Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of The Practice of The UN Human Rights Council
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of The Practice of The UN Human Rights Council
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of The Practice of The UN Human Rights Council
Human Rights
Obligations of Armed
Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the
Practice of the UN
Human Rights Council
Geneva
December 2016
Acknowledgements
This Academy In-Brief was researched and written by Dr Annyssa Bellal, Strategic
Adviser on IHL and Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy), with the initial research
support of Dr Sandra Krähenmann, Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy. The
Geneva Academy would like to thank all those who commented on a draft of the
text, in particular Professor Marco Sassòli, University of Geneva, Professor Lyal
S. Sunga, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Dr
Katharine Fortin, University of Utrecht, Dr Daragh Murray, University of Essex,
Jelena Pejic, ICRC, and Carolin Nehme, Geneva Call. The Geneva Academy
would like to thank the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE) for its
support to the Academy’s research on this issue. Editing, design, and layout by
Plain Sense, Geneva.
Disclaimer
This Academy In-Brief is the work of the author. The views expressed in it do not
necessarily reflect those of the project’s supporters or of anyone who provided
input to, or commented on, drafts. The designation of states or territories does
not imply any judgement by the Geneva Academy or the DFAE regarding the
legal status of such states or territories, or their authorities and institutions, or
the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any states or territories that
border them.
A C A D EM Y I N- B R I E F N o . 7
Human Rights
Obligations of Armed
Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of
the Practice of the
UN Human Rights
Council
Contents
Introduction____________________________________________________________ 3
Introduction
The great majority of contemporary armed conflicts are fought between states
and armed non-state actors (ANSAs) or between ANSAs.1 Armed violence by
ANSAs also poses a significant threat to human security outside situations of
armed conflict.2
While it is well established that ANSAs are bound by the law of armed conflict,
also known as ‘international humanitarian law’ (IHL), the extent to which these
actors have obligations under human rights law (HRL) when they are a party to
an armed conflict remains controversial. Even though the legal regime applicable
to ANSAs is unclear, the United Nations has generally recognized the need to
engage these actors on both IHL and HRL. For instance, in his report for the 2016
World Humanitarian Summit, the UN Secretary General emphasized that ‘at a time
when most conflicts are non-international, it is critical for impartial humanitarian
actors to engage in dialogue with States as well as non-State armed groups to
enhance their acceptance, understanding and implementation of obligations
under international humanitarian and human rights law’.3
Against this background, and in a manner resembling the practice of the UN
Security Council,4 in country5 and thematic resolutions of the Human Rights
Council (HRC) have increasingly reported on ANSA violations of international
law.6 In some sessions, the HRC has adopted resolutions that directly address
one or more ANSAs. For instance, resolution S-22/1 of September 2014
specifically addressed the organization known as ‘Islamic State’ and associated
groups in Iraq, and in May 2015 resolution S-23/1 considered Boko Haram in
‘affected States’. Many of the special procedures set up by the HRC also cover
1 According to The War Report 2014, twelve of fourteen armed conflicts (excluding military occupations)
are situations of non-international armed conflict in which at least one ANSA is a party. See A. Bellal (ed),
The War Report 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015.
2 In 2015, for example, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence ranked the states of Honduras and
Venezuela just below Syria in terms of violent death rates. Geneva Declaration, The Global Burden of Armed
Violence 2015: Every Body Counts. Executive Summary available at: http://www.genevadeclaration.org/
measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/gbav-2015/executive-summary.html.
3 UN General Assembly (2016), One humanity: shared responsibility – Report of the Secretary-General for
the World Humanitarian Summit, UN Doc. A/70/709, §51.
4 A. Constantinides, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups: The
Practice of the UN Security Council’, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 4 (2010), 89-110.
5 See for example the 2012 resolution 20/17 on Mali and the 2014 resolution 26/25 on Syria.
6 See for example the 2015 resolution 28/17 on the effect of terrorism on human rights.
4 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
7 A/HRC/29/51.
8 A. Clapham, ‘Protection of civilians under international human rights law’, in H. Willmot, R. Mamiya,
S. Sheeran, M. Weller (eds), Protection of Civilians, Oxford University Press, 2016, p 145.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 5
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
The research undertaken for this paper focused on HRC resolutions since the HRC
was created in 2006. As required by General Assembly (GA) resolution 60/251 of
15 March 2006, the Council must promote human rights for all and also address
gross and systematic violations of human rights.9 Since the majority of gross
violations of human rights occur in situations of armed conflict or other situations
of violence, the Council has had to cover many violations committed by ANSAs.
The research also examined the reports of Special Procedures (independent
experts nominated by the HRC who report on specific human rights issues or
the human rights situation of specific countries)10 and of Commissions of Inquiry
(COIs) which the HRC has established. Members of COIs are usually independent
experts.11 COIs establish facts, identify alleged perpetrators, and make
recommendations to the state concerned and to the international community
on how violations should be addressed.12 Special Procedures and COI reports
therefore differ from HRC resolutions in that they are not drafted and adopted
by state representatives and express expert opinions rather than the opinions of
states.
as all other human rights violations’.17 Although not common, this reference to
‘transnational crime networks’ in the resolutions on Mali shows that the HRC does
not necessarily restrict its concern to armed groups that have political objectives
but is prepared to address violence committed by other types of ANSA.
18 A/HRC/7/L.11/Add.1.
19 A/HRC/RES/17/25, 14 July 2011, §2.
20 A/HCR/RES/19/28 and A/HRC/RES/20/21 on Somalia; A/HCR/RES/21/25 on Mali, A/HCR/RES/21/27,
and A/HCR/RES/21/31 on Sudan.
21 A/HRC/RES/23/18, 27 July 2013, §3.
10 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
in the Syrian Arab Republic. In that resolution, the Council expressed its grave
‘concern at allegations of torture in detention facilities controlled by non-State
armed groups, and stresses that such acts constitute violations of international
humanitarian law and abuses of human rights’.22
Successive resolutions on the same country often adopt identical wording. In
several resolutions on Syria, for instance, the Council ‘strongly condemns the
terrorist acts and violence committed against civilians by the so-called Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh), al-Nusrah Front and other extremist groups,
and their continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights law
and violations of international humanitarian law’. (Resolution A/HRC/RES/30/10,
13 October 2015, para. 4; see also A/HRC/RES/29/16, 22 July 2015, para. 8).23
Similarly, resolutions on Sudan often call ‘upon all parties … to respect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms’.24
In contrast, several country-specific Special Procedures mandates prefer to
speak of ‘violations’ when they refer to ANSAs. In A/HRC/7/25 (summary), the
Independent Expert on the Democratic Republic of the Congo referred to ‘massive
human rights violations of armed groups’. In A/HRC/19/67, the Special Rapporteur
on Myanmar referred to serious violations by non-state armed groups and called
on them to ‘ensure respect for international human rights and humanitarian law’
(§59, §60, §95). Referring to the LTTE and the Karuna faction of the Tamil Makkal
Viduthalai Pulikal armed group (TMVP-Karuna], the Special Rapporteur on Torture
noted that ‘the most serious allegations of human rights violations that come
to light, including those related to torture and ill-treatment, are in relation to the
conflict and are alleged to be committed by both government and non-State
forces, including the LTTE and the TMVP-Karuna group’.25 In relation to the Al-
Shabaab armed group, the Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia found
that: ‘Al-Shabaab … continues to perpetrate serious violations of humanitarian
and human rights law, including summary executions of civilians associated with
the Government, unlawful arrest and detention and acts amounting to torture and
other inhumane, cruel and degrading practices, such as flogging, amputation and
stoning’.26
22 A/HRC/RES/27/16, §11.
23 A/HRC/RES/30/10, 13 October 2015, §4; also A/HRC/RES/29/16, 22 July 2015, §8.
24 A/HRC/RES/24/28, 8 October 2013, §13; A/HRC/RES/21/27, 15 October 2012, §12;
A/HRC/RES/18/16, 14 October 2011, §8.
25 A/HRC/7/3/Add.6.
26 A/HRC/18/48, §31.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 11
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
COIs and Fact-Finding missions tend to refer to both ‘abuses’ and ‘violations’.
An OHCHR report in February 2016 on Libya reported ‘patterns of violations and
abuses’.27 The COI on Gaza reported in June 2015 ‘serious violations of IHL and
IHRL by Israel and Palestinian armed groups’.28
With regard to categories of ANSA, resolutions most frequently speak of
‘armed groups’, but some describe certain ANSAs as ‘terrorist groups’.29 In its
resolution on human rights and preventing and countering violent extremism, the
HRC expressed its concern at the ‘serious human rights abuses and violations
of international humanitarian law by violent extremists and terrorists’.30 In a
resolution on cooperation and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights,
the Council strongly condemned ‘the violence and abuses committed by illegal
armed groups’.31
27 Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya,
A/HRC/31/47, 15 February 2016.
28 Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, 24 June 2015,
A/HRC/29/52, §74.
29 See A/HRC/RES/28/20, 8 April 2015, §6 on Syria; also A/HRC/RES/28/17, 9 April 2015, §5 on
the Effects of terrorism on the enjoyment of human rights.
30 A/HRC/RES/30/15, 12 October 2015.
31 A/HRC/RES/26/30, 15 July 2014, §5.
12 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
32 A/HRC/RES/S-22/1.
33 Ibid, §1. Emphasis added.
34 A/HRC/RES/S-23/1, 21 May 2015, §1. Emphasis added.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 13
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
35 See International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries’, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two.
36 In Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States), the ICJ held that Contra rebels were
not de facto agents of the United States because the United States’ ‘participation, even if preponderant
or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection
of ... targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself … for the purpose
of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras. […] For this conduct to give rise
to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military and paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed’. International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v US), 1986, §115.
37 In Tadic, the Appeal Chamber of the International Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that the ‘effective
control’ test was contrary to the logic of state responsibility and was inconsistent with state and judicial
practice. The ICTY concluded that states needed only to exercise ‘overall control’ over an ANSA to incur
responsibility for unlawful acts by that group. ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case N° IT-94-1-A, 1999, §116-
144. See also D. Jinks, ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups’, 83 Chicago Journal of
International Law (2003), 83-95.
14 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
Court of Justice confirmed the ‘effective control’ test.38 A typical example of the
application of this article would involve the actions of militias (ANSAs controlled by
a state). In the context of the conflict in Syria, for instance, the HRC has repeatedly
condemned ‘the systematic, widespread and gross violations and abuses of
human rights and all violations of international humanitarian law by the Syrian
authorities and affiliated militias’.39
Article 9 states that ‘the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group
of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the
absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call
for the exercise of those elements of authority’. The ILC Commentary on article
9 underlines that a prior demand for government to exercise authority must have
existed for this article to apply: ‘In other words the circumstances surrounding the
exercise of elements of the governmental authority by private persons must have
justified the attempts to exercise police or other functions in the absence of any
constituted authority’.40 An example might be the actions of Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards when they performed immigration and customs functions at Teheran
airport just after the revolution.
Article 10 states that ‘the conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes
the new government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under
international law’. The successful takeover of the government of the Central
African Republic (CAR) in March 2013 by Séléka (a coalition of armed groups) is a
noteworthy and rare example of the potential application of this article. As noted
in a 2013 report on CAR by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR): ‘According to article 10 of the draft articles on the Responsibility of
States for international wrongful acts, the Séléka, after it seized power, engaged
the State responsibility of the Central African Republic for all the violations
committed by Séléka members in the country during the armed conflict’.41
38 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007], ICJ Rep. 43.
39 A/HRC/RES/30/10, 13 October 2015, §3. Emphasis added.
40 International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p 49.
41 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Central African Republic, A/HRC/24/59, 12 September
2013, §25.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 15
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
In general, states are not responsible for acts committed by private entities or
persons. However, in certain circumstances a state can be legally responsible
at international level for violations of international law committed by an ANSA.
This is so when:
• A state has exercised control over the ANSA, such that the ANSA in fact
acts under its direction.
• The ANSA has exercised elements of governmental authority in the
absence or default of official state authorities and in circumstances where
it was necessary to so act.
• The ANSA has become the new government. The state then assumes
responsibility for violations the ANSA committed before it assumed power.
Source. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Articles 8, 9 and 10, International
Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two.
A state is also obliged to exercise due diligence and do all it can to protect all
persons under its jurisdiction against threats that ANSAs, including de facto
authorities and armed groups, pose to the enjoyment of human rights. States
must seek to hold individual perpetrators of abuses and violations to account and
guarantee the rights of victims, including their right to an effective remedy and
reparation. On these grounds, the African Commission on Human Rights stated
with respect to a conflict in Chad: ‘The national armed forces are participants in
the civil war and the Government has failed to intervene to prevent … killing. [...]
Even where it cannot be proved that violations were committed by government
agents, the Government had the responsibility to secure the safety and the liberty
of its citizens, and to conduct investigations.’42
42 African Commission on Human Rights, Commission Nationale des droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v
Chad, Commission N° 74/92 (1995).
16 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
43 See S. Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual
situations’, 91 International Review of the Red Cross 873 (2009), 69-94.
44 See also S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 17
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military
equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry
out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to
define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak
with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefires or
peace accords.45
Scholars continue to discuss the precise legal means by which ANSAs are bound
by IHL.46 However, state practice, international case law, and scholarship all agree
that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II
of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP II), and customary IHL apply to all
categories of ANSA that are parties in non-international armed conflicts.47
Additional Protocol II also applies to conflicts of a non-international character. In
addition to the existence of an armed conflict in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between an ANSA and the government,48 three cumulative material
conditions under para. 1 of Article 1 must be fulfilled before the treaty is applicable
to the ANSA in question:
1. The ANSA must be under responsible command.
2. It must exercise such control over a part of the national territory as to
enable it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.
3. Territorial control must be such as to enable the ANSA to be able to
implement the Protocol.
45 ICTY, Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Case No IT-04-84-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008, §60.
46 For example, in 2004 the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court held that ‘it is well
settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by international
humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties’. See Prosecutor
v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack
of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Decision of 31 May 2004, §22, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/49abc0a22.html. For the different theories on the applicability of IHL to ANSA, see S. Sivakumaran,
‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2006), 381; and A.
Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’,
30 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 2, (1981), 429.
47 In Nicaragua v United States of America, the International Court of Justice confirmed that Common
Article 3 was applicable to the Contras (an ANSA). ‘The conflict between the contras’ forces and those of
the Government of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is “not of an international character”. The acts of
the contras towards the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts
of that character.’ See ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United
States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, §219.
48 In contrast to Additional Protocol II, Common Article 3 also regulates armed conflicts between ANSAs.
18 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
Where these cumulative criteria for application of the Protocol are objectively met,
the Protocol becomes ‘immediately and automatically applicable’, irrespective of
the views of the parties to that conflict.49
Finally, customary international humanitarian law is applicable to all actors in
international and non-international armed conflicts,50 including ANSAs that meet
the necessary criteria. Customary IHL rules applicable to ANSAs include those on
the conduct of hostilities, such as the principle that requires parties to an armed
conflict to distinguish civilians and civilian objects from military objectives.51
49 See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p. 1353; and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2
September 1998, §624.
50 See, for example, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v Morris Kallon and Brima Buzzy Kamara,
SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé
Accord Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004, §45–47. This asserted: ‘There is now no doubt that
this article [Common Article 3] is binding on states and insurgents alike, and that insurgents are subject
to international humanitarian law. [...] A convincing theory is that [insurgents] are bound as a matter of
customary international law to observe the obligations declared by Common Article 3 which is aimed at the
protection of humanity.’ See also L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press,
2002, p. 56–58.
51 The customary international humanitarian law study conducted by the ICRC has identified 161 Rules of
which the great majority are also applicable in non-international armed conflicts. See https://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul.
52 See ICJ, 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, as well as its Advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of 9 July 2004, ICJ
Reports 2004. The ICJ also confirmed that international human rights law is applicable in situations of
armed conflict in a case concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda),
Judgment of 9 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 19
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
53 Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states: ‘In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions...’ (emphasis added). Article 1 of
Additional Protocol II states that ‘This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol’.
54 Article 4 of the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement
of children in armed conflict states: ‘1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18; 2. State
Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal
measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 3. The application of the present article shall
not affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.’ Article 2 of the 2009 African Union Convention
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa states that an objective of the
treaty is to ‘provide for the respective obligations, responsibilities and roles of armed groups, non-state
actors and other relevant actors, including civil society organizations, with respect to the prevention of
internal displacement and protection of, and assistance to, internally displaced persons’. Article 3 of the
2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states: ‘Each
State Party shall take appropriate measures to investigate acts defined in article 2 committed by persons
or groups of persons acting without the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State and to bring
those responsible to justice’.
55 See L. Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge
University Press, 2002, p 54.
56 A. Clapham, ‘The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape and
Issues Surrounding Engagement’, 1 February 2010, p 24, available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.1569636.
20 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
First, while IHL, through treaty and customary rules, potentially affords a
significant level of protection, especially to civilians, its remit is limited to acts
directly associated with armed conflict. IHL only partially addresses the range of
harmful actions that ANSAs may perpetrate against a civilian population.57
Second, the main purpose of IHL is to regulate armed conflicts and limit their
negative impacts on victims and those who have laid down their arms. It does
not cover all violations of international law that occur in these situations, such
as violations of freedom of expression or gender discrimination. More generally,
unlike HRL, IHL does not regulate the everyday life of people in situations of non-
international armed conflict.58
Third, if states are primarily responsible under international law for ensuring
that the human rights of persons under their jurisdiction are respected,59 during
situations of armed conflict (and sometimes outside that context) states may lose
control over part of their territory and population.
Finally, IHL may not apply in situations where its conditions of applicability are
unfulfilled (where violence is insufficiently intense or the ANSA is insufficiently
organized). In such cases, the only remaining legal framework other than domestic
57 The scope of IHL extends throughout the territory in which hostilities take place (ratione loci) and must
involve a person protected by the instruments (ratione personae): ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, 1995, §69–70;
ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment and Sentence, 21
May 1999, §189. However, international tribunals have developed slightly different tests to determine the
requisite nexus between alleged crimes and conflict. According to ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, § 573: ‘It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely
related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict’.
According to ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, 12 June 2002, §57: ‘As indicated by the Trial Chamber, the requirement that the acts of the
accused must be closely related to the armed conflict would not be negated if the crimes were temporally
and geographically remote from the actual fighting. It would be sufficient, for instance, for the purpose of
this requirement, that the alleged crimes were closely related to hostilities occurring in other parts of the
territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.’ According to ICTR, Prosecutor v Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, §260: ‘The alleged crimes ... must be closely
related to the hostilities or committed in conjunction with the armed conflict’.
58 See K. Fortin, ‘The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life under Rebel Control’,
Netherlands International Law Review (2016), 1-21.
59 As noted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: ‘Everyone has rights and
obligations under human rights law. The State holds primary responsibility, as not only must it respect
human rights and respond when it violates them, but it also has the duty to protect against violations by
third parties and to create an environment where all rights are respected. While, for example, armed actors,
landlords and businesses must all respect human rights and be accountable for violations they commit,
the State, through its policies, programmes and laws, must act to stop these violations and prevent their
repetition.’ Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Addendum, Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, 7
January 2013, A/HRC/22/17/Add.3, summary, p. 2.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 21
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
law is HRL: this is problematic if HRL only binds states, especially where a state’s
institutions have failed.
In all these different scenarios, the fact that IHL may not cover all the violations
committed by ANSAs or may not be applicable at all makes it likely that victims
under the control of ANSAs in situations of armed conflict or situations of violence
will be inadequately protected unless ANSAs are obliged to respect human rights.
The debate on the applicability of human rights law to ANSAs also has an impact
on field operations. As one author observed: ‘Human rights monitoring experience
in Nepal suggests that the lack of a clear framework addressing the human rights
obligations of non-state actors can impact the effectiveness of field operations.
[…] A narrow focus on the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens from violence
by non-state actors has proven unsatisfactory. As a consequence, human rights
organizations struggle to justify their monitoring and interventions, host states
become suspicious of international field presences, and policy makers at the
headquarters of monitoring organizations become concerned about potential
political fallout from human rights monitoring.’60
60 F. Rawski, ‘Engaging with armed groups: a human rights field perspective from Nepal’, 6 International
Organizations Law Review 2 (2009), 601–626.
61 A/65/223, 4 August 2010, §7.
22 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
62 Institut de Droit International, The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Fundamental
Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties, Berlin session, 1999, Article
X. No definition of what constitutes ‘fundamental human rights’ has been agreed, nor has it been settled
which human rights norms are part of jus cogens. In its commentary on the Draft articles on State
Responsibility, the International Law Commission has identified as peremptory norms of international
law the ‘prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and
torture, and the right to self-determination’ (Commentary on Article 26, in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries,
2001, Vol. 2, Part Two, p 85). However, this list is exemplary rather than definitive. The UN Human Rights
Committee has identified the following acts that violate jus cogens norms: arbitrary deprivation of life,
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, taking hostages, imposing collective punishments, arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, and deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of
innocence. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4),
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001.
63 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/19/69, §106. See T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups in other
situations of violence: The Syria Example’, International Humanitarian Legal Studies 3 (2012), 263-290.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 23
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
Article 6. Genocide.
For the purpose of this statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 7. Crimes against humanity.
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
SPLM-N
Office of the Chairperson
Resolution No. (6) - 2013
66 Arantzazu Mendi case, House of Lords, Judgment of 23 February 1939, L.R., [1939] A.C. 256 (House of
Lords), reproduced in 1942 International Law Review 60, at §65 et seq. See also M. Schoiswohl, ‘De facto
regimes and human rights obligations – the twilight zone of public international law?’ Austrian Review of
International and European Law 6 (2001), 50; and J. Van Essen, ‘De Facto Regimes in International Law’,
28 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 74 (2012), 31-49.
67 OHCHR, Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip - Report of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 7/1,
A/HRC/8/17, 6 June 2008, §9. OHCHR reiterated its position in a 2011 publication on the international
legal protection of human rights in armed conflict: ‘Concerning international human rights obligations,
the traditional approach has been to consider that only States are bound by them. However, in evolving
practice in the Security Council and in the reports of some special rapporteurs, it is increasingly considered
that under certain circumstances non-State actors can also be bound by international human rights law.’
See OHCHR, The international legal protection of human rights in armed conflict, 2011, p 24.
68 Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan
prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1713 (2006), S/2007/584, §282 and §330.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 27
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
69 Report of the International Commission on Libya established by the Human Rights Council resolution
S-15/1 of February 2011, (A/HRC/17/44). The Commission also noted that ‘since the NTC has been
exercising de facto control over territory akin to that of a Governmental authority, it will examine also
allegations of human rights committed by its forces’, §72.
70 Mission to Lebanon and Israel (7-14 September 2006), prepared jointly by the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, the
Representative of the Secretary General on human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin, and
the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living,
Miloon Kothari, A/HRC/2/7, 22 December 2014, §19.
71 A. Breitegger, ‘The legal framework applicable to insecurity and violence affecting the delivery of health
care in armed conflicts and other emergencies’, 95 International Review of the Red Cross 889, (2015),104.
The author notes, however, that the ICRC’s use of the term ‘responsibilities’ falls short of recognizing
legally-binding obligations.
28 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
was under the ‘continuing obligation to ensure respect for the rights recognized
in the Covenant in relation to the population of Transnistria within the limits of its
effective power’.72
Scholars generally support the idea that ANSAs that exercise territorial control
or de facto governmental authority have human rights obligations. Indeed, the
need to regulate the relationship between those who govern and those who
are governed, which many consider underpins human rights law, justifies the
application of that law.73
One weakness of this approach is that it is unclear for how long and to what
extent an ANSA must exercise control over a territory and population before it
becomes subject to human rights law.74 Some guidance may be found in a 2014
report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, who stated:
‘While international human rights law traditionally focused only on the obligations
of States, an evolving approach recognizes the importance and impact of certain
non-State actors, arguing that some human rights obligations also apply to them,
including non-State armed groups with (or arguably even without) effective control
over a territory. […] “Effective control” means that the non-State armed group
has consolidated its control and authority over a territory to such an extent that
it can exclude the State from governing the territory on a more than temporary
basis. Furthermore, armed groups without effective control over territory have
been held to have committed human rights violations. In May 2014, a report by
the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan stressed that the most
basic human rights obligations, in particular those emanating from peremptory
international law (jus cogens), bind both the State and armed opposition groups
in times of peace and during armed conflict.’75
A further challenge is to determine which human rights norms are applicable to
ANSA. Should de facto non-state authorities or ANSAs that control territory be
bound by all or only some human rights norms? It has been argued that this question
should be determined by ANSAs’ capacity to implement the norms in question.76
Some UN reports have attempted to list the human rights norms that might be
binding on ANSAs. Following a mission to Sri Lanka, the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions argued: ‘The LTTE should
refrain from violating human rights, including those of non-LTTE-affiliated Tamil
civilians. This includes in particular respect for the rights to freedom of expression,
peaceful assembly, freedom of association with others, family life, and democratic
participation, including the right to vote. The LTTE should specifically affirm that it
will abide by the North-East Secretariat on Human Rights charter.’77
74 T. Rodenhäuser, ‘Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and
International Criminal Law: What Degree of Organization is Required?’ PhD Thesis, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, 2016 (forthcoming 2017).
75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, A/HCR/28/66, 29
December 2014, §54 and §56.
76 See D. Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups, Hart, 2016.
77 Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in the context of his mission to
Sri Lanka, E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5, 27 March 2006, §85.
30 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
In a 2012 report on Mali, the OHCHR categorized violations that had occurred in
the north of the country, which was controlled by ANSAs. It listed: violation of the
right to life; extrajudicial and summary execution; torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; recruitment of child soldiers;
sexual abuse; attacks on property; violation of freedom of expression and the right
to information; violation of the right to education; violation of the right to health;
violation of cultural rights; and violation of the right to freedom of religion.78
It is also unclear from these statements whether human rights law binds all types
of ANSAs that exercise territorial control, including ‘territorial criminal gangs’. In
principle, there is no theoretical obstacle to considering territorial armed gangs
as ANSAs to which international law could apply. As has been noted above, IHL
only requires an armed group to reach a certain level of organization before it
becomes subject to IHL obligations, regardless of its objectives.79 While urban
gang violence does not initially seem relevant to the traditional framework of IHL
and HRL, it has nevertheless been shown that there are good reasons to consider
applying humanitarian norms to territorial gangs, and many humanitarian agencies
and NGOs, including national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, already
work in such contexts.80
78 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in
Mali, 7 January 2012, A/HRC/22/33.
79 See for example Jennifer M. Hazen, ‘Understanding gangs as armed groups’, 92 International Review of
the Red Cross, 878 (2010), 369-386.
80 O. Bangerter, ‘Territorial gangs and their consequences for humanitarian players’, 92 International
Review of the Red Cross, 878 (2010), 392- 400.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 31
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
3. Conclusions and
Recommendations
There is room for discussion as to how and to what extent ANSAs are bound
by human rights law, but it is clear that the international community increasingly
holds ANSAs accountable for human rights violations, despite legal uncertainties.
Several reasons explain this trend. Certain human rights obligations that apply to
situations of armed conflict are also protected by IHL, including the prohibitions
of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, murder, and sexual violence and
slavery. To an extent, therefore, the application of IHL to ANSAs in situations
of armed conflict protects civilian populations as well as people who are hors
de combat. However, most contemporary armed conflicts persist for years or
even decades. IHL was not meant to regulate the everyday life of people living
in areas under the control of ANSAs over such an extended period. In many
countries, civilians living in ANSA-controlled areas strive to lead ‘normal’ lives,
despite conditions of extreme violence. In addition, IHL is applicable to ANSAs
only in situations that are legally defined as armed conflicts, and human rights are
threatened by ANSAs in many other contexts. The state remains responsible for
ensuring that the human rights of populations under its jurisdiction are protected,
but in some instances it is not able to access ANSA-controlled areas or cannot
prevent or punish ANSA violations, notably where its institutions are failing. In
all such contexts, the Human Rights Council, many UN special procedures,
COIs, and other UN bodies have felt called by their mandates to address the
responsibility of ANSAs for human rights violations.
Recognizing that ANSAs have human rights obligations has important operational
and policy consequences. First, it may increase the legitimacy of ANSAs at
international level, which may be politically sensitive for states and international
organizations. One should note, at the same time, that a body bound by
international norms does not automatically incur a particular legal status. This is
made clear by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.81 Second, if
ANSAs are required to respect and implement human rights norms, they might
81 Common Article 3, §2, of the Geneva Conventions states: ‘An impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to
the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the
other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.’ (Emphasis added.)
32 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
need support from the international community to do so. This raises concerns
similar to those associated with the issue of legitimacy. The fact that some ANSAs
are listed as terrorist groups makes it difficult for many organizations to cooperate
with them or build their capacity.82
HRC resolutions referring to ANSAs have not been systematic in speaking of
‘abuses’ or ‘violations’ of human rights law. It seems that, as the main UN body
trusted with promoting human rights, the Council has wished to signal politically
that it cannot ignore the role of ANSAs and their impact on human rights, but
simultaneously it has been unwilling to take a firm stance on the applicable
legal framework. That said, the Human Rights Council should cease to speak
misleadingly of human rights ‘abuses’ rather than human rights ‘violations’,
thereby avoiding giving any impression that all categories of ANSA, including de
facto authorities, might be free of human rights obligations.
In 2014 and 2015, the HRC held two special sessions specifically on ANSAs, one
on the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the other on Boko Haram.
While it is interesting that ANSAs were the subject of these two resolutions, it
is significant that the HRC denounced the human rights and humanitarian law
violations of only one party to these armed conflicts. If such resolutions appear
biased, their influence on the conduct and policies of ANSAs is likely to diminish,
making ANSAs less ready to acknowledge that they have human rights obligations.
HRC resolutions have also sometimes employed the term ‘terrorist groups’
when referring to ANSAs. While it is true that some ANSAs are listed in national
and international lists of terrorist organizations, states will tend to label any
armed group that opposes it as ‘terrorist’. The branding of ANSAs as ‘terrorist’,
regardless of their nature and motivation, has created difficulties and dilemmas
both legally and for policy. First, since the legal qualification of an ‘armed conflict’
is based on fact, it is important to note that an ANSA can be party to a conflict
and bound by the same relevant rules of international law as other parties to that
conflict, whether or not it is labelled as a ‘terrorist group’.83 Second, as noted
by the ICRC, ‘a recent challenge for IHL has been the tendency of States to
label as terrorist all acts of warfare against them committed by armed groups,
especially in non-international armed conflicts. This has created confusion in
differentiating between lawful acts of war, including such acts committed by
82 See Geneva Call, The Positive Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: Legal and Policy Issues, Report
from the 2015 Garance Talks, 2016.
83 See S Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual
situations’, 92 International Review of the Red Cross, 873, March 2009, 69-94.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 33
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
84 ICRC, ‘Contemporary challenges for IHL: Overview’, 29 October 2010, at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/overview-contemporary-challenges-for-ihl.htm.
85 See Art 51(2), Additional Protocol I, and Art 13(2), Additional Protocol II.
86 ICTY, Judgment, Galić (IT-98-29-T), Trial Chamber, 5 December 2003, § 113-129.
87 See Article 19 of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997
Convention); Article 4 of the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (2005 Convention); and Article 21 of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism. See also A. Coco, ‘The Mark of Cain, The Crime of Terrorism in Times of Armed
Conflict as Interpreted by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in R v. Mohammed Gul’, 11 Journal of
International Criminal Justice, 2, 425-440.
88 See B. Saul, ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law’, Sydney Law School
Legal Studies Research Paper No 16/37, May 2016. See also D. Lewis, N. Modirzadeh, and G. Blum,
Medical Care in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and State Responses to Terrorism, Harvard
Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), Sept. 2015, at: https://dash.
harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/22508590/HLS_PILAC_Medical_Care_in_ Armed_Conflict_IHL_and_State_
Responses_to_Terrorism_September_2015.pdf?sequence=1. The authors describe the emerging conflict
of norms between national and international counter-terrorism laws and some IHL provisions on health care
and humanitarian assistance.
89 See EU Factsheet, ‘Mediation and Dialogue in transitional processes from non-state armed groups to
political movements/political parties’, 2012.
90 R. Dudai and K. McEvoy. ‘Thinking critically about armed groups and human rights praxis’, 4 Journal of
Human Rights Practice 1 (2012), 15.
34 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
The HRC, in common with other UN bodies that engage or address ANSAs,
should take these considerations into account, with the aim of providing better
protection to victims of both IHL and HRL violations.
This In-Brief has reviewed the human rights obligations of ANSAs and the practice
of the HRC with respect to them. It suggests that more research is needed to
develop a shared and more comprehensive understanding of the notion of de
facto authorities, and to identify the content of human rights norms that might be
binding on ANSAs. It also recommends that the views of ANSAs should be taken
into account on the norms and issues that concern them.91 Finally, the international
community should consider creating judicial or non-judicial mechanisms92 that will
make ANSAs more accountable for IHL and HRL violations that they commit.
91 See M. Sassòli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law’, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1 (2010), 5–51.
92 See A. Bellal, ‘Non-state armed groups in transitional justice processes’, International Centre for
Transitional Justice, 2017.
Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: 35
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
The HRC should not distinguish ‘abuses’ from ‘violations’ when it addresses
the human rights conduct of ANSAs in its resolutions. At a minimum, the term
‘violations’ should be used when:
1. The ANSA is a de facto authority or controls territory and a population over
an extended period of time.
2. The ANSA violates norms than amount to an international crime or can be
considered to violate jus cogens.
A two step analysis, which should not necessarily be taken in a precise order,
is suggested when addressing ANSAs in a specific resolution. The proposed
analysis and wording, which will necessarily be a simplification of the issues at
stake, should be understood as a framework for discussion and can, as such, be
questioned. It is aimed at stimulating thoughts and ideas on this important matter,
rather than closing the debate.
93 Article 38 (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines ‘international custom’ as ‘general
practice accepted as law’.
36 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
High Low
Organized ANSA
De facto authority? that does not Is IHL applicable?
control a population
Bibliography and
Further Reading
O. Bangerter, ‘Territorial gangs and their consequences for humanitarian players’,
92 International Review of the Red Cross 878 (2010), 387-406.
A. Bellal, ‘Beyond the pale? Engaging the Islamic State on international
humanitarian law’, 18 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2015 (2016),
123-153.
A. Bellal, ‘Non-state armed groups in transitional justice processes’, International
Centre for transitional Justice, 2017.
A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report 2014, Oxford University Press, 2015.
A. Bellal, ‘Central African Republic: From Conflict to Chaos and Back Again?’ in
S. Casey-Maslen (ed), The War Report 2013, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.
411-427.
A. Bellal, ‘Establishing the Direct Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups for
Violations of International Norms: Issues of Attribution’, in N. Gal-Or, C. Ryngaert,
M. Noortman (eds), Responsibilities of the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and
the Market Place, Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings, Brill/Nijhoof,
2015, 304-22.
A. Bellal, G. Giacca and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘International law and armed non-state
actors in Afghanistan’, 93 International Review of the Red Cross 881 (2011), 47-79.
A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, ‘Rules of Engagement: Protecting Civilians through
engagement with Armed Non-State Actors’, Geneva Academy of international
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2011.
A. Breitegger, ‘The legal framework applicable to insecurity and violence affecting
the delivery of health care in armed conflicts and other emergencies’, 95
International Review of the Red Cross 889 (2015), 83-127.
A. Coco, ‘The Mark of Cain, The Crime of Terrorism in Times of Armed Conflict as
Interpreted by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in R v. Mohammed Gul’,
11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2013), 425-440.
48 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
K. Fortin, ‘The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law’ (Utrecht
University, 2015, PhD thesis), forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 2017.
Geneva Call, The Positive Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: Legal and
Policy Issues, Report from the 2015 Garance Talks, 2016.
G. Giacca, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict, Oxford
University Press, 2014.
F. Gutiérrez-Sanín, ‘Organization and Governance: The Evolution of Urban Militias
in Medellín, Colombia’, in A. Arjona, N. Kasfir, and Z. Mampilly (eds), Rebel
Governance in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 246-264.
J. Hazen, ‘Understanding gangs as armed groups’, 92 International Review of the
Red Cross 878 (2010), 369-386.
J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law - Volume 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
J. Hessbruegge, ‘Human rights violations arising from conduct of non-state
actors’, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 11 (2005), 21-88.
C. Homequist, ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings’ in
Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, DCAF (2005).
I. Siatitsa, ‘A Serious Violation of International Human Rights Law, An Attempt to
Clarify a Crucial Provision of the Arms Trade Treaty’, European Journal of Human
Rights 5 (2015), 606-630.
Institut de Droit International, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law
and Fundamental Human Rights in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities
are Parties’, Berlin session, 1999.
International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two.
D. Jinks, ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups’, 83 Chicago
Journal of International Law (2003), 83-95.
C. Jochnick, ‘Confronting the impunity of non-state actors: new fields for the
promotion of human rights’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly 1(1999), 56-79.
K. Mastorodimos, Armed Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law: Foundation and Framework of Obligations, and Rules on
Accountability, Ashgate Publishing, 2016.
50 Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors:
An Exploration of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council
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