CRIMPRO RULE 116

Title: GR No. 99287

Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL,
respondents.

FACTS

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The
penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. 
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the
prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private
respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section
17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea.  The private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The prosecutor
then filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already
rested its case; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the
strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put
to waste.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently,
respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this instant
petition for review.

ISSUE/S

I. Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting private respondent's request to plead guilty to a lesser offense
because the request was filed out of time and the consent thereto of the prosecutor and the offended party was not
obtained. - YES
II. Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of section
17, republic act no. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of section 16 of the same
law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea - YES
RATIO

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only
one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in
the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already
rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick
within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan, the Court held that the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act
on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which
the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment
under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and
prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent
of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation of RA
6425 as amended because there is no offended party to speak of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute
requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his plea.
The Court does not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of  both the Fiscal and the offended party
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or
graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts
constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others.
The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant. The Fiscal who
represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though
he were the person directly injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will
have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right
against double jeopardy will be violated.

Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since
this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA
6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More
importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
RULING

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at
Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide)
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the
original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this
case is made permanent. No costs.
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