Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

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770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 112844. June 2, 1995.

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., represented


by JUAN O. NOLASCO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDELMIRO
AMANTE, RENATO CORONA, and the DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.

Administrative Law; Due Process; Assertion of petitioner that it was


deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct
the alleged deficiencies readily collapses.—Set against the records of the
case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing
and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily
collapses. The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the
DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly notified,
warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to
comply with pertinent orders and regulations.
Same; Same; Petitioner has no reason to complain of lack of
opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with the alleged
deficiencies.—Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the
President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is
thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side as well
as to comply with the alleged deficiencies.
Same; Evidence; Findings of fact of administrative departments are
generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.—By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
respect, if not finality, by the courts.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.

_______________

* EN BANC.
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BELLOSILLO, J.:

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI),


was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent
marine officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine Engineering
(A.M.E.) and a four-year course in Marine Transportation
(B.S.M.T.). In 1978 it established a branch in Talon, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila. But we are here concerned only with the main school
in Manila.
For several times prior to 1985 respondent Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner’s
requests for renewal permit/recognition. However, on 11 March
1986 the DECS issued petitioner a renewal permit for SY 1985-
1986. Later, petitioner applied for a summer permit for 1986 which
the DECS favorably indorsed to the Minister of Education in
consideration of the graduating students for summer. Thereafter the
application was returned to Director Modesta Boquiren of the DECS
for evaluation and decision pursuant to the authority delegated to the
Regions under Department Order No. 22, series of 1975. Director
Boquiren issued petitioner the summer permit for 1986 based on the
previously stated humanitarian reason but subject to the condition
that petitioner should not enroll students for the first semester of SY
1986-1987 until a permit therefor was granted and that the
enrollment list for the summer term be submitted immediately.
Sometime in 1986 the DECS received a complaint from
Felixberto B. Galvez, president of petitioner’s Faculty Association,
NAFLU-KMU, concerning the issuance of summer permit to
petitioner and of its holding of classes for courses not recognized by
the Government. Galvez requested that the matter be looked into as
well as the possible revocation of petitioner’s authority due to
persistent violation of the orders of the DECS.
In response, the DECS through Director Boquiren recommended
that petitioner’s summer permit be revoked and that the school be
closed effective SY 1986-1987 on the ground that: (a) petitioner did
not have a renewal permit/recognition for SY 1986-1987; (b) several
communications were sent to petitioner’s head telling him not to
operate without permit and to explain within seventy-two (72) hours
from receipt of Director Boquiren’s letter

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

dated 9 July 1986 why no drastic action should be taken against it


but said communication was never answered; and, (c) petitioner did
not correct the deficiencies indicated in the renewal permit for 1985-
1986.
Accordingly, in a 3rd Indorsement dated 23 September 1986 the
DECS through then Minister Lourdes R. Quisumbing approved the
following courses of action for petitioner: (a) the students in the two
courses who were graduating for SY 1986-1987 would be allowed to
graduate even without permit for said courses as a special case
provided that they completed the requirements for graduation and
subject to prior issuance of Special Order; and, (b) the remaining
students should be allowed to transfer to other authorized schools.
In a letter dated 30 September 1986 Director Boquiren informed
petitioner of the aforementioned courses of action and directed
immediate implementation thereof.
On 9 April 1987 the DECS Inter-Agency Technical Committee
(IATCOM) recommended renewal of permits for the maritime
courses offered by petitioner provided that a development plan for
the improvement of its buildings, classrooms, laboratory rooms,
library offices and other rooms be formulated and implemented
before the start of school year 1987-1988.
Despite lack of permit, petitioner continued to enroll students and
offer courses in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation for
SY 1987-1988. This prompted the DECS through Director
Hernando Dizon to write petitioner on 4 August 1988 directing it not
to operate without permit and 1
inviting its attention to the provisions
of the2
Private School Law as reiterated in the Education Act of
1982 which prohibits operation of unauthorized schools/ courses.
On 28 October 1988 petitioner sent a letter to Director Dizon
applying for permit/recognition to conduct classes for the two (2)
maritime courses retroactive from summer of 1987 up to SY 1988-
1989 and informing him of its transfer to the 5th Floor of the
Republic Supermarket Building, corner Rizal Avenue and Soler St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila.

_______________

1 Act No. 2706 of 1917.


2 B.P. Blg. 232.

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On the basis of the favorable report of a supervisor of the Bureau of


Higher Education who visited the premises of petitioner on 14
November 1988, a director of said Bureau recommended renewal of
petitioner’s permit. However, in a DECS-PAMI survey conducted by
the DECS technical staff in 1988, petitioner scored only 32 points
out of a possible 1,026 points for requirements in Nautical
Engineering, and only 207 points out of 905 points in Marine
Engineering, way below the DECS requirements.
Subsequent inspection of petitioner’s premises by the Bureau of
Higher Education-DECS Technical Panel for Maritime Education
(TPME) affirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI survey. It found
petitioner deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as
provided in DECS Order No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the
policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan. In a
memorandum dated 19 January 1989 addressed to DECS Director
Nilo Rosas, it set forth the following recommendations:

1. The PMMS administration may be given a last chance to


put up at least 60% of the minimum standard equipment for
a period of about two months (January-March 1989).
2. The DECS with TPME will conduct a reinspection
sometime the first week of April to monitor the progress of
the requirements.
3. No new and old students will be allowed to enroll during
summer of 1989 and the subsequent semesters pending
issuance of a permit.
4. Therefore, issuance of a school permit for 1987-1988 to
1988-89 shall be held in abeyance pending compliance of at
least 60% of the requirements.
5. DECS higher authorities shall decide whether the
graduating students for the second semester 1988-89 will be
allowed to graduate and a retroactive school permit
3
for the
school years 1987-88, 1988-89 can be granted.

As recommended, the TPME Secretariat conducted a reinspection of


petitioner’s premises, then submitted a report dated 18 April 1989
with the following new recommenda-tions—

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 207-208.

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Gradual phasing out of the BSMT Nautical Studies and


1. Associate in Marine Engineering programs. Under this
scheme, no new enrollees should be accepted anymore for
the 1st year BSMT Nautical Studies and AME starting 1st
semester of school year 1989-90.
2. If the school can come up with the DECS minimum
standard within the phasing out period, suspension order
may be lifted.
3. If the school fails to meet the DECS minimum standard at
the end of the phasing out period, closure order will be
issued.
4. No special permit for the BSMT Nautical Studies and AME
courses should be granted as a special case. However,
during the phasing out period students may be allowed to
graduate under PMMS, Talon, Las Piñas,

based on these considerations—

1. PMMS, Manila, has inadequate training facilities and


equipment for BSMT Nautical Studies and AME programs.
2. The school has not acquired its own school site and
building. The present school campus is not conducive for
training and is found to be very limited in space so that
there is difficulty for school development and expansion.
3. On 23 September 1986, the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports already issued a cease to operate order to the
school head of PMMS. The said indorsement letter also
provided humanitarian decision (reason?) which granted
permit to PMMS as a special case, just to allow BSMT and
AME students to graduate and the remaining students were
advised to transfer to authorized/recognized schools.
4. Labor dispute occurred in 1987. The conflict between the
employees and employer 4
is a manifestation of
mismanagement of school.

In a letter dated 27 April 1989 Director Rosas informed petitioner of


the TPME report and recommendations and invited it for a
conference on 2 May 1989 before any major decision and action
would be made.
On 2 May 1989, the TPME Secretariat submitted another
memorandum on its reinspection of petitioner’s premises made on
28 April 1989. Based on its findings that no substantial
improvement in terms of minimum requirements, equipment and
training facilities since the January 1989 inspection was

_______________

4 Id., pp. 208-209.


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made, it reiterated the recommendations it submitted to the DECS


Bureau of Higher Education. For this reason, in the letter dated 25
May 1989 Director Rosas notified petitioner about the
aforementioned report and the DECS’ decision that:

1. The BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine


Engineering courses be gradually phased out. Such being
the case, the school shall no longer be allowed to accept 1st
year students and new enrollees starting 1st semester of
school year 1989-90.
2. The second year and third year students may be allowed to
remain until they graduate. However, the school may opt to
transfer these students to PMMS, Talon, Las Piñas,

due to the following considerations:

1. The school’s training equipment and instructional facilities


are very far below the standards set by DECS.
2. The school site and building are not owned by the school
but only leased with contract of renewal to be made
annually.
3. The present location of the school does not warrant for
expansion, development and improvement.
4. The present location of the school is not conducive for
learning, it being located on the 5th floor of a supermarket
in the downtown section of the city.
5. A cease to operate order was issued by Secretary Lourdes
R. Quisumbing 5
sometime in 1986, which order was violated
by the school.

In a letter dated 11 July 1989 the DECS through Secretary


Quisumbing informed petitioner that it had received reports that
petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were
ordered phased out effective SY 1989-1990 per letter of Director
Rosas dated 25 May 1989; called petitioner’s attention to the
provision of Sec. 1, Rule 1, Part V, of the Implementing Rules of the
Education Act of 1982 which makes it punishable and subject to
penalties the operation of a school through the conduct or offering of
Educational Programs or Courses of Studies/Training, without prior
government authorization and/or in violation of any of the terms and
conditions of said permit or recognition; directed that in accordance
with the phase-out order, petitioner’s
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_______________

5 Id., pp. 209-210.

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Manila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years
of the authorized maritime programs which shall be gradually
phased out; and, required petitioner to comment on the reported
unauthorized enrollment.
In its letter to the DECS dated 26 July 1989, petitioner moved for
reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied with
the minimum requirements was due to the following: that as early as
21 June 1989 it filed a letter requesting reconsideration of the letter
dated 25 May 1989 of Director Rosas; that since there was no reply
it believed that the 25 May 1989 order was reconsidered sub-silencio
and that petitioner was allowed to enroll 1st year students for SY
1989-1990; and, that it had undertaken improvements in all of its
facilities in compliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it
requested another inspection of its premises.
Pursuant to petitioner’s request, another inspection of the Manila
premises was conducted by the TPME-Secretariat on 8 August 1989.
However, petitioner only obtained a general rating of 31.17% for
Nautical Studies and 28.53% for Marine Engineering. Consequently,
the inspection team reiterated its previous recommendation to
gradually phase out the maritime programs of petitioner’s Manila
campus effective SY 1990-1991 and that no new freshman students
be accepted beginning SY 1990-1991.
Accordingly, in a letter dated 25 September 1989 the DECS
through Secretary Quisumbing ordered petitioner to discontinue its
Maritime Program in the Manila campus effective school year 1990-
1991 and suggested that efforts be made towards the development of
PMMS, Las Piñas, 6
which has a great potential of being a good
Maritime School. The phase-out order was reiterated in subsequent
letters dated 19 February 1990 and 9 May 1990 of Director Rosas
and then DECS Secretary Isidro D. Cariño, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioner moved to reconsider the phase-out order
in its letter of 21 May 1990, which request was denied by the DECS
through Undersecretary Benjamin Tayabas in his letter of 1 June
1990. The letter reads—

_______________

6 Id., p. 211.

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

With reference to your request to rescind an order to phase-out the maritime


courses at PMMS, Manila, please be informed that this Department sees no
reason for such action as the conditions obtaining in the school when the
phase-out order was issued haven’t shown any significant improvement
inspite of the fact that the PMMS had been given reasonable period to
comply with the minimum standard requirements prescribed by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Maritime Education courses are highly specialized and require adequate
training facilities and equipment in order to ensure quality. However, the
series of visits made by the staff of the BHE, NCR, and members of the
Technical Panel on Maritime Education revealed the following findings:

(a) On April 9, 1987 the Inter-Agency Technical Committee (IATCOM)


recommended the renewal of permits of the maritime courses, provided, that
a development plan for the improvement of the buildings, classrooms,
laboratory rooms, library offices and other rooms shall be formulated and
implemented before the start of SY 1987-1988.
(b) In 1988, the DECS-PAMI survey conducted by technical persons, revealed
that PMMS, then located at the 5th floor of the Republic Supermarket,
obtained a general score of 32 out of 1,026 points for requirements in the
Nautical course and 207 out of 905 points for the Marine Engineering
course. It is needless to say that these findings are way below the DECS
requirements. Above all, the school site was described as not conducive for
offering maritime program due to its limited area. Furthermore, the lease on
the premises is not a long term lease (2 years), a condition which would
deter the school from fully developing the school site.
(c) In January of 1989, the findings of the Secretariat for the Technical Panel
for Maritime Education (TPME) reaffirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI
Survey. Very few equipment were found for the Maritime courses. You
concurred with these findings in a dialogue with the Director of the Bureau
of Higher Education Secretariat. You appealed for another chance and
requested for re-inspection before the opening of SY 1989-1990.
(d) As per agreement, on April 28, 1989 another re-inspection was made and it
showed that the school did not show any substantial improvement.

Then on May 25, 1989, Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing issued the phase-out order of
your maritime programs in Manila campus.
However, the Department again allowed PMMS, Manila, to operate the maritime
courses for SY 1989-1990 despite the

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

above phase-out order.

(e) Another evaluation of your school was conducted by technical people on


August 8, 1989, as requested. The findings revealed that your school
obtained a general rating of 31.17% for Nautical Studies and 28.53% for
Marine Engineering.

The PMMS has been provided with the Policies and Standards for
Maritime Education and, as revealed by the foregoing facts, the series of
inspection and evaluation were (sic) done by technical persons who have
expertise in the field of maritime education. Therefore, the requests relative
to these are not valid.
It is therefore with regrets that this Department cannot re-scind its order
to phase-out the Maritime courses at PMMS, Manila and the school is
admonished not to accept incoming first year students starting school year
1990-1991. So that by school year 1992-1993, the maritime courses at the
Manila campus would be fully phased-out xxxx7
It is suggested that PMMS concentrate its development plans in the Las
Piñas Campus which has a great potential of being a good maritime school.

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent


Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal the
DECS thru Secretary Cariño issued a Closure Order dated 27 August
1991—

In view of the report which was confirmed by the evaluation team from the
National Capital Region DECS Regional Office, that Philip-pine Merchant
Marine School (PMMS), Manila, has been accepting freshman students of
the maritime programs despite the phase-out order which was issued last
September 28, (sic) 1989 by former Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing and
further reiterated by the undersigned, dated May 9, 1990, the Department,
hereby orders Closure of your maritime programs of your school effective
second semester school year 1991-1992, otherwise this Department shall be
constrained to institute the appropriate administrative, civil and criminal
proceedings against you and the other responsible officers of your school
pursuant to Section 68, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 x x x x
The transfer of the affected students shall be facilitated by the National
Capital Region in accordance with our Memorandum dated August 16,
1991, xerox copy of which is hereto attached for your

_______________

7 Id., pp. 212-214.

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information. 8
For your guidance and strict compliance.

In a letter dated 24 August 1992 petitioner sought reconsideration of


the 27 August 1991 Closure Order and at the same time requested
that special orders be issued to its graduates for SY 1991-1992. In
letters filed with the Office of the President dated 2 and 3 October
1992 petitioner alleged compliance with DECS requirements. The
letters were referred to the DECS for consideration.
On 10 November 1992 the Office of the President through
respondent Executive Secretary Edelmiro 9
Amante rendered a
Resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal. It found no plausible
reason to disturb the action of the DECS Secretary in the light of the
conspicuous fact that petitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with
the phase-out order since 1986. Moreover, the grounds advanced by
petitioner have already been passed upon by the DECS.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be
remanded to the DECS for another ocular inspection and evaluation
of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on
the proposition that since it had made substantial improvements on
school equipment and facilities there existed no valid ground to deny
them a permit to offer maritime courses. After another circumspect
review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent
reason to set aside its previous resolution. It opined that—

Mere alleged efforts to improve the facilities and equipments (sic) which
were long due since 1986, do not warrant the reversal of our previous
resolution. It bears stressing as the records may show, that the phase-out
order of DECS was based not only on PMMSI’s failure to provide adequate
equipment and facilities but also on PMMSI’s failure to comply with the
standard requirements prescribed for a school site.
xxxx
Apart from these, PMMSI’s adamant refusal to comply with the orders of
the DECS to phase out its unauthorized courses is sufficient

_______________

8 Id., p. 215.
9 Id., p. 73.

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ground to uphold the order appealed from. Since 1986, PMMSI has been
applying for a permit to offer maritime courses but has been invariably
denied for failure to comply with the minimum requirements prescribed by
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DECS. Notwithstanding these denials, PMMSI continues to offer maritime


courses and to admit freshmen students in clear violation of Section 1, Rule
1, of the Education Act of 1982 x x x x
xxxx
PMMSI’s refusal to comply with the phase-out order on the ground that
the same is not yet final and executory is untenable. While said phase-out
may not be final and executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer
maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of the DECS. PMMSI
possessed no valid permit10
prior to the issuance of the phase-out. There was
no authority to speak of.

Thus the motion was denied in the Resolution dated 12 January


1993 through
11
respondent Assistant Executive Secretary Renato
Corona.
Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President
before respondent Court of Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged
that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of
due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and
closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed. Furthermore, its letters
dated 2 and 3 October 1992 which presented incontrovertible proof
that it had introduced substantial improvements on its facilities for
the past two and a half years while its appeal was pending were not
taken into account, thereby gravely abusing its discretion.
Respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the allegations of
petitioner since—

[T]he Office of the President, in the resolution dated November 10, 1992,
appears to have restated the report of the respondent DECS, meaning, that it
adopted as its own the DECS’ report, but that is not a violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, in line with Alba Patio De Makati vs.
Alba Patio De Makati Employees Association, 128 SCRA 253, 264-265 x x
x x Petitioner’s latest attempt at improving its facilities does not warrant a
reversal of the phase-out order. For, in spite of the claim that it spent on
improvements, the basic problem

_______________

10 Id., pp. 74-76.


11 Id., p. 76.

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remained as it still occupies the fifth floor of the William Liao building,
which is not conducive
12
to learning, and has a limited area for expansion and
development.

13
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13
On 22 July 1993 the petition was dismissed. 14
On 26 November 1993
the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner imputes error on respondent court: (1) in not setting
aside the questioned resolutions and orders of public respondents
which were rendered without due process of law since (a) petitioner
was not afforded the right to fully present its case and submit
evidence in support thereof; (b) public respondents did not consider
the evidence presented by petitioner; (c) public respon-dents’
decisions have no substantial evidence to support them; (d) public
respondents’ decisions did not disclose the bases therefor; and, (2) in
implementing the closure orders which had not become final and
executory.
Petitioner asseverates that the DECS denied its right to a hearing
on the supposed deficiencies which allegedly justified denial of its
request for issuance of a renewal permit. Likewise, the DECS denied
petitioner the opportunity to correct such deficiencies. The Office of
the President totally ignored supervening events properly brought to
its attention in the letters of petitioner dated 2 and 3 October 1992. It
issued resolutions strictly on the basis of the DECS’ representations
which do not amount to substantial evidence. The 10 November
1992 Resolution failed to sufficiently disclose the basis for
affirmation of the DECS’ phaseout and closure orders. The 12
January 1993 Resolution still refused to take into consideration
petitioner’s compliance with the DECS’ requirements. Petitioner did
not violate the Education Act of 1992 because it was authorized to
operate by virtue of the provisional authorities issued by the DECS.
The DECS orders were not final and executory because petitioner
challenged them and appropriately availed itself of the remedies
available to it under the law.
Before proceeding to resolve the merits of this case, we shall
state briefly the concept regarding establishment of schools. The

______________

12 Id., pp. 218-219.


13 Id., p. 227.
14 Id., p. 231.

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educational operation of schools is subject to prior authorization of


the government and is effected by recognition. In the case of
government-operated schools, whether local, regional or national,
recognition of educational programs and/or operations is deemed
granted simultaneously with establishment. In all other cases the
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rules and regulations governing recognition are prescribed and


enforced by the DECS, defining therein who are qualified to apply,
providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the grant of
recognition and for its15
cancellation and withdrawal, and providing
for related matters. The requirement on prior government
authorization is pursuant to the State policy that educational
programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and therefore
shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula,
teaching staff, physical
16
plant and facilities and of administrative or
management viability.
Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that
it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity
whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The
earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS
issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly notified,
warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies
and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.
Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President
to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is thus
no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to17 explain its side as
well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies. We agree with the
observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that—

As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment


was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met (Lindo v.
COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner herein
repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of respondent DECS
and its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of
allowing and granting its request for

_______________

15 Sec. 27, Education Act of 1982.


16 Sec. 5, Rule III, Rules Implementing the Education Act of 1982.
17 See Board of Medical Education v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 88259, 10 August 1989, 176 SCRA
304.

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith, it has been ruled that


the opportunity to be heard is the essence of procedural due process and that
any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for
18
reconsideration (Medenilla
v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278).

Furthermore, the Office of the President properly ignored (in the


sense that it did not find worthy of consideration) the alleged
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supervening events, i.e., substantial improvements on school


equipment and facilities during the pendency of the case before said
Office because the improvements should have been undertaken
starting 1986. Moreover, the phase-out and closure orders were
based not only on petitioner’s deficiencies as a maritime institute but
also on its continued operation without the requisite authorization
from the DECS and acceptance of freshman students in blatant
violation of the latter’s orders and/or persistent warnings not to do
so. Verily, there are sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-out and
closure orders of the DECS which were issued conformably with
Sec. 28 of the Education Act of 1982 which provides:

Sec. 28. x x x x Punishable Violations.—x x x x Operation of schools and


educational programs without authorization, and/or operation thereof in
violation of the terms of recognition, are hereby declared punishable
violations subject to the penalties provided in this Act. Secs. 68 and 69 of
the same Act provide the penalties:
Sec. 68. Penalty Clause.—Any person upon conviction for an act in
violation of Section 28, Chapter 3, Title III, shall be punished with a fine of
not less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) or imprisonment for a maximum period of two (2) years,
or both, in the discretion of the court. If the act is committed by a school
corporation, the school head together with the person or persons responsible
for the offense or violation shall be equally liable.
Sec. 69. Administrative Sanction.—The Minister (Secretary) of
Education, Culture and Sports may prescribe and impose such
administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the
implementing rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act for any
of the following causes x x x x 5. Unauthorized operation of a school, or
course, or any component thereof x x x x

_______________

18 Rollo, p. 424.

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The corresponding rules implementing Secs. 68 and 69 read—

Sec. 1.—Punishable Acts and Penalties.—The operation of a school,


through the conduct or offering of educational programs or courses of
studies/training without prior government authorization in the form of
permit or recognition as provided for in Rule III, PART III of these Rules,
and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of the said permit or

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recognition, have been declared punishable violations of the Act, subject to


the penalties provided therein.
Any person, therefore, upon conviction for an act constituting any of the
foregoing punishable violations, shall be punished with a fine of not less
than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), or imprisonment for a maximum period of two (2) years, or
both, in the discretion of the Court: Provided, however, that when the act is
committed by a school corporation, the school head together with the person
or persons responsible for the violation or offense shall be deemed equally
liable.
Sec. 2.—Administrative Sanction.—Without prejudice to the interest of
students, teachers and employees, and independently of the penalty imposed
in Sec. 1 under this Rule, the Minister may withdraw, suspend, revoke or
cancel a school’s authority to operate as an educational institution or to
conduct educational programs or courses of studies/training, for any of the
following causes, viz: x x x x e. Unauthorized operation of a school, or
program or course of studies or component thereof, or any violation of the
prescribed rules governing advertisements or announcements of educational
institutions.

Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence


as a reasonable
19
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. A perusal of the questioned resolutions of the Office of
the President reveals that they are based on the records of the case
which constitute substantial evidence, proving distinctly not only
petitioner’s consistent failure to meet the DECS’ minimum
standards for maritime institutes and correct its deficiencies but also
its continued operation and offering of maritime courses despite the
lack of permit.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the 10 November 1992
Resolution of the Office of the President sufficiently disclosed the

_______________

19 Velasquez v. Nery, G.R. No. 64284, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 28.

785

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Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

basis for its affirmance of the DECS’ phase-out and closure orders:

After a careful study, we are constrained to resolve that there exists no


sufficient justification to modify, alter or reverse the appealed order. We find
no plausible reason to disturb the action of the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, more so in light of the conspicuous fact that PMMS has
repeatedly failed to comply with the phase out order since 1986. What is

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more, the grounds advanced by PMMS20have already been passed upon, and
separately resolved by the office a quo.

Petitioner’s persistent refusal to comply with the phase-out orders on


the ground that the same were not yet final and executory is
untenable. As correctly held by the Office of the President—

x x x x While said phase-out (orders) may not be final and executory, there
was no reason for PMMSI to offer maritime courses without the requisite
prior authority of the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit 21
prior to the
issuance of the phase-out. There was no authority to speak of.

By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative


departments over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in
a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact
in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts. In the case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor
any other court for that matter—

x x x to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of


whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards
required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this
question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for
that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court
would have the competence to do so.
The only authority reposed in the Courts on the matter is the
determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law

_______________

20 Rollo, p. 72.
21 Rollo, p. 76.

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786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision
rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by
any court.
Of course, if it should be made to appear to the Court that those powers
were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively,
despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction—or stated
otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or
had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled—it becomes

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the Court’s duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet
even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has been
abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids
such an abuse of power, or commands whatever is needful to keep its
exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do
otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of
the issue of the satisfaction of fulfillment by an educational institution of the
standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which 22
it should not
ordinarily substitute its own judgment for that of said office.

There being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents


representing the Office of the President in issuing the Resolutions of
10 November 1992 and 12 January 1993, respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the resolutions in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1993, as well as its
Resolution of 26 November 1993, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,


Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.,
concur.
Quiason, J., On official leave.

Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.

_______________

22 See Note 15.

787

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Vinzons-Chato vs. Natividad

Note.—Factual finding of quasi-judicial tribunals will not be


examined by Supreme Court. (Zagada vs. Civil Service Commission,
222 SCRA 681 [1993])

——o0o——

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