
TCT No. 2653855 in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of land technical description of the land, as stated on the face of the title, had not
designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan Psd-10114 being a portion of been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of
Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters. 56 titles. In ARANETA’s case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been
verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in
Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title,
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which
the properties, covered by the subject certificates of title can still be
was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture. TCT No. 7784
determined with sufficient certainty.
covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282 square
meters.57 It would appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of
eventually cancelled by TCT No. 21343. 58 As per attachment of ARANETA RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from which said titles had
in its Answer dated 6 march 1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled
copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land designated OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and
as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a portion of Lot 6, 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos.
described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429 with an 26538 and 26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No.
approximate area of 333,377 square meters. 59 However, for reasons 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically therefore,
unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or certified true these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on OCT No.
copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court. 994, they not being the preceding titles.

In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to
of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical condition of the copy
evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a
RATO held title to these parcels of land even after its subdivision in the definite conclusion.64 On the other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found
1930’s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No. on the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the
21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A- issuance of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.65
3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those that ultimately passed
ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to
The other flaws noted on ARANETA’s certificates of title pertained to its
or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained, thereby proving identity of the
failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343. As we have
land.
discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of
TCT No. 21857 and a certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a
them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. For copy of said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to
purposes of tracing ARANETA’s titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission, especially
the evidence presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 so since TCT No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784.
and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly proven
legitimacy of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well in these proceedings, the authenticity of said title must be sustained.
substantiated by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles Besides, ARANETA’s failure to submit TCT No. 21343 had never been put
deserve validation. into issue in these proceedings.

Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 square
flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial court in invalidating meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538, we find that the trial
ARANETA’s titles. court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No.
26538 before they finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the
Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETA’s predecessor-in-
portions of this piece of land had been sold to various individuals before
interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in Rato’s name refer
 29
the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 march 1948. Naturally, Exhibit "N-Dimson," on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was
since the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect to the issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I. Tuason de Perez married to
portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the area of TCT No. Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of land described
26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer to ARANETA. Even as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140,
assuming that the entire area covered by TCT No. 26538 had been G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It ahs an area of 436 square meters and cancels
disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us to conclude that the TCT No. 21856.
conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the area covered under
the derivative title will be much more than its predecessor-in-interest.
Exhibit "Q-Dimson"71 consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of
Evidently, this is not so in the case before us.
land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No. 44 of the consolidation
Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372 square meters. It was
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA issued to Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate
should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering that the of title cancelled TCT No. 46118.
registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was
suspended/denied and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of
Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no
Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on march
identity of the land could be found. The Supreme Court, in the case of
4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial court, shows
Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc. 72 agreeing with the Court of
that the suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that the
Appeals’ dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent
person seeking registration had give days within which to correct the
for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another title to
defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the Notice merely
another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
contained a warning regarding the denial of the registration of the
voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the vested rights of ARANETA
to be land. The fact that the title to the land was subsequently issued free "On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number
from any notation of the alluded defect creates a reasonable presumption as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
that ARANETA was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed. there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s
This is especially true since the notice itself contained a note, "Just reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of
Completed," written across the face of the letter. land. This came about because under General Land Registration Office
(GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26
and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the
Records also reveal the RTC’s observation with regard to Araneta’s
time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles issued before
failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the subject land
the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered
(Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps ½ portion of TCT 15159
consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were numbered
and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other ½ portion of said TCT R-15169.
also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued
The trial court further noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT
before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the
26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other
inauguration of the Philippine Republic x x x."
within Lot 25-A. That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along
bearing distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in
yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343 (Araneta)." 66 Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s
Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON objected to the admissibility
of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K," it becomes apparent that the said evidence
the original copies of these certificates of title and contended that the
relied upon was only a private survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
"originals" contain different "contents" from their own Exhibits M, N and
Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of
Q.73 The fact that the entries contained in ARANETA’s pieces of evidence
Lands and was based only on photocopies of relevant land titles. 67 What
are different from that of DIMSON’s do not automatically make
is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his
ARANETA’s exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their
observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of
falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding the non-submission of the
the lots.68 From all indications, the conclusions reached by said geodetic
"original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON in their
engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence (Of
Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).74 In any case, we find the objections
Another defect cited on ARANETA’s title was the absence of any entry on unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm
the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in
between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of these proceedings.
TCT No. 26538 submitted to the trial court contained entries only up to
the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry with regard to the
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement
issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering that the same
Company at the time the special power of attorney was executed by Jose
was issued a year later and; (2) entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine
Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of conveyances,
Land Improvement Company which was entered way back on 21 August
the same only proves that Philippine Land Improvement Company was
1929.
not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving the existence or
non-existence of the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together company was not precluded to enter into contracts and be bound by
with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a voluntary agreement with the them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-registration
intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. under the law.
Moreover, no conclusion should have been reached regarding the total
cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title
former certificate of title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety
constitute as clouds on ARANETA’s titles are not for this Court to rule
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square meters.
upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not for
the Heirs of Dimson to rely on the weakness of ARANETA’s titles and
Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of their
ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos. 26538 69 and 21857,70 which are own titles since it is not within our office to decide in whose hands the
both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover contested lands should go, our task being merely to trace back the
parcels of land located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of parties’ claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. 75
title reflect different registered owners and designation of the land
covered.
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose Ma. Rato y
Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating to TCT No. 26538, registered on Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division
12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de Alvarez as the registered correctly assessed, among others, the reference to Decree No. 4429 and
owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of Araneta 76 as mere
the subdivision plan Psd-5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles, "4429" being the
certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain case number of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the technical
TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions. description of the land on those titles not having been shown to be
 30
erroneous or variant with the source title. The Special Division also Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No.
correctly considered that the trial court had failed to take into account 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales.78
the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538 before it was ultimately
transferred to Araneta in 1948, which explain the difference in area
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the
between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT
names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo
No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based
Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana
on a private survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of
Francisco Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara
Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the Memorandum of
Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y
Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale of the property between Rato
Narciso married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y
and Araneta did not, according to the Special Division, discount the fact
Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr.
that Rato and Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement with the
intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Finally,
the Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is
Dimson had submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads as follows:79
to properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
"A/2111 – Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a
Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we affirm the cuenta de la participacion de osia esta en (not legible) los
same. tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y
el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del Hon.
Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
B.
Manila Sala II, dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not
legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del nombrado
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente
controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact that there certificado de tituto y se expide otre a hombre decha Rufina
could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3 Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo T-168 del
May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of the Manotoks. However, libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de dicha orden
the significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the
titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES,
and subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division
Registrado de Titulos."
explained the milieu in full:

The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
subdivision plan Psd-21154.80 Partitioning the lots among the co-owners,
TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6)
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on certificates of titles were individually issued 81 to Francisco Gonzales’s six
page 17 of OCT 994 of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy, shows (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was
that Lot No. 26 had been a subject of sale in favor of issued in favor of all the children.82
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio. 77 The notations
reads:
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were
"Ap. 6655/O-994 – Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots
Certificado en cuanto a una extension superficial de 3,052.93 were obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the
Metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y descrita lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired
en elLote No. 26 vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruis y Mariano from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue
P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Diogracias Quinones y el of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de issue don 9 May 1991.
Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
Date of the Instrument – Aug. 29, 1918
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of
Date of Inscription – Sept. 9, 1918 – 10:50 a.m. consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of
4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who
was issued TCT No. 7526 which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 registered
(GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 83

"Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente

2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one Narcisa
Cerficiado en cuanto a una extension superficial de
Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an approximate area of 2,876
871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26,
square meters. Buenaventura’s ownership was evidenced by TCT No.
vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
7525,84 deriving the same from TCT No. 36657-63. 85
primar casado con Deogracias Quinones y el Segundo con
Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No.
4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22. 3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an area of
20,000 square meters.86 This certificate of title was traced from one
Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a
Date of Instrument – Aug. 21, 1918
transferee of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No.
7760 by virtue of sale between him and then People’s Homesite and
Date of Inscription – Sept. 9, 1918 – 10:50 a.m. Housing Corporation ["PHHC"]. The latter title eventually cancelled TCT
No. 36557-63 of the Republic.87
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an approximate
area of 23,979 square meters. MRI’s certificate of title was derived from
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was
TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of
issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the
Jose Dionisio, who was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisio’s title in turn
"Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in
cancelled the Republic’s TCT No. 36657-63.88
this Certificate" was the sale executed in favor of
 31
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate area cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila
of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the same by virtue of sale between and Antonio Sebastian and Jose Madulid. 104 MRI also submitted in
him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio evidence a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid
was a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as thereby subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per
evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and the PHHC, the latter’s subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091. 105 Again, we note that TCT No. 53124
certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic. 89 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records are bereft of any
indication what certificate of title it cancelled and to whom the same was
registered.
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and
Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No. 21484. The certificate of
title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters 15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
Custodio was in turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the 292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters, was a by-
registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of sale between him and product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI, after the
PHHC.90 Under Entry No. 6277/T-21485, it would appear that portions of same was subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT
the property covered under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the name of Quirino
been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the Manotok Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545
Estate Corporation, et al. interposed no objections subject to the payment cancelled TCT Nos. (36557) 12836 to (36563) 12842. 106
of just compensation.91
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 5-C
7) TCT Nos. 2640592 and 26406,93 both registered in the name of MRI, of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which has an approximate area of
cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the names of MRI
were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and (4,650 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita
Emilia all surnamed Jacinto, [JACINTOS"], before the same were Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No. 53123 by order of the Court
transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of the latter. The JACINTOS’ of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement
certificates of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 of the parties in Civil Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled
issued in the name of Filemon Custodio 94 Both TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were Conchita Umali (1,000
cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing TCT No. square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Jesus Hipona
7792/T-39 to the Republic’s certificate of titles, this certificate of title (4,650 square meters).107 Like some of the other titles, TCT No. 21346
was not submitted in evidence. cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of
title.
8) TCT No. 26407 95 issued to MRI was traced back to the title of Lourdes
Mercado Cloribel who was the registered owner of TCT No. 8404 by 17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2
virtue of sale between the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. and has an area of more or less 6,354 square meters and a by-product of
On the fact of TCT No. 8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No. TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided
8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT No. 8013 was under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn,
registered and what certificate of title it cancelled. cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S.
Custodio whose ownership thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a
voluntary sale.108 TCT No. 8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this
9) TCT No. 3390496 of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon Custodio
latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for purposes of
by virtue of sale between the latter and MRI. 97 We note that TCT No. 8017
tracing back to the Republic’s title.
cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the same
could be traced back to the Republic’s certificates of title.
18) TCT No. 165119109 was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale
between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of
IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES
11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the registered owner. This
IGNACIO was cancelled. 110 It would appear that TCT No. C-39690
certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic. 98
cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173 was not
submitted in evidence.
11) TCT No. 25487599 bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot 55-A with
an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. This certificate of title
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering Lot
cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the
No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206
name of MRI. It would appear that MRI acquired the lot covered under
square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by PhiVille
TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the registered owner of
Development and Housing Corporation under TCT No. 197357. MEC
TCT No. 25715 being a vendee of PHHC.100
acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of Exchange
between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991. 111 TCT No. 197357
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15, 101 which was purchased by cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is no trace what certificate of
MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta who held TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in title the latter title cancelled.
turn acquired the same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No.
7827 was eventually cancelled by Villacorta’s land title. 102 It would
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS,
appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. 7826/T-40 but there is no
including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT No. 994 registered
trace to whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title it
on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles
cancelled.
for taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had successfully traced back
some of their certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the acquired the lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same
consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate of
title cancelled TCT No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No.
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus
tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square
Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this
meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but
fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties
there is no indication to whom TCT No. 21315 was registered and what
covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic
certificate of title it cancelled.103
from the Gonzalezes.

14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters. MRI’s certificate
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750
tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in
square meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 square meters) and Jose
Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this
Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that TCT No. C-17234
 32
fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the
covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the People’s parties approved the creation of a commission to resolve only these two
Homesite and Housing Corporation which were later consolidated and issues, to wit:
subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest was ever
raised by CLT on this point.112
"x x x

The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by

These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
the State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever
previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,113 and then Associate Justice (now Chief 1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of
Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA: 114 "In an rem proceeding, Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate
condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus,
by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and
proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all
the property covered by the titles of the defendants overlap. 121
the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance." 115 This
doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S.
Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S., 116 which in Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial court’s conclusions
turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. were based, it would appear that the findings therein were outside the
Carmack117 that "[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better the deductions with regard to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT
title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether
conveyance."118 or not the subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
estate or whether there was overlapping of titles. Records bear out that
the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of
"ultra vires" acts of the two Commissioners.
TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was
issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all
defects that may have attended that particular title would have been In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent
purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging from the
the State through eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much: language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot
number and survey plan. Evidently, these defects go only as far as the
certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no
As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should be upheld
specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS’ titles indicating any
because they were derived from the Republic’s valid certificates of title.
irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who signed the
In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’ titles can be traced back to the
majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261,
Government’s titles as a result of the expropriation in 1947.
35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic)122 were irregularly and questionably issued
without any reference to the MANOTOKS’ certificates of
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the title.123 Otherwise stated, the imputed flaws affect only those certificates
MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition resulting of title issued prior to those registered in the name of the Republic. No
from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not flaw had been specifically identified or established in the proceedings
be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws below, which would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as
concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the the regularity of their issuance is concerned.124
State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the
subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the
acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the
validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular titles
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may
Philippines by way of expropriation.
be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or
title acquired or any reversion to the former owner. 119
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of
PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title which could not be
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the
traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically,
Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial court
MRI’s TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272,
to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report
T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MEC’s TCT No. T-232568. As to these
certificates of title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose
the Manotok titles were derived.120 The Special Division, however, names they were subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find
concluded that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it was no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins. 125
determined "outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by
the parties." To wit:
V.

In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with

The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary
regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as the majority
of its conclusions:
report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the
tasks which the trial court confined them to perform. The MANOTOKS
also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to In pré cis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence
introduce evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON and CLT to substantiate
engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are
maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove derivatives of OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917,
the authenticity and validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They insisted as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and
that the Palma Order was a void one for being conditional and having ARANETA, both of which had consistently anchored their proprietary
resulted to the issuance of "duplicate certificates of land title." claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand
proceeding, been able to support their claims of ownership over the
respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the case of the
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS’ titles which were
MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the validity of some of their
based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases of the alleged defects
certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA presented evidence
proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said
proving the identity, the extent and the origin of their titles.
report.
 33
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the properties, we find that the imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat
tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the MANOTOKS the valid claims of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the disputed
and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said portions of the Maysilo Estate.126
claims, this Court finds that, as discussed above, such flaws are
inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the
ARANETA titles.
Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As we earlier
stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending their claim to title for reasons other than the fact that OCT No. 994 dated
parties are contradictory to each other and stand to refute the validity of 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be noted that the
their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose Dimson and CLT
have correspondingly been subjected to dispute on the basis of separate seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment of title against
and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on
imputed flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of
on one hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other, is that the ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in the
imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective certificates of claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action to prosper.
title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the mechanical and The well-settled legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance
technical aspect of the transcription of their titles and are therefore of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a
inconsequential to the import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws do preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
not depart from the fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be reconveyed is his. 127 In an action to recover, the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA had been clothed with the right of ownership property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate. his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.128

On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special
primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise affecting the very Division. They are as follows:
crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA,
whose title is questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT
RECOMMENDATIONS
cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to
overcome as they delve into the substance of their proprietary claims. As
stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to overcome their onus and Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby
instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws of the adverse parties. For respectfully makes the following recommendations regarding
these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT should be declared a nullity. the validity of the conflicting proprietary claims as
interposed by the herein contending parties:
xxx
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of
DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to
From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme Court
their successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus
2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the following conclusions as to the
invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of
status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances:
land.

1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only one OCT

2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims
994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as
the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the
3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917. OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19
following certificates of title:
April 1917 as its registration date is null and void.

a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers

2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have already
Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
discussed, the certificates of title of the deceased Jose Dimson and his
which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
successor-in-interest, CLT, having been traced back to OCT 994 dated 19
April 1917, are NULL and VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in
favor of DIMSON and CLT. b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate
area of 2,287 square meters.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo Order,
on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the validity of their respective titles, c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of
do not substantiate their proprietary claims. While the existence of said 20,000 square meters.
Orders are admitted, the legal import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a
semblance of legality on the titles of DIMSON and consequently, of CLT,
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an
more so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and
approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
ARANETA, respectively.

e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate

4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy, particularly that
area of 2,557 square meters.
being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT, were expropriated by the
Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act
No. 539 for resale to tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in- f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate
interest of the Republic, were able to establish that some of their area of 25,276 square meters.
certificates of title had indeed originated or were derived from said
expropriated parcels of land.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797
with an area of 11,000 square meters.
5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title covering
the land being claimed by ARANETA were derived from OCT NO. 994
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of
registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately showing a direct link of TCT
approximately 1,910 square meters.
Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. By reason of which, that is
either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned by
RATO, had been well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision
DIMSON. plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established rights of
ownership of both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the contested With regard to the following certificates of title, namely:
 34
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC. The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third
recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently
indicate that they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of
Republic when it expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the
1,0000 square meters.
1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed by the
Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of benefited, as they should, from the cleansing effect the expropriation had
1,000 square meters. on whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although
the Special Division did not concede the same benefit to the other
Manotok titles named in the third recommendation, at the same time it
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of
did not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired.
1,000 square meters.
Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step of
annulling those titles.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of
1,802 square meters.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid
mother title – OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to
from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of an inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect
3,163 square meters. any error or fraud, and certainly the Special Division do not point to any
such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for
the Court to annul the same.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate
covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the
Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and
CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an
antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The
approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
Special Division concluded that such findings had been reached by the
Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires.
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision Assuming that such flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and
plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As
4,650 square meters. stated earlier, such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the
prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles enumerated in the third
recommendation could not be sourced from the titles acquired by the
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of
Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the Majority Report
more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of
signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not form the basis for
TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45
the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Division’s
registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio.
rejection of the Majority Report further diminishes any ground to annul
the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-
36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles
between said Spouses and MRI.
specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the
Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special
Division in rejecting the Majority Report – that the determinations were
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the
subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 parties -- does not categorically refute the technical findings made
square meters. therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the
Manotoks’ titles listed in the third recommendation, should be
sufficiently made public.
The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to
make specific references to the particular certificates of title
which they cancelled and in whose name they were Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Division’s
registered, may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the
alternative, subject the same to further technical verification. Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so
as to sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more
particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any
respecting parcels of land covered by the following cause for the annulment of those titles from a proper party’s end, then let
certificates of title: the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court.

a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division
Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion and issues the following reliefs:
of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square
meters;
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other
derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are declared
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject
an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.129 parcels of land;

The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they 2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land
logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the covered by the following certificates of title are declared LEGAL and
Special Division, which this Court adopts. VALID, to wit:

The third recommendation – that eleven (11) of the titles held by the a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of
Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of
verification – warrants some analysis. 4,988 square meters.
 35
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-
square meters. 13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.

c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square
meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate area of determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the said
23,979 square meters. titles "failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates
of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently
transferred and registered," thereby leading the Supreme Court "to find
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557
no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins." 130
square meters.

Costs against private respondents.

f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276
square meters.
SO ORDERED.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of
11,000 square meters.

h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately

1,910 square meters.

i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters.

3) The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby

declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:

a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of

subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an
aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;

b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area
of 390,383 square meters.
Republic of the Philippines
4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or Manotok SUPREME COURT
Estate Corporation, to wit: Manila

a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square FIRST DIVISION
meters;
G.R. No. 142549               March 9, 2010
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square
meters;
FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner, 
vs.
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
meters; REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square
meters; DECISION

e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163 square meters;
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred
Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described
square meters; by this Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three
cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of the Vatican."1 What we have before us now is touted as "one of the
27,850 square meters; biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history." 2

h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd- The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with
315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters; this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition
easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset,
applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just,
6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for
turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. almost forty-five (45) years.
Custodio;
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said spouses and (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the
MRI; Order3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
 36
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. xxxx
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of
Finality on March 12, 1998.
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st
Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to
claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the
parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the
Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its
action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x. 10 (Emphasis
Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19,
ours.)
1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report
No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of
Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this
Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this
Appeals,4 reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, 5 the was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917,
was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a
fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal
City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners,
heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings
including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate
showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square
meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of
land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of
divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing
the property. "certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994
was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it
was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:

v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the
acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated October 21,
TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of
1997 and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated December 30,
the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had
1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued
previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be
which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in
sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to
fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the
their respective interest in the property, is approved.
registration of OCT No. 994.11 (Underscoring in the original.)

The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being
directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." We quote the
owners for the following lots, namely:
last portion of said letter-reply:

xxxx
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former
Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong
Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if
not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the
subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City
mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as
and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they
the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent
were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding.
anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the
Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct
confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration.
said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.

With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for
issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No.
petitioner a letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1)
994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been
the 1st Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement)
cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in the
issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T.
names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the
Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-
lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper
119 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of
PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of of certificates of title covering land previously registered in the names of
the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not
September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT
the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the title of MWSS and
Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such
issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April declaration as to the various transfer certificates of title emanating from
1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for
Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97- the declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due
11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following: process clause of the Constitution.
 37
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer
SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a
behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the
issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against
mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its
loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and agencies who may appear to have participated therein, and (b) to
people at large."12 recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that may
directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st
agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued
Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by
Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the
this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court
courts affecting the Maysilo Estate."18
of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has
the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by
the highest Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose
Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was
OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures
1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor
decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the
contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate
final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee’s report
same" and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which
prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect. 14 spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA,
an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with respect to OCT No.
994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the
original or transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st
issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3,
Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it
1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated
could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was
contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and
reproof of the highest degree."15 Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated
September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18,
1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely
her rights and interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore,
ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424
respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process
cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she
when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner’s counsel
has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
to present petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona
other than this action."
claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of
due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for heard. 19
denial of the petition:
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial
the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice. where petitioner’s claim for damages can be fully litigated. This
Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is
inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was
claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is,
pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee
such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no
created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after
showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for
conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any
damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be outrightly
way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
dismissed.20

3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona
Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the
has to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of
1st Indorsement was issued.
public respondents’ failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A
private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
damages.17 respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of
the public respondents affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not
charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of
relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondent’s active
Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties
participation. 22
being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of
mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and
could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in
and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner
Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case. counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private
respondent x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of
this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ
the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the
Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee
private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994
due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of
on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in
Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel
in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According
to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact- Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is
finding inquiry: entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses
incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original
respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of
Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
Court in support of her argument:
purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City
 38
RULE 65 and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective shares, as
evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA
HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO)
xxxx
consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D", and its
faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding
section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the
corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the
same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-
court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt.
enumerated true owners.
An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance
with Section 1 of Rule 39.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the
undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of
RULE 39
the questioned Order of the lower court.

SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall

The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases
issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate. 26
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution
unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the
may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
(in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and
use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the
of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not
execution.
unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC
Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty;
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused
the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
order that had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise
avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23 board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
their Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share,
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs
XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to
deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of
undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is
and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. 27 It is
are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
names.25 involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of
an action already taken in the exercise of either. 28
Public respondents claim the following as facts:

Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May
compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the
25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public
the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-
respondents’ refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents
plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la
have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s request?
Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.

In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration

As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been
Authority29 instructive, to wit:
partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason
y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y
Tuason, Pedro Bañ os, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose,
Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiñ o, Maria Rocha
de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y Patiñ o, German Franco y Gonzales,
xxxx
Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma
Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores,
 39
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title
of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions
or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or
disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial similar to that at bar.36 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1
doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.30 (Emphasis
ours.)
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports
regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in declaring as follows:
cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the
same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the
involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds
findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since
are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by
there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject
the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports
parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those
cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level
Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds
as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that
to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of
they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself,
respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st
persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and
Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11,
arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny
and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to
and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or
grant petitioner’s request. 31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for
reject them.
public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the
finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could
anchored their rights, did not exist. only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved xxxx
by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
succeeding resolution33 in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to
Resolution.37
rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the
case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said
resolutions. Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence
engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions
as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided
case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the
by this Court 34 which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994,
registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May
dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in
1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No.
Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was
994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null
the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to
and void."
stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:

In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court
No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several
should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the
attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter
respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT
that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a
No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise
vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It
should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual
appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the
predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such
Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer
OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions,
prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very
said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of
basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does
the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as
not exist.
precedents.35

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of

Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly
mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the
issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
petition for lack of merit.
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the SO ORDERED.
date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears
on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered
as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson
and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. x x x.
 40
Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The
applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo)
and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the

Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds
that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess

sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots
applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various
types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real'
or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the
'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or
possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or
any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent applicable laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain

belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which

was approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case,
they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16,
Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the
lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found
CHAP 6 Classification of Public Lands that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open,
public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject
Republic of the Philippines parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty
SUPREME COURT (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for
Manila registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into
productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
FIRST DIVISION
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989 that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry
cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,  valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the
vs. case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA this petition, the government alleges that:
BISNAR, respondents.
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative
Amelia Bisnar. of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership; and

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands,"
affirming in totothe decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be
granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land
filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we
be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan ruled:
AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424
sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon,
 41
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands vs.
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS,
of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With JR., Respondents.
these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted DECISION
facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest
BERSAMIN, J.:
purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to
the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable
adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs.
is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as
Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
the ownership in some other person.
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA Antecedents
689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
Court, 151 SCRA 679).
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7,
1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is Parañ aque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Parañ aque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1
Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689 [1984]).
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30
in Amunategui that: years.2

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the The City of Parañ aque (the City) opposed the application for land
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
Ruling of the RTC
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
On May 10, 2000, 4 the RTC granted the application for land registration,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The
application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of
First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A.
SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as
the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is
SO ORDERED.
situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of
one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by
 Republic v. CA Carag Spouses Supra Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299,
Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot
4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:
 De Castro v. Yap refer to the second case we tackled this sem

xxxx
 Republic v. Javier see PDF

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding
Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

Republic of the Philippines SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

FIRST DIVISION
Ruling of the CA

G.R. No. 160453               November 12, 2012

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to
wit:
 42
I Ruling

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO The appeal is meritorious.
BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY
OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE
I.
ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED
AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE
CURRENT OF THE RIVER. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to
respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
II
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL
OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE. On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds
that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of
the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the
Parañ aque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by
III applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through
inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND
ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF "Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS. belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."9
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on October 20, 2003.7 It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in
Issues
this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners
of the land which was previously part of the Parañ aque River which
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8 became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which
adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained
by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
I

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN
of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM
respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying
TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
up of the Parañ aque River.
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

II

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS
proof to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of
"PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑ AQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN
evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or
ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
more convincing than that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY
held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
III
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of
IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the
elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
IV registration.

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead,
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE. their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of
the Parañ aque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold
that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was
Parañ aque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
 43
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following
when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in ratiocination, viz:20
1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed
between Lot 4 and the Parañ aque River, the unavoidable conclusion
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became
should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited
the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañ aque River, resulting in the
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
formation of Lot 4998-B.
years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of
the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-
thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only 00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management
cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys
causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In property is not a portion of the Parañ aque River and that it does not fall
other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by
the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case
large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area
and in view of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian
of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and
Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20
Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that
to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was
the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are
registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-
essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance
B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’
of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that
witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to
the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the
Parañ aque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own In fine, the application is GRANTED.
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the
Parañ aque River that had dried up and become an orchard.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer

Both lower courts erred.
Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the
RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the
Parañ aque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed." 14
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
(Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now representatives:
Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast." 15
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
xxxx
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on
the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water
level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title
respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the
of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21
and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room
for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents
apply the law.17 "took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court,
rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. 18 It follows especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of
that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings
being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the Court has consistently
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a)
that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
person.19 conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of
II
fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
Acquisitive prescription was not applicable in favor of respondents both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession of the property
are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the
evidence on record.24
 44
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There
surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the the Court held:
CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court
should now review the findings.
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a
dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina
adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared: Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the
adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under
Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became
Code, the same must fail.
the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years
because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the
the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the
Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the
the subject property is not a portion of the Parañ aque River and that it year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
application.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And,
performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has
openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey
of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the
xxxx
foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not
conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid
for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the
ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong
involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
possession. aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and
paying their value.
that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the
law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner
from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil
becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Code are applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the
Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in- however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR
interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B. the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public
and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation.
preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the
that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
paid realty taxes only from 1999 28 signified that their alleged possession accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or
would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-
for land registration on March 7, 1997. up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case
at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents
as riparian owners.
possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as
as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to
the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion. acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been
public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In
lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold
others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, emphases supplied)
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
public dominion.
State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable,
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31Occupation of
prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a case involving the registration of land into ownership and be registered as a title.32
 45
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification
course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the
adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso
In Menguito v. Republic, 35 which we reiterated in Republic v.
facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change
Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on
of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds
the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and
remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by
disposability of public land, to wit:
acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to
be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown
to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription. disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on
the survey plan, to wit:33
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
NOTE
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. are owned by the State. x x x."
MONS 15 X 60CM
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown
to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2,
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
1996.
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299 notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government
act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
"inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of (Emphasis supplied)
Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s
nature as alienable and disposable public land?
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the
certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:
positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that: In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
disposable.
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for certifications submitted by respondent.1â wphi1 The government officials
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is disposable.
alienable and disposable.
xxxx
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions
not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land
of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
 46
government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such,
the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date
of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of
Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not
prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription
of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the
application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S.
Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañ aque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State
for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

 Delos Reyes v. Calibo see PDF