1

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar 1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry  into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary:  Construction is the art or process
18 SCRA 247 – Statutory Construction – Construction; defined – Noscitur A Sociis of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The mechanics of the contest were
as follows: 2. No.
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).
during a specified period;
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers; and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift
enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
“lottery”. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station. principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then acting only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the
Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation of the contest does not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail
Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]). of the Philippine postal service.
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether
Roderick Daoang and Rommel Daoang vs The Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR No. L-34568, 28 March 1988)
sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or
159 SCRA 369
carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:
Facts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole
or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971,
the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot be mailed by Caltex an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had
via Philippine Post. a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for declaratory relief. Caltex spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following
elements: Issue:
a. consideration;
Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
b. prize; paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
c. chance.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is missing. Said element is
missing because participants are not required to pay anything – there’s no consideration on the part of the
participants. Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was merely applying the
law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a construction on the statute (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the
same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
HELD:
ISSUES:
The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper. are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant”, found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The children thus mentioned have a
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise. clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to
the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with
HELD: 
an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel
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Daoang , the grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal Court
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents FACTS:
and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the
former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana
Republic Flour Mills (RFM) were importing wheat to produce flour. During the process of transforming wheat into
Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names
‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with “Agonoy”, which is the family name of the petitioners, without flour, bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) were also produced. RFM were exporting bran and pollard but they were not
pronouncements as to costs paying wharfage dues because RFM were referring to them as wastes and not products. RFM interpreted Section
2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code referring only to “products of the Philippines” that are to be levied, etc. Hence,
Amores v. HRET, GR No. 189600, June 29, 2010 RFM did not agree with the CTA’s decision that a collection of wharfage dues must be given for exporting them.

FACTS ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law.

Petitioner, Milagros E. Amores, challenges the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public HELD:
respondent), which both dismissed her petition for Quo Warranto. Her petition seeks to ouster Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, whom she alleged to have assumed office as a representative of the party list organization Citizen’s Yes. Under Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it stated that: “There shall be levied, collected and paid on
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) without formal proclamation by the Commission on Elections; to be a disqualified all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines… exported from the Phils., a
to be a nominee of the youth sector since at the time of his filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage…” – which simply means that as long as the goods
was already 31 years old, which was beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Party-List System Act; to are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the
have changed his affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers sector was not effected at decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
least 6 months before the May 14, 2007 elections.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
The public respondent held that age qualification pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941 only applied to those nominated GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
until 1998, unless the sectoral party exclusively represents the youth which is not CIBAC’s case. Moreover, it held Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
that Section 14 of RA 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in the party-list affiliation.
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
After having her motion for reconsideration denied by Resolution No. 09-130, petitioner filed Petitioner for Certoriari
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus. The court determined
contending that the public respondent has created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941
Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees’ debt from the
fostering interpretations that go against equal protection of laws. In addition partial proclamation NBC Resolution 07- latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union; but which does not convert the credit union’s credit
60 was not enough basis for Villanueva to assume office on July 10, 2007. into a first priority credit.

ISSUE: Do Sections 9 and 15 of Republic Act No. 7941 apply to Villanueva? Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees
in favor of their credit unions.
HELD:
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The
law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil
The court has held that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 or Partylist System Act, apply to the private respondent.
Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case, the
According to Section 9 of RA 7941, a nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the
age on the day of election. When a youth sectoral representative attains the age of 30 during his term, he will be legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. Meanwhile, Section 15 reads “Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly
elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and
forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries.
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)”

The court has found no textual support for the public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 is applicable only to
those nominated until 1998 and found that Villanueva has changed his affiliation only on March 17, 2007, which was
within 6 months before the May 2007 elections. Therefore the court finds the private respondent not qualified to be a
nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families in May 2007 elections.
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., petitioner
vs National Telecommunications Commission and Kayumanggi Radio Network
Republic Flour Mills vs Commissioner of Customs and CTA
 3

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of NTC which ordered Radio Comm to desist from operating its radio Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
telephone services in Catarman, Samar and Sorsogon. adopt, viz.:

December 14, 1983 Kayumanggi filed a complaint with NTC alleging that Radio Comm was operating in Catarman (3) An alien, except:
without certificate of public convenience and necessity. Radio Comm counter-alleged that its telephone services in
the areas are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by NTC and its predecessor Public Service (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
Commission.
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
After conducting hearing, NTC ordered Radio Comm to immediately cease from operating in thise areas. Stating that
EO 546 a certificate of public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
and services including radio communications. consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children inaccordance with the rules on inter-
Radio Comm then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the present petition. country adoption as may be provided by law.

Issue: Whether or not Radio Comm a grantee of legislative franchise to operate a radio company is required to There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can operate. under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a
former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon
Ruling: Petition has no merit. Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the  third place, when
private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990,
PD No. 1 reorganizing the executive branch of the National Government, Public Service Commission was abolished private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipinocitizenship when she was
and its functions were transferred to 3 regulatory boards. The functions transferred were still subject to limitations naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
provided in the Public Service Law as amended.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a)
The new provision states that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies no longer exists because of the changes. of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipinocitizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
And the argument of the petitioner that the franchise has been operating for a long time already cannot be sustained. the petition foradoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and conclusions of law
insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule, Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
modify or ignore them only when it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14 SCRA 14). The petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be
denied the authority to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
the public respondent disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to public interest with Article 184.
and the common good.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the concept of
Republic vs. Toledano joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.  As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of
a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
Facts: spouses.

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a Note:
former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is
Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (DomesticAdoption Act of 1998). The Supreme
appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be
under Philippine Law.  qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband must complywith the requirements of the
law including the residency requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed. (Desiderio P. Jurado,
Issue: Civil Law Reviewer, 2006 ed., p. 232) 

Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

Held:

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)

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GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446) The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that the injured worker or
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success
decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February of such bids before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be
Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided”.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies
Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173,
publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that
extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the
(2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a
Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation
valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet,
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus,
its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, cases to which the law may apply.
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Republic v. CA and Molina
Floresca v. Philex Mining GR 108763, 13 February 1997
GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142) En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result
En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting
Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year
Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from
miners were able to recover under the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his
indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel
complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couples are separated-in-fact for more than three
has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are compensable exclusively under years.
Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA covers work connected accidents even if the employer was
negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of
on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during
jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court. the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the decision. Hence, the present recourse.
issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
or his heirs’ action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
action between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
(or fault) of the employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse. cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the
marriage.
 5

spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The Sangguniang
than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity;
but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes elections involving the barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order
psychological incapacity. issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof China Bank v. Ortega (J)
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part
be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically
permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation and
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to
code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.
the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the
State. To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. On 4
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the
China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court.
Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution) order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and
GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49) Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the
depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation),
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the
which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the
the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec also set the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation
recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of
opposition. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for law.
injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting
a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.
was without Comelec approval.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished
1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit
can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the
first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the
in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election. lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as
contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a recall Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
proceeding that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs against the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to petitioners.
the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law
leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its People vs. Jabinal
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the
 6

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, Adasa later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the
Antonio J. DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the OCP and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for
Estafa.
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of Abalos thereafter filed a MR arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved
retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa. party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of
the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. 
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted Adasa’s “Motion to Withdraw Information” and dismissed Criminal Case No.
He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently 8782. 
appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his
official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition and
Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal. reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA emphasized that Section 7 of DOJ Circular used the phrase “shall not”

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing Sec 7. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given
that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. due course if the accused had already been arraigned
mapa.
While the permissive word "may" in Section 121 would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to
Issue: entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. This provision should not be
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7.
conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
ISSUE: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such
Ruling: that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned? NO.
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
RATIO: CA is correct. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition
Reason: for review due course and must dismiss the same. Arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting
appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal
doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one under Section 12, must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. To give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not
only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice,
but would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.

BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS Estafa – Petition for Review before the DOJ – the use of the word “may” is erroneous – petition should have been
dismissed since the accused has already been arraigned
FACTS: 
Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, IBAA EMPLOYEES UNION VS. INCIONG
received and encashed two checks issued in the name of Abalos without the latter’s knowledge and consent and that
despite repeated demands by Abalos, Adasa failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. Adasa filed a FACTS
counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the 2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental On June 20, 1975, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before
affidavit claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the the then Department of Labor, NLRC in Manila. Conciliation having failed, the case was certified for arbitration and
country. later on a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter granting petitioner’s complaint. Respondent bank complied by
paying the holiday pay to and including January 1976. On December 1975, PD 850was promulgated amending the
A resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City finding probable cause against provisions of the Labor Code with the controversial section stating that monthly paid employees receiving uniform
Adasa and ordering the filing of 2 separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a monthly pay is presumed to be already paid the “10 paid legal holidays”. Policy instruction 9 was issued thereafter
Private Individual. Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. interpreting the said rule. Respondents bank stopped the payment by reason of the promulgated PD 850 and Policy
8782. This instant petition concerns only one of these criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8782).  Instruction 9.
ISSUE
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of Adasa, the trial court issued an order directing the OCP of Iligan City to conduct a Whether or not monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefit of holiday pay.
reinvestigation. After conducting the reinvestigation, OCP issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an
unconditional plea of not guilty. 1
 7

HELD
No. It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit- it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion
from the benefits. In Policy Instruction 9, the then Secretary of Labor categorically state that the benefit is principally
FACTS:
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
pay. While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statue by executive officers whose duty is
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
declared as null and void.
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627) Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing that “effective 1 this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
November 1958, all employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular 7 initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
(7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these Representatives.
objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere ISSUES: 
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
comes to the Supreme Court on appeal. House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation. 2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. 

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law HELD:
whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom 2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power
On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
determine what the law means. political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what “compensation” which are not truly political in nature.
should mean “For the purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions
authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever
prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear
mandate of the new law.
Sarmiento v. Mison
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.
[GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur
 8

the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.
enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s 6. Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of different language of proximate sentences to
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is determine meaning The word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner” which
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to
on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first
on Appointments. sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence,
contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to
Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to
is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by
Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other
1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to demands of public underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien
interest Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court juxtaposition.
resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether
prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of 7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictly The power to appoint is
whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the
2. Constitutional Construction The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court
will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative 8. The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. redundant After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use
of the word “alone” after the word “President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything
3. President’s power to appoint Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the
vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers
4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence, as a literal import
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987
Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would 9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included with the first group of
follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) appointment The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
of the Commission on Appointments. first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent
5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior laws A constitutional provision (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section
with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their
judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the 10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony with the new one RA 1937
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate
frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of
Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read
amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
“middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in GR 122156, 3 February 1997
 9

En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its Juan Antonio Oposa vs Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of 224 SCRA 792 – Political Law – Harmony in Nature – Inter-Generational Responsibility – Inter-Generational Justice
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) together with the minors Juan
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a Antonio Oposa et al and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that a
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and judgment be rendered ordering Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his agents, representatives, and other persons
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements, Factoran being the
Issue(s): secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
• Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
• Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the Manahan v. ECC
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of “Enteric Fever” while
may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas, Rizal, on 8 May, 1975. The
not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969, and that in the course of his
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes
of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.
that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the Issue: Whether the Workmen’s Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker
mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and
under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmen’s compensation
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in accrued Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, on passing
arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine upon petitioner’s claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has 1974, thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations — like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor
economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has Code — should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former. dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now
 10

the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor
of the claimant.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the amount of
P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the petitioner’s expenses
incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported
by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Tantuico, Jr. vs Hon. Eufemio Domingo (G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994)
28MAY
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit, ESTELITO SALVADOR,
MARGARITO SILOT, VALENTINA EUSTAQUIO, ANICIA CHICO and GERMINIA PASCO,respondents.
Kenny H. Tantuico for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Ponente: QUIASON

FACTS:
Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement.
He obtained the clearance applied for. The clearance had all the required signatures and bore a certification that
petitioner was “cleared from money, property and/or other accountabilities by this Commission”. Petitioner argues
that notwithstanding the clearances previously issued (by COA), and respondent Chairman’s certification that
petitioner had been cleared of money and property accountability, respondent Chairman still refuses to release the
remaining half of his retirement benefits — a purely ministerial act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement benefits is valid.

HELD:
NO. Petition was granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner’s
retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions.
RATIO:
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or Any
Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, the benefits granted thereunder “shall not be subject, among others, to
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.”
Well settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the
intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his
livelihood.