Economics Department FIU

Game Theory
Notes
Prof Dacal
 Game Theory Notes

Game theory From Wikipedia [with modifications]

Traditional applications of game theory attempt to find equilibrium in these games. In

Representation of games
A game consists of a set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and a
specification of payoffs for each combination of strategies. Most cooperative games are
presented in the characteristic function form, while the extensive and the normal forms are used
to define non-cooperative games.

Extensive form

An extensive form game

The extensive form can be used to formalize games with some important order. Games here are
often presented as trees (as pictured above). Here each node represents a point of choice for a
player. The player is specified by a number listed by the node. The lines out of the node represent
a possible action for that player. The payoffs are specified at the bottom of the tree.

In the game pictured here, there are two players. Player 1 moves first and chooses either F or U.
Player 2 sees Player 1's move and then chooses A or R. Suppose that Player 1 chooses U and
then Player 2 chooses A, then Player 1 gets 8 and Player 2 gets 2.

The extensive form can also capture simultaneous-move games and games with imperfect
information or asymmetric information. To represent it, either a dotted line connects different
vertices to represent them as being part of the same information set (i.e., the players do not know
at which point they are), or a closed line is drawn around them.

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 Game Theory Notes

Normal form

Player 2 Player 2
The normal (or strategic form) game is chooses Left chooses Right
usually represented by a matrix which shows
the players, strategies, and payoffs (see the Player 1
example to the right). More generally it can be chooses Up
4, 3 –1, –1
represented by any function that associates a
payoff for each player with every possible Player 1
combination of actions. In the accompanying chooses Down 0, 0 3, 4
example there are two players; one chooses
the row and the other chooses the column. Normal form or payoff matrix of a 2-player, 2-
Each player has two strategies (‘in this strategy game
example, but we could have more in our
class’), which are specified by the number of rows and the number of columns. The payoffs are
provided in the interior. The first number is the payoff received by the row player (Player 1 in
our example); the second is the payoff for the column player (Player 2 in our example). Suppose
that Player 1 plays Up and that Player 2 plays Left. Then Player 1 gets a payoff of 4, and Player 2
gets 3.

When a game is presented in normal form, it is presumed that each player acts simultaneously or,
at least, without knowing the actions of the other. If players have some information about the
choices of other players, the game is usually presented in extensive form.

Economics and business

Economists have long used game theory to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena,
including auctions, bargaining, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation,
and voting systems and to model across such broad classifications as behavioral economics[2] and
industrial organization.[3] This research usually focuses on particular sets of strategies known as
equilibria in games. These "solution concepts" are usually based on what is required by norms of
rationality.

In non-cooperative games, the most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. If each player’s
strategy represents the best response to the other strategies, this set of strategies is a Nash
equilibrium. So, if all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no
unilateral incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are
doing.

The payoffs of the game are generally taken to represent the utility (‘or disutility if it is
negative’) of individual players. Often in modeling situations the payoffs represent money, which
presumably corresponds to an individual's utility. This assumption, however, can be faulty.

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 Game Theory Notes

Types of games
Symmetric and asymmetric

E F
A symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a
particular strategy depend only on the other strategies E 1, 2 0, 0
employed, not on who is playing them. If the identities of the
players can be changed without changing the payoff to the
strategies, then a game is symmetric. Many of the commonly
F 0, 0 1, 2
studied 2×2 games are symmetric. The standard  An asymmetric game
representations of chicken, the prisoner's dilemma, and the
stag hunt are all symmetric games.

Most commonly studied asymmetric games are games where there are not identical strategy sets
for both players. For instance, the ultimatum game and similarly the dictator game have different
strategies for each player. It is possible, however, for a game to have identical strategies for both
players, yet be asymmetric. For example, the game pictured to the right is asymmetric despite
having identical strategy sets for both players.

Zero-sum

A B
Zero-sum games are a special case of constant-sum games, in
which choices by players can neither increase nor decrease the A –1, 1 3, –3
available resources. In zero-sum games the total benefit to all
players in the game, for every combination of strategies,
always adds to zero (more informally, a player benefits only at
B 0, 0 –2, 2
the equal expense of others). Poker exemplifies a zero-sum A zero-sum game
game (ignoring the possibility of the house's cut), because one
wins exactly the amount one's opponents lose. Other zero-sum games include matching pennies
and most classical board games including Go and chess.

Simultaneous and sequential

Simultaneous games are games where both players move simultaneously, or if they do not move
simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the earlier players' actions (making them
effectively simultaneous). Sequential game (or dynamic games) are games where later players
have some knowledge about earlier actions. This need not be perfect information about every
action of earlier players; it might be very little knowledge. For instance, a player may know that
an earlier player did not perform one particular action, while he does not know which of the
other available actions the first player actually performed.

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 Game Theory Notes

The difference between simultaneous and sequential games is captured in the different
representations discussed above. Often, normal form is used to represent simultaneous games,
and extensive form is used to represent sequential ones; although this isn't a strict rule in a
technical sense.

Perfect information and imperfect information

A game of imperfect information (the dotted line represents ignorance on the part of player 2)

An important subset of sequential games consists of games of perfect information. A game is one
of perfect information if all players know the moves previously made by all other players. Thus,
only sequential games can be games of perfect information, since in simultaneous games not
every player knows the actions of the others. Most games studied in game theory are imperfect-
information games. Perfect-information games include chess.

Perfect information is often confused with complete information, which is a similar concept.
Complete information requires that every player know the strategies and payoffs of the other
players but not necessarily the actions.

Infinitely long games

Games, as studied by economists and real-world game players, are generally finished in finitely
many moves. Pure mathematicians are not so constrained, and set theorists in particular study
games that last for infinitely many moves, with the winner (or other payoff) not known until
after all those moves are completed.

Discrete and continuous games

Much of game theory is concerned with finite, discrete games, that have a finite number of
players, moves, events, outcomes, etc. Many concepts can be extended, however. Continuous
games allow players to choose a strategy from a continuous strategy set. For instance, Cournot
competition is typically modeled with players' strategies being any non-negative quantities,
including fractional quantities (this is a game for duopolies).

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