The mission: The die was cast and with the induction of religion, it was no longer possible to keep

the
Two-Nation Theory out of consideration, especially since Mahatma Gandhi had preceded Jinnah in
broadcasting it. After inspecting the Sabarmati camp of the Hindu Mahasabha, Gandhi wrote: “Every
community is entitled, even bound to organise itself, if it is to live as a separate entity.” [Young India, 6
January 1929]

When the majority community organises separately, the minority community is automatically rendered
separate. When Quaid-i-Azam said at Lahore that the "Hindus and Muslims belong to two different
philosophies, social customs, literature...", he was not being original. Even at Lahore, he had buttressed
his claim by quoting Lala Lajpat Rai. Was that the end of the matter? No, when Sarat Chandar Bose, Kiran
Shankar Roy and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy had drawn up a scheme for a united and sovereign Bengal
in early 1947, Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League had agreed. However, Pandit Nehru told Sir Eric
Mieville that "there was no chance of Hindus there agreeing to put themselves under permanent Muslim
domination". [ S.M. Burke & Salim Al-Din Quraishi, The British Raj in India , Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1995, p.513]

Approached from the other end, it is still the Two-Nation Theory. The British Prime Minister Clement
Atlee had hoped till June 2, 1947, that Bengal would opt to be a separate country. [Dawn 28 December
2018, p.14] Thus it was the Two-Nation Theory of Nehru, not the Two-Nation Theory of Jinnah that was
drowned in 1971.

But regardless of what Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru or anyone else said, the question is, was the Two-Nation
Theory intrinsically valid? A theory does not validate experience; it is experience that validates theory.
Had India and Pakistan emerged on the map as friendly neighbours, the Two-Nation Theory would have
died a natural death. Such a course was preempted because Lord Mountbatten had told the Congress
that Pakistan was not viable and would collapse within six months.

To ensure that outcome, As Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck has testified [John Connell, Auchinleck,
London, Cassell, 1959, pp. 920, 921], the India’s Cabinet was doing everything in its power to prevent the
establishment of Pakistan on a firm basis. Had India not withheld the strategic and financial assets of
Pakistan, relations would have been based on cooperation.

Today, it is manifest that this hostility is based on Kashmir. The current plight of Kashmiris in their
bitterest winter of discontent bears testimony to it. Here I agree with Pandit Nehru when he said that
Kashmir was a symptom, not the disease. During the war of 1971, Kashmir was not the cause; yet this is
what Anthony Mascarenhas reported: "Everyone I spoke to in Delhi — editors, businessmen, civil
servants — said bluntly that 24 years was too long for India to be burdened with the problem of
Pakistan." [The Sunday Times, London, 5 December 1971]

As for Kashmir, M. A. Jinnah said on May 29, 1944: “Whenever Pakistan comes into existence, we shall
not force Kashmir to join it. It may like to stay outside and enjoy complete autonomy. We shall not stand
in its way to do so.” [Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.) Jinnah on World Affairs, Pakistan Study Centre, University of
Karachi, 2007, p.242] On the other hand, Congress was resolved that Pakistan be denied Kashmir. This is
what caused the misfortune of this paradise. In the brief prepared for the Cabinet Delegation’s
discussion with Jinnah it was proposed to offer him a sovereign Pakistan except perhaps Gurdaspur.
[Penderel Moon (ed.) Wavell The Viceroy’s Journal, Karachi. OUP, 1974, p.245]

The Congress and their insiders in the government had calculated the strategic importance of Gurdaspur,
a Muslim majority district. On June 14, 1947, Krishna Menon threatened Britain with dire consequences
if Kashmir were allowed to go to Pakistan [Nicholas Mansergh et al. The Transfer of Power Papers,
London, HMSO, 1982, Vol. XI, No. 201] despite Menon’s plea that Mountbatten destroy this letter, he
preserved it. On June 17, 1947, V.P. Menon asked specifi cally for Gurdaspur to be given to India. [The
British Raj in India, p.587]

H. Christopher Beaumont, private secretary to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, confessed publicly that Radcliffe had
altered the Boundary Award at the behest “of powers in New Delhi”. Since Gurdaspur had, despite a
Muslim majority, been awarded to India, Radcliffe made another gift of Muslim majority districts of
Ferozpur and Zira. [For details see Muhammad Reza Kazimi, "Clearing the Confusion" Dawn, 28 March
1992] Lord Mountbatten’s Publicity Officer concocted the myth that Jinnah had nominated Radcliffe.
[Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Second ed. London, Robert Hale, 1972, p.124] This
is completely belied by. [The Transfer of Power Papers, 1982, Vol.XI,pp.532,533] Now contrast Jawaharlal
Nehru’s stance on Kashmir in 1947 with Jinnah’s stance of 1944. The real reason behind Nehru explained
calling Kashmir a symptom rather than the disease: “Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources, but
they are going to be a greater drain on Pakistan.” [Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series II, Orient
Longmans, 1982-1994, pp.346,347]

True, with utmost devotion, dedication, honesty and sacrifice the earliest batch of civil servants, the
regrouped armed forces, even petty clerks as Nehru termed one of the prime ministers of Pakistan,
laboured day and night to save Pakistan from imminent collapse. Nevertheless, the two long term
destabilising factors had and are still taking their toll. The first being Nehru’s refusal to countenance the
independence of Bengal, and the, second, his now revealed to be totally insincere promises of plebiscite
in Kashmir. It is these two factors that have not only divided the country, but divided opinion across
Pakistan. It is they that have led to the questioning of Jinnah’s vision.

Quaid-i-Azam’s vision for Pakistan: In 1944, in an interview to the APA representative, Jinnah defined
Pakistan geographically. Politically, Pakistan would be a democracy. Economically, Jinnah hoped that
major industries and services would be socialised. [Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmed(ed.) Speeches and Writings of
Mr Jinnah, Lahore, Muhammad Ashraf, 1976, Vol. II, p,231] Now because India withheld the financial
assets of Pakistan, and Muslim plutocrats rushed to the rescue this programme could not be given effect
to.

Lest readers rush to condemn the Quaid-i-Azam or this writer, let me explain that the term “Islamic
Socialism” had been used by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 on one side and Syed Qutb Shaheed and
Mustafa al-Sibayi on the other, in the same year. It was them who explained the term: ‘In Islamic
Socialism, there would be no atheism of Communism and there would be no exploitation of Capitalism’.
[John L. Esposito, Unholy War, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.57] The term was suppressed in the Ayub
Khan era, which is why Ulama could anathemise it.

The geographical definition could not be obtained because of the Congress and British adamance over
the Rajgopalachari Formula, which demanded division of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam. Still between
the areas demarcated by Chakrawarti Rajgopalachari and Sir Cyril Radcliffe, there were substantial
differences. As to democracy, we all know that it has had a patchy existence. All this does not detract
from the fact that the Quaid-i-Azam set out clearly what he meant by Pakistan. There was no deception.

As for democracy, there is the Governor-Generalship issue. That the powers of the Governor-General
should have been under the strict scope of the Indian Independence Act 1947 is true. Liaquat Ali Khan
was leader of the All-India Muslim League bloc in the interim government and as such his appointment
as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan was only natural. That Jinnah had no intention of allowing Lord
Mountbatten to become Governor-General of Pakistan, is also clear.

In the June 9, 1947, meeting of the AIML, "The Quaid said: 'I have finished my work. I am like a field
marshal who is no longer needed when his army has become victorious. His duties are then transferred
to other citizens who are expected to take charge'…. At this point Maulana Hasrat Mohani rose and said
in a loud voice: 'This is not possible. We reject your decision… Pakistan’s Governor-General can only be a
man who has won Pakistan for the Muslims'." [Inam Aziz, Stop Press, Karachi, Oxford University Press,
2009, p.9]
When we understand that Quaid-i-Azam had not meant to nominate himself, then, other pieces fall in
place.

He actually had the Nawab of Bhopal in mind. Thus his pride, which we discussed at the beginning of this
paper, did not translate into accepting this office himself.

In keeping with his definition of Pakistan, Jinnah’s speech made one year earlier, (1943) in Calcutta,
makes sense. "There are millions of people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilisation? Is this the
aim of Pakistan? If that is Pakistan I would not have it."

We must understand that religion was the basis of discrimination. India was divided because of the
discrimination. How, then, would he allow discrimination on the basis of religion in Pakistan? Pakistan
was not an island that had sprung up from the sea. It was a territory that had to be carved out from
British India, and before the British left. Once they left, there would have been no Pakistan and we would
be living under the same benign rule that the people of Kashmir are living under.

Pakistan was an inadequate solution to the communal problem of India? Who denies that? But at least
we have a state. Whether you like it or not, a nuclear state. Look at the Middle East. Look at the
boundaries of Israel in 1948, in 1956, in 1967 and in 1973. The people of Israel are a minority in the
Middle East, but because of state power, they have been able to receive patronage and support. In
British India, the Muslims were a minority. Let us, therefore, be thankful and pay tribute to the leader
who achieved this.