Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601               November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ

and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenging the decision  dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution  dated April 17, 2008
1 2

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas,
Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning,
an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners
and Atty. Generoso reside. 3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station)
to report the incident.  Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ
4

Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the
crime and to render assistance.  SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from
5

the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the
crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation  and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
6

beaten.7

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted
the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.  The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police
8

Station.  At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
9

petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were
not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,
said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation  on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that
12

no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were
just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a
regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation.  The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
14

reconsideration. 15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.
16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.  The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02
17

Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest
the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that
the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was
called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts
and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the
denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution
of April 17, 2008;  hence, the present petition.
18

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A

WARRANT.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY
WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW
UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant
was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting
officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word
"invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of
Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours
before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not
have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the
petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for
its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay
the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing
the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These
Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-
trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,  and the
19

1935,  1973  and 1987  Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in
20 21 22

their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure. " 23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke  and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum),
24

sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England
on June 15, 1215.  The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers
25

and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties  under the feudal vassals' threat of
26

civil war.  The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became
27

the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution.  It provides:
28
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised  of his Freehold, or Liberties,
29

or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not
pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of
the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or
Right.  [Emphasis supplied]
30

In United States v. Snyder,  the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
31

provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but
only those that are unreasonable.  With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure,
32

which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and
England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.  These
34

court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate
laws then existing in the Philippines. 35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson  that Section 37  of Act No. 183,
36 37

or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant,
at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,  the Court held that in the absence of any
38

provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions
as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America, also
had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos  that the rules on warrantless arrest
39

were based on common sense and reason.  It further held that warrantless arrest found
40

support under the then Administrative Code  which directed municipal policemen to
41

exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,  the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30  of the
42 43

Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from
the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized
in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the
present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its
phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American
and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present
application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law
principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In
Fortaleza,  the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal
45

Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained,

persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the
duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater
than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that
of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the
presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who
gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and
who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or
court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be
arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following
circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which
provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in
the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,  the Court cited Miles v. Weston,  which ruled that a peace officer may arrest
46 47

persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable
cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable
ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions
are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to
be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was
not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually
committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In
addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable
suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would
be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.
48

In The US. v. Hachaw,  the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman
49

because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's
curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person
sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much
discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of
Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior
to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in
determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a
crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there
should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting
officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the
determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the
determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other
words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in
warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and
was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed"
but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the
warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause
to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination
of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were
adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting
with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just
been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,  the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the
52

Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests
must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,  the warrantless arrest of a person who
53

was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States  that the Fourth
54

Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made.
The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to
get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable
cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds." 55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating
the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in
warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial
officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information
that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information
acquired later.
56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities
similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and
prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of
the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his
possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion
does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant
especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably
trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may
rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,  the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be
59

based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of

suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for triat.  In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,  we defined
60 61

probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in
a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt
of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the
respondent and his witnesses. 62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during
the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause  to issue a warrant of arrest.
63

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged,  or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.
64 65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the
officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant
of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In
short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must
determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and
the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence
or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,  the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining

66

probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these
instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman.
He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he
has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to
prevent the escape of the criminal. 67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our

jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination
of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,  the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8,

68

1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's
assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI
attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the
commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,  one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
69

surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this
information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then
plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that
the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a
crime.

In People v. del Rosario,  the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just
70

been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the
time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware
of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

In People v. Cendana,  the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the
71

victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful
arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,  the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the
72

crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the
"arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was
the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came
from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the
accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,  the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was
73

held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally
gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the
perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,  the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after
74

Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,  the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
75

received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal
knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the
victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.
The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,  there was a shooting
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incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting.
The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the
death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,  a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
77

immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed
them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different
directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,  there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio
78

dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify
the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the
victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was
spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held
valid.

In Doria,  the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
79

Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of
the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative
of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez
to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was
wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left
the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to
the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt.
Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as
Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The
police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the
petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears
that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed"
and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note
that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's
Law Dictionary,  "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or
80

conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus,
even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make
a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable
cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no
time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are
prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of
probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same
provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect
a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that
the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have
been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his
personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they
were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest,
would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of
Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended

the facts in its decision.  From a review of the records, we conclude that the police
81

officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly
determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We
note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to
the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter  entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that
82

the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the
Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was
committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit,
Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the
arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence,
the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime
is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they
arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty:
Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph
Macapanas,  although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty.
83

Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate  that 84

was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling.
The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of
the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area;
Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal
3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand;
Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible
abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty.
Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners  and Atty. Generoso  lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
85 86

importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired. 87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the
police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,  the police officers in the present case saw
88

Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the
petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what
happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.  where Tonog did not flee
89

but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present
case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although
they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the

courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance
to the victim.  This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did
90
not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed. 1âwphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-
cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as
in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took
place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-
spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor
conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the
petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.  Thus, application of actual
91

force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is
not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,  SP02 Javier could not but
93

have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02
Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the
petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other
words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had
exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have
acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was
not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore,
SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges
against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the
petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been
issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution  and Rule 16,
95

Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused.
Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the
speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of
the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-
blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a
motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A
contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what
happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly
stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice