En Banc (G.R. No. L-35156, November 20, 1981)

[ G.R. No.
L-35156, November 20, 1981 ] 29/01/2020, 10(37 PM
196 Phil. 79
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-35156, November 20, 1981 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FLORO

RODIL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder
by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the
Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
"That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of

Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation
and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
"Contrary to law."
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana, together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo
Ligsa, and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in
front of the Indang market (pp. 2, 3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p.
21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the
restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been
drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana, then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter,
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[ G.R. No. L-35156, November 20, 1981 ] 29/01/2020, 10(37 PM
after identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a
license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana, appellant moved one step
backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed
appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana. After that, Lt. Masana told
the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and
the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1½) meters from the table of
Lt. Masana's three companions -- Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After
the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt.
Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the
receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but
appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt.
Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling the latter that they would talk the matter over in the
municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant
suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times,
on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n.,
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana -- PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica -- who were all
seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1½) meters away from that occupied by
the accused and Lt. Masana, stood up to assist Lt. Masana; but Chief of Police Primo
Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant,
was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed
the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant.
Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n.,
Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital
in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted
by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt.
Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and
"D-1" (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
"Postmortem findings.
"General:
"Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and
toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18)
stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen,
measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm.
from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking
out of each, respectively.
"TRUNK:
"(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior
midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards and slightly
upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
"(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior
midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards,
downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
"(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm., just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel, 11 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards
and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric
vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of
the lower lobe of the right lung.
"(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from
the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
"UPPER EXTREMITIES:
"(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring
3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
"(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
"Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
"There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature
of the stomach.
"There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
"REMARKS:
"Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung."
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the
following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in
a restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had
just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971).
Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he
saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While
the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him
and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join
him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation, so the two moved over to the officer's
table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was
still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any
matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported
any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identifi-
cation card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID
card, Exhibit "1", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the
accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when
the latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his ID card to
Lt. Masana, the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to
me or not?" (p. 71, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana.
Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its
handle two (2) times. Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana
was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer,
pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him
away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74, 75, 79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he
intended to surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief
of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were
bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89,
t.s.n., Ibid). Thereupon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to
the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accom-
panied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal
building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid
treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the municipal building, where he
was detained for two days before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary
operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n.,
Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore
stated.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient,

satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs.
Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA
473, 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149, 152; People vs. Berio, 59 Phil. 533, 536; People vs.
Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it
were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing (People vs.
Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarra, 25 SCRA
491, 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270;
People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 772). The rationale for
this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused
must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the
court the fact of legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana,
who committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his
gun after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the
same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his
(deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked
or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and
hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the
latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the
deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is
attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or
cause himself to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted
fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he being then
on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason
to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his
plea that his gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the
accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding
of the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the
third blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the
accused to show the scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused
to give his ID, thus -?
"Court
"Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86, 88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing
testimony in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
"Injuries: (1) lacerated wound, ½ inch, parietal region
(2) lacerated wound, 1½ inches, rt. ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area" [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec.].
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76, 77, t.s.n., Dec.
7, 1971). It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the
accused were facing each other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased
was, according to the accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit
on the right side of his head and on his right earlobe? WE find that this particular claim of the
accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before
parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location
of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the
protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both right-handed (p.
13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce
land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE,
therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural
course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is
that the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that
appellant bumped his head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting
injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the
municipal building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the
authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with
the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his
injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two
days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did
not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency that he
stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971, after the lapse of more than
two and one-half (2½) months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary
investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (p. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10,
1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the
Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who
allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun.
He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-
defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on
July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the crime
was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is
obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of
prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa,
both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the
absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be
afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated
by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present
during the incident between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced
appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal
building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed
with assault upon an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was
established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and
without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a
dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. x x x Needless to say, such
a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting
victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is
delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28
Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the
following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
"COURT
"Q What is the truth?
"A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo Masana,
Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the edge of a table;
that is why he sustained an injury and blood oozed from his head" (pp. 8-9,
t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; underscoring supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
"ATTY. MUÑOZ
"Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table, and you
saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
"A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped his
head on the table.
"Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that he
bumped his head on the table?
"A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xx xx xx xx
"Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already
stabbed?
"A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed."
[Pp. 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis added].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel,
one of the prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim
were indeed face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not
treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of
fact, the force he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his
head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In
short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the
attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43
SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation
to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time
impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 111 Phil.
546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the
accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to
himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his
three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation
between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging
to the former, and at the moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a
knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the
impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of
official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the
presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but
must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670,
675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or
treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who
was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused
then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in
authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, x x." Such an allegation
cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the
complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge
must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of
such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven,
would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle,
the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be
considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities"
(Par. [2], Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank, x x x" (Par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have
the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent
of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor, 35 SCRA 460 [1970]; People vs. Rellin, 72
Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear, et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure
to expressly allege in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person
attacked was a person in authority does not render the information defective so long as there
are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person
attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in
authority reads as follows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime
of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of
Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school
building of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the
performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there
pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to embrace and
kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the school building
and during school classes.
"Contrary to law."
And the ruling of the Court was:
"Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, x x shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal
Code).
"By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), 'teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in
applying the provisions of Article 148.' This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the
information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information
that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority. This is clearly erroneous.
"Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance
of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was
so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is
not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non-compliance
on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expe-
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diency, policy and necessity."
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975),
the information for Direct Assault reads:
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality
of Polillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony
Grande and Jose Astejada, each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except
Paulo Coralde, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
box and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias, a councilman of
barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said
councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties."
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
"Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and
that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal
in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on
certiorari but the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following
considerations:
"The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that
'(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There
is want of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been
based.
"It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct
assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held
by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of
a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear, 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin, 77
Phil. 1038; Vol. II, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].
"What was held in People vs. Balbar, 21 SCRA, 119, 1123, cited by the fiscal is
that it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the
position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not
necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that such position was
that of a person in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
'Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that
fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of
law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's
status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof
could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all
kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy
and necessity.'
"Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual
findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal, it is patent that the fiscal's proper
course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against
respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
"ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of a

valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated"
(underscoring supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies
to the instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the
information in the latter and does not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that
the accused knew that the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is
obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Mesana, identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who
is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social
status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high
social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or
social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are
placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of
distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to other
officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to
determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or
social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of
comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil, 92
SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction
of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-
358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469, 474;
People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs.
Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder of a city chief of police by the chief of the
secret service division (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District
Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreon, CA 52
OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate -- a mere chancellor (People vs.
Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606-607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et
al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those
"generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex),
deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition
between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is
present" (Albert M.A. -- The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member
of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault
against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be
appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault
against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the
appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should
be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder,
the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra -- the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was
charged with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel
transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra -- the appellants were charged with and convicted of
murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the
injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castañeda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. -- appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with
homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero, supra -- where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the
Bacolod City Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of
police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case
at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan
of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident
occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the
accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the
municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief
of police, although he now claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the
chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158),
People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled
that the term public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town
chief of police is not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is
need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term
public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority
which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the
phrase public authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could
have easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14
in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 152. The
lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which may
however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or
barangay captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher
is now considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil. 228). So is the town municipal health officer
(People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26,
1955; People vs. Reyes, et al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in
authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is
specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal
ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not
even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority
by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force
in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the
municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town
clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio
lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant
should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal, the
penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY
OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS
RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO OFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF PRISION
MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL
OTHER RESPECTS.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., in the result.
Barredo, J., votes with J. Teehankee in his brief concurrence.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concurs with the partial dissent of J. Melencio-Herrera.
DISSENTING OPINION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I believe that neither the aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to the public
authorities under Article 14, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, nor that of insult or disregard
of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank under Article 14, par. 3 of the
same Code, is applicable to the present case.
1. For the circumstance of contempt of, or with insult to, public authorities to be considered
aggravating, it is essential (a) that the crime is committed in the presence of a public
authority, not a mere agent of the authorities (People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 [1935];
People vs. Verzo, et al., 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; and (b) that the public authority is
engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not the person against whom the crime
is committed (People vs. Siojo, citing U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 [1911]; Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January 24, 1881, 1 Viada 310), nor the one in-
jured by the commission of the offense (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568 [1947]).
In this case, Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary is not a public authority
nor a person in authority as these terms are defined by Article 152, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code for he is not directly vested with jurisdiction, that is, power or authority to govern
and execute the laws or to hear and decide a cause; he is a mere agent of a person in
authority as defined by Article 152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a member of
the Philippine Constabulary which is a government military agency in charge of the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property. In fact, the
Decision itself calls him an agent of a person in authority (p. 13).
And even if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this aggravating circumstance cannot
be taken into account because it is he himself who is the offended party (People vs. Siojo,
supra).
2. Neither can the second circumstance, that of disregard of the respect due to rank, be
made to apply. It is not the existence alone of rank of the offended party that
determines the presence of this aggravating circumstance. There must be a difference
in the social condition of the offender and the offended party.
"El concepto de dignidad en su aspecto general no esta constituido solo por el

caracter de authoridad o por la funcion publica o cargo que desempene el
ofendido sino tambien por la diferencia de condicion social entre la victima y el
ofensor x x x" (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Decimotercera edicion, Tomo I, p.
554).
Where the offender and the offended party are of the same rank, this aggravating
circumstance does not apply.
"Las personas constituidas en dignidad, y que por esta razon merecen mayor
respeto, son las que generalmente se consideran por todo el mundo como
superiores o mas elevadas que el que comete el delito: tales son los sacerdotes
y las Autoridades respecto de los particulares, los maestros con relacion a sus
discipulos, los guardadores respecto de sus pupilos, etc. Siempre, pues, que hay
diferencia de condicion social entre el ofensor y el ofendido, concurrira la
agravante de este numero; mas no cuando hay igualdad. Asi, pues, si un
Sacerdote o un Magistrado calumnian a otro Sacerdote o Magistrado res-
pectivamente, no existira la circunstancia de agravacion que comentamos."
(Viada, Codigo Penal, Reformado de 1870, Tomo II, p. 316).
The provision contemplates such a difference in rank as that of a teacher where the
offender is a pupil (U.S. vs. Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469 [1907]) (although a teacher is now
considered a person in authority); a Judge where the offender is a private citizen (People vs.
Valeriano, et al., 90 Phil. 15 [1951]); a General of the Philippine Army where the offender is a
private citizen (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953); a Chief of Police, a superior
of the accused, who was chief of a division of the secret police (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil.
167 [1951] ); a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission where the offender is a clerk
thereat (People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271 [1976] ); a Consul who was killed by a chancellor in
the Consulate, who is a subordinate (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597 [1959]).
In the case at bar, the difference in the social condition and rank of the victim, a
Lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary, and that of the accused, who is a member of an
anti-smuggling unit and an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines, is not of
such a degree as to justify consideration of disrespect of rank due to the offended party as an
aggravating circumstance.
In the absence of the two aggravating circumstances discussed above or of any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium period,
and the accused should be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment ranging from
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur with the judgment's imposition of the maximum penalty for homicide, although I
join Mme. Justice Herrera's partial dissent insofar as she holds that the aggravating circum-
stance of contempt of or insult to the public authorities may not be appreciated. However,
disregard of rank was properly appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, and
hence the maximum penalty for homicide is properly imposed in the absence of any
mitigating circumstance.
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[ G.R. No.

L-35156, November 20, 1981 ] 29/01/2020, 10(37 PM

[ G.R. No. L-35156, November 20, 1981 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FLORO

"That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of

out of each, respectively.

"There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

"Cause of death is cardio-respira​tory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient,

"Q Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"

[pp. 86, 88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].

"Injuries: (1) lacerated wound, ½ inch, parietal region

(2) lacerated wound, 1½ inches, rt. ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid area" [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec.].

"Q What is the truth?

Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

"A Yes, sir.

[Pp. 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis added].

And the ruling of the Court was:

diency, policy and necessity."

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

"ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of a

"El concepto de dignidad en su aspecto general no esta constituido solo por el

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"Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic