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The document discusses development microeconomics and summarizes the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model of economic development which assumes surplus agricultural laborers can be shifted to industry without affecting output or wages. It also examines the efficiency wage theory where paying above market clearing wages can increase worker productivity and decrease costs. Labor tying arrangements are explored where workers accept lower wages during peak seasons in exchange for employment guarantees during lean periods.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
72 views18 pages

Nps 22

The document discusses development microeconomics and summarizes the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model of economic development which assumes surplus agricultural laborers can be shifted to industry without affecting output or wages. It also examines the efficiency wage theory where paying above market clearing wages can increase worker productivity and decrease costs. Labor tying arrangements are explored where workers accept lower wages during peak seasons in exchange for employment guarantees during lean periods.

Uploaded by

Atanu Mallik
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Development Economics

Development Microeconomics
(by) Bardhan and Udry
Chapter 4

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Marginal product vs. total output
„ Marginal product of „ Total output
labour Total
Labour force in agriculture
→ Diminishing this way
MPL output
g

Labour force in agriculture


→ Diminishing this way

g L
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Lewis-Fei-Ranis model [1]
„ Assumption.
– There are surplus labourers in the agricultural
sector whose marginal productivity is zero.

„ Implication.
– These labourers can be shifted to the industrial
sector.
» No change in agricultural output.
» No change in industrial wage rate.

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Lewis-Fei-Ranis model [2]
wage
D3 Labour supply
D2
D1

h’
h

g L

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Lewis-Fei-Ranis model [3]
„ Policy implications
– Importance of agricultural productivity
– High wage rate is incompatible with
industrialisation.

„ Empirical evidence
– Horizontal labour supply curve questionable

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Lewis-Fei-Ranis model [4]
„ Lacunae
– Skill compatibility
– Choice of industrial technology
– Comparative advantage

„ Puzzle
– Coexistence of widespread unemployment and
downward stickiness of wages

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [1]
„ Production function
– Q = F(nλ(W)), F’ > 0, F’’ < 0, λ’(W) > 0
– Q ≡ output; W ≡ wage rate
n ≡ number of hours/weeks of labour employed
λ ≡ labour efficiency

„ Choice variables
– n and W

„ Firm’s problem
– Max (F – nW), assuming price of output equals 1
– First order conditions will yield W* (efficiency wage)

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [2]
„ Efficiency wage
– At W = W*, the firm minimises
λ the ratio W/λ(W), i.e., the cost
of one efficiency unit of labour

λ(W)
„ Changes in W/λ(W)
– Initially, λ(W) = 0, and hence
ratio is infinite
– For W < W*, λ(W) rises rapidly
but W is still high relative to
λ (W)
– For W > W*, λ(W) falls
relative to W because of
W* W
diminishing marginal
productivity

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [3]
„ Involuntary unemployment „ Implication
Wage
– The demand for labour is
D(W) inelastic for wages below
S(W) W*, and has the usual
downward sloping shape for
W > W*

W*
„ Extension
– W* will be higher
whenever:
» Firms face a search cost
Aggregate R(W)
Employment » R’(W) < 0 and R(W)
Involuntary convex (i.e., R’’(W) > 0)
unemployment

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [4]
„ Land ownership
– Continuum from 0 to 1

landed „ Wage and productivity


landless
labourers gentry – μ ≡ minimum cost of buying
one efficiency unit of labour
μ – μ* ≡ aggregate marginal
product of effective labour
μ*

„ Unemployment
– Voluntary and involuntary

„ Land reforms
0 – Reduce involuntary
m1 m2 1 unemployment
small and
marginal
farmers Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Efficiency wage [5]
„ Empirical evidence

– Response of wage rates to changes in demand and


supply conditions in the labour market not as stable as
the physiological relationship between nutrition and
productivity
» Both for casual labourers and people with long-term contracts
who are more likely to get efficiency wage

– Unemployment probabilities and wage diversity not as


influenced by land and asset holding as predicted
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Impact of social norms [1]
„ Observation
– Despite developing economies being labour surplus, efficiency
wages exist; labourers do not undercut each other to reduce wages
to market clearing levels

„ Labourer behaviour
– Perceives a wage vector w = (W1, …., Wi, …., WN)
– On the basis of wi, labourer i estimates her own probability of
employment
– Her expected payoff is given by the following:
– Pi(w) = pi(w)Wi + (1 – pi(w))W0
– when Wo ≡ reservation wage

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Impact of social norms [2]
„ Inference
– If all labourers have a reservation wage of W0, and if that is also
the market clearing wage, any Wi > W0 would be better, for a
positive p

„ Problem
– Wi > W0 can be sustained only if no labourer undercuts the others’
wages

„ Enforcement
– Threat to reduce Wi = W0 for all periods (t + j) if labourer i
undercuts others in period t
– Whether the threat has any effect would depend on the rate at
which labourer i discounts the future
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Impact of social norms [3]
„ Problems with the model
– Assumes common knowledge which may not hold if there is a lot of
migration
– The threat that a labourer will forever be penalised by everyone by
reducing the wage rate to W0 is not credible
– There is scope for cooperation between employers and some labourers
who are promised a wage rate a little higher than W0 in perpetuity

„ Other issues
– Social acceptability of inter-personal variation in wage rates
– Social processes that match employers and employees along the lines of
location, ethnicity, religion etc
– Emergence of de facto insider-outsider models in labour markets, where
insiders are used to identify the more productive outsiders, and monitor
the latter at a later stage

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Labour tying [1]
„ Explanation I
– Employer concern about availability of skilled labourers in the
peak season
– Promise of wage in excess of (marginal) productivity in the lean
season, in exchange for guaranteed supply in the peak season

„ Explanation II
– Labourers are more risk averse than employers
– They accept relatively low wage during peak season in exchange
for guaranteed employment in the lean season
– Casual labourers exist in equilibrium because it is costly to hoard
labour
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Labour tying [2]
„ Explanation III
– Efficiency wage has to be paid to labourer in lean season because
consumption (or nutrition) enhances productivity with a lag

„ Modelling labour tying - I


– In peak season, contracted wage exceeds market clearing wage
– A labourer has incentive to renege on the contract, after benefiting
from it during lean season
– The premium offered in the tied contract has to be sufficiently
large to discourage the labourer from reneging on the contract
– The higher cost of the contract has to be traded off with the
potential cost of not having enough labourers during peak season
– In equilibrium, there will be an active casual labour market

Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik


http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Labour tying [3]
„ Modelling labour tying – II
– Two periods
– Work in first period is complex and difficult to monitor, but
outcome is known at the end of second period
– Work in second period simple and easy to monitor
– Tied labour works for employer in both periods, but casual labour
only in second period
– If outcome is “bad” at the end of second period, tied labourer may
lose his contract
» The threat is real if loss of contract makes the labourer worse off
» The threat is credible if the employer can easily find other similarly
productive labourers to replace him
– On account of incentive premium, and given the fact that having
casual labourers makes the threat credible, there is casual labour in
equilibrium
Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/
Labour tying [4]
„ Impact of economic development
– Greater labour tying
» Tighter labour markets
» Increase in complexity of production, leading to increased
demand for job-specific skills
– Less labour tying
» Greater outside opportunity for labourers, increasing
reservation wages (and incentive premium)
» Greater ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ as opposed to ‘loyalty’
» Greater access to capital and technology, making production
structure less labour intensive

„ Implications for income distribution


Created by: Dr Sumon Bhaumik
http://www.sumonbhaumik.net/

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