Investment Treaty Arbitration Report 2018

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October
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A report by the IBA Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration

A report by the IBA Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration
AAreport
reportby
bythe
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This is a draft version of the report. A final version, to undergo the full editorial process, will be published
on the IBA Arbitration Committee’s project webpages in due course.
Contents
Preface2
Summary of the 2016 Subcommittee report 3
Chapter 1: Consistency in investor-state arbitration 6
A solution to the status quo 7
An overhaul of the system? 23
Chapter 2: Efficiency in investor-state arbitration 36
Efficiency challenges before constitution of the tribunal (including

settlement and alternative dispute resolution) 36
Efficiency challenges after constitution of the tribunal 49
Chapter 3: Transparency in international investment arbitration 53
Publication of arbitral awards, broadcasting of hearings and document

production 54
Conclusion64
Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20181

Preface1
In 2014, the International Bar Association (IBA) Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration
(the ‘Subcommittee’) conducted a survey (the ‘Survey’) to gain an understanding of the criticisms
levelled at investment treaty arbitration and the extent to which such criticism justified reform.
The Survey contained 51 questions and covered a wide variety of topics, reflecting the practical
experience of investor-state arbitration users. In 2016, the Subcommittee summarised the responses
received (the ‘2016 Report’).2
The purpose of this report is to discuss the salient issues currently facing investment arbitration and
to offer proposed solutions on the matters of concern raised in the Survey. Three broad topics are
addressed – consistency, efficiency and transparency – which capture most of the subjects raised
with the current state of investment treaty arbitration. Indeed, increasing consistency, efficiency and
especially transparency foster the legitimacy of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Each section
of the report outlines specific questions and proposes potential solutions to the problems discussed,
with the goal of affirming the overall legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. Ultimately, the hope
is that this report will both deepen the understanding of some of the challenges facing investment
arbitration and promote a productive discussion concerning potential improvements.
Samaa A Haridi
Former Chair, Investment Treaty Arbitration Subcommittee3
Reza Mohtashami QC
Chair, Investment Treaty Arbitration Subcommittee
1 Editorial note: the report does not reflect changes to treaties and/or cases that were released after the contributions of the members of the
Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration were received in August 2018.
2 IBA Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration, Report on the Subcommittee’s Investment Treaty Arbitration Survey (May 2016).
3 The members of the Subcommittee are listed at the end of this report in Appendix 1. They include government officials, representatives of
arbitral organisations, academics, corporate counsel, arbitrators and arbitration practitioners.
2 Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 2018

Summary of the 2016 report
The 2016 Report provided a useful reference point for areas identified by stakeholders as needing
reform.4 The Survey contained 51 questions on topics frequently raised in reform-related discussions.
The Survey was designed by professionals in the field with the advice of a core advisory group
comprising some of the leading experts in the field of investment treaty arbitration. Input was
received from 109 individuals from a variety of jurisdictions.
The key findings of the Survey, as summarised in the 2016 Report, are set forth below:
Substantive protections and regionalisation
• More than half of the respondents expressed some concern regarding substantive
inconsistency between arbitral decisions in investment treaty arbitration.
• Most respondents believed that an appellate mechanism for investment treaty

arbitration could address that concern, in part.
• Most respondents believed that, to some extent, regionalisation of investment treaty

protection was an issue of concern. Regionalisation of investment treaty protection
refers to the phenomenon that has emerged in the past decade whereby states are
increasingly framing their international investment agreements (IIAs) within larger
regional arrangements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the attempted negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) represent examples of this.5
For instance, some commentators have argued that the overlap between bilateral
and regional treaty layers, a consequence of this regionalisation phenomenon, ‘raises
coordination challenges as parallel treaties may duplicate or contradict each other,
increasing the risk of parallel proceedings, double jeopardy and normative conflict’.6
Arbitrator appointments, disclosure and challenges
• A large majority of respondents considered that parties should have the right to appoint
an arbitrator.
• A majority expressed some concern about the distrust that parties may feel in the ability
of arbitral institutions to appoint good arbitrators.7 This distrust may be heightened by
the absence of system-wide disclosure practices and variations among institutional
appointment policies.8
4 See generally, the 2016 Report.

5 See generally, N Jansen Calamita Calamita and Mavluda Sattorova, The Regionalization of International Investment Treaty Arrangements,
British Institute of International & Comparative Law (2015).
6 Wolfgang Alschner, ‘Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law – Towards Consolidation or Contradiction?’ (2014) 17(2) J Int’l Econ
L 271.
7 Edna Sussman, ‘The Debate: Unilateral Party Appointment of Arbitrators’ (2013) 1(1) ABA Section of Int’l L 2.
8 David Gaukrodger, Appointing Authorities and the Selection of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview, OECD Consultation Paper
(2018) www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/ISDs-Appointing-Authorities-Arbitration-March-2018.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.

• A majority considered that the arbitrator disclosure process and arbitrator challenges
were issues of particular concern.
• An overwhelming proportion of respondents considered the fact that certain

arbitrators who had been previously appointed by the same party or the same law firm
in a particular dispute should be reported to the other members of the tribunal and
counterparties in an investment treaty arbitration.
• A majority considered that arbitrators should be able to act as counsel or legal experts
in addition to serving as arbitrators.
• A majority considered that arbitrators may sit in proceedings involving legal issues that
they previously decided in other proceedings.
• However, respondents were evenly divided on whether arbitrators should be permitted

to sit in proceedings involving factual issues that they previously decided in other
proceedings.
• Tribunal-appointed arbitral secretaries were not an issue of concern for a majority of

respondents.
• Most respondents considered that the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) procedure for challenging arbitrators is in need of reform.
This was not true with respect to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules.
• A majority of respondents considered diversity (eg, gender, race, religion and sexual
orientation) of arbitrators to be an issue of concern.
Arbitrator conduct and efficiency of proceedings
• An overwhelming number of respondents supported a code of conduct for arbitrators

in investment treaty arbitration.
• The majority of respondents thought that arbitrator availability, duration of arbitration

proceedings and the time taken to render awards were significant issues of concern in
investment treaty arbitration.
• Slightly less than 50 per cent expressed some support for limiting document disclosure
and approximately 30 per cent fully supported limitations on document disclosure.
Arbitration costs
• An overwhelming majority of respondents expressed some or significant concern about

attorney’s fees and expert fees, and to a lesser extent, concern was expressed about
arbitrator fees.

Parallel and collective proceedings
• The majority of respondents indicated some concern over parallel court and arbitration
proceedings by the same party against the same state and related parties against the
same state, as well as parallel court proceedings by the state against the claimant or its
affiliates.
• Some concern was also expressed about situations in which a single arbitration is
commenced by unrelated parties under the same treaty, state respondent and measures
at issue, and where multiple arbitrations are brought by the same or related parties
under different treaties against the same state.
Assessment of damages
• Most respondents were significantly concerned with the assessment of damages.
• The majority thought that tribunals are reasonably equipped to quantify damages, but
there was strong support for use of tribunal-appointed damages experts.
Third-party financing
• Just under half of respondents thought that third-party funding was a concern in
investment treaty arbitration.
• A majority of respondents considered that the existence of third-party funding should

not affect allocation of costs, and that security for costs should be available to parties
faced with claims funded by third parties.
Standards for annulment or setting aside of awards
• The majority of respondents considered that ICSID annulment grounds do not require
reform and that annulment committees or national courts hearing set aside applications
have not often exceeded their mandates.
Transparency
• Despite criticism calling for greater transparency, such as public access to hearings and
materials, most respondents were in favour of maintaining the status quo (and were
against, eg, open hearings, publication of pleadings and third-party participation,).
• Respondents were strongly in favour of the mandatory publication of partial and final
awards, which already exists in many cases.

Chapter 1: Consistency in investor-state arbitration
A legal system is consistent when it produces coherent solutions. Consistency engenders predictability,
thereby contributing to the system’s credibility and legitimacy. Conversely, a dispute system where
comparable cases produce contradictory results is unpredictable, which increases disputes and their
associated costs.
The debate over the lack of consistency in investment arbitration is not new. Several authors have
extensively analysed instances of alleged inconsistency in an attempt to identify its causes and propose
solutions.9
Certain features of investment law explain why it may be perceived as being more prone to
inconsistent decisions than other areas of law. Specifically, its reliance on broad legal concepts and its
decentralisation may foster inconsistent decisions, whereas other aspects, such as factual commonality
and public availability of awards, may make the pre-existing inconsistencies more visible to observers.
Catalysts for inconsistency
 Broad legal concepts: The legal issues addressed in investment arbitration generally involve
legal concepts that are designed to be applied to a broad range of situations, and,
therefore, are open to criticism and different interpretations (eg, fair and equitable
treatment (FET), full protection and security (FPS), transparency, and arbitrary and
discriminatory treatment).10
 Decentralisation: The decentralised nature of dispute resolution under investment treaties

contributes to its inconsistency: treaties provide for arbitration in the context of different
arbitral institutions, each with its own set of differing rules; in addition, the mere nature of
arbitration, where parties have a determining influence over the composition of the tribunal,
allows for inconsistent results. Each dispute is decided by tribunals consisting of different
arbitrators chosen by the parties, sometimes with opposing views on the relevant matters.11
 Newness: Finally, international investment law only emerged in its current form in ‘1959,
when Germany and Pakistan adopted a bilateral agreement, which entered into force in
1962’.12 The ICSID was not established until 1965, and significant case law in international
investment law did not begin to take shape until the early 1990s with the end of the
Cold War.13 While it may appear that investment law offers less certainty than many areas
of domestic law, this is, in part, a product of the fact that many (if not most) areas of
investment law are in the process of being formed.
9 See eg, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Is Consistency a Myth?’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds), Int’l Arbitration Inst, Precedent
in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing, Inc 2008) 137–148; Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521; Charles N Brower, Charles H Brower II
and Jeremy K Sharpe, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System’ (2003) 19 Arb Intl 415; ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements
of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Annex, at 3 (22 October 2004) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20
Improvements%20of%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
10 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Coherence and Consistency in International Investment Law’ in Robert Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), World Trade
Forum: Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy 1 (Cambridge University Press 2013).
11 Ibid, 9.
12 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 6.
13 Ibid, 9–11.

Magnifiers of inconsistency
 Factual commonality: Different cases with similar factual patterns are also common. In fact, it
is not unusual for different cases to challenge a single state measure or group of measures
affecting several investors. Occasionally, the common facts are not limited to the challenged
measures, but also extend to the investment itself, which is sometimes jointly owned by
different investors filing separate claims. The fact that different arbitration tribunals
address similar facts contributes to the risk of inconsistent arbitral decisions.
 Public availability of awards: Investment arbitration cases and decisions are often publicly
available and regularly attract attention as they deal with state policies and matters of public
interest. Although transparency may be seen generally as a factor that increases consistency
– because it allows arbitral tribunals and practitioners to have access to previous decisions
– it also highlights contradictions among decisions by different tribunals. Scholars and
practitioners closely scrutinise decisions focusing on contradictions and thereby increase
the perception of inconsistency.
Some commentators contend that inconsistency is an inherent feature of investment arbitration.14

Eliminating inconsistency, they argue, would risk jeopardising the decision-maker’s duty to decide
the dispute in an accurate, sincere and transparent manner.15 The majority view, however, is that
consistency in the interpretation of the applicable rules of investment law is a desirable goal, and thus,
measures to avoid inconsistency should be developed and implemented.16 The Tribunal in Saipem v
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh expressly referred to consistency as a duty of arbitral tribunals and a
necessary requirement to meet ‘the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors
towards certainty of the rule of law’.17 However, this view is far from uniform, and differences on this
issue have even arisen between arbitrators presiding over the same dispute. In Burlington Resources v
Ecuador, co-arbitrator, Professor Brigitte Stern, wrote that arbitrators have a duty to ‘decide each case
on its own merits, independently of any apparent jurisprudential trend’.18 In opposition, Professor
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler commented that arbitrators have a contrary duty to instead ‘adopt solutions
established in a series of consistent cases’ (absent compelling contrary grounds) to ‘contribute to
the harmonious development of investment law, and thereby meet the legitimate expectations of the
community of States and investors towards the certainty of the rule of law’.19
A solution to the status quo
Multilateralism/regionalism?
Since the end of the Second World War, ‘bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been the most
important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct
14 Thomas Schultz, ‘Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration’ in Zachary Douglas , Joost Pauwelyn, and Jorge E Vinuales (eds) The
Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford University Press 2014).
15 Ibid.
16 See n 9 above, 1.
17 Saipem SpA v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 March 2007, ICSID Case No ARB/05/07 67. See www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0733.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
18 Burlington Resources v Ecuador, Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5 para 187.
19 Ibid.

investment’.20 For the past three decades, however, multilateralism has been on the rise.21 New
regional and ‘mega-regional’ treaties have supplanted or supplemented older bilateral investment
relationships.
Negotiations on a proposed multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) were launched by

governments at the Annual Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Council at Ministerial Level in 1995.22 In 2013, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement entered into force,23 and the China-
Japan-South Korea Investment Treaty followed a year later.24 In 2014, in what was perhaps the
high-water mark for the trend towards multilateral investment agreements, the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that upwards of seven mega-regional treaties were
under negotiation and that some version of a MAI would touch over 80 developing and developed
economies, and cover nearly all of the world’s foreign investment flows.25 At the time, approximately
45 states and four regional integration organisations were creating or revising model investment
agreements.26 These mega-regional treaties were meant to usher in a new era of harmonisation for
international investment law with the hope that disparate obligations would converge, common
approaches to interpretation would be formalised, and arbitral decisions would become more
consistent over time. The perceived difficulties of a regime ‘too big and complex to handle for
governments and investors alike’27 would be overcome.
One of the promised benefits of mega-regional treaties was to mitigate the risk of inconsistent
interpretations.28 Through mega-regional consolidation, similar overlapping treaty provisions would
become more uniform in both substance and procedure. In turn, this would increase certainty in the
20 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T Guzman and Beth A Simmons, ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000’,
(2006) 60 Int’l Org 81.
21 See Robert O Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, (1990) 45(4) Int’l J 731 (defining multilateralism as ‘the practice of
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states’); John Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’ (1992) 46(3)
Int’l Org 561.
22 See OECD Press Release www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/43389907.pdf accessed 8 October 2018. See also, David
Henderson, The MAI Affair: A Story and its Lessons (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1999) 20–32; Peter T Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and
Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?’ (2000) 34 Int’l L 1033, 1037; Sam Zia-Zarifi, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Special Report’ 9 (1999) Y B Int’l Env L 345.
23 ASEAN, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (8 February 2013) http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2013/resources/
publication/2012%20-%20ACIA%20An%20Introduction%20(Apr).pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
24 Trilateral Investment Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, China-Japan-S Kor, 13 May 2012 ww.mofa.
go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf. accessed 15 December 2017.
25 UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Investing in the SDGs: Action Plan (2014), XXV, 119 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2014_en.pdf accessed 8 October 2018. In 2014, hopes were high that as of this writing the following multilateral treaties would be nearing
completion: European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CETA; the Tripartite Agreement (the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community
(SADC)); EU-Japan FTA; the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER Plus – Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island
Forum developing countries); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (ASEAN, China, India, Australia, South Korea and New
Zealand); TPP (NAFTA parties, Chile, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Peru, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei); TTIP (United States-
EU). UNCTAD striking an optimistic tone noted: ‘the more countries engage in IIA negotiations, including mega-regional ones, the more
they create a spirit of action and engagement also for those countries that are not taking part’. Ibid, 116.
26 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No 1 (2015 February) 1 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf accessed 15
December 2017.
27 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, XVII (2011); see also Wolfgang Alschner, ‘Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law - Towards
Consolidation or Contradiction?’ (2014) 17 JIEL 271 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2430242 accessed 15 December
2017, noting that ‘more than one BIT may result in difficulties’.
28 Mark Feldman, ‘Mega-Regional Investment Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (9 December 2016) http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2016/12/09/mega-regional-investment-arbitration accessed 15 December 2017 (‘Investment tribunals constituted
under mega-regional FTAs thus could make significant – and much needed – contributions to the development of investment law by analyzing
distinctions between intertwined trade and investment activities occurring in the contract of international production networks’).

obligations undertaken by states, and benefit host countries and investors alike.29
Events at the end of 2016 and 2017 caused the international investment law community to reassess
the likelihood of this new era, at least in the Global North. Diplomatic setbacks in the negotiations
of the TTIP and the United States’ withdrawal from the original TPP proposal, as well as political
challenges to the status quo attendant to Brexit and the 2016 United States election have called the
promise of this new multilateral era into question. Nevertheless, in the Global South, multilateralism
seems to have been proceeding at full pace.30 At this stage, it remains difficult to predict whether
we are entering into a new era of retrenchment from multilateralism or simply readjusting to the
emergence of multilateralism in a different form, where countries like the US are no longer at the
centre of gravity.
Moreover, increasing instances of overlap between regional treaties and BITs have raised separate
concerns that the obligations in those instruments create duplicate or contradictory standards,
thereby increasing, rather than decreasing, the risk of inconsistent results and parallel proceedings.
The scepticism now evident on whether large multilateral relationships between states will shape the
future is coupled with a renewed critique that ISDS is illegitimate and not sufficiently ‘fit for purpose’
as an ad hoc mechanism.31
The prevalence of overlapping international investment instruments resulting from regional treaties
Recent studies helped to clarify where overlaps exist within the investment law system and how
multilateral agreements may affect the consistency of interpretation in a given ISDS dispute. One
2014 study demonstrates that about 24 per cent of all bilateral relationships are governed by more
than one overlapping investment treaty or agreement, and upwards of nine per cent of all bilateral
relationships are governed by more than three investment treaties existing in parallel.32
This parallelism is sometimes by design and can result from carefully crafted integration efforts
by a state or group of states to establish a floor of substantive obligations. At the same time, it
permits those states to maintain a more nuanced or tailored bilateral relationship with individual
states. In other instances, the overlap is accidental, or not well accounted for, and is the result of
a state’s membership in separate, but intersecting, regional groups.33 The study cautions that ‘the
rise of regional investment arrangements can reduce, but also exacerbate, complexities in the
investment universe, furthering or diminishing the prospect of coherence and convergence towards
multilateralism’, and that ultimately ‘the impact of regionalism’ on ‘investment laws is, in the end,
what States make of it’.34 Thus, investment law’s turn towards regionalism requires a balancing
between the challenges to manage treaty overlap and the new opportunities to develop best practices
29 See generally World Economic Forum, ‘Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading
System?’ (2014 July) www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report_2014.pdf accessed
December 15 2017.
30 Matthew P Goodman, From TPP to CPTPP, CSIS (8 March 2018) www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp accessed 8 October 2018 (analysing the
transition from TPP to CPTPP after the US’s withdrawal in 2017).
31 Louise Woods, ‘Fit for purpose? The EU’s Investment Court System’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (23 March 2016) http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2016/03/23/to-be-decided accessed 15 December 2017; Anders Nilsson and Oscar Englesson, ‘Inconsistent Awards in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Is an Appeals Court Needed?’ (2013) 30 JIA 561.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid (citing UNCTAD, UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2013) 106–107) http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed
15 December 2017).

arising from the interplay between trade and investment law.35
Regionalisation has resulted in a large number of overlapping agreements that are subject to
ISDS. This, in turn, has given rise to a significant risk of discordant interpretations of substantive
obligations, divergent awards on similar facts, and ultimately the spectre that ISDS could be
delegitimised as a viable system of international justice.
Tools to ensure consistency in arbitral awards in the context of multilateral treaties
Where regionalism is especially ascendant, some states have attempted to create tools to exercise
control over their treaties and ensure that the obligations they have undertaken are interpreted
consistently across their overlapping investment agreements. A review of some of the multilateral
treaties negotiated in recent years offers insight into how states may be responding to concerns
regarding overlap and inconsistency in ISDS awards. States may use these tools to ensure that
tribunals provide consistent interpretations of the obligations they have undertaken to avoid conflicts
between different legal regimes and instruments. Some of those tools are:
Draft substantive provisions to guide interpretation: The first and most obvious tool a state has to ensure
consistent interpretation is to draft substantive provisions in the text that will guide interpretation. The
US, for example, favours a separate annex that sets out two categories of expropriation – direct and
indirect – and elaborates on factors that are relevant to determining when an indirect expropriation
through regulatory conduct may occur.36 Potentially less precise as guidance for a tribunal, although
equally determinative, is text that links substantive obligations to an evolving area of the law. For
example, states may tie the obligation to accord FET and FPS with customary international law, as a
way to provide an objective standard that is grounded in both state practice and opinio juris, rather
than based on any particular ad hoc tribunal’s view of what is unfair or inequitable.37 Similarly, another
example of how states guide the substantive interpretation of their obligations to ensure consistency
is found in the European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),38
which sets forth a closed list of acts that may violate the FET obligation.39
Joint-interpretations: Another tool states have at their disposal in several regional IIAs is the ability to
issue joint interpretations of their treaties. One such example is the Joint Interpretative Instrument,
attached to the CETA between Canada and EU Member States. This instrument purports to
35 Ibid (noting that ‘[c]ountries have two broad options in managing the rise of regionalism. They can either use regionalisation to de jure or
de facto consolidate overlapping treaties or they can opt for a co-extensive overlapping of treaty layers’, and that currently ‘the latter strategy
seems to be the dominant one’).
36 ‘Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives such as public health, safety, and the environment do not constitute indirect expropriations’. US Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty: Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection Investment (2012) (the ‘US Model BIT’) https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20
Meeting.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
37 Many states have adopted this approach, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, the US and Vietnam.
38 Eur Comm’n, In Focus: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (16 December 2016) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-
chapter-by-chapter/accessed 15 December 2017.
39 See, eg, Fabien Gélinas and Flavien Jadeau, ‘CETA’s Definition of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Toward a Guided and
Constrained Interpretation’ (2016) 1 Transnational Dispute Mgmt https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931503 accessed
15 December 2017. CETA Art 8.10.2 provides: ‘A party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 if a
measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b) fundamental breach of due
process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; (c) manifest arbitrariness; (d) targeted
discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief; (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion,
duress and harassment…’
clarify obligations ranging from the states’ right to regulate to investment protection and dispute
resolution, and expressly brings them in line with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties (the ‘Vienna Convention’).40 While these provisions are becoming more commonplace,
it is unclear whether they are a practical means of achieving consistency across awards, especially in
large multilateral treaties. Indeed, in NAFTA,41 the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (Interpretation) have not been used much by the three state parties to clarify substantive
provisions related to the minimum standard of treatment provision in Chapter 11 of the agreement.
Furthermore, joint interpretations may impact consistency in instances where the statement
effectively ‘amends’ rather than ‘clarifies’ the treaty, as was the case in Pope & Talbot, where the
tribunal found that the aforementioned note to NAFTA effectively amended obligations under
Article 1105 of the treaty.42 Moreover, it has been disputed, at least in the NAFTA context, whether
joint interpretations and notes of interpretation are binding on investors.43
Non-disputing party submissions by states: Perhaps the most underused tool that a state has to ensure
the proper interpretation of its treaty provisions is the non-disputing party submission procedure.44
These submissions are non-binding persuasive pronouncements by a single state on the meaning of
certain provisions. In the US, for example, these submissions are the product of internal deliberations
across many agencies. Most commentators and tribunals have recognised that state treaty-members’
‘common, concordant, and consistent statements’ of their intent with respect to a treaty provision
provide the best evidence of its meaning.45 Non-disputing party submissions are not as frequent as
one might expect, however, especially considering that all member states, including non-parties to
the dispute, have a right to submit statements on treaty interpretation, even without prior tribunal
approval or party consent.46 In addition, it is an open question whether tribunals sitting in
an investment dispute under a mega-regional multilateral treaty will be able to discern common,
concordant and consistent statements among more than 12, 16 or even 26 parties.47
40 Council of the EU, Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the
European Union and its Member States No 13541/16, 27 October 2016 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-
INIT/en accessed 15 December 2017.
41 North American Free Trade Agreement, US-Can-Mex, 17 December 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 612. See also www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
laws/italaw6187(15).pdf accessed 15 December 2017. NAFTA is currently being renegotiated. A future revision or replacement to NAFTA
could alter the investment arbitration provisions discussed throughout this report.
42 Pope & Talbot Inc v Gov’t of Can, Award in Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0686.pdf
accessed 15 December 2017.
43 David Gaukrodger, The Legal Framework Applicable to Joint Interpretive Agreements of Investment treaties, OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, No 2016/01, OECD Publishing, Paris; Eleni Methymaki and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Masters of Puppets? Reassertion of Control
Through Joint Investment Treaty Interpretation’ in Andreas Kulick (ed) Reassertion of Control Over the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge
University Press 2017) 155–181.
44 ‘United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration’ (2015) 54 ILM 747 (the ‘Mauritius Convention’). See
also www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (2015) accessed 15 December
2017.
45 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Points’ (1957)
33 Brit Y B Int’l L 203, 223 (‘a consistent [subsequent state] practice must come very near to being conclusive as to how the treaty should
be interpreted’ [emphasis omitted]). See Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Roles of
States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179, 200 (‘Under Article 31(3)(b), tribunals look for a “concordant, common and consistent” sequence of acts
or pronouncements about a treaty that “is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation”’ (citing, eg, Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1984) 137, and
Arnold D McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press 1961) 424.
46 In the NAFTA Chapter 11 context, the Art 1128 right to make submissions on treaty interpretation has been invoked by at least one non-
disputing state party in the majority of NAFTA arbitrations concluded to date. This has not been the experience to date in CAFTA-DR
Art 10.20.2 context. Whether and to what extent the six non-disputing state parties in any CAFTA arbitration will take advantage of these
procedures remains an open question.
47 See n 27 above, Feldman (‘[B]y including a large number of signatories, mega-regional FTAs could give rise to coordination challenges. Such
coordination challenges could weaken the effectiveness of joint interpretation mechanisms – a form of control mechanism on which States
can rely to limit the independence of tribunals constituted under a particular treaty’).

Treaty drafting
Clear treaty drafting
Many commentators believe that inconsistency in awards is an inevitable consequence of the fact that
there are more than 3,400 individual investment treaties, with numerous variations in the language
used, to express the parties’ substantive obligations.48 These differences in treaty language may result
in different interpretations and outcomes.
If a treaty is drafted clearly, it is less likely to lead to disputed treaty interpretations. The lessons from
interpretations of early treaties have already been incorporated by many states into their new treaties,
which are, typically, substantially more detailed than first-generation treaties. UNCTAD has expressly
advised states to review their early generation treaties to revise any language that may be unclear.
However, a balance must be struck between broad, even if imprecise, language and overly detailed
drafting, which may limit the inherent flexibility of concepts like FET, transparency, and arbitrary and
discriminatory treatment. Leaving room for interpretation in treaty language also allows standards to
be adapted to new situations.
Use of exceptions and reservations
The use of treaty drafting techniques such as exceptions, carve-outs and reservations should also be
considered to increase the clarity of investment treaties. Traditionally, investment treaties were short
documents that stated the substantive obligations agreed to by states, and rarely contained elaborate
exceptions to or explanations of treaty coverage. This can be contrasted with other economic treaties,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements and other free trade agreements (FTAs),
which typically contain carefully negotiated exceptions that clarify the intended scope of the treaty
for users and interpreters. Newer investment treaties have begun to include such exceptions. For
example, CETA contains a number of annexes clarifying the investment chapter, exclusions to the
chapter, joint declarations concerning the meaning of the text, and reservations from existing and
future measures.49
The use of exceptions is not without potential shortcomings. First, exceptions may limit the flexibility
of international legal concepts that protect investors. Second, substantial exceptions – especially
those that can be broadly interpreted in a dispute – may reduce the level of protection granted
to investors. Whether it is desirable to decrease protections and eliminate flexibility in this way
can be debated, given the small number of successful investor claims and the restraint shown by
international tribunals, even absent specific carve-outs. Third, exceptions included in treaties are
almost always backwards-looking, reflecting the state parties’ attempts to update the treaty in response
to investment disputes they have faced in the past. Consequently, they may not necessarily reflect
the disputes that could arise in the future. Fourth, exceptions drafted in an overly rigid manner may
restrict the ability of states to enact regulations and lead to further disputes regarding the scope of
48 See eg, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC’s) International Investment Agreements Negotiators Handbook: APEC/UNCTAD
Modules for an idea of the dozens of different potential wordings used for each obligation and how these might affect interpretation.
49 See n 37 above, ch 8 and annexes; see n 40 above at Art 1108 and annexes.
the exceptions’ application. These concerns should be weighed in deciding whether or not to include
exceptions in investment treaties.
Availability of travaux préparatoires
Travaux préparatoires are another tool that may enhance consistency in treaty interpretation
mechanisms. While states do not generally maintain travaux préparatoires, either because of record-
keeping practices or due to the use of model BITs, future negotiators might consider doing so. Treaty
drafts can also serve as legislative history, which may be a valuable aid to interpreters. Where such
texts are available, making travaux préparatoires to treaties available to arbitrators would be a welcome
step, as they can be resorted to under the Vienna Convention to confirm the ordinary meaning of the
treaty or to determine its meaning when general principles of interpretation leave it ambiguous or
obscure, or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.50 Of course, the use of travaux
préparatoires is not without controversy, as they may introduce ambiguity into treaty interpretation,
or be used to try to modify the intended interpretation of the final treaty language. Tribunals may,
therefore, wish to limit the use of travaux préparatoires in disputes to only those situations when they
are necessary to resolve a disagreement over interpretation.
Non-disputing state participation in arbitration
As mentioned in section (a)(ii) above, treaty provisions that give states a right to appear in an
individual case to address the proper interpretation and/or application of the treaty in question
may enhance consistency.51 While not determinative, the fact that the treaty parties are (or are
not) in accord about the interpretation of a provision should be useful guidance to tribunals that
must determine the intended meaning of that provision.52 Similarly, intervention of supranational
institutions, such as the European Commission, in recent proceedings, may provide guidance as to
how competing treaty obligations should be interpreted. The potential benefit from such outside
intervention should be weighed against the possibility that such input may add complexity to
proceedings, as well as the risk that non-disputing states will have diverging interpretations of the
treaty.
Binding and non-binding interpretive notes
Some new treaties include a provision that gives state parties to a treaty the power to issue binding
interpretive statements on the intended meaning of a treaty provision. This power was first exercised
in NAFTA under Article 1131. At the time, a number of commentators were concerned that this
would constitute a ‘de facto’ and retroactive amendment of the treaty. Alternatively, some have
said that the interpretation issued by NAFTA, the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (the ‘Interpretation’), contributed to a more cohesive approach to the NAFTA FET
standard. New treaties address the concern about possible retroactivity of binding interpretation by
making notes of interpretation effective from the dates they are issued (or even from later dates),
rather than making them instruments that purport to interpret both retroactively and prospectively.
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts 31–32, 23, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
51 See, eg, n 40 above, Art 1128.
52 Ibid.

For example, CETA provides that ‘[a]n interpretation adopted by the CETA Joint Committee shall
be binding on the tribunal established under this Section. The CETA Joint Committee may decide
than an interpretation shall have binding effect from a specific date’.53 A related technique would
be for states to issue non-binding guidance on treaty interpretation. For example, under NAFTA,
the parties have issued statements for non-disputing party participation, notices of intent to submit a
claim to arbitration and open hearings. While these do not purport to be binding, they have proved
useful. While interpretative notes have provided helpful guidance in some circumstances, they may
also carry the risk of introducing further ambiguity depending on their drafting. To the extent that
interpretative notes are non-binding, parties should be conscious of their limited applicability, as
attempts to overreach in issuing interpretative guidance may run into opposition to the extent they
conflict with the treaty’s plain text.
Agreed upon interpretations by domestic authorities
Another tool is to include provisions allowing domestic regulatory agencies of the treaty parties to
consult and agree on the interpretation of disputed legal provisions. This has been incorporated in
the prudential measures provisions of the Canadian and American model investment agreements.
These provisions essentially require the competent authorities of the claimants’ home state and
the respondent to confer on whether a taxation measure constitutes expropriation.54 Inter-state
discussions may increase the predictability of outcomes for states and provide helpful technical
analysis in some circumstances, but interpretation by state authorities may not necessarily increase
consistency.
Adoption of stare decisis or jurisprudence constante approaches
Agreement that treaty interpretations by a prior tribunal carry persuasive value may also be helpful.
Traditionally, investment treaty decisions were binding only as between the individual parties to the
case, with some treaties expressly stating this rule (eg, NAFTA).55 Over time, however, a number of
arbitrators have recognised the systemic importance of consistency and have thus sought to follow
prior decisions unless they were clearly incorrect. For example, in Canadian Cattlemen v United States,
the tribunal noted that case law could be considered as a supplemental means of interpretation
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.56 In other cases, this approach has evolved into a
doctrine known as ‘jurisprudence constante’, whereby tribunals strive to follow prior relevant decisions
unless they are distinguishable on the facts or the tribunal believes they are wrongly decided.57
Treaty drafters might consider requiring arbitrators to follow prior cases under the same treaty so
that systemic consistency is ensured. This could be done by adopting a doctrine of precedent or
stare decisis. However, the stare decisis rule is unknown to many national legal systems and might be
questioned when it is not placed in the context of a hierarchical legal system where appeal courts
53 See n 37 above, Art 8.31(3).

54 See n 35 above and Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPA).
55 See n 40 above, Art 1136(1) (‘An award made by a tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of
the particular case’).
56 Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v United States, Award on Jurisdiction (UNCITRAL 2008) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0114.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
57 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Award, 14 November 2005, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29 www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0075.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
can correct lower courts. The existence of a permanent investment court or other permanent
interpretative body, as discussed in this report, may reduce this risk. Furthermore, the absence of full
factual records and legal analysis of issues in prior cases may limit the ability of subsequent tribunals
to apply or distinguish previous findings. An alternative to stare decisis and potential middle ground
would be for treaties to adopt a softer approach to precedent, along the lines of the jurisprudence
constante approach espoused by some arbitrators.
Procedural mechanisms
Tackling parallel proceedings
Parallel proceedings may threaten the credibility of investment arbitration as a public form of
adjudication because, for some, they can run against the principle of legal certainty and undermine
arbitration as a credible method of dispute settlement.58
It is often in the context of parallel proceedings that inconsistency in investment arbitration arises.
Well-known examples are the CME and Lauder cases, which involved parallel proceedings brought
by a single investor against the same state, based upon the same set of facts and under two different
BITs.59 The two arbitral tribunals in both cases reached opposite conclusions – one found that the
actions of the government entity at issue caused the destruction of the investment and awarded
damages, while the other found insufficient proof of causation and dismissed the claim.60 Another
paradigmatic case is Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others v Arab Republic of Egypt,61 in which
Ampal-American Israel Corp and other companies brought an investment arbitration under the
ICSID Convention and two BITs, as well as four other related arbitrations: three commercial and one
additional investment arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules.62 The Ampal tribunal found that it was
jurisdictionally acceptable ‘to pursue distinct claims in different fora seeking redress for loss allegedly
suffered by each [investor] arising out of the same factual matrix’.63 The tribunal reasoned that
‘contract claims are distinct from treaty claims’ and it has jurisdiction to consider treaty claims made
by separate investors when those claims arise from distinct tranches of the same investment.64 The
tribunal drew the line, however, at claims in parallel arbitrations that are ‘double pursuit of the same
claim in respect to the same interest’, reasoning that it would be an abuse of process to pursue this
kind of parallel proceeding once the jurisdiction of one of the fora is confirmed.65 Thus, the tribunal
58 See eg, Giovanni Zarra, Parallel Proceedings in Investment Arbitration (Giappichelli Editore 2016).
59 The CME and Lauder arbitrations concerned the Czech Media Council, a government agency that granted television broadcasting licences in
the Czech Republic. Lauder, an American national, was a controlling shareholder of CME, a Dutch company through which Lauder invested
in the Czech broadcasting industry. Lauder was able to initiate one arbitration proceeding under the US-Czech Republic BIT and the other
under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT (through CME). In both arbitrations, Lauder claimed that the Czech Media Council interfered
with his contractual relationships and caused him to lose his investment.
See CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Final Award (UNCITRAL 2003) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0180.pdf accessed 15 December 2017; Lauder v Czech Republic, Final Award (UNCITRAL 2001) www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
60 See n 5 above, 271–298.
61 Ampal-American Israel Corp & others v Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, 1 February 2016, ICSID Case No
ARB/12/11 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7310.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
62 This parallel investment treaty arbitration against Egypt was initiated under the 2013 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (‘UNCITRAL Rules’) and
Egypt’s investment treaty with Poland. In that proceeding, the claimants were Polish-Israeli national Yosef Maiman and three companies of the
Merhav group of companies that he allegedly controls, including Ampal’s subsidiary, Merhav Ampal Group Ltd (ibid, 10(ii)).
63 Ampal-American Israel Corp & others v Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 February 2016, ICSID Case No ARB/12/11, at para 329
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7310.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, para 331.

held that Ampal had to ‘cure the abuse’ – which the tribunal clarified to not having been tainted
by bad faith, but rather the result of the factual situation – and submit the claim to the exclusive
jurisdiction of one tribunal, relinquishing the other.66
The issue of parallel proceedings in investment arbitration was included in the Survey conducted
by this Subcommittee in 2014. The responses to the questionnaire reflected concerns about parallel
court and arbitration proceedings by the same or related parties against the same state, and parallel
court proceedings by the state against the claimant or its affiliates. The questionnaire also reflected
the lack of general solutions to this issue. Similarly, a relatively recent phenomenon of multiple
investors bringing their claims collectively against a host state in a single arbitration proceeding has
also generated lively debate, as seen in Photovoltaic Investors Club v Czech Republic, and PV Investors
v Kingdom of Spain. This report tries to analyse whether the parties, arbitral tribunals or courts are
empowered to address these situations properly, what types of tools those stakeholders should be
given – adjudicators, in particular – to avoid undesirable situations of jurisdictional overlap between
two arbitral tribunals, or between a national court and an arbitral tribunal.
The respondents to this Subcommittee’s Survey were most concerned about the following three types
of parallel proceedings:67
 parallel court or commercial arbitration proceedings by the same party or related parties
against the same state, and parallel court or commercial arbitration proceedings by the
state against the claimant (or affiliates of the claimant);68
 multiple investors bringing their claims collectively against a host state in a single
arbitration proceeding. For example, the aforementioned Ampal v Egypt and Merhav v Egypt
cases, where the state refused to consolidate two overlapping treaty claims under different
treaties. The issue in these situations is whether there is double consent of the state to
arbitrate and to consolidate the cases. For example, in Erhas and others v Turkmenistan,
an UNCITRAL tribunal declined jurisdiction over a joint treaty claim brought against
Turkmenistan by a series of unrelated claimants.69 Conversely, in Flughafen Zürich AG
and Gestión e Ingenería IDC SA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the tribunal declared its
jurisdiction over the dispute even though the claimants were protected under different
BITs, as they were affected by the same set of measures attributable to the state. The
66 Ibid, para 334.

67 To some, parallel proceedings encompass both successive and concurrent proceedings. Although this broader definition is sometimes referred
to as ‘multiple proceedings’, for the purpose of this report, we will use ‘parallel proceedings’ to encompass both successive and concurrent
proceedings. See Nadja Erk-Kubat, Jurisdictional Disputes in Parallel Proceedings: A Comparative European Perspective on Parallel Proceedings before
National Courts and Arbitral Tribunals (Universitat St Gallen 2014) 98 www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/4226/$FILE/dis4226.
pdf accessed 15 December 2017; see also n 57, 2.
68 Eg, ‘ a foreign investor forms a local company in the host state of the investment and that company enters into a 30-year oil concession

contract with the host state’s oil company. After a few peaceful years, the host state terminates the contract. The local company starts
proceedings against the host state under the contract dispute resolution clause and claims that the contract termination was unlawful. In
addition, the foreign majority shareholder of the local company starts a treaty arbitration claiming that the contract termination was an
expropriation and a breach of fair and equitable treatment in violation of the investment treaty concluded by the host State and the national
State of the foreign shareholder. As a result, you will face two arbitrations about the same measure, the termination of the contract, and
about the same economic harm, the loss caused by the termination or expropriation’. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Multiple Proceedings in
International Arbitration: Blessing or Plague?’ [2015] The Asian Arbitration Lecture, Singapore 3.
69 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘UNCITRAL Tribunal Will Hear Turkmenistan’s Argument that a Bloc of Claimants Can’t Band Together to Bring
a Multi-party BIT Claim’ IA Rep (Santa Monica, 8 January 2014) www.iareporter.com/articles/uncitral-tribunal-will-hear-turkmenistans-
argument-that-a-bloc-of-claimants-cant-band-together-to-bring-a-multi-party-bit-claim accessed 15 December 2017; Luke Eric Peterson, ‘An
UNCITRAL Tribunal Declines Jurisdiction Over a Joint Treaty Claim Brought Against Turkmenistan by a Series of Unrelated Claimants’ IA
Rep (Santa Monica, 23 June 2015) www.iareporter.com/articles/an-uncitral-tribunal-declines-jurisdiction-over-a-joint-treaty-claim-brought-
against-turkmenistan-by-a-series-of-unrelated-claimants accessed 15 December 2017.
question remains, though, whether treaties should address collective claims specifically, and
whether institutions should provide specific rules for such cases;70 and
 multiple arbitration proceedings by the same or related parties under different investment
treaties against the same state.
1. The causes of parallel proceedings
In the context of investment arbitration, parallel proceedings may take place for various reasons.
Investors and affiliates may be required to press rights in one forum as part of their fiduciary
obligation, while voluntarily proceed in another forum in order to preserve their own rights. Or,
different fora may be governed by different instruments and legal regimes, providing different
remedies (parallel contract and ISDS arbitration is the quintessential example). Investors and
affiliates may also be forced into more than one forum by the state’s practices. Initiating arbitrations
under a particular treaty may be required to, practically (or even legally), preserve the ability to seek
home government assistance in a negotiated dispute. Often, parallel proceedings are undertaken
by investors whose parent companies have a different nationality. Each company may be considered
an investor under the relevant BIT and, therefore, commence its own arbitration.71 To this end, the
investor may use any of its subsidiaries and rely on the same or a different BIT. Under Article 25(2)
(b) of the ICSID Convention, the investor may even avail itself of a locally incorporated company.72
This may give the appearance that investors could be pursuing the parallel proceedings as an abusive
strategy; however, many would argue that only an exceedingly small number of investors, if any,
undertake the expense and complexity of multiple proceedings with the sole intent of increasing
their chances of receiving a favourable award.73 Apart from the reasons laid out above, a multiplicity
of claims may also simply reflect the modern economic realities of global corporations.
2. Adverse consequences of parallel proceedings
Parallel proceedings may have negative consequences that undermine the advantages of arbitration:74
1. The risk of inconsistent awards, in particular when contradictory decisions are made, and
a party tries to enforce the judgment or the award: In CME, the risk arguably materialised
because the Czech Republic refused a consolidated tribunal. In CME v Czech Republic75 and
70 See n 67 above 10–11.

71 See n 57 above.
72 Art 25(2)(b) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ‘ICSID
Convention’) for the purpose of the jurisdiction the ICSID considers as the national of another contracting state to ‘any juridical person
which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit
such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on
that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the
purposes of this Convention’. See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf accessed 15
December 2017.
73 Ibid, 8–9; see n 60 above, para 331.
74 See n 8 above, 1 (setting the following example: ‘I act as counsel in an on-going matter involving four parallel arbitrations concerning the
same dispute. The arbitrations were brought against our clients, a State and two State-owned companies, for the benefit of the same interests.
Shareholders at different levels of a chain of companies initiated two duplicative investment treaty arbitrations against the State under
separate investment treaties. The locally incorporated company sought the same relief as its shareholders in two duplicative commercial
arbitrations in different fora. Seeking to multiply their chances of obtaining recovery, these related parties dragged our clients through a
series of four full-blown proceedings before four different tribunals, each with two-week hearings involving essentially the same fact witnesses
and experts’ [footnotes omitted]).
75 7 UNCITRAL Arbitration No 403/VERMERK/2001/CME, Partial Award and Separate Opinion, para 418 (13 September 2001), 9 ICSID
Reports 113 (2006).

Lauder v Czech Republic,76 two different tribunals considered the same actions taken by the
government of the Czech Republic and notoriously came to opposite conclusions.77
2. The double recovery that allegedly may occur where a company, shareholder or another
company within the same group brings a treaty claim and a claim for breach of contract
and prevail in both proceedings for the same wrong: The tribunal in Sempra stated that
‘international law and decisions offer numerous mechanisms for preventing the possibility
of double recovery’ but offered no examples.78 The tribunal in Suez similarly alluded to
the need to prevent double-recovery at the jurisdictional phase,79 but the tribunal later
determined that ‘because the Claimants… did not intend to seek compensation in local
court proceedings for any loss already awarded and paid to them in this arbitration’, there
was no double recovery problem.80
3. The undermining of fundamental legal principles, such as legal certainty and procedural
fairness: Indeed, some commentators have argued that ‘arbitration fulfils its function only
if it finally settles the dispute underlying the claims of the parties. This means that the end
of arbitration proceedings shall coincide, from a substantial point of view, with the end of
the dispute between the parties. If, when a claim is judged, another substantially identical
claim is pending in another arbitration (or can be started again before another tribunal),
arbitration has failed in fulfilling that function’.81
4. The increase in legal costs, and in logistical issues because the parties need to present their
arguments before multiple fora sometimes in different jurisdictions.82
3. Potential mitigators
Preventing parallel proceedings has not usually been a key concern for drafters of bilateral or
multilateral investment arbitration treaties.83 Some treaties, however, include procedural mechanisms,
which some consider may prevent parallel proceedings.84
 Fork-in-the-road clause: gives parties a choice between seeking relief via either litigation in the
host-state’s domestic courts, or international arbitration.85 Once the decision is made, the
party waives its right to seek relief through the unchosen fora. While this does prevent the
same entity from bringing claims in both litigation and arbitration, its effect is limited to
that specific party.
 Denial of benefits clause: allows states to reserve the right to deny benefits of a treaty to ‘a
76 In the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, para 77 (3 September 2001), 9 ICSID Reports 62 (2006).
77 See James Crawford, ‘Ten Investment Arbitration Awards That Shook the World: Introduction and Overview’ (2010) 4 Disp Resol Int’l 71, 72.
78 Sempra, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para 102.
79 Suez, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 51.
80 Suez, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Award, paras 38–40.
81 Giovanni Zarra, Parallel Proceedings in Investment Arbitration XV (2017).
82 See n 66 above, 338.
84 See generally n 67 above, 12. As to the denial-of-benefits clause, some treaties use it to guard against the use of shell companies for the
purpose of initiating parallel proceedings – eg, shell companies tailor-made to meet nationality requirements. This clause allows the state to
deny treaty protection to a company controlled by nationals of a non-party. See, eg, Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95 https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202080/v2080.pdf accessed 15 December 2017
85 See n 11 above, 267.
company incorporated in a state, but with no economic connection to that state’.86 As
economic connection is normally defined as ‘substantial business activities’ within the host-
state, it has been used as a means of denying jurisdiction to shell companies.87 There has,
notably, also been some divergence among tribunals as to when and how the host-state will
be entitled to deny the advantages of a treaty to an investor, and whether the denial will
have retrospective or prospective effect.88
Courts and tribunals may also resort to the following doctrines in addressing parallel proceedings:
 Res judicata: a legal principle according to which courts and tribunals are bound by the
earlier judgments or findings of another court or tribunal as to a dispute before them.89
The principle is grounded in the desire to ensure finality in the resolution of a dispute and
to eliminate the harassment of respondents. However, the effect of this principle is limited;
it only comes into play after a proceeding is complete, where there is a triple identity of
object, cause, and parties, and it applies only to successive, but not simultaneous, parallel
proceedings.90
 Lis pendens: used by an adjudicator to stay or suspend a proceeding until the conclusion
of a parallel proceeding before another adjudicator.91 This doctrine is applicable when
parallel proceedings involve the same parties (persona), cause of action (causa petendi) and
claims (petitum).92 Some commentators have suggested that this triple identity test should
be relaxed. The persona requirement, in particular, to include identical claims brought by
shareholders, locally incorporated companies and companies within the same chain of
ownership.93
 Stay of arbitral proceedings: arbitrators’ competence to rule on their own jurisdiction

– the principle of competence-competence – provides tribunals with the means to stay
proceedings before them for reasons that include the mitigation of adverse impacts of
parallel proceedings. Although rules that govern investment arbitration are silent as to
a tribunal’s power to stay proceedings, it is generally accepted that it falls within their
inherent powers to conduct them in the manner they consider appropriate. In Spence v
Costa Rica, the tribunal recently reasoned that, if need be, it would have the power to stay
86 Ibid.
87 See Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2012, ICSID Case No
ARB/09/12 paras 4.71–4.92 (Tribunal granted El Salvador’s Denial of Benefits Defence brought under CAFTA Art 10.12.2, finding Pac Rim
(1) did not conduct substantial business activities in the US, as evidenced by (a) lacking a board of directors, board minutes, a continuous
physical presence, and a bank account, and (b) the fact that Pac Rim operated solely as a holding company for other subsidiaries which
conducted business in El Salvador, and (2) was owned by a Canadian parent company (Pacific Rim). The tribunal further noted this defence
had no impact on the Claimant’s non-CAFTA claims) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0935.pdf accessed 15 December
2017.
88 See generally Lindsay Gastrell and Paul-Jean Cannu, ‘Procedural Requirements of “Denial-of-Benefits” Clauses in Investment Treaties: A
Review of Arbitral Decisions’ (2015) 30(1) ICSID Review, 78–97.
89 See Denis Bensaude, ‘The International Law Association’s Recommendations on Res Judicata and Lis Pendens in International Commercial
Arbitration’ (2007) 24 JIA 415; see also Bernardo M Cremades and Ignacio I Madalena, ‘Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration’
(2008) 24 AI 507, 519.
91 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Vol III: International Arbitral Awards (Wolters Kluwer 2014) 3792.
92 Denice Forstén, Parallel Proceedings and the Doctrine of Lis Pendens in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Study between the Common
Law and Civil Law Traditions (Uppsala University 2015). See also www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:813565/FULLTEXT01.pdf accessed 15
December 2017.
93 See Christoph Schreuer, ‘Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law’ (2005) 3 TDM 1, 14; Silja Schaffstein, ‘The Doctrine of Res
Judicata Before International Arbitral Tribunals’ (PhD Thesis, University of Geneva and University of London, 2011) paras 713–715.

proceedings, based on its general power to conduct the arbitration under article 17(1) of
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.94 But, in Cairn Energy PLC & Cairn UK Holdings Limited
(CUHL) v The Republic of India, the tribunal denied a request to stay the proceedings and
reasoned that stays should be granted only exceptionally and for compelling reasons;
and the following four items should be considered: equality, the right to be heard,
the prevention of unreasonable delays and requiring that the outcome of the parallel
proceeding be ‘material’ to the outcome of the arbitration where the request to stay is
submitted.
 Consolidation of arbitral proceedings:95 the joinder of two or more pending arbitrations into a
single proceeding. Consolidation may be an option for parallel proceedings, in particular,
when one or more of the arbitrators appointed in the various and related cases are
identical.96 However, consent of all the parties involved is required, either expressly or by
accepting the rules of the institution administering the arbitration or by explicit consent of
the parties. Consolidation as a mechanism to increase the likelihood of consistent awards
has been included on ICSID’s agenda for the amendment of its arbitration rules.97
 Quasi-consolidation: or de facto consolidation encompasses a broad set of practices requiring

parties’ consent, one of which consists of submitting related cases to the same appointing
authority for the designation of the same arbitral tribunal or the same chairperson.
Another practice consists of different tribunals exchanging points of view on the core issues
of their cases. In one instance, the Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris went further and
decided that various tribunals would sit together to hear evidence and submissions by the
parties and would then separate and draft their awards in a predetermined and agreed
order.98
Other procedural mechanisms to tackle inconsistency of awards
Transparency of decisions and awards
Increased transparency of decisions and awards benefit the goal of consistency. It is difficult to expect
consistent case law if the cases themselves are not available to parties and arbitrators. Significant
steps have been taken in this regard, notably the 2006 ICSID rule amendments requiring publication
94 Aaron C Berkowitz, Brett E Berkowitz and Trevor B Berkowitz (formerly Spence International Investments and others) v Republic of Costa Rica, Procedural
Order on Stay Applications, ICSID Case No UNCT/13/2 (28 February 2017) 45 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw8478.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
95 Art 10 of the 2017 ICC Rules of Arbitration (the ‘ICC Rules’) deals in detail with the issue of consolidation. Under this provision, the ICC
court can consolidate arbitrations in three circumstances: (1) the parties have agreed to consolidation; (2) all of the claims in the arbitrations
are made under the same arbitration agreement; or (3) where the claims in the arbitrations are made under more than one arbitration
agreement, the arbitrations are between the same parties, the disputes in the arbitrations arise in connection with the same legal relationship,
and the court finds the arbitration agreements to be compatible. See also, eg, the Suez v Argentina water cases, in which three ICSID and
UNCITRAL arbitrations were combined into one proceeding.
96 See ICC, Arbitration Rules Art 10 (2017) (‘In deciding whether to consolidate, the Court may take into account any circumstances it considers
to be relevant, including whether one or more arbitrators have been confirmed or appointed in more than one of the arbitrations and, if so,
whether the same or different persons have been confirmed or appointed. When arbitrations are consolidated, they shall be consolidated into
the arbitration that commenced first, unless otherwise agreed by all parties’).
97 See IAReporter, ‘ICSID Identifies Sixteen Topics that Have Emerged from Rules Amendment Consultation, and Turns to Study and Drafting’,
IA Rep (Santa Monica, 8 May 2017) www.iareporter.com/articles/icsid-identifies-sixteen-topics-that-have-emerged-from-rules-amendment-
consultation-and-turns-to-study-and-drafting accessed 15 December 2017.
98 Cornelis Carel Albert Voskuil and John Anthony Anthony, Hague-Zagreb Essays 5: On the Law of International Trade: Reservation of Title, Domestic
Law, Conflict of Laws: Multiparty Arbitration (Kluwer Academic Publisher 1985) 131.
of awards or excerpts of awards,99 the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investment
Arbitration100 and the Mauritius Convention.101 Further efforts to publish arbitral awards will result in
a more consistent jurisprudence.
Preliminary rulings
Some commentators have suggested the creation of an advisory facility to which a tribunal might
refer a contentious legal interpretation and receive guidance in advance of its ruling. A similar
system has worked in Europe.102 Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU allows
domestic courts of Member States to request a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the
EU (CJEU) on the interpretation or validity of a relevant provision of EU law, with the underlying
purpose of ensuring its uniform interpretation across the EU. This provision has been applied to
arbitration in the context of the Yukos case, where the Court of Appeal in Paris formulated eight
questions for potential referral to the CJEU concerning the interpretation of the Energy Charter
Treaty. Furthermore, some have argued that tribunals be considered as courts under this provision,
allowing them to bring preliminary questions to the CJEU. In the decentralised system of investment
arbitration, however, there are significant difficulties in establishing an impartial and authoritative
advisory facility of this kind.
A permanent body issuing interpretive guidance
Consistency in international investment arbitration could be enhanced by creating a body tasked with
issuing either guidance or binding treaty interpretation. Existing examples of approaches that favour
a state interpretation are found in NAFTA, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and CETA.
Interpretations by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
NAFTA establishes the Free Trade Commission (FTC), composed of ‘cabinet level representatives’
of the NAFTA parties or their designees. The FTC may issue joint interpretations of treaty
provisions that are binding on NAFTA arbitral tribunals. The FTC is tasked with, among other
things, supervising NAFTA’s implementation, and ‘resolv[ing] disputes that may arise regarding its
interpretation or application’ in accordance with the treaty ‘and applicable rules of international
law’.103
This kind of interpretation may foster predictability of the law, as it ‘will bind all addressees of that
norm and all future NAFTA tribunals’, unlike the interpretation by a NAFTA tribunal, which would
have ‘more limited force’ as it would ‘bind the parties to the arbitration and may have some de facto
99 Aurélia Antonietti, ‘The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules’ (2006) 21 ICSID Rev 427,
442 https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/article/21/2/427/628910 accessed 15 December 2017.
100 UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014).
101 See n 43 above 747.
102 See, eg, Christoph Schreuer, ‘Preliminary Rulings in Investment Arbitration’ in Karl Sauvant (ed) Appeals Mechanism in International Investment
Disputes (OUP 2008) 207.
103 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of Law’ in Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11
Arbitration (Juris, 2011) 176 www.arbitration-icca.org/media/1/13571335953400/interpretive_powers_of_the_free_trade_commission_and_
the_rule_of_law_kaufmann-kohler.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.

precedential value’.104 Of course, it will not bind tribunals deciding a case under a different treaty
with identical or similar language.105
Interpretations under the CPTPP and CETA
More recent treaties have established similar mechanisms allowing a commission composed of
government representatives of the state parties involved to issue interpretations on the provisions
of the treaty. For example, Article 9.25 of the original TPP as incorporated into the CPTPP provides
that: ‘[a] decision of the Commission on the interpretation of a provision of this Agreement… shall
be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with
that decision’.106 In turn, Article 8.31.3 of CETA provides: ‘Where serious concerns arise as regards
matters of interpretation that may affect investment, the Committee on Services and Investment
may, pursuant to Article 8.44.3(a), recommend to the CETA Joint Committee the adoption of
interpretations of this Agreement. An interpretation adopted by the CETA Joint Committee shall be
binding on a tribunal established under this Section’.107
As is the case with NAFTA, these types of provisions may indeed promote consistency within the TPP
and CETA regimes, respectively, but their binding effects would be limited to their respective parties
and their respective languages.
Obstacles in the use of authoritative guidance on treaty interpretation
In addition to the coordination challenges associated with issuing such an interpretation, the exercise
of interpretative power by interpretive commissions created by treaties may be problematic for other
reasons as well. A well-known illustrative example of those reasons is the interpretation issued by the
FTC on 31 July 2001, prompted, in part, by the expansive reading of NAFTA’s Article 1105, that had
been adopted by the arbitral tribunals in Metalclad,108 S D Myers109 and Pope & Talbot regarding the
minimum standards of treatment under Article 1105.110 The FTC’s interpretation of Article 1105
purported to clarify that the concepts of FET and FPS did not require treatment in addition to, or
beyond that, which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.111 It was also ‘issued at a time when a number of Chapter 11 proceedings were pending’.112
The FTC’s interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105 has been heavily criticised on a number of grounds:
‘First, it has been argued that the Interpretation might be an ultra vires amendment of NAFTA,
104 Ibid, 187.

105 Andrea J Menaker, ‘Seeking Consistency in Investment Arbitration: The Evolution of ICSID and Alternatives for Reform’ in Albert Jan van den
Berg (ed), International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age? 17 ICCA Congress Series (Kluwer Law Int’l 2013) 634.
106 CPTPP Agreement, Art 1 (incorporating TPP Agreement Art 9.25.3) http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng.
107 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Art 8.44.3(a), 30 October 2016 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/
tradoc_152806.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
108 Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, Award, 30 August 2000, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1 para 100 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0510.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
109 S D Myers, Inc v Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, (2001) 40 ILM 1408 paras 224–264. See also www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
110 Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, 7 ICSID Rep 236 para 110. See also www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0678.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
111 See n 102 above, 181.
112 Ibid, 182.
as it adds words that are neither in the text nor in the drafting history of Article 1105. Second,
some have taken the view that the Interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of
the words in Article 1105 of the NAFTA and, therefore, is not an interpretation in accordance
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Third, concerns have
been voiced about the fact that the Interpretation intended to apply to pending disputes, which
violated the principle of non-retroactivity and the principle that no one may be the judge of his
or her own cause. Fourth, it has been argued that the FTC issued the Interpretation “out of the
blue,” “without any prior public consultation” and without giving “any warning to investors party
to ongoing Chapter Eleven arbitrations,” which may violate the principle of equal treatment of
parties’.113
Among these criticisms, of particular concern, is the notion that this kind of regime may allow states
to circumvent the principle of non-retroactivity of treaty amendments (because the amendment
creates a new norm) through the use of treaty interpretations. However, a genuine joint treaty
interpretation by an interpretive body should not constitute a breach of non-retroactivity because
‘true interpretations merely clarify the content of an existing norm’.114 An interpretation may indeed
be an amendment in disguise, as in the Pope & Talbot decision regarding NAFTA Article 1105, where
the FTC’s interpretation there ‘limited the reference to international law in Article 1105 to customary
international law’.115 Last, but not least, the fact that the state involved in the dispute is both a litigant
and a member of the commission that issues the interpretation could also be considered, because of
the ‘two hats worn by the respondent State’.116
Conclusion
An interpretive authority may contribute to the standardisation of treaty interpretation, but utility
may be limited. Coordination challenges among signatory states may contribute to this mechanism
not being used as often as it could be, a problem that is exacerbated under treaties involving a
large number of parties. In addition, there is also significant concern that: (1) states, as members
of the commissions issuing the authoritative treaty guidance, may unduly influence the outcomes
of the cases they are involved in as litigants; and (2) that this regime gives states undue power to
retroactively change the rules of the game without formally amending them. Moreover, even if
interpretive authorities continue to define treaty provisions to greater degrees of specificity, tribunals
will still likely reach different conclusions on the disputes before them.
An overhaul of the system?
The idea of establishing a standing court or some form of appellate mechanism for investment
arbitration has been evoked both by multilateral organisations at the international level, and among
individual states as a treaty-negotiation objective. In the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the
US proposed, as an objective in the negotiation of investment treaties, the establishment of an
113 Ibid, 188.

114 Ibid, 189.
115 Ibid, 190.
116 Ibid, 192.

‘appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment
provisions in trade agreements’.117
Practitioners and academics alike have also sought mechanisms to promote coherence in the
investment arbitration system given that the ICSID annulment mechanism, due to its impermanence
and inobservance of the stare decisis doctrine, has not always succeeded in doing so.118 However, the
form that such a mechanism should take remains the subject of debate. While some have proposed
a global multilateral institution as a solution, other less ambitious solutions, including regional
multilateral mechanisms and even bilateral mechanisms, have begun to take shape.
Historical background
Appellate mechanisms have been incorporated in several trade agreements. For example, the US has
incorporated an appellate mechanism into IIA’s entered into with Chile, Morocco and Singapore.
Taking it a step further, and with the same goal of ‘provid[ing] coherence to the interpretation of
investment provisions in the Agreement’, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) provides for the establishment of a ‘Negotiating Group to develop an
appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals’ within three months of
the date of entry into force of the agreement.119
CAFTA-DR, the Chile-US IIA and the CPTPP all provide that, in the case where a separate multilateral
agreement enters into force establishing an international investment appellate body for the parties,
they shall strive to reach an agreement whereby such an appellate body would review awards rendered
under their prior IIA.120
In a 2004 discussion paper titled Possible Improvement of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration the ICSID
Secretariat suggested that the establishment of an appellate mechanism for ICSID could be ‘desirable
to ensure coherence and consistency in case law generated in ICSID and other investor-to-state
arbitrations initiated under investment treaties’.121 Furthermore, such a system ‘might be beneficial
for ICSID to establish a single mechanism as an alternative to multiple mechanisms’.122 The proposal,
however, was not adopted since a subsequent paper noted that ‘most members of the ICSID
Administrative Council… considered that it would be premature to attempt to establish such an
ICSID mechanism at this stage, particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised in
the Discussion Paper’.123
As of today, the situation remains the same, with no palpable political consensus among states to
undertake the full-scale efforts that would be necessary to establish a universal appellate system. As
117 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 USC ss 3801–3813 (West Supp 2003).
118 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?’ (2007) 23 AI 357 www.arbitration-icca.org/
media/0/12319143087130/00950001.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
119 CAFTA-DR, annex 10-F https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
accessed 15 December 2017.
120 US-Chile Free Trade Agreement Art 10.19.10, US-Chile, 6 June 2003, 42 ILM 1026. See also https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/chile-fta/final-text accessed 15 December 2017.
121 ICSID; ‘Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) TDM 4 www.transnational-dispute-management.com/
welcome.asp accessed 8 October 2018.
122 Ibid.
123 Int’l Ctr for Settlement of Inv Disputes, ‘Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations’, Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat
(12 May 2005) para 4 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Suggested%20Changes%20to%20the%20ICSID%20Rules%20
and%20Regulations.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
such, individual states and regional blocs have begun to take matters into their own hands, pursuing
less ambitious but more feasible solutions.
Regional multilateral and bilateral solutions
One of the vehicles pursued by states to incorporate some form of appellate mechanism to
investment awards is the establishment of a different form of dispute resolution under regional or
multilateral FTAs. In fact, a different structure for the resolution of investment disputes has currently
been incorporated into two multilateral FTAs: CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (the
‘EU-Vietnam Agreement’).
These are the first two FTAs that contain provisions on ISDS and incorporate, inter alia, a new
method for the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the states that host their
investments. Both treaties provide a number of substantive protections for qualifying investors who
are enabled under the treaties to enforce these protections through a direct claim against the state
hosting the investment. The novelty of these agreements is that claims are adjudicated by a new court
with its own appellate mechanism, not by international arbitration.
Thus, investment disputes arising under CETA and the EU-Vietnam Agreement will be decided in the
first instance by a permanent court, referred to in the treaties as the ‘tribunal’.124 Some key features of
CETA’s dispute resolution mechanism are:
 the tribunal will be composed of 15 members appointed by the CETA Joint Committee
upon full entry into force of the treaty: ‘Five of the Members of the tribunal shall be
nationals of a Member State of the EU, five shall be nationals of Canada and five shall be
nationals of third countries’;125
 members ‘shall possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for
appointment to judicial office, or be jurists of recognised competence […] [with]
demonstrated expertise in public international law. It is desirable that they have particular
expertise in international investment law, in international trade law and in the resolution of
disputes under international investment or international trade agreements’;126
 the agreement requires that the tribunal ‘hear cases in divisions consisting of three
Members of the tribunal, of whom one shall be a national of a Member State of the EU, one
a national of Canada and one a national of a third country. The division shall be chaired by
the Member of the tribunal who is a national of a third country’;127
 the agreement provides for the establishment of a self-contained appellate mechanism

with the power ‘to uphold, modify or reverse [a] tribunal’s award’ or remand it for further
consideration, on the basis of: ‘(a) errors in the application or interpretation of applicable
law; (b) manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of
124 See n 37 above, Art 8.27.

125 Ibid, Art 8.27(2).
126 Ibid, Art 8.27(4).
127 Ibid, Art 8.27(6).

relevant domestic law; and (c) the grounds set out in Article 52(1) (a) through (e) of the
ICSID Convention, in so far as they are not covered by paragraphs (a) and (b)’;128 and
 in line with the provisions of CAFTA-DR, the CETA provides an obligation on the parties to
‘pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal
and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes’.129
Similarly, Vietnam and the EU have also agreed on a reformed investment dispute resolution
mechanism, consisting of a tribunal composed of nine members, and an accompanying appellate
tribunal, composed of six members. As in CETA, the EU-Vietnam Agreement imposes required
qualifications to serve as arbitrator and includes its own code of conduct.130 But, a bilateral or even
regional, appellate court may be seen as exacerbating the problem, as it creates just one more avenue
that may lead to more inconsistency in the system.
Global multilateral approach
The more radical approach to address inconsistency in international arbitration is the creation of a
permanent investment tribunal through a multilateral investment agreement, adopted in the context
of multilateral negotiations in the UN. This could be achieved through the creation of a permanent
international tribunal designed to resolve investment disputes between private parties and states that
would contain a built in, self-contained appellate system. Another option would be limited to the
creation of an international appellate system from which awards rendered under the existing system
could be appealed.
Both proposals have been studied by the Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS) in
a report presented at UNCITRAL, which decided, at its 50th session in July 2017, to mandate its
Working Group III on ISDS reform to proceed to: first, identify and consider concerns regarding
ISDS; second, consider whether reform was desirable in the light of any identified concerns; and
third, if the Working Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant
solutions to be recommended to UNCITRAL.
In its current presentation of the CIDS report (Document A/CN.9/917) of 20 April 2017 (the
‘Secretariat Note’), the CIDS notes that ‘the CIDS report considered two different options in depth:
(i) a permanent international dispute settlement body providing direct access to private parties and
State parties alike for investment related matters, and (ii) an appeal mechanism for investor-state
arbitral awards’.131 The Secretariat Note ‘addressed possible means for States to incorporate those
options into their existing and future investment treaties’ and concluded that ‘a convention modeled
on the Mauritius Convention on Transparency with certain adaptations could effectively extend new
dispute settlement options to existing investment treaties’.132
128 Ibid, Art 8.28(2).

129 Ibid, Art 8.29.
130 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, ch 8, annex II, January 2016 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 accessed 15
December 2017.
131 UN Secretariat, Possible Future Work in the Field of Dispute Settlement: Reforms of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), para 4, UN Doc A/CN.9/917
(20 April 2017) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V17/023/69/PDF/V1702369.pdf?OpenElement accessed 15
December 2017.
132 Ibid, para 4.
The Secretariat Note underlines that one of the main issues when choosing a type of appellate
mechanism is ‘the articulation between the new body and the current ISDS regime’.133 Both the
appellate and investment court options will be discussed succinctly below.
Standalone appellate body
One of the possible reform options of the current system discussed in the Secretariat Note is to create
a standalone appellate body, which would review appeals from decisions issued by current arbitral
tribunals.
The ICSID system in force would thus preserve most of its basic features, but would be complemented
by a newly devised appellate system. ‘A standing or at least semi-permanent appellate body as opposed
to ad hoc arbitral tribunals would pursue coherence and consistency across separate investment
treaties’.134 Notwithstanding that most arbitration regimes are premised upon the finality of awards,
the report cites a number of institutional arbitration regimes that provide appellate review of
arbitral awards. It notes that ‘under some national arbitration laws, parties may agree on a two-level
arbitration process, and there is no suggestion that the presence of an appeal makes the process
different from arbitration’.135 Many questions, however, must be considered including, but not limited
to ‘[w]hether a single appellate body should be created to hear appeals against awards irrespective
of the rules applied, and the extent to which this would be feasible’.136 Indeed, this raises procedural
questions concerning the composition of the appellate body, the appointment of the members of
the appellate tribunal, the applicable procedures, the role of parties in appointing members to the
tribunal and the applicable codes of conduct. Substantive questions also concern grounds forming
the basis of an appeal and enforcement questions linked to the binding nature of the award, as well as
the role, if any, for the seat of the tribunal and appellate tribunal.137
Institutional obstacles
The establishment of a permanent or semi-permanent appeals mechanism requires careful

consideration of its composition and structure. Relevant issues include the method of selection of the
members of the appellate body, the determination of their pay, the number of members, the duration
of their respective terms and eligibility requirements.
 Method of selection: One of the most contentious issues is the method of selection of the
adjudicators. There are two main options: one is to create a standing appellate body staffed
with permanent members, like the WTO Appellate Body. The second is to rely on the
formation of an ad hoc tribunal, the members of which would be selected from a roster
of arbitrators, like the ICSID Annulment Committee. Both options present challenges. A
standing appellate body would present issues with respect to its composition and related
costs. To some, it is particularly troublesome that a permanent appellate body would curtail
the parties’ ability to choose their arbitrators on a case-by-case basis. The ‘roster system’
133 Ibid, paras 16–28.

134 Ibid, para 20.
135 Ibid, para 21.
136 Ibid, para 24.
137 Ibid.

method is of concern based on the membership of the roster and the question of whether
states would ‘pack’ the roster with pro-respondent adjudicators.138
These issues require consideration of whether the appointment process should be undertaken by
states only, or whether organisations representing the interests of investors should be involved as
well, thus giving investors reassurance that their interests will be taken into account in the appellate
adjudicators’ selection process. Pursuant to the CIDS report, consulting ‘business organizations…
would mitigate the risk of shifting from the current model that resembles commercial arbitration to
the other extreme [by] neglect[ing] the fact that investor-State dispute settlement is asymmetric, i.e.,
the disputes are between an investor and a State and not between two States’.139
 Adjudicators’ pay: The adjudicators of an appellate body may be remunerated in different

ways, depending on their employment status (full-time, part-time or on call) and the
number of disputes expected to be handled. For example, adjudicators could be paid a
monthly retainer fee, which would be financed by the states that have consented to the
establishment of the permanent appeals body.140 Should the workload increase, the retainer
fee, other fees and expenses could be transformed into a regular salary, and the member
could serve on a full-time and exclusive basis.141 Or, the system may be financed through
fees paid by its users, including both investors and states.142 The amounts may vary, ranging
from covering the minimal cost of administration to providing for an amount allowing the
system to cover a significant portion of its budget.
 Number of members of the appellate body: Particular consideration is given to the number of
adjudicators who would sit on the appellate body. While in current investor-state arbitration
practice arbitrators typically sit on panels of three – and occasionally one – the idea of an
appellate body with a larger composition merits attention. For example, studies show that a
panel of five adjudicators is ‘possibly… the ideal number’.143 This is because, ‘[i]n smaller
groups of two or three, individuals are less efficient because they feel more exposed [and]
[i]n larger groups, the process is more cumbersome and individual members tend to be
less engaged’.144
 Duration of the adjudicators’ terms: Also important in the context of a permanent appellate
body is the decision on the length of adjudicators’ terms, and whether re-election should
be allowed. A strong case can be made for longer single-term periods, as opposed to shorter
ones with the possibility of re-election, as adjudicators so appointed would be ‘shield[ed]
from the possible (conscious or unconscious) pressure deriving from the desire to be re-
elected and would thus strengthen their actual and perceived independence’.145
138 See Robert Howse, ‘Courting the Critics of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: the EU proposal for a Judicial System for Investment Disputes’,
Working Paper (2015) https://cdn-media.web-view.net/i/fjj3t288ah/Courting_the_Criticsdraft1.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
139 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Michele Potestà, ‘Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model for the reform of investor-State arbitration
in connection with the introduction of a permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism? Analysis and Roadmap’, CIDS Geneva Ctr
for Int’l Dispute Settlement (2016) para 168 www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
140 Ibid, para 48.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid, para 175.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid, para 170.
 Qualifications of appellate members: The election and appointment process of the members
of the appellate body should consider a number of factors, including their independence
and impartiality, their nationality, their expertise and experience, as well as issues associated
with geographical and gender balance.146 Commentators insist on the notion that appellate
adjudicators should not sit on cases involving their state of nationality because, unlike
the usual commercial dispute, investment disputes ‘involve issues of public interest and
sometimes of high political sensitivity’ which can create in an adjudicator national of the
respondent state ‘certain psychological, if not actual political, pressure’ that inevitably
permeates the decision.147 While international judges ‘feel absolutely impartial…
temptations of ‘judicial nationalism’ may and do occur’.148
Competing policy interests
i. Undue burden on emerging markets
Policy-makers exploring appellate mechanism options should take into account all competing
policy interests, including the fact that an appellate mechanism may place a financial burden on
emerging markets. While in the current system costs associated with a dispute fall on the parties
involved, a permanent or semi-permanent appellate body would primarily be financed by the
states.149 In addition, the existence of an appeal mechanism will likely result in a greater number
of challenges brought against arbitral awards, which would cause additional costs and delays in the
dispute resolution process. As a result, states will be forced to increase the resources they allocate
to defending investment-treaty claims, to the detriment of their domestic expenditures. This
consideration is particularly important to low-to-medium income states ‘who obviously do not have as
much money to spend on arbitration’.150
ii. No guarantee of accuracy
A permanent or semi-permanent appellate body would not be a guarantee for accurate treaty
interpretation. A comparison of two lines of case law applying the denial of benefits provision (one
under the Energy Charter Treaty, the other under other investment treaties) helps illustrate the gap
between consistency and accuracy:
‘Both lines of decisions have been consistent in the sense that tribunals have allowed states to
deny treaty benefits after a claim has been submitted to arbitration under investment treaties
generally, but not under the Energy Charter Treaty. Such consistency, however, does not establish
the accuracy of the two lines of treaty interpretation because the difference in outcomes cannot
be explained by any distinctive characteristics of the Energy Charter Treaty’.151
146 See n 130 above, para 34.

148 Ibid.
149 See n 104 above, 623–624.
150 Nicolette Butler, The State of International Investment Arbitration: the Possibility of Establishing an Appeal Mechanism (University of Leeds, PhD
Thesis, 2012) 138 http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3361/1/FINAL_CORRECTED_THESIS_(22_jan_2013).pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
151 See n 27 above, 1, 8.

In light of the consistency-accuracy gap described above, policy-makers evaluating appellate
mechanisms may wish to consider the use of control mechanisms to offset the effects of greater
institutionalisation. Some of these mechanisms include: (1) the use of binding joint interpretations;
(2) the use of soft law (including non-binding rules, guidelines, standards and/or principles); and
(3) appointment (and reappointment) of members of the appellate body more attuned to national
positions.
iii. A standing investment court
The creation of a permanent international investment court by a multilateral treaty constitutes the
most radical proposal for the reform of the current system. This court would be similar in nature to
one of the existing established international tribunals (International Court of Justice, International
Criminal Court, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, etc) but would be tasked exclusively
with the resolution of international investment disputes. The court would be established through a
founding constituent instrument or statute to which states would become a party after a multilateral
negotiation in the context of UNCITRAL, with the participation of all member states of the UN.
As currently proposed in the Secretariat Note, such an investment court ‘could either be based on
a two-tier adjudicative system with a built-in appeal or without one’.152 This appeal mechanism is
distinct from the appellate mechanism described above, which is premised on preserving the ICSID
system. Indeed, ‘the setting up of an international investment court would constitute a departure
from the current ISDS regime. In short, an international investment court would bring key features
of domestic and international courts to the settlement of investment disputes. A multilateral process
to set up such a court would aim at ensuring coherence of the reform efforts, and address the
fragmentation of the current regime’.153
The main elements of an international investment court include issues regarding ‘adjudicators,
review mechanisms, enforcement and costs of its establishment and operation’.154 Consultations
‘covered the questions of composition and structure of an international investment court with the
purpose to review in more detail issues relating to the appointment of adjudicators, and ethical
and nationality requirement’.155 It was noted that a distinction should be made ‘between the
way adjudicators are elected as members of an international investment court and the way those
adjudicators are appointed or assigned to a panel to decide a specific dispute’.156 Any selection
process for potential arbitrators or adjudicators should be ‘transparent, rigorous, susceptible of being
clearly monitored by all stakeholders in order ensure legitimacy and gain public confidence’.157 Such
selection process would need to take into account, inter alia, ‘the independence and impartiality of
the adjudicators, their nationality, as well as of the possibility of investors’ input or involvement in
the election and appointment process’.158 Moreover, it would be worth considering ‘the expertise

153 Ibid.
154 Ibid, para 32.
155 Ibid, para 33.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid, para 34.
158 Ibid.
and experience of the adjudicators, as well as the geographical and gender balance’.159 One point
that was emphasised was the need to prevent so-called ‘double-hatting’, whereby adjudicators would
simultaneously act as counsel, experts or even arbitrators in other ISDS matters.160
The Secretariat Note also points out that:
‘[q]uestions were raised whether only States would participate in the election process or whether
a consultation with business organizations, i.e., organizations representing the interest of the
investors should be considered in order to avoid that only or mainly “pro-State” adjudicators
are selected, in particular if the system were to be funded by States entirely. It was underlined
that States were both hosting investments and home State of investors, and would therefore take
account of the interests of both when electing adjudicators’.161
Specifically, the Secretariat Note recommends consideration of issues involving the standards
and mechanisms of review in light of alternative mechanisms such as preliminary rulings, en banc
determinations, and consultation. For example, due consideration should be given to:
‘(i) the main purposes and usefulness of control mechanisms;
(ii) whether annulment would be better conducted through a self-contained built-in system; if
so, what are the procedural aspects to be considered, including grounds for annulment;
(iii) [r]egarding built-in appeal, how would an appeal mechanism interact with annulment (if
provided for); […] what would be the grounds for appeal […]; what should the standard
of review be […]; whether there should be any remand power of the appellate body to the
arbitral tribunal and, if so, how should it be delineated; and
(iv) Regarding alternatives, what mechanisms may be considered […] how could they best be
applied to the new regime’.162
The Secretariat Note also recommends consideration of award enforcement issues. For example, due
consideration must be given to: (1) whether the statute of an international investment court should
include a specific enforcement regime; (2) enforceability of decisions of an international investment
court in states that would not be party to its statute; and (3) enforceability of decisions under the New
York Convention.163
During the consultation process, two options were presented: under the first option, a system would
be designed as ‘an add-on to the current ISDS regime or under the auspices of an existing institution.
Such an approach would allow the use of existing resources for the preparation and initial set-
up, saving costs. This would essentially require the approval by the existing regime or institution
constituents for an additional mandate and that, in any case, would require additional financial
resources’.164
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid, paras 33, 34.
161 Ibid, para 36.
162 Ibid, para 45.
163 Ibid, para 50.
164 Ibid, para 53.

Another possibility would be to establish an international investment court independently from
any existing mechanism or institution and if so, ‘States that have consented to the statute of an
international investment court would generally be responsible for the financing of the court (the
same applies to a permanent appeals body)’.165 As an alternative, the users of the system should be
charged a fee.166
Finally, the Secretariat Note discusses to what extent could the proposed reforms, be it by the creation
of a standalone appellate body or an international investment court, be applicable to disputes that
would arise under existing investment treaties. Questions for consideration include whether or
not it would be possible to model such a multilateral mechanism on the Mauritius Convention on
Transparency, which could provide a framework for extending the mechanism to existing treaties.
Indeed, ‘a multilateral mechanism modelled on the Mauritius Convention approach could allow a
reform to begin as a plurilateral project, with the possibility for other States joining at a later stage,
whenever they consider it appropriate. This, too, would strengthen the chances for success of such
reform’.167
Furthermore, ‘this approach would relieve States from the burden of pursuing potentially complex
and long amendment procedures set forth in their numerous existing investment treaties. Indeed,
a mechanism implementing reforms, modelled on the Mauritius Convention, would render the
innovations directly applicable to existing investment treaties for those States that wish to embrace
such innovations’.168
Advantages of a standing investment court
The main advantages of a standing investment court are increased uniformity and legitimacy.
 Uniformity: A standing investment court consisting of a small group of designated jurists

addressing ISDS cases on a repeat basis would likely promote greater uniformity in
reasoning than the current system of appointment. Having a smaller designated group
of decision-makers expressly tasked with building a consistent jurisprudence could be
effective. Complementary tools, such as requiring collegial decision-making (as in the WTO
Appellate Body), making case law widely available and adopting an express requirement
to issue consistent awards will further strengthen this aspect of the system. It also seems
practical and more economical to focus on the initial decision-makers, so that cases are
more likely to be decided correctly at first instance rather than waiting to correct them
through an appellate mechanism.
 Legitimacy: A designated standing investment court could also address legitimacy concerns
such as repeat appointment leading to an alleged ‘arbitrator elite’, strategic appointment
of claimant or respondent friendly arbitrators and concerns that arbitrators are motivated
165 Ibid, para 54.

166 Ibid, para 55 (‘The fee to be charged to users could vary, from covering the minimal cost of administration to an amount which would
allow the system to cover a significant portion of its budget. The latter approach was seen as potentially useful to discourage frivolous
claims by investors... [However] one of the criticisms about the current system was that the tribunal members were being selected and paid
by the parties and therefore the funding of any new system should be set up so as to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the
adjudicators’).
167 Ibid, para 62.
168 Ibid, para 61.
by the hope of reappointment rather than the merits of a case. By definition, members of
a standing investment court act on a repeat basis. This would develop the expertise and
collegiality of the court members and is the norm in international tribunals. It is not usually
seen as creating an objectionable elite, but rather the creation of an expert body. In terms
of strategic appointment, court members presumably would be named to specific cases by a
neutral entity (institution, standing investment court president or other), and so concerns
about strategic appointment by parties and resulting bias should not arise. Similarly,
the fact that the court members would be appointed by a neutral entity means that the
outcome of a decision should not be perceived as having an impact on further appointment
and addresses this concern.
The selection of court members from a court roster and by a neutral entity should also address
concerns about the absence of legitimacy or democratic accountability that some have suggested
is absent from the current party appointment system. A carefully selected and skilled standing
investment court would have the same legitimacy as other standing international bodies. Several
corollary requirements could reinforce these impacts, including transparent selection requirements,
selection based on merit, collegial decision-making and publicly accessible decision-making.
Disadvantages of a standing investment court
The main disadvantages of creating a standing investment court are: (1) losing the confidence
created by party appointment; (2) ensuring a credible selection mechanism; and (3) costs.
 Claimants may lose confidence in the system: One of the key advantages of the current party
appointment system is that it gives each party a voice in the selection of a tribunal and
gives counsel and their clients confidence that their position will be fairly assessed.
Counsel have stressed this attribute of party appointment and warned that it should not be
underestimated as a strength of the system. This is especially the case in ISDS, where the
core of the dispute involves a private citizen complaining of state conduct, and the dispute
is not between two states on relatively equal footing. Similarly, both parties will be deprived
of the ability to agree on a presiding arbitrator, which is seen as an advantage by all.
 Who selects the standing investment court member? A particular concern about who selects a
standing court member is that it is likely to be selected only by states who are respondents
in the ISDS scenario. Commentators have suggested that this creates an incentive to
appoint tribunal members who are state focused and that it gives states an advantage. States
reject this argument, noting that in selecting a court member, they would represent the
interests both of investors from their jurisdiction who act as claimants and states who act as
respondents, and so they have every incentive to choose open-minded candidates that will
decide on the merits of each case.
 Cost: The cost of a standing investment court is also a concern. Presumably, standing court
members would be paid commensurate with other standing international courts, including
a salary, pension and employment benefits. If states want to avoid double-hat situations
and to ensure members are fully available to hear and decide cases expeditiously, they
will likely want a full-time body and must compensate tribunal members on this basis.

Similarly, a standing investment court would need facilities and support, including offices,
computers, technology support, administration, archives, legal support, tribunal secretaries,
court reporters, interpreters, hearing rooms, and so on. While this may be moderated
by using existing facilities, such as those of ICSID or the WTO, there is certainly a cost to
establishing a court. Furthermore, the process of filling vacancies on the bench, with the
political implications it entails, may lead to longer proceedings, thereby increasing costs for
attending parties.
The size of the standing investment court (and therefore its cost) will depend on how many states
adopt this system and how it is designed. Regardless of the number of cases, it will require a core
number of members who are independent and impartial, available for cases and able to operate in
the main languages of arbitration. One might also want to have a variety of nationalities so that a
court member would not be a national of the investor’s home state or the respondent state. The size
of the standing investment court will also depend on whether it sits in panels (three, five or more)
and whether it uses sole members for some tasks.
Most international courts are paid for by the states who established the court. The cost of these
courts can be substantial. It might be possible to have claimants contribute to the cost of a case or be
responsible for reimbursement of costs where they are unsuccessful.
i. How to design a standing investment court
There are many ways to design a standing tribunal. Several ideas (ranging from simple to complex)
might be considered. For example:
 States could agree on a list of persons who would act as members of the standing
investment court. These persons could be exclusively available for cases and could be
selected by parties (keeping some aspects of party selection), by an appointing authority or
by a designated standing investment court president. Once selected, all other aspects of the
applicable rules, including facilities support, would be provided as in the current system.
This would provide the advantages of a standing body with minimal cost.
 States could appoint a standing tribunal and have their work administered by an existing
arbitral institution under existing rules. This could provide more traditional administration
of the court, including having standing investment court members paid from a common
fund, using common support systems and having common offices where they could
share views on legal decisions. It would still allow for use of existing rules, with some
modifications.
States could establish a new standing investment court with full administration services and rules. In
so doing, numerous decisions would have to be made, including criteria for appointment, selection
process, length of term, funding of the court, support facilities required, designing procedural rules,
and so on. This would have the advantage of starting from a ‘green field’, but is likely to be the most
costly option.
ii. Criteria for members of standing tribunals
Finally, a credible standing investment court will depend on the selection of highly skilled members.
Among the criteria that should be considered are:
 expertise in the applicable law;
 familiarity with adjudicative processes;
 impartiality;
 availability;
 language skills; and
 diversity.

Chapter 2: Efficiency in investor-state arbitration
Results of the 2014 Survey revealed that many practitioners regard international arbitration as
inefficient. For example:
 approximately 95 per cent of all Survey respondents considered the duration of arbitration
proceedings and the availability of arbitrators to be issues of concern, with more than half
expressing significant concern in both respects;169
 approximately 85 per cent of all Survey respondents thought that the time tribunals take
after the last hearing to render their award is an issue of concern, with nearly 60 per cent
expressing a significant concern with the status quo;170
 approximately 75 per cent of all Survey respondents were in favour of limiting the
opportunity for document disclosure in investment treaty arbitration, with nearly half of all
respondents in favour of this measure to a significant extent;171 and
 a clear majority of all Survey respondents thought that attorneys’ fees, expert fees and
arbitrator’s fees were issues of at least some concern.172
Commentators ascribe the increasing time and cost of investment arbitration to a variety of factors.173
Regardless of the reason, investment arbitrations have taken more and more time and resources to
resolve. ICSID and UNCITRAL proceedings last an average of 3.6174 and 3.9 years,175 respectively. For
example, ICSID arbitrations require a $25,000 filing fee and take, on average, four to six months
just to constitute an arbitration tribunal.176 Of the matters arbitrated with ICSID in 2015, the average
amount of time to reach a resolution was 39 months.177 This Subcommittee’s Survey also found
growing dissatisfaction with the efficiency of proceedings. Recently, ICSID and other institutions have
begun to call for change to address this concern. While the international arbitration community
has had substantive discussions about increasing efficiency since the 1990s, efficiency as applied to
investment arbitration is a newer topic.178
Efficiency challenges before constitution of the tribunal (including settlement and alternative
dispute resolution)
Inefficiency concerns often arise before the merits may be decided. This section proceeds by
highlighting five pre-merit areas where issues of efficiency regularly arise: the process of selecting
169 2016 Report 7 (response to Qs 38 and 39).

170 Ibid (response to Q 40).
171 Ibid (response to Q 44).
172 Ibid (response to Qs 41–43).
173 Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi, ‘Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International Arbitration’ (2015) 3 GJIL 110 https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2611337 accessed 15 December 2017.
174 Anthony Sinclair, ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?’ Glob Arbitration Rev (26 October 2009) 20. See also https://
globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1028686/icsid-arbitration-how-long-does-it-take accessed 15 December 2017.
175 Jeffrey Commission, ‘The duration costs of ICSID and UNCITRAL investment treaty arbitrations’, Vannin Capital Funding in Focus (July 2016) 9
https://vannin.com/downloads/funding-in-focus-three.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
176 Lars A Markert, ‘Improving Efficiency in Investment Arbitration’ (2011) 4 Contemp Asia AJ 215, 224 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1966467 accessed 15 December 2017.
177 ICSID, Annual Report (2015) 31 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID_AR15_ENG_CRA-highres.pdf accessed 15
December 2017-.
178 See n 172 above, 117.
arbitrators, the number of arbitrators required, the availability of the arbitrators selected, the strength
of the claims or issues raised, and settlement procedures.
Selecting a tribunal
According to several studies, it can take anywhere from five to nine months to constitute an ICSID
tribunal from the moment that the request is registered.179
Under the ICSID Convention, tribunals are composed of three arbitrators, unless the parties agree
otherwise.180 When the parties do not agree on the number of arbitrators or method of selection, they
have 60 days after the registration of the request to notify the Secretary General that at least one of
them chooses the default mechanism set out in Article 37(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. Thus, even
if it is clear that there will be no agreement regarding the number or method, the parties may still
wait 60 days from the registration of the request before they invoke the default mechanism.181
Under the default mechanism, each party appoints an arbitrator and then agrees on a third presiding
arbitrator.182 This presents two concerns. First, the parties themselves may take some time to appoint
their nominees, and in most cases the parties take ample time to mutually agree on a presiding
arbitrator. Second, a party often objects to the nominees of its counterpart, which delays the
proceedings. Indeed, some analyses have indicated that objections and challenges to party-appointed
arbitrators are on the rise.183
In some circumstances, an arbitrator challenge may be tactical. It can have the desired effect of
delaying the proceedings. The moving party may also seek to send the arbitrator a warning, drive him
or her into making a mistake that would in turn create cause for challenge, or simply push him or her
to resign.184
Regardless of the motive, a decision on a challenge may take months,185 after which, finding and
appointing a replacement may again be time-consuming. Under the ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, the
same procedures apply for both the original appointment and its replacement.186
The ICSID Convention creates a deadline of 90 days for the completion of the constitution of the
tribunal.187 When that deadline is reached, a party may request the ICSID Administrative Council
to appoint the arbitrators itself.188 However, this deadline may be altered by the parties, and the
mechanism does not trigger automatically. Instead, parties are given the right to an appointment by
the ICSID Administrative Council. Moreover, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council’s
179 Stephen Jagusch and Jeffrey Sullivan, ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern’ in Michael
Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung and Claire Balchin (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Wolters
Kluwer 2010) 82.
180 ICSID Convention Art 37(2)(b).
181 See n 178 above, 81.
182 ICSID R 2(3).
183 Jason Gottlieb and Michael Mix, ‘Arbitrator Challenges: Balancing Flexibility, Confidentiality and Efficiency’, New York Law Journal (30 March
2015) www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202721577764/?slreturn=20180821155836 accessed 15 December 2017.
184 Constantine Partasides, ‘The Art of Selecting the Right Arbitrator’ (2011) London Sch of Econ www.lse.ac.uk/lse-player?id=1252 accessed 15
December 2017.
185 Adam Raviv, ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret (eds), J Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System for
Journeys for the 21st Century (Brill 2015) 653, 669.
186 ICSID Convention Art 56; UNCITRAL Rules Art 14.
187 ICSID Convention Art 38; ICSID Rule 4.
188 Ibid.

mandate is to consult both parties on an ‘as far as possible’ basis,189 which also leaves sufficient room
for recalcitrant parties to slow down proceedings.
Similarly, under UNCITRAL rules, a three-member tribunal is presumed unless the parties otherwise
agree within 15 days from when the respondent receives the notice of arbitration. As under the
ICSID Convention, the two sides appoint their respective arbitrators, and then agree on the presiding
arbitrator.190 If the parties are unable to agree on a sole arbitrator, they are required to designate an
appointing authority that will carry out such an appointment under UNCITRAL rules. If the parties
do not agree on an appointing authority within 30 days of the date of the proposal, the Secretary
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) may be requested to designate an appointing
authority required to make the appointment ‘as promptly as possible’.191 Thus, while in theory the
appointment of a sole arbitrator in the event of disagreement should take about 60 days, in practice,
it ends up taking between 90 and 120 days.192
Accordingly, under both the ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, while there are deadlines to avoid delays
in constituting the tribunal, there remains room for delay to be created by the parties.193 In ICSID
proceedings, a party may delay triggering the default mechanisms up to 60 days after the request is
registered, and under the UNCITRAL rules, much is at the discretion of the appointing authority,
and delays may also occur.194 The counter-argument, which helps to explain the long-time parties may
take in appointing arbitrators, is that ‘the selection of the party-appointed arbitrator may be the most
critical decision in an international arbitral proceeding’.195 Indeed, it is often said to be the reason for
parties to prefer arbitration over litigation.196 Parties and their counsel legitimately spend substantial
time and resources selecting the party-appointed arbitrator, underlining the importance of the issue.
The selection is normally completed after serious research by counsel with the client.197
There are several measures that institutions could adopt to minimise the time taken to select
tribunals. First, institutional rules might be amended to create a sanction mechanism for those parties
who create undue delays in selecting an arbitrator.198 Sanctions could mirror those enumerated in the
London Court of International Arbitration Rules, which include a written reproach, a written warning
concerning future conduct in arbitration, or any additional measures required to ensure a fair and
expeditious arbitration.199 Second, arbitral bodies could communicate to the parties the benefits of a
sole arbitrator. The UNCITRAL Rules could be changed to reflect the default rules regarding three
membered tribunals. And third, arbitration practitioners themselves might do their part to enlarge
the pool of arbitrators by nominating younger, lesser known arbitrators.
189 Ibid. Rule 4(4).

190 UNCITRAL Rules Art 7.
191 Ibid, Art 6(3).
192 David D Caron, Matti Pellonpää, Lee M Caplan, ‘The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary’ (Oxford University Press 2006) 176.
193 See n 178 above, 84.
194 Ibid.
195 Claudia T Salomon, ‘Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider’ (2002) 17 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep; Wendy Miles,
‘International Arbitrator Appointment’ (2002) 57 DRJ 36, 37.
196 Chiara Giorgetti, ‘Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?’ (2014) 35 UPenn JIL 431, 443 https://scholarship.law.
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1863&context=jil accessed 15 December 2017.
197 Ibid, 445.
198 Margaret Moses, ‘The Growth of Arbitrator Power to Control Counsel Conduct’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2014) http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2014/11/12/the-growth-of-arbitrator-power-to-control-counsel-conduct accessed 15 December 2017.
199 London Court of International Arbitration Rules Art 18.6, 1 October 2014. ‘The Arbitral Tribunal may order any or all of the following
sanctions against the legal representative: (i) a written reprimand; (ii) a written caution as to future conduct in the arbitration; and (iii) any
other measure necessary to fulfil within the arbitration the general duties required of the Arbitral Tribunal under Articles 14.4(i) and (ii)’.
Number of arbitrators
A further efficiency-advancing reform could be the mandatory direction or encouragement of

parties to arbitrate disputes via a sole arbitrator rather than a panel of three arbitrators in smaller
value or less complex disputes. This could save parties the time and expense of proceeding with
more arbitrators than may be necessary for the timely disposition of the case. Such reform would not
necessarily require wholesale revisions to major institutional rules. While most investment disputes
have historically proceeded before a panel of three arbitrators, no major arbitral rule concerning
investment disputes requires that there be three arbitrators instead of one.200
Modifying the framework for investment disputes to require or incentivise the use of a sole arbitrator
would address two key efficiency challenges that concerned Survey respondents. First, more than 90
per cent of Survey respondents expressed concern with the availability of arbitrators in investment
treaty arbitration and, relatedly, the duration of investment arbitration proceedings.201 As a matter
of scheduling, there is a clear advantage in having just one arbitrator rather than three. With two
fewer calendars and conflicting case commitments to coordinate, proceedings would no longer
be protracted from scheduling conflicts among the arbitrators. Further, to the extent that Survey
respondents interpreted arbitrator availability to connote the conflict-free commitment of an
arbitrator, requiring or incentivising a joint-party or institution-led appointment of a sole arbitrator
would mitigate the parties’ scope for arbitrator challenge and minimise the otherwise potentially
lengthy period before the arbitration where arbitrators are nominated and challenges are made
and adjudicated.202 Second, nearly 60 per cent of Survey respondents expressed significant concern
with post-hearing deliberation period.203 With just one arbitrator, the time required for extensive
consultation or the drawn out exchange of draft awards could be avoided.204 The time taken in
these respects by a three-arbitrator panel can be significant. Some commentators have suggested
that a party-appointed arbitrator may feel the need to pay specific regard to the facts or arguments
presented by the party appointing him or her, even – controversially – going so far as to actively
promote the appointing party’s interests in tribunal deliberations.205
However, while reducing the number of arbitrators on a panel may truncate the post-hearing
deliberation period, not all cases are suitable for a single arbitrator. The value of the claim,
complexity of the issues, and potential policy impact are some considerations to be made before
referring a case to a single arbitrator. In fact, most disputes involve high stakes matters, limiting the
200 See, eg, ICSID Convention Art 37(2)(a); UNCITRAL Rules Art 7; ICC Rules Art 12; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration Rules 2012
Art 7; Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the ‘SCC Rules’) Art 16; Investment Arbitration
Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rule 5.1.
201 2016 Report 7 (response to Qs 38 and 39). More than half of Survey respondents characterised their concern about both of these issues as
significant.
202 Around 90 per cent of Survey respondents expressed that challenges to arbitrators was an issue of at least some concern in investment treaty
arbitration. More than 40 per cent of Survey respondents said it was an issue of significant concern. See ibid, 4 (response to Q 33).
203 Ibid, 7 (response to Q 40). A further nearly 30 per cent of Survey respondents expressed some concern with the time investment tribunals take
after the last hearing to render their award.
204 Cases such as Pantechniki v Albania exemplify the benefit in terms of speed and cost that investment arbitration assumes, when the arbitration
is conducted by sole arbitrators: the entire procedure from the registration of the request to the award was completed in less than two years.
205 See generally n195 above, Giorgetti 454–458 (quoting Hand Smit, ‘The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator’ (2010) 33
Colum FDI Persp, 1 https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8G167Q9 accessed 15 December 2017); Albert Jan van den
Berg, ‘Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’ in Mahanoush H Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert
D Sloane, and Siegfried Wiessner (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff 2010)
821, 834; and Yves Derains, ‘Fifth Annual International Commercial Arbitration Lecture: The Arbitrator’s Deliberation’ (2012) 27 AUIL Rev
911, 913–919 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1790&context=auilr accessed 15
December 2017.

utility of a sole arbitrator in practice to a limited number of cases. From 2012–2017, the average
investment treaty claim was $719,334,000 (excluding the Yukos v Russia arbitrations).206 Furthermore,
according to ICC statistics, states and state-entities often prefer three-member arbitral tribunals, as
‘85% of ICC cases involving States and 86% of ICC cases involving State-entities were referred to
three-member tribunals, compared to only 57.5% of ICC cases in general’.207
The most problematic issue with having a single arbitrator is that it denies parties to an investment
dispute the ability to appoint an arbitrator of their own choosing. That denial, even under limited
circumstances, is an extreme measure. Any efficiency-serving benefit of an innovation that directs
parties to a sole arbitrator must be balanced against the impact this might have on the ongoing
willingness of investors and states to subject themselves to investor-state dispute resolution. With
more than 80 per cent of Survey respondents supporting parties’ ability to appoint an arbitrator
in investment treaty arbitration,208 the Survey results suggest that any measure that removes from
parties the ability to resort to a panel of three arbitrators would instigate re-evaluation of recourse to
the system. The fact that more than 60 per cent of Survey respondents also expressed at least some
concern with the appointment of arbitrators by institutions209 further highlights concerns beyond the
number of arbitrators. Having the autonomy to appoint an arbitrator to the panel remains a central
appeal of the investment treaty arbitration system to a large proportion of its users.
Automatic referral of cases to a sole arbitrator advances efficiency at too high a cost to most users
of the system. However, pre-arbitration arrangements may allow for parties to proceed with one
arbitrator. Pre-arbitration agreements preserve party autonomy in the panel constitution phase. The
parties themselves choose whether their ability to appoint an arbitrator of their choice should be
limited. Parties who genuinely value a more efficient process could explore the complexity of factual
and legal issues of the case. This would inform a discussion on damages appraisals and scheduling.
Parties would then be free to determine whether a sole arbitrator or a panel of three would, on
balance, be more desirable for the resolution of the dispute. 210 While it is a modest innovation, this
measure might allow parties who truly desire a speedy outcome to proceed more efficiently with a
sole arbitrator.
Lack of availability of arbitrators
In 1995, the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC (the ‘ICC Court’) expressed concern about
arbitrator availability and added to the arbitrator’s statement of independence a declaration that
the prospective arbitrator is ‘able and available to serve as an arbitrator in accordance with all of the
requirements of ‘the Rules’.211 The ICC believes that ‘[t]he availability of arbitrators, to be intended
206 Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, Duration and Size of Claims All Show Steady Increase, Allen & Overy, (14 December 2017) www.
allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-Arbitration-cost-duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx
accessed 8 October 2018.
207 ICC, Commission Report, States, State Entities and ICC Arbitration (2012) 3 n 1 https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2015/10/ICC-
Arbitration-Commission-Report-on-Arbitration-Involving-States-and-State-Entities-under-the-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-2012.pdf accessed 16
December 2017.
208 2016 Report 3 (response to Q 28).
209 Ibid, 4 (response to Q 29).
210 To preserve the confidentiality of the dispute, potential arbitrator appointees in any such pre-arbitration procedure may need to sign a non-
disclosure agreement. In this way, should the parties elect to proceed with an alternative arbitrator – or alternative arbitrators – the confidence
of the dispute remains protected.
211 Yves Derains and Eric Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (Kluwer Law Int’l 2005) 156.
as their ability to devote the necessary time to hearing the case, is fundamental to the streamlined
course of the proceedings. The quality of arbitral tribunals also results from this, as international
arbitrators are very often overloaded with work. A desired arbitrator may not be available in time and
in travelling capacity, thus endangering the celerity of the proceedings’.212
One potential solution is greater disclosure regarding arbitrator availability. In order to increase
efficiency, it is important to ensure that the nominated arbitrators (whether party or institutional)
do not have back-to-back hearings for the next 18 months. In this regard, institutions should require
broader disclosure by arbitrators of their commitments and availability to take on the case by
asking as a default rule for written confirmations about their calendar commitments in the next 18
months. For instance, in August 2009 the ICC took a major step towards transparency with respect
to arbitrators’ availability and workload. As a result of these measures, the ICC now requires ICC
arbitrators to complete an ICC Arbitrator Statement of Acceptance, Availability and Independence
listing their ‘currently pending’ cases, and confirming their ability to devote the necessary amount
of time to the arbitration and to conduct the process ‘diligently, efficiently and in accordance with
the time limits in the Rules’. Other institutions have followed suit. The ICSID Secretariat regularly
asks prospective arbitrators for their availabilities in form of marked-up calendars for the near future,
indicating the prospective arbitrator’s pre-scheduled commitments.
Some suggest that the number of arbitrated cases by one arbitrator could also be limited to allow
adequate time to handle the case, or at least to impose an obligation on prospective arbitrators and
chairpersons to raise the flag when the number of appointments in ongoing cases meets a certain
figure. This process should also be used for appointing authorities. However, more important and
practicable than imposing such limits might be intensive data collection by institutions concerning
arbitrator’s performance during proceedings. Feedback from parties on questionnaires or even from
co-arbitrators can be helpful in that regard. This would encourage newer faces to emerge and replace
the latter kind of arbitrators.
Meritless claims or issues
The current international investment arbitration system may not deal adequately with meritless
claims. In many court systems, a meritless claim, which is either legally, factually, or jurisdictionally
deficient, can be dismissed long before trial. In international arbitration, however, the claimant is
often permitted to request documents from the other side, submit witness statements, submit expert
reports and conduct a full hearing on all of the issues. After these numerous steps, a tribunal may
rule that the claim was meritless and fails as a matter of law. Such a ruling could often come earlier in
the process, eliminating the need for extensive factual development, as well as the time and expense
necessary to provide expert testimonies and argue at hearings.
There is a need to find a workable system of dispositive motions that fits into the existing framework
of international investment arbitration in order to increase efficiency of the system.213 For example,
an arbitral system that employed a way to dismiss a meritless claim as a matter of law before it moved
212 Institute for the Promotion of Arbitration and Mediation in the Mediterranean, ‘Report on the Criteria for Selection of Arbitrators’ (2012)
www.ispramed.it/root/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Report-on-the-Criteria-for-the-Selection-of-Arbitrators5.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
213 See ibid, (discussing some of the most commonly raised objections to the practice of dispositive motions in international arbitration and
explaining why they do not pose a major stumbling block).

on to a tribunal arguably could increase the efficiency of international investment arbitration.
To address this issue, ICSID amended its rules in 2006 to allow claims that manifestly lack legal merit
to be dismissed early on in the process before the claim unnecessarily consumes the opposing parties’
resources, while not wrongly depriving the claimant of due process guarantees.214 Rule 41(5) applies
to objections to jurisdiction, as well as to objections on the merits. The objection will be upheld if
the claim is ‘manifestly without legal merit’, which is a high standard. Parties must file preliminary
objections within 30 days of the constitution of the tribunal. Then, a decision is reached at the
tribunal’s first session, within 60 days of the constitution of the tribunal. From its inception in 2006
until 2017, this procedure has been used in 25 cases.215
A main criticism of Rule 41(5) is that it may not actually increase efficiency.216 For example, in Global
Trading v Ukraine, ten months passed from the filing of the objection until the date of the award.217
Rule 41(5) objections that are overruled may cause the arbitration to last longer and be more costly
because they must be argued and ruled upon before the rest of the arbitration commences.218
The standard of ‘manifestly without legal merit’ requires the ‘respondent to establish its objection
clearly and obviously, with relative ease and dispatch. The standard is thus set high’.219 ‘Manifest’
implies that it is not necessary to engage in elaborate analysis. Accordingly, objections involving
complex legal issues are outside the scope of Rule 41(5). This high bar protects the due process
of claimants. However, it also impedes efforts to increase efficiency in international investment
arbitration.
Many other arbitral systems have created mechanisms for early dismissal of meritless claims. In
October 2017, the ICC permitted tribunals to immediately dismiss manifestly unmeritorious claims
or defences. In 2016, Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) enacted Article 29.1, which
allows for the early dismissal of a ‘claim or defence… manifestly without legal merit’, and a ‘claim or
defence… manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal’.220 In 2017, the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC) followed suit and introduced Article 39, which declared ‘a request for summary
procedure may concern issues of jurisdiction, admissibility, or the merits’.221 The CPTPP adopts a
similar process, stating, ‘a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection
by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in
favour of the claimant may be made under Article 9.29 (Awards) or that a claim is manifestly without
legal merit’.222
214 ICSID, ‘Manifest Lack of Legal Merit - ICSID Convention Arbitration’ https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Manifest-Lack-of-Legal-
Merit.aspx accessed 15 December 2017.
215 ICSID, ‘Decisions on Manifest Lack of Legal Merit’ https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/Process/Decisions-on-Manifest-Lack-of-Legal-
Merit.aspx accessed 15 December 2017.
216 Christoph H Schreuer and Loretta Malintoppi, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2009) 544.
217 Global Trading Res Corp & Globex Int’l, Inc v Ukraine, Award, 1 December 2010, ICSID Case No ARB/09/11 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
218 An efficiency-serving measure might also be extracted from the cases Global Trading v Ukraine, RSM Production v Grenada and others that would
require adjusting the rules so that ICSID Rule 41(5) does not become a dilatory instrument. See Adam Raviv, ‘A Few Steps to a Faster ICSID’
(2016) 8 Glob Arbitration Rev. For instance, after a Rule 41(5) objection, there could be a specific deadline for the tribunal to decide.
219 Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc v Jordan, Decision on the Respondent’s Objection Under Rule 41(5), 12 May 2008, ICSID Case No ARB/07/25 para
88 www.italaw.com/documents/TransglobalRule41Decision.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
220 SIAC Rules 2016 Art 29.1.
221 SCC Rules 2017 Art 39.
222 CCTPP Rules (Art 1) (incorporating TPP Rules (Art 9.23(4)).
Separate and apart from the early dismissal of claims, tribunals may allow the strength of the claims
to weigh upon the final award of costs, which is often within their discretion. For example, if multiple
meritless claims were brought, but only one claim had merit, the claimant may receive a lesser award
of costs as to its meritorious claim or none at all. Cost allocation has been used in arbitration to
persuade parties to maximise efficiency and to deter meritless claims.
A tribunal may use a variant on the ‘loser pays’ approach to allocate costs in proportion to the
outcome of the case. This may take into consideration the relative success of certain claims and
defences while also taking into account of factors such as the amount of the claims compared to the
amount actually awarded.223 By seeking to allocate costs in proportion to the outcome of the case,
both sides in the arbitration are encouraged to engage in reasonable conduct during the proceeding.
For example, counsel are dissuaded from arguing frivolous claims. This approach has gained traction
in investment arbitrations in recent years224 and is sometimes termed ‘relative success’.
Claim settlement procedures
After an arbitration spanning more than three and a half years resulting in an award of damages
amounting to $17m in favour of Metalclad Corporation,225 the CEO of Metalclad Corporation
revealed at an American Bar Association event ‘that the arbitral mechanism he experienced was so
dissatisfying that he wished he had merely entrusted his company’s fate to informal mechanisms’.226
His comment, which was made in 2004, was one of the first public endorsements of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
Many have criticised mechanisms, such as arbitration and adjudication before courts, for depriving
disputants of control over the dispute resolution process and for potentially ‘destr[oying]’ the
business relationship between the disputants.227 In fact, investor-state arbitrations may carry the
potential of creating significant political consequences beyond the disputants.228 One way to
avoid adverse political and financial implications of investment disputes while preserving business
relationships is to open the gateways for ADR mechanisms, including mediation. However, there are
numerous roadblocks inhibiting the use of such procedures in claim settlement.
i. Lack of knowledge or information
Although ICSID has been promoting mediation for several years229 through its Rules of Procedure for
Conciliation Proceedings (the ‘Conciliation Rules’), government officials, corporate executives and
lawyers tend to lack knowledge on this process. ADR mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation and
223 Matthew Hodgson, ‘Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Case for Reform’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management 3.
224 Ibid; see EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, Award, 8 October 2009, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13 paras 327–329 www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0267.pdf accessed 15 December 2017; Occidental Petroleum Corp & Occidental Expl & Prod Co v Republic of Ecuador,
Award, 5 October 2012, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11 paras 873–874 www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1094.pdf
accessed 15 December 2017; Helnan Int’l Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, 3 July 2008, ICSID Case No ARB/05/19 paras 173–174 www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0399.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
225 See n 107 above.
226 Jack J Coe, Jr, ‘Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes – A Preliminary Sketch’ (2005) 12(7) UC Davis JIL &
Pol’y 7, 8.
227 Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution’ (2007) 31(1) Fordham ILJ
138, 155.
228 Ibid, 147.
229 Wolf von Kumberg, Jeremy Lack and Michael Leathes, ‘Enabling Early Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration the Time to Introduce
Mediation Has Come’ (2014) 29 ICSID Rev 133, 134.

consultation are rarely used.230 Indeed, statistical studies show that until 2014, of the 400-plus ICSID
cases filed, only nine cases (approximately two per cent) included conciliation.231 Moreover, while
most BITs have a so-called cooling off period built in to enable the parties to negotiate amicably at
the outset of a dispute, there are no guidelines or international norms suggesting how parties can use
this period productively.232
Further, while arbitration rules contemplate the possibility of settlement or consent awards,233 they do
not assist the parties in re-evaluating and actively exploring additional dispute resolution mechanisms.
The disputants may need guidance and education to overcome concerns about conveying a
perception of weakness if they propose negotiation or consultation. Disputants may not effectively
utilise cooling-off periods. In fact, disputants may even waste them by ‘turning the temperature up,
not down, and concentrating on arbitration, not settlement’.234
ii. Lack of inclination from the disputants
Some have argued that investors have developed a resistance towards alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution because they are using expansive legal services and are motivated to win as much
of the claimed damages as possible.235 From the states’ perspective, governments often hesitate
to use mediation in ISDS cases, apparently due to transparency and personal liability concerns.236
Furthermore, the host state may be weary of negotiating a settlement because any such settlement
‘may be challenged by political opponents and the media as ‘selling out to foreigners’, weakness,
or the product of corruption’.237 Some authors even have asserted that ADR mechanisms have the
potential to destroy state sovereignty because they do not constitute a resolution of the dispute
pursuant to law.238
Mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation and consultation are often categorised as ‘interests-
based’ dispute resolution mechanisms, as opposed to strictly ‘rights-based’ because they entail a
degree of compromise of legal rights if the interests of both sides are adequately protected.
Much has been written about the rights-based versus interests-based approach, and whether the latter
is suitable to international law disputes.239 Mediators focus on the subjective interests of the parties as
the basis for negotiated outcomes. They help the parties switch focus from their rights and positions
to their needs and interests to explore options for mutual gain.240 However, there is a difference of
opinion on the focus of conciliation. While some believe that conciliators use rights-based settlement
230 See n 226 above, 177–78.

231 See n 228 above, 136.
232 See n 226 above, 166.
233 SCC Rules 2017 Art 45; SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules Art 30.10 (2017) www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA/SIAC%20
Investment%20Arbitration%20Rules%20-%20Final.pdf accessed 15 December 2017 ; ICSID Arbitration Rule 43.
234 See n 228 above, 135–136.
235 See n 226 above, 150–153.
236 See n 228 above, 134.
237 See n 226 above, 149–150.
238 Fatma Khalifa, ‘Mediation use in ISDS’ (2014) 11(1) TDM 1, 5.
239 See generally Céline Lévesque, ‘Increasing the use of alternative dispute resolution in IIAs’ in Armand de Mestral and Céline Lévesque (eds)
Improving International Investment Agreements (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2013).
240 See in this regard, Art 7(4) of the 2012 IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (‘[T]he mediator shall take into account the wishes of the parties
(…)’ [emphasis author’s own]).
options for parties to choose from,241 others are of the opinion that the role of conciliators,
especially under the ICSID regime, is not so strictly demarcated.242 In other words, nothing prohibits
conciliators from undertaking an interests-based analysis.
In this regard, the ICSID Conciliation Rules themselves prescribe that the role of a conciliation
commission is ‘to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties and to endeavor to bring about
agreement between them on mutually acceptable terms’.243 This definition of the conciliator’s role is not
specifically indicative of either a rights-based or interests-based approach. However, the conciliator’s role is
much different from that of the arbitral tribunal. The role of an arbitral tribunal is to decide a dispute in
accordance with the applicable law as agreed upon by the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, the
law of the contracting state party to the dispute and any applicable rules of international law.244
While the categorisation of ADR mechanisms as either rights-based or interests-based may not be
strictly relevant, it can be said that disputants (especially states) generally tend to be disinclined to
change their focus from their legal rights and obligations to mutual needs and interests.
iii. Solutions
Educating disputants about ADR in ISDS
ICSID has taken important steps to encourage ADR in addition to promoting its mediation rules.245
For instance, in 2014, ICSID established a chairman’s list of conciliators who could likely serve as
third-party neutrals facilitating mediation proceedings.246 Further, ICSID together with the Centre
for Effective Dispute Resolution, the International Energy Charter Secretariat and the International
Mediation Institute offered a three-day mediator training course for investor-state disputes in June
2017.247 UNCTAD has also published several reports discussing the utility of mediation, suggesting
that ADR is vital to the future of international investment law.248
While such initiatives help in making ADR more accessible for investor-state disputes, more
widespread awareness of ADR should be encouraged. For instance, a Mediation Manual, such as
the one sponsored by the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom in 2012, in cases under
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, may constitute a useful educational tool on the
process of mediation by providing suggestions on how and why mediation may be used to resolve
claims in specific instances.249
Apart from such broad-based awareness, institutions such as the ICSID, ICC, SCC and others should
continue to take a proactive approach to inform the disputants about the options of mediating or
241 See n 228 above, 134.

242 Frauke Nitschke, ‘The IBA’s Investor-State Mediation Rules and the ICSID Dispute Settlement Framework’ (2014) 29 ICSID Rev 112, 127.
243 ICSID Conciliation Rules Art 34(1).
244 ICSID Convention Art 42(1).
245 See Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, ‘The Role of ADR in Investor–State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience’ (2005) 22 News from ICSID 12
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389763 accessed 15 December 2017.
246 Susan D Franck, ‘Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Management: An Introductory Guide’ (2014) 29 ICSID Rev 66, 68.
247 See ICSID, Investor-State Mediator Training https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID%20NewsLetter/January%2017/Investor-
State-Mediator-Training.aspx accessed 15 December 2017.
248 UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’ (2012) http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
diaepcb2012d5_en.pdf accessed 15 December 2017; UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No 2 (June 2013) http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.
249 See n 228 above, 137.

consulting for every instance they consider recourse to such mechanisms to be beneficial. Given that
their officials have the most frequent access to potential disputants, they are well placed to suggest
that disputants explore such possibilities.250
Encouraging the use of ADR mechanisms: usability of IBA rules?
In 2012, the IBA enacted its Rules for Investor-State Mediation (the ‘IBA Rules’). The IBA created
a Subcommittee specifically to address issues related to investor-state mediation,251 which developed
a set of mediation rules specifically designed to assist investors and states in settling disputes under
investment treaties, investment contracts or investment laws.252 These IBA Rules were meant to
educate parties on mediation and how it might be used to resolve a dispute. They also afford
flexibility and can be adapted by the parties to address their particular needs with respect to a conflict
or a dispute.253 The IBA Rules do not address specific details as far as the conduct of the mediation
process is concerned, such that the parties and the mediator may adapt the process to their specific
needs and preferences.254
The IBA Rules have been lauded as ‘an essential first step in legitimizing and normalizing’ mediation
for investor-state disputes.255
Many suggest the use of the IBA Rules during the ‘cooling-off’ period in the ICSID regime. Thus, an
instrument containing consent to ICSID jurisdiction could be drafted to require a two-tier procedure,
namely mediation under the IBA Rules at a preliminary stage, followed by an ICSID arbitration or
conciliation proceeding.256 Mediation may also be inserted in an ad hoc fashion before arbitration, or
in conjunction with the ICSID Conciliation Rules, even after arbitration has commenced.257
Data shows that ADR contributes to case settlement. A study published in the ICSID Review
(2014), reveals that disputes in sectors that regularly utilise ADR, such as construction, oil and gas,
information and communication, settle almost 50 per cent of the time as opposed to disputes in
sectors that do not regularly utilise ADR, such as power, agriculture, fishing and forestry.258
Interestingly, host states from Southeast Asia and South America appear most amenable to continuing
negotiations after commencement of the arbitration, whereas host states from North America appear
least amenable to settlement talks. Indeed, not a single North American case, even under the NAFTA
regime, appears to have reached settlement.259
Even if the parties are unable to reach a negotiated settlement of the entirety of the claims in issue,
the use of ADR mechanisms can certainly help to streamline the dispute such that only a portion of
it remains to be determined by a tribunal. Thus, ADR techniques may reduce the time and costs of
arbitral proceedings.
250 See n 226 above, 181.

251 See n 245 above, 68.
252 Anna Joubin-Bret and Barton Legum, ‘A Set of Rules Dedicated to Investor-State Mediation: The IBA Investor–State Mediation Rules’ (2014)
29 ICSID Rev 17.
253 Ibid, 20.
254 Ibid.
255 See n 245 above, 80.
256 See n 241 above, 129.
257 IBA Rules Art 2(4).
258 See n 241 above, 121.
259 Ibid, 123, 125.
Solutions specific to states
While some states, such as Australia and India, have shown faith in consultations and negotiations,
a number of states are not comfortable with using ADR to resolve highly political disputes under
intense public scrutiny.
Educational programmes may be specifically directed at assisting state institutions in coming to

trust mediation, negotiation or consultation. Transparent procedures may encourage state officials
or senior executives to engage in consultations. Further, the benefits of ADR over conventional
dispute settlement mechanisms may be highlighted. These include the opportunity in mediation
to have a private caucus with a mediator to express concerns. Mediation also allows the parties to
explore sensitive topics with the other side without feeling vulnerable and without compromising the
confidentiality of the dispute settlement process.260
Another important way to encourage states to use ADR is to inform them of their right to commence
mediation or consultation.261 While arbitration usually offers only the investor the right to commence
a dispute, both an investor and state may initiate mediations or consultations. Although there
have been a handful of investment arbitrations that were initiated by states, this remains relatively
uncommon. Mediation, conciliation or consultation procedures are motivated more by the needs and
interests of the parties than their legal rights. Therefore, a state may still be encouraged to mediate a
dispute over arbitrating it.262
While some governments in recent years have turned their attention to ‘conflict management’ for
investor-state disputes,263 many still do not have dedicated resources to deal with investment dispute
settlement. Accordingly, they may not trust their counsel to represent their interests in negotiations.
Some governments could designate a specific agency to have responsibility for managing investor-
state conflicts, and the resultant negotiations and consultations. This would enable governments
to manage the conflict before it escalates into a contested dispute. Placing trusted government
officials in this role may make governments more comfortable with their representation during such
processes.264
Treaty practice
The unpopularity of procedures surrounding claim settlement may be rectified by including such
procedures in investment treaties. While conciliation is often an option for the parties, it would help
if more treaties made explicit reference to mediation as an alternative to arbitration. While most
treaties call for ‘amicable settlement’ in their dispute resolution clauses, these provisions are mostly
kept open-ended. The absence of clearly delineated procedures leads to confusion.265 A description
of a procedure for mediation or a reference to the IBA Rules would help disputants utilise mediation
even during the arbitration, when settlement efforts fail during the preliminary stage. This would
allow for the exploration of interests-based settlement and rights-based outcomes.266
260 See n 228 above, 141.

261 See n 245 above, 82.
262 See n 226 above, 144–145.
263 See n 238 above, 137.
264 Ibid, 166.
265 Ibid, 150.
266 See n 228 above, 137.

To this end, states may seek to revise their existing investment treaties, as well as the treaty models
they use in negotiations, to incorporate specific language authorising and encouraging disputants
to employ ADR techniques. Such treaties should make clear that disputants should resort to
international arbitration only after they are convinced that negotiations and various forms of
alternative dispute settlement techniques would not be successful.267
Examples of prescribed ADR mechanisms can be derived from various BITs from the Australia,
Canada, India and the US. From 2004268 to 2012,269 the US Model BIT has provided for consultations
and negotiations as preconditions to arbitration. Similarly, the 2004 Canadian Model Foreign
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement also prescribed that ‘[t]he disputing parties
shall first hold consultations in an attempt to settle a claim amicably’.270 A few of India’s older BITs
provided for either ‘amicable’ settlement through negotiations271 or a broad obligation among state
parties to indulge in consultation for any aspects relating to the BIT.272 However, its recent BITs are
more unequivocal in their preference for ADR mechanisms, providing for the use of an ombudsman,
state-state arbitration and procedures for dispute prevention.273
Notably these ‘new generation’ BITs encourage amicable settlement on the part of both parties.
Consultation and negotiation is available to the states or to the investor during the phase before an
investor invokes the right to initiate international arbitration.274 More recent treaty practice goes
even further in encouraging ADR mechanisms as an alternative or additional means of solving
disputes between investors and states.275 For instance, CETA provides a detailed prescription of both
consultation and mediation, with the former being a condition precedent to submission of a claim to
the tribunal276 and the latter being an option available at any time to the disputing parties.277
In addition to the ongoing evolution of treaty practice, practitioners have also suggested the inclusion
of ‘convening clauses’ in BITs, which provide for an independent third person to convene a meeting
between the parties to assist them in evaluating and choosing an appropriate dispute resolution
process.278 Similar to this procedure is the process of an ‘early neutral evaluation’, which was also
proposed by UNCTAD, and involves an evaluator who hosts an informal meeting with investors and
the state representative, to examine and inform the investor of the prospects of the case.279 Both of
267 See n 226 above, 184.

268 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Investment (2004) Art 23(‘In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant
and the respondent shall initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding,
third-party procedures’) www.state.gov/documents/organisation/117601.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
269 See n 35 above, Art 23 (‘In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute
through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of nonbinding, third-party procedures’).
270 Canada’s Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement Art 25 (2004) www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-
model-en.pdf accessed 15 December 2017.
271 India-Argentina BIT Art 9(1) (1999).
272 Ibid, Art 11.
273 Nicholas Peacock, Donny Surtani, and Kritika Venugopal, ‘India and Brazil conclude negotiations of Bilateral Investment Treaty’, Herbert
Smith Freehills Arbitration Notes, 5 December 2016 http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2016/12/05/india-and-brazil-conclude-negotiations-of-
bilateral-investment-treaty accessed 8 October 2018.
274 See n 251 above, 18.
275 Ibid.
276 Art 8.22(1), CETA.
277 Art 8.20(1), CETA.
278 See n 238 above, 154–155.
279 UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternative to Arbitration’ (New York and Geneva, 2010), xvii.
these procedures may assist in not only filtering out unmeritorious claims from going into arbitration,
but also in avoiding arbitration altogether.
Efficiency challenges after constitution of the tribunal
After arbitration has commenced, many relevant efficiency considerations remain. Some of the
most common complaints parties raise concern extensive document disclosures and the length of
time it takes for tribunals to render an award after the proceedings are closed. Further, while many
are proposing that there should be an expedited procedure for smaller claims, this proposal raises
issues related to due process. Finally, the results of the Survey also revealed that users and observers
of investment arbitration are concerned that the costs associated with arbitration undermine the
efficient resolution of investment disputes.
Time taken to deliver an award
Counsel, arbitrators and institutions can all contribute to an efficient drafting and delivery of the
award. In respect of counsel, well-pleaded cases help produce well-drafted awards. Counsel can do a
lot to increase efficiency in drafting the award. Efficiency can be improved if counsel are sensitive to
the factual and legal issues that seem to be of interest to the tribunal. This may be determined in part
from the questions arbitrators pose to witnesses and experts. Counsel may also assist the arbitrators
establishing the facts. For example, some have suggested that parties confer and draft together a
timeline of all the undisputed factual events for the tribunal’s benefit. Where necessary, parties could
also include disputed facts and provide an account of their differences in the timeline. Additionally,
summarising legal arguments, or providing lists containing disputed issues of law and damages, may
assist the arbitrators in drafting the award.
Arbitrators can also contribute to the efficiency of the deliberations and the drafting of the awards
first by preparing well for the hearing. This will allow them to identify the areas that are relevant to
resolving the dispute and take advantage of the evidentiary hearings to resolve lingering questions.
Arbitrators should draft a summary of the parties’ position in preparation for the hearing. Second,
at the end of the hearing, the tribunal can establish a deadline for submitting post-hearing briefs
and foreshadow an approximate date for the issuance of the award. If the tribunal is not able to
meet this deadline, it should inform the parties with advance notice and a reasoned explanation.
Third, arbitrators would be well advised to set aside a certain period of time after the hearing for
deliberations. If the deliberations reveal the existence of factual or legal lacunae, arbitrators should
issue a procedural order on post-hearing issues, requesting counsel to address those issues in their
post-hearing briefs. Fourth, drafting an award takes time. Yet some arbitrators may fail to set aside and
devote sufficient uninterrupted time to the drafting of awards. The presiding arbitrator, in particular,
may consider setting aside at least two complete weeks after the submission of the post-hearing briefs
to devote him or herself to this task. Finally, awards probably could be shorter than they tend to be.
Procedural sections could be more concise, and long quotations avoided as much as possible. It is the
tribunal’s reasoning that should be more developed. Further, the award should be limited to the relief
sought and the legal arguments put forward by the parties. To that end, it is of paramount importance
that the parties draft the relief section of their pleadings with utmost care and in an exhaustive fashion,
including not only the principal relief sought but also any other subsidiary relief they may seek.

Institutions, too, can boost the efficiency of investment arbitration conducted under their auspices.
This can be achieved by several means. First, for example, institutions might request from each
arbitrator a written commitment to open as much time in his or her schedule as reasonably needed
to solve the dispute. This should include a statement by the president of the tribunal that he or she
will endeavour to reserve sufficient time (and in no case less than two weeks) within two months after
the submission of the post-hearing brief to prepare a first draft of the award. Second, institutions
might consider a reform by which arbitrators’ fees are linked to the time spent in drafting the award,
subject to all relevant circumstances. In the same vein, it may be good policy to gradually reduce
the arbitrators’ fees when the tribunal is late in delivering the award for unjustified causes, as is the
current policy in the ICC for all cases registered after 1 January 2016.280 And finally, institutions can
ensure that the signature and notification of the award is as simple as possible. E-signing should be
accepted as a valid method, followed by execution of hard copies where required.
Lengthy submissions and exhibits
Both counsel and arbitrators have a duty to produce evidence efficiently. There are three specific
areas in which counsel might minimise the impact of lengthy submissions and exhibits on the
efficiency of investment arbitration proceedings. First, counsel should use the opportunity to produce
evidence wisely, using efficient bundles containing core documents of the arbitration. Attempts to
overwhelm arbitrators with evidence entails a risk that significant evidence goes overlooked. Citations
to and quotes of evidentiary material should be as specific as possible, pointing to the relevant page
or paragraph as references to large documents tend to be disregarded. Second, only case law on point
should be cited. Third, the number of post-hearing memorials should be reduced, and those filed
should be targeted to answer specific questions from the tribunal. And fourth, document production
should also be carried out responsibly.281
Arbitrators also play a crucial role in policing lengthy submissions and exhibits through the use
of well-crafted procedural orders. Procedural orders should establish the categories of evidence –
documents, legal authorities, witness statements or expert reports – that are admissible, the scope
of the evidence (eg, rebuttal evidence), the procedural stage for its introduction and possible page
limits for submissions. Evidence should always be aimed at proving factual or legal allegations.
Arbitrators should not admit evidence that is not cross-referenced to a written submission. Procedural
orders should clearly state that the tribunal will reject evidence untimely introduced, as well as
unsolicited submissions on the merits, save under exceptional circumstances. The determination
of costs in the award should penalise the parties that breached this instruction. Procedural orders
should also ensure that the document production phase is carried out efficiently. Arbitrators
should provide in advance a set of clear instructions, rules and guidelines governing the document
production exercise. The tribunal should inform the parties that the document production costs
will be allocated separately, and will take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Additionally,
awarding costs immediately following document production may make counsel more cognisant of
the price of their requests, and therefore shield against unnecessary or overly expansive document
production.
280 See ICC to Name Sitting Arbitrators and to Penalize Delay in Issuing Awards, Global Arbitration Review (6 January 2016) http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2016/01/06/icc-to-name-sitting-arbitrators-and-penalize-delay-in-issuing-awards accessed 8 October 2018.
281 Joerg Risse, ‘Ten Drastic Proposals for Saving Time and Costs in Arbitral Proceedings’, (2013) 29(3) Arbitration International, 456, 460.
Expedited proceedings and other means to foster expedition
The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (the ‘Swiss Rules’) are among the pioneers of specific
rules on mandated expedited proceedings, and have provided such a mechanism since 2004282 (and
even earlier in the Geneva Chamber of Commerce (Chambre de commerce, d’industrie et des
services de Genève (CCIG)) Rules of 1992).283 In the current version, the Swiss Rules provide for
the same in Article 42 of the 2012 Rules. Both, voluntary and mandatory procedures are envisaged
therein for disputes below CHF 1m. The procedure provides the Swiss Chamber the discretion to
limit the rounds of submissions and numbers of hearings, shorten the time limits in the Swiss Rules
and have summary arbitral awards. All disputes below the said amount of CHF 1m are arbitrated
before a sole arbitrator as a default rule. Notably, the Swiss courts have had the chance to deal
with all due process related counterarguments that arise in the context of expedited proceedings,
for instance, the lack of sufficient reasons in an award, unequal treatment of parties, lack of
consideration of submissions and so on.284 Inspiration can be sought from their jurisprudence in
this regard. It is only now, when the Swiss Rules have progressed to what is called ‘super-expedited’
procedures285 that expedited procedures are making a foray into other institutions’ rules. The prime
examples of these are the ICC Rules of 2017 and the SIAC Rules of 2016.
There are potential due process concerns that arise as a result of implementing expedited
proceedings in investment arbitration, particularly due to the involvement of states and state
entities.286 These concerns include whether these expedited proceedings would be mandatory for
disputes below a particular amount in dispute, or whether they would be purely optional; whether
setting such threshold amounts is suitable for investment cases as it is for cases under the ICC or
Swiss Rules, considering that often, even smaller claims can be extremely factually complicated in
investment cases; whether having mandatory expedited proceedings for investment cases interferes
with state sovereignty, given the principle that state consent to dispute resolution has to be clear
and unambiguous; and whether the different institutions can assume as much power as they do in
expedited proceedings in commercial arbitration, given that in the investment context states are
involved and, if so, whether this would push institutions to issue more reasoned decisions and change
the notion of administrative functions of arbitral institutions.
Beyond reforming other major institutional rules to permit expedited proceedings, there are
solutions, some of which have already been discussed above, that do not require a revamp of
the rules that warrant consideration. One such solution that should be considered is whether to
reduce bifurcation of the proceedings. When a tribunal bifurcates proceedings and ‘at the end of
the jurisdictional stage decides it does have jurisdiction, the result is usually a very long case’.287 In
addition, bifurcation can cost a lot of time and money if the case ends up with pleadings in every
stage. Another practical solution involves increasing the use of instant cost orders, whereby the tribunal
determines which party will bear the costs of a specific part of the proceedings based on multiple
282 Art 42, Swiss Rules 2004.

283 Art 31, CCIG Rules 1992.
284 See 4A_294/2008 (28 October 2008); see also Matthias Scherer, ‘Review of the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration and Commercial
Mediation’ in Horacio A Grigera and Paul E Mason (eds), International Commercial Arbitration Practice: 21st Century Perspectives (LexisNexis 2016)
50-4–50-5.
285 See Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, Always One Step Ahead (March 2016).
286 See n 173 above.
287 See n 217 above, 5.

considerations. While these orders are of course subject to the final determination of the tribunal
regarding costs, an instant cost order could put recalcitrant parties on a backseat and inhibit bad faith
initiatives.288 Other solutions involve increasing the use of technology when practicable, as opposed to
traditional paper proceedings and in-person hearings, and making the presiding arbitrator the sole
member of the tribunal for procedural matters, even if the other members of the panel join for the
merits.
288 Niuscha Bassiri, ‘The Instant Cost Order’ www.youngicca-blog.com/the-instant-cost-order-by-niuscha-bassiri-for-yiag accessed 8 October 2018;
Niuscha Bassiri, ‘Guidelines to the Instant Cost Order’ www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12996309460860/guidelines_to_the_instant_cost_
order.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
Chapter 3: Transparency in international investment arbitration
Critics of investment arbitration have long condemned the lack of transparency at all stages of
a dispute. Demands for increased public access to hearings, materials and awards produced in
arbitrations, third-party participation through ‘amicus’ briefs, and disclosure of third-party funding
have all become more widespread over recent years. Recent changes in treaty practice and arbitration
rules have increased transparency significantly, and today, investment arbitration is arguably more
transparent than domestic dispute resolution practice in many states.
At the treaty level, the EU recently negotiated FTAs with Japan and Vietnam, ratified an FTA
with Canada (CETA), and is currently negotiating an FTA with China. Those agreements all have
provisions for the disclosure of third-party funding, which remains one of the most controversial
issues related to transparency in investment arbitration. Additionally, several BITS incorporate the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the ‘UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules’), or include provisions modelled on these rules on transparency.289 These
instruments establish principles of transparency in investor-state arbitration. It remains to be seen
how these principles are put into practice.
The Survey questionnaire developed by the 2014 Subcommittee explored a variety of perspectives
regarding transparency in investment arbitration. Survey questions revealed respondents’ opinions
on the appointment of arbitrators, third-party funding, and general transparency and accessibility in
international investment arbitration.
Appointment of arbitrators: The responses overwhelmingly reflected the view that appointments made
by the same party, the same counsel and same law firm should be disclosed.290 Survey responses
also showed that arbitrators should provide more fulsome disclosure of potential conflicts or ties
with the parties, including relationships with party counsel or the facts of the case at the start of the
proceedings.291 Like the 2015 International Arbitration Survey conducted by Queen Mary University
of London and White & Case, the IBA Survey called attention to the need for increased transparency
in institutional decision-making on the appointment of and challenges to arbitrators, as well as
consideration of arbitrator performance in making arbitral appointments.
Third-party funding: A majority of the respondents expressed the view that the existence of third-party
funding should not affect the way in which costs are allocated. A plurality, approximately 45 per cent,
responded that some degree of security for costs should be available to parties faced with claims
funded by third parties. However, about 21 per cent responded that no security for costs should be
available. At least one respondent state has recently taken criminal action against a third-party funder
and its client recipient of the funding.292
289 The Transparency Rules and the Mauritius Convention (the ‘Transparency Rules’) have been developed by approximately 90 states. A number
of treaties (nearly 40 since April 2014) incorporate the Transparency Rules via the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. A high number of these
treaties further include large parts of the Transparency Rules for all arbitrations. See Report of the UN Commission in International Trade
Law, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-second Session, Supplement No 17 (A/72/17), para 317 www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/commissionsessions/unc-50/A-72-17-E.pdf accessed 8 October 2018 .
290 2016 Report, Q31, Q32.
291 Ibid, Q29, Q33.
292 Ibid.

Transparency and accessibility: Half of all respondents considered that the present levels of transparency
and accessibility in investment arbitration are sufficient. Less than half, approximately 42 per cent,
called for greater levels thereof. With regard to third-party participation in proceedings, 56 per cent
considered the access to participation sufficient, while about 32 per cent responded that the status
quo is insufficient.
The majority of respondents (57 per cent) thought that open hearings should not be a requirement
for arbitral proceedings. Similarly, 50 per cent of respondents felt that pleadings should not be
published. An overwhelming 88 per cent of respondents, however, considered that publication of
partial and final awards should be a requirement in investment treaty arbitration
Publication of arbitral awards, broadcasting of hearings and document production
This section highlights recent trends towards greater transparency in international arbitration
and proceeds first by discussing provisions pertaining to transparency in NAFTA and CAFTA, and
continues by discussing transparency measures implemented by the ICSID, ICC and UNCITRAL
Rules. The section concludes by detailing recent developments pertaining to submissions by third
parties and third-party funding.
Treaties and legal instruments
i. NAFTA
In 2001, NAFTA’s FTC clarified that ‘[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on
the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and… nothing in the NAFTA precludes the parties
from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal’.293 The
FTC’s clarification further details rules applicable to the access of documents in Chapter 11 arbitrations.
Subject to certain exceptions, the FTC pledges that all parties to a Chapter 11 dispute will ‘make available
to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal’.294 A
party may, however, withhold information pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules.295
In 2003, the NAFTA Commission announced new transparency measures to make Chapter 11
arbitration proceedings more accessible to the public. The commission’s statement reaffirmed
tribunals’ authority to accept amicus curiae, and endorsed the use of standard forms for the Notice of
Intent to arbitrate.296
Subsequently Canada and the US published statements supporting open hearings in NAFTA Chapter
11 arbitrations.297 Mexico announced its support for open hearings in investor-state disputes following
293 Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions dated 31 July 2001.
294 Aaron Cosbey, ‘Note on NAFTA Commission’s July 31, 2001, Initiative to Clarify Chapter 11 Investment Provisions’ (January 2002) www.iisd.
org/pdf/2001/trade_nafta_aug2001.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
295 Ibid.
296 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘NAFTA Commission Announces New Transparency Measures’ (October 2003) https://
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen accessed 8
October 2018.
297 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations’ (October 2003)
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file143_3602.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
the 2004 NAFTA Commission Meeting.298 Subject to certain exceptions, the statements affirmed
that each country would consent to have hearings in Chapter 11 disputes open to the public and
would request consent for open hearings from disputing investors.299 The statements explained that
the countries could revoke consent for public hearings to protect confidential information where
appropriate.300 The countries encouraged tribunals to make arrangements with the disputing parties
to live broadcast hearings, use closed-circuit television or use other forms of access to make the
hearings public.301
Although contracting parties’ statements are not binding on tribunals, they provide Canada and the
US with incentives to actively seek open hearings in cases against them.302 So far Canada and the US
have steadfastly adhered to their commitments to make arbitrations more transparent. For example,
in United Parcel Service v Canada, the parties agreed to hold public proceedings in Washington,
DC, except for those parts of the hearing that involved confidential information.303 Cameras and
recording equipment were not allowed to record the proceedings.304 Similarly, in Methanex v United
States, the US supported public access to arbitral documents and proceedings. However, the tribunal
ruled that it had no authority to open hearings to non-disputing parties without both parties’
consent.305 While the tribunal was unwilling to open hearings to non-disputing parties without
Methanex’s consent, it did assert its authority to accept amicus curiae submissions.306
In 2013, Eli Lilly and Co, a US company, initiated arbitration to resolve claims related to its patents
in Canada. The Claimant argued that the Canadian court’s interpretation of the Patent Act violated
Canada’s obligations under NAFTA.307 All pleadings and procedural orders were made public shortly
after they were submitted or issued in Eli Lilly and Co v Canada.308 Instructions for submitting amicus
curiae petitions were published on the ICSID website.309 Ultimately, the tribunal accepted six out of
the nine non-disputing party briefs submitted.310 In addition, the disputing parties agreed to make
hearings public and the remaining member states, Mexico and the US, had representatives present
during hearings.311
298 Meg Kinnear, ‘Transparency and Third party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, 3 n 10 (December 2005) www.oecd.org/
investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36979626.pdf.
299 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations’ (October 2003),
3 https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file143_3602.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
302 Howard Mann, ‘The Free Trade Commission Statements of October 7, 2003, on NAFTA’s Chapter 11: Never-Never Land or Real Progress?’
(October 2003), 3 www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_ftc_comment_oct03.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
303 Ibid, 3–4.
304 ‘United Parcel Service of America, Inc v Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding’, (December 2005)
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/Archive_%20Announcement23.html accessed 8 October 2018.
305 Methanex Corp v United States, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, para 42 (NAFTA Ch 11
Arb Trib 15 January 2001).
306 Methanex Corp v United States, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, para 53 (NAFTA Ch 11
Arb Trib 15 January 2001).
307 Global Affairs Canada, ‘Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada: Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada’ www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/eli.aspx?lang=eng accessed 8 October 2018.
308 ICSID, ‘Transparency and Public Participation in Arbitration Proceedings – Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada’ https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID%20NewsLetter/2017-Issue2/Transparency-and-public-participation-in-arbitration-proceedings-.
aspx accessed 8 October 2018.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid.

By comparison, prior to the FTC’s 2001 Note of Interpretation and the 2003 statements of the
NAFTA parties on transparency, tribunals regularly denied party requests to make proceedings and
filings open to the public. In Metalclad Corporation v Mexico, the tribunal ordered the parties to keep
the proceedings confidential, overruling the claimant’s request to make the proceedings public.312
Likewise, the Loewen Group v United States tribunal denied the US request to make filings public.313
ii. CETA
CETA contains provisions on transparency in investment arbitration as a means of enhancing its

legitimacy. The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are incorporated by reference under Article 8.36.314
Further, the article provides that: ‘the request for consultations, the notice requesting a determination
of the respondent, the notice of determination of the respondent, the agreement to mediate, the notice
of intent to challenge a Member of the tribunal, the decision on challenge to a Member of the tribunal
and the request for consolidation… shall be… made available to the public’.315
Article 8.36.5 establishes that CETA hearings will also be open to the public.316 The tribunal, along
with the disputing parties, will decide the method of making the hearings publicly accessible. This
may entail physical public access to hearings or video broadcasting.317 Pursuant to Article 8.36.5,
arrangements would be made to withhold confidential information from the public proceedings.318
CETA Article 8.37 permits a respondent-state to disclose to officials of the EU, Member States of
the EU and sub-national governments documents that it considers necessary in the course of the
proceedings, but requires that confidential information be protected.319 Article 8.38 further provides
that respondent-states ‘shall’ share certain information with a non-disputing state, even where such
information has not been requested.320
Both Canada and the EU have ratified the treaty, which has allowed approximately 90 per cent of
the treaty to come into effect since its provisional application date of 21 September 2017.321 The
investment protection provisions and the new investment court system introduced in CETA require
approval from each EU Member State’s legislature and regional legislatures before they go into
effect.322 So far, Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden have voted to pass CETA.323
312 See n 107 above, para 13 (discussing and quoting from the tribunal’s October 1997 order on confidentiality).
313 Loewen Group v United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent’s Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, paras 25–26, 28 (NAFTA Ch 11
Arb Trib 9 January 2001) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0469.pdf accessed 8 October 2018 (discussing the tribunal’s
September 1999 and June 2000 orders on confidentiality).
314 See n 37 above, Art 8.36.
315 Ibid, Art 8.36.2.
316 Ibid, Art 8.36.5.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid, Art 8.37.
320 Ibid, Art 8.38.
321 Ibid; see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_en.htm accessed 15 December 2017.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
iii. Arbitral bodies and institutions
ICSID
In 2006, the ICSID Rules and Regulations were amended to increase transparency. Specifically,
Arbitration Rule 48 was amended to require the centre to publish excerpts of the tribunal’s legal
reasoning in cases where the parties do not consent to full publication of the award.324 In essence, the
amended rule guarantees that every ICSID legal decision is published either in full or as an excerpt.
Since the rule’s revision, entire proceedings have been made public in several notable cases. For
example, in The Renco Group Inc v Republic of Peru, the parties agreed to publish all documents and
hold open hearings.325 Likewise, in Bear Creek Mining Co v Republic of Peru, the hearings were held
publicly326 and the parties agreed that Arbitration Rule 48(4) mandated that all documents be made
public subject to the redaction of confidential information.327 Between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017,
public hearings were broadcast in seven ICSID cases.
Additionally, ICSID Rule 32 now provides that all hearings are open, provided that neither party
objects.328 Formerly, the rule required affirmative party consent to open hearings to any non-
disputing parties.329 As a result of the Rule 32 revision, proceedings that had previously been criticised
for lack of transparency began holding public hearings. Indeed, in Vattenfall AB and others v Federal
Republic of Germany, the hearings on jurisdiction, merits and damages were publicly broadcasted by
ICSID on a four-hour delay to ensure that portions of the hearings involving confidential or sensitive
information were omitted from public broadcast.330
In certain cases, the parties and the tribunal opted to broadcast hearings, instead of allowing non-
disputants to be present at hearings. Video broadcasting is an interesting compromise between
transparency and confidentiality. Live streaming can avoid the criticism that transparency necessarily
comes at higher administrative costs for parties. It also allows parties to protect confidential
information without the delay of clearing a public hearing. The parties in Spence International
Investments et al v Republic of Costa Rica took advantage of video broadcasting and live streamed the
hearings on the merits for the public on the ICSID website.331
Broadcasting proceedings also offers parties a feasible way to handle and protect confidential
information. For example, streaming delays allows parties to inhibit the release of confidential
information. However, parties can raise objections on the confidentiality ground. This seems to strike
a reasonable balance between the quest for more transparency and the need for confidentiality.
324 ICSID, Arbitration Rules, Rule 48(4) dated April 2006.

325 The Renco Group Inc v Republic of Peru, Procedural Order No 1 (ICSID Case No UNCT/13/1) http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3004/DC3712_En.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
326 Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru, Procedural Order No 1, para 21.6 (ICSID Case No ARB/14/21) http://icsidfiles.worldbank.
org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3745/DC5432_En.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
327 Ibid, paras 24.1–24.2.
328 ICSID, Arbitration Rules, rule 32 (April 2006).
329 ICSID, Arbitration Rules, rule 32 (January 2003).
330 Ibid.
331 See eg, Spence International Investments et al v Republic of Costa Rica, Hearing on the Merits (ICSID Case No UNCT/13/2) https://livestream.
com/ICSID/events/3954046 accessed 8 October 2018.

Another significant and often invoked amended ICSID rule allows non-disputing parties to file
amici submissions.332 Amended Rule 37 establishes the necessary criteria for amicus participation.333
In Biwater Gauff Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania334 and Philip Morris v Uruguay,335 amici successfully
invoked Amended Rule 37. The tribunal granted five non-governmental organisations the right to
make written submissions. The tribunal concluded that the non-disputing parties’ written submissions
had a reasonable potential to assist the arbitral tribunal by bringing a perspective, knowledge or
insight that was different from that of the disputing parties.336
Chapter 10, Article 10.20.3 of CAFTA-DR also authorises the tribunal to ‘accept and consider amicus
curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party’.337 In accordance with CAFTA-
DR Chapter 10, Article 10.20.3 and ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2), tribunals in both Pac Rim Cayman
LLC v Republic of El Salvador 338 and Commerce Group Corp & San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc v Republic of
El Salvador339 allowed amicus submissions. The tribunals in both cases published procedural orders
detailing the characteristics that non-disputing parties’ written applications should fulfil.340 The
publication included the deadline for amici petitions, the form and the substance of the petitions.341
Recently, in August 2018, ICSID published its Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, which
aims to provide greater transparency by including provisions relating to access of documents
(including arbitral awards), access to hearings and participation of non-disputing parties in ICSID
proceedings. A vote on these proposed amendments is expected in 2019 or 2020.
UNCITRAL
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules342 by UNCITRAL in 2013 marked a departure
from the approach to transparency under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules apply to investor-state arbitrations initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules pursuant to treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014. The new rules provide for hearings
to be held in public, and for a range of arbitral documents to be made public, including awards of
tribunals. Under the new rules, the disputing parties cannot withhold consent to open hearings.343
332 ICSID, Arbitration Rules, rule 37 (April 2006).

333 Ibid.
334 Biwater Gauff (Tanz) Ltd v United Republic of Tanz, Procedural Order No 5, para 55 (ICSID Case No ARB/05/22) (February 2007) www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0091_0.pdf accessed 8 October 2018 (‘The arbitral tribunal grants the Petitioners the opportunity
to file a written submission in these arbitral proceedings, pursuant to Rule 37(2)’).
335 Philip Morris v Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Award of 8 July 2016.
336 Ibid, para 50.
337 CAFTA-DR, ch 10, Art 10.20.3, 5 August 2004.
338 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections under CAFTA Articles 10.20.4 and 10.20.5,
para 50 (ICSID Case No ARB/09/12) (August 2010) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0592.pdf accessed 8 October
2018.
339 Commerce Group Corp & San Sebastian Gold Mines Inc v Republic of El Salvador, Award, para 39 (ICSID Case No ARB/09/17) (Mar. 2011) www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0202.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
340 ICSID, ‘Procedural Order Regarding Amici Curiae’, (February 2011) www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0608.pdf
341 Ibid.
342 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, ‘General Assembly Resolution 109’, 68 GAOR Vol I at 829, UN Doc A/68/462 (2013). For the Adoption
of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, see Report of the UN Commission in International Trade Law, Official Records of the General
Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No 17 (A/68/17), para 128 http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/68/17&referer=http:/www.
un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/resolutions_extracts_70.pdf accessed 8 October 2018. See also General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/109 https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/445/99/PDF/N1344599.pdf?OpenElement accessed 8 October 2018.
343 Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next
Steps’ (September 2013) www.iisd.org/itn/2013/09/18/new-uncitral-arbitration-rules-on-transparency-application-content-and-next-steps-2
Only the tribunal has the authority to decide how a hearing will be open to the public or to close a
hearing for logistical or confidentiality concerns.344
The commission was informed that the UNCTAD International Investment Agreement Navigator
database contained 60 treaties that had been concluded after 1 April 2014. Of those treaties, 46
offered investors the possibility of initiating arbitration according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules (with new Article 1, paragraph 4, as adopted in 2013) and thereby incorporating the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. In addition, about 50 per cent of those treaties established elements
of transparency for arbitral proceedings not conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Only 14 treaties excluded the application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. However, half of
these treaties implemented some elements of transparency, either the publication of documents,
access to hearings or the possibility of third parties turning in submissions, inspired by the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.345
The Mauritius Convention346 seeks to provide an efficient mechanism for states to apply the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules to treaties concluded prior to 1 April 2014. To date, Cameroon,
Canada, Mauritius and Switzerland have ratified the Mauritius Convention, which entered into
force on 18 October 2017.347 Thus, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules would apply on a unilateral
basis, under all treaties concluded by those states, if the claimant agreed to their application (eg, 35
treaties for Canada, 28 treaties for Mauritius and 114 treaties for Switzerland). A further 19 states
have signed it,348 including Australia, Belgium, Congo, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, Sweden, Syria, the UK and the US (where the convention has
been transmitted to the Senate for debate). Bolivia became the most recent signatory in April 2018.349
Furthermore, the EU is currently debating the signing of the convention.350
Current efforts by states to implement the convention are reflective of their perception of the
text, as well as their attitude towards transparency. At the same time, it must be noted that the
convention opened for signature only three years ago, in March 2015. More widespread accession to
and ratification of the UN Convention on Transparency is necessary to normalise the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules as the institutional norm for facilitating greater transparency in investment
arbitration. The rules have, however, already been applied for the first time in investor-state
arbitrations by party consent.
Iberdrola SA and Iberdrola Energia SAU v Bolivia was the first arbitration to apply the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules by party consent. Iberdrola initiated arbitral proceedings in 2014 under the
344 Ibid.
345 See Report of the UN Commission in International Trade Law, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-second Session, Supplement
No 17 (A/72/17), para 317 www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/commissionsessions/unc-50/A-72-17-E.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
346 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution A/Res/69/116 (2014) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/686/64/PDF/
N1468664.pdf?OpenElement accessed 8 October 2018.
347 Jakob Hans Johansen, ‘The UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration Will Enter into Force in Six Months’
(April 2017) www.kromannreumert.com/Nyheder/2017/05/The-United-Nations-Convention-on-Transparency accessed 8 October 2018.
348 UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of Treaties: United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration’ https://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-3&chapter=22&lang=en accessed 8 October 2018.
349 Ibid.
350 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the United Nations
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration’ (January 2015) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015PC0021 accessed 8 October 2018.

Bolivia-Spain BIT.351 Although the treaty was entered into prior to 1 April 2014, meaning that the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules would not automatically apply, the parties opted to abide by the UN
Transparency Rules nevertheless.352 The tribunal held that the PCA would act as the repository for
documents pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The PCA would make the documents available to the
public and would conduct public hearings in the case.353
Similarly, the parties to BSG Resources Limited v Republic of Guinea agreed to apply the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules with certain modifications intended to protect confidential information. The
parties made all written submissions public, including the request for arbitration, memorials, exhibits,
witness statements, expert reports, hearing transcripts and decisions of the tribunal.354 Additionally,
the hearings were made accessible through a video link on the ICSID website.355 The tribunal had the
discretion to admit or deny third parties from physically accessing the hearing. The parties also added
a 30-minute delay to the video broadcast in order to protect confidential information.
The Iberdrola and BSGR cases represent an important turning point in investment arbitration
transparency, since it is the first time that disputing parties have exercised the Transparency Rules’
article 1(2)(a) opt-in provision, a mere six months after the Treaty was opened for signature.
Furthermore, even where the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency are not overtly adopted, there has
been an increasing trend for parties to agree to some degree of transparency.
ICC
The Secretariat’s Guide to the ICC clarifies in paragraph 3-807 that ‘[t]he Rules do not provide that
the arbitration proceedings are confidential’. Since the 2012 revision of the rules, under Article 22,
the tribunal has the power to enter orders regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings.356 Prior
to the 2012 revisions; the rules only allowed the tribunal to take general measures to protect trade
secrets and other confidential information.
Article 26 provides parties’ rights with regard to hearings, adding that ‘persons not involved in the
proceedings shall not be admitted’, unless the tribunal and the parties approve the third party’s
attendance.357 Appendix II, Article 1(3) provides that ‘in exceptional circumstances, the President of
the Court may invite other persons to attend [sessions of the court]’.358
The confidentiality of the ICC’s work is emphasised in Appendix I to the ICC’s Arbitration Rules.
Article 6 of Appendix I provides: ‘[t]he work of the Court is of a confidential nature which must be
respected by everyone who participates in that work in whatever capacity. The Court lays down the
rules regarding the persons who can attend the meetings of the Court and its Committees and who
are entitled to have access to materials related to the work of the Court and its Secretariat’.359
351 Christian Leathley and Daniela Paez, ‘UNCITRAL Transparency Rules Applied for the First Time in Investor-State Arbitration’ (October 2015)
http://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2015/10/26/uncitral-transparency-rules-applied-for-the-first-time-in-investor-state-arbitration
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
356 ICC, Arbitration Rules, Art 22 (March 2017) https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration accessed 8
October 2018.
357 Ibid, Art 26.
358 Ibid, app II, Art 1.
359 Ibid, app I, Art 6.
The ICC’s Appendix II, Article 1 underscores the importance that any individual outside the tribunal
who is granted access to arbitral documents must ensure that the materials remain confidential.
Under ICC rules, there is no requirement that documents submitted to the tribunal be made public.
Rather, Appendix II, Article 1(4) establishes that ‘[t]he documents submitted to the Court, or drawn
up by it or the Secretariat in the course of the Court’s proceedings, are communicated only to the
members of the Court and to the Secretariat and to persons authorised by the President to attend
Court sessions’.360
In the rare event that a third party is granted access to documents submitted to the ICC tribunal or
any awards or decisions emanating from the ICC tribunal, Appendix II, Articles 1(5) and 1(6) provide
the limitations for the use of the documents. Article 1(5) provides that the President or Secretary
General of the ICC may authorise researchers to access certain awards and other documents of
general interest.361 The President and Secretary General do not have authority to grant access to
documents that were remitted by the parties, such as memoranda, notes and statements.362 Before
granting any third-party access to arbitral documents, the tribunal must ensure that the third party
will respect the confidentiality of the proceedings.363 Any academic work that the third party wishes to
publish using the ICC arbitral documents must be submitted to the Secretary General of the ICC for
approval.364
In an effort to make ICC proceedings more transparent, the ICC began publishing details about
arbitrators in 2016.365 Both ICC and party-appointed arbitrators’ details are uploaded on the ICC’s
website monthly.366 In addition to the name and nationality of the arbitrators, the ICC also posts the
arbitrator’s method of appointment, the role of the arbitrator, the status of the arbitration and the
status of the arbitrator on a particular case.367 The ICC has also begun publishing excerpts of awards
and procedural orders, along with reasoning for decisions on challenges to arbitrators.
Submissions by third parties
Investment disputes may implicate matters of public interest, particularly where they affect the ability
of a state to regulate for public welfare.368 Civil society and some governments have increasingly
pushed for greater transparency and participation in arbitration, demanding greater involvement in
proceedings and urging that governments not withhold information, including awards.
NAFTA’s FTC provided details regarding participation by non-disputing parties, stating that ‘[n]o
provision of [NAFTA] limits a tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from a person or
360 Ibid, app II, Art 1(4).

363 Ibid, app III, Art 1(6).
364 Ibid, app III, Art 1(6).
365 Markus Altenkirch and Malika Boussihmad, ‘ICC Publishes Arbitrator’s Details – A New Level of Transparency’ https://globalarbitrationnews.
com/icc-publishes-arbitrators-details-new-level-transparency accessed 8 October 2018.
366 ICC, ‘ICC arbitral tribunals’ https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/icc-arbitral-tribunals accessed 8 October 2018.
367 Ibid.
368 In Methanex v United States, eg, the disputed state action was a ban imposed by California on the use of Methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) because
it contaminated water supplies. Likewise, in Piero Foresti v South Africa, the disputed state action related to South Africa’s Black Economic
Empowerment programme, a post-apartheid measure to ameliorate the disenfranchisement of historically disadvantaged South Africans.

entity that is not a disputing party’, and detailing the applicable procedures for such participation.369
The 2003 statement clarifies that ‘[n]o provision in the NAFTA limits a tribunal’s discretion to
accept written submissions from a… non-disputing party’.370 The FTC’s statement lists recommended
procedures and requirements with respect to the submissions.371 Additionally, the statement provides
tribunals with the criteria to consider when deciding whether to grant leave to file a non-disputing
party’s submission.372 Ultimately the FTC’s statement serves as a suggested structure for handling
amicus curiae submissions.373
The most recent investment agreement developments came from the TTIP draft text. Under
the TTIP, those who ‘have a direct and present interest in the result of the dispute (called the
intervener)’ may have a right ‘to intervene as a third party’ (Article 23).
The openness of the hearing is not clearly enshrined in any provision of the TTIP draft. However,
if the application to intervene is granted, the intervener obtains a right to request a copy of every
procedural document, minutes included, thus gaining the opportunity to be fully aware of how the
proceeding has been conducted.
ICSID’s 2006 amendments to its Rules and Regulations permitted tribunals to allow a person or entity
that is not a party to the dispute to file written submissions. ICSID provides a list of decisions, dating
back to 2003 before the 2006 amendments, pertaining to non-disputing party participation.374
The new SCC Rules include an appendix applicable to investment, which allows a person or entity
(other than a state) that is not a disputing party to apply to an arbitral tribunal for permission to
make a written submission in the arbitration. Appendix III, Article 3 permits amici to apply for
permission to make submissions to the tribunal.375 The article also provides a list of the requirements
for amici submissions, including the contents and format of the submission.376 Notably, the tribunal
may, after consulting with the disputing parties, invite a non-disputing party to make a submission.377
Similar to the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, Rule 29 of the SIAC Rules contains specific provisions
on the participation of non-disputing parties. SIAC IA Rule 29.2 confers tribunals with the discretion
to permit non-disputing party submissions. However, the tribunal must first consult with all parties to
the dispute. This gives the tribunal the opportunity to balance the public interest and non-disputing
party participation with the confidentiality of proceedings.
The tribunal must consider the extent to which the non-disputing party submissions will bring a
different perspective to the legal or factual matters that are relevant to the dispute, and whether the
369 US Department of State, ‘Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation’ www.state.gov/documents/
organization/38791.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
370 US Trade Representative, ‘Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation’ https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/
Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file45_3600.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
373 Howard Mann, ‘The Free Trade Commission Statements of October 7, 2003, on NAFTA’s Chapter 11: Never-Never Land or Real Progress?’
www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_ftc_comment_oct03.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
374 ICSID, ‘Decisions on Non-Disputing Party Participation’ https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Decisions-on-Non-Disputing-party-
Participation.aspx accessed 8 October 2018.
375 Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ‘2017 Arbitration Rules’ app III Art 3 (January 2017) https://sccinstitute.com/
media/169838/arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf accessed 8 October 2018.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid, app III, Art (4).
non-disputing party has a ‘sufficient interest’ in the proceedings (SIAC IA Rules, Rule 29.3).378
Inspired by equivalent provisions in the ICSID Rules (Rule 37) and the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules (Article 4), SIAC IA Rules, Rule 29.3 arguably goes further by only requiring the non-disputing
party to show a ‘sufficient’ rather than ‘significant’ interest in the proceedings.
In addition to the general provision on non-disputing party submissions in the SIAC IA Rules, Rules
29.1–29.2 also specifically permit a party to the contract, treaty or other instrument that is not a party
to the dispute (ie, a non-disputing contracting party) to make submissions to the tribunal on written
notice to the parties (SIAC IA Rules, Rule 29.1). Under Rule 29.1, neither tribunal nor disputing
party consent is required, but the submissions must be limited to a question of treaty or contractual
interpretation that is directly relevant to the dispute (SIAC IA Rules, Rule 29.1).
i. Third-party funding
Third-party funding, if not disclosed, may impede transparency in investment arbitration. The text
of the agreed EU-Vietnam FTA released in January 2016 contains a specific provision which requires
that the presence of third-party funding be disclosed (but not the terms of the funding agreement).
In February 2016, the revised version of CETA was released. In addition to the reworked ISDS
provisions, it now also includes a provision requiring the disclosure of third-party funding. Article
8.26 requires the funded party to disclose ‘the name and address of the third party funder’.
Although CETA does not go any further, this is a step towards increased transparency of this type
of arrangement. CETA also provides for the application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, as
modified, in Article 8.36.
The SIAC IA Rules also address third-party funding. SIAC IA Rule 24.l expressly empowers the
tribunal to ‘order the disclosure of the existence and details of a party’s third-party funding
arrangement, including details concerning the identity of the funder, the funder’s interest in the
outcome of the proceedings, and whether or not the funder has committed to undertake adverse
costs liability’.
Neither the ICSID nor UNCITRAL Rules (or the ICC/SCC Rules) provide for a similar express
power to inquire into a third-party funder’s involvement. Although ICSID tribunals have relied on
their inherent power to order disclosure in cases involving a potential conflict of interest379 this is not
a settled matter. SIAC IA Rule 24.1 overcomes this uncertainty by bestowing on the tribunal broad
discretion to inquire into both the existence and details of third-party funding arrangements. Rule
33.1 allows the tribunal to take into account any third-party funding arrangements in apportioning
the costs of the arbitration. Rule 35 empowers the tribunal to make adverse costs orders against third-
party funders ‘where appropriate’.
Although most major funders will procure after-the-event insurance and are required by the
Association of Litigation Funders to address responsibility for adverse costs liability in their funding
agreements, such self-regulatory practices are neither uniformly observed nor mandatory. Rules 32.1
378 This is a lower threshold than under the ICSID Rules (ICSID Rules, Rule 37(c)). See also UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, Art 4(3)(a), which
may allow experts and amicus curiae without a strong link to the proceedings per se, but who nonetheless have important expertise to bring to
bear on the understanding or resolution of the dispute, to meaningfully participate in the proceedings.
379 See Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd Sti v Turkmenistan, Procedural Order No 3, ICSID Case No ARB/12/6.

and 34 reduce the risk of exposing successful respondent-states to a costs bill that they cannot recover.
The adverse cost consequences may also deter the funding of frivolous claims.
In an ICSID decision, the tribunal ordered the claimants to disclose whether they were the recipients
of third-party funding, and to divulge the names and details of the funder and some terms upon
which the funding had been provided. On 12 June 2015, the ICSID tribunal in Muhammet Çap &
Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd Sti v Turkmenistan ordered the claimants, two Turkish construction
companies, to disclose whether their claims in the arbitration are being funded by a third party. In
another PCA case under the UNCITRAL Rules, South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, the tribunal
ordered the claimant to disclose the identity of the third-party funder that granted financing to the
claimant in the arbitration.380 Tribunals have also considered the presence of third-party funding
in whether to grant security for costs. In RSM v Saint Lucia, the tribunal granted RSM’s request for
security stating that the presence of third-party funder ‘supports the Tribunal’s concern that Claimant
will not comply with a costs award rendered against it’.381 More recently, in Eskosol v Italy, the tribunal
rejected Italy’s request for security for costs on the grounds Eskosol, with the assistance of a third-
party funder, obtained an insurance policy from which costs could be paid.382 Conversely, it has been
reported that in Luis García Armas v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the ICSID tribunal ordered the
claimants to provide guarantee for Venezuela’s costs in defending the investment arbitration on the
basis that claimants’ third-party funding agreement provides that the funder is not liable for any
adverse cost orders and claimants have not established that they have the resources to pay an adverse
costs order themselves.383
The proposal of the EU for the TTIP contains an express rule on disclosure of third-party funding:
‘Where there is third party funding, the disputing party benefiting from it shall notify to the other
disputing party and to the division of the tribunal, or where the division of the tribunal is not
established, to the President of the tribunal, the name and address of the third party funder’.384
Conclusion
While a number of challenges exist within the ISDS system, increasing its consistency, efficiency and
transparency fosters its legitimacy. Many of the criticisms levelled at ISDS can in fact be addressed
through comprehensive, disciplined and collective efforts to attain those objectives.
380 South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, PCA Case No 2013-15, Procedural Order No 10 dated 11 January 2016.
381 RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs of 13 August 2014, para 83.
382 Eskosol SpA in Liquidazione v St Italian Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/15/50, Procedural Order No 3 of 12 April 2017, para 37.
383 Luis García Armas v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/16/1, Procedural Order No 8 of 20 June 2018.
384 EU’s proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes, Chapter II, Art 8(1).
IBA Arbitration Committee
Appendix 1
2016–17 Members of the Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration
Member Affiliation
Samaa A Haridi Hogan Lovells US
Chair
Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration
Niuscha Bassiri Hanotiau & van den Berg
Karel Daele Mishcon de Reya
Diego Garcia Carrion The Republic of Ecuador

Fmr Attorney General
José Manuel Garcia Represa Dechert
Jose Luis Gomara The Kingdom of Spain

Attorney General of the State
General Secretary of Dept of Treasury Financial Politics
Deva Gomez Villanua Armesto & Asociados
Alejandro Lopez Ortiz Mayer Brown
Ben Love Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Blanca Montejo The United Nations

Security Council Affairs Division
Department of Political Affairs
Corinne Montineri The United Nations

International Trade Law Division
Patrick W Pearsall Jenner & Block

Fmr US Chief of Investment Arbitration
Patricia Saiz ESADE Business & Law School
Sylvie Tabet Government of Canada
Maria Vicien-Milburn Independent Arbitrator

Fmr Director, General Legal Division, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
Romesh Weeramantry Clifford Chance
Pal Zoltan Kara MOL Hungarian Energy Company

General Counsel

Members of the Core Advisory Group
Member Affiliation
Mohamed Salah Abdelwahab Zulficar & Partners
Surya Gopalan Davis Polk & Wardwell
Judith Knieper The United Nations

International Trade Law Division
Craig Miles King & Spalding
Reza Mohtashami QC Three Crowns
Gaetan Verhoosel Three Crowns

2014–15 Chair of the Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration
The Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration would like to thank the 2016–17 Co-Chairs of
the IBA Arbitration Committee for the support and guidance they have provided in the preparation
of this report:
Name Affiliation
David Arias Arias
2016–17 Co-Chair, IBA Arbitration Committee
Eduardo Silva-Romero Dechert

2016–17 Co-Chair, IBA Arbitration Committee
Julie Bédard Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

2016–17 Senior Vice-Chair Arbitration Committee
The Subcommittee would also like to acknowledge the hard work and dedicated efforts of the
following individuals who helped with the preparation of this report:
Justin Bart Pratyush Panjwani

Catherine Bratic Diego Perez Ara
Catalina Carmona Brittany Stromko
Hunter Davis Mohan Warusha-Hennadige
Sam Dougherty Mengyi Xu
M Imad Khan Summer Yuan
Katherine McGuigan Julia Zenker
Juan Moreno

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A report by the IBA Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration

Summary of the 2016 Subcommittee report 3

Chapter 1: Consistency in investor-state arbitration 6

A solution to the status quo 7

An overhaul of the system? 23

Chapter 2: Efficiency in investor-state arbitration 36

Efficiency challenges before constitution of the tribunal (including

Efficiency challenges after constitution of the tribunal 49

Chapter 3: Transparency in international investment arbitration 53

Publication of arbitral awards, broadcasting of hearings and document

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20181

2 Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 2018

Substantive protections and regionalisation

• Most respondents believed that an appellate mechanism for investment treaty

• Most respondents believed that, to some extent, regionalisation of investment treaty

Arbitrator appointments, disclosure and challenges

4 See generally, the 2016 Report.

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20183

• An overwhelming proportion of respondents considered the fact that certain

• However, respondents were evenly divided on whether arbitrators should be permitted

• Tribunal-appointed arbitral secretaries were not an issue of concern for a majority of

Arbitrator conduct and efficiency of proceedings

• An overwhelming number of respondents supported a code of conduct for arbitrators

• The majority of respondents thought that arbitrator availability, duration of arbitration

• An overwhelming majority of respondents expressed some or significant concern about

4 Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 2018

• Most respondents were significantly concerned with the assessment of damages.

• A majority of respondents considered that the existence of third-party funding should

Standards for annulment or setting aside of awards

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20185

Catalysts for inconsistency

 Decentralisation: The decentralised nature of dispute resolution under investment treaties

6 Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 2018

Some commentators contend that inconsistency is an inherent feature of investment arbitration.14

A solution to the status quo

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20187

Negotiations on a proposed multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) were launched by

8 Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 2018

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 20189

Tools to ensure consistency in arbitral awards in the context of multilateral treaties

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 201811

Clear treaty drafting

Use of exceptions and reservations

Availability of travaux préparatoires

Non-disputing state participation in arbitration

Binding and non-binding interpretive notes

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 201813

Agreed upon interpretations by domestic authorities

Adoption of stare decisis or jurisprudence constante approaches

53 See n 37 above, Art 8.31(3).

Tackling parallel proceedings

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 201815

66 Ibid, para 334.

1. The causes of parallel proceedings

2. Adverse consequences of parallel proceedings

70 See n 67 above 10–11.

Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment treaty arbitration report 201817

 Stay of arbitral proceedings: arbitrators’ competence to rule on their own jurisdiction

Summary of the 2016 Subcommittee report 3

Chapter 1: Consistency in investor-state arbitration 6

A solution to the status quo 7

An overhaul of the system? 23

Chapter 2: Efficiency in investor-state arbitration 36

Efficiency challenges after constitution of the tribunal 49

Chapter 3: Transparency in international investment arbitration 53

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