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Anthropocene risk

Article · July 2019

DOI: 10.1038/s41893-019-0327-x

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 PERSPECTIVE
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0327-x

Anthropocene risk
Patrick W. Keys! !1*, Victor Galaz! !2,3, Michelle Dyer! !2, Nathanial Matthews4, Carl Folke! !2,3,
Magnus Nyström2 and Sarah E. Cornell! !2

The potential consequences of cross-scale systemic environmental risks with global effects are increasing. We argue that
current descriptions of globally connected systemic risk poorly capture the role of human–environment interactions. This
creates a bias towards solutions that ignore the new realities of the Anthropocene. We develop an integrated concept of
what we denote Anthropocene risk—that is, risks that: emerge from human-driven processes; interact with global social–eco-
logical connectivity; and exhibit complex, cross-scale relationships. To illustrate this, we use four cases: moisture recycling
teleconnections, aquaculture and stranded assets, biome migration in the Sahel, and sea-level rise and megacities. We discuss
the implications of Anthropocene risk across several research frontiers, particularly in the context of supranational power,
environmental and social externalities and possible future Anthropocene risk governance. We conclude that decision makers
must navigate this new epoch with new tools, and that Anthropocene risk contributes conceptual guidance towards a more
sustainable and just future.

I
n recent decades it has become increasingly apparent that global risks result from poorly understood interactions within the system,
phenomena, such as financial crashes and disease outbreaks, when these interactions are more than the sum of their parts and
propagate more quickly than in the past and with greater geo- therefore often emerge as surprises8. Current understanding of such
graphic spread1. These episodic shocks are also occurring alongside systemic risks relies heavily on concepts of global networks9 and
ongoing protracted crises, which may morph into new forms, creat- complex adaptive systems1.
ing a sense of a never-ending crisis2,3. Prominent cases of interact- The literature on global systemic risk has hitherto been domi-
ing, systemic crises include the large-scale human migration from nated by the finance1 and technology sectors. Prominent inter-
the Middle East into Europe2, the ongoing Syrian conflict3 and the national policy arenas are increasingly exploring the evolution
financial crises of the 2000s that interacted with oil price fluctua- and implications of these risks. The Intergovernmental Panel on
tions and commodity crises3. Such complex systemic phenomena Climate Change (IPCC), for example, has made several, increas-
have neither a clear cause nor simple blueprint solutions4, owing to a ingly sophisticated efforts to capture complex risks, using inter-
combination of often-contested social, technological, ecological and acting frameworks such as Reasons for Concern and Key Risks10.
geophysical drivers3,5,6. The World Economic Forum publishes an annual perception
Various efforts to classify and organize these types of linked analysis of global risks and how they have changed through time11,
systemic phenomena have been made, including global systemic including some environmental risks (for example, water stress and
risks, nested vulnerabilities and globally networked risks5. In this extreme weather)2.
Perspective, we argue that these dominant risk framings are inad- Although all of these initiatives contribute in important ways
equate for the task of dealing with the dawn of a geological epoch in to current understandings of global risks, none of them are able
which humans are a dominant force of change on our planet—the to fully capture the anatomy of risk and human–environmental
Anthropocene. As we elaborate below, the emerging geographical processes that are shaping new systemic environmental risks. For
and temporal dynamics of this new proposed epoch, in combina- example, although scholars have made considerable progress in
tion with increased global connectivity through teleconnections understanding and modelling systemic risks in the financial system,
and telecoupling dynamics7, have profound implications for how only recently have we begun to understand possible systemic risks
global systemic risks are understood and eventually governed. created by climate change and its impacts on ecosystems around the
Here we take stock of existing dominant global risk frameworks, world6. Recent analyses from the World Economic Forum integrate
highlight their gaps from a social–ecological perspective and elabo- environmental and climate dimensions in their global risk assess-
rate why a new concept of global environmental systemic risks is ments (which are generated from survey data), but do not incor-
needed. We use four illustrative case studies to highlight key dimen- porate actual Earth-system data and modelling. The IPCC reports
sions of these risks, and explore future research frontiers of inter- are without doubt the most authoritative summary of connected
est to a wide research community encompassing climate, ecology, risks induced by climate change, yet there is an acknowledged need
economy, technology and finance. for improving the characterization of socioeconomic processes, as
well as how complex adaptation to climate change might modulate
What are Anthropocene risks? cross-scale and cross-sectoral risks10.
The notion of ‘systemic risks’ has gained considerable traction in These dominant global systemic risk framings are often criticized
both the scientific and policy communities over the past few years. for global geographic biases12, failing to resolve small-scale system
Systemic risks have a number of different definitions, but are in features (such as local feedbacks) and omitting consideration of
general viewed as an emergent feature of complex systems in which power, equity, ethics and justice3. This is problematic, as addressing

School of Global Environmental Sustainability, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA. 2Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University,
1

Stockholm, Sweden. 3Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden. 4Global Resilience Partnership,
Stockholm, Sweden. *e-mail: [email protected]

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PERSPECTIVE NATURE SUSTAINABILITY

Furthermore, the Anthropocene did not simply emerge from an

Cross-scale integration undifferentiated humanity, but rather through a highly imbalanced
Changing the basis world in which very few accumulated vast wealth via, ultimately,
of risk prediction
emitting vast amounts of fossil carbon. This disproportionate accu-
mulation—in concert with the delayed effects of climate change,
and the asymmetric impacts to those least responsible for climate
Vulnerability
change19—underpins the need to consider past, present and future
distributions of power in the context of the Anthropocene.

Hazard
Anthropocene
Global social–ecological connectivity. Global connectivity can
risk trace much of its current roots to the Columbian Exchange, which
Global social–ecological broadly highlights the extraction of natural resources (silver from
connectivity South America to East Asia, potatoes from the Americas to Europe,
Changing the foci
Anthropogenic changes of risk for example) and the forced relocation of people across oceans (such
Changing the Exposure as slaves from West Africa to the Americas)20. These extractive pro-
baseline of hazards cesses, by which the powerful world removed the human and natu-
ral wealth of the less powerful, set the stage for the contemporary
configuration of power and distribution of wealth among nations.
Equally important, modern corporate entities have their roots in
this historical geopolitics of colonialism12. This reorganization of
Fig. 1 | Conceptual diagram of how Anthropocene risk interacts with people and traded goods also initiated a widespread shuffling of
more traditional notions of risk. First, anthropogenic changes to the Earth cultural and biological diversity that continues to this day.
system modify the baseline for hazard assessment. Second, global social– As such, social–ecological systems across geographies are more
ecological connectivity modulates exposure and vulnerability, and thus the likely to be connected through global trade, international institu-
foci for risk management. Third, cross-scale integration can alter how and tions, financialization and communication flows. Recent work
where risks are predicted and perceived. has highlighted global ‘tele-couplings’: social processes that can
drive system feedbacks despite being distant in space and time.
For example, strong deforestation regulations lead to deforestation
the scale and magnitude of global environmental changes will leakage in less-well-developed neighbours, international food trade
require confronting the underlying reasons for the unequal distri- drives distant groundwater depletion (often among poor, small-
bution of power and wealth, and the coincident implications for the holder farmers)21 and global trade leads to contagious exploitation
biosphere and Earth system13,14. Given these limitations, we intro- of marine resources21,22. The profound global connectedness and
duce Anthropocene risks as a complementary approach to existing power asymmetries in global social–ecological systems, accelerated
systemic risk frameworks (Fig. 1). We define Anthropocene risks as by the Columbian Exchange, have ricocheted through to modern
those that: times. Figure 2 demonstrates not only the massive increase in palm-
oil production, but also the countries that are driving this change.
Many of the top importers of palm oil (although not all) are thus
1. Originate from, or are related to, anthropogenic changes in key
driving explosively exploitative environmental change in other,
functions of the Earth system (such as climate change, biodi-
often marginalized or poor nations. Environmental injustice and
versity loss and land-use change)
inequality are embedded in the notion of Anthropocene risk, given
2. Emerge due to the evolution of globally intertwined social–eco-
that these risks are not simply about globalization, but undermine
logical systems, often characterized by inequality and injustice
the very functioning of key biogeophysical processes.
3. Exhibit complex cross-scale interactions, ranging from local
to global, and short-term to deep-time (millennia or longer),
Cross-scale integration. A third feature of Anthropocene risk
potentially involving Earth-system tipping elements
relates to the dynamic integration among spatial, temporal and other
scales. As cross-scale anthropogenic changes interact at both large
Anthropogenic changes. The Anthropocene is the proposed new and small scales—as well as across short and long time horizons—
geological epoch that posits that human activity is the prime driver new feedbacks emerge23. Such feedbacks give rise to the dynamic
of physical and biological changes in the Earth system15. Humanity interaction of slow (that is, climate change) and fast (large forest
now modifies weather patterns, climate, land surfaces, the cryo- fires, for example) changes, which can trigger nonlinear systemic
sphere (the frozen parts of the Earth), the deep ocean and even change (tipping points or regime shifts), such as the potential irre-
evolutionary processes in ways that fundamentally alter life’s inter- versible shift from rainforest to savannah for the Amazon biome24.
actions with its environment. Many of these systems have displayed It should be noted that the sheer scale, spread and speed of
accelerating rates of change since the 1850s15, altering the basis of human actions are changing the very operation of known slow and
scientific risk prediction in unprecedented ways. Some regions and fast variables, such as rising temperatures, sea-level rise and spe-
biophysical processes have been highlighted as ‘sleeping giants’15 cies extinction15. As has been noted by Earth-system scientists, the
with the latent potential to accelerate global change through vari- impacts of human action are expanding rapidly into what has been
ous feedback dynamics. ‘Planetary boundaries’16 have been pro- denoted deep time. As an example, recent analyses indicate that
posed in response to these ‘tipping elements’ or ‘planetary-scale the long-term dynamics of the Earth’s climate system (that is, for
tipping points’17, which entail both shorter-term and very-long- the next ten millennia and beyond) will be determined by politi-
term temporal dynamics. Given the importance of the stability of cal decisions made in the next few years and decades. Global mean
Earth-system processes to the emergence and success of human temperatures, sea-level rise and associated ecosystem changes con-
civilization18, these anthropogenic perturbations are central to our tinue to respond long after the stabilization of radiative forcing,
definition of Anthropocene risk. Likewise, we eschew notions of resulting in numerous committed changes in the Earth system
‘high probability/low risk versus low probability/high risk’ in favour thousands of years into the future. This lag in effects, the existence
of a holistic, systems dynamics-oriented perspective. of feedbacks, connections between subsystems, and nonlinearities

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NATURE SUSTAINABILITY PERSPECTIVE
a 1961–1985 b 1986–2000

Area harvested
(×103 ha)
40,000

20,000

10,000
5,000
2,500
1,250
100
0
c 2001–2011 d
6 Pakistan
Netherlands
Malaysia
5

Palm oil imports (Mt)

Germany
Top ten palm
United States
oil producers
4 Italy
Indonesia Bangladesh
Malaysia Nigeria
Nigeria 3
Mainland China
Thailand
India
Ghana 2
Côte d’Ivoire
Colombia
Ecuador 1
Cameroon
Guatemala 0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year

Fig. 2 | Harvesting and imports of palm oil for the period 1961 to 2011. a–c, Area harvested in the top ten palm-oil-producing countries over the periods
1961–1985 (a), 1986–2000 (b) and 2001–2011 (c). d, Imports for the top ten palm-oil-consuming countries over the same time period. Data from
FAOSTAT (http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/home/E).

allow for very complex temporal interactions among decision- (up to 40% in some months) of precipitation falling in East Africa27.
making, environmental change and its implications for human Thus, the social–ecological systems that are producing food in India
well-being. Understanding such dynamic interactions, and how to can have a cross-scale, teleconnected impact on rainfed systems in
prepare for and deal with them, is central for the governance of East Africa (Fig. 3a).
Anthropocene risk. East African societies are highly dependent on rainfed ecosys-
tems for agriculture, livestock forage and off-farm ecosystem ser-
Four cases of Anthropocene risk vices28. Many of these societies already operate at the hydrological
We illustrate Anthropocene risk using the following four case stud- margins, where small reductions in rainfall could lead to very large
ies. We use these to explore Anthropogenic changes, global social– consequences such as crop failure, livestock death or drought-
ecological connectivity and complex, cross-scale integration, and related hazards such as fire28. Some communities may be able to
highlight risks ranging from short-term (immediate) to very-long- respond to these environmental changes by transforming to other
term (>500 yr) time horizons. These four cases demonstrate differ- livelihood strategies29, or by finding ways to better capture and uti-
ent aspects of Anthropocene risk that are not normally included in lize existing rainfall and ground- and surface water. However, many
standard discussions about systemic risks, and explicitly emphasize communities and individuals will be unable to transform, and nega-
examples outside of North America and Europe. Within each case, tive outcomes such as food shortage, forced migration and conflict
we provide a specific example and then widen our focus to explore over scarce resources are likely3.
various aspects of that Anthropocene risk. As a result of the intensification of irrigation contributing to
rainfall in East Africa, farmers and pastoralists may have already
Moisture recycling teleconnections. Millions of farms in the Indian adjusted their practices to the current teleconnection (that is, a
subcontinent depend on groundwater irrigation21. Irrigation rates social–ecological ‘lock-in’ under contemporary biophysical con-
have increased since the 1990s, leading to the need for deeper, stron- ditions30). The situation therefore presents a delicate dilemma: if
ger pumps to extract water25. Agricultural productivity has been communities in India improve sustainable agriculture practices
largely maintained through subsidized fuel costs and an increased (reduced irrigation and groundwater depletion), then pastoralists
technical ability to extract deep water25. However, groundwater-irri- and farmers in Africa could suffer. This case of Anthropocene risk
gated agricultural systems have the potential for collapse, due to pro- highlights how economic globalization has driven biogeophysical
hibitive energy prices, exhaustion of wells and salinization of soils25. changes, leading to a new kind of systemic risk.
The large regional scale of this irrigated agriculture has profound
impacts on the local and regional water cycle, particularly in terms Aquaculture and locally stranded assets. Aquaculture is perhaps
of the influence on evaporation to the atmosphere and subsequent the most vibrant food sector in the world31 with Southeast Asia
moisture flows to specific parts of the planet26. Hydrological analy- particularly dominant, accounting for almost 89% of global aqua-
sis shows that irrigation in India contributes a substantial fraction culture production between the 1990s and 2010s32. The reliance of

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PERSPECTIVE NATURE SUSTAINABILITY

a b
Irrigated Ocean temperature, Declines in
Moisture
agriculture in India Climate salinity and acidity ocean fisheries
recycling
Groundwater change changes
over-pumping Global consumers
Evaporation Human and
rates Precipitation in Riverine agricultural waste
Groundwater East Africa flooding in rivers
Viability of rainfed ecosystem Regional and global
exhaustion
services collapses, with Algal blooms shrimp supply chain
Rainfed forage for Land-use Sediment
corresponding collapse in
livestock change
(current) social–ecological systems
Rainfed Relocate supply
Former farmers and agriculture Small-scale, coastal chains
pastoralists must seek aquaculture
Stranding of
alternative livelihoods Mangrove aquaculture assets
Transform local Migrate ecosystems
livelihood Other agricultural Transfrom
regions livelihood
Restore local
Potentially increased piracy
ecosystems Shift aquaculture Migrate
in the Gulf of Aden, threatening, Cities
for example, global trade species

c d Increased use of fossil fuels

Species fail to keep
pace with changes Pump water
Climate Protections make city more
out
change Terrestrial vulnerable to eventual
Temperature glaciers melt catastrophe
Local social–ecological Build
Biome interacts resilience sea-walls
Greenland ice
dynamically with melt Antarctic ice
hydroclimate melt
Local and regional Protect Protections
hydroclimate Social–ecological overwhelmed
systems cannot cope Coastal Megacities
with change Warming flooding respond Adapt
oceans
Transformation Sea-level rise
Precipitation Adaptations
Migrate Retreat inadequate
Climate
change
Urban residents
Novel social–ecological systems able to respond
Other physical drivers Cities
depending on assets
(storm tracks and so on)

Fig. 3 | System diagrams. a, Moisture recycling teleconnections. b, Aquaculture and stranded assets. c, Biome migration in the Sahel. d, Sea-level rise and
coastal cities.

aquaculture on terrestrial crops and wild fish for feeds, its tems. This confluence of global demand and site specificity means
dependence on freshwater and land for aquaculture sites, and its that tropical coastlines in the rapidly developing world, particularly
broad array of environmental impacts, strongly call for govern- those with weak environmental regulations, are particularly vulner-
ment policies to provide adequate incentives for resource efficiency, able to this Anthropocene risk31.
equity and environmental protection31.
In the central coast of Vietnam, a consequence of the expansion Biome migration in the Sahel. Without rapid mitigation, climate
of aquaculture is a vast denuding of coastal vegetation, especially change will perturb the current global distribution of biomes36.
mangroves. Aquaculture livelihoods are increasingly at risk owing Temperature stress is a key determinant of the types of plants and
to: increased sediment loads from upstream flooding, sand mining distributions of ecological communities that can grow in different
and human settlements; inundation from coastal storms, especially parts of the world37. As the entire planet warms, biomes tend to
typhoons; and the loss of local habitat and nutrient cycling due to migrate to cooler regions (north, south or upwards along elevation
hydropower development33. Slow dynamics, including gradual sea- gradients) by natural seed dispersal, human-assisted seed dispersal
level rise and increased flood magnitudes, also threaten these live- or physical transplanting37. Using climate-model temperatures and
lihood strategies (Fig. 3b). These local interactions connect with ecosystem temperature tolerance, the ‘velocity of climate change’
regional and global dynamics, such as shifts in global demand for can be calculated36: the speed that a given biome needs to move to
locally grown species or cheaper suppliers becoming available else- remain in an ecologically viable niche. However, given that eco-
where, which leads to local asset stranding (that is, the removal of systems can also respond in an abrupt, nonlinear fashion24, biome
supply chains), rendering aquaculture assets (fencing, nets, boats) migration is also expected to occur in bursts or shocks, depending
sources of debt as opposed to wealth32. Likewise, pollution from on the scale and nature of stress.
intensive aquaculture may also prevent aquaculture sites from being In the Sahel, climate change will probably lead to a drying
used for other purposes, leading to a pollution lock in-effect30. trend37, as well as increasing temperatures38 (Fig. 3c). Predictions
There are potential pathways by which local disturbances in of specific ecosystem responses have high uncertainties owing to
aquaculture could scale up to national-, regional- or even global- the range of biophysical and social drivers in play, yet some general
scale impacts. First, farmed species can become incubators of dis- conclusions may be drawn about biomes in the Sahel. First, it seems
eases34 that may spread to other farmed species, and combatting that desert areas are likely to encroach further south with current
disease with antibiotics is causing antimicrobial resistance, thereby open shrubland areas becoming either desert or scrubland36. The
challenging human health. This presents a significant threat to temperature tolerances of local sorghum and millet varieties will
regional aquaculture food safety and security35. Second, populations probably be exceeded. Future societies face the options of import-
of farmed species have interbred with wild populations, leading to a ing heat-tolerant varieties, developing new varieties, switching crop
weakening of hardiness to conditions in the normal life cycle of wild types altogether or abandoning farming39. Although it is difficult
species in these locations31. Spatially, aquaculture competes with to say what the future holds for the social–ecological systems in
other uses of aquatic spaces, leading to increasing removal of wild the Sahel, it seems likely that rainfed pastoralism will persist in
lake ecosystems and mangroves, creating much less resilient sys- some form due to the long-term adaptability of Sahelian pastoral

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NATURE SUSTAINABILITY PERSPECTIVE
societies40. Regardless, accelerated reconfigurations in ecosystem withdrawal happens on a large scale there will probably be signifi-
services are more likely to occur when exogenous changes in tem- cant direct consequences for the uninsured property owners and
perature and climate interact with local social–ecological systems41. their cities. Here, the consequences of centuries of unfair and unjust
Thus, social–ecological interactions may lead to nonlinear housing practices will be painfully revealed throughout the world.
changes or complete transformations in Sahelian social–ecological Given that the most affected communities are systematically pre-
systems41. These types of nonlinear changes are a near certainty in cluded from political, economic and social avenues for meaningful
some communities very close to the edge of agricultural productiv- Earth-system-level solutions, SLR may be the quintessential exam-
ity in the northern Sahel, given the exposure to disruption of their ple of an ignored Anthropocene risk19.
livelihoods on so many fronts29. More broadly, perhaps the biggest gamble the world’s power-
Ecosystem squeeze, the process of changes in the exogenous cli- ful are making in the twenty-first century is the assumption that
mate conditions that constrain a given ecosystem’s range, is a rel- the ocean will continue to function as it has during the Holocene.
evant concept for Sahelian social–ecological systems owing to the For example, the ocean absorbs more than 90% of the excess
inability to migrate en masse into the Sahara. This Anthropocene heat that humans put into the Earth system. Changes in ocean
risk also has implications for larger scales of social and political functioning are pervasive and potentially affect all aspects of the
organization, as people migrate to areas that are already heavily Earth system, challenging inclusion within specific examples of
populated, thereby increasing the pressure on both social and eco- Anthropocene risk.
logical systems. Cross-scale relationships, such as local to national
or urban to rural, may need to be redefined as social–ecological Discussion
configurations react to ecosystem squeeze. The distinguishing characteristics and complexity of four
Anthropocene risks have been briefly described. We now discuss
Sea-level rise and coastal cities. Global sea-level rise (SLR) is one several considerations for advancing the concept of Anthropocene
of the most disastrous impacts of climate change due to the great risk, with a focus on governance, social injustice, concentration of
importance of coastal settlements as hubs of trade, communica- influence and supranational power.
tions, government and culture. Ten per cent of humanity lives within
10 m of mean sea level42, meaning that a very significant fraction Is Anthropocene risk governance possible? Typical risk manage-
of humanity is at risk of losing their homes and communities to ment is based on a strategy of prepare, detect, respond and repeat,
the ocean in a few centuries. Most of the world’s current megacities with recent evolutions including elements of resilience theory (such
are likely to be underwater in 500 years, if not much sooner. This as adaptive management and continuous learning) to enhance
is less of a problem if cities proactively adapt or migrate away from capacity48. Yet, Anthropocene risks, by their very definition, pres-
coasts. However, cities are remarkably persistent in space and time. ent a challenge to this ability to detect and prepare for risks and,
For example, London, Shanghai, Jakarta and Manila have all existed importantly, to act on them. The Earth-system governance com-
in their modern locations for 800 years or more. munity has identified key challenges that are particularly relevant
Climate models project a large range in the magnitude of SLR in Anthropocene risk, including: governance architecture, alterna-
through time, due in part to the substantial uncertainty about how tive forms of agency beyond nationality, the accountability of gov-
the Earth’s ice sheets will behave in a changing climate43. However, ernance in a transnational context and who has access to power49,50.
the consistent finding is that if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis- This alludes to fundamental issues of equity in governance, includ-
sions are not controlled in the near term, the thermal expansion ing: Who decides? Who has a seat at the table? Whose knowledge
of ocean water combined with the release of freshwater from the counts? Who benefits from the problem and who benefits from the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and continental mountain gla- solutions? These questions connect with historically relevant dis-
ciers will lead to considerable SLR. Current estimates of SLR extend tributions of power and wealth, especially when considering the
above 2 m by 210043. In the long-term, however, palaeoclimate fossil-fuel-driven changes in the Anthropocene. These legacies of
records are important sources of evidence, and these suggest an the accumulation of carbon-based wealth19, for example, reinforce
equilibrium rise of at least 6 m associated with contemporary CO2 earlier Earth-system governance appeals for particular attention to
concentrations44. There is therefore a mismatch in model projec- accountability, legitimacy and access to decision-making49.
tions of SLR43,45 and the palaeoclimate record in terms of long-term Owing to the unavoidable deep uncertainties surrounding these
SLR44, potentially suggesting an underestimation—or ignorance— risks, and the need for flexible management5, a blending of quantita-
of cryosphere tipping points. Regardless, even the SLR estimate of tive (signal detection) and qualitative (iterative, shared learning dia-
2 m by 2100 will require unprecedented rates of adaptation (Fig. 3d). logue) governance tools will be necessary. In the moisture recycling
Furthermore, the poorest residents of low-lying megacities are most case as an example, even if groundwater collapse is detected, there is
exposed to geophysical hazards, most marginalized by political and no guarantee that information describing impacts on East African
economic programmes and often targeted as scapegoats for other rainfall will make it to the relevant communities, or that they will be
policy failures, such as the Makako community in Lagos, Nigeria46. able to manage a response that they find acceptable. The presence of
Despite the coastal defences erected by cities, projections suggest both information and power asymmetries among social groups may
that most, if not all, will eventually be overwhelmed by the inexo- lead to maladaptation and further exacerbate Anthropocene risk.
rable increases in global sea level, leading to retreat from coastlines
and migration inland. The impacts of SLR on cities are particu- Foregrounding social inequality and injustice in the Anthrop-
larly concerning given current trends towards rapid population ocene. Understanding the structure of networks (such as virtual
growth coupled with urbanization43. The vulnerability of cities to water networks, global trade patterns21) and the behaviour of net-
disease outbreak and disasters even with small rises in sea level (as works (propagating shocks in commodity chains, systematic exclu-
seen through the impact of recent extreme weather events such as sion of communities from Earth-system governance3) may prove
Hurricane Harvey and typhoon Haiyan) further demonstrates the key to characterizing Anthropocene risks. Recent work emphasizes
need to better understand the Anthropocene risks they face47. the need to better understand the cross-scale pathways, interactions
Foreknowledge of the impacts associated with SLR does not, on and feedbacks among inequality and the biosphere13. Furthermore,
its own, trigger action to proactively adapt. However, global insur- understanding multidimensional measures of inequality and their
ance markets may force planning decisions as insurance compa- intersectional nature51 is necessary to better map the complexity of
nies consider withdrawing mortgage lending support. When this social–ecological connections—especially those that are hidden at

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PERSPECTIVE NATURE SUSTAINABILITY

present by the focus on traditional measures of wealth inequality risks emerge from anthropogenically driven processes, interact with
at aggregated scales14. Some of these measures of inequality must globally connected social–ecological systems and exhibit complex,
include historical perspectives of power imbalances. For example, cross-scale interactions. The key advantages of the Anthropocene
the blithe proscription that the Syrian civil war owes its origin to risk framing are the emphasis on all scales (spatial, temporal and
climate change, or even drought, misses the deep internal legacy of otherwise) and the explicit focus on incorporating the complex
planned policy and resettlement in certain parts of Syria. Moreover, adaptive attributes of human–environment systems. Using four
it omits the legacy of European colonial powers dividing the entire examples of Anthropocene risk, we illustrate different types of con-
Middle East region into politically expedient units for extracting nections across space and time, as well as feedbacks among social–
natural resource wealth, leading to more than a century of strife. ecological and Earth-system processes. Ultimately, this work seeks
Much existing scholarship highlights how indigenous knowledge to provide conceptual guidance for exploring nonlinear and rapidly
practices contest the very notion of a human-dominated world52. changing systemic risks, especially in the face of compounding,
An important task for future Anthropocene-risk research is to learn exploitative human activity. We suggest that Anthropocene risk can
about the role of humanity in Earth-system stewardship through unpack the biogeophysical and Earth-system aspects of emerging
these well-established counter-narratives of global collective use53,54. systemic risks, which are normally ignored by other systemic risk
scholars, and bring insight as to how the future may unfold.
Uncovering key agents of Anthropocene risks. In complex systems,
there is a tendency to centralize resources among a small group of Received: 16 January 2019; Accepted: 7 June 2019;
agents13. Evidence suggests that key aspects of Anthropocene risks Published: xx xx xxxx
could be seen to be concentrated among just a handful of actors,
especially with the shift from earlier geopolitically based global rela- References
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