EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, People of The Philippines, Respondent
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, People of The Philippines, Respondent
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, People of The Philippines, Respondent
MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
I. Ticker
II. Doctrine
Malice is presumed
Intent v. Motive
Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent, on the other
hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. Motive alone is not proof of a
crime. In order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the
prosecution
III. Facts
The Petitioner, Eduardo Manuel, was previously and legally married to Rubylus Gaña,
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, the former contracted a second
marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel in 1996.
The petitioner assured Tina that he is single when he proposed and married her.
After about three years of marriage (Eduardo and Tina), the petitioner left and abandoned
Tina. The latter became curious and inquired from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
Manila and there she learned that the petitioner had been previously married.
Tina filed a case of bigamy against the petitioner, thus, the Court found him guilty.
The petitioner argued that he married Tina in good faith, that he believed his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years – presumed her dead.
He further argued that he shall be acquitted of the crime of bigamy because under Art.
390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is
still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA affirming the
decision of RTC.
IV. Issues
W/N it is presumed that petitioner acted with malice when he married his second wife in
good faith as he claims. YES
W/N the petitioner is criminally liable for bigamy when his only motive was to marry
Tina out of his desire to have a fruitful marriage, and claims to have no malicious intent
in doing so. YES
W/N the petitioner’s action may be excused for he was not familiar with what the Family
Code provides about presumption of death. NO
V. Decision/Ruling
1. Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or
omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by
the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.
In this case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Ruby in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage
is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the
private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The
petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married
the private complainant.
2. A felony cannot exist without intent. For one to be criminally liable for a felony
by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent.
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during
and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
1.
Aa general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.