Nps 22
Nps 22
Development Microeconomics
(by) Bardhan and Udry
Chapter 4
g L
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Lewis-Fei-Ranis model [1]
Assumption.
– There are surplus labourers in the agricultural
sector whose marginal productivity is zero.
Implication.
– These labourers can be shifted to the industrial
sector.
» No change in agricultural output.
» No change in industrial wage rate.
h’
h
g L
Empirical evidence
– Horizontal labour supply curve questionable
Puzzle
– Coexistence of widespread unemployment and
downward stickiness of wages
Choice variables
– n and W
Firm’s problem
– Max (F – nW), assuming price of output equals 1
– First order conditions will yield W* (efficiency wage)
λ(W)
Changes in W/λ(W)
– Initially, λ(W) = 0, and hence
ratio is infinite
– For W < W*, λ(W) rises rapidly
but W is still high relative to
λ (W)
– For W > W*, λ(W) falls
relative to W because of
W* W
diminishing marginal
productivity
W*
Extension
– W* will be higher
whenever:
» Firms face a search cost
Aggregate R(W)
Employment » R’(W) < 0 and R(W)
Involuntary convex (i.e., R’’(W) > 0)
unemployment
Unemployment
– Voluntary and involuntary
Land reforms
0 – Reduce involuntary
m1 m2 1 unemployment
small and
marginal
farmers Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [5]
Empirical evidence
Labourer behaviour
– Perceives a wage vector w = (W1, …., Wi, …., WN)
– On the basis of wi, labourer i estimates her own probability of
employment
– Her expected payoff is given by the following:
– Pi(w) = pi(w)Wi + (1 – pi(w))W0
– when Wo ≡ reservation wage
Problem
– Wi > W0 can be sustained only if no labourer undercuts the others’
wages
Enforcement
– Threat to reduce Wi = W0 for all periods (t + j) if labourer i
undercuts others in period t
– Whether the threat has any effect would depend on the rate at
which labourer i discounts the future
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Impact of social norms [3]
Problems with the model
– Assumes common knowledge which may not hold if there is a lot of
migration
– The threat that a labourer will forever be penalised by everyone by
reducing the wage rate to W0 is not credible
– There is scope for cooperation between employers and some labourers
who are promised a wage rate a little higher than W0 in perpetuity
Other issues
– Social acceptability of inter-personal variation in wage rates
– Social processes that match employers and employees along the lines of
location, ethnicity, religion etc
– Emergence of de facto insider-outsider models in labour markets, where
insiders are used to identify the more productive outsiders, and monitor
the latter at a later stage
Explanation II
– Labourers are more risk averse than employers
– They accept relatively low wage during peak season in exchange
for guaranteed employment in the lean season
– Casual labourers exist in equilibrium because it is costly to hoard
labour
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Labour tying [2]
Explanation III
– Efficiency wage has to be paid to labourer in lean season because
consumption (or nutrition) enhances productivity with a lag