Consti Cases Assigned December 22

Constitutional Law II Cases Assigned December 22, 2018
G.R. No. 200370 P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02
Alvin Vergara (P02 Vergara) who were both on duty. 10 Chief of Police June
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
Respondent Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. 11
DECISION The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
LEONEN, J.: They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on
board. 12 At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. 13 They flagged down the
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi
jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The police officers
(Veridiano) assails the Decision2 dated November 18, 2011 and
instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.15
33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165.4
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what
appeared to be marijuana." 16 POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked
In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
it with his initials. 17 Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
Laguna,5 Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station.19
dangerous drugs. The Information read:
At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1
That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province
Solano, who also placed his initials. 20 PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to
accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.21 The contents of the tea bag
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
tested positive for marijuana.22
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City
on January 15, 2008.23 After participating in the festivities, he decided to go
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00
a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay,
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3)
offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued.7 motorcycles, each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire.26
During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello) When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists
and POI Daniel Solano (POI Solano) to testify.8 flagged down the jeepney.27 Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and
frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found nothing on his person.29 Still,
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the informed that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. "30
Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was
later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano
drugs.9 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.32 [warrantless] search was likewise illegal."50Hence, under Article III, Section
2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the Constitution, the seized tea bag
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a
arrested."33 He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in poisonous tree."53
evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further
argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is
custody. 35 admissible in evidence, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to
preserve its integrity.54 The apprehending team did not strictly comply with the
On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over [the person of the Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.55
accused]."36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question
any irregularity in his arrest.37 With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a
search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' comment on the petition. 56 In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1,
s "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he 2012,57 respondent stated that it would no longer file a comment.
consented to the warrantless search. 38
The following issues are for this Court's resolution:
On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision39 affirming
the guilt ofVeridiano.40 First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;
The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and
having marijuana in his possession.41Assuming that he was illegally arrested,
Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may have attended Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for
his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
the court.42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to
the warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him
to remove the contents of his pocket.43 The Petition is granted.
Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the I
Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44 The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a)
the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal
liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the
On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45 arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally
inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in
violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.46 He asserts Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid
that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was merely seated inside the jeepney at arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his
the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is
police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."58
or that he was committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable
information is insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a
valid warrantless arrest. 49
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional
or her active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may circumstances "when searches are reasonable even when warrantless." 72 The
have attended an arrest. 59 The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful
accused."60 arrest,"73 (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving
vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6)
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."74
preclude an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence
seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is
fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely reasonable. In any given situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ...
manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional is purely a judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon the unique
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences and distinct factual circumstances. 75 This may involve an inquiry into "the
of an illegal arrest. purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searched, and the character of the articles procured." 76
searches and seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: II
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the his possession making the warrantless search lawful. 77
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 63
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful
To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede
and seizures, Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any the search; "the process cannot be reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest,
evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible. 64 law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may
also be effected without a warrant.
The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and
seizures.65 It is only directed against those that are There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. 67
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private
In People v. Aruta, 68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
implies that "searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest."69 The (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 70
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person arrest.92 The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes
to be arrested has committed it; and "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact committed does not
automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is crime is committed up to the point of arrest.
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime.
However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.
The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act
test79 as explained in Cogaed: People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of
the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements violation of Republic Act No. 6425.96 He assailed the admissibility of dried
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized
that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.97 On appeal, the accused's
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the conviction was affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was
view of the arresting officer."80 justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers
had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the accused
killed the victim:
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as
an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and
within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. 81 when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of
unlawful.83 The police officers received information that a man was in
the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler,
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
striped [t]-shirt."84 The police officers waited for the bus along the national
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
highway.85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited
would have fled the law as his two companions did.99 (Emphasis supplied)
along the highway for a tricycle.86 Suddenly, the police officers approached him
and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having shabu in
his possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts
envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu.88 surrounding the commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v.
Warden. 100
In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that
Racho was not "committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers
time he was apprehended.89 Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the
tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to Maguindano Massacre. 101 Salibo presented himself before the authorities to
justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and
under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.91 detained. 102 In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not
restrained under a lawful court process or order. 103 Furthermore, he was not Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure
arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest: 104 specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the
right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. 110
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk"
Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. 111 Law enforcers
to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be
escapee prisoner. 105 (Emphasis supplied) afoot. 112 Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot
produce a reasonable search. 113
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 114 the police officers conducted surveillance
committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug
did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that addicts.115 They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and [was]
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers walking in a swaying manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs,
relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient the police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him
to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be what he was holding.117 However, the man resisted. 118 Upon further
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's possession. 119
or is about to be committed.10 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the police officers
justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs. 120
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no In People v. Solayao, 121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence
personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons within
just committed an offense. Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused
in a camouflage uniform. 123 When the police officers approached, his
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must companions fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run
have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person away. 124 One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the
sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. 125 This Court likewise found
probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. upon seeing the government agents." 126
III The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid
because the accused in both cases exhibited overt acts that gave law
enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion
with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was
requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.
considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a
single suspicious circumstance that would justify a warrantless search.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya
weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk"
would be transporting marijuana. 128 A passenger jeepney passed through the
search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."109
checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then disembarked and
signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The police intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor presumed.139
Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of
their bags. 130 The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner
consented to the warrantless search.
Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of
marijuana in Cogaed's bag. 131 In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was V
invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious
circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle.
men and search their belongings. 132Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized when the
indicating that he was in possession of marijuana. 133 object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes.140 Police officers cannot
be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when
Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating
who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles. 141However, the
to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches.142 Law
a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 143
police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to
infer anything suspicious. A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. 144 Due to the
number of cases involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the
IV guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which
searches in checkpoints should be conducted.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as
consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable Checkpoints per se are not invalid. 145 They are allowed in exceptional
searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and ensure their
prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing safety. 146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival
evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be is in danger. 147 Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a]
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or motorist'sright to 'free passage'"148 to a certain extent, they must be "conducted
coercion."135 in a way least intrusive to motorists." 149 The extent of routine inspections must
be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers
The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. 150
the circumstances. 136 This may involve an inquiry into the environment in
which the consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police In Valmonte v. De Villa, 151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle
procedures."137 is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. 138 In Cogaed, this Court search[es]."152 Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain
observed: of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable. 153
Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint
into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based
offense. 154 on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the
accused was arrested. 168 On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers
Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks
they are limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of carried by the accused. 169
the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers
only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches.1âwphi1 They had no
be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution. probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip
they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was
does not justify an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A accused.
tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are
arouse suspicion. searches based on reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals 170 where this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused
Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified
on tipped information, there have been other circumstances that justified themselves. 171
warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.
On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened
In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law security. In Dela Cruz v. People, 172 the search conducted on the accused was
enforcement agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security
that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being measures in ports. 173 This case, however, should not be construed to apply to
committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; 174 there is a
enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box "reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or
which the accused had in their possession. 157 In their attempt to leave the bus, stop at airports or other ports of travel. 175
one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the
way. 158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid.
leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.159 Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is
rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section
In People v. Mariacos, 160 a police officer received information that a bag 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction,
containing illegal drugs was about to be transported on a passenger petitioner must be acquitted.
jeepney. 161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis of the tip, a police
officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney.163 Upon seeing WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in
the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and
marijuana emanating from the bag. 164 The tipped information and the police Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.
officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
warrantless search valid. 165 hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise
received tipped information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014 PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI
Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs. VICTOR San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers
COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant. from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
DECISION
passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and
LEONEN, J.: Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their
autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since
compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three
what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those bricks of what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy
who traffic this scourge of society. nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a
fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested
Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and
result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"16 inside the station.17
perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected
intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of
of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the suspected marijuana.20
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate
"stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI
done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total
possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted. weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1
grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A
I total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station "waiting for a jeepney to take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could
in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s]
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4 help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This
was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one
asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
know.34SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy
to their conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These facts were "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just
parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.37 alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that
head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
inside.39 such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."50
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and
Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals
Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states: denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals
found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and
SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by I
law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED
twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams. DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002").41 II
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE
against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated
May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive
portion of the decision states: III
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO
No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid character of the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of
search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused. 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
We find for the accused. vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
II suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection 4. Consentedwarrantless search;
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution: 5. Customs search;
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 6. Stop and frisk; and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be III
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk".
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to
only be determined by a judge.56The existence of probable cause must be ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to
things to be searched.58 determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when information."66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search warrant."67
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
Constitution. criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. COURT:
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly him in the passenger jeep?
based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they WITNESS:
should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal A Not yet, Your Honor.83
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
69
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about
a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the COURT:
police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a
swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have
officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers
"to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74 WITNESS:
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared A No, Your Honor.84
drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified
suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
by the police officers otherwise.
"homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to
person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than
the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying
this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person
manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
and effects.
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
IV transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in V
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances
as probable cause: Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this
exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was Malacat:
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied) [A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88 safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 93 (Emphasis supplied, case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing
footnotes omitted) in drugs from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers
prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107The
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, bag contained marijuana leaves.108
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable illegal.109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest
search.98 and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that
prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no admissible because of the illegal search.112Consequently, Aruta was
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The acquitted.113
person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was the police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case
at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119 or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case,
the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of
drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked at People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was "two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert
carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or
holding.128 within the view of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were missing when
Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that
Chua’s situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was time.
no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
VI qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the VII
evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we
assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a this court previously stated:
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
the Rules of Court: implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person: the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of
aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-
examination: A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he
was somewhat frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he
ATTY. BINWAG: was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that,"
and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry."134
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the
contents of their bags, is it not? For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a
WITNESS: police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be
searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
A Yes, ma’am.
search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language
known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
not? understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
A Yes, ma’am.
VIII
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags? The Constitution provides:
A None, ma’am. Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the
contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
them, is it not? doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This
rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am. go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should
be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It
opening the bags, is it not? ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and
effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were
surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied) Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on
the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means
that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s
responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to
COURT:
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will
....
be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek

to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007 On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, v. CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
DECISION Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they
not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] Any evidence obtained something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to
proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
the basic principles of government.[2] petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.[9]
On appeal is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points.
affirming the Judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out
La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 Mercado.[10] Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was
(R.A. No. 9165)[5] and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[6] purported contents thereof.[11]
I. The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya),

the forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to
of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information[7] which reads: him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.[12]
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-
five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he
prescription from the proper government agency. testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from
his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8] claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then
proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothers him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his
house. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for
After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who
carried the bag until they reached their destination.[13] Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or
tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, substance which could have affected the result of the case have been
which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.[17]
thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his
arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however,
order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was the Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review
brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although is in order.
petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his
bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at II.
Mercados house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the
first time.[14] At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality
prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[18]
medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[15] Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.
On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill- contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence
to arrest petitioner. It observed further: on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that
the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod
the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused- and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without
appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way
taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first
Valdezs own testimony.[16] time at the barangay captains house.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners
albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against arrest stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit: attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.[22] Of persuasion
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz[23] that
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: [f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances
because flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,[24] [t]he phrase in his
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person presence therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting
to be arrested has committed it; and officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
from one confinement to another. [25]
xxx Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not enough to validate his warrantless arrest.[26] If at all, the search most
one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case
By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on
alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.[20] petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v.
The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless Ohio,[27] must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer
arrest. clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that person detained has weapons concealed about him.[28]
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot
within the view of the arresting officer.[21] Here, petitioners act of looking be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless
around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his search which was not lawful.[29] As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod
approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1)
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4)
the barangay tanod when they approached him. waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
prisoners.[30] tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.[34]
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. III.
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest. Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being
the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly
warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners
consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. bag.
Court of Appeals[31]
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2)
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.[35] The
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.[36]
duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the one allegedly seized from the accused.[37] There can be no crime of illegal
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively prohibited drug.[38] As we discussed in People v. Orteza[39], where we
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements
of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[32] paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the
conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to
apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for
officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by performed by the police officers.
petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner
admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held
no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33] that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations
produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus testimony that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the
delicti. statement in full context.[43] Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings,
although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom consistently denied ownership thereof.[44] Furthermore, it defies logic to
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of chain
accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the of custody comes into play.
drug.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of
were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is
accused due to the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is
shabu. duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in
his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes
records only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
thereafter to the police station. The Joint Affidavit[40] executed by the tanod
merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the
the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt[41] issued by prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
supposedly confiscated from petitioner. doubt.[45] Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most
primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
petitioners bag was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of
actually opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.
inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to
its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.
know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as
authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers who strength from the weakness of the defense.[46] Moreover, where the
conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with
the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt,
crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not
they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of
Laya. conviction.[47]
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as an especially vicious crime,
establish the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such [f]inds [48] and one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society,
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied. [49] for those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of the
[42] We cannot agree. living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-
abiding members of society,[50] whereas peddlers of drugs are actually agents
of destruction.[51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of

prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough.
However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate
the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accuseds right to be presumed innocent until proven to the
contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the
guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the
fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination
of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be
[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[52] In the same vein, let this
serve as an admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform
their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause;
and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his
continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015 plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination
later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
DECISION
shabu. 8
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence,
October 20, 2011 and the Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the
Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered
Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.9
City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner
Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were
arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to
have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange
The Facts
for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought
to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 10
Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
The RTC Ruling
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty
named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve
knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine
transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram
in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12
(sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug. The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on
Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this
relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause to justify the
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that
Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent
2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to
P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.13
while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
The CA Ruling other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 23
In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's
conviction. It held that P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One
arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident
delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with to a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
inquire on the matter right then and there.15 lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
denied in a Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18 person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
The Issue before the Court (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
9165. cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect
a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal. 19 or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs. 20 and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The Court's Ruling The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
The petition is meritorious. arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such
another. 26
search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must
an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its xxxx
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male
that the accused had committed it.28 persons you already identified?
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he knows for a fact Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that
that a crime has just been committed. 29 particular act?
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there A: They were quite facing me then.
could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03
Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing 0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this
around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City?
handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided
to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory: A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.
Pros. Silao: Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.
court where were you?
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am. do?
xxxx A: We stopped ma'am.
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am. A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the
reaction of these two male persons?
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
A: They were surprised, ma'am.
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual
incident that happened if any? xxxx
A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as
someone. police officer?
A: They were surprised. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03
were surprised? Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and
A: They were stunned. while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour -
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small
plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them. about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing
Lang ng tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything? "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would
not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Court: Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his
reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens. officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.
was indeed shabu. 32
Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?

Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in
Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
sinabi mo sa kanila? facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the
factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit? knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante.
Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to
Witness: Wala po. believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact,
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33
xxxx
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid
Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v.
recover the plastic sachet? Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk"
searches:
A: From his hand ma'am.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given
Q: Left or right hand? the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should
be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the [35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around
have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are not enough to create a
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In
this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed
xxxx unlawful.
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk"
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
as probable cause: crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from all criminal liability.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
police officers to inspect the same. Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
SO ORDERED.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have
to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine
reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution
prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
G. R. No. 197788 Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not
guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
Respondent
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
DECISION testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself
and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011. possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
Statement of the Facts and of the Case traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
version of the prosecution, are as follows: unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11,
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1)
Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of with law.
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the SO ORDERED.[6]
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition.
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT

SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application
UPON IN THIS CASE. of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.[11]
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto,
or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed
held thus:
and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a
motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a
helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides
he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
checkpoints:
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of
City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
occupants;
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention
arrested.
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
petitioner into custody. combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest.
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows: subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary
traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a xxxxxxxxx
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come
to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977)
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic
spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer citation was being made.
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but
that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451. penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
same violation. search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
complied with. apparent.[16]
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
statement they might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to
of dangerous drugs. take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid
police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their consent to a warrantless search.
custody.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
was likewise illegal. which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a
full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was
officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
alight from the car or doing a patdown: prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver
exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and
weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and
custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a indifference to the basic principles of government.[24]
relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . .
than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The
also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence). of the accused.[26]
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby
it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby
full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a SO ORDERED.
patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they
may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a
Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a
G.R. No. 176077 On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness.
The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the
PHILIPPINES, Respondent prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
DECISION Evidence for the Prosecution
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa,
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan
CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in
Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and D-2) that per
convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06
gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to the test
for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat,
Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police
accusatory portion of which reads: Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution
further endeavored to establish the following:
That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose
accused, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully and Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame
[METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram, relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken
knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above- along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily
cited law. alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4).
Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3] Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo,
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team
to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. boarded a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify
the said informant and/or memorandum.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie
Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their
Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the informant to the house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself
Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group
investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered
petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution. window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he
saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to
be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining
entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while aggravating circumstances. The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the
Abe, on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter
was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and
arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine
white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham
Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later
Evidence for the Defense docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the
completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
alleged that at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while
he, together with his sister and father, were at the upper level of their house WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED
watching the television soap Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-
downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside appellant.
were several male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as
raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]
alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these
officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the
at the back when he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible
handcuffed and together with his father, they were boarded inside the police against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his
vehicle. That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the
Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements
white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal
from their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was possession of dangerous drugs.
transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained.
That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his Hence, the petition raising the following errors:
father was ordered to go home.[5]
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established 1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO
all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM
petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive OF SHABU TRADING ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH
portion of which reads: CONVERTED THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A
RAIDING TEAM, CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH
WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED
ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime FROM A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the
provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED
9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his
ARRANGED BY PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished
ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT accordingly.
ANY WARRANT.
The petition is bereft of merit.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT. of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED
any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is estopped from assailing any
(SIC) OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal
THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE
of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[12]
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT
OF THE PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no
COURT OF APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
AND ARREST, IS CORRECT.[10] participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal
dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even
into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu. negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[13]
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping
through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view searched and the persons or things to be seized.
doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which
was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
said evidence. Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  a peace office of a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;[14] consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] The right against
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually exceptions, namely:
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15] 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in 2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless
arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the 3. Search of a moving vehicle;
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station
were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to 4. Consented warrantless search;
verify the reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included
the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, 5. Customs search;
saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be
shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious 6. Stop and Frisk; and
contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about
one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining
entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which, What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure
petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioners circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights.[16] PO3 presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the articles procured.[19]
evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the name of the petitioner. The
heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure
dangerous drug under RA No. 9165. made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not
only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the plain
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest view doctrine.
of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was
then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
of the arresting officer. have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
established exceptions. a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law and quantitative examination;
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such x x x x.
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the
inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20] Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
guilt of the offense charged. inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration. and custody over said items.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides: x x x x.[21]
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory accused.[23]
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner: Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the
integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of
the petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police
Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the contents
of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[25] disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
established by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating convincing evidence.[30]
officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items
seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate
the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested sentence imposed should, however, be modified.
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:
elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
of being in possession of the drug.[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case. unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the x x x x.
accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive penalties shall be graduated as follows:
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular x x x x.
manner.[28] Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of
trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth. hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
[29] MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or
newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
fact of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]
inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events
which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
against him. Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of
denied the accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The
shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal
authority.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the

imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the
maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law;
hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188611 5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for
examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee v. BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and
DECISION submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals 7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the accused; and
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in
Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating 8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino.
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the
November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay
allegedly committed as follows: Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was
composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and
That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana,
Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met
proper government agency or office. with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
CONTRARY TO LAW. was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned
During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon: himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc
1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other
Belen Mariacos; passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew.
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
a passenger jeepney; backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the
said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and
contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab; introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused- Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.
station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the [5] She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly
opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag,
the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from
newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to
marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered. verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched
earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the her arrest.[6]
confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory
examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti
marijuana, a dangerous drug. of the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by
When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that: Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses,
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial
together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after
poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be
bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this
refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items
be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution
accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao- failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited
ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station.
When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless
bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving
owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3] appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on
reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also
of which states: argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed
charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and aside appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed
to pay a fine of P500,000.00. and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after
confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the practicable.[11]
Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid
successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear
bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying
the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the
warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated: evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of
the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would
wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc
needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful
duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant. Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
xxxx nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags.
Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless
at that time. search is valid. These are:
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12
police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret jurisprudence;
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other
recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
of the bags.
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 right to be where they are;
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check
the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor
vehicle had already left the locality.[13] (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without
probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the
4. Consented warrantless search; person arrested.[18]
5. Customs search; Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
6. Stop and Frisk; and believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14] and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]
that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the
search. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
determining the existence of probable cause.[15] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.[20]
In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
seizure of evidence in plain view. satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the place to another with impunity.[21]
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be
be sought. obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such must be sought.[22]
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to
in the vehicle to be searched. leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable board the vehicle before the same left for its destination
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also
arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported valid.
from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a
baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
allegedly containing illegal drugs. Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
provides: distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved,
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23] The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
the exceptions therefor, to wit: administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person as a broker in such transactions.
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him.
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; This contention, however, is of no consequence.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
to be arrested has committed it; and ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession
transferred from one confinement to another. and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24] rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs
of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make individuals, but against public order.[29]
the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to the following manner:
another.[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a
prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
reached.[32] and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave
rise to the disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further
and their contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her provides:
uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient. SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey the following manner:
without knowing where they were taking the bags.
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
instruments, apparatuses, and articles. counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
very corpus delicti of that crime.[35] served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all brought her to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers.
The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while
the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana SO ORDERED.
fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley
Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that
appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from
the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not
render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items.[37]
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was
immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the
Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs,
which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence
establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellants arrest until the
prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable
ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean
that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The
justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the
custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even
assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should
have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the
quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is
deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on
the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of
police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly,
absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]
In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her

conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992 A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses,
Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs SANTIAGO EVARISTO Constabulary, indicates that on the day in question, a contingent composed of
and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants. Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the
Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National
Police, were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity.
Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the
Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they came upon one
Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding the accused guilty of
Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
illegal possession of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo
prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the
perimeter of the house, specifically a cement pavement or porch leading to the
appellants) reads:
same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and
Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the crime of Vallarta immediately observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo
VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows: who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After
ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the license to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited
Municipality of Mendez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and for questioning.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being private persons not authorized by law As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he
manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their possession, custody found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly
and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12 the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
gauge home made shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver
(sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1) plier use (sic) in
For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in
the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any permit
question, alleging that they were forcibly taken into custody by the police
or license from competent (sic) authority.
officers and even subjected to physical and mental indignities. They denied
ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence,
CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW. contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the
prosecution witnesses and other police authorities.
Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1
After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, decision dated 18 April 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective witnesses and
evidence to support their divergent versions of the events leading to the arrest Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D.
of the appellants. No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are
hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under Sec.
1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment shall the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an
be deducted from the aforementioned penalty. appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
With costs de oficio. jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant
requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this
SO ORDERED. 2
jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in
Harris vs. U.S.4 and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that
Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court: objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F" introduced in evidence. 6
in evidence considering that those are illegally seized
evidence; The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by
the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to
2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is
seized evidence are firearms as contemplated in Presidential clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the
Decree No. 1866; and house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent
and even accidental.
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the
arresting officer's testimonies which are patently contradictory With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court
and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3 sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based
on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
of the Constitution, the relevant portion of which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
issue except upon probable cause to be determined under an offense;
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
searched and the persons or things to be seized. has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
Sec. 3. (1) . . . .
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
proceeding. pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit
are unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other people in the vicinity,
warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this
proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings
"offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court easily shows that the two (2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC
held in People of the Philippines v. Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the Vallarta, testified in a straightforward and candid manner, categorically
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule identifying the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, clearly narrating the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has
although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED given no possible reason or motivation for these peace officers to make false
THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."8 accusations against the appellants. Absent the presentation of such defense
evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should deserve full credence.
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the
part of the peace officer of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in
perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to the records resolves said query. Criminal Case No. NC-267 finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel
Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearms as
who were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. defined in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Vallarta discerned the bulge on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation
along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental
professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. paraphernalia found in the possession of the appellants, in favor of the
Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to Philippine National Police (PNP) to be disposed of in accordance with law.
have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the
statute's coverage does not extend to firearms that are not functional or
serviceable. The Court does not agree. SO ORDERED.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully Separate Opinion
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF
FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be CRUZ, J., concurring:
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law
makes no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the
possession of even a part of a firearm is sufficient to come within the firearms and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed
prohibitive ambit of the statute. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere to its search and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and
debemus. open to eye and hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion
that the bulge in Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the
Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the warrantless search of his person and the seizure from him of thepaltik.
prosecution witnesses, maintaining that these were inconsistent with each
other, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that the entire incident was a This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also
contrivance on their part. Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in the dissented. As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not
statement of the prosecution witnesses that there were only three (3) come under any of the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5,
individuals in the vicinity (aside from the peace officers) as opposed to the of the Rules of Court, where a warrantless arrest and search may be made.
testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a hostile witness, that aside Paragraph (a) and (c) are clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b)
because although it may be conceded that a crime had just been committed,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed

it. In fact, they were pursuing Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in
the air, and not Carillo, whose assistance they even sought. The circumstance
that the search resulted in the discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and
could not retroactively validate the warrantless search for it was clearly void ab
initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have
been used in evidence against Rosillo.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the

firearms and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed
to its search and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and
open to eye and hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion
that the bulge in Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the
warrantless search of his person and the seizure from him of thepaltik.
This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also
dissented. As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not
come under any of the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5,
of the Rules of Court, where a warrantless arrest and search may be made.
Paragraph (a) and (c) are clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b)
because although it may be conceded that a crime had just been committed,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed
it. In fact, they were pursuing Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in
the air, and not Carillo, whose assistance they even sought. The circumstance
that the search resulted in the discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and
could not retroactively validate the warrantless search for it was clearly void ab
initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have
been used in evidence against Rosillo.
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014 Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
DECISION
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines,
BRION, J.: the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder
Court challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the
directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO
resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No.
GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not
91541.
able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, to his damage and prejudice.
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's
(petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular

The Antecedent Facts
Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station.
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3 preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.13
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
Police Station) to report the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the
(SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02 petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65
one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
beaten.7
lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.16
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
The Assailed CA Decision
Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which
of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest actually used the word "invited. "
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident
warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the
crime.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent
state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had issued.
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The Court's Ruling
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition. We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The
criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
The Issues
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors: this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was
employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition
I. has been abused.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT. fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and
establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench
II. and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case
presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the
current applicable interpretation.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE
PRECINCT. I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
III. The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of
1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of
the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE
THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest
the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to
England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and
Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the 3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were
Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of
States Constitution.28 It provides: Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise a warrant, arrest a person:
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied] actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With regard to circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of while being transferred from one confinement to another.
America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the
Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35 a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act
No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned. above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of
any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through
England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
Philippines. jurisprudence.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that the rules on We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason. 40 It further held American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative appropriate present application.
Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
prevention of public offenses.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer
the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable
for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that: ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a
felony having been committed.
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest: probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable
cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in
good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with,
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be
greater than that of confinamiento.
innocent.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of
less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the
Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that
case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of
summoned by the judicial authorities.
reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion"
who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would
whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him. be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a
be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the
the following circumstances are present: Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which
aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed. It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the
rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied] commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of
the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of discretion.
Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may,
within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any B. The 1940 Rules of Court
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, (Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
probable cause) changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private
Court as follows:50 person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
committed it; from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
underscoring supplied] Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not
not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
person to be arrested has committed it. arrested has committed the crime.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element
of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules committed the crime.
of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under
Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
to be arrested has committed it. violating the law is not a violation of due process.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that
for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to
his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
arrested has committed it.
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
(2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case
to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
suspicion or hearsay.51 determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting
officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised later.56
Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves
committed it. probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon
which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the particular offense involved.57
offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
committed the crime. information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
Procedure: Probable cause suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information
supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on
arresting officer need not verify such information.58
how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within
his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime. In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context
of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts
must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to arrest.
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or
Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within
to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62 reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that the evidence submitted by the parties.
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient limited time frame.
that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to
issue a warrant of arrest. Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make
arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently escape of the criminal.67
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113: In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing
The crime has just been committed/personal of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
to be arrested has committed it
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been
our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The
to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. information upon which the police acted came from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife.
Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same
crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest. the accused was one of the perpetrators.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3)
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid warrantless arrest was held valid.
considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the
arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the
case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime. arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court
held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man
has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims
committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the
policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the
arrest was valid. Black's Law Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts,
events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen
Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on
reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
was held valid. immediacy.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts
the commission of the offense. or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from
that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding
a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed
on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that
a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated
in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house. Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's
adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the
seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer
driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita
could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with
the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113
cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the
the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
requires clarification. reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib
arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso
Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative. of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
valid warrantless arrest responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
misapprehended the facts in its decision.81From a review of the records, we those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty.
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the different version of what transpired.87
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners,
date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City. perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively
(2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded. identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of
fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the
police officers.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when
they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners'
admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso. petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the submission is necessary.92
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SP02 Javier could
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso'
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a
committed the crime. simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would
produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen
argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the
had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to
knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1 by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to
the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or investigation is valid
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime. In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order
denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
circumstances. accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
mean as an authoritative command
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we

uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its
denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated
April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his
PHILIPPINES, respondents. gunshot wound(s).
FELICIANO, J.: Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information

for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the
Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of
Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed
no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out P100,000.00.
where the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had
dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in
a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case
of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved
petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the in fact released that same day.
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police leave to conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers,
that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas
until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. corpus.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas
Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one
bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently
surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying
dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion
July 1991. had become moot and academic.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the
and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, prosecution presented its first witness.
contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge.
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the
offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police. "freshly committed." His identity had been established through
investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station,
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting
the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991. b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and
restrain his arraignment. seasonably under the Rules.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the
the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent
Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. conformable to law and justice.
The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24
and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 d. Since there was a valid information for murder against
November 1991. 11 petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden),
of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil
trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos,
trial court, with petitioner's conformity. by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted
14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an
hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the
from this Court. offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was
obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and
space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first,
"continuing crime."
whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had
effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of
issues seriatim. petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of
the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6)
days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of an offense;
Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of be arrested has committed it; and
Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
investigation. serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without confinement to another.
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed
Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
petitioner. "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article
knowledge." 18 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides: without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.
— When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out,
fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
arresting office or person immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General
contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court
and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held
However, before the filing of such complaint or information,
to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that
the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by
waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at
Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in
the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had
case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must
actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of
the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the
walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full
the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law. measure of his right to due process.
xxx xxx xxx The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a
preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied) Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation
(attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot
preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In
without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
(5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's
preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation.
Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate
applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
be held to have been substantially complied with. validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. 25
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of
part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge
recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the
considering that no evidence at all — and certainly judicial process.
no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that
could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner
follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the
evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny
right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be the motion for cancellation of bail.
released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
remain entitled to be released on bail? preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or
petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons
merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this
true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the
have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and
does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of determination to respect those rights and liberties.
procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and
literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review
haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct
objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen
protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal
him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion
During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through of the preliminary investigation.
counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary
investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing
objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a
on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release
was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. 30 If he did not shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue,
walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at
was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory. I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had
waived the right to preliminary investigation because he freely participated in
SO ORDERED. his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A
closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the
proceedings footnoted in theponencia, reveals that he had from the start
Separate Opinions
demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly
participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that
there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one,
rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that
Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay
followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the
really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his
go back to square one. precipitate and illegal action.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public
moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner
administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the
inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration,
received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete
objectivity in its handling of the case.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and
I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point,
persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is
after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already testified, among them an
particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those
eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan
unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike
inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate
the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a
number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct
poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be
a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if
presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence,
there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
the importance of the court always following the Rules.
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty
thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the believed to be so).
foregoing observations because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's
decision.
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return
the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule
CRUZ, J., concurring: 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important
work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary
seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail.
verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the
the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended,
was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The
crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more
frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's
before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor, instead of determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose
filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
July 11, 1991 in the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the judge is under a
for preliminary investigation and release on bail (which was erroneously filed legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca,
his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution. 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472;
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's
cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for
the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail. In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for
having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections
the trial of the case should be suspended and that the prosecutor should now thereto.
conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case.
In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet commenced because
motions to quash the information were filed by the accused. Lozada . . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the
vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof
vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its
been conducted before the informations were filed in court. evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting
such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the
It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of
preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari.
ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA (Emphasis supplied.)
354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the
information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an
infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs.
Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and
for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is
law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888). particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those
unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a
"petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that "petitioner had not been poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be
arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence,
into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the importance of the court always following the Rules.
an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the
person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked foregoing observations because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's
into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the decision.
disposal of the police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified
by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was actually and CRUZ, J., concurring:
effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver
of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had
validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA waived the right to preliminary investigation because he freely participated in
525). his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A
closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991. proceedings footnoted in theponencia, reveals that he had from the start
demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly
Separate Opinions participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a
counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such
compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one,
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that
rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay
Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the
followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his
really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to precipitate and illegal action.
go back to square one.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner
moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the
administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration,
inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
objectivity in its handling of the case.
I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case.
after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already testified, among them an In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23
eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet commenced because
inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate motions to quash the information were filed by the accused. Lozada
number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego
a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are
there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty been conducted before the informations were filed in court.
thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably
believed to be so). It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA
the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the
112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory. information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an
infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who,
seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important
verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary
the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail.
was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the
crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended,
8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The
frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor, instead of probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more
filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's
July 11, 1991 in the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended. determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose
the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion
for preliminary investigation and release on bail (which was erroneously filed The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an
with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the judge is under a
his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution. legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca,
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and
after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472;
cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu
propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for
and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail. persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for
the trial of the case should be suspended and that the prosecutor should now having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and
without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections

thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the

prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof
of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its
evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting
such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the
issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail
for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the
law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the

"petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that "petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person
into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked
into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified
by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was actually and
effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver
of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its
validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA
525).
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.

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Constitutional Law II Cases Assigned December 22, 2018

DECISION The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the I

be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek

I. The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya),

of destruction.[51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Pros. Silao: Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?

xxxx A: We stopped ma'am.

A: They were surprised. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT

DECISION Evidence for the Prosecution

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  a peace office of a private

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides: x x x x.[21]

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

5. Customs search; Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.

the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed

I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular

proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we

FELICIANO, J.: Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the

without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections

Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:

. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the

I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the

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