G.R. No. 164402 July 5, 2010 ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, Represented by ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Petitioner, Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro Respondents
G.R. No. 164402 July 5, 2010 ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, Represented by ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Petitioner, Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro Respondents
G.R. No. 164402 July 5, 2010 ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, Represented by ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Petitioner, Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro Respondents
DECISION
In an action for recovery of possession of realty, who has the better right of possession, the
registered owner armed with a Torrens title or the occupants brandishing a notarized but
unregistered deed of sale executed before the land was registered under the Torrens system?
As we previously ruled in similar cases,1 we resolve the question in favor of the titleholder.
Factual Antecedents
On August 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages 2 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977,
her husband Ignacio Aguilar (Ignacio) was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9354 3 over
a 606-square meter parcel of land designated as Lot 83 situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio allowed petitioner’s sister, Anastacia Urieta
(Anastacia), mother of respondent Ederlina B. Alfaro (Ederlina), to construct a house on the
southern portion of said land and to stay therein temporarily.
In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition Lot 83. Petitioner thus asked the
respondents, who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate Lot 83.
They did not heed her demand.
Thus, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacate
subject property, and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees
and the costs of suit.
In their Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses, 4 respondents did not dispute that
Ignacio was able to secure title over the entire Lot 83. However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973,
Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of Lot 83 consisting
of 367.5 square meters as shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan5 which bears the signatures of
petitioner and Ignacio. Since then, they and their mother have been in possession thereof.
Respondents also presented several Tax Declarations 6 in support of their allegations.
Respondents also raised the defense of prescription. They pointed out that accion publiciana or an
action to recover the real right of possession independent of ownership prescribes in 10 years.
However, it took petitioner more than 25 years before she asserted her rights by filing accion
publiciana. As alleged in the complaint, they took possession of the disputed portion of Lot 83 as
early as 1968, but petitioner filed the case only in 1995.
By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed that petitioner be directed to execute the necessary
documents so that title to the 367.5-square meter portion of Lot 83 could be issued in their name.
They likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
In her Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,7 petitioner denied having signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan
and averred that her signature appearing thereon is a forgery. She presented an unsworn written
declaration dated January 28, 1994 where her husband declared that he did not sell the property in
question to anyone. As to the issue of prescription, she asserted that respondents’ occupation of
subject property cannot ripen into ownership considering that the same is by mere tolerance of the
owner. Besides, the purported Kasulatan sa Bilihan was not registered with the proper Registry of
Deeds. 1avvphi1
During the trial, petitioner presented the testimonies of Orlando Aguilar (Orlando) and Zenaida
Baldeo (Zenaida). Orlando testified that he has been staying in Lot 83 since 1960 and had built a
house thereon where he is presently residing; and, that his mother, herein petitioner, denied having
sold the property or having signed any document for that matter.
Zenaida also testified that in 1981, her father (Ignacio) and Ederlina had a confrontation before the
barangay during which her father denied having conveyed any portion of Lot 83 to anybody. She
further testified that she is familiar with the signature of her father and that the signature appearing
on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is not her father’s signature.
For their part, respondents offered in evidence the testimonies of Estrella Bermudo Alfaro (Estrella),
Ederlina, and Jose Tampolino (Jose). Estrella declared that she was present when Ignacio and the
petitioner affixed their signatures on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, which was acknowledged before
Notary Public Juan Q. Dantayana on April 17, 1973. She narrated that her mother actually
purchased the property in 1954, but it was only in 1973 when the vendor executed the deed of sale.
In fact, her father Francisco Bermudo was able to secure a permit to erect a house on the disputed
property from the Office of the Mayor of Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro in 1954. 8 She was surprised
to learn though that their property is still registered in the name of the petitioner.
Ederlina corroborated the declarations of Estrella. She also alleged that her parents occupied the
property in 1954 when they built a hut there, then later on, a house of strong materials.
Jose corroborated the declarations of the other witnesses for the respondents that the disputed
portion of Lot 83 is owned by Anastacia.
In its Decision9 dated September 21, 1998, the court a quo ordered the respondents to vacate
subject premises and denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and
laches. It held that the prescriptive period for reconvenyance of fraudulently registered real property
is 10 years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In this case, however, it
is not disputed that OCT No. P-9354 covering the entire Lot 83 was issued to Ignacio in 1977. The
trial court likewise held that respondents are guilty of laches and that the reconveyance of the
disputed property in their favor would violate the rule on indefeasibility of Torrens title.
WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Ordering the defendants and any person claiming right under them to vacate the
premises in question and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. To pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as and for reasonable
attorney’s fees;
SO ORDERED.10
On June 7, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision11 reversing the trial court’s Decision and
dismissing the complaint, as well as respondents’ counterclaim. The CA upheld the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and
duly executed. In addition, witness Estrella categorically declared that she was present when
petitioner and Ignacio signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA elaborated that in order to disprove
the presumption accorded to a notarized document, the party contesting its authenticity and due
execution must present a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which the petitioner failed to
do.
The CA likewise disagreed with the court a quo that respondents’ counterclaim should be dismissed
on the ground of indefeasibility of title. It emphasized that the Torrens system was adopted to protect
innocent third parties for value and not to protect fraud. Nonetheless, the CA did not grant the relief
sought in respondents’ counterclaim considering that not all interested parties were impleaded in the
case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and a new one
ENTERED dismissing the complaint and counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.12
Issue
Without seeking reconsideration of the CA’s Decision, petitioner interposed the present recourse
raising the sole issue of:
Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan. She alleges that she wanted to take the witness stand to disclaim in open court
her purported signature appearing on respondents’ Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but could not do so
because she is too old, bed-ridden and has to bear a tortuous five-hour drive to reach the court.
Nevertheless, she executed a sworn statement declaring that she and her husband never sold any
portion of Lot 83 and that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged. She avers that the
assistance of an expert witness is not even necessary to detect the patent dissimilarities between
said forged signatures and their authentic signatures.
Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in taking into consideration the appearance and
condition of the paper where the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is written. She posits that the fabrication of an
ancient-looking document nowadays is no longer difficult. She also points to several circumstances
which cast doubt on the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA
inexplicably ignored
Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And while there are exceptions to the
rule on indefeasibility of title, 14 she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. With regard
to the tax declarations presented by respondents, petitioner asserts that it has been the consistent
ruling of this Court that tax declarations are not necessarily proof of ownership.
In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the arguments advanced by the
petitioner, however, it is clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence
on record.
Our Ruling
This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. 15 It is settled that in
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case.16 This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, 17 one of which is
when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, like in the present
case.
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. 19
It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 20
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.21
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue
of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. 22 The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive
on the issue of ownership.23
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential guideposts, we shall now resolve the arguments raised by
the parties in this petition.
As against petitioner’s Torrens title, respondents’ Kasulatan sa Bilihan cannot confer better right to
possess.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears.24 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein.25 It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession.26 Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,27 this Court declared that the
"age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire
Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their
claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris tantum
presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioner’s Torrens
title. This has been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel, 28 viz:
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it
would still not bolster the petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the
registered owners’ superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted
with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should
be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There,
the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed
therein that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err
in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-à-vis the contested
unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is
preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. (Citations omitted.)
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are
telltale signs which cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:
1. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer,
Anastacia, died;
2. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the
Kasulatan only when petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior
thereto, they neither asserted their rights thereunder nor registered the same with the
proper Registry of Deeds;
3. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses
thereto, was not presented in court; and,
4. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President
is a public officer who has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said
title.
Moreover, respondents’ attack on the validity of petitioner’s title by claiming that their mother
became the true owner of the southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-
9354 constitutes as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend
their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective
is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.29 This cannot be allowed. Under Section
48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a
certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to
the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. 30 This manner of attack
is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action
whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. 31
Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan,32 therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his defense,
defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiff-appellee’s Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2004 was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected
defendant-appellant’s defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals 33 we arrived
at the same conclusion and elaborated as follows:
In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised
in their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which
they may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private
respondents. That theory will not prosper.
While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic
complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and
independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as
above set forth, particularly in its required relation to the subject matter of opposing party’s claim.
Failing in that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an altogether different and original
action.
It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the property
in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is
apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the
land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a
proper action.
The lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents’ counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction.
Both the trial court and the appellate court considered respondents’ counterclaim as a petition for
reconveyance. In which case, it should be treated merely as a permissive counterclaim because the
evidence required to prove their claim differs from the evidence needed to establish petitioner’s
demand for recovery of possession. Being a permissive counterclaim, therefore, respondents should
have paid the corresponding docket fees.34 However, there is no proof on record that respondents
paid the required docket fees. The official receipts were neither attached to nor annotated on
respondents’ Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses 35 which was filed via registered
mail36 on August 19, 1995. It has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. 37
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. 38
On a final note, and as discussed above, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the
issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is
not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the
parties to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of OCT No. P-9354 can be properly threshed out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
7, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the
premises is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.