Helen Nort. Sophrosyne - Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature PDF

CORNELL STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY
EDITED BY
HARRY CAPLAN ★ JAMES HUTTON

G. M. KIRKWOOD
VOLUME XXXV
SOPHROSYNE
Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint
in Greek Literature
By HELEN NORTH
SOPHROSYNE
in Greek Literature
By Helen North
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

ITHACA, NEW YORK
Copyright (C) 1966 by Cornell University
All rights reserved
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
First published ig66
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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-13797
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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To C. D. N. and M. C. N.
and to the memory of F. A. D.
’A.pCTTjS KCU OcocppooVVTjS IVtKCt.

Preface
WE have had no detailed study of sophrosyne which embraces the en¬

tire period of Greek literature. Two brief articles offer useful analyses of
the concept in the classical age,1 and a Gottingen dissertation of 1917,
of which only an abstract has been published, studies the period in
greater detail.2 There are many discussions of sophrosyne in recent
works on Greek ethics and morality,3 but nothing on the scale attempted
here has been available. My aim has been to trace the development of
the concept from its earliest appearance in the Homeric poems to its
transformation into a Christian virtue in the fourth century of our era.
Although the evidence is found principally in Greek literature, I have
also given considerable attention to Roman efforts to naturalize sophro¬
syne, since its place in Roman thought has proved interesting in itself
and clearly affected the form in which it was transmitted to the Latin
Fathers. In view of the number and the variety of the authors and
1 Albrecht Kollmann, “Sophrosyne,” Wiener Studien 59 (1941), 12-34. G. J. de Vries,

“Eox^poaOi'Tj en grec classique,” Mnemosyne, Series 3, 11 (1943), 81-101.
2 Ernst Weitlich, Quae Fuent Vocis ^.ojcppoavvr] Vis ac Natura apud Antiquiores Scriptores Graecos
usque ad Platonem. Abstract in Jahrbuch der philosophischen Fakultat der Georg August-Universitat z.ur
Gottingen (1922). An unpublished twenty-five-page essay, “The Meaning of Sophrosyne,” by
Benedict S. Einarson, submitted for the M.A. degree at the University of Chicago (June 1927),
surveys the principal aspects of sophrosyne and illustrates them with passages drawn mainly
from classical and Elellenistic sources.
3 Arthur Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, i960); John Ferguson, Moral Values
in the Ancient World (London, 1958); Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans.
Gilbert Highet (Vol. I, 4th ed.; Oxford, 1954. Vols. II, III; New York, 1943, 1944); Eduard
Schwartz, Ethik der Griechen (Stuttgart, 1951); Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans.
T. G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford, 1953). Older standard works that consider sophrosyne at some
length include K. F. Nagelsbach, Die nachhomerische Theologie (Niirnberg, 1857), and Leopold
Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (Berlin, 1882), I.
vii
Vlll Preface
periods considered, it may be well to explain the method that I have used.
I was strongly tempted to employ a topical method—that is, to study
sophrosyne as a civic virtue, as the virtus feminarum, as a topic in rhetoric
and a canon in literary criticism, or to discuss it in relation to religion,
tragedy, education, and a variety of other subjects with which it is
allied throughout the history of Greek thought 4—but I decided that a
chronological approach would be more useful to most readers and
would have the additional advantage of enabling one who wished to
discover how a given author dealt with sophrosyne to do so without
searching through several chapters. Within a chapter my method has
also been largely chronological, although in some cases, especially
Chapter V (Plato), the advantages of a topical approach seemed par¬
ticularly compelling. In this case, too, however, I deemed it better, even
at the cost of some repetition, to study sophrosyne against the back¬
ground of individual dialogues, instead of attempting to organize into
separate categories a concept whose treatment by Plato is so dependent
on its context.
The method followed in the first five chapters, therefore, is to examine
the subject in detail, omitting (it is hoped) nothing of significance. The
last four chapters, however—which deal with Greek philosophy after
Plato, nonphilosophical writing (including inscriptions) of the Hellenis¬
tic period and thereafter, Roman adaptations of sophrosyne, and its
transition to Christian thought—potentially included so much material
that it was necessary to select only the most original developments and
the most influential authors. No attempt has been made in chapters VI
to IX to offer an exhaustive treatment of the subject; patristic literature
in particular received less consideration than it deserved.
My aim throughout has been to identify all the nuances of sophrosyne
as they occur, to trace their development, and to suggest, where evidence
is available, the reasons for such changes as seem explicable in the light
of altered political, social, religious, or economic conditions, or the
special interests of a given author. It must be admitted at the outset that
I make no attempt in this book to solve the ultimate mystery: the
emergence of sophrosyne as a primary virtue among the Greeks and not
among other ancient peoples whose background seems in many ways
comparable.5 In default of methods that would enable us to study in
4 Several of these topics were originally discussed in my doctoral dissertation, “The Concept
of Sophrosyne in Greek Thought from Homer to Aristotle” (Cornell University, 1945,
unpublished), on which the first five chapters of this book are based.
5 It is a source of deep regret that we can no longer look forward to enlightenment on this
subject from Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, who shortly before his death expressed (in conver-
Preface IX
detail the formative years of the Hellenic people, I am inclined to

emulate a writer who says, in connection with an equally baffling prob¬
lem in Celtic civilization, “There is no other answer than the racial
character, with all its virtues and all its weaknesses, that had developed
down the centuries. As to what had formed that character nobody will
ever know now.” * * 6
For the early period it seemed imperative to take into account the
existence of the concept of sophrosyne, even when expressed in other
terms. The heroic and the archaic ages afford many examples of the
appearance under some other name of what is later recognized as
sophrosyne. Among certain persistent themes that are discussed, the
most important is the polarity between sophrosyne and the opposing
principle—variously called andreia (“manliness”), to eugenes (“nobility”),
to drasterion (“the active principle”), or megalopsychia (“greatness of soul”)
—and the attempts made at various stages of Greek and Roman thought
to reconcile the two. This antithesis lies at the very core of Hellenism: it
accounts for some of the most perplexing contradictions in Greek atti-*
tudes and behavior and may derive ultimately from the most fundamen¬
tal polarity of all, that between rest and motion, being and becoming.
The tension between sophrosyne and the “heroic principle” in the
Greek character has often been recognized, but perhaps too much em¬
phasis has been laid on their opposition, too little on their reconciliation.
Moreover—and this is the primary difficulty attending any study of
sophrosyne in our time—modern interpreters have generally found it
hard to comprehend this quality as a positive force. Even so sympathetic
an observer as the classically trained anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn
regarded it as mainly a “negative caution” when he included Discipline
versus Fulfillment in a list of polarities devised for the purpose of con¬
structing a cultural profile of the Greeks.7 But sophrosyne both in its
essence and in its most typical manifestations is neither negative nor
sation with the writer) his belief that this question is fundamental to anthropology, and pro¬
posed to study it with the methods appropriate to that discipline.
6 Sean O’Faolain, The Irish: A Character Study (New York, 1949), 77.
7 Anthropology and the Classics (Providence, R. I., 1961), 50-67. Professor Kluckhohn says in
part, “The issue is between safety and adventure, between control and expansion, between
adjustment to the culture and internal harmony. Here I think the Greek position was about
an equal weighting or balance between the two value systems.” Ferguson, op. cit., also
emphasizes the negative aspect of sophrosyne and finds parallels in the high regard for
moderation expressed by Confucius, Alexander Hamilton, and other spokesmen for middle-
class cultures. As will become evident in the course of the present study, many Greeks
also emphasized the negative or restrictive aspects of sophrosyne; for example, Thucydides in
his portrayal of Spartan sophrosyne and the Cynics in their equation of sophrosyne with
frugality and austerity.
x Preface
merely cautious. Rather it is the harmonious product of intense passion

under perfect control, vis temperata in the felicitous Horatian phrase. It
was this perfect yet precarious control of the most turbulent forces that
stamped the inimitable seal of Hellenism on so many aspects of Greek
life, producing law in the realm of government, form in art, restraint
and proportion in human conduct—diverse results, to be sure, but all
the fruits of sophrosyne.8
One of the principal aims of this book is to draw attention to the
dynamic nature of sophrosyne and to demonstrate that, in the words of
Werner Jaeger (referring to the emergence of sophrosyne in the archaic
age), it was not “the humdrum doctrine of peace and contentment,” but
a “strong repression of the new individualistic impulse” to absolute
liberty.9 Or as a political scientist has lately observed, identifying as
sophrosyne the dominant quality in the character of President John F.
Kennedy, it is “not the product of weakness but of a judicious, disciplined
use of very great powers.” 10 Not for nothing did the Greeks—from the
time of Plato to the end of antiquity, pagan and Christian alike—find
the perfect symbol of this excellence in the charioteer guiding and hold-
\ ing in check his spirited horses: sophrosyne “savingphronesis” (as the tradi¬
tional etymology has it) from the assaults of appetite and passion but at
the same time making use of their motive power to reach goals unattain¬
able without them.
Throughout the book I have tried to be aware of the moral and
intellectual qualities that are allied with sophrosyne at various stages of
its history (aidos, eunomia, enkrateia, metriotes, kosmiotes, hagneia, katharotes in
particular), and to suggest the meaning of these shifting alliances, as well
as of the fluctuating group of antitheses (aphrosynehybris, andreia, akolasia,
anaisthesia, tryphe). Another subject that is treated not in one place, but
throughout, is the relation of sophrosyne to various expressions of the
Greek religious feeling, from the Apolline cult and the Orphic and
Pythagorean mysteries to the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God,
which endowed sophrosyne with special value in the eyes of Neoplatonists,
pagan and Christian. Exemplars of sophrosyne, divine and human, in
myth and history, are kept in view, as reflecting the interpretation of the
concept at different periods.
It became evident in the course of my work that the most important
8J. A. K. Thompson (Greeks and Barbarians [London, 1921], 136) describes sophrosyne
in these terms.
9 Paideia, 1. 167.
10 Walter Dean Burnham, The Commonweal, December 13, 1963, p. 343.
Preface XI
influences on the development of sophrosyne were the growth of the

polis, the flowering of tragedy, the rise of philosophy, and the coming of
Christianity. Hence I have emphasized the fifth and fourth centuries
b.c. and the third and fourth centuries after Christ, when the results of
these influences are most readily observed. The length of the chapters
has been dictated by the nature and the extent of the material available
and therefore varies considerably.
The word sophrosyne has been treated throughout as if it were an
English word and has usually been transliterated without italics. Related
words, however, are either italicized when transliterated or are rendered
in Greek. The singular and plural forms of the adjective (nominative
masculine-feminine sophron, sophrones, neuter sophron, sophrona, accusative
masculine-feminine sophrona, sophronas, neuter sophron, sophrona) are al¬
ways distinguished; the adverb is sophronos (less often sophronikos), the
present infinitive of the corresponding verb sophronein.11
As a general rule, classical authors are referred to in the most recent
Teubner editions. Important exceptions include the poets edited by
Edgar Lobel and D. L. Page in Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta (Oxford,
1955) and D. L. Page in Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford, 1962). In Chapter
IX, wherever possible, the texts of the Fathers in the Gnechischen christ-
lichen Schriftsteller (GCS) and the Corpus scnptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
(CSEL) have been used in preference to the Patrologia Graeca and Latina.
This book was substantially completed in January 1964, and it has
rarely been possible to take into consideration works published since then.
My warm thanks are due to the editors of the Cornell Studies in
Classical Philology, who have read the book in manuscript, and who by
their advice and criticism have removed at least some of its defects of
matter and style. I am indebted above all to Professor Harry Caplan of
Cornell University and Professor Friedrich Solmsen, now of the Institute
for Research in the Humanities, Madison, Wisconsin, who supervised
the doctoral dissertation on which the first five chapters of the book are
based, and who subsequently saw it through several stages of revision
and expansion. Their wisdom and good judgment have been equaled
only by their unfailing kindness over the years in which the book has
taken shape.
11 Other cognate words, less often encountered, include the adjective sophronikos, the nouns
sophronisma and sophromsmos (both mean “discipline, prudent counsel”), sophronistes and
sophronister (“chastiser, castigatrix”), and the verb sophronizein (“to bring to one’s senses,
to discipline”). Compound verbs such as synsophronein (“to join in being sane or moderate”)
and diasophronein (“to vie in sophrosyne”) are extremely rare.
I am grateful as well to three foundations for assistance of another
kind. In 1945-1946 the Phi Beta Kappa Foundation awarded me the
Mary Isabel Sibley Fellowship for post-doctoral research, which enabled
me to carry my study of sophrosyne into the Hellenistic and Graeco-
Roman periods. In 1958-1959 a fellowship from the John Simon
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation gave me leisure to begin writing the
book, which was completed in 1963-1964 with the help of the Dorothy
Bridgman Atkinson Fellowship, awarded me by the American Associa¬
tion of University Women. During 1958-1959 and 1963-1964 Swarth-
more College granted me leaves of absence and on several occasions,
through its Faculty Research Fund, helped with the cost of typing.
To those friends and colleagues who have read portions of this book in
manuscript or who have enlarged my understanding of sophrosyne
in the course of many a oucppovlôov Xoyos, I offer my grateful apprecia¬
tion.
H. N.
Swarthmore College
July 1965
Contents
Preface vii
Bibliography of Abbreviated Titles xv
I The Heroic and the Archaic Periods i

II Tragedy 32
III The Age of the Sophists 85
IV Xenophon, the Minor Socratic Schools, and the Attic
Orators of the Fourth Century 121
V Plato 150
VI Philosophy after Plato 197

VII Literary and Popular Usage after Plato 243
VIII Sophrosyne in Rome 258
IX Sophrosyne in Patristic Literature 312

Appendix: Imagery Related to Sophrosyne 380
Subject Index 387
Index of Ancient Authors 390
Xlll
Bibliography of
Abbreviated Titles
Bickel Ernst Bickel. Diatribe in Senecae Philosophi

Fragmenta. Vol. I (De Matrimonio). Leipzig,
I9!5-
Commager Steele Commager. The Odes of Horace: A Criti¬

cal Study. New Haven, Conn., 1962.
Cornford F. M. Cornford. The Unwritten Philosophy.

Cambridge, 1950.
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.

Vienna, 1866-
Del Grande Carlo del Grande. Hybris. Naples, 1947.
DK Hermann Diels. Die Fragmente der Vorsokrati-

ker. 10th edition, with index, by Walther
Kranz. Berlin, 1960-1961.
Dodds E. R. Dodds. The Greeks and the Irrational.

Berkeley, 1951.
During, Aristotle Ingemar During and G. E. L. Owen. Aristotle

and Plato and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Goteborg,
i960.
During, Protrepticus Ingemar During. Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An

Attempt at Reconstruction. Goteborg, 1961.
Earl D. C. Earl. The Political Thought of Sallust.

Cambridge, 1961.
xv
xv i Abbreviated Titles
Finley John H. Finley, Jr. Pindar and Aeschylus.

Cambridge, Mass., 1955.
Fraenkel Eduard Fraenkel. Horace. Oxford, 1957.
Gauthier R. A. Gauthier, O.R Magnanimite. Paris,

I95I-
GCS Die griechischen christlichen Schrifsteller der
ersten Jahrhunderte. Berlin, Leipzig, 1897- .
Geffcken Johannes Geffcken. Griechische Epigramme.

Heidelberg, 1916.
Gould John Gould. The Development of Plato's Ethics.

Cambridge, 1955.
Guthrie W. K. C. Guthrie. A History of Greek Philoso¬

phy. Vol. I. Cambridge, 1962.
Hackforth Richard Hackforth. Plato's Phaedrus. Cam¬

bridge, 1952.
Hagendahl Harald Hagendahl. Latin Fathers and the

Classics. Goteborg, 1958.
J acoby Felix Jacoby. Die Fragmente der griechischen

Historiker. Berlin and Leiden, 1923-1958.
Jaeger, Aristotle Werner Jaeger. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the

History of His Development. Trans, by Richard
Robinson. 2nd English edition. Oxford, 1948.
Jaeger, Paideia Werner Jaeger. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek

Culture. Trans, by Gilbert Highet. Vol. I,
4th edition, Oxford, 1954. Vols. II, III,
New York, 1943, 1944.
Jaeger, Two Works Werner Jaeger. Two Rediscovered Works of

Ancient Christian Literature. Leiden, 1954.
Kaibel George Kaibel. Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidi-

bus conlecta. Berlin, 1878.
Kaibel, Com. George Kaibel. Comicorum Graecorum Frag-

menta. Berlin, 1899.
Katzenellenbogen Adolf Katzenellenbogen. Allegories of the

Virtues and Vices in Mediaeval Art. Trans, by
Alan J. P. Crick. New York, 1964.
Abbreviated Titles xvu
Kirkwood Gordon Kirkwood. A Study of Sop hoc lean

Drama. Ithaca, 1958.
Kitto H. D. F. Kitto. Greek Tragedy. 3rd edition.

London, 1961.
Kitto, “Idea of God” H. D. F. Kitto. “The Idea of God in

Aeschylus and Sophocles.” La Notion du divin
depuis Homere jusqua Platon. Vandoeuvres-
Geneve, 1952.
Kock Th. Kock. Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta.

Leipzig, 1880-1888.
Ladner Gerhart B. Ladner. The Idea of Reform: Its

Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the
Age of the Fathers. Cambridge, Mass., 1959.
Laistner M. L. W. Laistner. The Greater Roman

Historians. Berkeley, 1947.
Maguire J. P. Maguire. “Plato’s Theory of Natural

Law.” Yale Classical Studies 10 (1947), 151-78.
Male Emile Male. The Gothic Image: Religious Art in

France of the Thirteenth Century. Trans, by
Dora Nussey. New York, 1958.
Mattingly Harold Mattingly. Coins of the Roman Empire

in the British Museum. Vols. I—III. London,
1923-1936.
Mattingly and Sydenham Harold Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham.

The Roman Imperial Coinage. Vol. V. London,
1933-
Merki Hubert Merki, O.S.B. 'Opolcccns Oew von der
platonischen Angleichung an Gott gur Gottdhn-
lichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa. Fribourg, 1952.
Musurillo Herbert Musurillo, S.J. “The Problem of

Ascetical Fasting in the Greek Patristic
Writers.” Traditio 12 (1956), 1-64.
Nauck August Nauck. Tragicorum Graecorum. Frag¬

menta. With supplement by Bruno Snell.
Hildesheim, 1964.
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pletus: Series Graeca. Paris, 1857-1912.
xviii Abbreviated Titles
P.L. Jacques Paul Migne. Patrologiae Cursus Com-

pletus: Series Latina. Paris, 1844-1890.
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1954-
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classischen A Itertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart,
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PERIODICALS
A.J.P. American Journal of Philology
C.P. Classical Philology
c.d Classical Quarterly
C.R. Classical Review
C.W. Classical World (successor to Classical Weekly)
H.S.C.P. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
H.T.R. Harvard Theological Review
J.H.S. Journal of Hellenic Studies
J.R.S. Journal of Roman Studies
M.A.A.R. Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome
Mus. Helv. Museum Helveticum
Philo 1. Philologus
Philol. Supp. Philologus Supplementband
Proc. Br. Acad. Proceedings of the British Academy
R.E.L. Revue des etudes latines

Abbreviated Titles
Rev. d. Et. Anc. Revue des etudes anciennes
Rev. Phil. Revue philologique
Rhein. Mus. Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie
T.A.P.A. Transactions of the American Philological Association
Y.C.S. Yale Classical Studies

SOPHROSYNE

in Greek Literature
I
The Heroic and the

Archaic Periods
DRAMATIC poets, orators, and philosophers of the fifth and fourth

centuries b.c. often drew upon epic poetry, especially the Trojan cycle,
for exemplars of the virtues and vices, as they were understood in the
classical period. When models of sophrosyne and its antitheses were
sought, a remarkable diversity appeared: Nestor, Menelaus, Diomedes,
and Odysseus are the epic exemplars of sophrosyne in Sophocles, Isoc¬
rates, and Plato, while Achilles and Ajax represent its opposite.1 The
choice of models is instructive in several ways. It points to the differing
facets of masculine sophrosyne,2 if such widely divergent heroes might
all be said to possess it; and it also points to an essential difference be¬
tween the Iliad and the Odyssey, the pathetic and the ethical epic poems
(to use Aristotle’s distinction),3 if the hero of one is conspicuously devoid
1 Nestor: Plato Laws 71 iE. Menelaus: Isocrates Panath. 72. Diomedes: Plato Rep. 389E.
Odysseus: Sophocles Ajax, passim; Plato Rep. 390D. Maximus of Tyre represents a much later
period in which the connotations of sophrosyne are so varied that almost any hero can
be regarded as sophron in some respect. Odysseus is so described as a result of his endurance
(XXVI. 114A); Hector, Achilles, and Patroclus are sophrones with respect to eros (XXVI.
113A; XVIII. 86B). For the sophron eros of Achilles and Patroclus, see also Aeschines I. 141-
50. Achilles is excessively emotional (hence not sophron) in Plato Rep. 388A-B. Ajax in
Sophocles’ play is an exemplar of hybris, the antithesis of sophrosyne.
2 Feminine sophrosyne (chastity, modesty, obedience, inconspicuous behavior) remains the
same throughout Greek history. The word is not used to describe the arete of women in the
Homeric poems; but when it is so used (from the time of Semonides of Amorgos), the
behavior designated corresponds precisely to the arete of Penelope and Andromache, who,
with Alcestis, become the classical exemplars of this excellence. The exempla hornbilia of the
opposed vice, wantonness or, more generally, being a bad wife, are Helen and Clytemnestra.
3Poetics 1459b 14-16. In Anth. Pal. (9. 522) the Odyssey is called to ocbypov ypappa.
I
2 Sophrosyne
of sophrosyne, while the hero of the other can become a type of the
oufppoov avpp, the man of sophrosyne. Most important of all, the choice
of exemplars makes it clear that sophrosyne is not a “heroic” virtue, since
the two greatest fighting men of the Homeric epic, Achilles and Ajax,
are the very ones who most notoriously lack this quality. It is no coinci¬
dence that these are the two whom Aristotle cites, along with Alcibiades,
as exemplars of megalopsychia (“high-mindedness”),4 an excellence that,
although by no means identical with the heroic ideal of Homer, never¬
theless shares certain characteristics of that earliest form of arete. Certainly,
by virtue of their passion for honor, the Homeric Achilles and Ajax may
be said to possess a kind of megalopsychia.
The contrast between the megalopsychos and the sophron, the high-
minded man and the man of restraint, which significantly enough proves
to be a contrast between the hybristes and the sophron as well, is sharply
drawn in the Ajax of Sophocles. From the very beginning of the tragedy
we see how incompatible are the qualities of its two great men: the
superb courage, the sense of honor, and the refusal to accept an affront,
which dominate the ethos of Ajax; and the altogether more civilized,
almost Periclean arete of the humane, reasonable, well-balanced Odys¬
seus.5 Sophocles, like Aristotle, of course arrived at a conception of
arete very different from that of Homer, yet there is enough of the
Homeric hero in his Ajax to make the contrast with his Odysseus signifi¬
cant for our study—to show, that is, the tension between the “heroic”
and the “moderate,” the “spirited” and the “gentle,” the agathos and the
sophron, which is one of the persistent themes of Greek literature.6
A study of the four references to sophrosyne in the Iliad and the
Odyssey confirms the impression that this quality (at least under its
classical name) is of minor importance to the heroic age. Only the early,
uncontracted forms of the noun and adjective, saophrosyne and saophron,
appear—always in passages that have been regarded as late additions to
the poems; 7 and their meaning is extremely limited, although even
4 Anal. Post. B. 13. 97b. 15-25. The development of the concept of the high-minded man is
traced by Gauthier; see pp. 21 ff. for its relation to the Homeric hero. A. W. H. Adkins’ study
of the terms of value used in the Homeric poems shows that while the hero is expected to be
agathos (“brave”) and esthlos (“noble”) and to excel in the “competitive” virtues, he need not
be sophron to maintain his status as a hero (Merit and Responsibility [Oxford, i960], 61 ff.).
5 For a discussion of this contrast, see Bernard M. W. Knox, H.S.C.P. 65 (1961), 21-22.
6 The appearance of this tension in Sophocles is discussed in Chap. II, and in Thucydides
in Chap. III. For various attempts to reconcile the opposites, see Chap. V (Plato) and
Chap. IX (the Church Fathers).
7 See, for example, Eduard Schwartz, Ethik der Gnechen (Stuttgart, 1951), 54-56; Albrecht
Kollmann, Wiener Studien 59 (1941), 12-34.
Heroic and Archaic Periods 3
among these four passages slight but significant differences appear.
Sophrosyne at this stage in its history is devoid of moral and religious
implications; in three of the four passages it clearly denotes “prudence”
or “shrewdness” in one’s own interest—a meaning that it never entirely
loses, in spite of the much more extensive range of connotations it sub¬
sequently acquired.8 Although such shrewdness is an obvious advantage
to its possessor, it is insignificant compared with courage, skill in arms,
or cleverness in planning (the principal components of the heroic arete),
and so is held in little value by the hero himself and by the society that
depends on the hero for its preservation. Since social, political, and
economic conditions in the Greek world have a bearing on the develop¬
ment of sophrosyne at each stage of its history, it is not surprising that
the first major expansion in meaning and the first signs of high value
attached to the word sophrosyne are found only with the growth of the
polis, whose survival (both economic and political) depended on the
operation of this form of excellence.9
If saophrosyne 10 is basically “soundness of mind”—that is, the state of
having one’s intellect unimpaired—we come closest to its original signifi¬
cance in the response of Penelope to Eurycleia’s announcement that
Odysseus has returned (Od. 23. 11-13): “My dear Nurse, the gods have
made you mad, the gods who can make foolish [acppcov] even one who
is exceedingly sensible [iTricppoiv] and who have brought the light-
8 This connotation survives in the commonplace remark of the Attic orators: lav ocotpporfjTe
(“if you are sensible, if you know what’s good for you”).
9 See Adkins, op. cit., 76 ff., on the need for the “cooperative virtues” in the city-state.
10 The word sophrosyne is a compound derived from the o-grade of the root of -phren
(“mind”) and the Homeric saos—Ionian-Attic soos, sos (“healthy, safe, sound”)—plus the
suffix -syne, which forms a feminine abstract noun from the earlier adjective saophron. The
contracted form of the noun appears first in the time of Theognis (fl. 540 b.c.), and its first
syllable may be traced either to a contraction of the form saos (<C*tu3 - uo - s) or to the Ionian-
Attic variant sos (<*tuo - uo - s). See Walde-Pokorny, Vergleichendes Worterbuch der Indo-
germanischen Sprachen (Berlin and Leipzig, 1930), 1. 706. The suffix -syne is used to form
abstract substantives from many adjectives and nouns. Originally it was the feminine of the
adjective suffix -sunos (turns, *tu-no-; cf. Sanskrit neuter abstracts in -tvana-). See Carl
D. Buck, Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (Chicago, 1948), 323, and Karl Brugmann,
A Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, trans. R. Seymour Conway and
W. H. D. Rouse (Strassburg, 1891), 2. 163. The suffix became general and could be used to
form abstract nouns directly from other adjectives and nouns. Such compounds usually have
an ethical connotation and first become common in gnomic poetry. A. W. Verrall showed
that in Attic prose of the fifth century such forms are rare and unproductive, but tragedy,
following Ionian usage, employs them in many passages that in some other way as well re¬
flect Ionian color or connection (f.H.S. 1 [1880], 260-92 and 2 [1881], 179-216). In
Attic prose writers of the fourth century—especially Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, and the
other orators—sophrosyne and related forms are well established and carry no Ionian
overtones.
4 Sophrosyne
minded [xotXicppoveoou] to saophrosyne ” 11 It is evident from the use of

c TTLCppcov as a parallel and of acppoov and xa^lQPPov^v as antonyms that
saophrosyne here is the mens sana, primarily intellectual rather than moral;
although it is well to remember that throughout its history sophrosyne,
however “intellectual” it may be, is normally applied to some kind
of behavior. The knowledge involved is revealed in human action and
generally has a moral outcome. It is perhaps significant, in the light of
later religious associations, that saophrosyne is here regarded as a gift of
the gods, but in fact it shares this distinction with every quality or
advantage (good luck, noble birth) that is not in man’s power to secure.
Sophrosyne does not acquire religious significance until its meaning has
expanded to include the fear of overstepping boundaries, since it is this
offense, above all others, that calls down the anger of the gods.12
The noun saophrosyne makes another appearance in the same conver¬
sation between Penelope and Eurycleia, when (Od. 23. 30) the nurse
ascribes Telemachus’ concealment of his father’s plans to his oaocppoovveoi
(“acts of prudence”). The use of the substantive in the plural, almost
unparalleled in later Greek, suggests that the noun has not yet become
completely abstract. Here again the basic meaning, “prudence in one’s
own interest,” is unencumbered by moral or religious accretions.
The other two Homeric allusions, however, are more suggestive of
later semantic developments, and in addition their context reveals the
source of Homeric sophrosyne. In the Iliad (21. 462-64), Apollo’s reply
to Poseidon’s challenge to battle (the earliest connection in Greek litera¬
ture between Apollo and sophrosyne) contains a hint of what is to be an
important aspect of the virtue—self-knowledge, combined with a vivid
appreciation of the boundary between god and man: “Earth-shaker,
11 Gilbert Murray (The Rise of the Greek Epic [Oxford, 1924], 26) suggests that the Homeric
antonym of saophron is oloophron (“with destructive thoughts”); but aesiphron (“damaged
in mind, witless, silly”) is a more likely antonym, since saophrosyne in its earliest stage is turned
inward, not outward, and concerns the possessor rather than society. For aesiphron see II. 20.
183; Od. 15. 470, 21. 302; Hesiod, Erg. 335.
12 In the archaic age the religious connotation becomes important, and sophrosyne emerges
as the characteristic virtue of the Apolline code. The statement of Athene in Sophocles
(Ajax 132 f.) that the gods love the sophrones and hate the kakoi (who in this context are clearly
the hybnstai) indicates the religious sanction of sophrosyne. In its later development, however,
sophrosyne moves away from religion once more (on this point see Wilamowitz, 2. 123-24)
and operates as a kind of “artistic flair” in the field of morality (Bruno Snell, The Discovery of
the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer [Oxford, 1953], 162). Yet in so far as sophrosyne is
thought to assist in the process of purifying the soul from the passions, it may have religious
implications, whether for the mystery cults, for Plato, or for the Church Fathers. In the
Apolline religion sophrosyne results in moderation and self-knowledge; in the mystery cults,
etc., in katharsis.
you would not consider me saophron, if I were to fight with you for the
sake of wretched mortals.” The prudential element is still present (there
would be no advantage to Apollo in accepting the challenge); but the
first traces of self-knowledge as a component of sophrosyne are here, and
they are especially interesting since Greek literature rarely shows us this
concept from the point of view of the gods. In the archaic period “Know
thyself” is the advice of Apollo to mankind, and sophrosyne has as
its consequence “thinking mortal thoughts.” In the present passage,
however, Apollo may be said to think immortal thoughts, and it is even
possible to find here a forerunner of the later concept of the theoprepes
(“what is suitable or proper for the Divine nature”).13
Another kind of self-knowledge, this time purely human and resulting
in modesty (or even bashfulness), is implied by the adjective saophron in
the Telemachia. Here it is Telemachus who comprehends his own position
with respect to that of the great hero Menelaus, his host in Sparta, and
remains silent from fear of presumption. His companion Peisistratus
explains (Od. 4. 158-60): “He is saophron and feels shame in his heart. . .
at embarking on hasty speech in your presence.” In certain respects this
is the most revealing use of saophron in Homer, because it shows the
connection of sophrosyne with the young—an association rooted deep in
Greek social organization and full of consequences for morality14—and
because it is the first clear recognition of sophrosyne as a form of repres¬
sion or control. Telemachus, unlike Eurycleia or Apollo, is called saophron
because he checks some natural impulse (in this case, the impulse to
speak out). Sophrosyne here is very close to aidds, which has a similar
outcome in another situation involving Telemachus (Od. 3. 24).15
In each of the two passages just described, Homer associates with
saophron another word, more familiar and much more weighty in the
heroic vocabulary, which serves to define the province of sophrosyne. Of
13 The development of this concept, especially as seen in Xenophanes, is studied by

Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, 1947), 38-54. It is hard to
decide how characteristic of Apollo the sophrosyne of II. 21. 462-64 actually is: another god
in the same situation might say something of the kind, but other gods do engage in combat
in behalf of mortal men and say nothing of the kind. Two exceptions to the rule that sophro¬
syne (in classical Greek usage) is a human, rather than a Divine, excellence may be found in
Aeschylean tragedy: in the Oresteia and the Prometheia it seems clear that Zeus himself
ultimately learns sophrosyne.
14 An epigram by Christodorus of Thebes on a statue of Homer describes him as being
crowned with sophrosyne kourotrophos, the “nurse of youth” (Anth. Pal. 2. 331-32).
15 Telemachus tells Mentor that it is shameful {aidds) for a young man to address an elder;
here aidds is more closely identified with nemesis than usual. Cf. also II. 10. 238, where
Agamemnon warns Diomedes against excessive compunction.
6 Sophrosyne
Apollo in the Iliad the poet says (21. 468-69), “For he felt ashamed
[mSero] to mix in combat with his uncle”; while of Telemachus in the
Odyssey his friend says (4. 158), “He feels shame [vcneooarou] in his
heart.” The two verbs alSeofiai and ueoao/jLou both mean “I feel
ashamed”—that is, to do something which the heroic arete rejects as un¬
worthy. Aidos and nemesis, the sense of shame and the feeling of righteous
indignation, are the twin sanctions of the heroic age, and both have re¬
ligious and social implications.16 They derive their strength from the
hero’s respect for the power of the gods and for the opinion of his peers.
Aidos normally implies a sense of compunction based on respect for the
rights of another; nemesis describes the reaction of others, human or
divine, to a violation of aidos. The roots of sophrosyne reach into the very
depths of the Hellenic nature, if they are fed by aidos and nemesis.
It is not surprising that saophron conduct is explained in terms of the
sense of shame or compunction, for later Greek thought regularly
acknowledges a close (often a causal) connection between aidos and
sophrosyne. A fourth-century Attic inscription,17 for example, salutes
Queenly (YloTPia) Sophrosyne as the daughter of megalophron Aidos—
a singularly felicitous affiliation, since the true complement to the
megalophrosyne (“greatness of soul”) that dominates Homeric arete is aidos,
the sense of compunction which is capable at times of restraining the
thymos of the warrior; and it is aidos that acts as a forerunner to sophro¬
syne in epic poetry.18 What the classical sophrosyne shares with the
Homeric aidos is chiefly a fear of overstepping boundaries.19 It is for this
reason that both can restrain hybris, the arrogant violation of limits set
by the gods or by human society.
That the poet of the Iliad was himself keenly sensitive to the need for
such restraint, both to avert disaster in the life of the individual and to
prevent a society made up of self-assertive heroes from destroying itself,
is evident from the content of many individual episodes and from the
very pattern of the poem, determined as it is by the sequence of cause
16 Carl von Erffa (Philol. Supp. 30 [1937], 30-36) discusses the relation between aidos
and nemesis in Homer. See also M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York, 1954), 114-54,
and W. C. Greene, Moira (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 18-19. On aidos in Homer, consult also
W. J. Verdenius, Mnemosyne 12 (1944), 47-60, and Adkins, op. cit., 45-46.
17 George Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus conlecta (Berlin, 1878), No. 34. Eupolemos
Arete (“Courage, victorious in war”) is paired with Sophrosyne in this epitaph.
18 Aidos is invoked, for example, by Priam (//. 24. 503): alSdo Qtovs. There are many il¬
lustrations in literature, from the sixth to the fourth centuries, of the way in which aidos is
supplanted by sophrosyne: e.g., Theognis 1135-50 compared with Hesiod Erg. 190-200;
Democritus, Frag. 208 DK compared with Theognis 409 f.; and the exegesis of the myth in
Plato’s Protagoras compared with the myth itself (322C-323A).
19 See Greene, op. cit., 1 o.
and effect, beginning with the hybris of Agamemnon and the unbounded
wrath of Achilles, and culminating in the scene where Achilles achieves
a kind of tragic self-knowledge in response to Priam’s appeal to his aidos
(II. 24. 503).20 It is irrelevant that this saving power of restraint or
compunction is never, in the epic, linked with the word sophrosyne. The
feeling is older than the word, and situations that in the Iliad are
accounted for by the presence or absence of aidos (such as the conduct of
Diomedes when insulted by Agamemnon) are interpreted in the fourth
century in terms of sophrosyne.21 The two qualities are by no means
identical in nature or function (aidos, for example, is more an objective
condition, sophrosyne more a personal attitude; aidos is felt in situations
involving respect for and responsibility towards others, sophrosyne is
more likely to be concerned with a conflict within the soul), but in so far
as both tend to inhibit free indulgence in passion of any kind, they are
undeniably akin.
Homeric society in general (especially its weaker members) places a
high value on aidos, but the hero himself, qua hero, is not obliged to re¬
spect it.22 Violations of aidos are frequent in the Iliad, whose great men
aim at glory, resent affronts, are carried away by pride and anger (all
characteristics of the megalopsychos according to Aristotle), and thus at
crucial moments tend to ignore all restraint.23 Such failure is a source
of tragic experience, just as in the drama of the fifth century. Like
sophrosyne in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, aidos is born of
time and suffering. Hence Pathei mathos, (“From suffering comes wisdom”)
has much the same meaning for Achilles as for the House of Atreus in
the Oresteia. Those heroes who from the first are capable of practicing
restraint—(whose thymos, or “passion,” does not drive them to extremes)
—are thereby equipped to avoid tragic experience. A secondary hero,
such as Diomedes, the nontragic counterpart of Achilles, is an example;
he lacks the passion that leads Achilles to violate aidos but that also gives
him towering stature.24
20 Cf. Cedric Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 218,
on Achilles’ attainment of “the truly classical idea . . . that mysterious union of detachment
and immediacy, of passion and order.”
21II. 4. 402; Plato Rep. 389E.
22 See Adkins, op. cit., 46 ff.
23 E.g., Agamemnon’s treatment of Chryses (1. 23-24); Achilles’ treatment of Hector’s body
(24. 44-46).
24 In addition to accepting Agamemnon’s unjust rebuke in a sophrdn manner, Diomedes
receives from Apollo a warning about the need to respect the boundary between gods
and men, which becomes part of the concept of sophrosyne in the classical period, although
the word is not mentioned in the Homeric passage (II. 5. 440-42).
8 Sophrosyne
The Odyssey, a story of romance and adventure rather than of warfare

and tragic enlightenment, reflects a concept of arete comprising a differ¬
ent balance of qualities, and demands of its hero, not the success in
battle which is necessary for Achilles, but a combination of shrewdness
and endurance with special emphasis on the latter. The expression of this
new arete is Odysseus’ famous address to his soul (Od. 20. 18), which Plato
approved as an utterance of sophrosyne {Rep. 390D):25 “Endure, my
soul, far worse have you endured.” The key word here is “endure”
(t€t\(xOl, from rXatLv), and it was tlemosyne (“endurance”), rather than
aidos, that won for Odysseus his status as an exemplar of sophrosyne in
later times. If aidos, as we have suggested, coincides with one aspect of
the classical sophrosyne (restraint of hybris), tlemosyne approximates
another, the power of enduring physical and spiritual hardship. This
capacity, also called karteria, is regarded as part of the sophrosyne of
Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia,26 but in the Odyssey the endurance
shown by Odysseus is commended by the word tto\vt\ols, and his
shrewdness by 'iroXv/ir^rLs, 'irt'nvviM.vos, or ttoXvtpottos.27 He is never
called saophron in any sense of the word, nor does Homer refer to
saophrosyne in the episode that above all others seemed to poets of the
English Renaissance to prove the hero’s sophrosyne or temperantia—the
encounter with Circe, in which the herb moly became a symbol of
chastity.28 If, as is sometimes suggested, the Odyssey adds sophrosyne to
the twofold arete of the Iliad {andreia and sophia, to use the terminology of
the fourth century), it is only in connection with Telemachus that this
innovation is made explicit.29
When we turn from the Iliad and the Odyssey to the Hymn to Dionysus
(the only Homeric Hymn to use the word saophron), we find a percepti¬
ble change. Saophron and saophrosyne in the two epic poems are pre¬
dominantly intellectual (or prudential), with a hint in the Iliad and the
Telemachia that the original “soundness of mind” is beginning to impinge
on the sphere of morality: the saophron knows himself and avoids unsuit¬
able conduct. The Hymn to Dionysus, which recounts the capture of the
25 Plato quotes the line as an expression of karteria (“patient endurance”) which in this
context is equivalent to sophrosyne.
26 Mem. 1. 6. 1-6.
27 ttoXvtXocs (5. 171); 7roAi3jurjTts (2. 173); ire'nvviK.vos (8. 388); tto\vtpo7tos (i. i). The
sophrosyne of Odysseus in later literature includes several aspects of the virtue which in the
Homeric poem are not linked with the word itself: fidelity in marriage (Iamblichus Vit. Pyth.
11), endurance of misfortune (Maximus of Tyre Orat. XXVI. 114A), military discipline
because of his rebuke to Thersites (Clement of Alexandria Paid. II. 7. 59, 2).
28 Consult Douglas Bush, Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition in English Poetry (New York,
1957). 264-68.
29 Telemachus has little importance as an exemplar of sophrosyne in later literature.
god by Etruscan pirates and his metamorphosis into a lion, describes the
pilot of the ship as having a saophron thymos (7. 49). Although saophron
still has a basically intellectual connotation (the pilot alone possessed
sufficient insight to recognize that the prisoner was a god), it also suggests
the calmness or self-control of the one member of the crew who remains
at his post when the others huddle around him in panic. If this Hymn
is a product of the seventh century, or possibly even of the sixth,30 the
blending of the intellectual with the moral is consistent with the inter¬
pretation of sophrosyne in elegiac poetry of the archaic period. The
phrase sophron thymos itself occurs in Theognis 754, where the moral
connotation is emphasized by its antithesis: atasthalia (“arrogance,”
hybris).
The poems of Hesiod, the product of a nonheroic, peasant culture, set
up a new standard of arete, in which the value of measure, restraint, and
self-control is enormously enhanced. Although Hesiod nowhere uses the
word sophron, which may not yet be current in mainland Greece, his view
of life and of the relations between god and man is thoroughly imbued
with sophrosyne in one of its later aspects: as the spirit of Meden agan
(“Nothing in excess”). Key words in the Works and Days are metrios,
mesos, and kairos (“moderate, in the middle, due measure”).31 The life of
the peasant is supportable only by the exercise of the cautious and
prudent virtues, just as the life of the little Boeotian community is
tolerable only when justice and eunomia (“good order”) exist. If hybris
triumphs, as in the myth of the Iron Age, Aidos and Nemesis will depart
from the earth (Erga. 190-200), but if justice prevails, peace and eunomia
will result. Eunomia, which was already opposed to hybris in the Odyssey
(17. 487), first becomes important for the polls in the Theogony and the
Works and Days. Like aidos it is a forerunner of sophrosyne, but on the
social, rather than the individual, plane. Its close kinship with Dike—they
are both daughters of Zeus and Themis (Theog. 901-2)—prefigures the
closeness of sophrosyne and justice in later Greek thought.32 It was
inevitable that sophrosyne and eunomia should be brought together, and
this is done at first in the phrase saophron eunomia (“sound and orderly
government”), which we find in Pindar and Bacchylides.33 Still later,
eunomia is partly replaced, as a civic virtue, by sophrosyne, a process that
30 T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, and E. E. Sikes, The Homeric Hymns (Oxford, 1936), 379.
31 See., e.g., Erg. 40, 306-7, 694.
32 For many examples of this close relation, see Rudolf Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes
(Leipzig, 1907), 180 ff. The departure of Aidos and Nemesis became something of a common¬
place in descriptions of the loss of innocence; see below, p. 18, for Theognis’ substitution of
Sophrosyne for Aidos. In Juvenal 6. 1-20 the goddesses are Pudicitia and Astraea.
33 Pindar Paean 1. 10; Bacchylides 13. 183-89.
io Sophrosyne
is already beginning in Aeschylus and can be seen near completion in

Thucydides and the Attic orators. But eunomia, like aidos, differs from
sophrosyne in being an objective condition rather than a personal, indi¬
vidual attitude. It is noticeable that Hesiod nowhere personifies any of
the qualities that were later considered virtues of the individual.34 The
growing importance of sophrosyne in Greek literature of the fifth and
fourth centuries coincides with the increase in self-consciousness and
introspection on the part of the Greeks themselves.
Hesiod’s view of human life and his cautious aspirations for the indi¬
vidual and society, while poles apart from the heroic arete of the Iliad
and even from the more realistic system of values reflected in the Odyssey,
have much in common with Greek folk wisdom, especially as it is
expressed in the sayings attributed to the seven Wise Men, statesmen
who flourished in the early sixth century and whose reputation for
wisdom seems to have been established during the next hundred-odd
years.35 With few exceptions the proverbs of the Seven advise the prac¬
tice of self-control, particularly the conquest of pleasure (hedone) and
passion (thymos) 36 or the recognition of limits in some form.37 Pittacus,
the tyrant of Mytilene early in the sixth century, is the only Wise Man
to whom is ascribed an actual reference to sophrosyne—QepaTrcve
ococppoovuir]^ (“cultivate [or ‘honor’] sophrosyne”)38—but this is un¬
questionably the ideal that inspires most of the maxims. The best-known
of the sayings, Gnothi sauton (“Know thyself”) and Meden agan, were in¬
scribed in the late sixth century over the entrance to the Alcmaeonid
temple of Apollo, who in the archaic age fulfills the hint of the Iliad
34 See Herbert Abel, T.A.P.A. 74 (1943), 92-101.

35 The earliest extant list of the Seven occurs in Plato Prot. 343A, but the legend that
brought them together was doubtless much older. The names of the Seven vary from
one ancient source to another. See P. W., “Sieben Weise” (Barkowski).
36 “Flee from hedone” (Solon, DK 10. 3). “Be not passionate” (Solon, DK 10. 13).
“Control thymos” (Chilon of Sparta, DK 10. 15).
37“Metron is best” (Cleobulus, DK 10. 1). “Understand kairos” (Pittacus, DK 10. 1).
Critias (Frag. 7 DK) ascribes Meden agan to Chilon. H. J. Mette, Meden agan (Munich, 1933),
discusses the varied traditions about the origin of the proverbs concerned with the Mean or
due measure. For Aristotle’s speculation (in the lost dialogue On Philosophy) about the place
of the Seven in the history of philosophy and for his effort to determine the date and author¬
ship of Gnothi sauton, the “most divine” of the precepts, see Jaeger, Aristotle, 130.
38 DK 10. 13. Cf. Diogenes Laertius 1. 78. Pittacus made the first recorded legal enactment
designed to instil sophrosyne, the famous law that doubled the penalty for any offense
committed in a state of intoxication (Aristotle Pol. 1274b 13). For Pittacus as a possible source
of the gnomic warning against marriage above one’s station, see A. E. Raubitschek, Wiener
Studien 71 (1958), 170-72. Antipater of Colophon describes all Seven as guardians of sophro¬
syne (Anth. Pal. 7. 81).
Heroic and Archaic Periods ii
that he will become the god of sophrosyne.39 The great development of

the influence of the Delphic oracle belongs to this same period—a time
during which the priests of Apollo preached measure and restraint
in public and private life and encouraged decency and civilized behavior
in religious rites.40 It was at this time that sophrosyne acquired a
strongly religious flavor.
It would be useful to know why it was that the seventh and sixth
centuries saw so great an increase in popular esteem for moderation, the
rule of no excess. So striking and widespread a phenomenon can scarcely
be traced to a single cause; not only religious but social, economic, and
political elements are involved. E. R. Dodds has identified some of them,
and he says, in part:
Without Delphi, Greek society could scarcely have endured the tensions to which
it was subjected in the Archaic Age. The crushing sense of human ignorance and
human insecurity, the dread of divine phthonos, the dread of miasma—the accumu¬
lated burden of these things would have been unendurable without the assurance
which such an omniscient divine counsellor could give.41
This explanation, together with further analyses of the economic crisis of

the seventh century and its effect on Greek attitudes, helps to account
for the influence of Apollo, but not entirely for the direction this influ¬
ence took; and we still need to explain the profound and widespread
feeling for sophrosyne which we find in the sayings of the Wise Men, the
Delphic Maxims, and early elegiac poetry, often based on gnomic
traditions.
39 See H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford, 1956) 1. 386 ff., for
a discussion of the proverbs inscribed on the Alcmaeonid temple, which may have adorned
its predecessor as well; and see ibid., p. 392, n. 24, for ancient sources that refer to the prov¬
erbs. For the relation of the Seven Wise Men to Apollo and his Delphic shrine, see ibid., 1.
388, and consult A. W. Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece (New York, i960), 207-9.
40 The earliest recorded response is a rebuke to the complacency of the people of Aegium
(Parke and Wormell, op. cit., 2, No. 1). Cf. also the carefully fostered tradition that the oracle
was opposed to tyrants and gave them abusive responses (ibid., 1. 124). A number of oracles
stress the worthlessness of human life, the preference of the god for humble offerings rather
than the hecatombs of the rich and ostentatious, and the paradoxical choice of some obscure
person as the happiest or wisest of men.
41 Dodds, 75. Dodds connects the tendency to look upon Zeus as “the awful judge, just but
stern, who punishes inexorably the capital sin of self-assertion, the sin of hubris” (48) with the
growing claim of the individual in the archaic age to personal rights and responsibility, which
dissolved the old solidarity of the family, undermined the authority of the father, and
caused tensions that led to feelings of guilt. These feelings were projected upon the heavenly
father. If we accept this explanation, which Dodds concedes is incapable of proof, we have a
reason for the intense interest in hybns during the archaic age and for the corresponding de¬
velopment of sophrosyne as the strongest safeguard against it.
12 Sophrosyne
It seems inescapable that the very conditions of Greek life in the

seventh century—the continual struggle for wealth and power, in which
the brilliant success of some city or of some great individual leader was
quickly followed by an equally striking disaster, so that no good fortune
could ever seem permanent—provided a background against which
every prudent person must have concluded that excess leads to catastro¬
phe, and that moderate hopes and ambitions are safest. Historical tradi¬
tions, especially in Herodotus, and the kind of anecdote in which choral
lyric abounds afford innumerable examples of such bewilderingly swift
changes of fortune, to which the natural response would seem to be
Aleman’s famous warning (i. 16-18 Page): “Let no man soar to the
heavens nor try to wed Aphrodite, the Queen of Paphos,” or Phocylides’
characteristic comment on conditions in the polls (Frag. 12 Diehl3): “I
wish to be midway in the state [mesos en polei\.”
There is special relevance in Phocylides’ remark (which finds a parallel
in Solon’s passion for the Mean), because it is in the growth of the polls
that we see conditions especially favorable to the development of sophro¬
syne. The polls by its very nature required a much greater exercise of
restraint (aidos, sophrosyne) than had the loosely organized Homeric
society. It has often been observed that the self-assertion of the heroic
individual was curbed when it encountered the restrictions imposed by
the nascent polish2 In Finley’s words, only by taming the hero could the
community grow; and as we know from the harsh comments of Callicles
in Plato’s Gorgias, sophrosyne is one name for the force that tames the
hero, that, in fact, makes him a citizen (492A-B).43 The consequences of
this painful adjustment for the individual are to be seen in tragedy
(especially Sophoclean tragedy), whose most characteristic plot concerns
the hero in conflict with society, a hero who carries his individualism to
some extreme incompatible with the apparent welfare of the com¬
munity.44 The relation of this typical myth to the development of the
concept of sophrosyne will be considered in Chapter II.
In addition to the pressure of the polls on the individual, there was also
the pressure of class against class, of the new middle class against the
hereditary aristocracy, and of the poor and landless against both. From
this conflict emerged the conception of sophrosyne as an arete polltlke,
appropriated at first by the aristocratic or oligarchic faction in the
42 See, e.g. Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Neue Wege zur Antike 8 (1929), 103-4.
43 Finley, op. cit., 129.
44 Helmut Kuhn, H.S.C.P. 52 (1941), 1-40, and 53 (1942), 37-88; see especially 53
(1942), 52 ff.
Greek city-states and later by the democrats, at least in Athens. In the

sixth and fifth centuries, sophrosyne, for all its Ionian origins, became
part of what may, with some reservations, be called the aristocratic
Dorian ethical tradition,45 seen in Theognis, Pindar, and (sometimes)
Bacchylides. In all three poets, but most consistently in Theognis,
sophrosyne is a “class” virtue, whose essential meaning resides in the
knowledge of limitations, from which in Pindar it derives its strong
religious affinity with Apollo, and because of which it tends to be linked
with hasychia (“quietness”) and eunomia (“good order”).46 Yet the poten¬
tialities of sophrosyne were so great that it did not remain frozen in the
Dorian ethical system but continued to develop, even as Greek political
forms developed, and always kept in close touch with the evolution
of the Athenian polis.
Significantly, not only elegiac poetry of the sixth century and lyric
poetry of the fifth, but also sepulchral inscriptions of the same period,
furnish evidence of the close association of sophrosyne and the city-state.
Epitaphs of this early age testify to the emergence of a new kind of arete
to take the place of the heroic ideal, a new balance of the physical and
the intellectual, a blending of the heroism of the soldier (exercised now,
not in search of personal glory, but on behalf of the city) and the excel¬
lence of the patriotic citizen in time of peace. The phrases chosen to de¬
scribe this new form of excellence exhibit a high degree of similarity:
arete kai sophrosyne, agathos kai sophron47 Nearly all the early inscriptions
of this type are Athenian, but it is difficult to estimate the true significance
of this striking fact in the absence of an equal number of contemporary
epitaphs from other states. Yet even though the bulk of our evidence for
45 Sophrosyne and related qualities (such as eunomia and hesychia) can be linked with
the Dorian tradition only tentatively, so far as the seventh and sixth centuries are concerned,
because not until after the Persian wars did the Greeks themselves show much awareness of
this element in the contrast between Dorian and Ionian. It must be remembered that
eunomia and hesychia are vital to Solon’s political program. In the sixth century the position of
sophrosyne as an excellence valued by Dorian aristocrats rests mainly on the evidence
of Theognis of Megara.
46 See below, pp. 23 ff.
47 See Paul Friedlander, Epigrammata (Berkeley, 1948), Nos. 71, 6, 31, 85; and cf. Simonides
128 Diehl (arete and sophrosyne). In Friedlander, No. 88, the virtues are called noos and anorea;
cf. the epitaph by Ion of Chios for Pherecydes, which mentions anorea and aidos (5. 1
Diehl 3). Pindar Paean 9. 46 praises the saophron anorea of the Theban seer Teneros. The ad¬
jective sophron has a different meaning (“chaste, modest”) in epitaphs for women. See Kaibel,
Nos. 51 (agathe kai sophron) and 53 (esthle kai sophron). Friedlander, No. 89, exemplifies a type
of inscription that lists the virtues of the dead and includes a variety of predominantly
intellectual qualities: sophron, euxynetos (“clever”), pinytos (“shrewd”), ta kala eidos (“under¬
standing what is fair”). The first and last terms have moral implications as well.
14 Sophrosyne
Attic sophrosyne belongs to the period after the Persian wars, the epitaphs
of the type mentioned above suggest that in the archaic age sophrosyne
had already begun to be, not just the most Hellenic virtue, as has
always been recognized,48 but the most Athenian as well.
Here again it would be useful to know the reason, and again we find
a complex situation with several possible explanations. One theory sug¬
gests an economic origin for Attic sophrosyne and connects it with the
rise of a mercantile middle class.49 The same spirit as animates the
reforms of Solon (the insistence on measure, the balancing of one party
against the others, the instinct for moderation as a shield against hybris
and stasis) leads to the adoption by the emerging middle class of the
virtue that symbolizes their innermost aspirations. It is also possible to
find more purely political motives. As hybris comes to be considered the
characteristic vice of tyrants (an association of ideas firmly established
by the early fifth century),50 its opposite, sophrosyne, becomes the virtue
of the constitutional form of government which overthrows or wards off
tyranny. Still a third hypothesis relates Attic sophrosyne to the historic
blending of Dorian and Ionian elements in Athenian life. It is a common¬
place that, in the poetry of the archaic age, Solon steers a middle course
between those poles of the Hellenic world, Tyrtaeus with his Spartan
austerity and Mimnermus with his Ionian hedonism. Jaeger, for exam¬
ple, points out that Athens “was the first to strike a balance between the
outward-striving energy of the individual and the unifying power of the
state.”51 Aristotle, in the Politics, seems to have interpreted the Greek
character as a mean between the contrasting Hippocratic types, the
violent, warlike Europeans and the tame, passive Asiatics.52 In much the
same way Athens blends in herself the contrasting qualities of the eastern
and western Greeks. This krasis, as the Hippocratics might call it, was
completed in the archaic age, and one of its results is Attic sophrosyne.
Solon himself does not, in the extant Fragments, employ any form of
this word,53 but his adoption of the principle of the Mean in political
48 Wilamowitz, 2. 123-24; J. A. K. Thomson, Greeks and Barbarians (London, 1921), 118.

49 George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (London, 1941), 283, 350; Gregory Vlastos, C.P.
41 (1946), 65-83.
50 Aeschylus regularly associates hybris with the tyrant. The antithesis beween freedom and
tyranny and between sophrosyne and hybris in his tragedies is studied by Bruno Snell, Philol.
Supp. 20 (1928), 1-164. On hybris in a political context in early Greek poetry, see Del
Grande, 45-53.
51 Paideia, 1. 137.
52Jaeger, Scripta Minora (Rome, i960), 313-14.
53 Perhaps a mere accident of survival. Like all the gnomic poets, Solon makes free use of
abstractions in -syne (euphrosyne, doulosyne, aphrosyne, gnomosyne). There is nothing to suggest,
life marks him as the first spokesman for Athenian sophrosyne; as such
he was remembered by the Attic orators of the fourth century and by
Aristotle.54 In his efforts to secure economic justice Solon seems especially
conscious of taking a position “in the middle,” between the rich and the
poor (25. 8-9 Diehl3), and of restraining excess;55 but the Mean
underlies his conception of political justice also, as is shown by the close
causal connection that he establishes between the upsetting of the meas¬
ure of power or liberty proper to the various classes, and the outbreak of
civil war (for instance, 3 and 5 Diehl 3). Solon’s political vocabulary in¬
cludes several terms that later writers link closely with sophrosyne:
hesychie (“quietness” [3. 10 Diehl 3; cf. 4. 5]); eunomie (“orderly behavior,”
the antithesis to hybris and koros [3. 32-34]); kosmos (“order” [1. 11]); and
of course dike (3. 14). The first two, as we have observed, denote the key
values of Dorian aristocracy later in the sixth century and throughout
the fifth. In Solon they have as yet no “class” meaning. Hesychie is
essentially a medical metaphor, opposed to “disturbance” and suggest¬
ing that balance of powers which in the body results in health and in the
polis leads to justice and peace.56 Eunomie, one of the ethical concepts
that Solon found in Hesiod and transplanted to Attic soil, implies modera¬
tion and restraint on the part of all groups in the polis.57 The great politi¬
cal elegy that praises eunomie for bringing order to the State and blotting
out hybris (3. 32, 34) contains the seeds of many later Greek utterances
on the need for restraint and moderation in the mutual relations of the
citizens. Not long after Solon’s day it inspired some of Theognis’ com¬
ments on the danger of class conflict, but Theognis characteristically
substitutes sophrosyne for eunomie as the antithesis to hybris (39-42).
No one reading the Fragments of Solon’s political poems, brief though
they are, can doubt that for him the middle way amounted to a passion.
He finds a variety of terms to express the concept of the Mean or of
measure, including fipre Xiav (“not too much” [5. 8]); h [icraix^
(25. 8) to describe the position of the boundary mark which he established
however, that sophrosyne at this time implied moderation in political affairs; the word
for this is mesos (as in Phocylides, Frag. 12) or metrios (Solon 4. 7 Diehl3).
54 Demosthenes 19. 251; Aeschines 1. 6, 7. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1179a 10 ff, ascribes to Solon
the belief that those men are happy who, being moderately (perplcos) equipped with external
goods, have performed the noblest deeds and lived ocosppovcos. This view may echo Herodotus’
account of Solon’s response to Croesus (1. 30-32), although Herodotus does not use the word
sophron in this connection. Plutarch Solon 14 records the advice of the Delphic oracle to
Solon: “Sit in the middle of the boat.” Cf. Kollmann, loc. cit., 16, on Solon as “der erste Mann
der Sophrosyne.”
55 Cf. Vlastos, loc. cit., 81-82. 56 Ibid., 68-69. 57 See Solmsen, Hesiod, 116.
16 Sophrosyne
between the rich and the poor; h plTpotoi 58 (4. 7) when he bids the
rich to quiet their hearts and put their proud minds “within the meas¬
ures” (or “within boundaries”); and pirpov yvoopoovvijs (“the measure
of judgment,” which knows the limits of everything [16. 1-2]). Solon
speaks several times of the need to restrain (usually KaTcyav) either
certain groups within the polls (as in 10. 5, 25. 6) or the excess (koros) to
which they tend. The proverbial genealogy of olbos (“prosperity”)—
koros—hybris appears in his poetry with the qualification that koros brings
forth hybris when great prosperity comes to men who do not possess a
sound mind; noos artios (5. 10) here comes close to sophrosyne in its
Homeric sense.
The words sophron and sophrosyne begin to appear with some frequency
in poetry of the sixth and early fifth centuries, showing for the first time
definite moral and religious connotations. During this period it is always
possible for sophron to maintain its original significance of “sound-minded”
or “prudent,” and often it keeps the uncontracted form of the adjective.
Thus Phocylides says (Frag. 11 Diehl3): “Many who are thoughtless
[e\a(ppovooi] seem to be saophrones because they move in orderly fashion.”
'EAnqPjoovoos is to saophron as yakieppovio^v is to saophrosyne in the Odyssey.
The same meaning obtains in a line from Hipponax, which says that the
best marriage for a sophron man is to take a woman of serviceable habits,
for this is the only dowry that will save the household (81. 1 Diehl3).59
But important innovations are at hand, many of them in the collection
that goes under the name of Theognis.60 One of the major accomplish¬
ments of Greek poetry in the archaic period is the formulation of the
“civic” aretae which were ultimately canonized as the Platonic or cardi¬
nal virtues. What Tyrtaeus did for andreia, Solon for justice, and Xeno¬
phanes for sophia, Theognis and his imitators did for sophrosyne.61
Undoubtedly their most far-reaching innovation is the use of sophro¬
syne as an antonym of hybris in both public and private life, a usage that
reflects the encroachment of sophrosyne on the preserves of eunomia and
58 The emendation of Kaibel and Wilamowitz for the papyrus p(.Tpioioi.

59 A fragment of dubious authenticity. Later variants of this commonplace apply the word
sophron to the wife, with the meaning “chaste.” E.g. Epicharmus 286 Kaibel, Com.
60 Although the authorship and date of many verses in this collection are uncertain,
it is generally agreed that most of them belong to the sixth and fifth centuries and may there¬
fore be used as evidence for ethical developments during this period. See Jaeger, Paideia,
1. 187-93; Josef Kroll, Philol. Supp. 29 (1936), 1-284; Jean Carriere, Theognis de Megare
(Paris, 1948), 38-136; Burn, op. cit., 258-64.
61 The innovations of Tyrtaeus are discussed by Werner Jaeger, Scripta Minora 2. 75-114.
On Solonian justice, see Vlastos, loc. cit., and Solmsen, Hesiod, 107-23. Xenophanes (Frag. 2
Diehl 3) substitutes sophia for athletic prowess as a civic ideal.
Heroic and Archaic Periods n
aidos and sets the stage for its role in tragedy. Theognis is the first
to provide sophrosyne with a political context. There is an obvious con¬
nection between this development and the civil strife that accompanied
the transition from aristocracy or oligarchy to some form of democracy,
often by way of tyranny, in many Greek cities during the seventh and
sixth centuries. Theognis himself, a spokesman for the conservative
Dorian nobility in Megara around the middle of the sixth century,
expresses the feelings of his class in the face of the growing power of the
lower orders, which first attained influence either with or soon after the
rule of the tyrant Theagenes (traditionally dated ca. 640 b.c.). It
is natural to consider “sound-minded” those who acquiesce in a tradi¬
tional arrangement, and this is the doorway through which sophrosyne
first enters the Greek political vocabulary. Theognis warns his young
friend of the approaching upheaval (39-42): “Cyrnus, this city is in
labor and I fear that it will bring forth a chastiser of our wicked hybris.
The townspeople are still saophrones, but the leaders are inclined to
fall into great trouble.”
The situation here—especially the identity of the “leaders”62—is
obscure, and while it is clear from the political orientation of the
Theognidea that the townspeople are called saophrones (“right-minded”)
because they still subordinate themselves to the nobles, the antithesis
between sophrosyne and hybris is implied rather than explicit. An imita¬
tor, perhaps dissatisfied with this lack of clarity, alters the second line to
read (1081-82): “I fear that it [the city] will bring forth a man wantonly
insolent [hybristes], the leader of harsh civil war.” The revision changes
the meaning of the passage and involves an awkward use of the word
hegemon (“leader”) in two different senses in as many lines (1082-1082a),
but the antithesis between hybris and sophrosyne is now sharply defined.
Elsewhere in Theognis, sophrosyne and hybris, while contrasted, are
not politically oriented. The famous reproach to Zeus for allowing the
just to suffer and the wicked to prosper contains as its kernel the follow¬
ing lines (377-80): “How, then, son of Cronus, can your mind bear to
hold the wicked and the just in the same respect, whether the minds of
men are turned to sophrosyne or to hybris? ” The alliance of sophrosyne
62 Jean Carriere (Theognis, poemes elegiaques [Paris, 1948], 97-98) suggests that the hegemones
(Theognis 41) are the new leaders of the middle class, while Kroll (loc. cit., 121-26) identifies
them with the aristocrats. Plutarch (Mor. 295D) says that the Megarians iooxppovr\oav Kara
T7)v TToXndav after the expulsion of the despot Theagenes, referring to a brief period of sta¬
bility before the demagogues corrupted the masses with draughts of unmixed freedom. Kroll
(loc. cit., 115) traces the debt of Theognis in this passage to Solon 3. 5 and 36. See also F. S.
Hasler, Untersuchungen gu Theognis (Winterthur, 1959), 34 flf. and 128.
18 Sophrosyne
with justice in this passage marks an important stage in its moral

growth, while the opposition of both qualities to hybris prepares us for
the use of this theme by Aeschylus. In the three passages of the Theogmdea
mentioned so far, sophrosyne has gone beyond the simple Ionian “sound¬
ness of mind” or “shrewdness in one’s own interest” and has begun
to imply something like “resistance to unjust ambition” or “refusal to
seek wealth or power beyond one’s due.” For the first time it may per¬
haps be translated as “moderation” or even “self-control,” with the
reservation that it does not yet imply restraint of the physical appetites,
only restraint of ambition or avarice. It has often and truly been observed
that the value of the Mean is the central idea in the ethics of Theognis,63
but it is untrue to say that the quality that embodied the Mean was
sophrosyne.64 Theognis associates sophrosyne with the idea of modera¬
tion only in the three passages mentioned above and in one other
(753-54), which bids Cyrnus acquire possessions justly and keep a
sophron thymos, free from insolence—here atasthalia, a Homeric equivalent
of hybris. Usually sophron remains close to its Homeric connotation, as is
shown by the frequency with which it is opposed to aphron or nepios
(“foolish, of unsound mind” [431, 454, 497, 665, 483]). A typical passage
is one in which the poet observes that it is easier to beget and rear a man
than to instil in him intelligence (430-31, 433-35): “No one has yet
found a way to make a fool [aphron] wise [sophron] or a bad man good. . . .
If it were possible to make intelligence and put it into a man, the son of
a good father would never become bad, but would be persuaded by wise
counsels [mythoi saophrones].”
One other passage in Theognis shows a definite development in the
meaning of sophrosyne and moreover connects it with social, rather than
individual, ethics. These verses are especially striking because they con¬
tain the first personification of sophrosyne, in an adaptation of Hesiod’s
famous prediction about the departure from the earth of Aidos and
Nemesis, after the triumph of hybris and injustice in the Iron Age. In the
Theognidea, Sophrosyne, appropriately enough, supplants Aidos; she, to¬
gether with Pistis (Good Faith) and the Charites (Graces) has returned
to Olympus, leaving only Elpis (Hope) among mankind. Thereafter
(1135-42): “No longer are just oaths kept faithfully [pistoi] among
men, nor does anyone worship the immortal gods, but the race of
reverent men has perished, nor do they any longer recognize law and
63 E.g., Jean Carriere, Theognis de Megare, 232.

64 As does C. M. Bowra, Early Greek Elegists (New York, i960), 154.
order.” 65 Since the function of Fist is is clearly to guarantee the observ¬
ance of just oaths, and no specific responsibility is assigned to the Charites,
it seems that Sophrosyne is concerned with reverence for the gods and
the preservation of law and order. She is therefore close to Eusebeia
(Piety) and Eunomia. Whoever wrote this particular verse may well have
been a contemporary of Pindar and Bacchylides, both of whom refer to
saophron eunomia. The other early personification of Sophrosyne reflects
much the same context of Dorian ideas: the Fragment of Epicharmus
which describes Sophrosyne as a neighbor of Hasychia (Quietness [Frag.
101 Kaibel]). Later in the fifth century Critias makes her a neighbor of
Eusebeia in his elegiac poem on the Spartan constitution (Frag. 6 DK).
The Theogmdea also contain the earliest recorded exemplar of sophro¬
syne. In a bitter attack on the worship of wealth, the poet says that
nothing else is accounted valuable, though you possess the sophrosyne of
Rhadamanthys, the knowledge of Sisyphus, or the eloquence of Nestor
(699-71:8). The association of Rhadamanthys with Sisyphus and Nestor,
both noted for some kind of intelligence, and the appearance of Rhada¬
manthys elsewhere as a model of wisdom and good judgment suggest
that sophrosyne here has an intellectual connotation—presumably
distinct from the tricky cleverness for which Sisyphus was noted. Rhada¬
manthys seldom appears in later literature as an exemplar of sophrosyne,
possibly because the intellectual aspect of the virtue is overtaken and
surpassed by the moral (which Peleus and other models of self-control
represent) and the political (typified by Solon and Pericles).66
65 Reading cupolas (Herwerden). The Charites (Euphrosyne, Thalia, and Aglaia) symbolize
the elements of joy and festivity in human life and are naturally supposed to be present when
a city is well governed and at peace. For the association of some of these qualities in an ode
of Bacchylides, see p. 23. In the passage from Hesiod on which Theognis has modeled these
lines {Erg. 190-200), chans, though present, is not personified. Hesiod says that when Aidos and
Nemesis depart, the charis belonging to the man who is euorkos (“faithful to his oath”), just, and
agathos, will disappear, as will reverence for parents and fear of the gods (two nuances
of eusebeia).
66 Peleus: Aristophanes Clouds 1063. Solon: see n. 54 above. Pericles: Isocrates XV. in,
XVI, 28. Rhadamanthys is a type of self-restraint in Pseudo-Demosthenes Eroticus 30.
The keen interest in assigning supremacy in wisdom, happiness, and other desirable qualities
that inspired so many inquiries at Delphi caused Myson, one of the Seven Wise Men, to be
pronounced sophronestatos (Hipponax, Frag. 61 Diehl 3). Another version of the story describes
Myson as sophbteros (Diogenes Laertius 1. 106), and it is probable that even if sophronestatos is
the word the oracle actually used, it has an intellectual significance. Sophos and sophron, while
not identical {sophos implies being clever at something; sophron, being prudent, often with
moral consequences), are sometimes hard to distinguish in fifth-century literature. See
Herodotus 4. 77, and cf. Fritz Wehrli, Lathe Biosas (Leipzig, 1931), 42. Xenophon {Mem. 3. 9.
4) says that Socrates made no distinction between sophia and sophrosyne.
20 Sophrosyne
Still another far-reaching innovation in the Theogmdea is the earliest

specific linking of sophrosyne with maturity, as distinguished from youth.
In the Odyssey there is no suggestion that sophrosyne belongs to any one
time of life more than to another, although the young Telemachus
is twice credited with the virtue. Later Greek thought is divided on the
subject, appropriately enough, since sophrosyne has different aspects;
and some of these belong to youth, others to age.67 Theognis prays
to Aphrodite for an end to labor and care (1325-26): “When I have
finished the measure of youth with a cheerful heart, grant me the
ergmata sophrosynes.” These ergmata are probably “the works of wisdom,”
rather than self-restraint, since sophrosyne is not clearly connected with
masculine chastity until the age of Euripides. Even so, it is unusual for
Aphrodite to be involved in a prayer for this particular gift.68 The con¬
trast between this prayer of Theognis and the famous complaint of
Mimnermus is probably unintentional, but it is almost as striking as
Solon’s deliberate rebuke to the Ionian poet.69
The extension of sophrosyne to mean “sobriety, avoidance of drunk¬
enness,” must have been in progress in the sixth century, but when
Theognis uses sophron in the context of the drinking party, it still means
“sound of mind” and “intelligent” rather than “sober.” One couplet
says (497-98): “Wine makes light the head of fool [aphron] and wise man
[sophron] alike whenever they drink beyond measure.” Sophron is exactly
like sophos in a similar verse on the same theme (499-502). The opposite
is aphron or, in still another, similar verse, nepios (483). There is as yet no
suggestion that the sophron man would avoid excessive drink, nor is
there any hint of the theory developed in Plato’s Laws I—II that the be-
67 According to F. M. Cornford’s theory of the origin of the cardinal virtues in a Pytha¬

gorean division of human life into periods, each of which has its appropriate virtue (C.Q. 6
[1912], 246-65), sophrosyne belongs to the young; and it is true that throughout its history
there is a nuance of sophrosyne which is always recognized as proper to the young. See Plato
Laws 710A on the temperamental sophrosyne natural to some children and young animals,
and see Isocrates Evagoras 22 on sophrosyne (“obedience, discipline”) as a virtue of childhood
and adolescence. The sophrosyne of the old is the hard-won wisdom that comes with time and
suffering (Sophocles, Frag. 718; Democritus, Frag. 294 DK; Plato Laws 665E) or, more
often, is the control of the appetites. On the apparent sophrosyne of old men, in whom the
passions of youth have abated, see Aristotle Rhetoric 2. 12-14.
68 The reason is perhaps to be found in the nature of the poem; since the earlier part is a
conventional prayer for satisfaction in love, inevitably addressed to Aphrodite, the same god¬
dess is appealed to throughout. Solon’s wish that in old age the ergmata Kyprogenous may be
dear to him (20 Diehl 3) may have been in Theognis’ mind.
69 Mimnermus, Frag. 1 Diehl3. Plutarch (De virt. mor. 445F) describes Mimnermus as
wanton (akolastos) on the strength of this lament. Solon’s response (22 Diehl3) is characteris¬
tic of his sophrosyne.
havior of a man at a drinking party will reveal whether or not he

is truly sophron.
Sophrosyne was indeed beginning to be connected with sobriety, as we
learn from one of the Attic skolia (dating perhaps from the late sixth
century), which also contains the earliest recorded antithesis between
sophrosyne and mama (902 Page): “Drink with me, feast with me, love
with me, be wreathed with me. When I am mad, be mad with me, when
I am sane, be sane with me [ovv o&cppovi ooxppovei].” Although the
verbal contrast is between sophrosyne and mania, the madness is obviously
that of drink. The relation between these two types of irrationality and
their common opposition to sophrosyne form a continuing theme in
Greek literature.70
By the end of the sixth century a link was established between sophro¬
syne and the general idea of restraint or even abstinence, as is clear not
only from its connection with sobriety, demonstrated above, but also
from the even earlier use of sophrosyne to designate feminine arete. The
qualities expected of women in Homeric society (beauty, domestic skills,
and chastity) continue to comprise feminine arete throughout antiquity;
and although Homer never uses the word sophrosyne in this connection,
it is regularly so used in the classical period, when Penelope by reason
of her faithfulness becomes the most prominent exemplar of the virtue.
Semonides of Amorgos makes the first recorded allusion to sophrosyne
in this sense. In his diatribe against women he reserves for the last and
weightiest charge the accusation that whatever woman seems especially
sophronein is actually behaving most outrageously (7. 108-10 Diehl3).
The infinitive sophronein (occurring here for the first time) may mean “to
be chaste” or may have a broader significance, “to be a good wife.”
Either nuance is possible also in a fragment from Epicharmus which says
that the virtue of a sophron woman is not to wrong her husband (286
Kaibel, Com.). Sophrosyne, once this usage becomes current, is the
special virtue of women whether married or unmarried, and for women
of both categories it is the most common of all tributes inscribed on
memorial reliefs and tombstones.71
70 Cf. Anacreontea 2. 6 Bergk, which speaks of singing a drinking song in a decent frenzy
{sophron lysse). See also Anacreon 43. 3 Diehl, where awfiptoTus is equivalent to sophronos.
(The text preferred by D. L. Page [356] av ]vfipLOTL0>s] destroys the parallel). Horace Odes
1.27, verecundum Bacchum, is in the same tradition. For various expressions embodying the idea
of a sophron mama or sohna ebnetas and for the transformations of this concept, see Hans Lewy,
Sobna Ebnetas (Giessen, 1929).
71 E.g., Kaibel, Nos. 78, 53; Johannes Geffcken, Gnechische Epigramme (Heidelberg, 1916),
Nos. 132, 140. The Latin equivalents are casta and pudens, which are ubiquitous on Roman
22 Sophrosyne
Lyric poetry, in common with the epic, makes frequent use of the
themes of sophrosyne without employing the word itself. Wilamowitz in
fact maintained that Archilochus, Alcaeus, Mimnermus, and Anacreon
knew nothing of sophrosyne.72 Yet Archilochus’ address to his thymos on
the proper reaction to good and bad fortune (67a Diehl3) and his
praise of tlemosyne (7. 6 Diehl3); and Alcaeus’ advice to his friend
Melanippus not to set his heart on things too great, since even Sisyphus
could not escape death for ever, and man must bear with courage what
cannot be avoided (B 6 Lobel and Page)—all these are valid expressions
of the sophron spirit.73 One of the perennial themes of Greek lyric poetry
is the meditation on human mortality, which easily gives rise to warn¬
ings against excessive hope and ambition. An early instance of this feel¬
ing is Aleman’s Maiden Song, which describes the ruin that befell
certain heroes who exceeded mortal bounds. The fear of hybris is expressed
in a characteristic warning (1. 16-18, Page): “Let no man soar to the
heavens nor try to wed Aphrodite, the Queen of Paphos.” This type of
admonition became a cliche, especially favored in dirges and victory
odes, both of which found use for commonplaces on thinking mortal
thoughts,74 and Aleman is the first of a long line of lyric and tragic poets
to find in mythology examples of hybris punished and, by implication at
least, sophrosyne instilled.
Yet Aleman does not mention sophrosyne; and in fact, this word,
although it is overtly connected with the themes of hybris, human mor¬
tality, mortal thoughts, and the mutability of fortune more often in the
epitaphs. So far as men are concerned, sophrosyne does not have a well-attested meaning of
“chastity” until the latter half of the fifth century. Euripides, Frag. 446 Nauck (from the first
Hippolytus), is an early example. Chastity was not expected of the Homeric hero, and there
were no religious sanctions to support masculine chastity in Greek paganism, except in so far
as belief in pollution led under certain circumstances to the practice of chastity as a means
of purification. The sanctions that enforced feminine chastity were originally social rather
than religious.
72 Wilamowitz, 2. 123.
73 The phrase sophrosynas oiaka (“the helm of sophrosyne”) which occurs in the Parian in¬
scription of Archilochus (Tetram. Frag. 51 p. IV B 18 Diehl3) is probably the work of
the dedicator, rather than of Archilochus himself. Rudolph Pfeiffer (Philol. 84 [1928],
137-52) discusses the tlemosyne of Archilochus (as well as the tolman of Sappho 2. 17) as their
response to the sense of helplessness (amechanie) felt by the early lyric poets. This helplessness
in the face of Divine will or fortune leads in tragedy to the suggestion that through sophro¬
syne man may become moderate in grief and learn to accept reversals calmly.
74 J. T. Sheppard (Oedipus Tyrannus [Cambridge, 1920], lix ff.) discusses this commonplace
and its relation to sophrosyne. Cf. Pindar Pyth. 2. 27-34, where Ixion’s desire for Hera, the
wife of Zeus, exemplifies hybris and the failure to respect the metron. Euripides (I.A. 543-45 and
Frag. 503) refers to sophrosyne in connection with this topos. Callimachus (1. 20 Pfeiffer) cites
a related commonplace, without using the word sophron.
fifth century than in the seventh and sixth, is even in the later period
rarely used by lyric poets. When it does occur, it refers to “civic” virtue
more frequently than to the ethics of the individual in his private life.
In the early fifth century, for example, Simonides, deeply concerned
with the themes of mortality and the helplessness of man, often
expresses the classical feeling for sophrosyne, as when he says (521
Page): “If you are a man, never say what tomorrow will be, nor,
when you see a man happy, say how long he will be so, for swift is
change, more swift than the turn of a long-winged fly.” Yet his only ex¬
tant reference to sophrosyne belongs, not to any of the lyric odes, but to
another type of verse, the epitaph; and here he confirms the testimony
of the Attic gravestones about the establishment of sophrosyne as one
member of a pair of qualities that in the fifth century comprise the
Hellenic ideal. His epitaph for Protomachus reads in part (128 Diehl):
“O son of Timenor, never in the world will you cease to long for your
dear son’s arete and saophrosyne.” Another epitaph ascribed to Simonides
(85 Diehl), which lacks the word sophrosyne but speaks eloquently of its
spirit, records the modesty of Archedice, the daughter of Hippias, and
says that she, although the daughter, sister, wife, and mother of tyrants,
was never guilty of arrogance (atasthalia).75
Bacchylides casts further light on the progress of sophrosyne as a
virtue of the polis. In an ode honoring Pytheas of Aegina for a victory
at Nemea sometime before 480 b.c., he says that the renowned island of
Aeacus is guided by Areta, with Eukleia (Fair Fame), the lover of wreaths,
and saophron Eunomia, to whom belong feasts and who guards in peace
the cities of pious men (13. 183-89 Snell).76 Bacchylides here recalls the
passages in Theognis that regard sophrosyne as the opposite of hybris in
the polis and associate the personified Sophrosyne with law-abiding con¬
duct and the Charites. The complex of ideas involving eunomia, peace,
piety, and feasting also recalls Hesiod, whom Bacchylides still further
resembles in the dithyramb on the “Demand for Helen.” Here Menelaus
reminds the Trojans that woe does not come to men through the fault of
Zeus, since every man has the power to win Dike, the servant of pure
Eunomia and wise Themis—but through the fault of Hybris, who rejoices
in furtive gains and acts of lawless folly (aphrosyne [15 Snell]).77 Eunomia
75 Simonides himself was linked in the popular mind with the idea of sophrosyne, as many
anecdotes attest. Among these are the story of his warning to Pausanias (Plutarch Cons. Apoll.
6) and the testimony of Athenaeus about his renown for kosmiotes and sophrosyne (14. 656).
76 Pindar, too, uses the word eunomia to describe the aristocratic constitution of Aegina
(Isth. 5. 22).
77 Cf. Homer Od. 1. 32-43, and Hesiod Theog. 901-3.
24 Sophrosyne
is now described as hagna rather than as saophron, but hybns is associated

with one of the oldest antonyms of sophrosyne. In this ode the group of
concepts often connected with the life of the polls is applied to man’s
conduct of his personal affairs, but the consequences affect the whole
community.
Pindar weaves into his poetry many themes of sophrosyne (the praise
of measure, gnomic reminders of mortal limitations, and warnings
against hybris, supported by mythical exempla) 78 and gives them religious
content by stressing the gulf between man and the gods;79 he neverthe¬
less uses the adjective sophron only five times and entirely neglects the
noun sophrosyne. Four of his five allusions occur in a context somehow
connected with the State or with political conditions in Greece. The first
Paean, of uncertain date, employs the very phrase saophron eunomia
which occurs in Bacchylides’ ode for Pytheas of Aegina. Beginning with
an appeal for man to be content with due measure (epi metra), the
Paean concludes with a prayer to Apollo to crown the children of
Thebes with the blossoms of saophron eunomia (i. io). The aristocratic bias
of Pindar—or of his patron—leads him to associate sophrosyne with the
sound and orderly rule of the conservative nobility. What is particularly
memorable about this passage is the reference to Apollo: this is the first
recorded prayer to the god of Delphi for the gift of sophrosyne.
The ninth Paean—which can be dated by its reference to the eclipse
of the sun on April 30, 463 b.c.—again connects sophrosyne with the
government of Thebes, when Pindar asserts that the local hero, Tenerus,
was entrusted with the rule of the city by reason of his saophron anorea,
his sober-minded courage (9. 46). Here, too, the god of Delphi is some¬
where in the background, for Tenerus is not only a seer but also Apollo’s
son. Wilamowitz suggests that the eclipse is a symbol of evil, represent¬
ing the dangers that threaten Boeotia and her allies as a result of the
victory of Pericles and Ephialtes in Athens.80 Still a third papyrus frag¬
ment, this time from a Parthenion, has also been thought to reflect
Pindar’s support of the anti-Athenian faction in Thebes.81 The poet
celebrates the family of Aeoladas, three generations of whom are taking
78See, e.g., 01. 13. 47; Pyth. 1. 56-57, 2. 34, 4. 286, 9. 78; Nem. 11. 47; 01. 5. 21-
24, 13. 64; Isth. 5. 14, 7. 39; Pyth. 4. 90-93, 8. 1-14. Eduard Fraenkel (Horace [Oxford, 1957],
273-85), commenting on Horace Odes 3. 4, draws a parallel with Pindar Pyth. 1 and 8 which
brings out the sophrosyne implicit in these two odes.
79 See especially Nem. 6. 1-7 and Pyth. 10. 21-30.
80 Wilamowitz, Pindaros (Berlin, 1922), 396.
81 C. M. Bowra, in T. U. Powell, New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature (Oxford,
1933), Vol. Ill, 52 ff.
part in a procession at the Daphnephoria, and refers as follows (2. 66)
to hostility shown them (by the pro-Athenian party?): “And then
malevolent anger at the sophrones ambitions of these men caused hateful
strife, unrelenting, but they loved all the paths of justice.” Both the word
sophrones and the allusion to dike imply that the ambitions of this family
constitute no danger to the State. It is evident that for Pindar, as for
Theognis and Bacchylides, sophrosyne in the polis is allied with the other
excellences—arete or anorea, eunomia, and dike—which by now have a
well-established “class” meaning in the old-fashioned Dorian world.82
One of the two allusions to sophrosyne in the Odes deserves special
notice because it forms part of the earliest recorded reference to a canon
of cardinal virtues. The eighth Isthmian, which honors Oleander of
Aegina for his victory in the boys’ pankration in 478 b.c., introduces, ac¬
cording to the familiar epinician pattern, the myth of the legendary
founders of Aegina, the Aeacids, and praises them for their possession of
four virtues (24-28). Aeacus, the most virtuous (KedvoTaros) of mortals,
gave judgments to the gods themselves, while his children excelled
in courage (anorea) and were sophrones and wise (mvvToi re Ovpov). Here
are all four of the virtues later canonized by Plato and the Stoa, although
only sophrosyne goes by its proper name. Justice is implied in the giving
of judgments. Anorea is an epic term for courage, equivalent to the later
andreia, and 7TIVvtos is one of Homer’s favorite epithets for the prudent
Penelope or Telemachus.83 Eusebeia (“piety”), which was often included
among the civic virtues in the fifth and fourth centuries and was elimi¬
nated from the canon only when Plato’s theory of the soul led him
to adopt a set of four excellences in Republic IV, appears in the eighth
Isthmian immediately after this passage, where it is cited as the special
virtue of Peleus (29).
Amid the predominantly heroic ethical terminology of the ode, the
precise meaning of sophron is debatable. Is it the Homeric “soundness of
mind,” or does it have the moral implications found in Pindar’s con¬
temporary Aeschylus, or the political nuance that Pindar himself often
favors? If, as I have suggested elsewhere,84 the ode is intended to honor,
not alone the hero Oleander, but also the entire city of Aegina, which
82 Pyth. 11, in honor of a Theban victor, also contains a political allusion praising modera¬
tion, this time in contrast to tyranny. Pindar says that of those in the polis, the midmost
(to; /ac'cto:) have the most enduring prosperity; he condemns tyranny, saying (54): “I am pas¬
sionately attached to the common virtues [pvvaloi . . . apcTcm].” He then brings this statement
into line with the conventions of the victory ode by remarking that envious evil is warded off
if one who has secured the highest place and lives quietly flees from hybris (54-55).
83 E.g., Od. 1. 229, 4. 211, 10. 445. 84 A.J.P. 69 (1948), 304-8.
26 Sophrosyne
just two years previously had distinguished itself against the Persians (in
contrast to the medizing of Thebes, its sister city), Pindar may be
deliberately stressing a canon of civic virtues that were gaining recogni¬
tion at this very time; and sophron may be thought of as suggesting
political moderation, the avoidance of hybris, as it undoubtedly does in
the three Pindaric Fragments mentioned above.
The one remaining use of sophron in the Odes is more traditional.
In the third Pythian, which touches on many commonplaces of sophro¬
syne and uses the myth of Asclepius to illustrate the danger of forgetting
the limits of mortality, Pindar applies the epithet sophron to Chiron, the
teacher of Asclepius (63). In all likelihood, and in spite of the context of
warnings against hybris, it bears a predominantly intellectual rather
than a moral significance, since Chiron is here spoken of in his capacity
as the teacher of heroes. Elsewhere Pindar describes him, in a similar
connection, as /3a6viiriTts (“deep-thinking” [Nem. 3. 53]). In such a
context, however, it is especially difficult to distinguish moral from
intellectual nuances.
Two more writers may be considered here. Both of them are eastern
Greeks by origin, and both retain the Ionian intellectual concept of
sophrosyne, although in one, Heraclitus, the concept is deepened by
association with a systematic cosmology, while in the other, Herodotus,
the word merely echoes the usage of everyday speech. Heraclitus is the
first of the pre-Socratic philosophers to base an ethical system on a
theory of physics and the only one before Democritus who refers to
sophrosyne.85 He is also the first writer to make explicit the link that
Homer implied between sophrosyne and self-knowledge. In Fragment
116 (DK) he says: “It is possible for all men to know themselves and
sophronein” and in Fragment 112 he goes so far as to say: “Sophronein is
the greatest arete, and wisdom (sophia) consists in speaking the truth and
acting in accordance with nature, paying heed to it.” 86 The association
of sophronein with words indicating intellectual activity provides a clue to
the meaning of this concept for Heraclitus. In spite of the emphasis
elsewhere in his writings on the need to be moderate and suppress pas¬
sion (Frags. 85, 110, 43), it is doubtful that sophronein in these two
85 Although the concepts of order, balance, and limit that are to be found in other
pre-Socratic philosophers have an obvious relation to certain aspects of sophrosyne, the
philosophers themselves apparently did not make the connection, nor did the Milesians apply
their physical theories to the subject of ethics. The bearing that certain Pythagorean beliefs
may have had on sophrosyne is suggested below, pp. 29-30.
86 The MS reading sophronein in these two fragments is restored by Kranz after being
emended to phronein by Diels. For a vigorous defense of sophronein, see Wilamowitz, 2. 123-24.
passages can mean “to be self-controlled, moderate,” as is often as¬
sumed.87 Rather it should be related to the contemplation of the human \/
soul which is the source of understanding. Heraclitus repeatedly asserts
that wisdom is one, and that it is sophia which enables man to share in
the divine logos (Frags. 41, 32, 50). In Fragment 112, sophronein (which
in Fragment 116 stands side by side with self-knowledge as a possibility
open to all men) appears in company with sophia, suggesting an affinity
among all three concepts. Sophia is now defined as “to speak the truth
and to act in accordance with nature, paying heed to it.” Nature {physis)
is to be connected with that universal logos which Heraclitus found by
looking into his own soul (Frag. 101), and which must, he says, guide
man in speech and action (Frags. 72, 73). The physis of Heraclitus is less
like that of the Sophists than like that of the Stoics or indeed of Plato,
when in Laws X he substitutes for the materialistic/?^^ of his opponents
a changed and spiritualized Nature in which the kindred of Mind
(including sophia) are supreme. For Heraclitus physis, logos, and the theios
nomos (“Divine law”) of Fragment 114 are all related concepts, and the
sophia that comprehends them and translates their precepts into speech
and action must depend ultimately upon a profound and philosophical
self-knowledge.
By self-knowledge Heraclitus seems to mean a searching examination
into the soul to discover the universal law common to man and the cos¬
mos. If he connects sophrosyne with this deep and essential self-knowledge,
there should be nothing startling about the statement that sophronein is
the greatest arete. It is another name for the faculty by which man may
attain that wisdom whose object is the universal logos. Through this
process man comes to know the law that governs his own soul and the
rest of the universe. Clearly then, the concept of sophrosyne still has the
Ionian intellectualism, but its meaning has become much more profound
than the simple “good sense” of Odyssey 23. It has in fact developed the
early hint of self-knowledge (which we saw in Iliad 21 and in the
Telemachia) in such a way as to suggest the riches that await a further
unfolding of these ideas in the tragic poets and especially in Plato.
Herodotus, despite his connection with Athens in the age of Pericles,
may well be considered in the context of the archaic age, for his use of
the word sophron is predominantly Homeric, while in his moral and
religious ideas he has more in common with the lyric and elegiac poetry
of the sixth and early fifth centuries and with the more traditional ele¬
ments in Aeschylean thought than with the prose writers of the later fifth
87 As it is by Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1948), 32.
28 Sophrosyne
century. Herodotus develops at length several ideas familiar in the

gnomic writers and also in Simonides, Bacchylides, and Pindar: ideas
having to do with the nothingness of man, the mutability of human
affairs, the jealousy of the gods, and the dangerous folly of encroaching
on boundaries set by Nature or by the Divine. The ruin brought about
by hybris and the contrasting value of modesty provide Herodotus with
the dominant moral theme of his work, a theme connected, as in
Aeschylus, with the corresponding motives of tyranny versus freedom and
of barbarism versus Hellenism. Many of the most memorable episodes of
the History illustrate the downfall of a king or a state after flagrant acts
of hybris: the story of Croesus, which stands as a prologue to the story of
the rise and fall of the Persian Empire; the stories of Periander of Corinth
and Polycrates of Samos; and the career of Xerxes—all illustrate this
fundamental text of sophrosyne. But although Herodotus is the most
fertile source in Greek prose of stories illustrating traditional ideas of
sophrosyne,88 he applies the word to none of the typical situations, and
indeed he never uses the noun. For example, in his account of the debate
among the Persian nobles over the rival forms of government, the
danger of hybris is the chief argument advanced against both monarchy
and democracy (3. 80-81), but the words sophron and sophrosyne, which
would almost certainly have appeared in any such discussion by Attic
writers from Thucydides on, do not occur.89 In the History we meet
sophron, sophronein, and the adverb sophronos, always with some implication
of soundness of mind, good sense, or occasionally sanity.
The fundamental meaning of sophron for Herodotus becomes evident
in a passage close to the beginning of Book I, which gives the traditional
reason for enmity between Europe and Asia, the kidnaping of women.
The Persians blame the Greeks for going to war for the sake of Helen,
because although it is the act of unjust men to steal women, it is the part
of fools (ctvorjToov) to desire vengeance and of wise men (oucppovoov)
to pay no heed, since clearly women would not be carried off without
their consent (1. 4). The antithesis between ototjtos (“fool”) and sophron
shows that the latter has not developed beyond its Homeric connotation.
Furthermore, the sophron man referred to in a conversation between
Xerxes and Demaratus (7. 104) is one with sense enough to value help
and friendship. Xerxes uses the verb in a related “prudential” sense,
when he apologizes to Artabanus for rejecting his good advice and says
88 See, e.g., J. A. K. Thomson, op. cit., 118; J. T. Sheppard, op. cit., lxiv; W. C. Greene, op.
cit., 86.
89 See Gregory Vlastos, A.J.P. 74 (1953), 337-66.
(7. 15): ovk kocoeppoveov (“I was not using good judgment”). The adverb
sophronos has a like meaning in the story of Anacharsis’ report to the
Scythian king, in which he says that among all the Greeks it is possible
to conduct a conversation sensibly (sophronos) only with the Spartans
(4. 77). The intellectual meaning is extended to include sanity in Book III,
where sophronein is the antithesis of madness in the story of Cambyses and
Prexaspes’ son (3. 35); and the verb means “to come to one’s senses” in
the episode of Cambyses’ death at Ecbatana, after he awoke from his
delusion about the prophecy involving a town by that name (3. 64).
Only once, and then on a very small scale, does sophron approach the
meaning “moderate” in Herodotus. Otanes warns Darius not to take
hasty action against the Magian usurper, but to behave with greater
caution or moderation (km to oaxppovkorepov [3. 71]). The relation
between prudence and moderation is very close here.
One further phenomenon of the archaic age, the spread of the mystery
religions, demands notice, since Pythagorean and Orphic beliefs were
later held to have a bearing on sophrosyne. Our information about
these cults is so fragmentary and elusive that it is impossible to do more j
than guess at the nature of their relation to sophrosyne. In Pythagorean
writings of later times (such as the accounts of Pythagoras’ life and
teaching by Iamblichus and Porphyry) great importance is attached to
sophrosyne in the sense of “self-restraint” or “abstinence” (the sophron
association of the sexes, the education of the young in a spirit of sophro¬
syne or good discipline), but nothing of this can be convincingly ascribed
to Pythagoras himself or to his earliest followers. In the sixth century the
important Pythagorean notions involved order, harmony, limit, and
purification; 90 each of these was closely linked with sophrosyne by later
philosophers, by Plato above all.
The first three of these ideas are expressions in physical terms of the
point of view that in morality gave rise to sophrosyne. How important
the concepts of order and harmony were in transforming the Socratic
concept of sophrosyne (as seen, for example, in the Apology and the
Charmides) into the Platonic, we may conjecture on the basis of the
Gorgias, where sophrosyne is identified with the principle of order (kosmos)
which holds together earth and heaven, gods and men (506D-508C),
and of the Republic, in which sophrosyne in the soul and the State
90 See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), 217-64,
for a sober assessment of the doctrines that may be ascribed to the Pythagorean school
before Parmenides; and consult W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge,
1962), 1. 146-340.
jo Sophrosyne
is compared to a harmony “sounding the same note in perfect unison

throughout the whole” and to a symphoma of the naturally inferior and
the naturally superior on the question of which should rule (432A). The
notion of limit was also a fruitful one for sophrosyne. The Pythagorean
table of opposites begins (Aristotle Metaphysics A5 986a 24) with peras
(“limit”) and apeiron (the “unlimited”): the first is identified with Good;
the second with Evil. When applied to morality, this doctrine, physical
in origin, gives scientific support to the Apolline rule of moderation, and
Plato makes use of it for just this purpose in the Philebus, when, as
Jaeger says, he tries “to make ethics an exact science on the mathemati¬
cal pattern.”91 Lyric and elegiac poetry show that the Greeks of the
archaic and early classical periods were strongly inclined to identify
what is limited or measurable with health of soul and safety, and what
is unlimited and immeasurable with turbulence and danger. Aeschylus,
from whose plays has been constructed a table of opposites not unlike the
Pythagorean, consistently ranges sophrosyne and what is limited, meas¬
ured, or restrained on the side of the Good.92
The idea of katharsis (“purification”) also held great possibilities for
sophrosyne, although in its origin this virtue had nothing to do with either
purity or its opposite, pollution.93 Only when the concept of purification
was extended beyond mere ritual taboo and came to include the katharsis
of the soul through some form of abstinence, usually the restraint of
passion, did the notions of purification and sophrosyne coincide. This
coincidence had occurred in all probability by the early fifth century, at
which time purity (hagnotes) had acquired a moral connotation, and
sophrosyne had begun to include some forms of self-restraint.94
Katharsis was sought by the Orphics, too, since they shared the Pytha¬
gorean dualism; and several aspects of Orphic belief, as it was popularly
understood in the fifth and fourth centuries, made it natural to connect
Orphism with the practice of sophrosyne. The supposed personality of
Orpheus himself, whose music had a calming influence (and who,
moreover, was associated with sexual purity), the importance of Apollo
91 Aristotle, 87.
92 See Chapter II, p. 33. The idea of proportion, which later has a close affinity with
sophrosyne, is best exemplified in the archaic age by Alcmaeon’s definition of health as
a proportionate blending (krasis symmetros) of opposing powers; their excess is a cause of ill¬
ness (Frag. 4 DK). Cf. the sophron krasis referred to by the physician Eryximachus in
Plato Symp. 188A.
93 The concept of pollution is discussed by Dodds, 35-37; and at greater length by
Louis Moulinier, Le Pur et 1’impur dans la pense'e des Grecs (Paris, 1952).
94 The relation of purity and abstinence to morality is discussed by Adkins, op. cit., 140-48.
in the cult, and the practice of various forms of abstinence by the mem¬
bers—all make it easy to understand why Theseus, however mistakenly,
could have ascribed Orphism to the sophron Hippolytus.95 Once again it
is Plato who makes the greatest use of “Orphic’ ’ elements to enrich his
doctrine of sophrosyne.96 Moreover, Plato’s development of the doctrine
of katharsis in relation to the soul—whether achieved through music, as
the Pythagoreans believed,97 or through some form of abstinence—and
his tendency to link this katharsis with sophrosyne led the Neoplatonists
and the Church Fathers to assign a high place to the virtue. Plotinus and
his followers value sophrosyne as a means of purifying the soul from what
is material and of elevating it, step by step, towards the goal of union
with the One. Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus ally sophro¬
syne, respectively, with katharotes (“purity”) and hagneia (“holiness”),
which are key values in the ascetic life and lead the soul to God.98 Such
an outcome—one that could not have been predicted on the basis of what
Homer and the writers of the archaic age meant by sophrosyne—is an
example of the adaptability of this concept, which nevertheless always
changes in ways consistent with its own essential nature, responding with
infinite sensitivity to the diverse stimuli of Greek life and thought.
95 Euripides Hipp. 953. The evidence for Orphic rites and for the existence of a cult
is examined by W. K. C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion (2nd ed.; London, 1952),
and Ivan Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus (Berkeley, 1941).
96 See Ivan Linforth, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 12 (1944), 295-
314, for the suggestion that the imagery of the sieve in Gorg. 492D 1 ff. is Orphic. For an op¬
posing view, see E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), ad loc.
97 See Kirk and Raven, op. cit., 229.
98 See chaps. VI (on the Neoplatonists) and IX (on the Church Fathers).
II
Tragedy
SOPHROSYNE, as we learn from Theognis, owes its first notable

development beyond its Homeric beginnings to the stimulus afforded by
conditions in the polis. Tragedy, too, is at least in part a product of these
conditions, and it is no accident that the first great flowering of sophro-
syne in Greek literature occurs in the work of the tragic poets. Many
studies have demonstrated what tragedy owes to the conflict that occurred
when the heroic individual encountered the restrictions imposed by the
world order—whether manifested in religion or in the framework of the
polis.1 The characteristic expression of these religious and social restric¬
tions is sophrosyne, the sense of measure, the reluctance to overstep
boundaries. The prominence in Aeschylean tragedy of the conflict be¬
tween hybris (one result of heroic arete unrestrained by any Divine or
human sanction) and sophrosyne accurately reflects the conditions that
launched Attic tragedy on its course.
Sophrosyne is so fundamental to all three tragic poets that each one
in his treatment of the concept reveals his basic beliefs about human life,
and each interprets it in a characteristically different fashion. To
Aeschylus sophrosyne is a masculine virtue, which he links with all the
most favored elements in his kosmos. It is essentially religious. Its kernel
is respect for the limitations imposed on man by the gods and only
secondarily by human society. It has strong ties with the Mean and is
more clearly political in its effects than it is in either of the other two
poets. To Sophocles sophrosyne is no longer a specifically masculine
virtue but is in fact generally opposed to the heroic, the eugenes, the
megalopsychos, especially when heroic self-assertion is carried to an extreme.
1 See, e.g., Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Neue Wege zur Antike 8 (1929), 103-4.
32
Tragedy jj
Sophocles interprets sophrosyne chiefly as the power to recognize reality

and identifies it closely with self-knowledge. In his drama the tension
between sophrosyne and the heroic principle, implicit in Homer, becomes
explicit. To Euripides sophrosyne is one aspect of the rational element,
eternally in conflict with the irrational. As such it has wide scope but
appears chiefly as the control of the emotions and appetites, and now
becomes predominantly moral rather than intellectual. Only for
Euripides, among the tragic poets, does sophrosyne normally mean
“self-control.”
AESCHYLUS
Aeschylus associates sophrosyne with a set of key ideas—freedom,

justice, defense against aggression, masculinity, Hellenism—to which he
opposes a set of antitheses—tyranny, injustice, aggression, femininity,
barbarism, and above all hybris.2 The relation of these ideas to sophro¬
syne, while so regular as to constitute a major theme in Aeschylean
tragedy, is far from static. It is possible to trace a steady increase in
complexity from the comparatively clear-cut antitheses of the Persians to
the realignment and reconciliation of motives in the Eumenides.
The Persians presents in a state of relative simplicity the opposition be¬
tween hybris and sophrosyne which lies at the heart of Aeschylean
tragedy. In other plays this theme and related themes are used in a more
complicated (sometimes even a rather ambiguous) way, but here
Aeschylus draws in Xerxes a paradigm of hybris and makes an unequiv¬
ocal contrast between the barbarians whom he represents and the
Greeks whose triumph at Salamis and Plataea is due to their possession
of the virtues that their enemies lack. Finley has pointed out the persistent
contrast between Persia and Greece (gold versus silver, pomp versus
piety, conquest versus self-defense, tyranny versus freedom, Xerxes’
motives in making war versus the battle cry at Salamis).3 The alliance
of sophrosyne and freedom is more prominent in the Persians than in any
other play of Aeschylus; and there can be little doubt that the poet faith¬
fully reflects contemporary Athenian opinion when he interprets the war
2 Several of these antitheses have been traced through Aeschylean tragedy by Snell,
“Aischylos,” in connection with his study of phobos. Helen H. Bacon (Barbarians in Greek
Tragedy [New Haven, 1961], 36 ff.) denies that Aeschylus polarizes Good and Evil around
Greek and non-Greek, but in the case of the Persians at least this polarity seems inescapable.
Although the noun sophrosyne does not appear in the extant tragedies, related forms occur
twenty-two times: sophronein eight times, sophron eleven, sophronizein once, sophronisma once, and
see Supp. 198 for a disputed compound noun with sophron. Consult Gabriel Italie, Index
Aeschyleus (Leiden, 1955).
3 Finley, 210.
34 S op hr o syne
as an encounter between the forces of freedom and sophrosyne on the

one hand and those of despotism and hybns on the other. An Attic
skolion dated soon after the victory at Salamis expresses this view and
unites the two concepts of sophrosyne and eleutheria in verses modeled on
the antityrannical skolia in honor of Harmodius and Aristogiton. The
couplet, as restored by Werner Peek, reads as follows:
2,o(ppooovvcv hi /cAaJSots a]ju/Aa[Kos hetpevos]
[2tpoju/8(X€, €\e]vdcpias kolXov Ix^torecpavov.4
The meaning is something like: “Garbed in sophrosyne, Strombichus,

amid the boughs of smilax, you wear a fair crown of freedom.”
Among the antitheses of the Persians the fundamental contrast, and the
one that includes all the others, is that between hybris and sophrosyne.
This contrast becomes explicit at the climax of Darius’ prophecy of the
final disaster at Plataea. Everything in this speech calls attention to the
impiety of the Persian host. The defeat at Plataea is to be a punishment
for their hybris and godless thoughts (808), for they have ravaged the
temples of Greece, and their fate will be a warning, even to the third
generation, that mortal man must not direct his thoughts too high
(oi>x v'nepopev . . . <ppove.lv [820]). When hybris has blossomed forth, it
bears a fruit consisting of ate, and from ate comes a harvest of tears
(822-23).5 Zeus punishes excessive desires (827). Now that Xerxes has
been divinely warned to respect limitations (oicypovelv KtxPVl**-V°v
[829]),6 Darius urges the Chorus to teach him with its reasonable coun-
4 Hermes 68 (1933), 118-21. Lionel Pearson (C.P. 52 (1957), 228-44) examines the evidence
for a popular tendency to see the Persian war in terms of hybris and nemesis.
5 Recurrent patterns of imagery, of which recent studies have found a great number
in Aeschylus (e.g., W. B. Stanford, Greek Metaphor [Oxford, 1936], and Aeschylus in His Style
[Dublin, 1942], 96-100; Robert Goheen, A.J.P. 76 [1955], 113-37; R- D. Murray, Jr.,
The Motif of Io in Aeschylus’ Suppliants [Princeton, 1958]; Otto Hiltbrunner, Wiederho lungs- und
Motivtechmk bei Aischylos [Bern, 1950]; B. H. Fowler, A.J.P. 78 [1957], 173-84), are con¬
nected, not with sophrosyne itself, but with its more dramatic antitheses. Hybris, for example,
may be symbolized by blossom, fruit, and harvest (Sept. 601; Supp. 106) or by the medical
imagery drawn from physical illness (P.V 224-25, 977-78). Sophrosyne itself is occasionally
suggested by metaphors involving restraint of some kind, such as the bit, the bridle, or
the yoke (P.V. 1009-10), an anticipation of mediaeval and Renaissance iconography (as in
Giotto’s bridled Temperantia in the Arena Chapel in Padua, Raphael’s Moderatio in the
Stanza della Segnatura in the Vatican, and innumerable examples of sepulchral statuary in
the baroque period). See Appendix for a summary of types of imagery connected with
the theme of sophrosyne.
6 Rose, ad loc., taking KtxPVphov as a participle of xPV°âl (“to be in need of”), translates:
“Therefore give him wisdom with reasonable admonitions, for sorely he needs sobriety.”
H. D. Broadhead (The Persae of Aeschylus [Cambridge, i960]) regards KexPVP-hov (or
KexPVaP^pov) as a participle of XP^V (“to pronounce an oracle”) and translates: “It having
been declared [by the gods] that moderation must be observed.”
Tragedy 35
sels to refrain from drawing upon himself the punishment of God by his
overweening boldness {v'ncpKop'ntp Qpaoei [831]). It is evident that verse
831 defines the content of sophronein in verse 829; and nowhere do
we find a more explicit statement of the intensely religious implications
of this concept in the mind of Aeschylus. The god who is offended by
the Persian hybris is Zeus Kolastes (“the Corrector”); and it is the impiety
of the Persians, their failure to “think mortal thoughts,” and their
immoderate desires which constitute hybris.
The observance of limits is the essence of Aeschylean sophrosyne. In
terms of the Apolline proverbs, Meden agan is of primary importance to
Aeschylus, as is Gnothi sauton to Sophocles. The limits may be set by man,
but often they are Divine, and the cardinal sin of the violator of sophro¬
syne is that, although mortal, he does not “think mortal thoughts.”
In the Persians the recurrence of words and phrases employing the root
of phronein or some synonym is significant. Xerxes led his forces to
disaster imprudently (dvocppovoos [552]); he thought the thoughts of
youth {via cppovd [782]), unlike his ancestor Gyrus, whom the gods did
not hate since the latter was prudent by nature (evcppoov [772]); Xerxes,
by his foolish notion (ovk evjBovXia [749]) that he could master all the
gods, even Poseidon, although he was but a mortal, showed that an ill¬
ness of the mind (yooos cppcvcbv [750]) had taken hold of him. In this
context sophronein (829) seems to come at the climax of a long series of
related words, which derive added meaning from their repetition, and
it pronounces final judgment on the moral significance of Salamis and
Plataea. To the excessive ambition and arrogance of Xerxes himself is
added unrestrained emotionalism, a barbarian trait apparent in the
lamentations of the Chorus.7 Both kinds of excess are offenses against
sophrosyne, and it is characteristic of the simple, antithetical pattern
used in the Persians that both are committed by the same barbarian group.
In the Suppliants and the Septem Aeschylus separates the two types of
offense, assigns each to a different group and sets between them a figure
who in some fashion represents a sophrosyne opposed to both extremes.8
The Suppliants, in fact, requires us to consider at least two kinds of
sophrosyne, instead of the simple Meden agan of the Persians. Here, as usual
in Aeschylus and Sophocles, the situation that existed in the archaic
7 Snell, 67 ff. The lamentations of the Chorus are particularly “oriental” from verse
935 on. Note the reference to the Mariandyan “howl.” From verse 1102 on, the Chorus and
Xerxes lament antiphonally in an equally abandoned way.
8 It is questionable whether we should see in this development a confirmation of the later
date of the Suppliants. See Albin Lesky, Hermes 82 (1954), 1 — 13, for a discussion of the papyrus
fragment Oxy. xx. No. 2256. 3. Lesky dates the Suppliants after the Septem.
36 Sop hro syne
period still obtains: comparatively few references to sophrosyne occur,

yet the concept is of major importance to the plot and the characteriza¬
tion. A clue to this importance lies in the frequent allusions to the hybris
of the Egyptians. The chief connotation of hybris here is not that found in
the Persians, but “lustfulness” with the accessory implication of “violence.”
In opposition to this flagrant hybris, and equally explicit, is the claim that
the Suppliants are, and must take care to remain, sophrones. But as the
hybris of the Egyptians is different from that of the Persians, so, too,
sophronein has now altered in meaning. Quite evidently an important
aspect of the Danaids’ personality is their chastity, but only once does
sophronein have so limited a significance. Its usual meaning in this play
is “to be modest, calm, self-controlled”—as in verses 198, 724, and 992.
Danaus is the only spokesman for sophrosyne. His speeches to his
daughters concentrate on this theme, possibly because, as critics often
suggest,9 it suits his role as father and gives him something to say in a part
of the trilogy where he is dramatically superfluous. Possibly, however,
Aeschylus gives him so much to say about sophrosyne for another reason:
the tragedy has to do with two different offenses against this virtue—the
violence of the suitors and the excessive emotionalism, combined with a
distorted view of life, which the Danaids exhibit. The girls are, from the
beginning, sophrones in the sense of “chaste;” Danaus exhorts them to be
sophrones in the sense of “self-controlled;” and at the end of the play a hint
begins to emerge that they must also learn yet another aspect of sophro¬
syne: moderation in their demands on life and a balanced view of their
own role. The true nature of sophrosyne is revealed only gradually;
there is even a kind of irony in the injunctions that Danaus constantly
directs at his daughters, because not only their own natural sophrosyne
(chastity), but also the kind that he enjoins (self-control), proves to be
superficial and one-sided. The very fierceness with which they assert their
devotion to their concept of sophrosyne constitutes a denial of the genuine
and complete sophrosyne (moderation, balance) which alone could have
prevented the tragic consequences of their demands on Argos. The
speeches of Danaus show that he himself is unaware of the full meaning
of sophrosyne. The richness and complexity of the concept, even at this
comparatively early stage of its development, are suggested by the ironic
use that Aeschylus makes of it here.
9 Kitto, 6, 14; Rose, ad 991-95. E. T. Owen {The Harmony of Aeschylus [Toronto, 1952], 17)
suggests a dramatic purpose for Danaus’ preaching: it is a method of suggesting the continu¬
ing theme of trouble to come. Cf. Richmond Lattimore ( The Poetry of Greek Tragedy [Baltimore,
1958], 14) on the inconsistent characterization of Danaus in the first and second plays of the
trilogy.
Tragedy 37
From their first appearance in the parodos, the Danaids show them¬
selves to be passionate, determined, and excitable—as emotional, in fact,
as the Chorus of the Persians. Danaus’ first speech is wholly concerned
with the modesty, propriety, and humility befitting strangers and sup¬
pliants. Their words must be modest (aidola [194]); audacity (to 9paov)
must not attend their speech (197); nothing vain must proceed from their
modest countenances (c/c peTco7roooxppovcov [198]),10 and they are to
remember that bold speech does not befit the weak (203). The keynote
is struck in the first line (176): “Children, you must be prudent [cppoveiv].
With your prudent [cppovovvn] father you have come.” It is echoed with
deceptive meekness by the girls’ response (204): “Father, prudently
[oppovovvrcos] and to the prudent [oppovovvras] do you speak.” Phronein
and sophronein are identical in meaning, here as in the Agamemnon (176-
Si). Later Danaus sums up the content of his advice to his daughters
when he bids them receive his current admonition and add it to the many
other sophronismata (“prudent counsels”) of their father (992). Sophronein
has the precise significance of “preserve chastity or modesty” only once
—at the end of Danaus’ speech when he returns to his daughters with
the promise of asylum in Argos. In twenty lines of exhortation he
reminds them that their beauty is a temptation to men, and that they
must not be a source of shame to themselves and him and of gratification
to their enemies. “Only,” he concludes (1012-13), “pay attention to
these commands of your father, honoring chastity [.sophronein] more than
life.” Sophronein is here for the first time used to describe the behavior
proper to unmarried women.
The remaining allusions to sophrosyne also occur in a speech of
Danaus, which looks backward to the prayer of the girls for Argos and
forward to the approach of the Egyptians. Danaus commends the prayer
in these words (710): “I praise these sophrones prayers of yours.” His use
of sophrones, however, underlines the irony of the situation because, while
the theme of the benediction is fertility and peace, the Danaids, as
Murray observes, not only “destroy peace by their slaughter of the
Egyptians, but in refusing motherhood . . . renounce fertility in favor of
sterility.” 11 In the following lines Danaus orders the girls to face the
Egyptian threat calmly and with self-control (rjovycos . . .
otocoeppoviopivcos), not unmindful of the gods (724-25). The association
of sophrosyne with the gods is again typical of the Aeschylean concep-
10 See Rose, ad loc., reading iv pirpw V6 ouypovuv (Gilbert Murray) instead of Porsen’s
conjecture pcTccmooaxppovoiv for the MS ptrco ttco ouypov&v.
11 R. D. Murray, Jr., op. cit., 81.
38 Sophrosyne
tion of the virtue. Zeus and Artemis—pure (Ayra) daughter of Zeus

(144-45)—are the gods invoked by the Danaids themselves: Zeus in
several capacities (as their ancestor, as the god of suppliants, as the pro¬
tector of justice) and Artemis, significantly, as the guardian of virgins
(1030-32).
Hazardous though it is to reconstruct the outcome of the trilogy, it is
an attractive conjecture that the love of Hypermnestra for Lynceus
brings harmony and fertility out of the hatred and repugnance of the
Danaids for the Egyptians. The Danaids’ attitude in this first play, while
easy to understand (especially after the entrance of the herald), is essen¬
tially unbalanced in its hatred of marriage, and throughout the play it
is clear that the violence is not all on one side.12 The clue to the devel¬
opment of the trilogy comes at the end of the first play in speeches
assigned variously by different editors. Whether they represent an
exchange between two groups of Danaids or between the Danaids as a
unit and a group of maidservants is immaterial to our argument. What
matters is that several traditional allusions to the danger of excess are
worked into the dialogue. The warning (1059), “Utter a prayer that is
moderate [puerpiov] now,” is followed by the question (1060), “What
limit [Koupov] do you teach me?” And the response comes back (1061),
“No excess [pTjdev aya^tiv] in what concerns the gods.” This interchange
—coming close upon a song that praises Aphrodite and Hera, in pointed
contrast to earlier prayers to Artemis—forecasts the direction to be taken
by the remainder of the trilogy.
The position of Danaus between the hybns of the Egyptians and the
more subtle denial of sophrosyne by his daughters illustrates the pattern
that Aeschylus also uses in the Septem, where Eteocles at first is a Mean
between the various kinds of immoderate behavior on the part of the
chorus of Theban women and the attacking Argives. The impact of the
situation is less concentrated in the Suppliants than in the Septem, how¬
ever, because the sophrosyne of Danaus himself is never an issue, nor is
his own fate a matter of concern in the first part of the trilogy. The tragic
figure caught between the two extremes is actually Pelasgos; and although
he may be considered a spokesman for Hellenic restraint—as in his re¬
mark that his city likes brevity of speech (272)—it makes little difference
to his fate whether he is sophron or not, since his tragedy is one of situa-
12 The Danaids are violent in their threat to defile the sanctuary (465), and they will ulti¬
mately commit the supreme act of violence by murdering their husbands. Hence the irony
noted by R. D. Murray, Jr., in Danaus’ speech (498-99): thrasos is indeed destined to bring
forth phobos, and the Danaids will each kill someone philos in their ignorance of their true destiny.
Tragedy 39
tion rather than of character. In the Septem, however, the character of

Eteocles and his possession—or lack—of sophrosyne are of first im¬
portance.
Several of the themes related to sophrosyne which appear in the
Persians and the Suppliants recur in the Septem and are handled with in¬
creasing subtlety and effectiveness. Like the Persians, the play involves a
contrast between a sophron, pious community engaged in self-defense and
an attacking force that is exactly the opposite—hybristic, impious, and
aggressive. So far the Thebans and the Argives correspond to the Greeks
and the Persians, but this time justice is not all on one side, as the de¬
vice on Polyneices’ shield (645 ff.) reminds us. This time, too, the posi¬
tive merits of the defenders are set forth more explicitly, and the hybris
of the attackers shows certain new features.
The second familiar theme, this time linking the Septem with the
Suppliants rather than with the Persians, is that of male versus female: the
male represents not only courage and resolution but also sophrosyne,
while the female represents excessive emotion, in this instance fear.
When Eteocles rebukes the Chorus, whose terror fills the early part of
the play with the wildest emotion, we are reminded of Danaus’ speeches
to his daughters. Just as Danaus’ major concern was to enjoin sophro¬
syne upon them, so Eteocles tells the Theban girls that they are hateful
to sophron folk (186). Yet there is a difference. By sophron Danaus meant
“modest, discreet” as well as “calm, well-behaved,” but Eteocles con¬
stantly exhorts the Chorus to control itself and restrain its terror. The
Theban girls are even more excited than the Danaids (as their use of
dochmiacs for the parodos indicates), and Eteocles is much stronger in
his condemnation, which he extends to the entire feminine sex (188).
Woman, whether in a position of power (Kparovoa) or in a state of
terror (ddoaoa), is kakon (190).
As has been pointed out, the offenses against sophrosyne—hybris and
unrestrained emotionalism—which in the Persians were both displayed
by the barbarians, are in the Septem divided between the attacking
Argives, who are hybris personified, and the frantic women. Eteocles, who
must seek to control both types of excess, is a Mean between the ex¬
tremes; and Aeschylus makes him the true center of interest, not only in
the larger issues of the drama, but even in the contrast between sophro¬
syne and hybris. Instead of being, like the Danaids, superficially sophron,
in one sense of the word, and at the same time violent and unbalanced,
he is at first completely sophron and then suddenly, when the Erinys
strikes, completely the reverse. Up to verse 653 Eteocles is entirely
40 Sophrosyne
rational, self-controlled, and—like the ideal king of the fourth-century

philosophers—a source of self-control for his subjects. After he learns that
Polyneices is to attack the seventh gate, he leaps to the conclusion that
he must meet his brother there, and he loses control of himself. Now he
is in turn exhorted to sophrosyne by the Chorus. It urges him not to be
like Polyneices in anger (opyrjv [678]) but to resist infatuation (ara
[687]), and it speaks of his evil desire (kolkov epcoros [687-88]) and
fiercely gnawing passion (<b/uoSaiajs . . . 'ipcpos [692]). The Coryphaeus
even alludes to the theme of male versus female, bidding Eteocles (712):
“Obey the women, though it goes against the grain”—an oblique indi¬
cation that the roles are now reversed. From this point on, the Chorus
will be the spokesman for sophrosyne.13
The fate of Eteocles is not identical with that of Thebes, for he is de¬
stroyed while the city is saved. The reason for this contrast is not, as we
are sometimes told,14 that Eteocles sacrifices himself for the city, but
rather that the city continues to act with sophrosyne, whereas Eteocles
before our very eyes rejects this virtue. His transition from sophrosyne to
mania and kakos eros is the first manifestation of his helplessness before the
power of the Erinys. Thebes, on the other hand, is saved because its
cause is just and its champions are as sophrones as the attackers are
hybristic.15 The contrast is emphasized through the arresting device
used in the great central scene between Eteocles and the scout, in which
the individual attackers are named and described, and their opponents
selected, in accordance with dike and prepon. The aspect of Argive hybris
which Aeschylus chooses to stress is the boastfulness of all save Amphiar-
aus. Some form of the root of kompein (“to boast”) is used with reference
to each of the other attackers. Tydeus raves with his boastful (imepKopTrois)
trappings (391). Capaneus—6 Kopvros—does not think mortal thoughts
(425). The very chariot mares of Eteoclus make barbarous noises, filling
their muzzle gear with the breath from their proud nostrils (pvKT€poKop7roi$
[464]). In the person of Hippomedon, Phobos vaunts himself (KopTraêrat)
at the gate (500). Not without a boast (aKoprraoTos) does Parthenius take
his stand (538). Polyneices himself shouts threats (639-42). In the case
of the defenders the reverse is true: Melanippus hates boastful words
(410); Megareus lets his two hands do his bragging (473); Actor is not
13 See Friedrich Solmsen, T.A.P.A. 68 (1937), 199 ff.

14E.g., Finley, 244 ff.; Snell, 87. For a summary of the arguments bearing on this ques¬
tion, see H. Lloyd-Jones, C.Q., N.S. 9 (1959), 88-92.
15 This is the answer to the question asked by Lloyd-Jones (loc. cit., 89) about why Thebes
escapes the curse.
Tragedy 4i
boastful (a/cojLt7ros [554]). Why does Aeschylus stress this aspect of hybris
and virtually ignore the other facets that are prominent in the Persians?
The answer may perhaps lie in the emphasis placed throughout the
trilogy on the power of words. The words of Apollo to Laius, the curse
of Oedipus on his sons, the statement of Eteocles in the first line of the
Septem that it is the duty of the king to say what the moment demands
(Xeyclv ta Kaipia), the cries and lamentations of the Chorus which
Eteocles points out will endanger the city (191-95), and now the boasts
of the attackers—all are part of the same pervading pattern.16
By a bold stroke of the imagination Aeschylus mirrors the hybris of the
attackers in their shields. It is as though the boasts that portend the de¬
struction of the Argives were made tangible by being translated into
blazons.17 All the devices are highly symbolic. Tydeus has the heavens
ablaze with stars and in the center the moon, which the scout calls an
insolent device (387); Capaneus has a man brandishing a torch and
promising to burn the town (432-34); Eteoclus, a man in armor climb¬
ing a scaling ladder and defying Ares to hurl him down (466-69);
Hippomedon, the fire-breathing Typhon (493); Parthenopaeus, the
Sphinx, a special taunt to Thebes (541); and, crowning irony, Polyneices
has a figure of Dike, advancing acocpporcos (“modestly”) and leading a
warrior (645 ff.). Only Amphiaraus carries a shield without a blazon, a
symbol of his desire, not to seem, but to be aristos (591-92).
The seer, who is posted at the sixth gate and is therefore mentioned
just before Polyneices, is a figure of special significance, morally and
dramatically both a parallel and a contrast to Eteocles. As a parallel he
shares Eteocles’ piety and sophrosyne; he stands to the hybristle attackers
as Eteocles does to Polyneices. But he contrasts with Eteocles also, for in
the face of certain knowledge that he is doomed to die, he maintains his
self-control and always speaks and acts as a rational being. Eteocles
recognizes an omen in the presence of this dikaios aner among the impious
(598) and thus implies that he feels akin to the seer. Like Eteocles in his
rebuke to the excited women, Amphiaraus reproaches Tydeus and
Polyneices for their acts of hybris (571 ff.). The scout specifically describes
him as an avftpa oueppovicnaTOv (568), and Eteocles praises him as
a atotppto*', Slkouos, ayaOos, cvoe/3ps avpp (610).18 Sophron in both passages
16 Owen (op. cit. 41 ff.) discusses the tragedy in terms of the efficacy of words.
17 The audience sees them only in the mind’s eye. Presumably the shields of the champions
are visible; Aeschylus does not describe them, except in the case of Hyperbius (512-14). The
devices on the shields of the Seven described by Euripides in the Phoenissae are quite differ¬
ent and are not so much hybristic as designed to terrify.
18 This is the second recorded allusion to a canon of four cardinal virtues. Eusebeia (“piety”)
42 Sophrosyne
has the primary meaning of “modest” (opposed to hybns), for here lies
the contrast between the seer and his companions; but the intellectual
aspect of the word is still operative. The opponents whom Eteocles
is bidden to find are to be intelligent and honorable (crocpovs re KayaOovs
[595]), and the one actually chosen is Lasthenes, whom Eteocles de¬
scribes as mature in mind (yepovra rov vovv [622]). Eteocles underscores
the likeness between Amphiaraus and himself by saying that the seer is
wont to be silent or to say what the moment demands (Keyetv ra Kcdpta
[619]),19 the very phrase that he has already used to describe his own
function as king. At this point Eteocles is still sophron (both self-controlled
and sound-minded)—as his meditation upon the difference between
Amphiaraus’ character and his fortune reveals—but he does not realize
that his gnomic statement (601), “The harvest of ate is death,” will
so quickly be proved true in his own case.20
The emphasis laid upon the impious defiance of the gods by six of the
attackers and the contrasting reverence of Amphiaraus (as well as the
appeals of the Thebans to the gods) indicates that the chief significance
of the /ry/>rff-sophrosyne theme is still religious. The hybris of the Argives
resides mainly in their failure to “think mortal thoughts” and their con¬
fidence that the gods cannot stop them—not Ares nor even the thunder¬
bolt of Zeus. The defenders, naturally, are models of eusebeia. Melanippus
honors Aischyne (Compunction) and is urged on by Dike. Polyphontes is
a favorite of Artemis. Hyperbius has on his shield Zeus, who always de¬
feats Typhon. Athene will ward off Hippomedon because she hates his
hybris (501-3). Amphiaraus seems especially dangerous precisely because
he alone of the attackers is eusebes (596): “Dangerous is he who fears the
gods.” It is the Olympians, the rewarders of justice and sophrosyne,
who rescue Thebes, in spite of the king’s death. The connection between
has as good a claim as phronesis or sophia to a place in the original canon and is here more
appropriate than either, because Amphiaraus’ one failure is in respect to prudence (fity
yptvtiv [612]). His reputation for sophrosyne is referred to by Euripides Hyps., Frag. 12. 229-
31, 236 Page, and Phoen. 1112. For Amphiaraus as an exemplar of sophrosyne in Roman
imperial times, see Julian Letter to a Priest 303C. Cf. also Erwin Wolff, Platos Apologie (Berlin,
1929), 77 ff-
19 This phrase is sometimes applied to Apollo or even to Lasthenes, but the parallel with
Eteocles makes it likely that it belongs to Amphiaraus after all.
20 Finley (244) would take the parallel between Eteocles and the seer even further. He be¬
lieves that the assertiveness of the heroic mind is checked, “against their will in Capaneus and
the other Argives, consciously and of their own choice in Eteocles and Amphiaraus. This re¬
turn from the delusive freedom of heroic assertiveness to the bonds of earth, community, and
true freedom creates a final accord between Eteocles and the women.” This interpretation
depends on the theory that Eteocles sacrifices himself and thereby saves the city; for this there
is no evidence in the play.
Tragedy 43
eusebeia and sophrosyne is strongly marked both in this play and in the
Oresteia, where it again effects the salvation of a city.
In the Prometheus Bound the themes of freedom and sophrosyne, so
closely allied in the Persians and the Septem, are for once divorced, and
all who advocate sophrosyne are to some degree enslaved, while the
champion of freedom rejects all counsels of moderation.21 What Aeschylus
intended to make of this situation remains mysterious, but the recon¬
struction of the trilogy which has won most favor in recent years22
is that in which the brutal and tyrannical Zeus, newly enthroned and
therefore harsh in the first play, will himself learn sophrosyne, just as
Prometheus will be persuaded to restrain his bitterness and hate, and the
two will ultimately be reconciled. In the surviving play the traditional
antitheses to sophrosyne are about equally divided between Prometheus
and Zeus,23 but the sympathy of the audience is powerfully engaged on
the side of the Titan. Whatever could be said in favor of Zeus later in
the trilogy, almost everything in the first play speaks against him. The
hybris (“violence, lust”) which he displays towards Io inevitably recalls
that of the Egyptians in their pursuit of the Danaids (except for the
assurance of ultimate release and reward for Io—a pointer towards the
solution). Zeus is ungrateful, suspicious, and violent, corresponding pre¬
cisely to the familiar stereotype of the tyrant in the fifth century. But
Prometheus, too, with his arrogant self-assertion, his steadily increasing
contempt for all restraint, and his refusal to recognize the realities of
the situation, clearly violates sophrosyne—as the Chorus, Oceanus, and
Hermes in turn suggest, when they urge him to curb excess (178-80, 507)
and learn to know himself (309) or to acquire euboulia (“good judgment”
[1035]) and sophrosyne (983). The doctrine of Pathei mathos is implied
for both Zeus (982) and Prometheus (1000),24 and the use that Aeschylus
21 Snell (145) suggests that Aeschylus in P.V has reached the point where he values
to meson more than eleutheria. Without certainty about the remainder of the trilogy, it is diffi¬
cult to predict what will become of the theme of eleutheria, but the attitude of Athene towards
the Mean in government in the Eumemdes supports Snell’s theory. The skolion referred
to earlier (p. 34) reminds us that freedom and sophrosyne could be linked in the popular
imagination as well as in the thought of Aeschylus.
22 The list of those who accept a solution along these lines includes Wilamowitz, Nilsson,
Festugiere, Dodds, Kitto, and Solmsen. For a different view, see H. Lloyd-Jones, J.H.S.
76 (1956), 55-67. Rose (9-10) denies the very existence of a Prometheus trilogy, suggesting
instead that Aeschylus produced in Syracuse, where the requirements of the Attic festivals
did not apply, a Prometheia consisting of the extant play and a Prometheus Unbound.
23 Authadia, thrasos, cholos, hybris, and chlide are especially prominent.
24 On Zeus as tyrant, consult George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (London, 1950) 322.
On the need for Zeus to learn sophrosyne, as well as the probable role of Athene in recon¬
ciling the rebel and the tyrant, see Thomson’s reconstruction of the trilogy in the introduc¬
tion to his edition of Prometheus Bound (Cambridge, 1932), 12-38.
44 Sophrosyne
makes of this solution to the problem of suffering in the Oresteia suggests

a comparable outcome here. The sophrosyne that must emerge before
Zeus and Prometheus can be reconciled will not, it may be supposed, be
the cautious prudence urged by Oceanus and Hermes (311, 983),25 but
a self-knowledge and restraint worthy of the cosmic dignity of the Titan
and the king of the gods—something like the sophrosyne with justice
which Athene evokes in the name of Zeus at the conclusion of the Oresteia.
The treatment of sophrosyne in the Oresteia brings together all the
major themes that we have noted in the earlier plays: freedom versus
tyranny, male versus female, restraint versus hybns. The religious basis
of the virtue is still prominent, especially its connection with eusebeia; but
at the conclusion of the trilogy Aeschylus takes a long step forward and
relates sophrosyne to the life of the polis, doubtless because he perceived
how much Athens herself depended on the sophrosyne of her citizens.
Allusions to sophrosyne in a political context are still extremely rare for
Athens; the Oresteia (458 b.c.) is in fact our major source for the middle
of the fifth century. It may be that in spite of the connection established
between sophrosyne and freedom at the time of the Persian wars, this
virtue still carried predominantly aristocratic overtones for Athenians.
Perhaps after the reforms of Ephialtes, which introduced sharp and
continuing political conflict (Plutarch Pericles 7. 8), sophron became
something of a “dirty word” for self-conscious democrats (rather like our
“sound,” which is noncommittal in general use but politically implies
“conservative”). Only after the revolutions towards the close of the fifth
century exposed oligarchic pretensions to sophrosyne as false did the word
sophron become available to the democrats (who regularly claim it as their
characteristic excellence in fourth-century oratory). An epigraphic allu¬
sion to sophrosyne in the mid-fifth century (in the Miletus decree of ca.
450-449) is difficult to interpret because the immediate context is lost,
but the words cav 8c oocppovd(oi (line 82) may be a warning to the
oligarchs in Miletus that they will receive Athenian support so long as
they display what they claim as the characteristic virtue of oligarchy—
sophrosyne.26
25 Oceanus is the earliest example in tragedy of an ignoble sophrosyne. Lloyd-Jones

(J.H.S. 76 [1956], 66) is unique among recent critics in finding a kind word to say for him.
Snell considers his speech at verse 385 the “bankruptcy” of classical sophrosyne.
26 The Miletus decree (LG. 1 2 22 = A.T.L. II D 11) has been brought to my attention by
Russell Meiggs, who tentatively suggests that Miletus was at this time (450-449 b.c.) under
an oligarchy. He points out that the quota lists suggest a revolt from Athens in the mid-fifties
and the recovery of Miletus in 453, and he links this episode with the statement of the Old
Oligarch (Ath. Pol. 3. 11) that Athens once supported an oligarchy in Miletus. Since the de-
Tragedy 45
In the absence of other evidence for sophrosyne as an Athenian arete
politike at this period, the Oresteia is doubly precious. At the conclusion
of the trilogy sophrosyne (“moderation”) emerges as the force that will
save the polis from the two extremes of anarchy and despotism, and it is
specifically designated as the characteristic virtue of Athens. This sophro¬
syne is not a “class” virtue but obviously owes much to Solon’s middle
way, and, as in Solon’s political elegy, moderation and justice go hand
in hand. In the Agamemnon the kinship of sophrosyne and justice (implied
in the Suppliants and the Septem) is firmly established by the interweav¬
ing of the two virtues in the choral odes on which depends the moral
atmosphere of the entire trilogy. Furthermore, the connection of sophro¬
syne with the doctrine of Pathei mathos becomes explicit in these same
odes, which give out a theme to be echoed in the Eumenides. The key
passage (176-81) first praises Zeus for setting mankind on the road to
wisdom (cppovciv) and establishing the validity of the principle “Learn
by suffering,” and then immediately adds that ooxppovdv comes to men
against their will (7ro:p’ olkovms).27 The second part of the statement
explicates the first.
cree is two years later than the “liberation,” Meiggs infers that the first settlement has
not been satisfactory and that Athens now needs to take stronger action, including the
installation of a garrison and a political resident. He thinks that Miletus is still being governed
by oligarchs, and sees in the words quoted a warning that Athens will be generous towards
Miletus only if the oligarchs display sophrosyne (moderation or good sense?). Meiggs empha¬
sizes, however, that there is no evidence that the decree represents a second stage of Athenian
interference, or that the language of the decree necessarily indicates a Milesian oligarchy. A
later date (426-425) for the decree, suggested by H. B. Mattingly (Histona 10 [1961],
174-81) is convincingly refuted by Meiggs (H.S.C.P. 67 [1963], 24-25).
27 This passage—especially the doctrine of Pathei mathos and sophrosyne—has recently
been attacked from two directions. Lloyd-Jones (C.Q. 6 [1956], 62 ff.) maintains that it em¬
bodies only a primitive conception of Zeus, entirely within the framework of the theology of
Hesiod, and complains that the victims of the “law” in the Oresteia are not purified or
ennobled but are merely killed, and that others learn from their death nothing but the use¬
lessness of defying Zeus’ law. See also, along these lines, J. D. Denniston and Denys Page,
Aeschylus, Agamemnon (Oxford, 1957), xv, xxiii-xxix, 85-86. T. G. Rosenmeyer (A.J.P. 76
[1955]> 225-60) makes the more radical suggestion that for Aeschylus the gods are no more
than a mise en scene, an instrument of the poet’s apate, and therefore whatever Aeschylus says
about Zeus in this ode has only a dramatic, not a religious, importance (256): “The recapitu¬
lation of the developments at Aulis is momentarily interrupted, at the point of Agamemnon’s
hopeless decision, to evoke a false picture of security in Zeus, and to underscore the enigma
of the universal order, while at the same time holding out such make-believe panaceas
as sophrosyne and the like.” Rosenmeyer, too, complains that the victim never has a real
choice (255): “Pathei mathos and know thyself are useless if the human agent is placed in a
dilemma which leaves him no scope for restraint.” But it is wrong to assume that Agamemnon
had no choice, and it is unfair to Aeschylus to charge him with evoking “a false picture of
security in Zeus” at this point in the tragedy. As Kitto observes (“Idea of God,” 183 ff.),
46 Sophrosyne
In this passage phronein and sophronein have substantially the same

meaning: “understanding, wisdom, soundness of mind”—paraphrased
by vyieia eppgv&v (“health of mind”) in the Eumenides (535-36). The
source of this wisdom that comes to men even against their will (7rap’
olkovtols being equivalent to pathei) is Zeus, or his daughter Dike (Aiko.
8e rols pkv TraOovcnv paOdv imppiTrei—“Justice allots wisdom to those
who have suffered” [Ag. 250]), or in the final dispensation his ministers,
the Eumenides ($vjuqxpci ococppovelv V7rd ot('.vet—“It is advantageous to
learn wisdom under stress” [Eum. 520-21]). The wisdom thus divinely
instilled is the wisdom that controls hybris (or Opao\nr\$, often its equiva¬
lent in the Agamemnon28) and teaches man to observe the limits imposed
by his own nature, the gods, or the polls. Connected with the theme of
learning through suffering is that of late learning. When this appears in
the Agamemnon—in the threats of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus to the
Chorus (1425, 1620)—it contains no deeper significance than is custom¬
ary in the gnomic tradition, and sophronein means no more than
“prudence”; but the ococppovovvres kv xporw of the Eumenides 1000 is
freighted with the Pathei mathos doctrine and with prophecies of
Athenian destiny.29
The opposition between sophrosyne and hybris is prominent in the
Agamemnon, where the hybris is chiefly that of Agamemnon himself and
is symbolized by the blood-red carpet.30 He realizes that to tread on the
carpet is to tread sophrosyne underfoot, for he says (927-28): “Not to be
unsound of mind [to 1arj kolkcos ypovdv] is the best gift of God.” But after
his death our attention switches to the hybris, violence, and adultery of
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. That they have established conditions under
which sophrosyne cannot exist is evident from the prayer of the Chorus
in the second play (786), “that things may work out for those who wish
Aeschylus does not say in this ode that Zeus is all-wise, for at the moment he is not. What he
does say is that Zeus has made wisdom possible: “Out of your suffering wisdom may come.”
It seems inescapable that society, as represented by Orestes and the Athenians, has actually
achieved a higher degree of wisdom at the end of the trilogy than Agamemnon and
Clytemnestra possessed at the beginning; this result justifies the doctrine of Pathei mathos. The
gods also learn wisdom kv xpot'w, and not only the Erinyes but Zeus himself advances
in morality in the course of the trilogy. See Eduard Fraenkel, Aeschylus, Agamemnon (Oxford,
1950), ad 176, for the “much higher plane of ideas” arrived at by Aeschylus than that found
in the gnomic tradition. The implications of the Pathei mathos doctrine for this passage and
for P.V. have been studied by Heinrich Dorrie, Leid und Erfahrung (Mainz, 1956), 324-30.
28 E.g., 168, 222, 769 (Thrasos, the child of Hybris), 1399, 1437, 1671.
29 That cities as well as individuals learn by suffering is evident from verses 709-11.
30 See Goheen, loc. cit., 128 ff, for a discussion of the imagery in this scene and its relation
to the past hybris of Agamemnon and the fresh hybris of Clytemnestra.
Tragedy 47
to see ra occxppovaP In the latter part of the Agamemnon the subsidiary
theme of sophrosyne versus tyranny (already seen in the Persians) reap¬
pears. A tyranny has been set up in Argos, and the threats of Clytem-
nestra and Aegisthus reveal their tyrannical nature. Hence a prominent
theme of the Choephoroi is freeing the city from the tyrants and establish¬
ing freedom, justice, and sophrosyne; this theme in turn leads to the
political solution in the Eumenides. A link between the Oresteia and the
Prometheus is the tendency of both to conclude that sophrosyne, while in¬
compatible with tyranny, is also incompatible with unrestrained self-
assertion on the part of those who are ruled. In the Prometheus neither
Zeus the tyrant nor Prometheus the defiant rebel is sophron, while in the
Oresteia we learn that both despotism and anarchy are hateful to the
spirit of the Mean.
The motive of masculine versus feminine appears in the Oresteia in a
form less simple than in earlier tragedies. The feminine element is
v represented no longer by a chorus of terrified women, but rather by the
towering figure of Clytemnestra, who violates sophrosyne in a new way.
Aeschylus has now turned from the Sdoaoa to the Kparovoa. woman
(Septem 189-90). Clytemnestra’s offense against sophrosyne takes the ob¬
vious form of adultery and the less obvious form of upsetting the proper
order of society by her murder of her husband, which subjects Argos to
the rule of a woman—or rather, of two women (Choeph. 304-5). Refer¬
ences to feminine characteristics in the Agamemnon are uniformly deroga¬
tory: women are credulous, led by their emotions to believe what they
wish to believe (483, 592), and they are luxurious (a/3pvve [918], con¬
nected with hybris [1205]).31 The Chorus devotes a long ode to the evil
deeds of women (1455 ff), and finally Aegisthus, the adulterer and
usurper, is addressed by the Chorus as yvvou (1625).32 That sophrosyne
is a masculine trait is implied when the Chorus says to Clytemnestra
(351); “Woman, you speak prudently like a man of sense [/car' avdpa
ocooppova].” The Choephoroi adds something to our knowledge of sophro¬
syne in this context. Again, the Chorus sings a significant ode about the
behavior of women in the grip of passion (585-651). Althaea, Scylla, and
the women of Lemnos are mentioned, but the Chorus clearly has
Clytemnestra in mind. Hence the earlier prayer of Electra is enlighten¬
ing: she asks that she may be ococppoveorcpa and evoe/3eorepa (“more
31 On agpoTTjs and in Aeschylus and Pindar, see Snell, 81.

32 For the view that yvvai (“woman”) is addressed to Aegisthus, see Fraenkel, op. atand
Denniston and Page, op. cit. The effeminacy of Aegisthus is indicated in Choeph. 305;
his cowardice in Ag. 1224.
48 Sophrosyne
pure and pious”) than her mother (140-41). The plea for purity indi¬
cates the difference in motive and therefore in moral status between the
acts of Electra and Clytemnestra and marks an important step in the
development of the religious ideas expressed in the trilogy.
The Eumenides brings the conflict of male versus female to a surprising
climax in the debate before the Areopagus about the true parentage of
the child. This debate has no explicit connection with sophrosyne but
leads towards the solution of the moral chaos in the earlier plays of the
trilogy. The acceptance of the masculine principle advocated by Apollo
and approved by Athene (however illogical the grounds) reasserts the
order that was upset when Clytemnestra murdered Agamemnon and
gave Argos a tyrant in his stead—reasserts it, however, on a higher
plane where justice and sophrosyne are both at work.33
The final scene before the Areopagus demonstrates the need for
sophrosyne in human society and does so by recourse to the theme of
fear, restated in terms of awe and reverence (sebas, deinon, deos), which
awaken echoes of the u phobos-moX.\ve” prominent in the Agamemnon. In
that play an atmosphere of dread and foreboding was established by the
watchman in the prologue when he said that phobos (“fear”) stood
beside him, in place of sleep (14). The Chorus deepened the note of fear
with its ominous hints of evil and danger (as in 100, 121, 253, 459-60),
until Cassandra made all but tangible the terror that hung over the house
of Atreus. There is a close link between sophrosyne and the theme
of phobos in other plays of Aeschylus,34 but the relation is usually one of
opposition: terrified women (the Danaids, the Thebans) are urged by
Danaus or Eteocles to be sophrones, that is, to control their terror. In the
Prometheus the relation is equivocal: fear of the unjust and violent Zeus
gives rise to an unheroic sophrosyne in Oceanus and Hermes. In the
Choephoroi fear is again personified at the very end, when Orestes, sur¬
rounded by the Furies, cries out (1024-25): “At my heart Phobos is
ready to sing and dance with wrath,” and the Chorus bids him not give
way to fear (1052), an injunction echoed by Apollo near the beginning
of the Eumenides (88). Obviously the Furies are linked with phobos, and
Apollo represents deliverance from fear.
In the Eumenides the Furies make their case for maintaining fear as
guardian of the heart (517 ff.). It is advantageous to learn wisdom
under stress: $vpcpepa oooypovdv into otcvci (520-21), an echo of Ag.
33 See Kitto, “Idea of God,” 186.

34 Consult Snell for the development of this theme and the relation of phobos to sophrosyne
in the Eumenides.
180-81. Neither anarchy nor despotism should be praised, for God has
assigned power to the Mean in every way (526-30). Hybris is the child
of impiety, from vyUta cppev&v comes happiness, and reverence leads to
justice, as piety and aidos lead to prosperity (533 ff.). This speech brings
fear {demon, deos) within the range of sebas (“reverence”) and aidos (525,
533, 546 ff.) and thereby begins the rehabilitation of phobos, so that
it, too, may find a place in the new dispensation. That the position of the
Furies has some justification and is, indeed, essential for the welfare of
Athens is confirmed when Athene quotes what they have said. On the
Areopagus, she asserts, Sebas and its kinsman, Phobos, shall prevent the
Athenians from doing wrong by night or day (690-92). The townsmen
should revere {sebein) neither anarchy nor despotism, nor banish utterly
what is terrifying {demon). Sebas is a bulwark for the country and the
city such as neither the Scythians nor the Peloponnesians possess. The
Scythians evidently represent anarchy, the Spartans despotism; by
implication, the Athenians typify the Mean.35
When the Furies have consented to renounce their bitter resentment
and become kindly goddesses, their benediction to the Athenians (com¬
parable to the sophrones prayers of the Danaids for Argos) visualizes the
citizens seated beside Zeus, beloved by Athene, learning wisdom in time
{oucppovovvTcs kv xpovoo [1000]). Here is the true outcome of the doctrine
of Pathei mathos: the establishment of sophrosyne with justice as the
foundation stones of the Athenian polis, and the union of sophrosyne with
reverence to achieve the Mean in government. Phobos has been made
acceptable, just as Peitho (Persuasion), who was entirely evil and deceit¬
ful in the Agamemnon, becomes in the Eumemdes a beneficent and whole¬
some power wielded by Athene, appropriately enough, in the first
Athenian law court.36 She even connects the two, when she bids the
Furies hold sacred the Peithous sebas (“reverence for Persuasion” [885])
and give up their wrath. The gods themselves, we note—not just man¬
kind—have learned sophrosyne kv ypovog. Apollo, the first spokesman
for Zeus, was the instigator of murder in the Agamemnon and the Choe-
phoroi and was intemperate and abusive towards the older powers in the
35 Solmsen (Hesiod, 121, n. 70, and p. 209) finds the beginning of this contrast between
governmental extremes in Solon 5. 7 ff. He compares Plato Laws III (693E ff., 697C, 698A
ff, 701E), where, however, Persia represents the extreme of despotism; Athens, excessive
freedom; and Sparta and Crete, ta metria.
36 On the conversion of Peitho, see Solmsen, Hesiod, 136, 200; Thomson, Aeschylus and
Athens, 293-94; Owen, op. cit., 129; and Goheen, loc. cit., 130. F. M. Cornford (Plato’s Cosmol¬
ogy [London, 1937], 361-64) finds analogies between the Eumemdes and the Timaeus, includ¬
ing the role of Peitho in both.
go Sophrosyne
Eumenides. The Furies themselves were foul daemons who delighted in

human blood. But Athene, who persuades the old to join hands with
the new and speaks for Zeus at the end of the process of reconciliation,
is gracious to the older goddesses (881-84), a loving guardian over her
people (927-28), and herself the perfect exemplar of sebas, peitho, and
sophrosyne. The theme of reconciliation originates with Hesiod, but it is
Aeschylus who first gives to sophrosyne a role in this process.
SOPHOCLES
In Sophoclean tragedy the conflict between hybris and sophrosyne no

longer occupies the center of the stage. As Jaeger and others have
observed,37 this Aeschylean subject has retreated to the periphery, along
with the corresponding theme of suffering as the punishment for guilt. To
Sophocles the object of primary interest is not the deed but the doer, and
in his tragedies suffering is likely to be either disproportionate to its cause
or totally undeserved. As a result of this shift of interest both hybris and
sophrosyne present different aspects from those found in Aeschylus.
Hybris is more often an offense against human standards than an affront
to the gods. The remark in the Trachimae (280) that the daimones also hate
hybris is significant, for it implies that naturally and primarily hybris
offends mortals.38 Sophrosyne, too, is more remote from its religious
bases than in Aeschylus; except in the Ajax, its motives spring from the
relations between man and man, rather than between man and god.
Furthermore, the poet’s interest in character leads him to emphasize the
relation of sophrosyne to the other elements in a complex soul, rather
than to concentrate on a situation in which sophrosyne has been violated.
There is a noticeable increase in the variety of meanings attached to the
words sophron and sophronein in Sophocles 39—a reflection, no doubt,
of contemporary usage; but on the whole it may be said that sophrosyne
now tends to be intellectual in its implications, although the moral
aspect is prominent in the Ajax and never wholly disappears. In terms of
the Delphic proverbs, Sophoclean sophrosyne leans towards Gnothi
sauton rather than Meden agan.
For the /ry^m-sophrosyne conflict of Aeschylus, Sophocles substitutes
37 Paideia, i. 282-83; Kitto, 142. See Del Grande, 131-48, on the different dramatic
treatment of hybris in Aeschylus and Sophocles.
38 Cf. Opstelten, Sophocles and Greek Pessimism (Amsterdam, 1952), 69.
39 In Sophocles, as in Aeschylus, the noun sophrosyne is lacking. Only thirteen related words
are used in the extant tragedies: the adjective sophron appears four times; the adverb
sophronos once; and the verb sophronein eight times. Consult Friedrich Ellendt, Lexicon Sopho-
cleum (Berlin, 1872). Fragments in which the word sophron appears are discussed in n. 88 below.
Tragedy 51
the struggle between the demands of the heroic nature (the eugenes) and
the limitations imposed even on the hero by the realities of human life.40
In the typical Sophoclean situation the central figure, who towers above
ordinary beings and cherishes a noble standard of conduct to which he
will sacrifice everything else, encounters disaster through a weakness
that is inextricably connected with his strength: the hero, that is, pushes
beyond permissible limits that form of arete in which he excels, and thus
reveals his failure to know himself perfectly or to know the truth about
his circumstances. Ajax, Electra, both Heracles and Deianeira, Creon in
the Antigone, even Antigone herself, and Oedipus in Oedipus Tyrannus are
examples of this kind of failure in sophrosyne, which Sophocles some¬
times links with the theme of the nothingness of man. In addition to ex¬
cess, the Sophoclean hero is commonly marked by a second species
of failure in sophrosyne (and this is clearly a failure in self-knowledge)
—namely, delusion. If the theme of excess represents the moral aspect of
sophrosyne in Sophocles, the theme of delusion illustrates the intellectual.
Delusion takes many forms and may be more or less prominent.41 In
the Ajax the temporary madness of the hero, which leads him to mistake
animals for men, is sent by Athene; but long before this event Ajax has
deluded himself into believing that he can triumph without the help of
the gods (764-69, 770-75), a delusion specifically described (779) as ov
KOiT avdpoiTTOv cppovtbv (“not thinking mortal thoughts”). This is the
delusion, the violation of sophrosyne, that earns him the enmity of the
goddess. In the Trachiniae delusion is a net of ate, woven around Deianira
by Moira and Gypris; while in the Antigone a total lack of self-knowledge
deludes Creon in his relations with everyone else. Often the theme of
delusion is connected with a misunderstood oracle or prophecy: Teucer
in the Ajax, Heracles in the Trachiniae, and Oedipus in the Tyrannus are
victims of such misunderstanding. Even the Philoctetes shows a vestige of
this theme. When the meaning of the prophecy of Helenus is fully
explained by Heracles, Philoctetes makes that reasonable accommoda¬
tion to reality which is the essence of sophrosyne in Sophoclean tragedy.
After reading Aeschylus, who expresses through characters and Chorus
alike a profound respect for sophrosyne,42 one is at first baffled by
40 Wolfgang Schadewaldt (op. cit., 103-4) discusses the effect on the arete of the heroic in¬
dividual when it is confined within the boundaries of civic virtue, so that a conflict results
between the principles of individualism and communal life.
41 On this theme, consult Karl Reinhardt, Sophokles (Frankfurt, 1947), 57 ff, and
Opstelten, op. cit., 124, 187-90.
42 Kitto (no) discusses the reasons why the Aeschylean Chorus is in a position to make
such pronouncements, while the Chorus of Sophocles often is not.
52 Sophrosyne
Sophocles’ treatment of the subject. No heroic figure in Sophoclean

tragedy speaks of sophrosyne with unalloyed admiration.43 Ajax indeed
recommends it to Tecmessa as a virtue proper to women, but in his
“speech of deception” he shows that while he understands what sophronein
means to the rest of the world (“acquiescence in limitation”), he cannot
himself accept it. Electra is even more specific in her rejection: she tells
the Chorus that in her plight there is no place for sophronein or eusebein.
To the word eusebeia (and to aidos) she in fact gives a new connotation,
and we will consider in due course the possibility that she does the same
for sophrosyne.44 Secondary figures who urge sophrosyne or interpret its
demands are unheroic (Creon in the Oedipus Tyrannus) or even, by
a favorite Sophoclean irony, guilty of hybns themselves (Menelaus and
Agamemnon in the Ajax).
How then does Sophocles create the impression that his tragedies are
much concerned with sophrosyne? 45 He does it in three ways: by the
device of contrasting characters, by the use of traditional topoi of sophro¬
syne (even without the word itself) in key choral odes, and by the very
form of his tragic poetry, which, in its strict but apparently effortless
control of the most intense emotion, illustrates sophrosyne in its ultimate
perfection. The first two methods, which are largely a matter of content,
will be discussed here. A consideration of the effect of poetic style in
conveying an impression of sophrosyne would require a separate book;
meanwhile Jaeger’s perceptive remarks on “the firm harmonious repose”
of Sophocles’ poetry and the power of its sounds and rhythms to restore
a sense of balance and proportion suggest the direction such a study
might take.46
The reliance of Sophocles on the device of contrast for both structure
and characterization is widely recognized.47 It is this device in particu¬
lar that enables us to see the relation of sophrosyne to the tragic action
and character, and this fact explains why the choruses and the second¬
ary figures, whatever their differences otherwise, often insist on the
43 Schadewaldt (op. cit., 104, n. 1) has compiled a list of concepts that are regularly associ¬
ated in Sophoclean tragedy: kleos (“glory”), eukleia (“good repute”), gennaion (“nobility”), and
kalon (“the fair”) are opposed to nous, phronein, euboulia, eulabeia, sophronein (all indicate intel¬
lectual processes or prudence). Cf. also Schmid-Stahlin, Griechische Literatur-Geschichte, 1.
2. 470, n. 16.
44 See p. 65.
45 A very general impression: see, e.g., T. B. L. Webster, Introduction to Sophocles (Oxford,
1936), 27, 37, 65; Jaeger, Paideia, 1. 277; Opstelten, op. cit., no.
46Paideia, I. 277.
47 See Kirkwood, 83, 100, and Webster, op. cit., 85.
Tragedy 53
need for sophrosyne (or some familiar equivalent) or else behave in an
almost ostentatiously sophron manner.
The publication of Whitman’s book on Sophocles with its concentra¬
tion on the heroic humanism of the Sophoclean tragic character has
proved a healthy corrective to the traditional view that found in
Sophocles’ plays only a rather tedious moral lesson about the value of
sophrosyne. No one is now tempted to overlook the poet’s emphasis on
the overwhelming nobility of the heroic soul or to interpret Sophoclean
tragedy in too Aeschylean a light. It would be unfortunate, however, if
Whitman’s persuasive attack on “classicism” and his defense of the
heroic should lead to an oversimplification in the other direction—lead,
that is, to an uncritical acceptance of the values of the heroic figure as
they seem to the hero himself. It is easy to be swept away by the mag¬
nificence of Ajax or the superb disdain of Antigone; inevitably the con¬
trast between the heroic figure and its foils emphasizes the isolated
nobility of the tragic soul. But to regard this as the view of Sophocles
himself is to do an injustice to the complexity that he found in the nature
of man; and to justify Whitman’s interpretation of Sophoclean tragedy
it is occasionally necessary to ignore whole scenes in certain plays or to
regard as mere conventional framework speeches that actually are rich
in meaning. Many of these speeches have to do with sophrosyne. It is
Whitman’s view that Sophocles has abandoned this word to “the little
people who wish to be safe.” 48 His comments deserve to be quoted in
full, since they pose a serious problem:
Sophocles’ dramas may well teach sophrosyne, but it is in the character of the hero
that this sophrosyne is to be found, and not in the commonplaces and cliches of the
chorus and lesser characters. It is the hero himself who has the real self-knowledge
[italics mine]: the others have only rules of behavior. And yet, because in the mid-
fifth century these rules of behavior had already become identified with sophro¬
syne in common intercourse, it forever appears that the protagonist moves blindly
and arbitrarily along his fated road, while the static chorus and all the secondary
figures stand firmly on the bed-rock of a settled and utterly correct ethic, approved
and protected by the sanction of the gods themselves. Not even the hero himself
can say that he acts from sophrosyne, for the word has already been pinned down
to a code of behavior closely resembling philistinism.49
It is true that to accept the speeches of the choruses and the second¬
ary figures as the view of the poet is often—not always—a mistake, but
48 Whitman, 9.
49 Ibid., 8-9. S. M. Adams (Sophocles the Playwright [Toronto, 1957], 18-19) also suggests that
Sophocles believes that sophrosyne is to be sacrificed to tolma (“daring”), thrasos (“boldness”),
or even hybris, if the unwritten laws, interpreted in the light of aidos and eusebeia, so demand.
54 Sophrosyne
it is equally erroneous to equate the hero’s point of view with that of

Sophocles. If “sophrosyne is not to be found in the commonplaces and
cliches of the chorus and lesser characters,” neither is it to be found in
the character of the hero, and it is futile to deny that the chief figures
regularly precipitate their respective catastrophes by some excess or de¬
lusion of their own. The hero’s self-knowledge is never perfect; there is
always a blindness to something essential in himself or his situation, and
tragedy arises out of the interplay between his circumstances and his
admirable but imperfect nature. That is the real reason the hero cannot
claim sophrosyne: it is foreign to his nature, and he (unlike some
Euripidean heroes) recognizes the fact. The poet himself—not any one
of his characters, major or minor—is the one who truly understands
sophrosyne, and it is the entire poem, not any one speech or choral ode,
that conveys its significance. Hence it is essential to appreciate that one
of the functions of the secondary figures and the choruses is to remind us
of the normal Greek standards of conduct, including the conviction that
self-knowledge and moderation equip a man to face reality.
It is not at all necessary to think that Sophocles meant us to find
admirable the secondary characters and their easily achieved sophrosyne.
With one exception they are unheroic, and without exception they are
untragic. Aeschylus in the Prometheus Bound had already represented in
a distinctly unheroic light that advocate of sophrosyne, Oceanus, and in
Sophocles both Ismene and Chrysothemis exhibit something of the same
quality. They possess only what Plato was to describe in the Republic as
sophrosyne cos 'nXpOe.i and in the Phaedo as sophrosyne Sthiotikt}50—
a virtue that is habitual, rather than philosophical, and consists mainly
in obedience to rulers and control of appetites. Neither Plato nor
Sophocles would regard this as anything but a low level of the virtue.
Creon in the Oedipus Tyrannus possesses a kind of sophrosyne that owes
more to intellectual analysis and conscious choice than does the sophro¬
syne of Ismene and Chrysothemis; theirs amounts to no more than a timid
acquiescence in the conventions of feminine behavior. If we were to as¬
sign stages of the virtue to Sophoclean characters (like the Neoplatonic
bathmoi), we would place Creon on the second rung of the ladder. He
abides by all the rules: he is cautious in assertions (569); he thinks
mortal thoughts; he refuses to act without consulting the gods (1438-39);
he prefers to enjoy untroubled the power of a king rather than to have
at once the name and the manifold troubles of a king (he calls this
50 Rep. 389D-E; Phaedo 82A.

Tragedy 55
preference sophron [589]); and he refuses to gloat over the downfall of
Oedipus, who has so brutally threatened him. In all this it is legitimate
to see a character designed for the express purpose of contrasting with
Oedipus as sharply as possible; it is undoubtedly significant that Sophocles
chooses sophrosyne as the basis of this contrast. That Creon is unheroic,
untragic, and, as Kirkwood points out, unattractive,51 makes him all the
more effective as a foil to Oedipus.
The third rung of the ladder of sophrosyne may be assigned to
Odysseus in the Ajax. His sophrosyne, which appears most markedly in
his recognition of the common humanity that he shares with his enemy
(121 ff.), is of an enlightened variety, and, unlike Creon, he is a thoroughly
sympathetic character. Where Creon is self-regarding in his sophrosyne,
Odysseus is generous and magnanimous. By contrast to Ajax, however,
he is lacking in the quality of heroism, that consciousness of supreme
nobility which lies behind both the violence and the genuine megalopsychia
of the hero. Only one of all Sophocles’ sophrones foil characters may
properly be called heroic: Theseus in the Oedipus at Colonus. Not only does
he display magnanimity in welcoming the outcast Oedipus to Athens and
assuring him of protection—expressing himself with a commonplace of
sophrosyne (567), e£ot5’ avpp ihv (“I know that I am mortal”); but he is
twice specifically described with the key word of Sophoclean nobility,
gennaios (569, 1636). His power of restraining his thymos, even when justly
aroused by Creon, gives him the right to urge self-restraint upon the
choleric Oedipus (592, 1180). Theseus alone in Sophoclean tragedy
demonstrates the possibility of being at once gennaios and sophron. Is it by
accident that he appears in the Oedipus at Colonus as the representative
of Athens, whose greatest achievement was the combination of just
these qualities?
Sophocles’ use of the Chorus in the interests of sophrosyne is very
similar to his use of secondary characters. The Chorus often has a strong
contrasting value; and since each Chorus is equipped with a well-
defined personality, the type of sophrosyne it represents may differ from
one play to another. Thus the Chorus of Salaminians in the Ajax uses
sophronein in the sense of “be moderate, self-controlled” (1264), an
Aeschylean connotation employed by both Ajax himself and Menelaus
in the same play. The Chorus advises Ajax to avoid boastfulness (386),
partly out of genuine concern for him but partly also out of fear for its
own fate if he is destroyed.
51 Kirkwood, 131-32.
56 Sophrosyne
The Chorus in the Electro, also personally involved with the chief
figure, at first urges moderation upon the heroine and reproaches her for
violating ta metna (140) and for going to extremes in hatred (176), but
its adherence to sophrosyne is little more than conventional. Once it has
been convinced that Electra’s murderous intention is justified, it accepts
her interpretation of nobility, piety, and allied values and abandons its
earlier resistance. Its only use of the word sophronein is in a highly con¬
ventional phrase (465), cl oucppovi)ocLS (“if you will be sensible”), a
cliche in comedy and oratory towards the close of the fifth century.
It should be noted that the two explicit references to the verb sophronein
by the choruses of the Ajax and the Electro come not in the odes but
merely in choral iambics, whose dramatic and spiritual weight tends to
be negligible.52 The real feeling for sophrosyne emerges from the odes
themselves and is conveyed, neither by explicit comments on the doctrine
of sophrosyne nor by pointed criticism of the conduct of the chief figures,
but, more lyrically and subtly, by reflections upon the themes of sophro¬
syne familiar in Homer, lyric and elegy, popular proverbs, earlier tragedy,
and Herodotus: the nothingness of man, the mutability of all things, the
danger of hybris or of overmastering passion.of any kind, particularly
eros, and the need for acquiescence in the Divine will.53 The most sig¬
nificant and effective of these odes are, as we might expect, those sung
by the choruses of the Antigone, the Oedipus Tyrannus, and the Oedipus at
Colonus, which are composed of elders unselfishly concerned with the
welfare of the polis and with eternal moral principles. The views on the
danger of hybris which are expressed in the second stasimon of the Oedipus
Tyrannus, the reflections in the second stasimon of the Antigone on the
impossibility of checking the power of Zeus by a vjrcppaoia avbp&v
52 Cf. Kirkwood, 188.

53 For an exhaustive list of Sophoclean reminiscences of epic, lyric, and elegiac poetry, see
Schmid-Stahlin, op. cit., i. 2. 311-12, n. 6. Opstelten (op. cit., 166 ff.) collects many of these
allusions in connection with particular themes, as does Sir John Sheppard in his edition of the
Oedipus Tyrannus (Cambridge, 1920), lix-lxxix. See also Webster, op. cit., 39 ff. Neither in the
following passages from earlier poetry nor in the Sophoclean odes is there any overt reference
to sophrosyne; the effect is achieved without use of the word: Nothingness of man: Homer Od.
18. 130-31; Pindar Pyth. 8. 95; Simonides 15 Page; Bacchylides 3. 78 Snell; Herodotus
I. 32; cf. Sophocles O.T. 1187 ff. Mutability: Homer It. 6. 146-49; Archilochus 67a,
6-7 Diehl3; Mimnermus 2 Diehl3; Theognis 159-60, 567, 591 ff., 657-58; Simonides
16 Page; cf. Sophocles Ajax 127 ff., Track. 130 ff., Phil. 179 ff. Danger of hybris: Pindar Pyth.
II. 27; Solon 1. 11 Diehl3; Herodotus 7. 108; cf. Sophocles Ajax 760 ff., O.T. 872 ff. Over¬
mastering power of eros or Aphrodite: Pindar, Frags. 123, 127; Nem. 8. 4 ff; cf. Sophocles
Trach. 441 ff., 497 ff., 860, Ant. 781 ff. Delusion, ate, deceptive hope: Homer II. 9. 502
ff.; Hesiod Erg. 498; Simonides 1. 1-10 Diehl3; Pindar Nem. 11. 45 ff.; Bacchylides 9. 18; cf.
Sophocles Ant. 582 ff.
Tragedy 57
(“overstepping by mankind” [604-5]) and the fir) (pvvou ode in Oedipus
at Colonus are more than merely conventional. They express profound
and justified convictions about fundamental problems, and they do so
in a way that contributes both to the dramatic effect and to the moral
background against which the chief figures act.
Space does not permit an analysis of all the relevant odes. Sheppard’s
discussion of the use of familiar topoi of sophrosyne in the odes of the
Oedipus Tyrannus suggests the richness of the material that Sophocles
exploited.54 The second stasimon of the Antigone offers an especially en¬
lightening example of the technique. Coming after the episode in which
Antigone and Creon clash and Antigone and Ismene are both con¬
demned to death, the ode first devotes itself to a lament for the family
of Labdacus, accursed from ancient days, and then turns to more gen¬
eralized reflections. It touches upon such traditional topics as the con¬
trast between Divine power and human weakness, the ate that follows
excess in human life, the fickleness of hope and her gifts, and the theme
of delusion leading to ateAb The dramatic effectiveness of this stasimon
has been demonstrated, and it is true that its ambiguity on the question
of precisely who is offending Zeus maintains suspense at a point in the
plot where an open accusation would be disastrous; but in addition to
conveying a “feeling of impending calamity for wrongdoing,” 56 the ode
specifically suggests a kind of wrongdoing that the Greeks associated with
the violation of sophrosyne, and it does so by the use of the topoi listed
above. This stasimon and certain odes in the two Oedipus plays show this
technique in its perfection, but all Sophocles’ plays, except the Ajax,
have at least one choral ode of this general type. The Trachiniae has its
parodos on mutability (122 ff.) and its ode on the overwhelming power
of Cypris (497 ff.); the Electra its kommos on the might of Zeus and the
folly of excess in grief and hatred (137 ff.); and the Philoctetes, its ode on
the pitiable lot of man (169 ff.) and its kommos on the disastrous effects
of stubbornness (1095 ff.).
At least six of Sophocles’ tragic characters, diverse though they are in
54 Sheppard, op. cit., lix-lxxix. In spite of the criticism of Sheppard’s interpretation of the
odes by Bernard Knox (Oedipus at Thebes [New Haven, 1957], 100), the background material
that Sheppard collected is useful and relevant as an example of Sophocles’ method of calling
forth the associations stored in the minds of his hearers.
55 Cf. 620 ff. with Theognis 403 ff. and 133-42, and with Solon 1. 67 Diehl.3 Kitto,
162, n. 1, calls attention to the play on the word ate. See Del Grande (135) on parallels be¬
tween Sophocles’ use of virepfiaota and Aeschylus’ use of Trapgaota (Sept. 734-49) as synonyms
for hybris.
56 See Kirkwood, 208.
58 Sophrosyne
all except fidelity to a private standard of heroic excellence, precipitate

their catastrophes through some defect in sophrosyne. The arrogance of
Ajax, the stubbornness of Antigone and the tyrannical hybris of Greon,
the rashness and violent temper of Oedipus, Electra’s contempt for
moderation, even the excessive credulity of Deianeira violate this far-
reaching virtue (especially in its primary significance of soundness of
mind or self-knowledge). To recognize this is by no means to accuse them
all of serious failings proportionate to their punishment; only in the case
of Creon in the Antigone do we feel that the punishment is justified (and
only in this play is there a strong suggestion of the Aeschylean Pathei
mathos).bl But to deny them any failing is to ignore the degree to which
they are responsible for what they do and suffer, and thus to rob them
of their stature as tragic figures.
The relation of sophrosyne to the tragedy of the eugenes (“noble, well¬
born”) individual is most clearly defined in the Ajax, which is justly re¬
garded as the most Aeschylean of the tragedies.58 It is Aeschylean in the
prominence given to the conflict between hybris and sophrosyne and in
the essential meaning assigned to these concepts (hybris: failure to think
mortal thoughts; sophrosyne: respecting limits, both Divine and human),
but the treatment of the theme is already intensely Sophoclean. Instead
of making the demonstration of hybris the climax of the drama, Sophocles
presents it in the Prologue and then deliberately minimizes it, after he
has impressed us with both the shocking arrogance and the heroic
stature of Ajax.59 The rest of the play has to do with the rehabilitation
of Ajax (pace Kitto),60 partly through our sight of him when the mad¬
ness has passed, but mainly through the interplay of contrasting char¬
acters: the sophron Odysseus, the sophron Tecmessa, and the mean-spirited
and vengeful Atridae. Our final impression is of the greatness of the
heroic nature, not of its concomitant hybris.
The words sophronein and sophron occur more often in this tragedy than
in any other by Sophocles and are given several shades of meaning by
different characters. The basic contrast between Ajax and Odysseus is
underscored by the appearance of the goddess of sophrosyne, Athene
herself (most beloved by Odysseus and most offended by Ajax) in the
Prologue, where her function is to guide the two heroes to a revelation
57 In the case of Ajax and Deianeira also, there is some hint of Pathei mathos, but it is not
so explicitly stated as in the final utterance of the Chorus in the Antigone.
58 See, e.g., Opstelten, op. cit., 51, and Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles (Leiden, 1953), 1.
16.
59 See Adams, op. cit., 25, and Bernard Knox, H.S.C.P. 65 (1961), 1-37.
60 Kitto, 119: “It is . . . idle to talk of the ‘rehabilitation’ of Ajax.”
Tragedy 59
of their fundamental ethos. The Prologue stresses both the supreme
daring of Ajax and his delusion; 61 it gives Odysseus an opportunity to
reject Athene’s invitation to gloat over his maddened enemy, even as that
enemy is seen gloating over his fancied prospect of torturing Odysseus,
and it sums up the sophrosyne of Odysseus in his famous speech about
the universal condition of mankind (125-26): opcb yap ripas ovdev ovras
aXXo 7tXt]v el'8coX’ oooirrep z&pev 77 Kov(pr]P oklclv (“For I see that we—all
of mankind—are no more than phantoms or empty shadow”). What it
means to be a sophron aner becomes clear not only from this speech, with
its obvious contrast between Odysseus and Ajax, but also from the latter
half of the play, in which the contrast is between Odysseus and the
Atridae.62 Athene offers a reminder of the (Aeschylean) religious basis
of sophrosyne in her warning about the danger of boastful speech against
the gods and undue pride in strength or wealth. She reminds Odysseus
of the mutability of all that is mortal and concludes the Prologue with
the famous observation that the gods love the sophrones and hate the
proud (kakous [132-33]).
The picture of the sophron man is balanced by one of the sophron
woman. To Ajax it may seem that the sophrosyne of women consists in
silence—“Do not question, do not ask; sophronein is'good” (586)—but
Tecmessa’s conduct—especially her speech on the true nature of the
eugenes (485-524)—suggests what the Hellenic view of feminine sophro¬
syne really included. It is not inconsistent with a positive personality and
genuine intelligence, and it reveals itself especially in the will to face re¬
ality, which here amounts to making the best of a situation common in
ancient warfare, never less than tragic. Tecmessa, so often compared to
Andromache in Iliad VI,63 is actually in a worse plight than Hector’s
beloved and honored wife. From being the daughter of a free and wealthy
Phrygian father, she has become a slave (her address to Ajax as “Ajax,
61 The two aspects of his behavior that are opposed to sophrosyne are indicated by the
words SvoXoyioTov (“irrational” [40]) and roXpals (“acts of audacity” [46]) and (ppevu>v
Opaoa (“boldness of spirit” [46]) as well as by the references to mama (“madness” [59]) and
nosos (“illness” [68]).
62 We should miss part of the richness of contrasting characterization if we failed to note
that the hybris of Menelaus and Agamemnon (shown towards Ajax and his family) not only
emphasizes the sophrosyne of Odysseus, but also makes the hybris of Ajax (directed towards
the gods) less offensive, because less cowardly.
63 E.g., Kamerbeek on Ajax 550, 557. The obvious modeling of the scene on the farewell
of Hector and Andromache (It. 6. 476-81) gives Sophocles the opportunity for a characteris¬
tically subtle effect. The prayer of Ajax for Eurysaces is essentially that of Hector for Astyanax
but for one thing: where Hector prays that his son may be better than his father, Ajax prays
that Eurysaces may be luckier than he, but in all else the same (550-51).
60 Sophrosyne
master” [485, cf. 368] and her outright statement, “Now I am a slave”
[489], are reminders of her humiliation), but she accepts the bitter fact and
responds to it with love and tenderness instead of with hatred. The im¬
portance of these two sophrones characters, Odysseus and Tecmessa, must
not be ignored. If the wholehearted admirer of Ajax can persuade us
that it is a proof of the hero’s nobility to resent even to the point of
murder the award of the arms to Odysseus,64 it is more difficult to make
us accept as noble two consequences of the hero’s resentment: his glee¬
ful anticipation of the pleasure of torturing Odysseus and his selfish
abandonment of his concubine and child to whatever may await them,
so that he may indulge his sense of honor.65 But we can accept these two
peculiarly distasteful consequences of Ajax’ hybris and see them in rela¬
tion to his whole nature precisely because Odysseus and Tecmessa, the
primary victims of this hybris, are able to understand him out of the
fullness of their own sophrosyne.
In Ajax himself there are traces of sophrosyne which make his present
enslavement by ate (123) the more tragic. While it is going too far to say
that Ajax “was—and but for an act of gross injustice, still would be—a
man of supreme sophrosyne,” 66 it is true that we are given glimpses of the
hero’s capacity for sophrosyne in earlier days (recalled especially in the
speech of Athene [118-20]). Much more effective, however, in evoking
our response to his present situation is the enigmatic speech in which
Ajax meditates upon the theme of mutability. The procession of the
seasons and the yielding of night to day and of sleep to waking are illus¬
trations of sophrosyne in the natural universe (a dim foreshadowing of
the “cosmic” justification of sophrosyne in Plato’s Gorgias), and with them
Ajax equates obedience to the gods and to rulers in the life of man. “And
we,” he adds (677), “how shall we not be forced to learn restraint
[77055 ov yvccodficOa acotppom*']?” 67 The bitterness with which Ajax asks
64 Whitman, 62 ff.
65 The Chorus wrongly supposes that the sight of his dependents may induce in Ajax some
trace of aidos (345). Note the emphasis in this play on gloating over one’s fallen enemy, a
violation of both aidos and sophrosyne. Cf. Odysseus’ rebuke to Eurycleia (Od. 22. 411-12),
in which such gloating is condemned as unholy (oux t>air\).
66 Adams, op. cit., 25. It is in the presence of gross injustice that sophrosyne is tested and
proves itself. Whitman (Homer and the Heroic Tradition [Cambridge, Mass., 1958], 171) says of
Ajax in the Iliad that he is, “more than any other figure on the Greek side,” the man of aidos.
bl See the remarks of Knox, loc. cit., 20, on the soliloquy. Ajax interprets as a sign
of sophrosyne the cynical recognition that friends become enemies and enemies friends.
As Kirkwood shows (109), this view is answered at a distance by Odysseus in the second half
of the play. Odysseus’ conclusion—that a change from friendship to enmity should not alter
the recognition of a man’s true worth—is made a sign of the contrast between the two men.
Tragedy 6i
the question indicates what the answer must be for him, yet it is impor¬
tant that he has shown a comprehension of what sophrosyne means. It
is typical of the Sophoclean tragic figure that he grasps the normal
standards, but that his heroic nature will not permit him to adhere to
them.68 The tragedy of Ajax becomes more poignant when we feel this
tension between gnome and physis.
Other speeches about sophrosyne in the Ajax reveal only partial
comprehension. It is characteristic of Sophocles’ verbal irony that
Menelaus and Agamemnon, both of whom are guilty of hybris, arrogantly
urge sophrosyne upon Teucer. To Menelaus it is merely obedience to
authority, in the city or the army, and is the result of phobos and aidos
(1073 ff.). Agamemnon makes the word ooxppovriocis (1259) precisely
equivalent to vovv KaraKrrior] in verse 1256: both mean “to get some
sense.” The Chorus uses sophronein (1264) conventionally with the
Aeschylean meaning: “Behave with moderation, observe limits.” Only
Athene’s words and the behavior of Odysseus and Tecmessa reveal
a sophrosyne that is more than perfunctory.
The function of sophrosyne in the other plays may be treated more
briefly. We shall usually find its meaning expressed by the contrast or
interplay of characters rather than by an explicit discussion, for after the
Ajax. references to sophronein and sophron are rare. But to conclude that
the poet is concerned with sophrosyne only when it is mentioned ex¬
plicitly would be to ignore his skilful manipulation of his audience and
their response to the topoi that we have mentioned as being linked with
the concept of sophrosyne. The Trachiniae is an example of the implicit
importance of sophrosyne in a drama where the word sophron occurs only
once (435), and then in a trivial connection.69 In this play, as in the
Ajax, the device of contrast is employed, but with a difference. Here there
is no secondary figure whose sophron behavior casts into relief the viola¬
tion of sophrosyne by the chief character. Rather, there are two chief
characters, each dominating one half of the play, who contrast with each
other in almost every respect, including their attitude towards sophrosyne.
There is special irony in the condition of Deianeira, who specifically and
emphatically renounces kclkcls . . . roXpas (“acts of wicked daring” [582])
and describes thymos (“passion” [543])and orge (“anger” [552]) as alien
to a woman of sense (vovv eyovoav [553] paraphrases ooxppovovoav),
68 The same situation occurs in the Electra. On the significance of this speech see Reinhardt,
op. cit., 32-34.
69 Here sophron (“sensible”) is opposed to vootiv (“to be mentally ill”), a vestige of the
Homeric conception of sophrosyne (Od. 23. 11 — 13).
62 Sophrosyne
yet causes the ruin of her household because of her foolish reliance on
the unproved remedy of Nessus. To call her, as one critic does, “the
embodiment of sophrosyne” 70 is to interpret that quality in the narrow¬
est way. It takes both courage and intelligence to achieve sophrosyne,
and Deianeira, with the best intentions in the world, fails both tests. She
is indeed sophron in her acceptance of the traditional role of a good wife,
in her recognition of the overwhelming power of eros, before which man
is helpless, and in her consequent readiness to excuse her husband (like
the sophron Andromache in Euripides), and she gives expression to this
exclusively feminine sophrosyne in the speech beginning at verse 436.71
But at the crucial moment when she makes the choice on which every¬
thing depends, Deianeira nullifies all her claims to be a woman of sense
by relying on a remedy for whose efficacy she has only So£a: (“opinion”),
not proof (588-91). The contrast between her effort to achieve sophro¬
syne in one meaning of the word and her tragic failure to attain it in
another sense is one of the Euripidean elements in this drama.
Heracles fails in sophrosyne, too, but in a different and much more
obvious way. He makes no pretense of sophrosyne, which he would not,
any more than would Ajax, recognize as an arete proper to a great hero.
His excess, which is one manifestation of his tremendous heroic stature
(vividly recalled in his own speeches on the subject of his labors, 1046 ff.),
lies in his lust and his selfish satisfaction of his passions at the expense of
anyone who gets in his way. Like Deianeira, moreover, Heracles is the
victim of delusion: they are both out of touch with reality. Reinhardt 72
has drawn an enlightening parallel between Heracles, who belatedly
understands the oracle about his death when the name of Nessus pene¬
trates his consciousness, and Cambyses in Herodotus 3. 64. Gambyses had
interpreted an oracle predicting his death in Ecbatana as a reference to
the capital of Media. When he found himself in a little town called
Ecbatana in Syria, where he accidentally stabbed himself with his own
sword, he understood the true meaning of the oracle. As Herodotus
puts it, eouxppoi'rioe (“he came to his senses”).
The Antigone exhibits the same method of contrasting two characters
lacking in sophrosyne: one intensely sympathetic; the other distinctly
the opposite, yet not without a certain moral grandeur. Antigone’s fail-
70 Adams, op. cit., 109. Cf. Webster, op. cit., 75, 98, on the sophrosyne of Deianeira.
71 The speech picks up Lidias’ antithesis between nosos and sophrosyne (435) and plays with
the concepts of sickness and health, madness and sanity. For the “wifely” sophrosyne of
Andromache, see p. 71.
72 Op. cit., 73.
Tragedy 63
ure in sophrosyne (especially evident in her reactions to Ismene and

Creon) 73 is, dramatically speaking, static; but the hybris of Creon is a
major theme, developed in a series of increasingly dramatic scenes with
the watchman, with Haemon, and finally with Teiresias. Creon, like
Zeus in the Prometheus trilogy, is a tyrant, and, what is more, he too is
new in his tyrannis—and is thus in two ways opposed to sophrosyne;
moreover, he is a victim of his own delusions. The signs of the king’s
moral blindness are rapidly multiplied. By the end of the fifth episode
he has revealed in his own nature almost every crime of which he
accuses others, and has divorced himself from all the virtues he has
claimed.74 The turning against him of the tide of public opinion and
finally of religious sanctions is expressed in a series of warnings by
Haemon, Teiresias, and the Chorus, which include exhortations to pru¬
dence and moderation. The speech of Teiresias (1064-90) is, in fact, a
veritable ooxppovi?,cov Xoyos, to use a later Cynic expression; after it
Creon yields to the advice of the Chorus and attempts—too late, of
course—to undo what he has done. The euboulia which Teiresias regards
as the best of goods is equivalent to sophrosyne; its opposite is /xrj eppovdv
(1050-51). Indeed, the key word in the Antigone is phronein, which the
chief characters interpret in very different ways.75 At the end of the
tragedy the Chorus is far from uttering a mere cliche when it observes
that phronein is much the greatest part of happiness—the wisdom that
boastful men learn only after suffering, in old age (1347-53).76
The concept expressed by both phronein and sophronein becomes in¬
creasingly identified with the very essence of tragedy in the Oedipus
Tyrannus, where the search for knowledge, which proves to be self-
knowledge in the most literal sense, forms the substance of the plot,77
and the poetic imagery is concerned above all with physical and spiritual
blindness and sight. Oedipus is the supreme example of the Sophoclean
73 Antigone betrays a lack of sophrosyne by her passionate and hostile reaction, first,
to Ismene’s refusal to help with the burial and, later, to her attempt to share the blame (fig-
70, 86-87, 542 ff-)> as we^ as by her anger at Creon’s interference with what she conceives to
be her duty (32-33). Cf. Ismene’s warning to her against meddling or doing more than
is proper ('ne.piooa Trpaooeiv [68]) and her own claim to SvofiovXia (“imprudence” [95]), like
Prometheus’ boasted hamartia ( P. V. 266). Creon’s charges against her (hybris and virepfiaoia
[449, 480-82]) reveal his own character more than hers, but there is no reason to undervalue
the comments of the Chorus about her Opaoos (853) and opyrj (875).
74 Cf. C. M. Bowra, Sophoclean Tragedy (Oxford, 1944), 114.
75 See Kirkwood, 233-39.
76 Pathos and chronos are linked as teachers of sophrosyne in the Oresteia, too.
77 For the view that the hamartia of Oedipus as Aristotle understood it is ignorance of his
identity, see Martin Ostwald, Festschrift Ernst Kapp (Hamburg, 1958), 93-108.
64 Sophrosyne
hero whose strength is inseparable from his weakness. The magnificent

self-confidence which reveals itself as early as the Prologue gives rise, as
we watch, to the orge and thymos so often referred to in the scenes with
Teiresias and Creon.78 The noble resolution that commands our respect
when Oedipus is confronted with Creon’s report from Delphi has as its
counterpart the haste and rashness that—before the events of the play
—have made possible the fulfillment of the oracles.79 There can be no
question about Oedipus’ lack of sophrosyne in the sense of self-control
and ordinary prudence, nor does he ever acquire this form of excellence
—even in the Coloneus. What he does achieve before the close of the
Tyrannus is the most profound and shattering self-knowledge, the essence
of Sophoclean sophrosyne. And it is this self-knowledge, healing as well
as wounding, that enables Oedipus to face the reality that he has sought
thoughout his life.
The function of Creon as a foil whose characteristic virtue is bourgeois
sophrosyne has been discussed, and we have noted the absence in him
of any touch of the heroic.80 Even in Aeschylus there was an implication
in a speech of Eteocles that if he obeyed the injunction of the Chorus and
controlled his frenzy, he would lose his honor {Sept. 683-85). Sophoclean
tragedy makes us fully aware that sophrosyne, like the eugenes (the
“noble”) in the Ajax or phronesis and eusebeia in the Antigone, means
different things to different people and may to the heroic nature seem
like weakness or even cowardice. The clearest statement of this belief is
found in the Electra in a scene that is especially effective because in it
Sophocles echoes a key speech from the Choephoroi.
It has been clear from our first glimpse of Electra that she exults in the
excesses with which the Chorus and Chrysothemis charge her—excess of
anger and hatred as well as grief. She rejects to fierpov (236) and sets
78 E.g. 337, 344, 364, 405, 524 ,674.

79 See again Sheppard, op. cit., lix ff., and the interesting remarks of Knox, Oedipus at Thebes,
195, on the final episode of the play.
80 If Creon were our sole criterion, we might agree with Bowra’s theory that the Greek
nature had two conflicting ideals, the heroic mentality and the doctrine of the Mean, and
that they excluded each other {The Greek Experience [Cleveland, 1957], 34). But it is an error
to suppose that sophrosyne and dynamism (as Bowra calls it) are incompatible, for the
highest form of sophrosyne (that which Pericles achieved in political life, Sophocles in tragic
poetry, and the sculptors of the pediments of the temple of Zeus at Olympia in plastic art) is
that in which the most passionate nature is held in perfect check. Cf. the perceptive remark
of Opstelten, op. cit., 94: “Apolline metron and sophrosyne certainly do not mean a tranquil
mediocrity; they stand for a loaded balance which does not escape from, but overcomes the
temptation to excess.” As for Creon, see W. C. Helmbold, A.J.P. 72 (1951), 293-300, for the
observation that Creon is a neutral figure who alone is given no development and at the end
has not been “blinded by knowledge.”
Tragedy 65
up independent standards of behavior consistent with her ayaOp opvois

(“noble nature”). As a verbal expression of this trait, she takes familiar
ethical terms and fills them with new meaning. “If blood be not shed for
blood, aidos and eusebeia would be lost” (245 ff.). In such a situation as
hers, she tells the Chorus (307-8): ovre croocppovdv . . . ovt evotpelv
TrapcoTiv (“there is no room for sophrosyne or piety”). Here is the echo
of the Choephoroi; Aeschylus’ Electra had prayed that she might prove
ooxppoveoTepav 'noXv . . . PevoepeoTtpav (“far more chaste and pious”)
than her mother (140-41). In that context sophron clearly referred to
sexual purity. Sophocles, however, imagines an Electra who rejects
sophrosyne; he must therefore give to this word the meaning “modera¬
tion,” for even the Sophoclean Electra can still be chaste. The echo en¬
ables the poet to use his favorite device of contrast in a peculiarly
effective way: Electra’s nature is revealed by an implied contrast with
the corresponding character in an earlier play, which is well known to
the present audience. The Aeschylean Electra, who was genuinely
different from her mother, could pray sincerely for sophrosyne and piety;
this Electra, although chaste where her mother is wanton, is like Clytem-
nestra in rejecting moderation, and both mother and daughter lack self-
knowledge. Yet as with aidos and eusebeia, Electra has her own private
interpretation of sophrosyne, hinted at in her first scene with Chryso-
themis. The sister, like Ismene, is an ordinary woman, not brave enough
to resist her masters, yet willing to admit that Electra’s attitude is just
(338-39, 1041-42). Electra accuses her of yXiftr) (“luxuriousness”)81
and says that she herself would not desire Chrysothemis’ favored position
in the household, nor would Chrysothemis, aoxppcoj' y’ oi>oa (365). This
phrase, which is admirably adapted to Sophocles’ verbal irony, illustrates
the difficulty of translating sophron, for the word is susceptible to several
interpretations. It can mean “if you had any sense” in the common
colloquial phrase, or “if you were modest, not given to but
it can also mean “if you were genuinely sophron, if you really understood
what that virtue is,” which would be appropriate in a play so full of de¬
bate about the meaning of familiar ethical terms.82
The Philoctetes depicts an absorbing conflict between two opposing
ways of life: that of the ayaOi) tpvots, which is fully developed in
Philoctetes; and that of the sophistic guile and ruthless self-will embodied
81 In lyric poetry and Aeschylean tragedy, regularly has a connotation opposed

to sophrosyne.
82 See Kirkwood, 137-38, on the contrast between the two sisters in their use of familiar
words, such as kalon and kakon.
66 Sophrosyne
in Odysseus. The struggle between Philoctetes and Odysseus for the

soul of the eugenes Neoptolemus is reminiscent in certain ways of the agon
between the Dikaios and the Adikos Logoi in the Clouds of Aristophanes,
which had been presented some fifteen years previously and reflected the
same distaste for sophistic standards of education and conduct. One
might expect sophrosyne to belong to the conservative and aristocratic,
rather than to the sophistic, side in this debate, as it does in the Clouds
(see, for example, 1006, 1027)—and, indeed, sophrosyne is perhaps im¬
plied in the rejection of deceit and of the philosophy of profit and victory
at any price—but Sophocles makes no explicit statement on the subject.
The other important theme of this play, the choice of Philoctetes, is more
evidently connected with sophrosyne. Both Neoptolemus and Heracles,
as well as the Chorus, employ familiar topoi—the necessity of bearing
misfortunes as best one can (avayKalov [1316-17]), the immortality of
eusebeia (1443)—in persuading Philoctetes to renounce his wrath. As
we have already suggested, his ultimate acceptance of his fate, after
Heracles has confirmed and explicated the prophecy of Helenus, is an
example of that adjustment to reality which is the essence of Sophoclean
sophrosyne. But in spite of the implicit connection of sophrosyne with
these two themes in the play, the only significant use of the word
sophronein shows quite another facet of its meaning and reflects a con¬
temporary development in semantics. When, after Neoptolemus has
abandoned the intrigue, Odysseus threatens feebly to report him to the
Greek army, Neoptolemus taunts him with cowardice, saying (1259-60):
“You have come to your senses! [eocoypovrioasl] If you are always
so cautious, you will live in safety.” This use of the word is a clear expres¬
sion of the tendency that we have noted among Sophoclean heroes to
regard sophrosyne as incompatible with courage; 83 it foreshadows the
confusion of sophrosyne and cowardice which Thucydides records (3.
82), and it explains Plato’s continued interest in the relation between
the sophron and andnkos temperaments ( Politicus 306b ff.).84 But Sophocles
merely applies the honorable name of sophrosyne to something ignoble
—a purely semantic change—while the essential quality is not dis¬
paraged. It remains for the Sophists and some of their pupils to question
or to reject the virtue itself.
The most notable reflection of sophrosyne in the Oedipus at Colonus is
the one we have already remarked: Theseus, the representative of Athens,
83 And not only heroes. Agamemnon in Ajax 1362 fears that he will seem a coward
if he yields to Odysseus.
84 See Chap. V, pp. 171, 184.
Tragedy 6y
who combines the sophron and the gennaion, is a contrast at once to the
undiminished thymos of Oedipus and to the self-acknowledged hybris of
Creon (883). The thymos and orge of the aged Oedipus have sometimes
been ignored or minimized in an effort to prove that the irascible hero
has learned sophrosyne through suffering; but this is neither true nor
characteristic of Sophocles.85 The anger of Oedipus is so basic to his
personality that if it were gone he would no longer be Oedipus, and the
tremendously effective reversal of the movement of the Oedipus Tyramnus
(noted by Kitto) 86 would be irrelevant. Oedipus still manifests thymos,
and there is an interesting reminder in a speech of Antigone that this
passion is characteristic of the whole family of Laius. Imploring her
father in the name of charis and eusebeia to listen to Polyneices, she bids
him remember what he has suffered because of his own father and
mother and to learn from this the evil consequences of kakos thymos
(1 I95_9^)- The conclusion of her speech (on the propriety of yielding to
those whose pleas are just) strongly recalls the conclusion of Tecmessa’s
speech to Ajax on the nature of the eugenes, although Antigone substitutes
a play on jraoxtw (“to suffer”) for the one on charis in the Ajax. Whereas
Ajax is apparently unmoved by Tecmessa’s plea—although later he de¬
scribes himself as having been softened by it (650-53)—Oedipus yields
reluctantly and allows Polyneices to approach, but the temper in which
he listens to his son is subtly conveyed by a comparison of their two ideas
about the £vvc8pos (Councillor) of Zeus. Polyneices says that Zeus has
Aidos as the partner of his throne in all that he does, and she should
therefore be enthroned with Oedipus as well (1267-69). But Oedipus
rejects this traditional appeal of the suppliant and maintains that
primeval Justice—tj 7raXaLcpaTos Ana]—is the partner of Zeus according
to ancient beliefs (1381-82).87 And it is justice, without a trace of either
aidos or charis, that governs the response of Oedipus to Polyneices. At the
conclusion of this episode Antigone directs towards Polyneices her
campaign against thymos, begging him to abandon the attack on Thebes,
since he knows that it is destined to fail. She asks him (1420): “Why is
it necessary for you to give way to anger [OvpovoOca]?” His reply (1422-
23) unmasks his false notion of honor: “It is disgraceful to be in exile
and be thus laughed at by my younger brother.” The reminder that
85 Suffering has little educative effect in Sophocles. Pathei mathos is not so important in his
view of life as in that of Aeschylus, although late learning is a persistent theme {Ant. 1347 ff).
Suffering reveals character in Sophoclean tragedy; it rarely improves it. In Euripides,
realism asserts itself: suffering debases character.
86 Kitto, 401.
87 Cf. Plato Prot. 322C.
68 Sophrosyne
thymos is the source of disaster in three generations of the family of Laius

illustrates both Sophocles’ insistence on human responsibility and his
habit of finding the cause of tragedy in some violation of sophrosyne.88
EURIPIDES
However substantial the differences between Aeschylus and Sophocles

may seem, their likenesses far outweigh their differences when they are
compared with Euripides, who reflects with unparalleled directness the
intellectual, moral, and political ferment of his times and provides our
most extensive evidence for the implications of sophrosyne in Attic
speech during the last quarter of the fifth century. Euripides outstrips
the other tragic poets both in the frequency with which he alludes to
sophrosyne and in the variety of meanings that he gives the word,89 and
his plays reveal many of the effects that contemporary social and politi¬
cal changes were having on the popular attitude towards this concept.
What Euripides himself felt to be the relation of sophrosyne to tragedy
is everywhere apparent, but especially in the Hippolytus and the Bacchae,
which derive much of their effect from a tension between conflicting ideas
of the virtue. It is impossible to determine how much Euripides’ new and
individual approach to sophrosyne owes to contemporary influences,
how much to his own temperament, but whatever the operative causes,
88 The word sophron rarely appears in the Fragments, two of which relate the virtue to
feminine conduct; two others relate it to the contrast between youth and maturity. In
Frag. 61, from the Acrisius, Sophocles says that those whose thoughts are sophrona regard
brevity of speech as an ornament in young girls (cf. Aeschylus Supp. 197; Sophocles Ajax 293).
Frag. 621 (from the Phaedra) is the commonplace about the sophron wife, man’s greatest
treasure (cf. Epicharmus 286 Kaibel, Com.) Frag. 622 (also from the Phaedra) describes
as insecure a city in which ta dikaia and ta sophrona are trodden underfoot—an unusual refer¬
ence to “civic” sophrosyne. Frag. 850 says that a city in which parents are ruled by their
children is not a city of sophrones men, while Frag. 718 contrasts hybris with sophrosyne and
assigns the one to youth, the other to age: hybris never in the world comes to the age of sophro¬
syne (t)/8t)s fis to otiypov) but blossoms and withers in the young.
89 The noun sophrosyne makes its first appearance in tragedy in Euripides, who uses it in
the extant plays and Fragments a total of six times (Me. 635; Hipp. 1365; I. A. 544; Frags. 446,
503, and 959). A. W. Verrall (J.H.S. 1 [1880], 289-90) suggests that the use of the noun in the
two versions of the Hippolytus has its source in hymns sung at Troezen in honor of the hero.
Other forms of the root are used nearly one hundred times, a vast increase over its use by
Aeschylus and Sophocles. Sophron appears fifty-four times, sbphronein thirty-two, sophronbs five
times, sophromzein twice. Sophronizein, which occurs once in Aeschylus (Supp. 724) first becomes
common in literature of the sophistic age, with the meaning “to render sophron (that is, calm,
sensible, prudent)”; cf. Antiphon Tetr. 2. 3. 3; Thucydides 6. 78, 8. 1. Euripides H.F.
869 contains an unusual use of the verb, in a strictly physical application, when it is said that
Heracles has no command over his breathing: aprrvoas 8’ov ouxppovi&i. See J. T. Allen
and Gabriel Italie, A Concordance to Euripides (Berkeley and London, 1954), for Euripides’ use
of these words.
Tragedy 6g
their results separate him sharply from Aeschylus and Sophocles and
range him on the side of the Sophists, Thucydides, and the Platonic
Socrates, not necessarily in his conception of the virtue, but certainly in
his methods of analysis and definition.
In Euripides, as in the older tragic poets, the concept of sophrosyne
is related to a fundamental conviction about the nature of tragedy. To
Aeschylus, who found the source of tragedy in hybris, the arrogant
transgression of Divine and human law, sophrosyne was essentially
religious, an acceptance of mortal limitations. To Sophocles, whose
tragic concept was rooted in the imperfection of the heroic nature,
sophrosyne was the self-knowledge that enables man to come to grips
with reality. To Euripides, who saw in the triumph of the irrational over
the rational the primary source of tragedy for the individual and society,
sophrosyne is one of several names for the rational element. It is that
quality, intellectual in origin, but predominantly moral in its applica¬
tion and effect, which controls and moderates the passions, whether lust,
anger, ambition, cruelty, or even something so trivial as gluttony or
drunkenness. Euripides has been called the first psychologist,90 and very
likely it was his keen interest in probing the motives to action and
exposing the death struggle between passion and reason in the human
soul that led him to set so high a value on sophrosyne, which is called in
the Medea the fairest gift of the gods (636) and in Fragment 959 the most
venerable of all virtues, since it dwells for ever with the good. Because
he identifies sophrosyne with the mastery of passion, Euripides often
applies the term to chastity or to some other form of self-control, a
significance rarely found in Aeschylus and Sophocles; this new emphasis
is the single most arresting element in his interpretation of the virtue.
Euripides is also the first tragic poet to exploit fully and deliberately
the dramatic possibilities inherent in the manifold connotations of
sophrosyne. It is true that in several tragedies involving various nuances
of the virtue no particular dramatic effect is achieved by their interplay,
and none seems to be intended; in such instances we merely see the wide
scope of the word in ordinary usage. The Iphigeneia in Aulis (perhaps not
Euripidean in its entirety) includes at least five such nuances—modera¬
tion (379), sanity (407), chastity (543-44), modesty (824), and good
sense (1024)—but the poet does not deliberately play off one meaning
against another. In several plays, however, he makes dramatic capital
out of the fact that sophrosyne can mean several different things. The
alternation between the meanings “chastity” and “moderation” in the
90 Jaeger, Paideia, i. 353.
yo Sophrosyne
Andromache is a case in point, as are the plays on the meanings “wise”

and “chaste” in the Medea, or “wise” and “temperate” in the Cyclops.91
But the greatest importance is attached to the multiplicity of meanings
in those tragedies that illustrate the danger of taking a one-sided view
of the virtue. This concern, which is most evident in the Hippolytus and
the Bacchae, is the second striking innovation in Euripides’ treatment of
sophrosyne.
Both innovations owe something to sophistic influence. While Euripides’
conception of sophrosyne must have originated in his own intuition,
heightened no doubt by his observation of the suffering caused by the
war with Sparta, it must also have been shaped by his participation in
contemporary modes of thought. Certain Sophists appear to have been
among the first to develop systematically the concept of sophrosyne as
the control of man’s lower impulses and appetites. Antiphon the Sophist,
as we shall see, defined it as the rule and conquest of self (Frag. 58 DK).
Gorgias’ pupil Callicles, in the Platonic dialogue, regarded it as the
limitation of appetite (49iE), and Critias in his elegiac poem on the
Spartan constitution interprets it as temperance in drink (Frag. 6 DK).
The common view of the late fifth century is expressed in Agathon’s
speech in Plato’s Symposium, which defines sophrosyne as the control of
pleasure and desire (196C ff). Most of the hostility towards sophrosyne
which appears at this time stems from an interpretation of the virtue as
a kind of spoilsport which deprives life of all that makes it worth living.92
Euripides’ interpretation of sophrosyne as a form of self-control belongs
in this tradition.
His persistent criticism of limited or imperfect sophrosyne also finds
parallels and perhaps inspiration in the sophistic challenge to traditional
values. One thinks of Antiphon’s attack on conventional law (Frag. 44
DK), Critias’ attack on conventional notions about the gods (Frag. 25
DK), and the attack on sophrosyne itself by the Adikos Logos in the
Clouds and by Callicles in the Gorgias. This critical reappraisal is the
91 In the Andromache, whenever sophrosyne is referred to by the anti-Spartan Andromache

and Peleus, it means chastity and is part of the attack on the notorious wantonness of
Spartan women and the failure of their husbands to control them (235, 345-46, 595-96).
When the word is used by Menelaus or the Chorus, against Andromache and Peleus, it
means moderation (365, 686, 741), since the Spartans can claim this nuance of the virtue
more plausibly than chastity. As we learn from Thucydides, sophrosyne in the sense of
political moderation or conservatism is felt at this time to be a Spartan slogan. When
Andromache uses the word sophron, it is the antithesis to words meaning “wanton”; when
Menelaus and the Chorus use it, sophrosyne is opposed to thymos and orge. Cf. Me. 1369; I.A.
1024; Cyc. 337.
92 See my article on opposition to sophrosyne in Greek thought, T.A.P.A. 78 (1947), 1-17.
Tragedy 71
background against which the Hippolytus should be read, although being

earlier than most records of sophistic teaching, it might better perhaps
serve as background for the development of the sophistic ideas themselves.
While sophrosyne has many ramifications in Euripides’ drama, it is
most frequently associated with certain recurrent themes, entirely differ¬
ent from the set of antitheses that Aeschylus connected with it, but
equally persistent. One of these is the study of feminine psychology. In
the extensive gallery of wicked and passionate women who people
Euripidean tragedy, there are few whose destructive effect on society
cannot be traced to a failure in sophrosyne; and in the case of Medea,
Phaedra, and Hermione this failure is explicitly stated. As a counterpoise
to the wicked woman Euripides develops in unprecedented detail the
stereotype of the sophron woman. The speeches of Andromache in both
the Troades and the Andromache, as well as the conduct of Alcestis and
other noble heroines, fill out a type (already suggested by Sophocles’
Tecmessa) that was thereafter to remain constant in drama and oratory.
The sophrosyne of a married woman naturally includes chastity, but
Euripides broadens the concept to include other aspects of a good wife’s
behavior. Quietness and tact are part of it, according to Andromache,
who in the Troades describes by the one word sophron all her life under
Hector’s roof. Knowing what blame attaches to women who roam
abroad, she stayed within the house, and she did not share in the gossip
of other women but kept her own counsel. To Hector she presented a
quiet glance and a silent tongue, knowing in what things she should
prevail over her husband, and in what yield (645-56). In the Andromache
another note is added, the absence of jealousy, which is appropriate be¬
cause Andromache is here contrasted to the jealous Hermione. Macaria
and Antigone, in the Heracleidae and the Phoenissae, exemplify the sophro¬
syne of the unmarried woman. Macaria says that for a woman silence and
modesty (ococppovelv) and staying quietly in the house are best (476-77),
while Antigone, when Oedipus is concerned lest it be unmaidenly for
her to accompany him into exile, concludes that it would be noble
(ycvvala), provided that she is modest in her behavior (ooocppovovcnj
[1692]).93 The contrast with Sophocles’ Antigone, for whom nobility
and sophrosyne are incompatible, is arresting.
Masculine sophrosyne has a special importance in the Hippolytus and
the Bacchae, to which we shall presently return. Apart from these two
93 See Arthur Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, i960), 184, on Antigone’s response.
Other allusions to the sophron wife include Ale. 181-82, 615; I.A. 1159, Frags. 909. 3, 545. 1,
543 5
- -
J2 Sophrosyne
instances the theme is not a favorite with Euripides, and he presents no

stereotype of the sophron aner.94 Only when a man represents a state, and
the state is Athens, does Euripides in the extant tragedies endow a male
character with unambiguous sophrosyne. Demophon in the Heracleidae
and Theseus in both the Suppliants and the Heracles display certain char¬
acteristics of the sophron man and the sophron polls—notably the kind
treatment of suppliants and defeated enemies and loyalty to friends—
which were important elements in the “image” of Athens disseminated
by Athenian propaganda (such as epitaphioi logoi) now and in the fourth
century.95 Eurystheus says that Athens spared him ococppovovoa, having
regard for the Divine, rather than showing enmity towards himself
(Heracleidae 1012), and Theseus in the Heracles exhibits the kind of
steadfast loyalty towards his friend that, as J. T. Sheppard has demon¬
strated, is at this time considered proof of sophrosyne.96 Although
Euripides (in the extant plays, at least) pays less attention than Aeschylus
to sophrosyne as a virtue of the polis, a long fragment from the satyr
play Autolycus contains an important reference to this form of excellence.
It is remarkable for being the only passage in Euripides in which all four
of the cardinal virtues are mentioned, and is even more remarkable for
adding as a fifth, not eusebeia, but eloquence. With a reminiscence of
Xenophanes’ preference for sophia over athletic ability as a benefit
to the polis, Euripides says (Frag. 282. 23-28):
It is necessary to crown with garlands men who are intelligent and courageous
[ctotpous tc Kayo!#ot)s], both whatever man provides the finest leadership for the
polls, because he is a man of restraint and justice [oucppup Kai Slkouos ctprjp] and
whatever man by his speech [pvOois] wards off evil deeds, preventing battles and
civil strife, since such actions are fair both for the entire city and for all the Hellenes.
94 As E. M. Blaiklock observes (The Male Characters of Euripides [Wellington, 1952], xv),

Euripides treats his masculine characters realistically. The sophrosyne of Amphiaraus (Hyps.
Frag. 12. 229-31, 236 Page), well known throughout Greece, is equated with self-control
(Koopeiv oavtop). Bellerophon, a well-established type of masculine chastity, discusses the
sophron eros in Sthen., Frag. 16. 22-25 Page-
95 On the themes common to epitaphioi, consult Hermann Strasburger, Hermes 86 (1958),
21-22; J. H. Finley, Jr., H.S.C.P. 64 (1946), 40-45; and Guenther Zuntz, The Political Plays
of Euripides (Manchester, 1955), 16-20.
96 C.Q. 10 (1916), 72-79. See H.F. 1425-26. Kitto (228) calls attention to the warning
note struck amid the praise of Athenian sophrosyne in the Suppliants. This play ascribes the
characteristics of sophrosyne to Capaneus, the greatest hybristes of Aeschylus, Septem. For the
view that Euripides’ Capaneus is intended as a portrait of the sophron Nicias, see Peter Giles,
C.R. 4 (1890), 95-98.
The addition of eloquence to the canon is peculiarly fitting for the
spokesman of sophistic rhetoric,97 but for us the greatest significance
attaches to the choice of sophrosyne as a quality in the man who can
best lead the polish What this politically oriented sophrosyne may be is
not revealed, but it would be dangerous to assume that for Euripides
political sophrosyne has the same connotation as for Theognis, Pindar,
or Aeschylus. In the fourth century sophrosyne is sometimes linked with
good administration of the household or the State,99 and it is likely that
this usage was already familiar to Euripides. In its original significance
of “prudence” or “good sense” sophrosyne could advance the security
and prosperity of the polis, perhaps especially a polis like Athens, which
was engaged in commerce and hence depended on wise foresight and
clever administration even more than would states whose prosperity was
derived from agriculture. If, as was suggested previously, “moderation”
or “self-control” constitutes one gateway through which sophrosyne
could enter the polis, “good sense” (resulting in wise administration) is
another. Yet these two facets of sophrosyne are not sharply distinguished,
in the political any more than in the moral sphere. A speech of Orestes
in the Electra of Euripides refers to good administration (eu oIkClv)
of cities and households and, surprisingly, cites (377 ff.) as the virtue by
which a man proves himself aristos and capable of such administration,
the self-control of the peasant who is married to Electra.100 Euripides
does not in this passage describe the peasant as sophron, but elsewhere he
does (261; cf. 53) and clearly means by it “self-controlled” rather than
“shrewd” or “sensible.”
Another recurrent theme is that of sophron eros, a natural development
of Euripides’ interest in the effects of overmastering passion. The sophron
eros is love in moderation, without the extremes of passion that lead to
jealousy and violence. It is a theme assigned to the Chorus in both the
Medea and the Hippolytus. “May sophrosyne, the fairest gift of the gods,
cherish me,” sings the Chorus in the Medea (635-36), following the
scene between Jason and Medea in which he attempts (with a show of
reasonableness) to prove that he is sophos, sophron, and philos to Medea
97 Eloquence (evyXuooia) is also inserted into the canon of civic virtues by the Anonymous
Iamblichi (Frag. 89 DK).
98 Adkins (op. cit., 191-92) maintains—because of the grammatical subordination of
sophrosyne and dikaiosyne—that Euripides does not regard them as part of the arete of the man
who is agathos. It seems, however, that the subordination of these two virtues, and of eloquence
in a parallel structure, indicates that all three are manifestations of arete in different situations.
99 E.g., Plato Meno 73A 6 ff.; Xenophon Oik. 7-8. 100 Cf. Adkins, op. cit., 195 ff.
J4 Sophrosyne
and their children, while she erupts with fury. The effect of the ode is
double-barreled: in addition to commenting on the rage and jealousy to
which excessive eros has led Medea, it also calls attention to the cold
calculation with which Jason acts. If she is without sophrosyne, he
is without eros. In the Hippolytus it is the Coryphaeus who comments,
after Phaedra’s speech about her fight to overcome passion for the sake
of reputation, that what is sophron is always kalon and wins good repute
among men (431-32). This episode concludes with an ode to Eros which
prays that the overwhelming power of this god may not be ctppvdpos
(“without measure” [529]). The same subject occupies an ode in the
Iphigeneia in Aulis, where the Chorus calls blessed those who enjoy
Aphrodite with sophrosyne, and prays for metria charis (“delight without
excess” [543 ff.]). Of the numerous fragments concerned with the sub¬
ject, the most explicit and detailed is Fragment 388 which speaks of the
existence of “another” eros, belonging to the soul that is dikaia, sophron,
and agathe, and recommends that men who are pious and sophrones
choose this principle and bid farewell to Cypris. The notion of a sophron
eros, which was to linger as a commonplace of Hellenistic poetry, is one
of several lines of thought in which Euripides anticipates Plato.101 But
whereas Plato believes that it is possible for at least some men to control
eros (and other forms of the irrational), Euripides invariably shows the
failure of sophrosyne.
Still another subject often joined with sophrosyne is that of physis
(“nature”). Euripides, like every other contemporary writer, reflects the
great debate over the relation of physis to nomos (“convention”). Sophro¬
syne is involved in at least two aspects of this debate: the problem of the
origin of virtue (whether it comes from nature or education) and the
equally fundamental question of what human nature is really like when
it is revealed by suffering or ill treatment. With regard to the origin of
101 The concept of a twofold eros is comparable to that of the twofold aidos in Hipp.
Cf. Sthen. Frag. 16. 22-25 Page, on the diploi . . . erotes, one leading to Hades, the other
to sophrosyne and arete; and see Frag. 503 (Melanippe) for part of a conventional choral ode
about metria . . . lektra meta sophrosynes (“love in moderation, with self-restraint”). This Euripi-
dean theme often appears in the tragedies of Seneca, even in those modeled on Sophoclean
sources. See, e.g., Seneca Oedipus 882-910 , where the Sophoclean ode ico ytveai fipoTtiv
is replaced by a typically Euripidean prayer for a moderate life devoid of excess. For the
theme of sophron eros in Hellenistic poetry, see Cercidas, Frag. 2a Diehl 3, a parody and per¬
version of Euripides, Sthen. Frag. 16. 22-25 Page. The sophron eros is a theme of Plato’s
Phaedrus and occurs also in Xenophon Mem. 1. 6. 13. Cf. the dikaios eros of Democritus,
Frag. 73 DK. Kaibel (811) records a Hadrianic inscription honoring sophron eros in connec¬
tion with the emperor’s success in killing a bear. For the theme of sophron mania, important in
mystical religion and in literary criticism, see Hans Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas (Giessen, 1929), and
my article in C.P. 43 (1948), 1—17.
Tragedy 75
virtue, including sophrosyne, Euripides is firmly of opinion that physis
plays the chief role. He sees little hope that heredity can be altered by
environment. Although the words of Hippolytus to Artemis reflect an
extremely unbalanced character, they nevertheless describe faithfully
the usual situation in Euripidean tragedy: Aidos brings forth flowers for
those who possess to sophronein (“chastity”) not as a result of teaching but
in their very nature (78-80).102 Teiresias in the Bacchae reiterates this
idea: Dionysus will not compel women to be chaste (ooxppovelv . . . ds tt\v
Ku7rpiv), but to sophronein is inherent in one’s physis. Even in the revels,
the sophron woman will be safe from corruption (314-19). The conviction
that physis is megiston (“most powerful” [Frag. 810]) is consonant with
Euripides’ belief in the “moral impotence of reason” when it comes into
conflict with the powerful irrational forces of the soul and the universe.103
Another way of inquiring into the source of sophrosyne is to examine its
relation to the gods. In this form the question is complicated by the great
variety of Euripidean approaches to the Divine, but it is noticeable that
definitions of sophrosyne tend to involve piety, as either cause or re¬
sult.104 In so far as a god symbolizes a natural force—some aspect of
physis—we may perhaps say that sophrosyne is related to the gods, as
the chastity of Hippolytus manifests the power of Artemis, but the rela¬
tionship is obviously not Aeschylean. The concept of a god who leads
mankind to wisdom through suffering is foreign to Euripides.
As for the true nature that is revealed by suffering, the answer in such
plays as the Medea, Hippolytus, Electra, and Hecuba is the realistic one:
when we see physis as it actually is, we see passion triumphant and
sophrosyne defeated. The contrast between Euripides and Sophocles is
nowhere greater than in their treatment of this problem. The physis
revealed by suffering or some other test in Sophoclean tragedy is seldom
sophron, but it is at least agathe (“noble”). For Euripides, suffering has the
same effect as poverty, which Orestes in the Electra maintains is a
teacher of evil (376).
In his treatment of these and other themes Euripides employs the word
sophrosyne with a variety of nuances. As we have observed, the most
common meaning of all is “control of passion, appetite, or emotion." For
102 In Hippolytus, as Pohlenz observes (1. 271), the sophrosyne of Hippolytus, which is his
by nature, is never lost; but Phaedra’s, which she cannot maintain, is by her own admission
the product of training and practice.
103 See E. R. Dodds, C.R. 43 (1929), 97-104. For the priority of physis over trophe, see also
Frags. 333, 1068; Hipp. 921-22; Hec. 592-600. The opposite view is presented in Supp. 911 ff.
and I.A. 558-72.
104 E.g., Hipp. 995-96; Ba. 1150; Or. 502-3; Frags. 446, 388.
y6 Sop hro syne
the first time in Greek literature the normal significance of sophrosyne

is “self-control.” Since sexual passion is so overwhelming a motive in
Euripidean tragedy, the meaning “chastity” occurs with great frequency
in the plays and the Fragments, usually referring to women, but some¬
times also to men.105 Related to this usage is the meaning “modesty”—
as when Hecuba tells Helen that she would be dressed in rags, if she had
more sophrosyne than effrontery (Troades 1027); so> too, is the general
connotation of behavior suitable to a good wife. Control of anger (thymos,
orge) and the practice of forbearance towards an enemy are sometimes
described as sophrosyne by Euripides,106 in whose tragedies the victory
of passion in the form of anger is common. The dangers of yielding to
thymos and orge were recognized by earlier authors,107 but Euripides is
especially sensitive to the consequences resulting from the triumph of
anger and vengefulness. In the Medea, Hecuba, and Heracleidae he shows
the horrors of vengeance so graphically as to shift the sympathy of the
audience from the original victim to the oppressor when he in turn be¬
comes a victim. Fragment 799 relates control of anger to the old theme
of mortality: “Since our bodies are mortal, it befits any man who
understands how to control himself \sophronein] not to cherish immortal
wrath.”
Sophrosyne only infrequently designates the control of the appetites
for food and drink, probably because these appetites are not sufficiently
dignified for tragedy.108 A play on two meanings of sophron enlivens a
passage in the satyr play, Cyclops, where the giant boasts that his god is
his belly, and adds that to eat and drink all day and have no cares at all
is “god” to one who is truly sophron (334-38). Sophron here means “sen¬
sible, wise,” but in this context the fact that the word can also mean
“temperate” would not be lost on the audience.109
Sophrosyne may also indicate resistance to ambition (as in Hipp.
105 See, in addition to passages already cited: El. 923, 1080, 1099; Or. 558, 1132; Hel. 47,
932, 1684; Troad. 1056; I.A. 1159; Me. 1369; Hipp. 413, 431, 667, 1034; Frag. 909. 3;
Ba. 314, 316, 318. Masculine chastity: Frag. 446 (from the first Hippy El. 53, 261; Hipp. 949,
995, 1007, 1035, 1100, 1365, 1402; Hyps. 12. 229, 236 Page. While masculine and feminine
chastity are both described with the word sophrosyne, they derive from different aspects of
this virtue: the masculine from self-control, resistance to excess, the opposite of hybris; the
feminine from obedience or dutifulness.
106 E.g., Herac. 1107; Or. 502; And. 741; Ba. 641.
107 Theognis 631 f.; Epicharmus, Frags. 281, 282 Kaibel, Com.-, Heraclitus, Frag. 85 DK.
108 See Frag. 893 on the sophron table; cf. Frags. 892, 413. Democritus (Frag. 210 DK)
contrasts the frugal table set by sophrosyne and the lavish one set by tyche (“fortune”).
“Sober” is the meaning of sophron once or twice in the Bacchae (686, 940), but the connotation
is uncommon elsewhere.
109 For a similar play on words, see Ale. 753, where oim acoqpporcos means both “noisy and
overbearing” and “drunken.”
Tragedy 77
1013), but in this area it impinges upon another aspect of the virtue—
that of self-knowledge and “thinking mortal thoughts”—which should
probably be classified under our second category, the intellectual,
although the moral consequences are obvious. The distinction can never
be precise, since the basic concept of sophrosyne as control of the passions
and appetites—that is, of the irrational—implies that the virtue itself is
allied with reason, and its etymology always reminded the Greeks of
this fact.110 Sometimes its intellectual affinities are more prominent
than its moral implications; then it finds itself allied with nous (as in
Andr. 231, 235, 237) and sophia (as in Ba. 641) rather than with aidos or
eusebeia, and opposed to anoia (“folly”) rather than to anaideia (“effron¬
tery”). The intellectual meaning—“understanding, wise judgment”—is
inextricably bound up with the moral when Phaedra says that she had
meant to endure her anoia in silence and bear it with sophrosyne (Hipp.
399). A like combination of intellectual and moral implications under¬
lies Dionysus’ remark to the Theban royal family at the end of the
Bacchae (1341): “If you had known how to achieve understanding
[sophronein] when you were unwilling to do so, you could have been
happy and had the son of Zeus as your ally.” Sophron sometimes means
“wise, intelligent” in a fairly emphatic sense (Me. 311; Hipp. 704); but
much more often it conveys a weaker intellectualism, such as permeates
the common phrase r\v ococppouffs and its variants, where sophronein means
merely “to be sensible, have ordinary prudence, etre sage.” Next to
chastity, this sens intellectuelle affaiblie, as De Vries calls it, is the most
common meaning of sophron in Euripides,111 but the least important
dramatically. The intellectual meaning has greater force in a phrase from
the Helen, sophron apistia (1617), which Dodds well translates “enlightened
skepticism.”112 An extension of the original Homeric soundness of mind
is “sanity,” contrasted with mania or nosos phrenon, as in the Orestes when
Electra says (254) to her brother, who is terrified at the approach of the
Furies: “You are growing wild-eyed, you are becoming frenzied, who
were just now in your right mind [ococppovtiv].” 113 Similarly, in the
Troades Hecuba says that Cassandra’s misfortunes have brought her to
her senses (eacooppovi]Kao' [350]).
A third important nuance, “moderation,” must be distinguished,
although it is often hard to determine whether the chief implication is
actually moderation or self-control in some form. “Moderation” seems
110 Unlike the Romans, who found in temperantia no specifically intellectual associations.
111 G. J. de Vries, Mnem. 11 (1943), 86. E.g., Ba. 329, 504; Troad. 350; Or. 1509; Hel. 1657;
I.A. 1024, !2o8; Herac. 263; Me. 549, 884, 913.
112 Dodds, loc. cit., 100. 113 Cf. LA. 407: ovvouypovtiv contrasted with ovvvoaeiv.
y8 Sophrosyne
preferable when sophrosyne is associated with a revival of hybris in the

Aeschylean sense. This is a feature of Euripides’ late tragedies, the
Phoenissae and the Bacchae, and it is appropriate that the Aeschylean
meaning of sophrosyne—“observance of limits,” especially those estab¬
lished by the gods—should reappear. The hybris of Eteocles in the
Phoenissae takes the form of unjust ambition for tyrannis, in pursuit
of which he is willing to commit any adikia (523-25). Jocasta brands this
ambition philotimia (532) and tells him that it will not bring happiness,
since sufficiency is enough for the moderate (tols ye ooxppooiv [554]).114
In the Bacchae Pentheus and his mother are accused of hybris (555, 516,
1297, 1303, 1347); and instead of indicating violence against men, as is
usual in Euripides,115 hybris again means the refusal of honor due a god.
Moderation is an important aspect of sophrosyne in all references to the
sophron eros and also in those passages that bring sophrosyne close to
aidds and ta metria.116 There is a clue to the basic meaning of sophrosyne
for Euripides in the fact that whereas for Aeschylus and Sophocles
its closest neighbor is phronesis, in Euripides it has a deeper kinship with
aidds.
The tension between two or more conceptions of sophrosyne and the
exposure of characters whose sophrosyne is either incomplete or illusory
are important elements in the Hippolytus and the Bacchae. Even earlier,
in the Medea, Euripides had depicted Jason as a complacent bourgeois,
who boasted that he was sophron and criticized Medea for her lack
of this quality, while in fact he was selfish and calculating, an example
of pseudo sophrosyne like the nonlover in Plato’s Phaedrus. The poet
demonstrates in this play the Greeks’ dawning awareness that even
a virtue can lose its balance, and that this particular virtue may degen¬
erate from authentic self-control into heartless cruelty.117 The opposition
114 The contrast between the heroic Aeschylean Eteocles and his counterpart in Euripides
reflects the spread of philotimia and pleonexia in the course of the Peloponnesian war (traced
stage by stage in Thucydides’ History; see below, Chapter III). Eteocles is the would-be
tyrannos of that time, as his brother is the phygas, the political exile of the age. Jocasta’s use of
the metra in nature (541-48) as an argument for sophrosyne is remotely comparable to Ajax’
reference to nature in his speech of deception. The hybris of the attackers in the Phoen. echoes
the same theme in Aeschylus; once again Amphiaraus alone has no arrogant blazon, but
atoqopot'co? (“modestly”) bears an unmarked shield (1111-12).
115 Me. 1366; Herac. 18; H.F. 708. Cf. Del Grande, 148-210.
116 Aidds: Hipp. 78-81, 995-99; I.A. 379, 821-24; Frag. 209. Ta metria: Me. 119-30;
Frag. 893. Other passages in which the primary meaning of sophron is “moderate” include:
Andr. 365, 686; Herac. 272; Ba. 1150; Frag. 505.
117 It was this realization that led Aristotle to formulate the doctrine of the Mean, which
opposed true sophrosyne to the equally vicious extremes of profligacy and insensibility (Eth.
Nic. 1118b 28-1119a 20).
Tragedy 79
to sophrosyne in Euripides’ plays concentrates on this kind of weakness
—the lack of generosity and self-knowledge—rather than on the con¬
fusion of sophrosyne with cowardice which we sometimes find in
Sophocles and Thucydides.118
The criticism of sophrosyne is only a minor theme in the Medea;
in the Hippolytus and the Bacchae it is fundamental. Both plays regard
sophrosyne, basically, as the power that resists the irrational. In one the
opposing force is called erds and is represented in the Prologue by
Aphrodite; while in the other it is called by various names implying ir¬
rationality (mania itself or a synonym), and Dionysus is the divine rep¬
resentative, but the struggle is always the same. Aphrodite, as the nurse
observes (Hipp. 360, 447), is not a mythological or a religious entity, but
an irresistible cosmic power, while Dionysus stands for all the forces of
nature, beautiful or terrible or both, which have nothing to do with
reason and morality. Aphrodite herself belongs to his sphere (Ba. 773—
74). It is the task of sophrosyne to control these forces, and the essence
of the tragedy in both plays is that the sophrosyne of the chief figures is
too limited to succeed.
The similarity between the situations in the two plays has been the
subject of repeated analysis,119 but less attention has been paid to the
differences, one of which is the extent to which the Bacchae goes beyond
the Hippolytus in its treatment of sophrosyne.
In the Hippolytus Artemis is the divine symbol of the force that attracts
the young hero; this force is manifested in him as a fanatical chastity,
and whenever he boasts of his sophrosyne, as he so often does (995,
1007, 1034-35, 1100, 1364-65), it is chastity that he means.120 In the
first scene there is an undeniable beauty—the beauty of wild places and
intimacy with nature—associated with Hippolytus and his chosen way
of life, but it soon becomes clear that he is in a very dangerous spiritual
condition.121 His sophrosyne is genuine but pitifully limited. Chastity
alone is not the total virtue: Meden agan (praised by the nurse [250 ff.])
and Gnothi sauton are inseparable from sophrosyne, but Hippolytus is
118 The only example of this confusion in Euripides is the reference to Odysseus in Troad.
422-23 as a sophron woman. Cf. Sophocles Phil. 1259-60.
119 E.g., Dodds, loc. cit.; Kitto, 383; Winnington-Ingram, 17 ff., 27, 174.
120 The one exception—when Hippolytus says that ambition is not characteristic of the
sophron (1013)—recalls Creon in O.T. 589. One is tempted to hear in such a novel use of the
word an echo of the recently performed Oedipus. Hippolytus’ analysis of his own sophrosyne
(995 ff-) indicates that its sources are piety, aidos, and sexual purity.
121 The same beauty and the same danger—the rejection of normal life—are associated
with Camilla in the Aeneid.
80 Sophrosyne
without moderation or self-knowledge. His devotion to Artemis excludes

even the objective recognition that Aphrodite also has legitimate claims,
and his rejection of this goddess arouses well-justified fears in the hunts¬
man (114-20).122 On the human level there is a parallel act of hybris:
Hippolytus’ denunciation of women and his tirade against Phaedra,
which is fanatically cruel and intemperate, and which drives her first to
revenge, then to suicide.
When Artemis ultimately appears, she herself confirms the impression
that Hippolytus’ sophrosyne has already left with us. Far from making
it possible for Hippolytus to die in the odor of sophrosyne,123 she can
only promise to take vengeance on some favorite of Aphrodite (1420-22).
Clearly she herself is not a rational force, any more than is her rival. As
Dodds observes, she is merely the negative pole, “the principle of aloof¬
ness, of refusal, ultimately of death,” 124 and it is no wonder that she
proves unable to control the force symbolized by Aphrodite, the Venus
Genetrix. Even within the play the defects of Hippolytus’ sophrosyne are
recognized, notably by Phaedra in her final speech when she says that
by her death she will teach Hippolytus not to exult over her woes.
He will share her vogos (“disease”) and ococppovelv paOrjo^Tai (“learn to
behave with moderation” [730-31])—one of the most effective plays on
the meanings of sophrosyne in all Greek literature. The nurse in an
earlier speech (358-61) comments on the impotence of sophrosyne as she
sees it in practice: “Those who are sophrones nevertheless have evil
desires, even against their will. Cypris is not after all a goddess, but some¬
thing greater, which has destroyed Phaedra and me and the whole
household.”125 She is actually referring to the chastity that Phaedra has
vainly tried to achieve, but her observation applies in a sense to the
sophrosyne of Hippolytus, too, which is so limited in scope as to be
helpless when confronted with the irrational.
In the futile effort of Phaedra to overcome her passion by self-control
(.sophronein [398-99]), Euripides sees yet another failure of the rational.
Unlike Hippolytus, Phaedra cannot claim to be sophron by her very
nature. Her sophrosyne is an acquired virtue, which proves just as
inadequate as the “natural” virtue of Hippolytus (400-401), but in
122 Cf. the unbalanced devotion of the Danaids to Artemis and the hint at the close
of Aeschylus’ Suppliants that Aphrodite and Hera too must be honored.
123 As S. M. Adams suggests, C.R. 49 (1935), 119.
124 C.R. 43 (1929), 102.
125 Aristotle rejects the possibility that the sophron can have evil desires. According to
his system, Phaedra would be akrates (Eth. Nic. 1104b 5-7). On the sophrosyne of Hippolytus
and Phaedra, see Gilbert Norwood, Essays on Eunpidean Drama (Berkeley, 1954), 84-89.
Tragedy 8i
a different way. Phaedra confesses that, in common with the rest of

humanity, she knows what is right but cannot put it into practice
(380-81).126 Ironically, it is in part because of her aidos that she fails.
The “good” aidos, a sense of shame and concern for her reputation—
especially as it affects her children (405-30)—prompts her to try to con¬
quer Gypris by sophrosyne, but the “bad” aidos, the compunction that
leads her, against her judgment, to reveal to the nurse the nature of her
illness (335), opens the floodgates of disaster.127 The nurse, expressing
herself in sophistic terms, maintains that by fighting so strong a power
as eros (against which the gods themselves are helpless) Phaedra is guilty
of hybris (446, 474). According to this perverted view, it would actually
be a kind of sophrosyne to give in and accept the common lot of gods and
men. The nurse does not, however, go so far as to draw this conclusion.
Her reversal of values is not complete, and at the climax of her speech
she says (494) that Phaedra must give way to passion precisely because
she is not sophron—“chaste,” the ordinary meaning of the word when
applied to a woman.
Finally, in this wholesale condemnation of inadequate sophrosyne,
Euripides does not overlook Theseus, who is here portrayed, not as the
sophron representative of Athens, but merely as an impetuous and blinded
husband and father. While denouncing the sophrosyne of his son as mere
hypocrisy (949-57), he betrays his own violation of sophrosyne by his
indulgence in anger and rash judgment. His son concludes his defense
with a statement (1034-35) that draws attention to the baffling nature
of sophrosyne throughout the play: “Phaedra behaved with self-control
[eooxppovgoev] although she had not the power to be chaste [ococppovclv],
while I, who have the power, have not used it well.” The play on two
slightly different nuances of sophronein—“to control oneself” and “to
be naturally chaste”—is impossible to render in English.128
The tragic inadequacy of partial sophrosyne is the theme to which
Euripides returns in the Bacchae (this play, like the Hippolytus, could be
subtitled “The Sophron Hybristes”), but here his treatment is more
complex and ironic. The pattern of the Hippolytus is after all relatively
126 Cf. Me. 1079. An illuminating study of Phaedra’s environment as it affects her behavior
is provided by R. P. Winnington-Ingram in Euripide, ed. J. C. Kamerbeek (Vandoeuvres-
Geneve, i960), 169-91.
127 See E. R. Dodds, C.R. 39 (1925), 102-4.
128 A. E. Housman used this passage to support his theory that a noun acocppouri existed in
tragedy; he maintained that “the line she was virtuous though unable to be so is a contradiction
in terms” (C.R. 2 [1888], 242-45). It seems less contradictory if we recognize the typically
Euripidean play on the multiple nuances of sophrosyne.
82 Sophrosyne
simple: on the mythological level the embodiment of passion is opposed

to the embodiment of chastity, and on the human level, passion destroys
those who try to suppress it, along with the innocent bystanders (but no
one is wholly innocent), since it is the nature of passion to be indiscrimi¬
nate. In the Bacchae the irrational is once again opposed by human
reason, which proves unable to cope with the terrible forces of Nature,
seen this time in the form of orgiastic religious emotion. Again we dis¬
cover the narrowness and imperfection of the sophrosyne which the
champion of reason claims to possess: he has chastity and sobriety
indeed, but without self-knowledge, imagination, or genuine under¬
standing of reality. Yet Pentheus is more complex than Hippolytus.
Even his chastity and sobriety are superficial and insecure and give way
before the first serious temptation. He lacks poise and self-control in the
face of opposition, and he shows several of the traditional marks of the
tyrant.129 Moreover, Dionysus, instead of being merely a symbol of the
irrational, as Aphrodite was, makes a startling claim to possess sophro¬
syne himself. It is the contrast between the two kinds of sophrosyne, that
of Pentheus and that of the Dionysiac god and his Asian Bacchae,
which lies at the heart of the tragedy.
What is the sophrosyne of Dionysus? Throughout the play he calls
himself sophron and sophos and, in the face of Pentheus’ emotional out¬
bursts, displays an unearthly, if ultimately a sinister, calm.130 This
is sophrosyne in a more or less conventional sense. But the chorus of
Asian Bacchae meanwhile lays claim to another kind of sophrosyne, and
this, too, is Dionysiac. At first this sophrosyne allies itself with the old
Hellenic doctrines of “Think mortal thoughts” and “Nothing in excess”
(395-40t), but presently it is equated with a strange kind of wisdom
which accepts the most brutal, along with the most joyous, manifestations
of unrestrained emotion.131 The beauty and freedom of the wild and the
ghastly rites of sparagmos and omophagia are equally a part of this wisdom.
Dionysus, as he himself says, is most terrible to men but also most
tender (dcivoraros . . . gnttinonos [861]). The cruelty with which he
makes Pentheus ridiculous in his woman’s disguise and sends him to his
129 See Winnington-Ingram, 45 ff.; G. M. A. Grube, T.A.P.A. 66 (1935), 40; and

E. R. Dodds, C.R. 43 (1929), 97-104; H.T.R. 33 (1940), 155 ff.; and his edition of the
Bacchae (Oxford, i960), xliii, 97, etc., for various post-Freudian analyses of Pentheus. Dodds
regards Hippolytus, too, as a victim of suppressed desires.
130 Dionysus as sophron: 504, 641. Another key word is hesychia; the calmness of Dionysus
contrasts with the thymos and orge of Pentheus (389, 636, 647, 997).
131 Winnington-Ingram analyzes the mixture of joy and terror in the odes; see especially
PP- 38“39, 59 ff-, 107.
Tragedy 8j
death, the vengefulness of the Chorus, and the unbearable anagnorisis

(recognition) to which Agave is subjected, all combine to make the
sophrosyne of Dionysus a baffling quality. Is not Euripides attacking
Dionysus and his sophrosyne, just as surely as he is exposing Pentheus
and his? The reproach of Cadmus (1348), “It is not fitting for gods to
imitate men (opoiovoOou fiporois) in wrath,” comes too close to the
prayer of the old servant in the Hippolytus (114-20) to be ignored.132
But the analogy with the earlier play suggests the answer. The
reproach is genuine and is directed against the anthropomorphic con¬
ception of the god; yet the revelation of the power that Dionysus repre¬
sents is also genuine. Moreover, the hint that there is a kind of sophrosyne
which can honor Dionysus without shaming Apollo (328-29) constitutes
a significant advance over the Hippolytus. There the poet contented
himself with exposing the failure of sophrosyne, on every level, to control
passion. In the Bacchae he postulates the existence of another sophrosyne
which can embrace mania—can, that is, understand the place of the ir¬
rational in the human soul and somehow come to terms with it. In effect,
Euripides here calls attention to the paradox that had always been
implicit in Greek drama (whether tragedy, comedy, or satyr play), the
paradox expressed centuries later by a poet of the Greek Anthology, who
observed that when Bacchus established the satyr drama at Sicyon, he
taught sophrosyne to the townsman though he was himself a drunkard
(6 jieOvcov aoTOV eooxppoviocv [11. 32]).
It is no part of the dramatist’s purpose to analyze this sophrosyne
(that is a task for a philosopher, and Plato did not reject the challenge);
nor can it be denied that some of its manifestations are appalling. But
the response of Dionysus (1349) to Cadmus’ reproach—“Long ago this
was ordained by Zeus, my father”—is a guarantee that, dreadful and
mysterious as these events are, they must be accepted.133 Euripides does
not pretend, any more than Aeschylus or Sophocles pretend, that reality
is pleasant to contemplate; but he seems to suggest, as indeed each
of them in his own way suggests, that there is a sophrosyne that enables
man to face reality in all its manifestations. The total effect of the
Bacchae is pessimistic in a characteristically Euripidean fashion—the
failure of human reason, the shallowness of human pretensions to virtue,
the malignity of the gods, and the indiscriminate operation of natural
132 Both speeches reveal Euripides’ intense concern for what may perhaps be called
6/Wcocus fipoTti (“the imitation of man”) in his demands upon the gods.
133 Cf. the closing words of Sophocles Trach. 1278, which ascribe to Zeus the responsibility
for an equally terrible situation.
84 Sophrosyne
forces—but there is one gleam of hope: eudaimonia could somehow result

from a sophrosyne that could understand the Dionysiac and avoid the
denial of its demands which in the Bacchae is constantly equated with
hybris.134 “If you had known how to achieve understanding [sophronein],
when you would not do so,” says Dionysus to Cadmus and Agave
(1341-43), “you would be happy and have the son of Zeus as your
champion.” 135
134 E.g., 555, 516, 1297, 1347.

135 Cf. the promise of a life without care to those who possess the yv&\ixav oucppova (“modest
frame of mind” [1002-4]). But Murray would read yvcopav ocacppova with Housman’s hypo¬
thetical noun ooxppovri (castigatrix), while Dodds would emend to yvccpav aco<pp6^<ia/i,>a
6a.va.T0s and translate “death is a corrective of his purposes.” Euripides’ treatment of sophro¬
syne in the Bacchae in certain respects anticipates the ideas expressed by Plato in the Laws,
where he attempts to render Dionysus socially useful. Despite a fundamental difference
in approach (Plato always assumes the supremacy of reason), there are two points of resem¬
blance. One is the insistence that all must share in the worship of Dionysus. In the Bacchae
Teiresias forestalls possible criticism of his and Cadmus’ behavior by saying that the god makes
no distinction between young and old but demands honor from all (206-9). Plato insists that
just as the children and young men gather in choruses to honor the Muses and Apollo, the
older men must form a chorus in honor of Dionysus. It is typical of the difference between the
two approaches to Dionysus that whereas Euripides would have the old men serve the god
and yield to his mysterious power, Plato turns the god to the service of education and the
state, so that the drinking party, strictly controlled by law, may help old men renew their
youth and preserve the effects of paideia (664C-667B 5). A more fundamental similarity lies
in the view held by both Euripides and Plato that, under the influence of Dionysus, charac¬
ter is revealed. How ancient and widespread this belief was we learn from the lyric poets and
the Attic skolia, which show that the Greeks felt it imperative yet profoundly difficult to dis¬
cover a means of testing character; see A. Korte, Hermes 64 (1929), 69-86. In Euripides, to
whom this theme is very important, the test is often time (Hipp. 428-30; Frag. 60), but in the
Bacchae he indicates that such is also the power of wine (e.g., 314-18, 918-70, where the physis
of Pentheus is laid bare). Plato takes over the search for a touchstone, and he, too, finds a
test in wine but, unlike Euripides, strives to use the test for social and political ends. The
symposium described in Laws I is designed to reveal the character of young men for the
benefit of the State, and the particular quality tested by the device of methe is sophrosyne. In
the Laws the effect of methe is good, and in the Phaedrus, where Divine madness is praised
above human sophrosyne, the effects of mania are also good. This conclusion is not drawn in
the Bacchae.
Ill
The Age of the Sophists
RATIONAL criticism of traditional values and unfettered speculation

about ethics, politics, and religion were conspicuous activities of the first
generation of Sophists, whose influence in Athenian intellectual life had
already been manifest for at least a decade before the outbreak of the
Peloponnesian war.1 Their modes of thought had a powerful—often a
disintegrating—impact on such concepts as justice, piety, and sophro-
syne, which up to now had based their claims for the most part on
religious or social sanctions or on uncritically accepted rules of conduct.
Sophrosyne entered upon a new stage of its development under the
rigorous scrutiny of the Sophists and those who adopted their methods
of inquiry. Three of these methods were particularly effective:
1. The search for precise distinctions of words and ideas, which
included the effort to define with greater exactitude the ethical concepts
familiar in a vague and popular sense for generations.2
2. The application to ethics and politics of certain forms of argumen¬
tation which had been developed in the early stages of sophistic rhetoric,
notably the arguments from probability, advantage, and nature. The
third of these was itself only a special form of the debate over the rela¬
tion of physis (“nature”) to nomos (“convention”),3 which gave rise in
education and politics to such questions as “What is the source of arete
—nature or training?” and “How, if at all, can arete be imparted?”
1 For the view that the Antilogies of Protagoras are reflected in the Ajax and Antigone of
Sophocles and that the treatise On Concord by Antiphon the Sophist influenced the Alcestis and
Medea of Euripides, see John H. Finley Jr., H.S.C.P. 50 (1939), - .
35 84
2 The Sophists chiefly associated with this search for precision and clarity are Protagoras
and Prodicus. See Heinrich Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik (Leipzig, 1912), 198, - .
96 97
3 For a detailed study of this subject, see Felix Heinemann, Nomos und Physis (Basel, 1945).
#5
86 Sophrosyne
3. The special study of human nature in connection with the State

and with rhetoric, the avenue to power in a democracy. This study was
concerned with motives for action—particularly appetites and passions
—and goals, both immediate and ultimate—chiefly power and pleasure.4
It often resulted in the “realistic” view of human nature which we have
already observed in Euripides and in the development of a hedonistic
calculus such as frequently underlay the ethical teachings of the great
Sophists. This study not only proved useful to oratory, for which it was
principally designed, but also influenced the writers of drama and history.
In regard to all three of these sophistic lines of thought, our best
witnesses are not the Sophists themselves, but Euripides and Thucydides,
who testify to the entire period between ca. 440 b.c. and the last years
of the fifth century, and who reflect the moral and intellectual as well
as the political developments of the period.
The fragmentary nature of our sources and the difficulty of dating such
Fragments as we possess make it hazardous to ascribe to any of the
Sophists a systematic study of sophrosyne; it is even more difficult
to determine their relative chronology and possible influence. Yet it
seems that two Sophists of the earliest group—those who taught in
Athens before the first visit of Gorgias in 427 b.c.—traced a connection
between sophrosyne and the overriding moral issues of the period, and
in so doing employed some of the sophistic approaches that we have de¬
scribed. These two Sophists are Protagoras and Antiphon. The contri¬
bution of Protagoras (if we may assume that Plato’s Protagoras is true in
essentials to the known views of the Sophist) was to analyze the by now
familiar conception of sophrosyne as a virtue of the State and to fit it
into a coherent theory of the growth of civilization. Antiphon offered the
first formal definition of sophrosyne, one that recognized as its primary
function the control of passion.
The connection of sophrosyne with the welfare of the polis was a
commonplace in the Dorian world of Theognis and Pindar, and the
concept of moderation, whatever it might be named, had been part of
the Athenian political orientation ever since Solon; but it remained for
the age of the Sophists to ask what sophrosyne actually contributed to
the State, how it was related to other forms of politike arete, especially
justice, and how it originated. The precise formulation of all these
questions may have been the work of Socrates, but there is evidence that
the Sophists, too, were interested in the general problem. No surviving
4 On the relation between the study of this kind of physis and Greek medicine in the fifth
century, see Jaeger, Paideia, 1. 306 ff., and Max Pohlenz, Hermes 81 (1953), 418-35.
Age of the Sophists 8y
fragment of Protagoras’ works refers explicitly to sophrosyne, nor is there
general agreement that we may accept the testimony of Plato,5 but the
famous myth about the origin of human society undoubtedly reflects an
authentic insight of the period depicted (the dramatic date is shortly
before the outbreak of the war), and it is hard to believe that Plato de¬
vised so elaborate an imitation of Protagoras’ style without also repro¬
ducing his thought.
In his speech before the gathering in the house of Callias, Protagoras
treats sophrosyne as a part of what he calls politike techne (or arete), the
teaching of which is his own specific skill (Protagoras 319A). His discourse
is divided into two parts, myth and logos. According to the myth, after
Prometheus had endowed mankind with the two gifts of fire and tech¬
nical competence, which he had stolen from Hephaestus and Athene
(321C-D), human beings were in danger of extinction because they still
lacked civic ability (politike sophia) and could not live together in cities
without wronging one another (322B-C). Zeus therefore sent Hermes to
give men aidos and dike, which were to be a source of order (kosmos) and
friendship; and he specifically instructed Hermes that these gifts should
not be distributed just to a few, as the various crafts had been, but that
all men should have a share in them (322C-D), for otherwise cities could
not exist. He added that whoever could not share in aidos and dike must
be put to death as a threat to the city’s health.6 This is why, Protagoras
explains, men consult a few specialists on a question of competence in
some art or craft, but when they confer about politike arete, which
requires dikaiosyne and sophrosyne, they ask the opinion of all men
(323A). As further proof of the general belief that all men share politike
arete, he points out that anyone who admits that he does not possess a
knowledge ofjustice is considered mad and is punished (324A) “obviously
because politike arete is thought to be acquired through practice [epimeleia]
and learning [mathesis]” From the discussion up to the point at which
Protagoras clearly marks off mythos from logos (324D), several facts
emerge: sophrosyne is an aspect of politike arete; it is synonymous with
aidos, and therefore its function must be to provide kosmos and philia
in the community; and it is not a gift of nature but is acquired and
therefore accessible to all.
The part of Protagoras’ speech that is concerned with logos elaborates
5 Antonio Capizzi (Protagora [Firenze, 1955], 259) and Eric Havelock (The Liberal Temper in
Greek Politics [London, 1957], 87-94, 168-69) deny that the content of the myth is Protagorean.
For a different view, see Jaeger, Paideia, 1. 299; Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists (Oxford,
1954), 72-73; and W. K. C. Guthrie, In the Beginning (London, 1957), 90-91, 140.
6Cf. Democritus, Frags. 257, 258 DK.
88 Sophrosyne
the last point—that politike arete is acquired—and explains that it is

taught, not by any special teacher, but by the very institutions of each
city and by all persons with whom the child comes in contact (325C-
326E). In his effort to explain why the sons of good fathers often turn
out poorly, Protagoras pays more attention than he does in the myth to
the element of natural endowment, without which no kind of excellence
can be developed. This admission accords with a Fragment of his Megas
Logos (Frag. 3 DK) which says that teaching has need of both physis and
askesis (“practice, effort”). One other important element in Protagoras’
doctrine about arete may be inferred from Plato’s dialogue: he denies
the unity of virtue, holding that one may be brave but unjust, or just
but unwise (329E). Even after a prolonged discussion with Socrates
about the resemblances among the virtues, Protagoras will not class
courage with the others but maintains that it is possible to be unjust,
unholy, profligate, and ignorant, and yet supremely brave (349D).7
Antiphon the Sophist is known from substantial Fragments of two
treatises: On Concord (Peri Homonoias), dated ca. 439 b.c.; and Truth
(.Aletheia), dated towards the end of the same decade.8 He defines
sophrosyne in the first of these. Despite the common application of the
word homonoia (“concord”) to the affairs of the polls,9 Antiphon links it
rather with the ethics of the individual in his relation both to others and
to himself. He dwells on the wretchedness of human life (Frag. 51 DK),
especially in the long Fragment 49 on the problems of marriage.10 The
responsibility of having a wife is likened to being burdened with a
second body, which doubles all the cares involved in supporting the first.
These cares include concern for health, livelihood, and reputation, for
the last of which Antiphon uses four synonyms: doxa, sophrosyne, eukleia,
and to ev olkovclv. Each of the synonyms describes a slightly different
aspect of good repute, but they are basically very similar. Sophrosyne,
as the word is used twice in this Fragment, can mean only “outward
reputation, won by good moral conduct.” This connotation recalls the
external type of sophrosyne depicted by the Dikaios Logos in the Clouds
7 The canon of cardinal virtues still has room for five aretae; they are reduced to four only
in Plato Rep. IV.
8 See Wolf Aly, Philol. Supp. 21 (1929), 153; Finley, loc. cit., 63 ff.
9E.g., Democritus, Frag. 250 DK; Thucydides 8. 93; Xenophon Mem. 4. 4. 16; Thrasy-
machus, Frag. 1 DK; Plato Rep. IV. 432A. Consult Alexander Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution
(London, 1953), 102-6. Homonoia in the ethics of the individual is discussed in P.W.
Supp. IV, j-.y. Antiphon (Stenzel). See also Ragnar Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King
(Uppsala, 1948), 108-10, where the relevance of this kind of homonoia to Antisthenes is
considered.
10 The close parallels in thought and language between this Fragment and Euripides Ale.
882-84, Hipp. 258-59, and Me. 1090-1115, 235-36, are chiefly responsible for attempts
to assign an early date to On Concord.
Age of the Sophists 8g
of Aristophanes and the superficial definitions of the virtue offered
in the early part of Plato’s Charmides.n
A greater degree of inwardness is achieved in another section of
Antiphon’s treatise, which deals, not with concord in the family, but
with homonoia in the soul. Fragment 58 applies a kind of calculus to the
choice between doing an injury to one’s neighbor and refraining from
such an act, and terms sophron the man who chooses to avoid both the
act and its unpleasant consequences. Whoever fears to harm his neighbor
lest he suffer harm himself is more prudent (sophronesteros). Whoever
thinks he can do ill to his neighbor and not suffer is unwise (ov ooooppovei),
for such hopes have a way of recoiling. Immediately after these observa¬
tions, in which sophron and ococppovti clearly refer to self-regarding
prudence, Antiphon uses sophrosyne with still a third nuance.12 No one,
he maintains, could judge more properly the sophrosyne of another
man than one who blocks the immediate pleasures 13 of his own thymos
and has proved able to rule and conquer himself; but he who chooses to
indulge his immediate passions chooses the worse instead of the better.
This interpretation of sophrosyne as “self-control” is confirmed and ex¬
panded by Fragment 59: “Whoever has neither desired nor touched
what is disgraceful or bad is not sophron, for there is nothing over which
he has gained mastery and thus proved himself kosmios (“orderly”).”
Fragments 58 and 59 possess great importance because they clearly de¬
fine sophrosyne as self-control, and because they emphasize the element
of struggle and conflict in attaining it. This is the sophrosyne that is
dramatized repeatedly by Euripides and constitutes one of the major
themes in his tragedy. There is no anticipation in either Antiphon
or Euripides of Aristotle’s view that sophrosyne is a habitual state
requiring no effort.14 In their opinion the warfare between reason and
passion is the ground from which this virtue springs; and it is character¬
istic of the antithetical thinking of the early Sophists that sophrosyne
should be defined in terms of its opposite.15
None of these Fragments from the treatise On Concord betrays a sign
of ethical radicalism. Their interest lies in their rational approach
to sophrosyne, not in any sophistic “transvaluation.” 16 But it is signifi-
11 Clouds 1002-8; Charm. 159B, 160E.

12 A development from one meaning to the other can be traced, but the two are not iden¬
tical, in spite of Diels’ translation besonnen or Besonnenheit in either case.
13 For the phrase at 7rapaxptjjua -qSovat, cf. Plato Prot. 356A and Xenophon Mem. 2. 1. 20.
14 Eth. Nic. 1099a 15-20.
15 Antiphon says that the sophron person avoids ra aiaxpa (“what is disgraceful”), a
reminder of the closeness of sophrosyne to aidos in Euripides.
16 Equally traditional is the sentiment expressed in Frag. 61, on the danger of anarchy and
the desirability of obedience in children.
go Sophrosyne
cant that in Fragment 49 (on marriage) Antiphon uses a calculus of

pleasures or advantages, and that the same standard, one of personal
advantage, is again used in Fragment 58 to judge whether or not one
should harm one’s neighbor. A similar recourse to the criterion of util¬
ity appears in the Fragments of Truth: this treatise lays a foundation for
ethical relativism by asserting that physis is superior in authority to
nomos, and equates pleasure with “natural” interest or advantage.17 It
must be noted, however, that the conclusions drawn from the superior¬
ity of physis to nomos in the Gorgias and the Melian Dialogue are not
drawn by Antiphon; hence the treatise has been dated in the decade
between 440 and 430 b.c., before this sophistic commonplace had
become a justification for unrestrained individualism.18
Although Antiphon the Orator is to be distinguished from his name¬
sake the Sophist, and there is good reason to regard as spurious the
Tetralogies that in antiquity were ascribed to the Orator, the references
to sophrosyne in these model speeches may be considered here because
the Tetralogies seem to date from the age of Pericles or the early years of
the war,19 and they contain several allusions to sophrosyne as “self-
control,” the concept that appears in the treatise On Concord. An excep¬
tion is the appearance of the verb sophronein as an antithesis to “mad¬
ness” in the second speech of the First Tetralogy (1.2. 5), which concerns
the murder of a man returning at night from a party. If he was slain by
robbers who failed to remove his clothing because they were frightened
off by passers-by, they were in their right minds (eooocppovovv) and were
not mad, in preferring safety to gain. All other allusions to sophron,
sophronein, and sophronizein in the Tetralogies imply the control of appetites
and passions. In the third speech of the First Tetralogy, for example, it is
suggested that those enemies of the murdered man who were not in great
danger from him would have controlled themselves, because the danger
and disgrace involved in attacking him would have been sufficient to
check (oGxppovloaL) their passion (1.3. 3). The Third Tetralogy demon¬
strates the use of the argument from probability in the case of an old
man who has been killed by a younger one; and the assignment of responsi¬
bility for the first blow depends on whether it is more probable that the
old or the young will be sophron. In the third speech it is asserted that
the young are more likely than the old to behave badly when drunk
17 Frag. 44.
18 Aly, loc. cit., 117-33. See Finley, loc. cit., 70 ff., for parallels between Truth and early plays
of Sophocles and Euripides, and for stylistic evidence tending to date the treatise to the be¬
ginning of the sophistic period.
19 See Wilhelm Dittenberger, Hermes 32 (1897), 40; Wilamowitz, Hermes 22 (1887), 198;
K. J. Dover, C.Q. 44 (1950), 44-60; and Peter Von der Miihll, Mus. Helv. 5 (1948), 1 ff.
Age of the Sophists 91
because their pride of family, their strength, and their inexperience with
drink cause them to give way to their passions,20 while the opposite con¬
ditions combine to restrain (sophronizein) the old (3. 3. 2). The fourth
speech in this Tetralogy counters this argument by maintaining that
young men often exhibit sophrosyne while the old become violent in
drink (3. 4. 2). The antitheses to sophrosyne here are akolasia and hybris,
the latter in no Aeschylean sense. Instead of being the ultimate offense
against god and man, hybris now refers to brutal violence in general or
specifically indicates the crime of malicious assault, its normal meaning
in Attic law.21 Yet such is the elasticity of the word sophrosyne that it
continues to serve as the opposite of hybris in the language of the court¬
room. Akolasia, which begins to appear as an antithesis to sophrosyne in
the middle of the fifth century,22 is less technical and therefore broader
in its applications. In the Third Tetralogy it refers both to lack of control
over the temper and to excess in drink. 23 The use of sophrosyne in the
Tetralogies is entirely consistent with its meaning in the Fragments of
Antiphon the Sophist but provides no basis for identifying the two
authors. The conception of the virtue as control of passion, akin to
kosmiotes, evidently began to be common in Attic usage in the decade
before the outbreak of the war. The testimony of the Tetralogies is
particularly valuable because they provide the first evidence for
references to sophrosyne in oratory. Moreover, since the speaker, even
in model orations, would naturally employ terms familiar to the average
jury, we may feel certain that this nuance of sophrosyne is already well
established in popular speech and is not just a sophistic innovation.
The other prominent Sophists of the earliest group tell us nothing
about sophrosyne, although if we possessed the works of Prodicus we
might find that he applied his interest in precise distinctions to this
concept, as he did to andreia,24 It has been suggested indeed that the
distinction between aidos and sophrosyne that Xenophon ascribes to
20 roj #UjUa> xaP&°@al- Cf. Antiphon the Sophist, Frag. 58—xotpioaaOm rw 6v\i&—where
the phrase is also opposed to the concept of sophrosyne. The contrast between generations is
a commonplace of the sophistic period (see, e.g., Thucydides 6. 13, Aristophanes Clouds), and
sophrosyne is normally regarded as a trait natural to the older generation but desirable in the
young.
21 See Del Grande, 283-91, for this aspect of the concept of hybris.
22 For akolasia and akolastos in the fifth century, see, e.g., Herodotus 3. 81; Euripides Hec.
607; the Old Oligarch Ath. Pol. 1. 5; Thucydides 3. 37. In the fourth century akolasia largely
replaces hybris as the principal antithesis to sophrosyne, especially in Peripatetic writings.
23 In a Fragment of the Abuse of Alcibiades, attributed to Antiphon the Orator, akolasia re¬
fers to sexual excess (Frag. 22. 67 Blass); this connotation tends to predominate in Hellenis¬
tic and later Greek.
24 See Plato Laches 197B, D.
g2 Sophrosyne
Cyrus actually goes back to Prodicus.25 Cyrus points out that those who
possess aidos refrain from what is disgraceful in public, while those who
possess sophrosyne restrain themselves even in secret—a distinction that
recalls sophistic discussions of offenses committed with and without wit¬
nesses.26 Ancient tradition made Xenophon a pupil of Prodicus,27 but the
version of the Choice of Heracles which he relates in the Memorabilia is
said to come by way of Socrates, rather than directly from Prodicus, and
we are specifically warned that the actual wording is not that of the
Sophist (2. 1. 21). In the apologue Arete and Kakia are distinguished
partly by the fact that the first possesses, while the second lacks, aidos
and sophrosyne. A purely external value is given both qualities (2. 1. 22):
aidos is manifested by the face (ra o/jL/iara) of Arete and sophrosyne by
her form (to oxrimx).
The next stage of sophistic influence on Athenian thought coincides
with the Peloponnesian war. The greatest name is that of Gorgias, who
resembles Protagoras in certain respects—particularly in the relativism
of his morality, his hedonism, and his opportunism. Gorgias, unique
among the Sophists, denied that arete could be taught.28 He held that
arete depends on physis; and although the teacher can awaken enthu¬
siasm for arete, he cannot impart it.29 Furthermore, Gorgias is reported
by both Plato and Aristotle to have denied that arete is a generic
concept. “Sophrosyne is not the same for a woman and a man, nor is
andreia or dikaiosyne,” says Aristotle in the Politics (1260a 27), “but much
more correct are those who enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias does.”30
Each person possesses arete in accordance with his activity and his age
(.Meno 72A). Hence the element of kairos (the “opportune time”), which
Gorgias applied to rhetoric and poetry,31 is equally important where
virtue is concerned, and opportunism is fundamental to his ethics.
Gorgias’ conception of arete is elicited from Meno by Socrates in a
series of questions designed to show that, for a man, arete consists of the
ability to rule in the city and to help his friends and harm his enemies
(71E).32 Later this arete is more specifically defined as the ability to
25 See Ludwig Radermacher, Artium Scnptores (Vienna, 1951), 68, on Prodicus, Frag. 10.
26 Cyr. 8. 1. 31. Cf. Antiphon Truth, Frag. 44 DK; Gritias Sisyphus, Frag. 25. 5-15 DK; and
see also Euripides Hipp. 403-4, and the story of Gyges, Plato Rep. 359D ff.
27 Philostratus Vit. Soph. 12. For the wide influence of Prodicus’ parable of the choice of
lives, see Untersteiner, op. cit., 221.
28 Plato Meno 95C.
29 Plato Gorg. 460A.
30 Cf. Plato Meno 71E.
31 See Wilhelm Vollgraff, L'Oraison funebre de Gorgias (Leiden, 1952), 21 ff.
32 The virtue of a woman (71E), although no name is assigned to it, corresponds to
the conventional conception of feminine sophrosyne.
achieve the fine things (KaXa) that one desires (77B), these kala being
enumerated as money, offices in the city, and, again, the ruling power
(oLpxh [78C]). This definition of arete resembles that expressed by Cal-
licles in the Gorgias of Plato, but we need not depend on Plato for an
exposition of Gorgias’ moral teaching. We have, in addition to the
Palamedes and the Helen, an extremely informative Fragment of an
Epitaphios which, since it deals with the virtues of the dead, stands as a
major witness to Gorgias’ use of the topic of arete in epideictic oratory.
The Palamedes is the most conventional of the surviving works.
Palamedes denies, for example, that he is a slave to pleasure (Frag. 1 ia.
15 DK), and maintains that he values arete above wealth and is obedi¬
ent to authority (32). Such conformity to tradition is probably more es¬
sential in a juridical speech—even a model speech—than in epideictic.
The Encomium of Helen takes a more “sophistic1' line. Its total effect is
to deny human responsibility and to deprive man of the power of
controlling his passions. The force of eros is made to seem irresistible
(Frag. 11. 19 DK), much as in the apology for adultery in the Clouds
(1079-82) or the speech of the nurse in the Hippolytus (433-81).
The Epitaphios, brief though the extant fragment is, confirms the
impression that Plato gives us of the implicit relativism and amorality
of Gorgias’ teaching.33 One of the characteristics praised in the dead
men is their opportunism,34 the form that Gorgias’ favorite principle of
kairos takes in ethics. Vollgraff has pointed out the significance of the
qualities selected for mention at the beginning of the epilogue.35 Instead
of the usual combination of military and civic virtues (the arete and
sophrosyne of the Attic tombstones), Gorgias praises the dead for
preferring gentle equity to justice, and correctness of reasoning to the
letter of the law (6. 15 ff); these are preferences that the sophistic
rhetorician customarily urged upon jurymen and the comic poets
branded as signs of the new education. The word sophrosyne does not
appear in the extant portions of the Epitaphios, but Gorgias employs
three other terms that describe certain aspects of this quality and are
in fact equated with it at various periods in ancient thought: praon
epieikes (“gentle equity”) prepon (“the fitting”), and kosmiotes (“order¬
liness”).
It has been suggested that when Gorgias speaks of entheos arete (“im¬
mortal courage”), praon epieikes, authades dikaion (“rigorous justice”), and
33 Cf. Vollgraff, op. cit., 171.
34 to 8kov kv to) 8kovTi Kal Xkyeiv Kai oiyav Kai rroidv (Kai kav) (“to speak and be silent, to
do and leave undone what is necessary at the necessary time” [Frag. 6 DK]). For a favora¬
ble interpretation of Gorgias’ kairos as Divine law, see Untersteiner, op. cit., 178.
35 Op. cit., 11 ff.
94 Sophrosyne
eusebeia (“piety”), he has in mind the four cardinal virtues; and in this
group the second clearly has most in common with sophrosyne.36 But
these four excellences are not, in fact, listed as a group. Arete forms part
of a contrast between immortal courage and human mortality. Praon
epieikes and authades dikaion are part of a different set of contrasting
qualities; they are ranged against each other, as if they were mutually
exclusive, and in the same construction correctness of reasoning is
contrasted with the letter of the law. Finally, piety finds mention only
some fourteen lines after the reference to justice and equity, while
another code of excellence is described in the intervening lines.
It is in this code that a reference to the canon of cardinal virtues may
more plausibly be seen, since the categories praised by Gorgias would
not easily have taken just this form without the existence of such a
group as we have already found in Pindar and Aeschylus. Gorgias tells
us that the heroes were helpful towards those who suffered misfortune
unjustly, but chastised those who prospered unjustly, being rigorous in
the pursuit of advantage, well-disposed towards what is fitting {prepon).
They checked folly by their own wisdom, were insolent towards the
insolent but moderate (kosmioi) towards the moderate, fearless towards
the fearless and terrifying among the terrifying. Finally—making a
transition from the virtue of courage, by way of a reference to the
heroes’ acquaintance with both war and peace—Gorgias praises their
piety under four subheads: reverence towards the gods, scrupulous care
of parents, justice towards fellow townsmen, and faithful devotion
towards friends.
The qualities thus approved and practiced by the dead heroes are
evidently justice, wisdom, moderation, courage, and piety. In the first
category it is clearly the presence or absence of justice in the dispensa¬
tions of fortune that determines the reaction of the heroes. Prepon, which
becomes a synonym for sophrosyne in the philosophy of Panaetius, is in
this context closer to justice.37 Kosmiotes is frequently associated with
sophrosyne by the writers of the late fifth century, and the contrast
between kosmiotes and hybris in this passage of the Epitaphios indicates
that it takes the place of sophrosyne here. Kosmios, like taxis (“order”),
seems in fact to have been a favorite word with the pupils of Gorgias,38
36 The suggestion is made by Hieronymus Markowski, Eos 37 (1936), 111.

37 The relation of prepon or decorum to sophrosyne in Stoic thought is discussed in Chap. VI,
pp. 221 ff. Several possible interpretations of the puzzling phrase avOadeis rrpos to ovpqxpov
are considered by Vollgraff, op. at., 32 ff.
38 See Wilhelm Suss, Ethos (Leipzig, 1910), 104 f. The close link between sophrosyne and
kosmiotes is apparent in e.g., Phocylides, Frag. 11 Diehl3; Aristophanes Plutus 563-64;
Thucydides 1. 84. 3.
and it may be that kosmios replaced sophron in the vocabulary of the

great Sophist himself. If so, the importance assigned to the conception
of kosmos and the heightened meaning of the word in Plato’s Gorgias
assume a new significance.
It is natural to turn from the great Sophists to their pupils, among
whom Critias and the Platonic Callicles have noteworthy views on
sophrosyne. Critias, whom Xenophon calls the most violent of the
oligarchs, because of his ruthlessness as a leader of the Thirty Tyrants in
404 b.c.,39 exemplifies the able and ambitious men who carried out in
public life the implications of what they had learned from Gorgias,
Protagoras, and other Sophists. The best known of Critias’ works is the
fragment of his satyr play, Sisyphus, which improves upon the sophistic
argument that law is mere convention by suggesting that after law had
been invented to keep mankind from offenses in public, the notion of
the gods was devised to prevent wrongdoing in private.40 In spite of the
radical point of view underlying this theory, and in spite of Critias1
record as a hybristes when the Thirty were in power, the treatment of
sophrosyne in his elegiac poem on the Spartan Constitution is entirely
conventional. Sophrosyne remains within the tradition of Dorian ethical
ideals familiar as early as the elegies of Tyrtaeus and Theognis, and is
particularly close to the concept of measure. Fragment 6 (DK) praises
Spartan moderation in drink, in contrast to the excess practiced by
other Greeks, and describes this moderation as being in harmony with
the works of Aphrodite, sleep, Health, and Sophrosyne, the neighbor of
Piety. There is no reason to suppose that the personification of Sophro¬
syne is a Dorian literary device, but it is a fact that we meet it first in
Theognis and Epicharmus, both of whom make Sophrosyne a compan¬
ion of other personified values honored in the Dorian ethos: Eusebeia
and Eunomia in Theognis (1135-50), Hasychia in Epicharmus (101
Kaibel, Com.). Hygieia, health of body, is naturally and inevitably
coupled with sophrosyne, health of soul. It supplies one of the most
common metaphors for virtue in general in Plato’s dialogues, and in the
Roman period Sophrosyne and Hygieia are honored together on
Pergamene inscriptions.41
The concluding lines of Critias’ elegiac fragment contrast the momen¬
tary pleasures of drink with the lasting pains, recalling the hedonistic
calculus of Antiphon the Sophist. Less sophistic, indeed completely
conventional, is Critias’ praise of measure (metron), to which he refers
39 Mem. 1. 2. 12.
40 Frag. 25. 5-15 DK.
41 For Plato, see, e.g., Gorg. 526D; and cf. Pierre Louis, Les Metaphores de Platon (Paris, 1945).
For Hygieia and Sophrosyne on an inscription in Phrygia, see Chapter VII below.
g6 Sophrosyne
four times in this fragmentary poem.42 Another elegiac verse (Frag. 7 DK)
plausibly attached to the same poem credits the Spartan Chilon with
the proverb Meden agan and adds that all fair things are connected with
the proper season (kairos). The chief value of this elegy is that it reflects
the philo-Laconianism of the Athenian oligarchic faction and, by show¬
ing what aspects of sophrosyne were commended by this group, provides
a kind of control for Thucydides’ account of oligarchic and pro-Spartan
values. It may be added that in Plato’s Charmides the definition of
sophrosyne as doing one’s own work (to ra avrov TTparreiv) is ten¬
tatively ascribed to Critias (161B). This idea, too, belongs to the Dorian
tradition in so far as doing one’s own work is opposed to meddling
(77oXXa upaTTeiv, polypragmosyne) and is thus equivalent to the aristo¬
cratic excellence, apragmosyne,43
The main tendency of the sophistic Fragments so far considered is to
regard sophrosyne as the control of appetite for the ultimate advantage
of the individual involved; this advantage is determined by a comparison
of pleasures and pains. The profit motive is the standard of human
behavior. Given this moral relativism, the next step is predictable: when
it seems that yielding to the appetites produces greater pleasure than
suppressing or limiting them, the hedonistic calculus will require that
sophrosyne be rejected. This step is mirrored in the Gorgias of Plato and
the Clouds of Aristophanes.
The Gorgias shows the defense of hedonism and pleonexia (“overreach¬
ing”) by a man capable of using for his own purposes not only the
rhetorical techniques imparted by Gorgias, but also his basic ideas about
human society and its origins: Callicles’ entire argument grows out of
the sophistic opposition between physis and nomos. He maintains
(483B-C) that nomos (“convention, law”) is the device invented by the
weak to restrain the strong from overreaching {pleonexia), and insists
that according to the law of nature {Kara vopov ye rov rfjs cpvoecos
[483E]; cf. to rijs cpvoecos SiKatov [484B]) manifested among animals and
men alike, genuine justice requires that the strong have “more” {pleon
[483D]) than the weak and inferior. By “stronger” {dwarurepoi,
ioxvporepoi), “superior” (Kpeirroves), and “better” {apdvoves, /3eXrloves)
Callicles means those who are wise and courageous with respect to
public affairs and the proper way of conducting them (491B-C). Such
men deserve to rule, and justice means that they should have “more”
42 Frag. 6 DK: pArptov ye'AtOTa (17), imep to ptjpov (23), ovpperpa (26), apCTpoioi ttotois
(28).
43 See pp. 98, 101 ff., and n. 58.
than those whom they rule. True happiness and arete consist in having
the strongest possible desires and in being able to satisfy them com¬
pletely (492A,C; 494C).44 The ability to satisfy these desires depends
on the possession of andreia and phronesis, two excellences that are never
underrated in the sophistic age; indeed, they are both enlisted in the
service of appetite, a curious anticipation of the Epicurean picture so
repugnant to Cicero and Seneca: Pleasure surrounded by her hand¬
maidens, the Virtues.45 Gorgias’ pupils regard as happiest of men the
tyrant, who is subject to no restraint whatsoever; and Callicles there¬
fore condemns sophrosyne, together with law and conventional justice,
as the invention of the weak, who, unable to satisfy their own desires,
try to impose an unnatural restraint upon the strong.46 But for the
strong nothing can be more disgraceful than sophrosyne and justice,
which make slaves of those who would otherwise be free.47 License and
complete unrestraint, if supported by force, constitute true arete and
happiness. Hence Callicles labels the sophron a fool (491E)48 and
maintains that the weak give praise to both sophrosyne and justice
because of their own unmanliness (anandria [492B]). This is the strong¬
est statement in Greek literature of the antithesis between sophrosyne
and the “manly” virtues—whether designated as andreia, megalopsychia,
or to eugenes—but the background of Callicles’ attitude may be seen as
early as the Prometheus Bound, and the antithesis is especially evident in
the rejection of sophrosyne by Sophocles’ self-consciously heroic Ajax,
Antigone, and Electra.
The agon between the Just and the Unjust Arguments in the Clouds
of Aristophanes complements the speech of Callicles, reproducing with
comic exaggeration the belligerent apologia of a representative of the
same general type of paideia. In this case the attack on sophrosyne is not
justified by a might-makes-right philosophy but is expressed in the
simple terms of an elementary hedonism, based on a crude demand for
immediate gratification of appetite. The Unjust Argument interprets
sophrosyne narrowly, as restraint of appetite, particularly as chastity; as
such he subjects it to prolonged ridicule, summing up his attack with
the sweeping allegation that to sophronein deprives a man of all the
44 A speech in Euripides’ Cyclops (336-38) reads like a satire on the cult of physis and the
right of the strong: Polyphemus says that to satisfy one’s appetites is “god” for the sophron
person, i.e., the man of sense.
45 Cicero De Fin. 2. 21. 69, 2. 12. 37; Seneca De Benef. 4. 2. 1.
46 Cf. Critias’ theory of the origin of law (Frag. 25. 5-15 DK).
47 Cf. the coupling of akolasia and eleutheria in Gorg. 492C and Rep. 557B.
48 Cf. Rep. 348D, where Thrasymachus says that justice is mere folly {(.vpdtia).
g8 Sophrosyne
delights of love, gaming, drinking, and feasting—in short, of all that

makes life worth living (1071-74). The picture of the traditional
education, defended by the Just Argument, is fragrant with the breath
of the past, the honest, oldfashioned perfume of sophrosyne and aidos
(962, 1006, 1029). Yet it is noticeable that the details of the portrait of
the sophron youth (physical hardiness, devotion to athletics, propriety in
conduct) are purely external. They are comparable to the sophrosyne of
the young Gharmides in Plato’s dialogue, an entirely conventional and
nonrational arete, which cannot defend itself against attack and is there¬
fore helpless against the destructive rationalism of the new paideia. The
defeat of the Just Argument by the Unjust in the Clouds is paralleled
by the helplessness of Charmides in his conversation with Socrates; and
the difference between the two debates (those of the Clouds and the
Charmides) in spirit and outcome is one measure of Plato’s reaction to
the challenge of sophistic immorality.49
One of the qualities with which Aristophanes links sophrosyne in the
agon of the Clouds is apragmosyne (1006), the gentlemanly aloofness and
detachment so highly prized by Greek conservatives. Like sophrosyne
itself, this excellence often has political implications, as it does in the
Birds when the two Athenians leave the city in disgust and set out to
find a place that will be apragmon (44). There is no sharp dividing line
between the moral and the political aspects of sophrosyne and apragmo¬
syne in Aristophanes, because the qualities that distinguish a citizen as
well bred, well behaved, and decent in private life are the same quali¬
ties as the poet ascribed to the oldfashioned moderate in politics. Certain
keywords apply to both spheres: in addition to sophron and apragmon, the
most common are kosmios (“orderly”), metrios (“moderate”), and chrestos
(“useful”).50 Aristophanes’ point of view—not to be identified with that
of any political party, but rather with a tenacious ideal of an incor¬
ruptible Athens—remains constant from first to last in his comedies,
from the Fragments of the Banqueters to the Plutus.51 The locus classicus
49 The agon in the Clouds illustrates the opposition to sophrosyne as self-control. The only
trace in Aristophanes of the equation of sophrosyne with unmanliness is found in Peace 1297,
where the son of Cleonymus, who threw away his shield, is said to come of a sophron father.
Here, too, a political nuance is likely, if sophrosyne is linked with the “peace party.”
50 Kosmios: Thes. 573; PI. 89, 565; etc. Frag. 84 Kock describes as sophron /cosmos the
controlled movement of a ship as it is rowed over the waves. Metrios: Clouds 1137, 1510; Thes.
1227; PL 245; etc. Chrestos: Clouds 8; Birds 1449; Frogs 686, 735; PL 239, 901, 909, etc.
51 The Banqueters, like the Clouds, dealt with the contrast between the old paideia, which
produced sophrosyne, and the new, which made its pupils wanton (Clouds 529). The Plutus
personifies Sophrosyne and Kosmiotes and links both with Poverty, while Wealth is linked with
hybns (563-64). For a possible connection between the praise of poverty here and the
teachings of Prodicus, see Wilhelm Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos (Stuttgart, 1942), 358.
for the combination of political and moral virtues in the idealized por¬
trait of a gentlemanly product of the oldfashioned paideia, who takes a
conservative line in politics, is found in the Frogs:, when the Chorus
advises Athens neither to substitute base metal for gold and silver coin¬
age, nor to honor strangers of dubious parentage instead of the citizens
known to be well bred and sophrones, just, noble, and gentlemanly,
brought up in the gymnasium, the choruses, and the schools of music
(721-30). Sophrosyne is still what it was in the Clouds: oldfashioned,
nonintellectual, essentially aristocratic.52 It is associated, by implication,
with the oligarchic faction in a speech of Prometheus in the Birds, which
lists among Zeus’s possessions sophrosyne (“soundness”), euboulia
(“political prudence”), and eunomia (“lawabiding conduct”), and in the
next line names the standard equipment of the demagogues as the
thunderbolt, the dockyards, and insulting language (1540).
Occasionally sophrosyne carries a strictly moral connotation, without
a trace of political implications; then its meaning is almost invariably
“chastity” or “purity.” It is a virtue of men and women alike 53 (whereas
sophrosyne the arete politike belongs only to men). The model of mascu¬
line chastity is Peleus, whose sophrosyne is praised by the Just Argument
in the Clouds and is derided by the Unjust.54 The feminine exemplar is
Penelope, who is contrasted with the wanton Phaedra and Medea in
the women’s reproach to Euripides in the Thesmophoriazusae (548). It is
this purely moral nuance that Aristophanes employs in the Clouds when
he describes that play as clean (sophron), because it is free from the
conventional phallic symbols of Old Comedy (537). A tentative step
towards the development of sophrosyne as a term in literary criticism
is taken when the Chorus of the Knights applies the related adverb
sophronikos to the conduct of Aristophanes himself. When he presented
his earlier plays under the name of Callestratus, he refrained sophronikos
(“modestly, bashfully”) from rushing before the people to talk nonsense
(545). In almost all its applications to literary criticism before the
Hellenistic age, sophrosyne is predominantly moral and is predicated
of the writer rather than of his work.55
In one other meaning of sophrosyne Aristophanes resembles Euripides,
the Orators, and Thucydides, all of whom reflect the contemporary
Athenian habit of using sophron as “prudent, sensible.” The significance
52 A like association of sophrosyne with the oldfashioned paideia, incompatible with the
demagogic principles of the popular leaders, occurs in Knights 334.
53 Aristophanes Lys. 473 (feminine sophrosyne), 795-96 (masculine).
54 Aristophanes Clouds 1063, 1067. Cf. Pindar Isth. 8. 40, Nem. 4. 95; Plato Rep. 391C 1-2.
55 See my paper, C.P. 43 (1948), 1—18.
ioo Sophrosyne
is especially clear in the Wasps, where the verb sophronein has precisely
the same meaning as the phrase vovv txeiV (I4°5? 1440). Like the
Orators, characters in Aristophanes use the warning ei oooeppovels (“if you
have any sense”).56 Only in this fashion does any trace of the intel¬
lectual quality in sophrosyne survive. Everywhere else moral con¬
notations prevail, and the combination of the moral and the political is
the aspect of sophrosyne most typical of Aristophanes.
It is also most typical of Thucydides, who, however, presents a picture
of far greater complexity. Although the historian often uses sophron with
the meaning “prudent, sensible,” and the common phrase ei oueppoveiTe
(“if you use good judgment”) recurs frequently in the speeches he
records, it is his tendency to connect sophrosyne with the chief moral
issues of the History that is most instructive. There are two great themes
in Thucydides: the contrast between Athens and Sparta; and the
prolonged deterioration of Greece (seen especially in connection with
Athens), because of the triumph of ambition and greed in the statesmen
who succeeded Pericles in Athens and Archidamus and Brasidas in
Sparta. Sophrosyne is involved in both issues, as well as in several
subsidiary themes: the contrast between generations, the role of anthro-
peia physis (“human nature”) in political action, and the various attitudes
towards fortune (tyche) which Thucydides observed in political leaders
and the Greeks in general.
The contrast between the simplicity of Herodotus’ concept of
sophrosyne and the complexity of Thucydides’ suggests something of
the effect that tragedy and sophistic, as well as political events, had on
the development of the virtue. Thucydides resembles, in different ways,
each of the tragic poets as they dealt with sophrosyne—Euripides more
than the others, but Sophocles and even Aeschylus as well. He shares
with Euripides a deep interest in the struggle between the rational and
the irrational in human affairs. Among the irrational elements with
which statesmen and generals must cope, the most dangerous are
human emotions and fortune. Thucydides goes so far as to treat success
or failure in this area as the supreme test of statesmanship, and
like Euripides he regards sophrosyne as one of the manifestations of the
rational (others are pronoia, “foresight,” gnome, “intelligence,” and
euboulia, “prudence”). The historian and Sophocles have in common
their realization of the gulf between the bold and the restrained tempera¬
ments—what Plato later calls the andrikos and the sophronikos. Sophocles
56 Lys. 1093; Frogs 853. Aristophanes occasionally exploits the multiple meanings of
sophrosyne, as in Ecc. 767, where sophron implies both “law-abiding” and “prudent.”
Age of the Sophists IOI
portrays this dangerous incompatibility as it affects the individual soul;

for Thucydides it is one of the great destructive forces in Athens—where
it leads to the conflict between the reckless Cleon and Alcibiades and
the cautious Nicias—and, on an even larger scale, in the Greek world
—where it underlies the hostility between confident, aggressive Athens
and slow-moving, conservative Sparta. The resemblance of Thucydides
to Aeschylus is slighter, but the two are alike in their conception of
sophrosyne as an arete politike. The sophron polis forecast at the close
of the Oresteia would probably have won from Thucydides something like
the praise he assigns to the constitution of the Five Thousand in 411 b.c.:
the best government that the Athenians had enjoyed in his time (8. 97. 2).
Among the similarities between Thucydides and the Sophists, the one
that most profoundly affects his treatment of sophrosyne is the practice
of analyzing ethical and political terms and playing with several possi¬
ble meanings of the same word in different contexts; this practice is
largely responsible for the impression that we receive of sophrosyne as a
term of manifold significance in Thucydides.57 He resembles the Sophists
also in divorcing sophrosyne from the religious implications that it had
acquired during the archaic period and still possessed in tragedy, where
Aeschylus and Sophocles commonly associate the virtue in some way
with the Divine, and Euripides frequently criticizes the gods for their
lack of sophrosyne. Again like the Sophists, Thucydides employs the
arguments from probability, nature, and advantage, the last two of
which he connects with sophrosyne as it is interpreted by the Athenians
in the course of the Melian Dialogue.
While the contrast between Athens and Sparta is worked out in great
detail and depends on many elements, it is to some extent a contrast
between rival conceptions of sophrosyne. Both are presented through the
device of speeches; first the speeches of the Corinthians and the Athenians
at the council in Sparta before the war; then the speeches of Archidamus
and Pericles, each of whom is a representative of his own tradition at its
best and advocates a policy in harmony with that tradition. Through¬
out these speeches Thucydides employs a specialized vocabulary familiar
from other sources of the period. Certain words are appropriated by
Athens, others by Sparta, and still a third group contains terms and
slogans that are used by both states, or by rival factions within them.
Apragmosyne and hesychia are distinctive Spartan and oligarchic qualities.
Prothymia (“enthusiasm”), synesis (“intelligence”), to drasterion (“activity”),
57 On this trait in Thucydides, see A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides

(Oxford, i945-I956), 2. 301.
102 Sophrosyne
tolme (“audacity,” in a good sense), and polypragmosyne (also, and more

surprisingly, in a good sense) belong to the Athenians.58 One of the
controversial qualities, belonging in some sense to both sides, is sophro¬
syne, but the word itself, as distinguished from the quality, is usually
treated as Spartan and oligarchic. Nothing in Thucydides’ allusions to
sophrosyne is more significant than this fact, which beyond doubt
reflects contemporary opinion. We have conjectured that from the
reforms of Ephialtes to the Revolution of the Thirty the word sophron was
politically weighted in Athens (see p. 44). It would normally mean
“sound, conservative, aristocratic, oligarchic” and would therefore be
avoided by democrats. Thucydides’ usage shows that the same was
probably true on the international scene. His avoidance of the term
sophrosyne in his descriptions of Athenian moderation recalls the prac¬
tice of Sophocles. Since the “heroic” characters reject sophrosyne for
themselves, the poet, when he wishes to commend the virtue, must do so
by indirection. Thucydides, having accepted the claim of the Spartans
and the oligarchs that sophrosyne is peculiarly their own, must find a
different term to describe Athenian sophrosyne. The word he chooses is
the one that Solon chose—metrios, traditionally a synonym for sophron in
a political context.59
The prevailing connotations of sophrosyne in the contrast between
Athens and Sparta first come to our attention in the speeches delivered
at Sparta before the outbreak of the war. The Corinthians draw a vivid
sketch of the psychology of their Spartan allies and their Athenian
enemies, presenting a contrast that greatly favors the Athenians. The
first quality on which they comment is Spartan sophrosyne. The trustful
spirit that characterizes Spartan domestic affairs produces sophrosyne
(“stability”), they concede, but leads to ignorance (amathia) and lethargy
(hesychia) in external affairs (1. 68-69). The Athenians by contrast are
described in terms of activity, boldness, and enterprise (1. 70). The
speech is full of sharp antitheses, which are climaxed by the assertion
that the Athenians consider apragmon hesychia (“leisurely aloofness”) no
58 For a detailed study of apragmosyne, see Wilhelm Nestle, Philol. 3i (1925), 129-40; and
cf. T. H. Wade-Gery, J.H.S. 52 (1932), 224-25. On polypragmosyne, consult Victor Ehrenberg,
J.H.S. 67 (1947), 46-67, and A. W. Gomme, op. cit., on Thucydides 1. 32-34. Gustav Gross-
mann (Politische Schlagworter aus der Zeit des peloponnesischen Krieges [Zurich, 1950]) discusses the
relation of sophrosyne to eunomia as a political excellence (70-89) and brings together much
of the evidence connecting sophrosyne with apragmosyne as individual and political virtues
(126-37).
59 See, e.g., Solon 4. 7, 16. 1-2 Diehl3; and cf. Thucydides 1. 76. 4, 1. 77. 2, 2. 65. 5.
Age of the Sophists W3
more desirable than laborious lack of leisure (i. 70. 8). The association
of sophrosyne with apragmosyne and hesychia firmly establishes it as part
of the conservative Dorian tradition, with which both words are often
linked.60 The noblest exemplar of this tradition is the old king Archida-
mus, whom Thucydides describes as wise and sophron (1. 79. 2). His
speech to the conference at Sparta, marked by just these qualities of
intellectual and moral stability, analyzes the roots of Spartan sophro¬
syne and its outcome in political behavior in a more favorable light than
the Corinthian estimate had shed.
Beginning with a reasoned discussion of the powers involved in the
coming struggle and a warning against unrealistic hope {elpis [1. 81. 6];
cf. 1. 84. 4 on tyche, “fortune”), Archidamus advises his listeners not to
regard the conduct he advocates as unmanliness (anandna) nor to be
ashamed of a policy of slowness and caution (1. 83-84). The very
freedom and good repute of Sparta are the result of this policy, which
embodies in the truest sense intelligent moderation (sophrosyne emphron
[1. 84. 1]) and has enabled Sparta alone among Greek cities to avoid
hybris in prosperity and despair in adversity (1. 84. 2). Archidamus
then proceeds to demonstrate that sophrosyne is the basis of the two most
valued aspects of Spartan arete. He sums up the national character
in these words (1. 84. 3):
We are warlike and wise in counsel because of our orderly nature [to eukosmon], the
one because a sense of honor [aidos] springs chiefly from sophrosyne, and courage
from the sense of honor, the other because we are brought up with too much
amathia to scorn the laws and too much severity of discipline [avv xa'^€77’(1'n7Tt
ooo(ppoP€GTcpov] to disobey them.61
The emphasis on amathia as a Spartan trait (already mentioned in the

speech of the Corinthians, 1. 68. 1), contrasts with Athenian intel-
lectualism, as does Spartan authoritarianism with Athenian love of
freedom. Pericles, too, alludes to this contrast when he says in the
60 For apragmosyne, see n. 58 above. Apragmosyne in a conservative political sense occurs in

Aristophanes Birds 44, Knights 261; Antiphon the Orator 3. 2. 1; Plato Rep. 565A. Nestle
(loc. cit., 132) sees some hint—in Euripides Me. 298 f. and Antiope, Frags. 184, 193, and
Aristophanes Knights 191—that the view of the apragmon as unpatriotic was familiar in the
last third of the fifth century. See also Gomme, op. cit., on Thucydides 2. 40. 2. For hesychia,
cf. Pindar Pyth. 8. 1-2, where the word refers to international affairs. Internal hesychia
is mentioned in Pindar 01. 4. 16. See also Epicharmus, Frag. 101 Kaibel, Com.; and Aristo¬
phanes Birds 1320-22.
61 Cf. Sophocles Ajax 1073-80, where Menelaus insists that phobos and aidos are essential to
sophrosyne in the army.
104 Sophrosyne
Funeral Oration that the Athenians alone combine daring with reflec¬
tion, whereas in all other people boldness (thrasos) depends on amathia,
and with consideration comes hesitancy (2. 40. 3). One of the earliest
signs of Athenian decay is Cleon’s praise of amathia combined with what
he calls sophrosyne (“discipline, obedience”) in the Mytilene Debate (3.
37- 3-5)-62
Spartan sophrosyne then, as analyzed in the speeches of both the
Corinthians and Archidamus, has two principal facets: the tendency to
maintain the status quo in external affairs and, internally, the repressive
discipline and restraint essential to a militaristic regime. According to
both views, sophrosyne is a cause of slowness to act—hesychia (1. 69. 4,
1. 83. 3) or bradytes (1. 71. 4, 1. 84. 1)—which is interpreted by
the Corinthians as intolerable sluggishness (1. 70. 4), by Archidamus as
prudent deliberation (1. 84). In addition Archidamus links sophrosyne
with the refusal to give way to delusive hopes about fortune and with
Sparta’s consequent immunity to overconfidence and despair—an
important and original aspect of political sophrosyne in the History,63
That Athens, too, lays claim to a certain kind of moderation we learn
from the speech of the Athenian ambassadors who address the confer¬
ence at Sparta, and from Pericles himself in all three of the speeches re¬
ported by Thucydides. It is in these four speeches particularly that we
observe a reluctance to use the word sophrosyne in connection with
Athens, although situations are not lacking where the word would be
entirely appropriate. The ambassadors at Sparta, in reply to the
Corinthian attack on Athenian influence in Greece, first recall the
heroism of their ancestors in the Persian wars (1. 73-75), using a series
of words that describe Athenian conduct throughout the History—
prothymia (“enthusiasm”), tolme (“daring”), and synesis (“intelligence”)—
and then predict that if any other state should seize power from Athens,
it would show that the Athenians by contrast had behaved with a cer¬
tain moderation (tl per p 16050 ptv [1. 76. 4]).64 They conclude with a
warning about the unpredictability of tyche in a long war and with
a recommendation that Sparta employ euboulia while there is yet time
(1. 78). Just as they prefer metriotes to sophrosyne in describing Athenian
moderation towards the allies, so they choose to call by the name
62 Cf. Euripides Andr. 479-85.

63 Cf. 4. 18. 4, where the Spartan envoys after Sphacteria range sophrosyne against tyche.
The Athenians at Sparta oppose euboulia (“good judgment”) to tyche (1. 78. 1-4). For further
observations on the deluding power of hope, desire, and fortune, see the speech of Diodotus,
3- 45- 5-
64 Cf Thucydides 1. 77. 2: other rulers are less metrioi than the Athenians.
Age of the Sophists 1 °5
euboulia what Archidamus describes as sophrosyne in his remarks about
the danger of relying on tyche and elpis.65
The first oration of Pericles demonstrates his keen awareness of this
danger. Although the main purpose of the speech is to encourage the
Athenians to undertake the war by setting forth the resources on which
they may rely (we note that Pericles is careful to give many sound
reasons for his own elpis), it includes a warning that success will come
only if the Athenians agree neither to attempt further expansion of the
empire nor to expose themselves to needless risks while they are at war
(i. 144. 1). The pronoia (“foresight”) and sophrosyne which later gener¬
ations considered typical of Pericles 66 inspire this characteristic attempt
to check Athenian exuberance. The same statesmanlike gifts are applied
in reverse in the third speech: now Pericles uses his gnome (“intelligence”)
to counteract, not the hybris of the masses, but their unwarranted despair
after the devastation wrought by the plague and the second Spartan in¬
vasion of Attica.67 To bring them out of their tapeinotes (“dejection” [2.
61. 2]), he reminds them that their control of the sea opens up unlimited
possibilities for future conquest, and he remarks significantly that he has
never previously discussed this subject in his speeches (because it would
seem too boastful), and he would not do so now if he did not see that they
were unreasonably depressed (2. 62. 1-2). He urges them to base their
attitude towards the enemy not on hope {elpis) but on reason (gnome),
from which springs genuine pronoia (2. 62. 5). The speech concludes
with Pericles’ famous observations on the nature of tyrannis and the
deficiencies of apragmosyne when compared with the active principle (to
drasterion [63. 3; cf. 64. 4]). Everything in the speech, including the final
appeal to Athenian pride in the verdict of history, is shrewdly calculated
to revive courage and allay resentment against Pericles himself; it
demonstrates the statesmanlike sophrosyne of the great leader and
accounts for his success in dealing with his distracted people.
Immediately after reporting the speech and describing its consequences,
Thucydides gives his estimate of the essential Periclean qualities: modera¬
tion in time of peace, foresight in time of war (2. 65. 5), and the ability
65 Cf. the phrase ouxppouus e/cAoytôfro (“consider prudently”) in the speech of Archidamus
(1. 80. 2).
66 On Pericles’ foresight (also called eulabeia, “caution”) see Plutarch Pericles 18. On
his moderation (metriotes), see ibid., 39. On his sophrosyne, see Isocrates Antidosis 190. Pericles
appears as a type of temperantia in Perugino’s painting of the cardinal virtues in the Collegio
del Cambio in Perugia; the other exemplars of this virtue are the Roman statesmen Scipio
and Cincinnatus.
67 Cf 2. 21. After the first invasion Pericles refuses to convene the Assembly lest the
people act under the instigation of orge (“emotion”) rather than of reason (gnome).
io6 Sophrosyne
to control the emotions of the people—once again defined as hybris

in prosperity and unreasonable dejection in misfortune (2. 65. 8-9). By
contrast, Thucydides says, the successors of Pericles brought the state to
disaster by their ambition (philotimia) and greed (2. 65. 7). Later he adds
pleonexia, the form taken by hybris in public affairs (3. 82. 8).68
Although the power to cope with the irrational is described as sophro¬
syne by the Spartan king Archidamus and later (after the Sphacteria
campaign) by the Spartan envoys to Athens (4. 18. 4), Thucydides
avoids the word in his estimate of Pericles; and when he commends his
restraint, he says (2. 65. 5): gerpfios l^ydro (“he governed the state with
moderation”). The word sophrosyne is missing from the Funeral Oration
also. It is surely remarkable that a speech celebrating the spiritual,
political, and aesthetic values of Athens in the age of Pericles should
contain no reference to this word, which more than any other sums up
the inimitable balance of dynamism with restraint underlying the
greatest achievements of that age. This balance is in fact the keynote of
the Funeral Oration. Pericles captures the essential arete of Athens in
the famous observation (2. 40. 1), “We love beauty without extravagance
and wisdom without softness,”69 which is to this oration what Archidamus’
analysis of Spartan sophrosyne is to his speech in Book I—a revelation
of the very core of the national ethos. Each oration calls attention to a
quality that could legitimately be termed sophrosyne,70 but the two
forms of arete are sharply distinguished, and in accordance with the
normal political vocabulary of the day, the word sophrosyne is applied
to the cautious conservatism of Sparta rather than to the “measured
grace” of Athens.
The Funeral Oration restates many of the views about Athens set forth
in the speeches delivered at Sparta before the war, including the anti¬
thesis between Spartan apragmosyne and Athenian energy and aggressive-
68 See A. W. Gomme,J.H.S. 71 (1951), 70-72, for objections to Thucydides’ analysis of the

reasons for Athens’ defeat.
69 A. E. Wardman, C. Q. 9 (1959), 38-42 proposes to translate as follows: “Our love of good
things is compatible with economy and our love of discussion does not involve cowardice.”
A. W. Gomme, Commentary, ad toe., criticizes Thucydides’ use of the word euteleia on the
ground that it implies cheapness. See J. T. Kakridis, Der thukydideische Epitaphios (Munich,
1961), 47-48, for criticism of Wardman’s translation and defense of the word euteleia in this
connection. In the fourth and third centuries euteleia (“frugality, austerity”) is closely connected
with sophrosyne by the Cynics; see Crates, Frag. 2 Diehl3: Euteleia, child of glorious Sophrosyne.
For Cicero’s suggestion that frugalitas is the appropriate Fatin rendering of sophrosyne,
see Tusc. Disp. 3. 8.
70 Gomme (Commentary, ad. loc.) compares the Funeral Oration, especially 41. 1, to the
Parthenon frieze and the close of Aeschylus’ Eumemdes. Felix Wasserman (T.A.P.A. 85 [1954],
46-54) discusses the idealized picture of the mesoi (“moderates”) in the oration.
Age of the Sophists ioy
ness. Pericles echoes the Corinthians when he says that the Athenians
alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as apragmon
(“minding his own business”), but as good for nothing (2. 40. 2). The
ideal Athenian citizen is not called polypragmon because of its invidious
implications; but by rejecting apragmosyne, Pericles makes the contrast
with Sparta unmistakable. Moreover, by alluding to the benefits con¬
ferred on other Greek cities by Athenian intervention (SpcorTes, 6 Spaoas
[2. 40. 4]), he contrives to praise implicitly the quality of polypragmosyne
on the international scene.
Only once in the History is polypragmosyne frankly used as a term
of commendation. The Athenian Euphemus at Camarina tells the
Sicilians that necessity has compelled the Athenians to do many things
(rroXXa TTpaooav [6. 87. 2]) and that their polypragmosyne benefits most of
the Greeks. The realization that Athens will not hesitate to intervene
compels the wrongdoer to control himself even against his will (6 pev
aKuv . . . ocooppoveiv, a phrase that has Aeschylean overtones, ironical in
this context), and the one wronged is thereby saved with no effort
on his own part (apragmonos [6. 87. 3-4]). Polypragmosyne thus becomes a
word of praise, but only in a limited context; in civic life it remains an
invidious term and is so used by most writers of the fourth century.71
The second great theme of the History—the triumph of pleonexia and
philotimia over sophrosyne and euboulia—is traced in several stages. The
process affects all of Greece, but Thucydides illustrates it with the most
abundant detail in the case of Athens.72 The first stage coincides with
the plague, whose effects lead to unrestrained indulgence in hedone and
to a condition of anomia (“lawlessness”) which Thucydides holds respon¬
sible for permanent damage to Athenian morale.73 The second stage is
marked by the Mytilene Debate of the year 427, in which Cleon advo¬
cates a policy of ruthless brutality and pours scorn upon the intellect, the
emotion of pity, and the reliance on discussion to determine policy—all
Athenian traits of long standing. Amathia (“anti-intellectualism”) is
linked in his mind with sophrosyne (“authoritarian discipline”), and he
echoes what Archidamus had said about the two qualities, even to the
71 See Chapter IV, pp. 138 ff.

72 The decline from Pericles to Alcibiades and Nicias is matched by the falling off in
Spartan leadership from the sophrosyne of Archidamus (1. 84) and the metriotes of Brasidas
(4. 81. 3, 108. 2-6) to the ruthlessness and cruelty of later generals. Thucydides did not com¬
plete the history of the war and thus could not show the final degradation of Spartan
leadership in Lysander. Plato’s description of the decline of the ideal state and the virtuous
soul {Rep. VIII) has several features in common with Thucydides.
73 Gomme, Commentary, ad. loc., expresses doubts about the permanence of the damage.
108 Sophrosyne
point of preferring bad laws that are obeyed, over better ones that are
ignored. His opponent, Diodotus, possesses an almost Periclean sophro¬
syne and euboulia, evinced in his remarks on the danger of haste, passion,
and reliance on tyche.74 His success in persuading the Assembly to revoke
the cruel decree against Mytilene shows that the moral decay of Athens
is still in its early stages.
Parallel to the Mytilene Debate is the equally vivid description of the
fall of Plataea, culminating in speeches about the disposition of the
prisoners which show the Spartans to be equal to the Athenians in
cruelty and far more advanced in hypocrisy. The Plataeans ask in vain
for sophron oiktos (“pity” [3. 59. 1]) and sophron charis (“grace” [3. 58. 1]).
In each case the adjective, while no doubt chosen for its presumed
appeal to Spartan tradition, recalls the use of sophron with the implica¬
tion “merciful” in Euripides’ war tragedies.75
A third stage in the deterioration of Hellas is marked by the account
of the revolution in Corcyra (3. 82), the classical example of stasis
(“civil war”), which gave the Greek world a hint of the horrors that were
to come in the next two decades. Here Thucydides reveals the effect
wrought by warfare (the “violent teacher,” as he calls it) on morals—
precisely as Euripides traces the deterioration of individual morality
under ill-treatment. External strife provoked civil war and made it more
deadly. The transvaluation of ethical terms is an early and devastating
result of civil conflict. Andreia is replaced by senseless rashness (tolme
alogistos), and sophrosyne is considered a cloak for cowardice (anandria).
No one who remembers the signs in Attic drama of a tendency to con¬
fuse sophrosyne and cowardice will be surprised by this development,
especially since one of the conclusions to which Thucydides comes in his
account of the war years is that the antagonism between reason and
emotion is now heightened, and reason is quenched by ambition, greed,
hope, and fear. The noble daring of Periclean Athens (equivalent to
andreia, because governed by reason) becomes something quite different
in Cleon and Alcibiades, something closer to thrasos (in Platonic terms);
and as it becomes wilder and more immoderate, it becomes more and
more contemptuous of sophrosyne. Any conflict between the bold and
the peaceful temperaments is potentially dangerous to the State, as Plato
points out in the Republic and the Politicus. Their polarity is already
74 A warning against reliance on tyche is joined with advice to practice sophrosyne in the
speech of the Spartan legates (4. 18). Athens rejects their offer of peace because of her greed
for “more” and because of the dominance of Cleon.
75 See especially Herac., whose central idea is that of charis (220, 241, 320, 438, 548, 767,
etc.), implying pity or compassion.
Age of the Sophists iog
hinted at in the statement of the Corinthians at Sparta (i. 120. 3) that

it is the part of sophrones men, if they are not wronged, to remain at peace,
but of brave men (agathoi) to go to war if they meet injustice. It would
be going too far to say that agathos is the antithesis of sophron in this sen¬
tence, but a contrast is felt, as it is felt by Sophocles. Thucydides brings
the contrast out into the open at Corcyra.
The Melian Dialogue shows in action the principles described in
connection with Corcyra. Without a trace of embarrassment the Athenian
representatives assert the right of the strong and reject every appeal to
such traditional ideals as justice, religion, and aidos. In their usage
at this point in the History, sophrosyne means recognizing the realities of
political life, acquiescence in the laws of nature that require the weak to
obey the strong.76 When the Melians describe the situation as one in
which they must defend their freedom or incur the guilt of cowardice,
the Athenians reply that such is not the case, r\v ye ooocppovcos fiovXevrioOe
(“if you take thought for your own advantage”), for this is not an equal
contest, concerned with honor, but a decision having to do with survival,
and the Melians are greatly outnumbered (5. 101). Later in the dialogue
the Athenians equate sophrosyne with realistic calculation and resistance
to the irrational, when they comment on the lack of euboulia in the
deliberations of the Melians and advise them to arrive at some more in¬
telligent (ooxppovtorcpav) conclusion, instead of putting their faith in
fortune and hope 77 or in the dubious loyalty of the Spartans.
The speeches delivered in Athens before the Sicilian expedition expose
the decline in Athenian statesmanship and show how two remnants of
Pericles’ political legacy have been divided and turned against each
other. Alcibiades, like Cleon before him, has inherited the aggressive
thrust in Periclean policy and is in the process of driving the principles
of tolme and drasterion to the extreme of pleonexia. Nicias, who has
inherited the moderation that governed Pericles’ foreign policy after
445 b.c., drives this principle to the opposite extreme of apragmosyne,78
76 Cf. the speech of Hermocrates of Syracuse at Gela (6. 79) in which sophrosyne is equiva¬
lent to putting the claims of physis before those of dikaion. This is the sophrosyne of Oceanus
in Aeschylus’ P. V and of Chrysothemis in Sophocles’ Electra.
77 The different attitudes towards tyche evinced by Athens and Melos are signs of the con¬
flict between two opposing political philosophies; see Felix Wassermann, T.A.P.A. 78 (1947),
29-30. Thucydides’ technique in revealing a fundamental contrast through the differing
connotations of one and the same word is comparable to the device used by Sophocles
to reveal contrasting characters; see Chap. II, pp. 65 ff Richmond Lattimore, A.J.P. 68
(1947), 161-79 discusses the theme of the folly of elpis in Greek literature from Solon on.
78 See Gomme, loc. cit., 74-80, for Cleon and Alcibiades; and Allen B. West, C.P. 19
(1924), 120 ff, for Nicias. Consult also Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydide et I’imperialisme
i io Sophrosyne
The contrast between the two leaders is stated in terms of the opposition
between generations—the headstrong young men and the inactive elders
(6. 13), a theme popular in tragedy and comedy at this time. The
dominant trait of the young, of Alcibiades, and of the Athenian masses
(both young and old, as it turns out) is epithymia—uncontrolled greed
(6. 13. 1, 15. 2, 24. 4). Nicias, like Archidamus at Sparta, begs the older
men not to be afraid of seeming cowardly if they vote against the expe¬
dition, and reminds them that pronoia (one of the great Periclean virtues)
wins more victories than does epithymia (6. 13. 1). If we look to our own
advantage (a ococppovovucv), he says, we Athenians will realize that our
proper concern is not with Sicily but with Sparta (6. 11. 7)—a restate¬
ment of Pericles’ warning against embarking on further conquest or
undertaking unnecessary risks (1. 144. 1). Alcibiades, of course, wins
over the Assembly, partly by his observation that Athens cannot now
afford to become apragmon—another echo of Pericles (2. 63. 3)—but
mostly because his audience shares his hopes and ambitions.79
In addition to these, another irrational element had its effect, which
Thucydides mentions only in describing how the Athenians received news
of the defeat when all was over. Then the people blamed not only the
orators who had urged them on but also the oracle mongers and sooth¬
sayers and all the others who had encouraged them by divination to hope
that they could conquer Sicily (8. 1. 1). This, together with the record of
Nicias’ fatal dependence on his soothsayers (7. 50. 4), is a further indi¬
cation of the failure of post-Periclean leaders to control the irrational
factors in politics and war.80
It remains to sum up the chief meanings of sophrosyne in Thucydides.
As the passages so far considered have shown, sophrosyne is a flexible
term that may be predicated of internal or external affairs. It is in the
area of foreign policy that the greatest variation occurs, often depending
on whether the state involved is a first-class or a minor power. Corcyra,
about whom the term is first used in Book I, confesses that her policy of
sophrosyne, which she thought would bring safety, has proved a source
of danger (1. 32. 4). In her case it means isolationism, the effort to avoid
athemen (Paris, 1947), 156-57. Nicias is said to be a moderate (ooxppovtiv) in Frag. 41 of the
comic poet Telecleides (Plutarch Nicias 4. 5); see Gomme, Commentary, on Thucydides 4. 28. 5.
79 Thucydides holds Alcibiades’ private epithymiae (“appetites”) responsible in large meas¬
ure for the fall of Athens. For a different reason Cicero considers the cupiditates pnncipum
dangerous to the State (Legg. 3. 13. 30).
80 Cf. 2. 21. 3, where Thucydides records the refusal of Pericles to convene the Assembly
when the Athenians had been aroused by oracle mongers after the Spartan invasion of
Attica in the first year of the war.
Age of the Sophists Ill
foreign entanglements. But when Sparta, one of the two greatest powers
in Greece, boasts of her sophrosyne and equates it with apragmosyne, it
cannot mean a policy of isolationism, because it is admitted that Sparta
interferes with the constitutions of her allies. Rather, it indicates a non¬
provocative policy—what Archidamus calls to fipaSv Kal ptWov and
Pindar hasychia (Pyth. 8. i)—a policy fostered by the Dorian states
especially in their contacts with one another.
For Athens the normal foreign policy was the reverse—polypragmosyne
instead of apragmosyne—but occasionally she was advised, either by her
own leaders or by foreign powers, to practice sophrosyne, which then
implies caution or at least the repression of Athens’ typical overconfidence.
At one point a sophron policy involves rejecting Corcyra’s request for an
alliance, because it would be prudent or advantageous to lull the hostil¬
ity aroused by the Megara affair (i. 42. 3). Elsewhere it means accept¬
ing the peace proposals of Sparta after Sphacteria, because sophrosyne
teaches that good fortune is mutable (4. 18. 4). Still later, sophrosyne
would dictate a refusal to intervene in Sicily (6. 11. 7). Only rarely is a
policy of intervention called sophron, but this exceptional usage occurs
when the ambassadors from Egesta urge Athens to join the alliance
against Syracuse (6. 6. 2). Here the word sophron reverts to its primary
significance, “shrewd in one’s own interest,” a meaning common in
Greek oratory where it is used with reference to both internal and
external affairs. Thus Hermocrates of Syracuse, in his address to the
assembly at Gela, three times uses the stereotyped phrase d ooxppovovpev
(“if we show good sense for] consult our best interests”)—each time to
commend some aspect of the policy which he advocates (4. 60, 61, 64).
Similarly Diodotus in the debate over Mytilene speaks of the sophron
polls without reference to factional disputes; he means a city wise enough
to encourage her citizens to speak fearlessly, without the threat of
punishment if their advice is not followed (3. 42. 5). And amid the
debate over Pylos, Thucydides describes as sophrones the opponents of
Cleon (4. 28. 5). In spite of the party quarrels in which the demagogue
was involved, sophron here, as Gomme observes, need not refer exclusively
to the oligarchic faction, but may refer more generally to the men of
sense who hoped that by sending Cleon against the Spartans in Pylos,
they would either defeat the enemy or get rid of Cleon himself.
Normally, however, sophrosyne in internal affairs was the shibboleth
of the oligarchs, as Thucydides’ account of the civil war in Corcyra makes
abundantly clear. The cry of equal rights for the many was raised by the
democrats, while their opponents used the catchword sophron aristokratia
112 Sophrosyne
(3. 82. 8). Sophron is the operative word denoting oligarchy, because it
was a commonplace of political thought that a democracy was more in¬
clined to be turbulent, an oligarchy to be better disciplined.81 Hence the
word is usually present—like eunomia, eutaxia, and kosmos—in discussions
of the Spartan Constitution,82 yet it might be used of any moderate form
of government, especially one in which the power of the masses was in
some way restricted. Book VIII, which deals with the period from 411
to 406—during which sophrosyne, like homonoia and the “ancestral con¬
stitution,” was topical in Athenian debates about politics—always con¬
nects sophrosyne with oligarchy or modified democracy. When, for
example, Peisander came from Samos in 411, he told the Athenians that
they could not hope for assistance from the Great King unless they
adopted a more sophron constitution (et pp TToXtrcvoopev tc oaxppoveoTtpov)
and put the offices of the state into the hands of fewer men (8. 53. 3).
That sophrosyne was also thought to be incompatible with the rule of
a very small number or with tyranny, we learn from a statement of the
Thebans at Plataea. They respond to the charge that their ancestors
medized in 481 by pointing out that their constitution at that time was
neither an oligarchy with equal rights before the law nor a democracy,
but a dynasty of a few men, which is the closest thing to tyranny and
the farthest removed from laws and the ideal of moderate government
(too ococppovcoTOLTu ivavTiGnarov [3. 62. 3]).83 The Thebans imply that
oligarchy is sophron when they explain that the oligarchic faction in
Plataea opened the gates to them because this faction wished the better
element in the city to be the sophromstae (“correctors”) of the opinions of
the rest (3. 65. 3). The political use of the word sophronistes occurs else¬
where in the History, not necessarily with oligarchic implications. When
Alcibiades tries to persuade the Athenians to accept an oligarchic con¬
stitution in order to curry favor with the Great King, Phrynichus
argues against it on the ground that it will not win over the king, and
that the allies prefer a democracy at Athens, since they know that the
oligarchs would put the allies to death without a trial, whereas the
81 The same point of view is expressed by the Old Oligarch, who credits the aristocrats with
the least akolasia and adikia and charges the democrats with amathia (“ignorance”), ataxia
(“disorder”), and ponena (“knavery”), in Ath. Pol. i. 5. This treatise is dated shortly before the
outbreak of the war by Hartvig Frisch {The Constitution of the Athenians [Copenhagen, 1942],
47-62) but somewhat later by Wilhelm Nestle (Vom Mythos zum Logos, 407-8).
82 Gomme, Commentary, on 1. 32. 4 and 1. 18. 1; cf. Grossmann, op. cit. 70 ff.
83 The two superlatives are unusual. For a suggested emendation (rtp o&rppovL ttclptuv
avavTidncnov, Herwerden), see Gomme, Commentary, ad loc.
Age of the Sophists iij
democracy would be a refuge for the allies and a sophronistes for the
oligarchs (8. 48. 6-7).84
Almost all the references to sophrosyne or its cognates in Thucydides
occur in reports of speeches—either direct or, as in Book VIII, indirect.
Yet here and there Thucydides betrays his own point of view. Two pas¬
sages are especially instructive. One is his estimate of Chian policy,
which he emphatically approves. “Next to the Spartans,” he says (8. 24.
4-5), “only the Chians of the people I have known were at the same time
fortunate and moderate (r\v5ai\iovrioav tc afia Kai cooocppovijoav), and
the more their city grew, the more securely they regulated it (Ikoo/jlovuto
cxvpcorcpou).” The comparison with Sparta, as well as the use of kosmein
to explicate sophronein, shows that what Thucydides commends in Chios
is a conservative form of government in which the expansive and demo¬
cratic tendencies natural to success and prosperity are checked. Thucy¬
dides’ own views are apparent elsewhere in Book VIII, when he comments
on the fate of the allied cities in which Peisander and other reactionary
Athenians established oligarchies, in place of the democracies previously
in control. Once the democrats had been driven out, the exiled oligarchs
of Thasos and the other cities returned, and many of these subject cities
were lost to the Empire. Thucydides observes that these cities, having
acquired sophrosyne (aootppoaurijr 8c Xafiovoai) and freedom in carry¬
ing out their plans, aimed at absolute eleuthena, rejecting the pretense of
eunomia which the Athenians offered (8. 64. 5). Here the restoration
of oligarchy is described as “acquiring sophrosyne,” and this condition
is equated with genuine eunomia, in contrast to the counterfeit of this
excellence under the democrats.
Finally, there is the historian’s comment on the Constitution of the
Five Thousand, established in Athens after the Four Hundred had been
deposed. It was the best government that Athens had had in his time,
for there was a moderate blending (metria synkrasis) of the few and the
many. Again sophron is replaced by metria,85 its closest synonym in
political terminology and the one that Thucydides always prefers when
he describes Athens, but his own bias is perfectly clear. A limited
democracy, in which there should be no payment for office and the
84 Sophronistes has no factional implications when Euphemus tells the Sicilians not to try to
act in this capacity for the Athenians at this late date (6. 87. 3).
85 Consult Glenn Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton, i960), 525, for the meaning
of the phrase metria synkrasis applied to Theramenes’ constitution, the philosophical back¬
ground of the idea of a mixed constitution, and the possibility that Thucydides’ description
reflects Theramenes’ own ideas on the subject.
i14- Sophrosyne
rights of citizenship would belong to those who could fight as hoplites,

appears to Thucydides to be “moderate.” The situation that obtained
in Thasos is reversed in Athens: in the former the shift from democracy
to oligarchy is considered a change to sophrosyne; in Athens it is the
change from the oligarchy of the Four Hundred to a democracy like that
of Cleisthenes (the “ancestral constitution”) that Thucydides considers
moderate.
Sophrosyne never occurs in the History with the meaning “chastity,”
which is otherwise common in literature of the later fifth century. Like
Euripides, Thucydides regards sophrosyne as the control of the irrational;
but whereas the tragic poet dramatizes the conflict in the individual soul
between sophrosyne and such passions as eros, thymos, and orge, the
historian concentrates his attention on man as politikon zoon so exclusively
that he portrays this struggle only in the context of the State. The scope
of sophrosyne as he understands it is demonstrated by its synonyms,
which invariably have a political connotation—words such as euboulia,
to eukosmon, or metriotes (rather than the individual virtues of aidos and
enkrateia)—and by its antitheses, which include not only the traditional
hybris, orge, and epithymia but the more specialized Thucydidean and
Periclean words for the active principle—to drasterion and the like.
There is also a tendency to oppose sophrosyne to tyche. Although much
has been written about varying attitudes towards tyche in Thucydides and
his contemporaries,86 it may still be useful to point out in the History
signs of a new development in the relation of sophrosyne to fortune.
When the theme of fortune and its mutability appears in lyric and
tragic poetry and in Herodotus, it usually teaches the doctrine of sophro¬
syne as it was understood in the archaic age: man must endure what is
beyond his power to control. The age of the Sophists, however, felt
a new confidence in the power of man to manipulate circumstances and
to some extent control his fortune by techne and gnome. While the older
point of view is often expressed in the History, even by Pericles,87 like an
echo of Herodotus in Thucydides, the newer philosophy is more truly
characteristic of Pericles and of the historian himself. We have found
86 See, for example, Felix Wassermann, T.A.P.A. 78 (1947), 29-30; Friedrich Solmsen,
Hermes 69 (1934), 400 fif.; Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Neue Wege iur Antike 8 (1926), 255 f.; John
H. Finley, Jr., H.S.C.P. 49 (1938), 61 ff.
87 E.g., 2. 64. 2: cpipav <5c \PV TC 8ai(i6vta avayKodocs, ra re a7ro tcov irokepLuv avSpdus
(“one must bear divine visitations as best one can, and the afflictions of the enemy with
courage”), where ta 8ca\i6via is equivalent to tyche, and amy/cm'cos to oucppoi'cjs. Cf.
Sophocles Phil. 1316-17. The appearance of proverbial wisdom in Thucydides is discussed by
Claus Meister, Die Gnomik im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (Winterthur, 1955).
Age of the Sophists ny
that for Thucydides the word sophrosyne generally designates “modera¬

tion or stability in government” yet sometimes implies that provision
against irrational elements (notably tyche) which is part of the new
philosophy of self-reliance and foresight. Hence sophrosyne and tyche are
no longer confined to the archaic pattern but hereafter find a variety of
relationships, ranging from their absolute opposition in the individual
ethics of Democritus to their realignment in the political thought of
Plato.88
Thucydides’ discussion in Book VIII of the constitutional crisis at
Athens in 411 provides historical background for the brief Fragment of
Thrasymachus’ speech On the Constitution. Although in Plato’s Republic the
rhetorician Thrasymachus is made to take a radical view of the nature
of justice and to praise tyranny as the height of felicity because it is sub¬
ject to no restraint, his interpretation of sophrosyne in this Fragment is
utterly conventional. Internal evidence suggests that the oration was
composed either as a model speech or as a discourse to be delivered be¬
fore the Assembly at a time when the ancestral constitution was a sub¬
ject of discussion, the word homonoia was used to describe the reconcilia¬
tion of rival factions, and Athens was still at war—probably 411 .
b c.89
Thrasymachus (who as a citizen of Chalcedon would have been barred

from speaking before the Assembly himself, but might have composed
the speech for someone else) maintains (Frag. 1 DK) that good fortune
usually makes people wanton and quarrelsome (vpplêiv re 7tolclv nal
OTaoiaêiv), while adversity is wont to sober them (sophronizein). His
audience, however, has reversed the normal process: “We were wont to
be sober [kooxppovovpev] in prosperity, but to lose our head in time
of trouble [epauripeu kv 8k tois /ca/cols].” The sentiment recalls the words
of Thucydides about Chios (8. 24. 4-5), when he implies that sophrosyne
is almost unheard of in times of good fortune. In opposing hybris and
stasis to sophrosyne, Thrasymachus uses the accepted political vocabulary
of the day; mania is not one of the Thucydidean antitheses, but it
is common elsewhere,90 and the application to politics is readily under¬
standable. Thrasymachus does not seem to have in mind any one
faction when he speaks of the previous sophrosyne of the Athenians;
88 Democritus, Frag. 210 DK. Plato (Laws 709D-710A), after discussing techne and tyche as
they affect the ruler, maintains that the best tyche for a new state would be to have a ruler
endowed with sophrosyne (here approximating enkrateia rather than phronesis).
89 See the analysis by Fuks, op. cit., 102-6.
90 E.g., Antiphon the Orator Tetr. 1. 2. 5; Dissoi Logoi 5. 1,7 DK (see also n. 93). It appears
often in the fourth century, especially in Plato (e.g., Phaedrus 241 A) and Xenophon (Mem. 1.
1. 16).
ii6 Sophrosyne
sophrosyne means “stability,” and mania is equivalent to hybris and

stasis.
The concepts of homonoia and sophrosyne are joined in one of the
orations of Andocides, who had returned from exile after the amnesty
of 403 but was prosecuted in 399 on a charge of impiety. His address
On the Mysteries treats sophrosyne as a political virtue but avoids both
the tendency of Thucydides and Aristophanes to use the word as a
party slogan of the oligarchs and the practice of fourth-century orators
of making a stereotype of the sophron polites. Andocides’ usage, in fact, il¬
lustrates the political meaning of sophrosyne in the transitional stage at
the close of the fifth century, when oligarchic pretensions to this virtue
had been discredited, and democratic claims had not yet been estab¬
lished. Sophrosyne now means “moderation” simpliciter and suggests
“reconciliation of enemies,” a revival of an Aeschylean nuance, under
circumstances not unlike those that presumably led to Aeschylus’ own
usage.91 Reminding the jury of the occasions on which their ancestors
had recalled the exiles and rallied to defeat foreign enemies, Andocides
maintains that greatness will again be theirs if the citizens will practice
moderation (sophronein) and live in peace (homonoein) with one another
(1. 109). Towards the end of the oration he says that to reconcile the
citizens and put concord before vengeance is the work of men who are
good and moderate (sophrones [1. 140]). The more common interpre¬
tation of sophrosyne as a kind of moralized wisdom also appears in this
oration, when Andocides describes as sophrosyne that wisdom which is
learned from experience, particularly from mistakes of the past (1. 145).
This interpretation, a development of the ancient doctrine of Pathei
mathos, seems to be a fundamental part of Andocides’ outlook, for it re¬
appears in his two other genuine orations, On His Return and On the
Peace with Sparta. In the first of these, delivered ca. 409-408, the appli¬
cation is personal. Admitting his part in the mutilation of the Hermae
in 415, but blaming it on youthful folly or bad company (2. 7), Andocides
seeks to associate his errors with the misfortunes common to mankind.
They are happiest, he says, who make the fewest mistakes, and wisest
(sophronestatoi) who repent most readily (2. 6). In the second speech
(391 . .) sophrosyne is once again a political virtue, to be applied in
bc
this instance to Athenian foreign policy; here, too, it is the ability to

profit by past mistakes.92
91 The notion of reconciling opposite factions or moderating extremes is implicit in

the sophrosyne of the Eumenides, which was produced amid the tense circumstances surround¬
ing the reforms of Ephialtes.
92 Andocides reminds the Assembly of the mistakes Athens has made in the past by ally-
Age of the Sophists uy
In the Invective against Alcibiades by Pseudo-Andocides,93 sophrosyne

also has a political significance but an entirely different one. After the
violence of the Thirty Tyrants had discredited the cause of oligarchy,
most of the fourth-century Attic orators from Lysias to Demosthenes
rejected the fifth-century conception of this party as notably sophron.
From now on, the sophron kai metrios polites is invariably a democrat; the
oligarch, if mentioned at all, is charged with hybris. The Invective shows
many signs of this point of view. The fourth-century atmosphere is al¬
ready palpable in the description of the sophron citizen as one who takes
precautions against tyranny (4. 24), and in the coupling of justice and
sophrosyne as antitheses to the lawlessness of Alcibiades and his
ancestors (4. 34, 40). Among the Attic orators, Antiphon and Andocides
constitute a small minority, allied with the Sophists, Aristophanes,
Euripides, and Thucydides in their manner of interpreting sophrosyne.
The remaining orators, even Lysias, have much stronger affinities with
Xenophon than with Thucydides and uniformly reflect the conditions
of the fourth century.
Important, though entirely disparate, contributions to the develop¬
ment of sophrosyne were made during the age of the Sophists by the
two philosophers, Socrates and Democritus. It is admittedly difficult to
disentangle Socrates from Plato, but the value of seeing him against the
background of his contemporaries would seem to justify the attempt.
Only a small body of doctrine is widely accepted as genuinely Socratic.
This nucleus of ideas includes the following: that arete is episteme
(“knowledge”), that the care of the soul is the true purpose of life, that
the virtues are inseparable, and that self-control is the foundation of
ing herself with Argos and becoming involved in war with Sparta. “The examples furnished
by our past mistakes are sufficient to prevent the sophrones from erring again.” Another facet
of sophrosyne, “good repute,” appears in the speech On the Mysteries (131). Cf. Antiphon the
Sophist, Frag. 49.
93 Friedrich Blass (Die attische Beredsamkeit 2 [Leipzig, 1887], 1. 338) assigns the speech to
the early fourth century on grounds of style; and K. J. Maidment (Minor Attic Orators
[London, 1941] 1. 538-59) agrees, chiefly on grounds of content. Antony Raubitschek
(T.A.P.A. 79 [1948], 205) argues that it may be genuine. The early fourth century is the date
commonly assigned to another work dependent on sophistic doctrine, the Dissoi Logoi, a series
of antilogies in the manner of Protagoras. One pair of arguments deals with the proposition
that madmen and sane, wise men and fools (1) say and do the same things and (2) do not say
and do the same things. Throughout this argument sophrosyne and mama are used antitheti¬
cally (5. 1,7 DK). The word sophrosyne does not appear in the treatise of the Anonymous
Iamblichi on arete, which attempts to prove that the rule of nomos benefits even the strong, but
its place is taken by enkrateia (4. 1 DK). In refuting the view that obedience to law is
cowardice and that pleonexia is true arete, the author attempts to show that nomos is actually
based on physis. A. T. Cole (H.S.C.P. 65 [1961], 127-63) suggests that the treatise is influenced
by the philosophy of Democritus.
ii8 Sop hr o syne
moral conduct.94 All these views have a bearing on sophrosyne. In

\y particular, the emphasis on man’s primary duty of tending his soul leads
to a process of endless questioning, both of self and of others, which
aims at self-knowledge. Hence Socrates is always portrayed in the
dialogues written by his admirers as the embodiment of the Delphic
Gnothi sauton. The other aspect of his personality which left an imperish¬
able impression is his self-control. This quality appears in Xenophon’s
portrait of Socrates as enkrateia, in the works of Antisthenes and
Aristippus as autarkeia, and in Plato’s reflection of the Socratic person¬
ality as sophrosyne. The erotic nature of Socrates is still another com¬
mon theme in the dialogues inspired by his life and personality; this,
\ too, has a bearing on sophrosyne, because it was a sophron eros that
governed his relation to his pupils.
The connection between Socrates and the great Sophists is evident
chiefly in the tendency of his questioning. Nothing is more striking in
the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon that profess to reproduce the con¬
versations of Socrates than his persistent refutation of conventional ideas
accepted by the average man without examination. The question “What
is X?” which sets off so many Platonic dialogues is surely a reflection of
the Socratic practice. The result of these dialogues is invariably nega¬
tive, at most a kind of purgation of false ideas (as the Sophist suggests
[230B]), which leaves the soul ready for the pursuit of knowledge; and
Vj
we have no reason to believe that Socrates ever answered the questions

that he asked, except implicitly by the life he lived. It is significant,
however, not only that he was interested in many of the same ethical
problems as engaged Protagoras and other Sophists—the source of
moral obligations, the relation of appetite and passion to ethical and
political conduct, the role of education in imparting arete—and often
surpassed them in the unconventionality with which he approached
these problems, but that he reacted strongly against their relativism and
hedonism.
Although Democritus was by birth a colonial and his approach to
sophrosyne was the personal and individualistic one of an Ionian
thinker who escaped those influences—Attic tragedy and the Athenian
polls—that molded sophrosyne in the fifth century,95 he, too, was
interested in many of the same problems as were Socrates and the
Sophists. His contribution to the doctrine of sophrosyne consists of his
sophron hedonism. Pleasure occupies a central position in the ethics of
94 Aristotle ascribes to Socrates inductive argumentation and universal definition (Metaph.

M4. 1078b 27).
95 Witness his famous complaint (Frag. 116 DK): “I came to Athens and no one knew me.”
Age of the Sophists ng
Democritus, yet unlike Callicles and other pupils of the Sophists,

he regards sophrosyne not as an obstacle but as a positive aid to the
enjoyment of pleasure. Moderation, metriotes or sophrosyne, is the key
to the sensible hedonism of Democritus; this note runs all through his
ethical maxims, presenting the greatest possible contrast to contem¬
porary sophistic arguments that happiness, pleasure, and the satisfaction
of appetite are incompatible with self-restraint. Democritus is probably
the first philosopher to justify systematically the already popular
conception of sophrosyne as the control of appetite; he elevates and
expands this notion to make it one of the chief sources of euthymia
(“contentment”), his summum bonum. Most of his references to sophro¬
syne occur in connection with terpsis (“enjoyment”), hedone (“pleasure”),
and related terms. A typical observation maintains (Frag. 211 DK):
“Sophrosyne increases delights and makes pleasures greater.”96
Democritus distinguishes between good and bad pleasures and
frequently shows that the best pleasures are somehow connected with
intellectual and spiritual values, especially the kalon (as in Frags. 207,
189, 194). His conception of sophrosyne includes the element of autarkeia
(“independence”), in whose company it is opposed to tyche 97 Accord¬
ing to Fragment 210, “tyche sets a costly table; sophrosyne one that is
self-sufficient [autarkes].” In Fragment 176, Democritus describes tyche
as munificent but undependable and says that nature is self-sufficient.
Evidently then sophrosyne and nature have this in common: both en¬
able man to attain self-sufficiency. Other qualities akin to sophrosyne
are sophia and phronesis,98 which are also opposed to tyche (Frags. 197,
119). The euthymos and autarkes individual enjoys only the proper
pleasures (rfdoual e<p’ ois 8d), not those that are bound up with tyche.
Several of these key ideas—fidelity to nature, distrust of fortune, and
the need for moderation—appear in the introductory sentence of
Democritus’ On Contentment, which says that he who is to achieve this
condition must not be overactive in public or private and, whatever he
does, must not grasp what is beyond his own power and nature. If tyche
leads him to excess, he must resist the temptation to seize more than his
powers permit, for moderation is safer than superfluity (Frag. 3 DK).99
96 Cf. Frag. 232: “The pleasures that come least often give most enjoyment.”
97 Autarkeia is a link with several Hellenistic philosophies. Zeph Stewart (H.S.C.P. 63
1*958], 179-91) discusses the influence of Democritus on the Cynics. For the debt of Epicurean
ethics to Democritus, see Robert Philippson, Hermes 59 (1924), 414; for his influence on the
Skeptics and on Plato, see Paul Natorp, Die Ethika des Demokritos (Marburg, 1893), 68.
98 See Hermann Langerbeck, Ao£is e77tpua/xn7 (Berlin, 1935), 72.
99 Kurt von Fritz (Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Plato und Aristoteles
[New York, 1938], 23) suggests that all Democritus’ moral precepts are based on three prin-
120 Sophrosyne
These ideas have great importance in Hellenistic philosophy, for in many

ways Democritus foreshadows the concerns of the late fourth century:
in his defense of cosmopolitanism, for instance (Frags. 246, 247), and
his ideal of tranquillity. Like the Epicureans he values sophrosyne, not
at all for its usefulness to the polls, but for its help in the attainment of
personal happiness. That he sets a high value on it is evident from two
further Fragments, one of which (208) says that a father’s sophrosyne
is for his children the greatest precept. The other (294) is an expression
of a traditional Hellenic belief: “Strength and beauty are the good
things of youth, but sophrosyne is the flower of age.” 100
ciples: XPV (“necessity”), jutTpiov (“moderation”), and prj ttoXXa Trppootiv (“not
‘meddling’ ”), the last two of which are synonyms for sophrosyne in the late fifth century.
For the relation of ]UT) iroWa ,npr\oo(.LV to the Platonic to ra avTov irpaTTeiv (“doing one’s own
work”), see Philippson, loc. cit., 386-89. Democritus’ and Epicurus’ concepts of nature
are compared by Langerbeck, op. cit., 61.
100 Sophrosyne is linked with the restraint of appetite in the interests of pleasure in all the
Fragments except 54 and 67, which are perhaps to be assigned to the Pythagorean Democrates.
In these Fragments alone, sophrosyne has the older, “intellectual” connotation and is the
antithesis of folly, rather than of licentiousness (Frag. 67: to curves, “folly”; Frag. 54:
ol a^vvtTOi, “the witless”).
IV
Xenophon, the Minor

Socratic Schools, and the
Attic Orators of the
Fourth Century
AT the close of the fifth century the concept of sophrosyne included a

wide range of nuances, most of which had developed under the pressure
of the great forces at work—especially in Athens—during that period of
rapid change. These influences were the continued unfolding of Attic
democracy, the conflict between oligarchic and democratic factions in
the Greek states, the Peloponnesian war itself, the flowering of tragedy
and comedy, and the sophistic movement, together with the reactions
it provoked. In the fourth century, too, it is possible to identify certain
influences—again chiefly Athenian—that shaped the further growth of
the concept of sophrosyne, but they were now by no means so numerous.
There were in fact only two great forces responsible in the main for the
altered significance of the word sophrosyne in the fourth century: the
Athenian polis, in its domestic and external affairs, and the memory of
Socrates.1
The influence of the polis is most clearly seen in the speeches of the
Attic orators, which delineate to perfection the sophron polites— the law-
1 The memory of Socrates had its most lasting effect on sophrosyne through the mediation
of Plato, which is discussed in Chap. V. Another force that obviously influences sophrosyne
is rhetoric, but this affects the form in which the concept is presented, more than the
concept itself.
121
122 S op hr o syne
abiding citizen—whom the conditions of Athenian society in the fourth

century converted into an ideal. There are slight variations in the
picture drawn by the various orators (Isaeus, for example, omits one
facet that Lysias and Demosthenes both emphasize), but three essentials
are nearly always present: the sophron citizen is a fervent democrat, who
hates oligarchy; he is loyal and generous to his fellow citizens and
therefore quick to perform “liturgies”; and in private life he is self-
effacing, inoffensive, averse to litigation. Beyond the borders of Attica
events were also taking place which affected the concept of sophrosyne:
the rise and decline of Sparta and later of Thebes, the growth and col¬
lapse of the Athenian Second Maritime Confederacy, the revival of the
danger from Persia, and finally the threat of Macedon. The concern
felt by many Greeks over the futile, endless warfare between Hellenic
states or leagues of states prompted some to extend the scope of sophro¬
syne so as to include moderation and restraint in international relations.
Isocrates was the spokesman for this point of view. Another develop¬
ment, on the frontier between politics and philosophy, singled out so¬
phrosyne as the characteristic virtue of Sparta, making it the basis of
her envied stability, moral conservatism, and military discipline. This
tendency, already strong in the fifth century, was intensified in the
fourth, particularly in the semi-historical, semi-philosophical writing of
which Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedemonians affords a fair sample.
It provoked a reaction in some quarters, particularly the school of
Isocrates, and may be partly responsible for the patriotic fervor with
which Isocrates propagated his commonplaces about the archaia arete of
Athens herself, in which he made sophrosyne a basic ingredient.
The multiplication of philosophical schools in the wake of Socrates
had major consequences for sophrosyne. The automatic reflex of such
schools or of their founders seems to have been inquiry into moral
values, primarily those of Socrates himself. Among these values sophro¬
syne was inevitably emphasized, although it was variously interpreted
by the divergent Socratic schools. Not only Plato but also Antisthenes,
whom tradition represents as the precursor of Cynicism, and even the
Cyrenaic Aristippus found the Socratic self-command peculiarly signif¬
icant, whether it was called sophrosyne, enkrateia, or autarkeia. Some of
Socrates’ most ardent admirers founded no school but tried to recapture
his personality and teaching in dialogue form; to this group belong
Aeschines of Sphettus, who wrote seven Socratic dialogues, and
Xenophon.
Xenophon and the Orators 123
XENOPHON
In all his writings—Socratic, biographical, didactic, and historical—

Xenophon demonstrates the wide scope assigned to sophrosyne in the
ethical vocabulary of the fourth century. Moreover, he is on familiar
terms with the canon of virtues—piety, wisdom, justice, courage, and
sophrosyne (or enkrateia)—which was already known in the fifth century
and was destined to take definitive shape in the fourth. Xenophon fore¬
shadows the borrowing of the topic of the virtues (not necessarily or
only these five) by prose writers of every kind, but especially historians,
in the fourth century and thereafter. Although the study of arete and its
component parts formed one of the principal tasks of the philosophers—
Socrates and Plato above all—the topic of the virtues and vices held
vast possibilities for oratory as well; and we have already seen how
Gorgias, for example, discussed the heroic qualities of the dead in his
Epitaphios, and how Pericles in the Funeral Oration celebrated the virtues
of Athens herself.2 The Sophists had enriched the topic in several ways: by
defining the virtues, by relating them to the life of the State as well as
to private life, by finding exemplars in poetry and myth, and by adapt¬
ing to prose certain devices, such as the personification of virtue, which
had long been used by the poets. Now in the fourth century Isocrates
made this topic his own, adding a wealth of commonplaces and
exemplars which constituted his legacy to his pupils and ultimately
became the property of every writer of rhetorical prose in the Graeco-
Roman world. Xenophon was in a position to benefit from both ways
of approaching the subject of the virtues—the philosophical and the
rhetorical. Both the Agesilaus and the Memorabilia employ a canon of
virtues as a framework for eulogy. The contents of the canon differ, as
we shall see, even within the Memorabilia, but both treatises include
piety in every list of virtues and place great emphasis on enkrateia, either
as a subhead of sophrosyne or as a separate virtue in its own right.
Xenophon uses the word sophrosyne with remarkable frequency and
diversity of meaning. No earlier writer—except perhaps Euripides—
refers so often to this virtue, with such a variety of connotations. Xeno¬
phon was interested in several problems concerning sophrosyne: the
method of acquiring it and the possibility of losing it; its value to the
ruler and to the State; its relation to other virtues, such as aidbs\ and its
central position in the personality of Socrates. It is in his Socratic
2 See Chap. Ill, pp. 93-94, 106-7.
124 Sophrosyne
writings and those that deal in some way with education or encomium
that Xenophon discusses these problems; the Hellemca and the Anabasis
merely reflect contemporary usage in their allusions to sophrosyne and
related words, showing a strong preference for an intellectual—or,
perhaps better, “prudential”—significance.3 The moral connotations of
the word are more prominent in the Memorabilia.
The literary type of the Socratic dialogue came into vogue within a
decade after the death of Socrates. Xenophon’s Memorabilia, which was
composed of several different elements—apologia, memoirs, dialogue—
put together over a period of many years,4 reflects the author’s acquaint¬
ance with at least some of the earlier representatives of the genre,
especially the dialogues of Antisthenes, whose view of Socrates Xeno¬
phon is inclined to adopt. Since Socrates’ most memorable occupation
was discussing the nature of the virtues, the typical Socratic dialogue
reproduces such a conversation. Early in the Memorabilia Xenophon
lists the subjects that Socrates discussed—always “human,” rather than
“divine,” topics. They consist of five moral virtues and their opposites
and four questions connected with the State. The virtues are piety, the
kalon (“the fair,” as much moral as aesthetic), justice, sophrosyne, and
courage (i. i. 16). The omission of wisdom {phronesis or sophia) from this
canon is noteworthy. Since the antithesis to sophrosyne is given as mania
(“madness” or “irrationality”), sophrosyne here is more intellectual
than moral and can take the place of phronesis, without, however,
entirely sacrificing its moral connotations. It is significant that when
discussing the loss of sophrosyne by Alcibiades and Critias, once they
had parted company with Socrates, Xenophon employs two antitheses
for sophron: agnomon (“heedless”) and akrates (“profligate”), thus calling
attention to the twofold nature of sophrosyne.
Although he lists the subjects that Socrates was wont to discuss,
Xenophon does not at this point launch a Socratic dialogue. In the first
two chapters of Book I he defends Socrates against the indictment of
3 Anabasis 6. 2. 11; 7. 3. 17; 7. 6. 41, 42 (all variations on the phrase rjv ocjcppoinjre, “if you
are sensible”); 6. 1. 28; 7. 7. 24 (sdphron.iz.ein, “to bring to one’s senses”). Hellenica 2. 3. 24;
4. 3. 6; 6. 2. 39; 6. 3. 5; 7. 1. 24 (sophron, with the general implication of “prudent,
sensible”); 7. 3. 6 (sophron, “virtuous,” opposed to poneros, “wicked”).
4 Beginning probably ca. 393, when Polycrates published his Accusation, and continuing
for at least a decade. Xenophon’s sources and the extent of his originality are disputed. For
Antisthenes as a source, see Olof Gigon, Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien
(Basel, 1953); for Plato, see Ernst Gebhardt, Polykrates’ Anklage gegen Sokrates und Xenophons
Erwiderung (Frankfurt, 1957). J.-H. Kiihn (Gnomon 32 [i960], 97-107) defends the ability of
Xenophon (as shown in the Anabasis) to create a picture of a personality, without depending
on literary sources.
Xenophon and the Orators
399 b.c., which charged him with two crimes: rejecting the gods of the
state and introducing new gods, and corrupting the youth (i. i. i).
Furthermore, he replies to the Accusation of Polycrates, which supplied
a detailed explanation of the so-called corruption. These two charges
determine the content of Xenophon’s defense and account for the total
concentration of Chapter I on the virtue of piety (eusebeia) and of
Chapter II on sophrosyne and various forms of helpfulness (Ophelia)—
to the State, to family, and to friends. Although he mentions the canon
of virtues, Xenophon does not use it as the basis of an encomium here,
as he does in Book IV (8. 11, for example). The justice of Socrates is
very briefly described in Chapter I as an adjunct of piety (17-18), and
his courage is entirely ignored.5 Even the interpretation of sophrosyne,
which was largely intellectual in 1. 1. 16, is affected by the terms of the
indictment and becomes predominently moral in Chapter II, where its
function is to refute the charge that Socrates corrupted the young.
There are three components of sophrosyne in Xenophon’s portrait of
Socrates at this stage of the Memorabilia: enkrateia (“control over the ap¬
petites and passions”), karteria (“endurance of cold, heat, and toil”), and
autarkeia (“contentment with little, independence of external things”).
The first two are subheads of sophrosyne in the Agesilaus (5. 1-7) as
well, but autarkeia is uniquely Socratic—the true source of his tremen¬
dous appeal to the Cynics. Xenophon’s conception of Socrates as the
sophron aner is much closer to the Cynic tradition than to Plato’s picture,
which, while it does not ignore the ascetic element, includes many
other nuances that Antisthenes and Xenophon normally omit. Since,
however, the charge of corruption, as expanded by Polycrates, included
teaching the young to despise the established laws, it is not enough to
describe Socrates as self-controlled, enduring, and independent and to
show that he taught the young to imitate him (1. 2. 18). Xenophon is
obliged to expand the topic of sophrosyne still further, to include a
defense of Socrates’ influence on Athenian politics.
This part of the defense includes an assurance that Socrates’
phronesis had no bad effect on the polis—since it was combined with
persuasion rather than violence (1. 2. 10-11)—and a detailed refutation
of the well-known theory that Socrates was responsible for the evil
inflicted on the state by Critias and Alcibiades. Because their vices were,
in the first case, violence and greed and, in the second, licentiousness
5 Gigon (op. cit., 26) suggests that the omission of references to Socrates’ courage may be
explained by the fact that in all the famous episodes that proved his andreia, he was closely
linked with Alcibiades, whom Xenophon wished to eliminate from the biography of Socrates.
126 Sophrosyne
and hybris (i. 2. 12), sophrosyne is the virtue that they both conspicu¬
ously lacked. Xenophon must therefore show that Socrates was not
responsible for this deficiency. He does so by asserting that Socrates pos¬
sessed both sophrosyne and a knowledge of dialectic, but that Critias and
Alcibiades were interested only in the second and, indeed, would have
preferred death to the kind of life Socrates led (1. 2. 14-16). To avert
the charge that Socrates should not have taught his pupils about
politics before teaching them sophrosyne (1. 2. 17), Xenophon next
maintains, rather inconsistently, that while they associated with Socrates,
the two actually did practice sophrosyne, believing at that time that
such conduct was best (1.2. 18).6 This statement in turn obliges Xeno¬
phon to explain how virtue, once learned, can be forgotten, and he em¬
barks upon a refutation of Antisthenes’ view—that virtue cannot be
unlearned—by maintaining that everything good, especially sophrosyne,
depends on training (askesis) and can be forgotten when training stops
(1. 2. 21-23).7 He adds that Socrates deserves praise for teaching
Critias and Alcibiades sophrosyne in their youth, when they would
naturally be most heedless and profligate (1.2. 26), for persevering in
sophrosyne himself (1.2. 28), and for censuring Critias’ licentiousness
so severely that Critias thereafter bore a grudge against him (1.2. 29-31).
The remainder of Chapter II refutes the other charges of Polycrates
(49-61) and reiterates that Socrates, by his piety and his teaching of
arete, deserved well of the state (62-64). The pattern thus established—
praise of Socrates’ piety and of his morality, considered first under the
rubric of sophrosyne or enkrateia, then under that of conduct towards the
state, family, and friends—is repeated in 1. 4-7, so that 1. 5-6, on the
restraint of appetite, corresponds closely to 1. 2. 1-5.8 In this further dis¬
cussion of Socrates’ self-restraint, the same three aspects are eulogized.
Xenophon praises enkrateia as the foundation of all virtue (1. 5. 5) and
ascribes to Socrates not only restraint of bodily pleasure but also
enkrateia in regard to money,9 and in the following chapter reverts to
the subject of autarkeia and karteria (1.6. 1-8). He reports a conversation
6 See Gigon {op. cit., 53) for a comparison with Plato’s Gorgias, where rhetoric and sophro¬
syne correspond to dialectic and sophrosyne in the Memorabilia.
7 Cf. Cyr. 7. 5. 75, where the acquisition and loss of sophrosyne are discussed.
8 Before taking up this scheme in 1.4, Xenophon inserts a single chapter (1.3) which
briefly treats the two crucial subjects: first, Socrates’ piety, and then his euteleia, autarkeia, and
enkrateia. For the threat to enkrateia resulting from a kiss, cf. Ages. 5. 4.
9 The same pattern (piety and morality) is followed in Xenophon’s Apology; see especially
19, on sophrosyne and enkrateia. Enkrateia where money is concerned becomes a subhead of
justice in Ages. 4. 3-4.
between Socrates and Antiphon the Sophist, which concludes with

Socrates’ statement that happiness consists not in luxury and extrava¬
gance, but in having as few wants as possible, since to have no wants at
all is divine (i. 6. io).10 An aspect of autarkeia often encountered in the
Memorabilia is the independence (eleutheriotes) of the teacher who refuses
to accept fees and is therefore not bound to converse with anyone (i. 2.
6). This subject, too, arises in the conversation with Antiphon, who tries
to interpret Socrates’ rejection of payment as a sign that his knowledge
is worthless. By likening the Sophist who demands a fee to a prostitute
and comparing his own practice to that of a person who is sophron
in affairs of love, Socrates implies that autarkeia in this sense is a form of
sophrosyne (1. 6. 13).
Book IV repeats the pattern of 1. 1-2 and 1. 4-7 on a larger scale,
again attempting to prove that Socrates preferred to give moral training
before training in speech and action (4. 3. 1; cf. 1.2. 17: sophrosyne be¬
fore t a ttoXltlkol). The importance of sophrosyne is, if anything, enhanced:
it has now become the heading under which other virtues are discussed.
After observing that Socrates believed facility in speech and action,
without sophrosyne, to be only a source of injustice and wrong-doing,
Xenophon proceeds to discuss the first division of sophrosyne, which is_
sophrosyne towards the gods, or piety (4. 3. 1-2).11 The second moral
virtue discussed is justice, which is not related to sophrosyne;12 and the
third is enkrateia, which is regarded as a necessary preliminary to
efficiency in political and private affairs (4. 5. 1) and is also said to be
essential for attaining wisdom (sophia), sophrosyne, and even pleasure
(4. 5. 6, 7, 9). An attempt is made to link enkrateia with dialectic (the
second subject that Socrates taught, after morality) through an untrans¬
latable word play on the active and the passive voices of the verb
dialegein (“to classify” and “to discuss”), which assigns to enkrateia the
power to sort out the most important things and to choose the good and
reject the bad (4. 5. 11). It is perhaps in such passages that the inspira¬
tion for the Stoic definition of sophrosyne (phronesis in choosing, SVF 1.
200) should be sought.13 The final eulogy of Socrates, at the close of
10 This statement corresponds to the Cynic ideal and is also attributed to Diogenes
of Sinope (D.L. 6. 104). In the attempts of later philosophers and theologians to imitate the
Divine nature, asceticism usually plays some part.
11 Cf. 4. 3. 17: “To please the gods is the greatest sign of sophrosyne.”
12 Xenophon inserts at this point a dialogue between Socrates and Hippias which deals
with justice, but is not a development of the preceding remarks.
13 See Chap. VI, n. 65, for other anticipations of the Stoic definition, including Mem.
4. 8. 11, 3. 9. 4.
128 Sophrosyne
Book IV, organizes his virtues into a canon consisting of piety, justice,
wisdom {phronesis), and enkrateia, which is again defined as never choos¬
ing the more pleasant in preference to the better course (4. 8. 11).
Enkrateia corresponds to sophrosyne in the canon of Book I (1. 16 and
2. 15), and since the connotations of enkrateia are entirely moral, there
is need for an unequivocally intellectual excellence—a need met by
phronesis.14
Although Xenophon habitually in the Memorabilia calls attention to
the moral aspects of sophrosyne,15 he is careful to state in Book III that
Socrates made no distinction between sophia and sophrosyne (9. 4), since
both consist in knowing what is good and fair and doing it, and in know¬
ing what is disgraceful and avoiding it. Justice and “all virtue” are
identified with sophia, through their common identification with the
Fair and the Good. Mania, which in 1. 1. 16 is the antithesis to sophro¬
syne, here becomes the opposite of sophia (3. 9. 6).
An isolated use of sophronein in a military context, equivalent to
€vtocktclv (“to be orderly”) and to 7TtiOapxttv (“to be obedient”), occurs
in a conversation between Socrates and the younger Pericles (3. 5. 21),
who laments that these qualities, which are most essential in the army,
are now the most neglected. In this passage Xenophon uses the topic of
degeneratio in a way reminiscent of Isocrates. He, too, mourns for the
archaia arete of Athens, which flourished both in the legendary days
of Cecrops and in the historical period of the Persian war (3. 5. 9-14),
and, like Isocrates, locates this virtue only in the Council of the Areo¬
pagus in present-day Athens.16 Unlike Isocrates, Xenophon believes
that this type of arete still exists in Sparta, where aidos, obedience, and
homonoia (“concord”) offer a model that Athens would do well to imitate
(3- 5- i5-!6).17
The Oikonomikos, which opens with a discussion of enslavement to the
14 The response of the oracle to Chaerephon as reported in Apol. 4. 15-17 contains a
vestigial canon of virtues: freedom from passion (equivalent to enkrateia), justice, and
sophrosyne, which in the later comments on the oracle is treated as a synonym of sophia, yet
is also opposed to hybris (19). See Plato Apol. 20D 7 ff.-3iC. for the canon of virtues inter¬
preted with reference to the true statesman; for Xenophon the aretae of Socrates are not
politically oriented. Erwin Wolff (Platos Apologie [Berlin, 1929], 96-99) compares the treat¬
ment of the canon of virtues in the two Apologies.
15 In Mem. 2. 1. 21-34, the apologue of Heracles at the crossroads, sophrosyne is allied with
aidos and katharotes (“modesty” and “purity”) in the description of Arete. There is no way of
determining how much of the language used here goes back to Prodicus, the inventor of the
apologue.
16 Cf. Isocrates Areop. 37-38.
17 These virtues play an important role in Spartan education as described by Xenophon
in the Constitution of the Lacedemonians.
appetites, contains much the same kind of conversation with Socrates as

the fourth book of the Memorabilia. The special contribution of this little
treatise to the subject of sophrosyne lies in its picture of the vita rustica as
nurse of arete—a topic much expanded by Cicero (who in his youth
translated the Oikonomikos)18—and in its application of sophrosyne to
the duties of both husband and wife. At first it appears that sophrosyne
is confined to the woman’s role, for the bride of Ischomachus protests
that she can do nothing to help her husband manage the estate; her
mother has told her that her task is to be a good wife (sophronein). The
verb sums up the whole duty of the married woman, including, of
course, fidelity to her husband, but much more as well. Ischomachus re¬
sponds that man and wife must both be sophrones—must, that is, behave
in such a way as to preserve and add to their property, when they can
do so with justice (7. 14-15). Sophrosyne in his usage is practical wisdom,
manifested particularly in the qualities of orderliness and systematic
arrangement which Ischomachus teaches his wife to impose on the pots
and pans and all their household goods (8). Although the qualities
proper to men and women differ in many respects, enkrateia (“self-
control”), like memory and the capacity for taking pains, is common to
both (7. 26-27).
The Agesilaus and the Cyropaedia are the other two works of Xenophon
that show a marked interest in sophrosyne, and both link the virtue with
the concept of the ideal ruler. The Agesilaus, which was to be one of the
fountainheads of eulogy in Graeco-Roman rhetoric and historiography,19
juxtaposes two methods of celebrating the life of the Spartan general:
praise of his birth, family, native land, and achievements in chronologi¬
cal order (1-2); and description of his virtues (3-8). The first method is
the one already employed by Isocrates in the Evagoras,20 which discusses
the virtues of the king in connection with his achievements, instead of
18 For Cicero’s use of this topos, see Chap. VIII, p. 274. Xenophon believes that
husbandry instils justice and cooperation (5. 12, 5. 14). Hunting is another occupation that
he considers a source of virtue (13. 15), specifically of self-restraint (enkrateia, Cyr. 8. i. 36).
This belief persists as a topic in Roman poetry, where, e.g., Ovid links hunting and chastity
in the case of Cephalus and Procris (Metam. VII. 694-861). The Oikonomikos, like the Gorgias
of Plato, connects sophrosyne with genuine leadership (here kingship, rather than the art of
the statesman) and links despotism with its opposite, which is compared to the condition of
Tantalus in the afterlife (21. 11).
19 Its influence is apparent in such Latin works as Cicero’s De Imp. Cn. Pompei, Nepos’
Atticus (where, however, the virtues of peacetime are distinguished from those suitable in
time of war), Tacitus’ Agricola, and Pliny’s Panegyric.
20 Assuming that the Evagoras was composed soon after the death of the king, who was
assassinated in 374 b.c.
ijo Sophrosyne
allotting to them a separate section. The canon of excellence in the

Agesilaus consists of piety (not mentioned in the Evagoras), justice, sophro¬
syne, courage, wisdom (sophia), and, in addition, patriotism and some¬
thing akin to affability (to evyotpi [8. i]). Sophrosyne here includes two
of the same elements as in the Memorabilia—enkrateia and karteria, but
not autarkeia. The requirements of a military career influence the inter¬
pretation given each of the virtues. Thus piety is shown by fidelity
to oaths, which gained the trust even of the enemy (3. 2), while the value
to a general of great powers of endurance is stressed in the praise of
sophrosyne (5. 2-3). Agesilaus’ affability, simplicity, and friendliness are
admirable in so great a man and are contrasted with the pride and aloof¬
ness of the Persian king (8. 1-6, 9). In the summary of the virtues of
Agesilaus this quality is called praotes (10. 1), and Xenophon even goes
to the unusual length of treating the word tapeinos (“humble, lowly”) as
a term of praise, in commenting on Agesilaus’ lack of arrogance (11. 11).
Praotes and sophrosyne are synonymous in the parallel phrases (.vtvx&v
8k 7Tpaos dvat (“to be gentle when things go well” [ 11. 2]) and oweppovdv
kv rats €U7Tpa&ats (“to be modest in good fortune” [10. 1]), where both
words denote absence of arrogance.21 Like Isocrates in the Evagoras and
the Nicocles, Xenophon uses the commonplace that a king must be
a paradeigma for his subjects. He asks who could become impious after
imitating one who was pious, and continues with a canon that includes
both sophrosyne and enkrateia; hybris is the antithesis to the first, akrasia
to the second (10. 2).
The ruler as paradeigma is a theme frequently referred to in the
Cyropaedia. We learn, for example, that Cyrus taught his people sophro¬
syne by refraining from hybris, although he had the power to commit it,
and that he thought he could best instil enkrateia by showing that he was
never carried away from the pursuit of the Good by the pleasures of the
moment (8. 1. 30).22 As in the passage from the Agesilaus just cited,
sophrosyne and enkrateia are distinguished but remain closely related.
Sophrosyne has a wider scope than enkrateia, which is usually restricted
to the control of appetites and passions. Xenophon never explicitly
distinguishes between the two, but in the same passage in the Cyropaedia
he does distinguish between sophrosyne and aidos, in terms reminiscent
21 See Chap. VIII, pp. 301 ff. for the possible coalescence of praotes and sophrosyne to form
the imperial virtue of dementia. Tapeinotes is a virtue also in the Const. Lac. 8. 2. For sophro¬
syne as a virtue hard to maintain in time of good fortune, see Cyr. 8. 4. 14, where the oppos¬
ing vice (as usual in this commonplace) is hybris.
22 Cf. the definition of enkrateia in the eulogy of Socrates, Mem. 4. 8. 11.
Xenophon and the Orators iji
of Antiphon and Gritias. Aidos is that which causes us to avoid what is

disgraceful in public; sophrosyne has the same effect even in private (8.
i. 30).23
The Cyropaedia is much concerned with the general problem of instill¬
ing virtue, which was one of the overriding issues of all fourth-century
literature. Like Plato, Xenophon assumes that the important thing is to
educate the ruling class, and he devotes some attention to the methods
used in his idealized Persian state to instil the proper qualities in each
age group of this class. From his discussion it appears that sophrosyne is
the excellence peculiarly associated with youth. Young boys are sent to
school to learn justice and sophrosyne: the first by actual practice in
trying cases, the second by imitating the example of their elders (1.2. 8).
Obedience and enkrateia (again, the restraint of appetite) are also learned
during this early period. The next age group, that of the ephebes, must
spend a decade on sentry duty, both to guard the city and to learn
sophrosyne, the quality that enables men to perform wearisome tasks
(1.2. 9). The sophrosyne of the younger boys is obedience and orderly
behavior; that of the ephebes is close to karteria.24
A dialogue between Gyrus and Tigranes centers on the question
whether sophrosyne can be acquired, and how. Tigranes, son of the King
of Armenia, tries to persuade Cyrus to spare his father (who has led an
unsuccessful revolt); he bases his plea on the assertion that the king will
now be a more useful subject, since he has become sophron through
being caught in an act of injustice. Sophrosyne here is opposed to
aphrosyne (“folly”) and denotes knowledge of one’s situation or adjustment
to reality. Like Socrates in the Memorabilia, Tigranes holds that no
other quality—whether strength, courage, wealth, or power—is useful
without sophrosyne (3. 1. 16). Cyrus replies that if the king has indeed
become sophron in the space of a single day, Tigranes must assume that
sophrosyne is not something learned (mathema) but, like grief, is an
emotion (pathema) of the soul, for such an instantaneous conversion
would be impossible if phronesis (“reasonableness”) were a necessary
antecedent of sophrosyne (3. 1. 17). Tigranes’ argument places great
23 This distinction is sometimes ascribed to Prodicus; see Chap. Ill, p. 92, and cf. Anti¬
phon, Frag. 44 DK, and Critias, Frag. 25 DK.
24 Whatever else it may become, sophrosyne throughout Greek literature is always the
virtue proper to the young, and of course to women—i.e., to all those members of society
of whom obedience is required. In a comparable description of education by age groups, the
Const. Lac. 2-4 assigns obedience, sophrosyne, and aidos to the youngest boys; sophrosyne and
aidos to the next older group as well; and manly valor to the third.
ij2 Sophrosyne
emphasis on the power of punishment to bring a man to his senses (the

basic meaning of sophronizein [3. 1. 20, 22, 27]).25 This discussion—like
the remarks on askesis as a source of sophrosyne in the Memorabilia (1.2.
21-23)—doubtless echoes the debates in the philosophical schools over
the difference between intellectual and moral virtues and the methods
of instilling each type. Habituation or practice (askesis) was always con¬
sidered the source of moral virtue. Tigranes’ argument perhaps contains
also a reminiscence of the still popular theme of Pathei mathos.
The military aspects of sophrosyne (obedience, orderliness, discipline,
and even knowledge of strategy) are prominent in the Cyropaedia,2& as in
the Agesilaus. In addition to these and to the familiar connotations of
moderation, restraint of appetite, and prudence, sophrosyne occasionally
means “chastity,” as in the episode of Panthea, the beautiful captive,
whom Gyrus promises to honor because of her sophrosyne and perfect
virtue (7. 3. 12).27
THE MINOR SOCRATIC SCHOOLS
The self-control, hardiness, and self-sufficiency of Socrates, which in

Xenophon’s view formed the essence of his sophrosyne, made a deep
impression on many other admirers as well, if we may trust the ancient
accounts of the life and teachings of Aeschines of Sphettus, Antisthenes,
and even Aristippus. Since, however, it seems highly probable that
many elements in this tradition are products of the imagination,28 they
must be treated with reserve, particularly when they relate to the influ¬
ence of Antisthenes on Diogenes and on Cynic morality. According to
the ancient biographers, both Aeschines of Sphettus and Antisthenes
emphasized practical morality, and this tendency determined their
attitude towards sophrosyne. Aeschines wrote a Socratic dialogue named
for Callias—who figures in many works of Plato and Xenophon as a type
of the rich young man—and in it, according to the reconstruction by
Dittmar,29 he discussed the relation of happiness to arete, showing that
arete consists chiefly in enkrateia and sophrosyne, of which the rich man,
enslaved by pleasure, has no share. Another dialogue, Miltiades, which
25 Cf. 2. 2. 14, where fathers teach their sons sophrosyne by making them weep, and
8. 4. 14, where bad fortune is said to render a man sophron.
26 See 3. 3. 58; 5. 3. 43; 5. 4. 44.
27 Cyrus himself displays both sophrosyne and hosiotes (“scrupulous purity”) in refusing to
look upon Panthea (6. 1. 47).
28 See D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism (London, 1937), 1 — 16, for a convincing attack
on the traditions about Antisthenes and his relation to Diogenes and later Cynics.
29 Heinrich Dittmar, Aischines von Sphettos (Berlin, 1912), 199.
Xenophon and the Orators *33
has been described as a dialogue on sophrosyne,30 contrasted modern
education and its results to the older Attic culture, whose chief charac¬
teristics (as in Mem. 3. 5. 8-20) were modesty and propriety in behavior.
Antisthenes, too, seems to have taken a one-sided view of Socratic
sophrosyne. Misunderstanding the motives with which Socrates prac¬
ticed enkrateia and the other ascetic virtues,31 he established as an end
what was for Socrates no more than a means. The attitudes of the two
men towards pleasure reveal their fundamental difference: in contrast
to the genuine freedom of Socrates, Antisthenes is imprisoned within his
own rigid conception of autarkeia. According to Diogenes Laertius,
Antisthenes said that he would rather suffer madness than pleasure (6.
3); the only pleasure he considered good was that secured by toil (ponos).
He was famous for his enkrateia (D. L. 6. 15) and was said to have
learned from Socrates hardiness (to KaprepiKov) and absence of feeling
(to aTTaOis [D. L. 6. 2]). Since he believed virtue to consist in deeds, not
words or learning (D. L. 6. 11), his sophrosyne had nothing to do with
the intellect. He warned those who possessed this virtue to refrain from
studying literature, lest they be perverted by alien influences (D. L. 6. 103).
Diogenes alleges that Antisthenes in turn was the source from which
the Cynics, Diogenes of Sinope and Crates, learned, respectively, apatheia
and enkrateia, and Zeno the Stoic, karteria (6. 15). Although it is precisely
here that Diogenes inspires the least confidence,32 there is no doubt that
the ascetic ideal of the Cynics included an extremely narrow conception
of sophrosyne, entirely divorced from the theoretical life.33 Diogenes of
Sinope, in defining paideia as sophrosyne for the young (D. L. 6. 68),
obviously has in mind the disciplinary aspects of the virtue—those that
Xenophon describes as being instilled in Spartan and Persian boys in the
earliest stages of their education. Crates, in the famous elegy that per¬
sonifies Sophrosyne as the mother of Euteleia (Frugality [Frag. 2 Diehl 3]),
locates her accurately among the Cynic cardinal virtues, at some distance
from the more gracious qualities, such as Hesychia and the Charites,
which are elsewhere her close companions.34 Even aidos, the mother of
sophrosyne in one Attic inscription, is cut off from the Cynic self-
30 Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog (Leipzig, 1895), 1. 134.

31 Heinrich Maier (Sokrates [Tubingen, 1913], 506 ff.) analyzes the proofs of Antisthenes’
fanatical devotion to Socrates as the prophet of freedom and moral autonomy.
32 See Dudley, op. cit., 1-58.
33 Audrey Rich (Mnemosyne 9 [1956], 23-29) draws attention to the paradox by which the
only genuine autarkeia is to be found in the Aristotelian ideal of the contemplative life, which,
being intellectual, was not acceptable to the Cynics.
34 Hesychia: Epicharmus, Frag. 101 Kaibel, Com.; the Charites: Theognis 1135-50.
134 Sophrosyne
sufficiency, which, supported by a radical endorsement of physis and a

radical rejection of all nomoi, expressed itself in affronts to decency and
in the renunciation of conventional restraints (D. L. 6. 46). Indeed, the
filth and eccentricity, the deliberate lack of modesty, which became the
hallmark of Cynicism in the later fourth and the third centuries (and in
the revived Cynicism of the first century after Christ), might well serve
as an appropriate symbol of the distortion of sophrosyne by this school.35
The antithesis to sophrosyne in Cynic thought was neither hybris nor
akolasia but tryphe (“extravagance”), as Crates’ elegy suggests. This anti¬
thesis illustrates the sympathy felt by the Cynics for the ethical precepts
of Democritus, who linked sophrosyne with frugality and self-sufficiency
and opposed it to extravagance.36
It was the Cynics of the third century who, on the basis of Crates’
spoudaiogeloion (“mixture of seriousness with jest”), developed the diatribe,
often described as a sophronizon logos, which imparted some flavor of Cynic
sophrosyne to a wide variety of literary types—the Stoic treatise on
morality, the verse of Phoenix of Colophon and Cercidas of Megalopolis,
Roman satire, the oratory of the Second Sophistic, and the homilies of
certain Church Fathers.37 The immense influence of the Cynic-Stoic
diatribe helps to explain the wide diffusion in Graeco-Roman times of
the ascetic concept of sophrosyne, which is summed up in Antipater’s
epitaph for Diogenes, where the famous wallet, cloak, and staff of the
Cynic prototype are termed the weapons of autarkes sophrosyne (Anth.
Pal. 7. 65).
Socratic self-mastery took a different form in the hedonistic philoso¬
phy of Aristippus, traditionally represented as the founder of the Cyrenaic
school; he regarded pleasure as the end in life and considered bodily
gratification superior to any other pleasure.38 Unlikely though it may
seem, there is a relationship between the Cyrenaics and the morality of
Socrates, again by way of autarkeia. The essence of Cyrenaic hedonism
lies in the belief that life offers most to the man who never denies him¬
self a pleasure yet is always sufficiently master of himself to do without
35 Cicero describes the Cynic lack of verecundia in Off. 1. 148.

36 Zeph Stewart (H.S.C.P. 63 [1958], 179-91) discusses the development of a hedonistic
Cynicism in the mid-third century b.c. For Julian’s denunciation of the debased Cynicism
current in his day, see Chap. VII, p. 250.
37 See Chap. VI (the later Stoa), Chap. VII (Phoenix and Cercidas), Chap. VIII (Roman
satire), and Chap. IX (Patristic writings).
38 Consult G. C. Field (Plato and His Contemporaries [London, 1930], 159-60) for a discus¬
sion of the question whether it was the elder Aristippus or his grandson who actually founded
the Cyrenaic school.
it if necessary (D. L. 2. 74). The common aim of all the Hellenistic

philosophies, to render man secure against the blows of chance, is evi¬
dent in this Cyrenaic attempt to attain steadfast composure under all
circumstances. With the Cyrenaics the Socratic autarkeia took the form
of subjecting appetite to the dictates of prudence in order to secure the
greatest ultimate pleasure (a device subsequently adopted by the
Epicureans). As in the Odes of Horace both Stoic and Epicurean princi¬
ples sometimes issue in the same practical advice, even couched in the
identical vocabulary of modus and temperantia, so the Cyrenaics had one
area of identity with the Cynics, resulting from their common admira¬
tion for the self-mastery of Socrates. The point is made by Maximus of
Tyre {Orat. I, 23B Hobein), who observes that Aristippus eacocppom
(“behaved with self-restraint”) no less than did Diogenes.
THE ATTIC ORATORS
The development of sophrosyne as a civic virtue, which was well under

way in the fifth century, continued in the fourth, where it is best observed
on a practical level in the speeches of the Attic orators and on a theo¬
retical level in Plato. The orators provide us with a rare opportunity
(available otherwise only in comedy and, to some extent, inscriptions) of
studying what sophrosyne meant in ordinary speech, without philosophi¬
cal refinement or poetic embellishment. In Attic oratory we expect
a concept of the virtue that will be readily understood and accepted by
the average Athenian serving in the jury or the popular assembly.
What we find is a democratic sophrosyne, in certain respects dramati¬
cally different from the civic virtue of the fifth century, and different in
ways that are readily traceable to the changing conditions in the polls.
The identification of sophrosyne with the democratic spirit, rather than
with the oligarchic or aristocratic—with which it was most often linked
in the fifth century—is clearly a sign of Athenian revulsion from the
tyranny of the Thirty, with its proscriptions and confiscations. The
return of democracy after the expulsion of the Thirty is described in so
many words as the restoration of a sophron politeia.39 So violent was the
reaction against the oligarchs that even far down into the fourth century,
at a time when the external threat to Athens from Philip was the para¬
mount issue in public life, the antithesis between the sophron democrat
and the disloyal oligarch persists as a rhetorical topic in the speeches of
Demosthenes and Aeschines. This democratic orientation is the princi¬
pal novelty in the popular fourth-century view of sophrosyne, but the
39 Aeschines Orat. 2. 176.

ij6 Sophrosyne
orators also place new emphasis on certain other characteristics of the

sophron citizen: his readiness to serve the State, especially by the perform¬
ance of “liturgies,” and his quiet, inoffensive behavior in private life.
Neither of these facets is mentioned by the orators of the late fifth cen¬
tury, Antiphon and Andocides.40 In fact, the stereotype of the sophron
citizen, with his well-defined traits, could only result from the peculiar
conditions that prevailed in Athens after the disaster of the Pelopon¬
nesian war and the collapse of the high hopes that had been founded on
the intellectual and spiritual, no less than the political, aggressiveness of
the fifth century. To accept apragmosyne as the token of good citizenship
was to say farewell to the Periclean spirit in Athenian life.41
This concept of sophrosyne is fresh and vigorous, not yet a stereotype,
in Lysias, whose family suffered much at the hands of the Thirty
Tyrants; but already it seems well established in the minds of those whom
he hopes to influence by his speeches that the sophron (or metrios or
kosmios) citizen combines hatred of oligarchy with orderly, law-abiding,
responsible conduct in public and private life. Since Lysias was often
employed as a logographer by individuals hovering on the fringes of the
Thirty, we sometimes find him spreading the cloak of sophrosyne around
the questionable trappings of an ex-cavalryman like Mantitheus, who
seeks to conceal his antidemocratic military service behind his exemplary
decorum in private life. After maintaining that he has lived a life of
decent moderation (metrios [16. 3]), Mantitheus analyzes its content: he
has provided his sisters with liberal dowries, allowed his brother the larger
share in their joint patrimony, behaved so circumspectly that no one has
a grievance against him, won the contempt of all the young bloods by
his decorum, avoided law suits, defended his country in arms, and has
even chosen, he says, to serve in the infantry, the more dangerous
branch of the service (16. 10 ff). Mantitheus characterizes his conduct
as both liberal and moderate (16. 18) and asks the jury not to condemn
him for wearing his hair long, in the Spartan fashion, since many who
dress in a more conservative way actually harm the state.
This is the most detailed definition of the metrios or sophron bios in the
40 In Antiphon sophrosyne usually means self-control, while in Andocides it is sometimes

related to politics, but in a special way characteristic of the period of factional disputes in
Athens at the close of the fifth century. See Chap. Ill, p. 116.
41 Apragmosyne was part of the aristocratic, oligarchic, and “Dorian” ethos in the fifth
century, and in foreign policy it signified a tendency to maintain the status quo. In private
life, where it implied aloofness, avoidance of meddling, it was doubtless admired by all
classes of society. It is clear from the constant emphasis fourth-century orators laid on this
and related values that, for the time being at least, the “inactive” principle had triumphed
over the “active” in Athenian life.
speeches of Lysias; but separate elements appear elsewhere, especially
that of minding one’s own business, for to to avrov ttparreiv, the watch¬
word of the aristocrats, has now been absorbed into the Attic ideal
of citizenship. Hesychia, too, the Dorian political virtue praised by
Pindar,42 has maintained its connection with sophrosyne, now that the
latter is claimed by the democrats. In the Oration on the Scrutiny of
Evandrus Lysias warns that Evandrus will boast of his family’s services to
the state and say that he himself is kosmios and, unlike so many Athenians,
minds his own business (26. 4). The jury, however, should reject these
claims, for the state would have been better off without those public
services, which led to the overthrow of the democracy; and “with refer¬
ence to his quiet behavior (hesychiotes), we should not examine his sophron
conduct now, when he has no chance to misbehave, but investigate his
lawless conduct when he was free to act as he chose” (26. 5). Kosmios,
hesychos, sophron, apragmon—all the familiar aristocratic values have been
thoroughly “democratized” in fourth-century Athens.43
The performance of “liturgies” (such as outfitting warships, subsidiz¬
ing religious processions, or paying for the production of plays in the
dramatic festivals) had always been a matter of civic pride to the
Athenians. Now it became one of the commonplaces of sophrosyne to
recall such liturgies, because they were regarded as proof that the citizen
had expended his fortune on behalf of the state, while practicing admir¬
able economy in private life.44 Both Lysias and Isaeus employ a related
commonplace: the most laborious liturgy is to be orderly and moderate
(,kosmios and sophron), to resist the temptations offered by pleasure and
profit, and to conduct oneself in such a way as to give no offense to any
fellow citizen.45
Still another cliche of the courtroom is the appeal for the conviction
of a defendant on the ground that his punishment will render sophron (or
kosmios) anyone else who might contemplate the same offense.46 Exem¬
plary punishment is a favorite topos in the orators, who often describe the
function of legal enactments as sophronigein (“to render law-abiding [or]
well-behaved”).47
42 Pyth. 8. 1-2; 01. 4. 16.

43 Kosmios and sophron continue to be synonymous in purely private, nonpolitical con¬
nections, although as a matter of fact Lysias rarely so uses the words. One example occurs
in Oral. 19. 16.
44 Lysias 12. 20; Demosthenes 38. 26; Isaeus 7. 39, 41.
45 Lysias 21. 19; Isaeus, Frag. 35.
46 E.g., Lysias 6. 54, 14. 12, 15. 19, 27. 7.
47 For Lysias and Isocrates, the effect of exemplary punishment (sophronizein) is usually to
render the other citizens moderate, orderly, and responsible. For Demosthenes and
ij8 Sophrosyne
By far the most common meaning of sophrosyne in Lysias’ Orations is

the “civic” one: moderate and law-abiding conduct toward one’s fellow
citizens. This aspect of sophrosyne overrides all others; the intellectual
nuance is rare (even the commonplace phrase lav oaxppovrjre hardly
occurs in Lysias), sophron means “chaste” in just two passages (i. io, 3.
4), and sophronein has the connotation “to be of sound mind” only
in the speech ascribed to Lysias in Plato’s Phaedrus (231D).48
Isaeus terms the ideal citizen metrios or kosmios more often than sophron,
but his conception of this ideal closely resembles that of Lysias, with the
notable exception that he ignores the strictly factional element. Since the
speeches of Isaeus deal with private cases, mostly involving inheritance,
they rarely allude to public affairs and never describe the sophron or
metrios citizen as a foe of oligarchy. Isaeus assigns great importance to
minding one’s own business. The speaker in his first oration says, for ex¬
ample, that he and his brothers were brought up in so respectable a
fashion (sophronos) that they never entered a law court, even as listeners.49
Isaeus’ other favorite commonplace presents the payment of liturgies as
proof of metriotes or sophrosyne. One of his speeches asks a rhetorical
question: What must the metrios polites do? The answer is that he must
refrain from taking by force the property of others and must preserve
his own for the good of the state, contributing freely in time of need and
concealing no part of his fortune (7. 39).50
Demosthenes shows little originality in his references to sophrosyne,
but these are so extremely numerous as to suggest that the concept is an
important one, even though taken entirely for granted, in the ethical
vocabulary of his audiences. Two principal connotations, the intellectual
and the civic, are evenly balanced in his speeches. Demosthenes appeals
much more often than do Lysias and Isaeus to the judgment of the
sophron anthropos or the sophron dikastes, the man of common sense, shrewd¬
ness, and practical experience (1. 27; 2. 22; 11. 15; 6. 19; 24. 101; 23.
193; 23. T97; 3- 25)- The colloquial phrase lav ocoeppovfjTe (“if you are
Aeschines, it is more likely to make them self-restrained, decent, and, in the case of women,
chaste. See Lysias 1. 47, 6. 54, 14. 12, 15. 9, 22. 20, 27. 7, 30. 24; Isocrates Areop. 20 (7tou.Iv
ouxppoi'coTtpovs); Demosthenes 2. 18, 21. 227, 24. 101, 59. 86; Aeschines 1. 139.
48 Sophronein is opposed to nosein (“to be ill”), but the subsequent contrast between self-
control and bad judgment (kakos phronein) is a reminder that soundness of mind includes
control of the appetites.
49 Cf. 4. 28-30, where the plaintiffs describe themselves as kosmioi, not philopragmones
(“busybodies”).
50 The citizen who contributes to the State may also be called spoudaios (“zealous” [7. 41]).
Antitheses of sophrosyne and kosmiotes include pleonexia (“overreaching” [n. 36]), tolme
(“boldness”), and poneria (“wickedness” [Frag. 12]), as well as the usual hybris.
sensible”) comes often to his lips, as it does to those of Aeschines and

Isocrates.51
In his allusions to the sophron citizen, Demosthenes has more to say
about social than about strictly political conduct; yet in one notable
passage he maintains the fourth-century connection between sophrosyne
and democracy and their joint opposition to hybris and oligarchy. His
speech against Timocrates divides the citizens according to their prefer¬
ence for one faction or the other. Those who choose to be ruled by laws
are moderate and useful (sophrones and chrestoi); those who desire an
oligarchy are cowardly and servile (anandroi kai douloi [24. 75]). The
usefulness of the sophron citizen is a favorite commonplace with Demos¬
thenes, who links both chrestos and chresimos with sophron (25. 24, 97; 38.
26). Chrestos as a term of approbation appears early in the Athenian
political vocabulary, and it was partly through association with the
concept of usefulness that sophrosyne won a place among the civic
virtues.52 Already in the Plutus of Aristophanes the chrestoi and sophrones
are linked (387), and this alliance is confirmed in the course of the
fourth century. Demosthenes also makes much of the relation between
sophrosyne and law: obedience to the laws results in sophrosyne,
respect for elders, and orderliness (eutaxia)—the solemn and beautiful
qualities by which the city becomes well regulated and safe (25. 24).53
The appeal to historical exemplars of sophrosyne plays a part in the
speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates;54 and Demosthenes
combines the topos of the liturgy with that of the mos maiorum in a way
that found imitators in Rome. He says in the Third Olynthiac that the
ancestral heroes erected many superb public buildings but in private
51 Demosthenes 58. 56, 6. 28, 15. 16. Aeschines 1. 123, 3. 117, 3. 242. Isocrates Helen 31,
38; Paneg. 165; Areop. 13; Antid. 242, 304.
52 See A. W. Adkins (Merit and Responsibility, 197, 215, n. 6) on the connection between
chrestos and agathos in Greek society. Spoudaios has much the same implications as chrestos in
the orators. On the tendency to treat sophron and spoudaios as synonyms in Peripatetic
educational treatises, see Adolf Dryoff, Die Ethik der alien Stoa (Berlin, 1897), 261.
53 Cf. 24. 210 and 59. 86. In the spurious oration, 26. 25, the fruits of lawlessness are
given as mama, akrasia, and pleonexia; the results of obedience to law are phronesis, sophrosyne,
and dikaiosyne.
54 Demosthenes uses exemplars least. Isocrates employs exemplars from mythology more
than do the other orators, who usually cite historical models. Most of the great Athenian
statesmen of the past—Solon, Dracon, Cleisthenes, Miltiades, and Pericles—serve the orators
as models of sophrosyne, either in private life (where they are modest, chaste, and decorous;
cf. Aeschines 1. 7, 20; 3. 257) or in public life (where their role is usually that of sophronistes
for their fellow citizens; cf. Isocrates, 15. 111, 16. 28). See Karl Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild
der Vorfahren (Paderborn, 1936), and Gisela Schmitz-Kahlmann, Das Beispiel der Geschichte im
politischen Denken des Isokrates, Philol. Supp. 31 (1939), 1-38.
1/j.o Sophrosyne
were so modest (sophrones) and true to the spirit of the Constitution that
the homes of Aristides, Miltiades, and their like were no more splendid
than the houses of ordinary men (25).55
Sophrosyne as self-control exercised in various circumstances—the
aspect that is on the whole most prominent in Xenophon but rarely ap¬
pears in Lysias and Isaeus—makes a better showing in Demosthenes,
who will speak of a man as being sophron with respect to gluttony,
drunkenness, or extravagance (38. 26), anger {Proem. 43. 1. 2), or sexual
appetites (2. 18; 18. 216; 19. 285; 45. 80). Sophrosyne regularly denotes
chastity when it refers to feminine virtue (19. 196; 59. 11).56 A reveal¬
ing sidelight on the popular misunderstanding of sophrosyne emerges
from the Oration against Stephanas, where Demosthenes warns the jury
against mistaking the gloomy expression of Stephanus for a proof
of sophrosyne; rather, it means that he is a misanthrope, for he assumes
this attitude, not because he is modest and high-minded, but because
he wishes to discourage beggars (45. 68). It is probably the same
tendency to associate sophrosyne with a certain austerity or at least un¬
sociable behavior that leads Isocrates, in his letter to Antipater, to
recommend a combination of sophrosyne and charis (“graciousness,
charm” [4. 2]).57
The speeches of Aeschines contain a great many allusions to sophro¬
syne, of which a disproportionate number refer to chastity or some other
aspect of decent behavior, since Oration I is an accusation against
Timarchus for prostitution. The discourse not only gives us some idea
of the popular attitude towards pederasty, and the supposed distinctions
between a sophron eros and a dishonorable association, but tells us about
numerous laws that Aeschines interprets as injunctions to sophrosyne.
He maintains that the lawmakers as a matter of course made laws
designed to instil sophrosyne before making any other enactments, on
the theory that where good behavior (eukosmia) is greatest, the city is
best governed (1. 20-22). Specific laws are read aloud by the clerk, to
prove that Solon was interested in sophrosyne 7Te.pl ttoll8&v (1.7, 20), and
that it is a function of law to render lovers chaste (sophronigein [1. 139]).
The punitive intention of the laws is also emphasized (1. 36, 192). In
55 See Sallust Cat. 13-14 and Horace Odes 2. 15.

56 “Chastity’’ is the regular meaning of sophrosyne in the spurious Eroticus, attributed by
Blass (Attische Beredsamkeit 3. 406-8) to a writer influenced by Isocrates; note that sophrosyne
has this significance in Isocrates Nic. 36-37.
:>7 Erotic epigrams in the Greek Anthology regularly contrast sophrosyne with beauty and
charm (Rufinus 1. 149; Agathias Scholasticus 1. 29). The disgust felt by Theseus at Hip-
polytus’ asceticism is probably a typical reaction to the puritanical sophrosyne.
addition to citing actual laws, Aeschines employs the exemplum to prove

that the greatest Athenian statesmen were themselves models of sophro-
syne (here “decency, honorable behavior”) and made it their chief
business to guide the polls towards this excellence. Solon, Pericles,
Themistocles, and Aristides were all such models of decorum that when
addressing the people they restrained their gestures and kept one arm
inside the cloak (1. 25; cf. 3. 257).58 Aeschines appeals to historical and
poetic exemplars of the sophron and lawful eros—Harmodius and Aristo-
geiton, Achilles and Patroclus (1. 140)—and quotes Euripides on the
love that leads to sophrosyne and arete (Frag. 672 Nauck). His evident
purpose in all these allusions is to create a link in the minds of his
audience between the civic sophrosyne (“modesty, usefulness, inoffen¬
siveness”), which was familiar in all the oratory of the fourth century,
and individual morality, the erotic sophrosyne, which was equally
familiar in the plays of Euripides, in Old and Middle Comedy, and in
philosophical discussions such as the Symposium and Memorabilia of
Xenophon, and the Symposium and Phaedrus of Plato. His emphasis on
the importance to the State of laws that enforce sophrosyne is a good
example of the effort to relate an individual virtue to the public welfare,
which Aristotle recommends to orators in the Rhetoric (1366b 13-15).
The stereotype of the sophron polites is analyzed in the speech Against
Ctesiphon, where Aeschines examines the distinction between the natural
qualities of the S^/xotucos avf\p Kai ocbcppcou (“the democratic and moder¬
ate citizen”)59 and his opposite, who is not even an aner but an anthropos
and is denounced as oligarchic and worthless (cpavXos). The essential
qualifications for the sophron citizen are (3. 168): first, that he be of free
birth on both sides; secondly, that he come of ancestors with a good
record of public service (or at least with no enmity towards the State);
thirdly, that he be sophron and metrios in his daily life, so that he will
never need to take bribes to finance his profligacy; fourthly, that he
have good judgment and facility in speaking—the first is more essential
than the second; and fifthly, that he be courageous (andreios). This pas¬
sage forms a little epideictic oration within the speech as a whole, fol¬
lowing the conventional topics of eulogy—birth, ancestry, and virtues:
the virtues here are sophrosyne, first and foremost, then a kind of
wisdom suited to public life, oratorical ability,60 and, last of all, courage.
58 The sophrosyne exemplified or instilled by the great Attic lawgivers is more often the
virtue of private conduct than a genuine arete politike.
59 Cf. Demosthenes Ep. 3. 18 for this phrase.
60See Euripides Autolycus, Frag. 282. 23-28 Nauck, and Anon. Iamblichi Frag. 89 DK.
142 Sophrosyne
Although it seems, at first glance, redundant to demand that the sophron

and democratic citizen be sophron, Aeschines actually refers to two dif¬
ferent aspects of the virtue. In the first instance, sophron alludes to the
civic virtue, moderation, while in the second, it indicates control of the
physical appetites. These topics of epideictic are turned against
Demosthenes, who, Aeschines maintains, shows all the characteristics
of the oligarchic type: he is of foreign descent (Scythian, in fact); has a
family tradition of hatred towards Athens; is eloquent indeed (Aeschines
can hardly deny this) but cowardly and useless to the state; and in
private life he is extravagant, licentious, and unable to save money and
therefore depends for support on bribes from the king of the Persians
(3- 173)- In addition, he is a meddler (periergos, equivalent to the
traditional epithet, polypragmon). The way in which Aeschines amplifies
the stereotype of the sophron citizen shows that it is still considered
effective, still worth an orator’s serious attention, even in the last years
of Athenian independence.
One final oratorical flourish, in the Epitaphios of Hypereides, also
links sophrosyne with the Athenian polish1 Like the sun which shines on
the whole world and provides birth and sustenance for the sophron and
epieikes (“the moderate and reasonable”), so Athens bestows her gifts on
mankind, punishing the wicked, helping the just, guaranteeing equity
in place of pleonexia (6. 5).62 The parallel between the beneficiaries of
the sun and of the polls—in the one case the sophron, in the other the
just who are preserved from pleonexia—is a final assertion of the two
cardinal excellences that Aeschylus had long ago designated as the
cornerstones of Athenian democracy—justice and sophrosyne.
ISOCRATES
Although as a group the Attic orators made effective use of the topic
of the sophron citizen and from time to time—especially in the oration
of Aeschines against Timarchus—attempted to arouse odium and
indignatio through emotional appeals based on an interpretation of
sophrosyne as decency or chastity, they were only on the threshold of
the great rhetorical development of the topic of sophrosyne which
reached a peak in Ciceronian oratory and continued on into the Second
Sophistic. Isocrates made important contributions to this development:
61 Hypereides also alludes to the sophron upbringing of the heroes in his Epitaphios (6. 8)
and links with the sophron bios many of Lycurgus’ services to the state (Frag. 118).
62 The restoration of the phrase sophron kai epieikes seems convincing. Cf. Lysias 2. 57 for
sophrosyne and deos (“reverence”) as the gift of Athens to the Aegean world.
notably by using a canon of virtues in encomium, by paying special
attention to the excellence of the ruler and his role as paradeigma, and
by frequent recourse to the topic of the ancestral virtues, among which
sophrosyne ranks high. In each of these categories Isocrates was a model
for Cicero; he did not, however, provide a precedent for the treatment
of sophrosyne as a topic of invective, in which Cicero has no peer and
in which, for variety and subtlety, the Roman orator far surpasses even
Aeschines.
The topic of sophrosyne as a political virtue is expanded by Isocrates,
who shows conventional concern for the effect of individual morality on
the internal affairs of the polls and uses the same vocabulary as Lysias
and Demosthenes to describe the desirable type of citizen. His chief
originality lies in his attempt to apply sophrosyne, as political modera¬
tion and restraint, to international affairs, but he does so with a super¬
ficiality and even a naivete that contrast unfavorably with the realism
of Thucydides in treating these same topics. Isocrates identifies individ¬
ual, personal morality with the morality of the State and always insists
that Athens must adopt the same standard of sophrosyne as the individ¬
ual citizen. Nothing in his pronouncements on foreign policy suggests a
rigorous consideration of what sophrosyne would actually mean in the
context of Athenian power, commitments, and aims, whether immediate
or long-range.
Isocrates is always severely critical of Athenian democracy in his own
time and often suggests that the absence of sophrosyne is the cardinal
evil. He reviews domestic affairs chiefly in the Areopagiticus and the
Panathenaicus, and foreign policy in the Panegyricus and On the Peace. In
all four addresses he appears as a laudator temporis acti and helps to
construct that semi-mythical picture of Athens in her golden age of
sophrosyne and justice which soon became a commonplace in history,
biography, and rhetoric.63 A typical expression of his attitude is the
idealized portrait in the Areopagiticus of the well-disciplined, healthy
state, which valued sophrosyne and metriotes (4, 13, 20) and entrusted
control of education to the Areopagus, whose members all shared not
merely noble birth but great arete and sophrosyne (37). The conduct of
the young in those days is described in terms reminiscent of the Dikaios
Logos in the Clouds\ Isocrates says that they did not frequent gambling
dens or associate with flute girls, but even in the streets always behaved
with great aidos and sophrosyne (48).64 In each of these passages, so-
63 According to Isocrates, the architects of Athenian sophrosyne are Solon and Cleisthenes.
64 Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 962, 1006.
144 Sophrosyne
phrosyne is the old aristocratic ideal of quietude, restraint, and eukosmia.

It is significant that Isocrates often associates this kind of sophrosyne
with good birth (Panath. 197; cf. Ad Nic. 43).
Many of the same topics reappear in the Panathenaicus, which was
composed near the end of Isocrates’ long life. Especially notable in this
discourse are the comparison of Athenian and Spartan sophrosyne and
the admission that there exists among the virtues a hierarchy, which de¬
presses the value of andreia and exalts sophrosyne. Isocrates concedes
that outsiders may contrast Athenian disorderliness with Spartan
sophrosyne and discipline (Xenophon frequently did so), but he insists
that the two conditions are the consequence of the two types of power,
on sea and on land. Hegemony on land is won by sophrosyne, obedi¬
ence, and good order, but sea power is won by the crafts concerned
with shipbuilding and by penniless men.65 Before she embarked on a
thalassocracy, Athens was not inferior to Sparta; her kings trained their
people in arete, justice, and great sophrosyne (m-15, 138); and
Isocrates maintains that the Athenians of former days were more
admired for their endurance and sophrosyne than for their courage,
since courage may belong to the base, while the other virtues are the
product of good birth and education (197).66
The two addresses that deal with foreign policy are alike in advocat¬
ing sophrosyne and condemning hybris, akolasia, and polypragmosyne in
Athens’ relations with other states, and in praising the ancestors for their
ideal behavior. Otherwise there is a great difference between the two
speeches, reflecting the change in Athenian power and hopes between
380, the year of the Panegyricus, and 355, after the collapse of the Second
Maritime Confederacy. In the earlier address Isocrates hopes that
Athens may again lead the Greeks against the barbarians; hence he
lists the services of Athens to Greece and idealizes her past, when so¬
phrosyne towards the allies was linked with homonoia (“concord” [3, 104,
173])* Sophrosyne in the Panegyricus means considerate treatment of
allied states (81). In On the Peace it means renouncing the ambition to
have allies. Isocrates now terms the recent, disastrous policy of Athens
polypragmosyne (“meddling [30]), pronounces it inferior to sophrosyne
(“isolationism” [58]), and demands that the Athenians transfer to their
public life the virtues they praise as individuals (119). The topic of the
golden age of Athenian sophrosyne and justice is used once more, but
65 Cf. the Old Oligarch, Ath. Pol. 1. 2, 5-6.

66 The model of sophrosyne and justice is now Menelaus (72), who because of these
virtues was deemed worthy to become the son-in-law of Zeus.
Xenophon and the Orators H5
with a different purpose: to contrast both Athenian and Spartan suc¬
cess and fair reputation in the days when they practiced sophrosyne with
their later hybris, which led to the fall of both empires (93, 102, 104, 119).
Isocrates says in so many words (119): “Unrestraint [akolasia] and arro¬
gance [hybris] have proved to be the cause of our woes, sophrosyne of our
blessings.” He is so intent on identifying the virtues of public and private
life that he maintains that States, being immortal, cannot escape paying
the penalty for their sins, which men may evade by death. In calling atten¬
tion to Athenian polypragmosyne and blaming it for her collapse,
Isocrates implicitly rejects the Periclean boast that Athens by her inter¬
vention brought many benefits to Greece. In Thucydidean terms,
Isocrates advises Athens to reconcile herself to being a second-class
power, whose safest course is a quiet, nonprovocative foreign policy.
The other area connected with sophrosyne in which Isocrates shows
a certain originality is in his theorizing about the virtues of the ruler
and the education of the prince. These topics are treated in a large
number of Isocrates’ works, whether protreptical addresses and letters
or outright eulogies. The portrait of the ideal ruler appears in Nicocles
or the Cyprians and Evagoras. In each of these, sophrosyne, as a virtue of
the ruler, is neither intellectual nor civic but moral: self-control, resist¬
ance to the temptations offered by pleasure and power, or even virtue
simp licit er.67 Both addresses also insist on the obligation of the ruler to
serve as a model of virtue, and both show a tendency to create a
hierarchy among the virtues.
The Nicocles proclaims sophrosyne and justice, which are continually
paired by Isocrates, to be the most valuable of the virtues, because of
the benefit they bestow on mankind (29-30). Sophrosyne proves to have
a limited connotation as practiced by Nicocles himself: since ascending
the throne he has never approached any woman save his wife (36-37).
The motives for his restraint are listed at considerable length: eight
reasons are given, four of which are peculiar to the position of a king,
while four apply to ordinary men (43 ff.). Among these reasons,
two seem especially characteristic of the thinking of the period: the king
must be sophron as a model for his subjects, and he should cultivate so¬
phrosyne and justice because they are found only in the noble, whereas
67 As a political excellence sophrosyne is now entirely different from the democratic virtue
of the other fourth-century orators. It is the self-restraint of the king, which induces his sub¬
jects to practice self-restraint in their turn. The civic virtue of sophrosyne did not survive the
Athenian democracy which gave it birth, but the sophrosyne of the ruler was one of the
most persistent and influential aspects developed in the entire history of the concept, and
was especially fruitful in history and oratory.
146 Sophrosyne
courage and cleverness may belong also to the base. The king should be
supreme in virtues that are worthy of the greatest praise (43-44).
Isocrates, as we saw in connection with the Panathenaicus, is likely
to distinguish andreia from the other virtues and to place it at the bot¬
tom of the canon. He sometimes advocates wisdom, justice, sophrosyne,
and “all arete,” omitting even to mention andreia,68
The Nicocles contains two other ideas of some significance for the
fourth-century development of sophrosyne: the need for a way to test
arete and the contrast between two or more “levels” of a given virtue.
Isocrates says that we should not test all the virtues in the same circum¬
stances, but justice in time of need, sophrosyne in time of power, and
self-control (enkrateia) in the flower of youth (44). The contrast between
sophrosyne and enkrateia shows that the former is not actually as limited
as the earlier references in this speech suggest; it can still denote the
antithesis to hybris. Unlike Plato, who in the Laws seriously discusses the
need for a way of testing virtue—sophrosyne especially (649-50)—
Isocrates makes no attempt to suggest a specific test, but is satisfied by
past performance; and he does not emphasize the importance to the
State of such a test. Another idea that occurs frequently in fourth-
century discussions of arete is the contrast between virtue based on
nature and virtue that owes something to reason as well. Those who are
orderly (kosmioi) by nature deserve praise, but still greater praise is due
those who are such as a result of reasoning (fiera Xoyiofiov). Sophrosyne
that comes by chance (tyche), rather than by good judgment {gnome),
may be lost, unlike the virtue that is grounded in both nature and
reason (46).69
The panegyric of Nicocles’ father, Evagoras, may well be the most
influential of all the works of Isocrates, through its impact on epideictic
oratory and historiography. In it Isocrates maintains that he is the first
to eulogize arete in prose (8); thus he proclaims both his intention
of rivaling the poets who had previously dealt with this subject, and his
preoccupation with the central theme of excellence. The method that
he uses is to celebrate the achievements of Evagoras in chronological
68 On the Peace 63. Other examples of hierarchies among the virtues: Ad Dem. 6, 19, 38;
Phil. 125 ff.; Ad Nic. 30, 31; Panath. 72. Contrast Isocrates’ preference for justice and sophro¬
syne with the choice customarily made by the Sophists of the fifth century, who preferred
sophia and andreia (physis over nomos).
69 Ad Nic., a protreptic address loosely constructed of many familiar ethical maxims,
includes a number having to do with sophrosyne, such as the admonition to the young
prince to serve as a model of this virtue and make his subjects sophronesteroi (29). Another
collection of gnomic exhortations, addressed this time to a private citizen, comprises the Ad
Demonicum: see especially 15, 21, and 46 for commonplaces relating to sophrosyne familiar
from lyric and elegiac poetry.
Xenophon and the Orators 14J
order, mentioning the various aretae in connection with appropriate

deeds, and beginning with the praise of Evagoras’ ancestry and physis.
Sophrosyne is assigned to the period of childhood and is grouped with
the physical excellences of beauty and strength—an arrangement that
was imitated by eulogists well into the Patristic age.70 Sophrosyne of
this kind is nothing more than obedience and orderly conduct. When
Evagoras became a man, the excellences of childhood grew with him;
and to them were added courage, wisdom, and justice (23). Sophrosyne
now indicates restraint of appetite (45), as it does in the Nicocles. Among
the virtues that the ruler’s example instilled in his people, Isocrates
mentions praotes (“gentleness”) and metriotes (“moderation” [49; cf.
75, 76]), both of which are traditionally related to sophrosyne and in
this passage probably have a political significance. As the sophrosyne of
the ruler in Isocratean eulogy tends to be confined to self-restraint, the
sophrosyne of his subjects is usually obedience or quiet behavior rather
than more positive civic virtue.
The Evagoras affords one of the very rare examples in the fourth
century of the rhetorical use of a canon confined to wisdom, justice,
courage, and sophrosyne. The absence of piety from the list is noteworthy,
because it contrasts with the practice of Xenophon 71 and of Isocrates
himself elsewhere. When he first uses a canon of virtues in epideictic,
Isocrates credits Theseus with courage, wisdom, piety, sophrosyne, and
“the rest of arete” (Helen 31), and in On the Peace he warns that Athens
as a whole cannot win happiness without the same forms of excellence—
piety, sophrosyne, justice, and “the rest of arete” (63).72 The sophrosyne
of Theseus in the Helen offers a clue to the civic connotations of the
term when applied to an Athenian leader, whether mythical or histori¬
cal. Theseus is called sophron, not because of his moderation or self-
control, but because of his wise administration (dioikein) of the polls.
None of the other three virtues as defined by Isocrates in this passage
has a political function.73
It was in the Evagoras, the Helen, and other discourses with a strong
epideictic flavor that Isocrates provided a model for later orators and
70 For a somewhat similar grouping, see Xenophon Const. Lac. 2. 3 and Symp. 8. 8. The
place of sophrosyne in Patristic eulogy is discussed in Chap. IX.
71 Especially the Agesilaus. No eulogy of the Spartan king could omit piety, because he
made a great display of religious observances. In the Hellenica much is made of his sacrifices
to the gods.
72 Cf. Panath. 204, 216.
73 Theseus demonstrated andreia by the risks he took “on his own” (auros Kad’ avjov),
episteme by the battles he fought in common with the whole city, and piety by his response
to the supplications of Adrastus and the children of Heracles.
148 Sophrosyne
also for historians trained to write rhetorical prose. Eulogy and vituper¬
ation are prominent in all the Hellenistic historians directly influenced
by Isocrates and in those who carried on his tradition. Polybius’ con¬
demnation of historians who substitute eulogy for history (12. 25C; cf.
10. 21) shows how widespread this trend became, supported, to be sure,
by philosophical as well as rhetorical forces;74 and we shall learn from
the Roman historians that one of the most enduring legacies of the
rhetorical schools was this very device of converting the canon of
cardinal virtues into a framework to support the biographical approach
to history.
The educational views of Isocrates are necessarily in close touch with
his political ideals, since political discourse was the primary subject of
his paideia. The two works that deal specifically with his career as
a teacher, the fragment of his programme, Against the Sophists, and the
vindication of his entire career, the Antidosis, show Isocrates’ lifelong
concern for sophrosyne as an excellence that the teacher should stimu¬
late in his pupils, and both reveal his conviction that political discourse
is the best way of doing so.75 His purely rhetorical doctrine also contains
certain elements related to sophrosyne—in addition to his frequent use
of the topic of the virtues in epideictic. One such element is the adapta¬
tion of the principles of the prepon (“what is fitting”) and kairos (“what
is opportune”) in oratory.76 Both concepts are akin to sophrosyne in its
aesthetic aspect, and the prepon, especially as developed in Peripatetic
theories of style, may be considered the chief rhetorical expression
of sophrosyne.77
74 Although Theopompus, for example, doubtless learned from his teacher Isocrates how
to employ the topic of virtue and vice in historiography, he may also have been inspired by
the Cynic philosophy to criticize individuals and states for moral weaknesses, including lack
of sophrosyne. Throughout the Philippica he castigates Philip for profligacy, drunkenness,
and inability to live cnocppovus (Frags. 27, 224, 225, 236 Jacoby). The people of Illyria,
Byzantium, and Chalcis are collectively stigmatized as deficient in sophrosyne (Frags. 39,
62); while Agesilaus and the Spartans are praised for their enkrateia (Frag. 22), and Lysander
is commended for being odxppojv and able to master every pleasure (Frag. 20).
75 In Against the Sophists Isocrates condemns the Sophists for professing to teach arete and
sophrosyne, yet failing to do so (6); he holds that the eristic philosophers do concern them¬
selves with these excellences, whereas the Sophists inculcate only polypragmosyne and pleonexia
(20). Isocrates denies that any art can instil justice and sophrosyne in those who are with¬
out a good physis, but thinks that political discourse is of the greatest assistance in stimulating
these virtues (21). Cf. Antid. 84, where Isocrates invites comparison with the eristic philoso¬
phers who profess to turn men towards sophrosyne and justice.
76 See, for example, Against the Sophists 13, where kairos and the prepon are mentioned in
connection with the qualities that distinguish good oratory; and Panath. 85 on kairos and
metnotes in speech.
77 For the identification of sophrosyne and the prepon in the ethics of Panaetius, see Chap.
VI, pp. 220-22.
Xenophon and the Orators i4g
In the Antidosis Isocrates observes that one of the natural qualifications

of a good orator is audacity combined with restraint (tolme meta sophro-
synes [190]). In its own way, and in a relatively limited area, this phrase
reconciles the two principles in the Greek character whose opposition
we have traced from Homer. Efforts to mingle and adjust the rival
tendencies are most often found in discussions of political history or
theory; Isocrates is the first to apply the commonplace to rhetoric.78
In this, as in several more important areas of his thought concerning
sophrosyne—its value for the State, its dominant position in the “ances¬
tral constitution,” its place in the character of the ideal ruler, the need
for the State to devise methods of instilling sophrosyne, the existence of
levels or stages of arete—Isocrates invites comparison with Plato, who in
the same polls and at the same time was confronting the same problems.
But if now and again the reader is inclined to suspect that within
Isocrates there was a Plato struggling to get out, the impression is only
fleeting. The differences are fundamental. In accepting the challenge to
the principles and aims of rhetorical education flung down by Plato’s
Gorgias and Protagoras, Isocrates steadfastly rejects the most essential and
characteristic elements in the whole Platonic system: the belief that
arete is unified, that it can be taught, and that it must be based on
knowledge of absolute values rather than on opinion.79 Given these dif¬
ferences, Plato was bound to arrive at solutions to the great fourth-century
questions about arete—its nature, its relation to the individual and society,
how it can be instilled—that differed from Isocrates’ solutions in almost
every conceivable way. As I shall attempt to show in the following
chapter, Plato surpassed Isocrates in clarity, precision, and depth of
thought about these matters—in everything except the power to influence
his contemporaries. For it was Isocrates—especially the Isocrates of the
Evagoras and the Nicocles— who found the wider audience for his views
on sophrosyne and transmitted them, via the orators and historians who
emerged from his school, to the prose writers of succeeding generations
in both Greece and Rome.
78 Isocrates’ references to sophrosyne in private life are for the most part conventional in
content and phrasing. One point of interest is his tendency to link sophrosyne with culture
(as Cicero later associates temperantia with humamtas). See, e.g., the description of the culti¬
vated man in Panath. 31-32 (although the word sophrosyne does not occur, the conditions
necessary for the existence of paideia include two traditional components of sophrosyne) and
the observation in Busiris 21-22 that the culture of the Egyptian priests depends on their
sophrosyne and leisure.
79 Jaeger (Paideia 3. 46-70 and nn. 32a, 44) discusses the relation of Isocrates to Plato,
especially the reaction to the Gorgias and Protagoras expressed in Against the Sophists.
V
Plato
IN spite of the more spectacular and extensive influence of Isocrates on

his own generation, it does not need to be demonstrated that Plato’s
impact was ultimately both greater and more lasting. His place in the
history of sophrosyne exemplifies his sovereign effect on Greek thought
in general, for with him the development of this concept reaches a
climax. Not only did he reconsider most of the earlier interpretations of
the virtue which had emerged from the archaic and the classical worlds
—now shattered for ever by the crises of the late fifth century—and re¬
integrate them into a new unity, but he so extended its scope that all
subsequent interpretations were the result, in some fashion, of his
achievement.
The first great expansion in the meaning of sophrosyne coincided, as
we have seen, with the flowering of the Athenian polls and the birth of
tragedy. These events are inseparable. By the middle of the sixth century,
sophrosyne had been recognized as the characteristic excellence of the
Athenian citizen in time of peace, celebrated in epitaphs together with
arete, the corresponding virtue in time of war. Sophrosyne was a term that
expressed the all-embracing order and the morality of restraint and limi¬
tation which the polls demanded. At this point the purely individual
heroic ideal, always capable of being intensified to the point of hybris,
came into conflict with the demands of an established order (cosmic and
political), which limited the self-assertion of the hero and required him
to obey its primary law of measure. From this conflict was born Attic
tragedy, which throughout its brief century of life focused attention on
the antithesis between hybris and sophrosyne. With the decline of the
democratic Athenian polls at the close of the Peloponnesian war came
inevitably the decline of tragedy.
150
Plato I5I
Inevitably, too, sophrosyne had to undergo modification, since its

principal arenas, the polls itself and the theater of Dionysus, were so
radically altered. But instead of becoming fossilized (like hybris) or
virtually disappearing (like aidos), sophrosyne entered its second period
of notable development in the fourth century—mainly as a result of
philosophic interest in its relation to the ethics of the individual and the
State.
Ironically, Plato’s most far-reaching contribution to the history of
sophrosyne was his arbitrary establishment of the canon of four cardinal
virtues in the fourth book of the Republic. Although a tentative and
shifting alignment of four or five primary virtues had been known at
least as early as Pindar and Aeschylus, it was Plato who defined the
canon for all time and is therefore responsible for the special development
of sophrosyne in Hellenistic, Graeco-Roman, and Christian thought
which resulted from its inclusion in the Platonic tetrad. Rejected by
Aristotle, the canon was adopted by the Stoics, although it did not cor¬
respond to their theory of the soul, and thereafter it found its way
to Rome, to the Church Fathers, and ultimately to the literature and
art of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The appearance of a
personified Temperantia pouring water into a vessel of wine among the
cupola mosaics of St. Mark’s in Venice, holding an hourglass in the
fresco of Good Government in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, or
sheathing a sword while she grasps a bridle between her teeth on the
walls of the Arena Chapel in Padua; the vision of Temperanza accom¬
panying the triumphal chariot of the Church in Canto XXIX of
Dante’s Purgatorio; and the character of Temperaunce in Book II of
Spenser’s Faerie Queen—all must ultimately be traced back to Book IV
of the Republic.
Apart from this accidental result of his tremendous influence on Hel¬
lenistic philosophy, Plato contributed more generously to the develop¬
ment of sophrosyne than did any other writer of any period. So rich and
complex is his thought on the subject that it is difficult to separate the
theme of sophrosyne from the multitude of other subjects with which it
is constantly interwoven: the soul and the State, love, pleasure, educa¬
tion, eschatology, the universe. Since, however, Plato’s three great
topics are ethics, politics, and cosmology, we shall attempt to show the
relation of sophrosyne to each of them—considering in some detail the
Charmides, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedrus, and Laws and noting significant pas¬
sages in the Phaedo, Symposium, Philebus, Timaeus, and Statesman. That
sophrosyne is intimately connected with ethics and politics is self-
/j2 Sophrosyne
evident, but its place in Plato’s cosmology often escapes notice because
of his vocabulary. Here, just as in lyric poetry and Sophoclean tragedy,
it is essential to identify the concept of sophrosyne when it appears
under a variety of names—including taxis (“arrangement”), kosmos
(“order”), symphonia (“agreement”), and perhaps even systasis (“compro¬
mise”)—instead of limiting our study to the word sophrosyne itself.
Plato’s treatment of sophrosyne is intensely dynamic. The earliest
stage is naturally the most Socratic: it is dominated not only by
Socrates’ conception of virtue as knowledge but also by Socrates him¬
self as the exemplar of sophrosyne. This stage is represented in the
dialogues by the Charmides. A later stage finds Plato refining and deepen¬
ing the popular interpretation of sophrosyne as the restraint of appetite.
His own distinctive contribution is the theory that all virtue depends on
orderly arrangement within the soul. This view is responsible for the
treatment of sophrosyne in the Gorgias and is further developed in the
Republic. A third stage is reached in the late dialogues: Plato’s interest
in movement and change causes him to give renewed attention to the
appetites and passions and to accord them a higher status in the pattern
of the soul’s activity than he had been willing to concede in the Republic.
To rehabilitate the appetitive element in the soul, it is necessary to impose
order on this microcosm, as reason brings order out of chaos in the
macrocosm of the universe. Hence the greatly increased importance of
sophrosyne in the Laws parallels the emphasis on other terms denoting
order, compromise, and arrangement in the Timaeus and the Statesman.
As we shall see, Plato’s strengthened concern for the “inferior” aspects
of the human soul also has important consequences for sophrosyne in
the Phaedrus and Philebus. Although it thus seems possible (with due
regard for chronological uncertainty in the case of many dialogues) to
trace a development in Plato’s theory of sophrosyne, a topical
treatment of the subject is inadvisable, because of the danger of
abstracting any definition from its context. The dramatic structure of
each dialogue and the character of the interlocutors who are to be
refuted or convinced always determine how sophrosyne is to be
regarded. It is necessary, therefore, even at the cost of some repetition,
always to deal with this excellence within the framework of specific
dialogues.
The earliest of the three stages just described derives its peculiar
flavor from the character of Socrates. It would be possible to show that
he is for Plato an exemplar of all four cardinal virtues; but there can
be little doubt which virtue is most “Socratic,” and the recognition of
Plato *53
Socrates as the otbcppoov avrjp is often vitally important to the total
impact of a dialogue, notably the Charmides, Symposium, and Phaedrus.
Socratic sophrosyne has three principal facets: self-knowledge, the sophron
erds, and what Socrates’ admirers called enkrateia (“self-control”) or
autarkeia (“self-sufficiency, independence”). The third aspect is more
subtle than mere physical hardihood and indifference to comfort—with
which the Cynics and the Cyrenaics often confused it. The genuine
Socratic autarkeia is a unique self-mastery in any situation, which Plato
portrays on the dramatic level in most of the Socratic dialogues. When¬
ever he conveys the impression that Socrates is truly the master of him¬
self and of every situation, that he is never at a loss—whatever his ironic
subterfuge; and that moreover he is honestly in search of the truth at
all costs and welcomes correction if it brings him closer to his goal, he
conveys the essential sophrosyne of his teacher. Sir Richard Living¬
stone, pointing out that the character of Socrates provides an example
of what sophrosyne is, also observes that sophrosyne in style may
be found in the concluding paragraphs of the Phaedo.1 The combination y
of stylistic sophrosyne with a portrait of the sophron Socrates is not un¬
common in the dialogues.
THE CHARMIDES
A consideration of Plato’s view of sophrosyne must begin with

the Charmides, which introduces many themes that reappear in other
dialogues: the identity of sophrosyne with some form of knowledge; the
contrast between the external and the internal—body and soul, opinion
and knowledge, seeming and being; the comparison of virtue to an art
(techne), especially medicine; the parallel between sophrosyne (“health
of soul”) and physical health; and, most striking of all, the Socratic erds
in its physical and intellectual manifestations. The Charmides is also
prophetic of the way in which the dramatic element is made to comple¬
ment the dialectical in all the dialogues much concerned with sophro¬
syne (the Gorgias, Symposium, and Phaedrus). In this instance, both setting
and characterization support and dramatize the search for a definition
of the virtue. The setting is a palaestra, which evokes the image of
physical exercise, suppleness, and health, to which correspond the
mental gymnastics and intellectual subtlety of Socrates and the conception
of sophrosyne as health of soul, the true source of physical health. The
dramatic date is significant: it is the year 432, and Socrates has just
1 Livingstone, Portrait of Socrates (Oxford, 1938), lvi.

i$4 Sophrosyne
returned from Potidaea, where, as we know from the Symposium

(219E ff.), he has distinguished himself by his courage. Plato here
makes effective use of the device that contributes ethical and pathetic
persuasion to so many Socratic dialogues:, his readers’ knowledge of the
destiny awaiting his characters and Athens herself in the future beyond
the dramatic date of the dialogue. It is the same retrospective aware¬
ness that endows with special meaning Thucydides’ version of the
Funeral Oration of Pericles or certain speeches of Oedipus in the
Coloneus, when it was produced after the death of Sophocles himself.2
Plato uses this device most insistently in the Gorgias, where the references
to the approaching trial and death of Socrates are scarcely veiled; but
already in the Charmides he exploits both the personalities and the
ultimate destinies of Charmides, Critias, and, of course, Socrates above
all. There is deliberate irony in the emphasis, early in the dialogue, on
the glorious ancestry of Charmides and Critias—the heroic past which
carries with it the promise of an honorable future (157E ff.)—for Critias
became the leader of the Thirty Tyrants, “the most violent of the
oligarchs,” 3 and took into that brutal conspiracy his nephew Charmides,
who died with him fighting against the democrats in the Peiraeus. In
the course of his tyranny Critias even proposed a law aimed at sup¬
pressing the eternal questioning of Socrates himself—who in the cheer¬
ful and unshadowed palaestra of Plato’s dialogue discusses with him the
correct organization of the State and the usefulness of sophrosyne to the
administrator.
In the Charmides Socrates demonstrates the true nature of sophrosyne
more memorably—for most readers—through his ethos than through his
dialectic. In a brief foreshadowing of the device that is much more
developed in the Symposium, Plato calls attention to the eros of Socrates
at the very moment when Charmides enters the palaestra (155D); he
uses this means to contrast the “outer” with the “inner” and to intro¬
duce the first reference to passion as a wild beast.4 The fact that Socrates’
eros is actually directed towards the intellect of Charmides, rather than
towards his physical beauty, is a constant reminder of sophrosyne in the
popular sense of self-control. The reminder has special value because
everything in the dialectic of the Charmides directs our attention to other
nuances of the virtue, and even the portrait of Socrates himself gives
greater prominence to intellectual than to moral sophrosyne.
The very arrangement of the cast of characters is significant:
2 See Kitto, 389.

3 Xenophon Mem. 1.2. 12. 4 Cf. Rep. 588C, Tim. 70D ff., Phaedrus 246A ff.
Plato 155
Charmides—the exemplar of temperamental sophrosyne (the demodes
quality of Laws 710A, which belongs to certain animals and children
naturally restrained in their appetites), who cannot explain what
sophrosyne is and therefore, by Platonic standards, does not truly pos¬
sess it—is seated between Critias and Socrates. Gritias, as befits a pupil
of the Sophists, represents both their approach to ethical values and their
habits of debate.5 Socrates symbolizes genuine sophrosyne, the philo¬
sophical virtue, the inner reality in contrast to the mere semblance
embodied in Charmides and the illusion of intellectual comprehen¬
sion which Critias represents.6 As the symbolic seating arrangement is
established, setting and character at once make themselves felt. Charmides
appears to be modest and ingenuous, and his uncle claims for him
beauty (154A), wisdom (155A), and sophrosyne (157D). Socrates
endorses only the first of these claims and even here is interested more
in beauty of soul than of body (154D-E). The metaphor of health,
which Plato so frequently associates with sophrosyne, provides the first
approach to the virtue in the Charmides. Socrates undertakes to cure the
boy’s headache and, after stating the principle of the Whole in medicine—
the head cannot be cured without the entire body—extends it still
further by maintaining that the body cannot be healed without the soul.
In fact, it is sophrosyne in the soul that guarantees health in the
body (157A). ""
The serious search for a definition now begins, following a symmetrical
pattern which moves from the outer to the inner and from a lower level
of popular morality and instinctive response to a higher one of intel¬
lectual analysis.7 Plato repeatedly calls attention to the purpose and the
technique of the search, as when Socrates bids Charmides look within
himself to find the answer (160D), or sets forth the purpose of the
elenchus—to prevent himself from supposing that he knows what he in
fact does not know (166D). These techniques of the Socratic investi¬
gation—bringing out the knowledge that lies unrecognized within and
1/
purging the soul of ignorance in preparation for learning—are both
5 Critias is full of confidence in his capacity for debate, able to quote the classical poets
to support his arguments, anxious to impress his audience (162C), loath to confess bewilder¬
ment (169C-D), quick to accuse Socrates of seeking victory, not truth (166C); and he thinks
he knows what he does not know.
6 See Paul Friedlander, Platon2 (Berlin, 1957), 2. 61-74, for a discussion of this technique
of characterization.
7 The dialectical processes of the Charmides are analyzed by T. G. Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides
(Cambridge, 1951). Our interest lies in the pattern of the argument, rather than in the
particular steps.
iy6 Sophrosyne
processes of sophrosyne; and it is well to realize that this virtue has a part
in the dialectic of Socrates as well as in his ethos.8
The definitions of sophrosyne that are now proposed show that Plato
is looking both backward and forward: back to some of the associations
that had clustered around sophrosyne from earliest times, forward to the
direction in which Socrates’ teaching led. The four traditional definitions
that in quick succession are produced, examined, and rejected are
hesychia (“quietness”), aidos (“modesty”), doing one’s own work, and
self-knowledge. All are shrewdly chosen, not only to suggest the limited
extent of popular understanding of the virtue (rooted in the Dorian
system of ethics, supported by the Delphic code, on the whole un-
reflective and superficial), but also to initiate the characteristic move¬
ment of the dialogue from the external to the internal. Charmides’ first
suggestion is entirely external, as well as traditional in the aristocratic
code of behavior: sophrosyne is a kind of quietness in walking, talking,
and such activities (159B). Persuaded to give up this definition,9 he
next “looks within” and finds that sophrosyne is aidos (160E). He has
indeed moved inward, but he is still bound by the inflexible Dorian
tradition. Again refuted,10 he next offers a definition that he hints
belongs to Critias: sophrosyne is attending to one’s own affairs (161B).
Anyone who has followed apragmosyne and polypragmosyne through the
literature of the late fifth century will recognize the aristocratic
bias behind this definition, and anyone who has read the Republic will
be aware of the possibilities for development inherent in the phrase.11
Here it is unsuccessfully defended as a definition of sophrosyne, first by
Charmides and then by Critias, with whose entrance into the debate
the argument becomes more sophisticated (in the original sense of the
word), and the spirit rather less gentle.
The first allusion to the Good is made with apparent casualness when
Critias alters “doing one’s own work” to “doing good things” (163E)—
a slight enough change, but one that allows Socrates to introduce the
8 The connection of self-knowledge with sophrosyne is specifically stated in Tim. 72A; this
topic is developed at great length by the author of Ale. I (see especially 13 iB). That the
elenchus results in sophrosyne, we learn from Soph. 230D.
9 On the ground that sophrosyne is kalon (again external), but quietness is sometimes the
reverse of kalon (160B).
10 For sophrosyne must be agathon (more inward than kalon), but Homer (Od. 17. 347)
denies that aidos is always agathon (161A).
11 See Chap. III. In Tim. 7 2 A, doing one’s one work is again made an aspect of sophro¬
syne. A. E. Raubitschek ( Wiener Studien 71 [1958], 170-72) traces the maxim back to Pittacus;
in its earlier stages it has no reference to politics.
Plato *57
theme of utility (sophrosyne must somehow be beneficial), to compare the
sophron man to the craftsman, and finally to identify sophrosyne with 1/
knowledge. Critias makes possible the transition to episteme by asserting

that sophrosyne is self-knowledge, that in fact the Delphic proverb is the
greeting of the god to his worshipers and is equivalent to the command
“Practice sophrosyne” (164D). This suggestion completes the preliminary
series of traditional definitions and prepares for the next stage of the
discussion by calling attention to the intellectual element implicit
in sophrosyne. Picking up the clue in the word gnothi, Socrates suggests
that sophrosyne is indeed some form of knowledge (165C); the consider¬
ation of this hypothesis occupies the remainder of the dialogue. All
subsequent definitions are variants of episteme: sophrosyne is knowledge
of itself (supposedly a paraphrase of gnothi sauton), knowledge of other
sciences and of itself, knowledge that one knows and does not know,
and finally knowledge of what one knows and does not know. The last
stage is reached when Critias admits that the knowledge that makes us
happy is not sophrosyne at all but the knowledge of Good and Evil
(174B); and we realize that the actual subject of the dialogue has been
the examination of the Socratic equation of virtue and knowledge,
rather than the study of any one aspect of virtue.
In the long section devoted to the testing of Critias’ definitions, the
antitheses “outer” and “inner,” “lower” and “higher,” continue to be
applied. The argument moves from doing one’s own work to knowing
oneself and from doing what is good to knowing the Good. The last pair
of terms suggests the contrast between the active and the theoretical life
which is developed at greater length in the Gorgias, still in connection
with sophrosyne. Another foreshadowing of the Gorgias is the comparison
of the sophron man to the possessor of an art (techne). Since the craftsman
(demiourgos) who applies a techne for the good of the whole is important
for Plato’s doctrine of sophrosyne—not only in the Gorgias, but even
more in the Republic and the Laws—we should note the characteristics
of a techne in the Charmides. The question of knowledge is raised—does
the doctor or other craftsman know when he is likely to profit by his art?
(164B)—but much more emphasis is laid on the usefulness of the art
(164B, 165C, 167B, 172D, etc.). It is in connection with this theme of
utility that the political implications of sophrosyne first enter the dis¬
cussion. Sophrosyne would benefit the State if the sophron man knew
what he knew and what he did not know and could observe this
condition in others, because every man would then do what he knew
iy8 Sophrosyne
how to do, and the State ruled by the sophron man would be ruled well
(172A).12 That the craftsman uses orderly arrangement to achieve his
object is not stated. This is one of the principal attributes of the
demiourgos from the Gorgias on, and it seems to be Plato’s own contribution
to the understanding of arete as techne.
Since the result of the conversation with Critias is the paradox that
sophrosyne is not beneficial (169B)—a conclusion that Socrates refuses
to accept—the quest for a definition is suspended. But Charmides, how¬
ever incapable of dialectic, is sensitive to the ethical mode of persuasion
and insists that Socrates is not genuinely ignorant of sophrosyne (176B).
The boy will therefore submit to his “incantations;” 13 and when to his
own inclination is added the support of Critias’ authority, Charmides
is able, by a show of obedience to his guardian, to demonstrate his pos¬
session of sophrosyne in a limited but genuine sense—that of aidos. Thus
Plato concludes the dialogue at the point where it began, with the
instinctive, nonphilosophical sophrosyne of Charmides.
If we assess the results of the dialogue, we find that, in addition to
exposing as superficial the most widely accepted traditional definitions
of sophrosyne and employing characterization in such a way as to leave
an impression of the difference between false and true, superficial and
profound sophrosyne, more lasting than the memory of any mere
process of argumentation, Plato has also examined the equation of virtue
and knowledge and the analogy between knowledge and various
techniques. He has brought sophrosyne within the orbit of the two
concepts most important for the Socratic approach to virtue: episteme
and techne. What he has not done is to refer, even in passing, to the
definition of sophrosyne that is most common in the late fifth century
and indeed in Plato’s own later dialogues: control of the appetites and
passions. The reason is clearly that such a definition would not contri¬
bute to the purpose of the dialogue—the discussion of virtue as knowl¬
edge. In later dialogues, as Plato moves away from the Socratic position,
he becomes increasingly interested in sophrosyne as the means of con¬
trolling the irrational in man, and in the last of his works, the Laws,
this conception of sophrosyne is completely victorious.14
12 The development of this idea is reserved for the Republic, where, however, it is linked
with justice, rather than with sophrosyne.
13 Cf. Laws 664B and 665C for the incantations that are to mold the soul to virtue.
14 For the definition of sophrosyne in the latter part of the fifth century as the control of
appetites and passions, see chaps. II and III on Antiphon the Sophist, Euripides, and
Aristophanes. The omission of this nuance of sophrosyne from the Charmides illustrates the
danger of abstracting any Platonic definition from its context.
Plato !59
THE PROTAGORAS
The definition of sophrosyne that we miss in the Charmides is promi¬

nent in both the Protagoras and the Gorgias. Even though, in the
Protagoras, Socrates insists on the unity of the virtues and equates
sophrosyne with wisdom (sophia), on the ground that both have as their
antithesis the same vice (folly, aphrosyne, [332B-333B]), Plato introduces
two other qualities as opposites of sophrosyne: wantonness (akolasia) and
the puzzling condition of “being inferior to oneself.” The first of these
antitheses, which occurs in the speech of Protagoras, represents the cur¬
rent popular belief; the second hints at one of Plato’s most character¬
istic methods of interpreting sophrosyne. In other dialogues, especially
the Republic and the Laws, the concept of being inferior or superior to
oneself leads to an analysis of the parts of the soul, or a recognition of
conflicting tendencies, and permits sophrosyne to be defined as the
harmony of these parts.15 The Protagoras does not explore this approach
to sophrosyne, but its presence in the dialogue marks an advance over
the Charmides. Another subject destined for increasing emphasis is the
relation of pleasure to the Good. Socrates’ apparent willingness to
equate the two in the Protagoras16 enables Plato to demonstrate the need
for an art of measurement, a standard by which to choose among
available pleasures, so that once again episteme is essential, even for the
polloi. The pleasures associated with sophrosyne form an important topic
in the Republic, the Philebus, and the Laws.11
THE GORGIAS
Plato’s systematic study of sophrosyne as the control of appetites and

desires begins with the Gorgias, where the virtue is defined, when first
mentioned, as the polloi define it—“the control of pleasures and appetites
in oneself” (49iD); no other definition is ever suggested. Firmly reject¬
ing the hedonism of the Protagoras, Plato constructs the Gorgias upon the
contrast between two ways of life: the Socratic, which aims at the Good,
and the Sophistic, which seeks power and pleasure. The Good is char¬
acterized by order, one of whose manifestations is sophrosyne; the life
of pleasure, which rejects order, embraces the opposite of sophrosyne,
wantonness (akolasia). There is a complete parallel, anticipating the
15E.g., Rep. 430E, Laws 689B.
16 On the hedonism of Socrates in the Protagoras, real or apparent, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2.
142-43. The view that it is genuine is defended by Richard Hackforth, C.Q. 22 (1928), 39-
42; see also G. B. Kerford,J.H.S. 73 (1953), 42-45.
17 See especially Laws 734A ff.
160 Sophrosyne
Republic, between the excellence of the soul and of the State. Once
again Plato makes dramatic use of character, reinforcing the arguments
of each speaker by his ethos. The first “act” of the dialogue, devoted to
eliciting from Gorgias a consistent statement about the nature of
rhetoric, is the least important of the three for sophrosyne; yet it intro¬
duces the important theme of the comparison between the physician
and the orator, draws attention to the achievements of the great
Athenian statesmen, and prepares us, by Gorgias’ uncertainty about the
moral responsibilities of the rhetorician, for the naked amorality of his
two pupils.
In the debate with Polus, not only does the tone of the conversation
at once become unusually acrimonious, but the fundamental issues of
the dialogue begin to appear. Socrates proposes his famous equation
between the four varieties of art (techne), all rational and aiming at the
Good, and the four empirical knacks, which are branches of flattery and
are irrational and hedonistic. This equation has a number of important
results. Rhetoric takes an inferior place, since it is allied with cookery
and cosmetic among the subdivisions of flattery; and pleasure is
diametrically opposed to the Good. As a result, sophrosyne—explicitly
defined as the control of pleasure—takes a lofty position on the Socratic
scale of values. Moreover, the presence in the equation of both gymnas¬
tic and medicine among the arts and cookery and cosmetic among the
flatteries guarantees that the parallel between sophrosyne (“health of
soul”) and physical health will be even more central than it was in the
Charmides. The metaphor proves particularly dynamic in connection
with the Socratic paradox often referred to in the conversations with
Polus and Callicles—the desirability of being punished if one has done
wrong.18 Socrates prepares for it by establishing the parallels between
body and soul: just as the sick man is less wretched if he undergoes
medical treatment, however painful, so, too, the wrongdoer is less
wretched if he is punished than if he escapes (479A ff.). The metaphor
applies with equal validity to the State, in the comparison between
politicians who have stuffed the city with harbors and arsenals without
regard for sophrosyne and justice, and caterers who stuff men’s bodies and
cause an unwholesome swelling, instead of genuine health (518C-
519A); it is pursued to the very end of the dialogue, where it culminates
in the myth of the soul’s judgment. When all bodily concealments are
removed, and the naked soul is exposed with the scars of all its crimes,
18 Cf. Rep. 591B ff., and note the relation to sophrosyne implied by calling the Reformatory
of Laws 908E a Sophronisterion.
Plato 161
Socrates’ one concern will be to present to the judges the healthiest soul
possible (526D).
It is the third “act,” the conversation with Callicles, that is crucial for
sophrosyne. The intensity of the dialectical argument is matched by the
tone of passionate indignation with which Plato records it. Socrates,
whose trial and death at the hands of an irrational and immoral society
are repeatedly foreshadowed, stands forth as the embodiment of the
orderly life, intelligently organized to achieve the Good, in contrast to
Callicles, who expresses with overwhelming assurance the case for a
totally disordered life of pleonexia (“self-seeking”), aimed solely at the
satisfaction of the appetites. His argument (summarized in Chapter III)
is based on a conception of the law of nature—vofios rrjs cpvoecos
(483E)—which dismisses as mere products of convention such traditional
values as sophrosyne and justice.19 His attack on sophrosyne is partic¬
ularly comprehensive in that it unites the two chief lines of argument
against this virtue current in the late fifth century: the profligate’s
hostility to that which interferes with the satisfaction of his appetites,
and the “strong man’s” contempt for what he regards as cowardice.20
Socrates’ defense of sophrosyne and justice is revolutionary in its impli¬
cations, some of which are fulfilled only in the Republic and the Laws. It
involves nothing less than a justification of these traditional values and
all their kindred on the basis of a new concept of soul, together with a
theory of nature totally opposed to that of Callicles and the sophistic
materialists whom he echoes. The importance of these innovations,
especially the second, can scarcely be exaggerated, because the con¬
ception of nature as order (/cosmos) is essential to the psychology of the
Republic, the political theory of the Republic and Laws, and the theology
of the Timaeus and the Laws.
From the very beginning of the argument with Callicles, Socrates has
stressed the need for internal harmony and agreement in the soul
19 The coupling of these two virtues in Callicles’ attack (which conversely shows great
respect for the utility of sophia and andreia) is the first hint in this dialogue of their close
relation. In the subsequent discussion of virtue in the soul, sophrosyne and justice are used
interchangeably, and in the myth at the close of the dialogue, when sophrosyne has disap¬
peared altogether, the word dikaiosyne conveys the same implications. See Curtis Larson,
A.J.P. 72 (1951), 402-4.
20 See Chap. Ill, pp. 96-97. An innovation in the Gorgias is the parallel attack on the
life of the philosopher as anandria (“unmanliness”), which establishes the identity of the sophron
and the contemplative lives. In the Republic, too, the philosophic temperament is the sophron
physis (410E). For the continuation of some of these ideas in Patristic thought, where the
contemplative life merges into the ascetic life (based on the practice of sophrosyne), see
Chap. IX.
162 Sophrosyne
(482B-C). The question whether the tyrant—whom Callicles considers

the happiest of men—must also rule himself introduces the word sophron
into the discussion; it is the definition of the sophron man as “self-controlled
and ruling the pleasures and appetites in himself” (49iD) that provokes
Callicles’ outburst against the virtue. The climax of Socrates’ response
is a comparison of sophrosyne in the soul to kosmos or taxis (“order” or
“arrangement”) in the physical universe (506-508). The way has been
prepared for this analogy by the resumption of two themes introduced,
in a somewhat different connection, in the debate with Polus: the op¬
position of pleasure and the Good, and the two principal characteristics
of art—that it is rational and that it aims at the good of the whole.
Callicles unwarily concedes that there is a difference between good and
bad pleasures (495A, 499B) and thus permits Socrates to return to the
topic of the choice of lives: the rational life which aims at the Good and
the irrational which embraces any pleasure, good or bad (501 B-C).
The search for the Good presupposes both an art and a craftsman
(techmkos, demiourgos) who organizes his material according to a pattern
(504A). In any art, Socrates points out, the criterion of excellence is the
order (taxis) and harmony of the parts (503E). This statement holds
good in every context—bodily health, health of soul (which is sophro¬
syne and justice), the excellence of the State and of the physical universe
(504A-505C). In fact, it is the principle of order that holds together
(owey*1) heaven and earth, gods and men: community (koinoma), friend¬
ship (philia), orderliness (kosmiotes), sophrosyne, and justice are all names
for the same force. Hence the term applied to the universe is kosmos,
rather than disorder (akosmia) or wantonness (akolasia) (506D-508C).21
Brief though it is, this passage is extremely suggestive. In the first
place, while sophrosyne as “health of soul” was a familiar metaphor, no
one had previously defined the virtue as “good order or arrangement
within the soul.” 22 Not only is sophrosyne for the first time related to
the soul in a specific, nonmetaphorical, almost scientific way and
identified with the condition of orderly arrangement therein, but the
21 The identity of kosmos and sophrosyne is implied by the acceptance of their antitheses
as synonyms. Here, as often in Plato, the multiple meanings of sophrosyne provide a con¬
venient bridge from one argument to another. On the philosophical antecedents of this
passage, see E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), ad loc., where a Pythagorean source
for the idea of a common mathematical principle holding together the kosmos is accepted.
The history of philia as a cosmic principle is traced by Werner Jaeger, Nemesios von Emesa
(Berlin, 1914).
22 Jaeger (Paideia, 2. 146) points out that it was an innovation to use the word kosmos to
mean an orderly system within the soul, although the adjective kosmios had signified orderly
behavior at least as early as Solon.
Plato 163
new definition implies a rejection of the unitary soul and at least

a readiness to accept a theory of “parts”—even though there is in the
Gorgias no specific discussion of the nature, or number, of these
“parts.”23 These two innovations—the concept of the soul as composite
and the definition of sophrosyne as its kosmos or taxis—mark Plato’s first
important advance over the earlier, Socratic conception of sophrosyne
as a form of knowledge. Whether the inspiration for either or both is to
be found in Pythagorean doctrines (of which there are other traces in
the Gorgias)24 is less important than the fact of Plato’s originality
in visualizing a kosmios psyche.
Furthermore, the passage in question supplies a fresh justification for
the practice of the time-honored civic virtues—an essentially aesthetic
justification, behind which lies still another, less aesthetic than ontolog¬
ical. The comparison between the cosmic order and the virtuous condi¬
tion of the soul (which has already appeared in tragedy with specific
reference to sophrosyne) 25 rests for Plato on the assumption that both
are products of art: the orderly arrangement of parts according to a pat¬
tern by a craftsman. This analogy suggests that the function of the
governing element in the soul is to arrange its parts in such a way as to
secure the good of the whole. Sophrosyne and justice are thereby trans¬
formed from ordinary civic virtues into organizing principles akin to the
principle of order in the universe.26 The bearing that this analogy has
on the State will become obvious in the Republic, which spells out several
points at which the Gorgias merely hints.27 For example, the precise
meaning of taxis or kosmos in the soul is never explained in the Gorgias,
23 Dodds {op. cit.) denies that tripartition appears in the Gorgias (see his comments on 493A
3-4); and indeed there is no reason to believe that Plato developed the theory before it was
called forth by the special requirements of the Republic, but it seems impossible to deny that
the concept of a composite soul underlies such a passage as 503C ff. See W. K. C. Guthrie,
“Plato’s Views on the Nature of the Soul,” Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne (Vandoeuvres-
Geneve, 1955), 5-6.
24 For the view that the tripartite soul is Pythagorean in origin, see A. E. Taylor, A Com¬
mentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), on 69C. According to Dodds, Pythagorean elements
in the Gorgias include—in addition to the doctrine of geometrical proportion (see n. 21
above)—the allegorical interpretation of the myth of the waterbearers (492D 1 ff.).
25 See Sophocles Ajax 646-77 and Euripides Phoen. 543 ff, for the suggestion that the
parallels between the cosmos and human life justify or demand the practice of sophrosyne.
26 See Maguire, especially 160-63, x75> and cf- Cicero: vitae modus atque constantia, which
imitate the caelestium ordinem (De Sen. 21. 77).
27 See Maguire (167-68) on Plato’s later substitution of the Forms for the principle of
cosmic order as a model for the soul. Later still, these ideas bear fruit in the Laws. See the
comment of Solmsen {Theology, 70) on Gorg. 506-508 as proof that Plato early believed in
the fundamental unity of the issues involved in the interpretation of the universe with those
confronting the moralist, the political thinker, and the statesman, and on the continued
presence of this conviction in the Laws.
164 Sophrosyne
nor are we told how the orderly arrangement is to be secured. More¬

over, as we have noted, the Gorgias merely implies the existence of parts
in the soul (503C, 493B, 496E) without specifying what they are. The
important point here again is that Plato for the first time recognizes
something that will later be of great consequence to his theory of
sophrosyne—its kinship to the common principle affecting everything in
the universe. This innovation may with some confidence be linked with
Plato’s interest in Pythagorean doctrines.28
In addition to pioneering a new conception of sophrosyne and a new
justification for moral virtue in general, the Gorgias makes still further
contributions to the history of Platonic sophrosyne. It establishes once
again the unity of the virtues (as in the Protagoras, but for different
reasons) 29 and, still more important, finds a way to unite the Socratic
concept of sophrosyne as an episteme (dominant, as we have seen, in the
Charmides) with the popular definition of the virtue as the control
of appetite (assumed in the Protagoras and explicitly stated in the
Gorgias, the Phaedo, and the Symposium).30 The bridge is the concept of
techne, which always implies episteme on the part of the craftsman and
which is here applied to the orderly arrangement of the parts of the
soul so as to achieve self-rule, the domination of appetite by reason.
Still another innovation is the use of an eschatological myth to
confirm in poetic terms the assertion that the virtuous man is happy.31
The myth gathers into a final unity all the principal themes of the
dialogue. The souls of those whom Polus and Callicles admire, such as
the Great King or the tyrant Archelaus, may appear before the judges
scarred by a lifetime of injustice and hybris, and will accordingly be sent
to the place of punishment (524E-525D). It is almost always the case,
Socrates observes, that power leads to wickedness. The private citizen is
more apt to live a holy life, and it is especially likely that the philosopher,
28J. S. Morrison (C.Q. 8 [1958], 198-218) presents the evidence for Pythagorean influence
on Plato’s political thinking in the Gorgias, including his identification of sophrosyne with
geometrical proportion. For Plato’s later definition of sophrosyne (in unmistakably Pytha¬
gorean terms) as harmonic proportion {Rep. 43 iD ft.), see, in addition to Morrison, Guthrie,
1. 31?-
29 In Prot. 333C and 35 iB, the unity of the virtues rests upon their identity with knowl¬
edge. In Gorg. 507A-C, it rests on the fact that the sophron person does what is fitting in every
situation and is therefore pious, just, and brave (for the development of this theory in the
Middle Stoa, especially by Panaetius, see Chap. VI).
30 Gorg. 491D, Phaedo 68C, Symp, 196C ff.
31 An innovation, that is, if the Gorgias precedes the Phaedo. Eschatology, which regularly
appears in mythical form to assure us of the triumph of virtue, ultimately emerges in the
Laws on the plane of physics. See Solmsen, Theology, 158.
Plato i65
who has attended to his own affairs and avoided polypragmosyne in this
world, will win the approval of the judges and be sent to the Islands of
the Blessed (526C). Thus the contrast between the active life and the
contemplative—the one in search of power and pleasure, and the other
in pursuit of order, justice, and sophrosyne—is extended to the life after
death; and the question of which life produces happiness is answered
sub specie aeternitatis.
THE PHAEDO
The tendency towards asceticism so noticeable in the Gorgias is still

more pronounced in the Phaedo; and nowhere is it stronger than in the
assumption that sophrosyne is part of the philosopher’s preparation for
death, the melete thanatou (64A, 67C, 114E). The atmosphere of the
mystery religions and the total orientation of the dialogue towards death,
instead of life, endow sophrosyne with a degree of hostility towards the
senses and all sensual pleasures that is not typical of Greek thought in
general or of Plato himself.32 The concept of the unitary soul is clearly
responsible for the extraordinary severity with which Plato regards the
appetites and passions in the Phaedo. Immortality is possible only for the
intellectual element in man; contact with the body results in contami¬
nation, which imprisons and weighs down the soul. If purity is to be
achieved, the appetites must be suppressed—not merely regulated; and
it is sophrosyne that accomplishes this suppression. Hence the purity and
the freedom of the soul, its chance of happiness hereafter, depend
directly on the practice of sophrosyne in life.
In connection with this doctrine of melete thanatou, Plato touches on
the distinction between various stages or levels of virtue which becomes
fundamental for his political and educational theories, and which later
inspires much Neoplatonic and Christian theorizing about various
stages of arete in the ladder of perfection. The distinction is one of
motive. Only the philosopher is truly sophron, because only he renounces
epithymia for the love of wisdom (82C). The inferior motives for practic¬
ing self-restraint—love of money or honor— produce an inferior variety
32 The normal Platonic interpretation of sophrosyne in relation to the appetites is sug¬

gested by the statement in Rep. 57 iE that the epithymetikon (the “appetitive element”) must
be neither starved nor stuffed. Plato’s unequivocal adoption in the Republic of the tripartite
soul, which assigns the appetites and passions, not to the body alone, but to some aspect of
the soul itself, produced a less ascetic conception of sophrosyne. For a discussion of the
consequences of the unitary and the plural concepts of the soul in Plato, see Guthrie, loc cit.
(n. 23 above), 5-6. The connection of sophrosyne in the Phaedo with the melete thanatou had a
disproportionate effect on the interpretation of this virtue in Patristic thought. See Chap. IX.
166 Sophrosyne
of virtue. In the Republic such practice of sophrosyne is one of the

earliest signs of deterioration in the political constitution or in the soul:
the oligarchic man practices sophrosyne for the sake of avarice, and
although his conduct is not outwardly different from that of the citizen
in the ideal state, inwardly there is a vast difference: corruption has
begun. In the Phaedo, Plato describes the semblance of sophrosyne in
the man who avoids certain pleasures so that he may obtain other
pleasures (the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras), as a foolish
(evijOris) sophrosyne; those who practice it are actually self-restrained
by reason of a kind of wantonness—aKoXaola tlvl ococppoves (68C-E).33
How far this type of arete is from genuine sophrosyne, Plato reminds us
in his discussion of the destiny of the souls who have achieved “bour¬
geois” virtue (demotike arete), called sophrosyne and justice, not through
philosophy but through habit and practice. They are reincarnated as
bees, wasps, ants, or some other social animal that enjoys an orderly
existence without episteme (81E). The danger of such imperfect partici¬
pation in arete is demonstrated vividly in the Republic, when (in the myth
of Er) the soul of one who had lived in a well-ordered state and pos¬
sessed virtue by habit, not philosophy, unwarily chooses for his next life
the lot of a tyrant (619C).34
THE SYMPOSIUM
The degree to which Plato’s treatment of sophrosyne depends on the

context of the dialogue in which it occurs becomes evident when we turn
from the otherworldly orientation of the Phaedo to the Symposium. Here
the emphasis is on life and the proper direction of the “life-force” which
can enable the soul to view Beauty itself by a process of ascent compar¬
able to the intellectual ascent to the Forms suggested in the Republic. It
33 Sophrosyne dia akolasian, although treated with scant respect amid the austerity of the
Phaedo, receives more favorable consideration in the Republic and the Laws, since this is the
level of virtue with which all but the philosophers and the members of the Nocturnal
Council must be content. The mass of the citizens will practice sophrosyne because they are
persuaded by their rulers that this course will enable them to avoid greater disadvantages,
and they will therefore be SCaKoXaotav oeouxppouiopeuoL. See Gould, 121.
34 Still another facet of Plato’s treatment of the soul in the Phaedo has a certain relevance
for sophrosyne, although its importance appears only in later dialogues. Soul—being inter¬
mediate between Being and Becoming, a link between the Forms and the physical world—
rules the body and is the source of its activity (79E-80A, 94B, 105C-D); this concept repre¬
sents the soul as movement. But since it is akin to the Forms, the soul is uniquely capable
of imitating that order and harmony which the Forms possess, and of putting them into
effect in the physical world. This concept makes the soul the ordering principle and is
essential to the view of sophrosyne as accomplishing in human life what kosmos or taxis
achieves in the universe.
Plato i6y
is the peculiar attribute of sophrosyne, alone among the cardinal virtues,

that it has a prominent place in the dialectic of Beauty as well as in the
dialectic of Reason.
Both Beauty—the object of the soul’s desire in the Symposium—and the
Good—the goal of Reason in the Republic—are characterized by the
orderly arrangement that the Gorgias associates with sophrosyne. To
participate in either Beauty or the Good, the soul is obliged to achieve
sophrosyne within its own microcosm. So far as participating in the
Good is concerned, sophrosyne is not more prominent than the other
three cardinal virtues, but in connection with Beauty it is uniquely im¬
portant, because of the special responsibility of this arete for the control
of Eros, which is awakened by Beauty. This importance is most evident
in the Phaedrus (254B), but it is implicit also in the various accounts of
the soul’s commerce with Eros in the Symposium and in the description of
the effects of the orthos Eros in the Republic (402E-403A). In the Sympo¬
sium the varied approaches to the nature of Eros involve sophrosyne in
such different ways as to suggest something of the scope of the virtue in
Plato’s thought.
The speech of Eryximachus contains a passage strongly reminiscent of
the “cosmological” section of the Gorgias. The physician maintains that
when the heavenly Eros prevails, the physical elements in the universe
are brought into harmony, so that a sophron krasis (“orderly mixture”
[ 188A]) results, with consequent fertility and health for mankind and
animals. This scientific approach to Eros, which utilizes the distinction
between heavenly and earthly Eros made by Pausanias in the previous
speech (180D ff), contains echoes of Pythagorean physical theories—
notably the reference to homonoia among opposites as a kind of Eros, and
the allusion to harmonia, another manifestation of love, in musical theory
and social life. The heavenly Eros is described as kosmios in its effect on
physical qualities (the hot, cold, dry, and moist), while the other Eros,
which causes damage, is characterized as hybris. Pleonexia and akosmia are
held responsible for the mutual encroachments of the elements (188A)
—an instance of the description of physical processes in ethical terms that
Plato took over from the pre-Socratic philosophers.35 This is the clearest
statement anywhere of Plato’s belief in the operation of sophrosyne in
the cosmos and in the complete parallelism that exists in every depart¬
ment of being. In the later dialogues, as has been pointed out, the role
of sophrosyne in cosmology is obscured by Plato’s habit of reserving this
term for the description of order and harmony in the soul and the
35 E.g., Anaximander, Frag, i DK; Heraclitus, Frag. 94 DK.
168 Sophrosyne
State, while its appearance in the universe is usually described in terms

,
of symmetria, taxis or symphoma.36
Other references to sophrosyne in connection with Eros in the Sympo¬
sium are in a more traditional vein and exploit its moral implications.
The speech of Agathon, indeed, belongs to the history of sophrosyne in
epideictic oratory, for it applies the conventional topics of the four
cardinal virtues to the eulogy of Eros and shows in what way the god
possesses each of them. The treatment of sophrosyne provides an amus¬
ing example of sophistic word-play. Agathon takes the popular concep¬
tion of sophrosyne as the mastery (to Kparelu) of pleasures and appetites
(196C ff.) and points out that no pleasure is greater (Kpeittco) than Eros.
Hence the pleasures are inferior to Eros and, if inferior, are subject
to him. But if this is so, he must rule them; and by definition the rule or
mastery of pleasure is sophrosyne. The play on the meanings of the verb
KpoiTtiv amounts to a parody of Plato’s own customary approach to
sophrosyne, for in his more serious discussions he often calls attention to
the puzzling character of the phrase Kpetrrco avrov and relates it to the
existence of opposing tendencies in the soul.37
Socrates’ speech, like that of Eryximachus, makes use of the division
of Eros into two kinds and relates sophrosyne and justice to the good Eros,
but instead of the cosmic implications Socrates develops the political. His
Eros seeks intellectual, rather than physical, fulfillment and becomes
“pregnant” with phronesis, whose greatest and fairest aspect, according to
Socrates, is that ordering of cities and households which is called sophro¬
syne and justice (209A-B). The extension of the concept of order to the
State is part of the progression in the dialogue, which regularly utilizes
material introduced in earlier speeches to perfect, in ladderlike stages,
the structure of the whole. The ladder, indeed, is the dominant symbol
of the dialogue; it is most vividly realized in the speech of Socrates but
actually operates throughout the entire work.38
The culmination of all the speeches is that of Alcibiades, who eulogizes
not Eros but Socrates, and finds in his character whatever good qualities
have hitherto been ascribed to the god. The contrast between “outer”
and “inner”—appearance and reality—which marked the discussion of
sophrosyne in the Charmides, reappears in the famous description of the
36 E.g., symmetria: Tim. 87B 6 ff., taxis: Tim. 30A, symphonia: Tim. 47D. In Laws 906B-C,
there is an isolated instance of the application of sophrosyne and pleonexia to cosmic as well
as to political and medical conditions.
37 E.g., Rep. 430-31; Laws 689B.
38 The ascent of Eros parallels the ascent of the mind in Rep. VI-VIII; and the degener¬
ation of the soul in Rep. VIII-IX is actually the downfall of Eros. See Cornford, 76-77.
Plato 169
outwardly erotic physiognomy of the Silenus-like Socrates and the inner

sophrosyne that frustrates Alcibiades’ attempt to seduce him (216D-
219D). The sophrosyne of Socrates in this context takes the form of
chastity, which in the light of the preceding speeches we now understand
as the application of the principle of order and restraint to the soul. Plato
makes clear, in his references to Socrates’ heroism at Potidaea and
Delium, that he also possesses the virtues of courage and hardiness
(andreia and karteria), so often held to be incompatible with sophrosyne.
The virtues playfully ascribed to Eros in Agathon’s speech are seriously
attributed to Socrates, and Alcibiades, who has not heard Socrates’ own
description of Eros, yet shows that the concept of love as a medium
of education—the sophron Eros—is the one that governs the life of
Socrates himself.
THE REPUBLIC
In the Republic, where Plato’s political and ethical thought reaches its
first great climax, sophrosyne is conceived much as in the Gorgias, but
the description of its nature and function includes more detail. Our
study will limit itself to the following points: the two definitions of
sophrosyne in books III and IV, with the corresponding discussions of
education; the “cosmological” justification for the virtues in Book VI;
and the relation of sophrosyne to the corrupt constitutions and psychol¬
ogies in Book VIII.
Like the Gorgias, the Republic assumes that the purpose of the State is
the realization of certain ethical values. The explicit assertion of this
hypothesis and the arbitrary assumption of a complete parallel between
the State and the soul are responsible for the isolation of the four
primary virtues and the systematic analysis of their relation. Behind the
plan of the first four books lies the concept of the tripartite soul, which
determines the manner in which the appetites and the passions will be
regarded. Since they are now connected with the soul itself, rather than
merely with the body which contaminates the soul (as in the Phaedo),
they have a higher status than in any psychological system based on a
unitary concept of the soul. The consequences for sophrosyne are immedi¬
ately evident: its duty will be to regulate and order, rather than to
suppress the appetites. The first movement of the dialogue leads to the
identification of the virtues and the definition of each in terms appropri¬
ate to the State and the individual. It is important to realize that the
arete thus readily isolated and defined is only “civic” virtue, whose
shortcomings we know from the Phaedo\ the definitions of Book IV are
by no means Plato’s last word on the subject.
iyo Sophrosyne
The first need for a definition of sophrosyne arises from the discussion
of the elementary training of the prospective guardians in books II and
III. The decision to seek an understanding of justice in the soul by con¬
templating it in the macrocosm of the State has led to the establishment
in Book II (369B-372D) of the “first city,” the simplest possible politi¬
cal organism, in which each individual performs his proper task, and only
the necessary appetites are satisfied. Justice and sophrosyne of a kind
undoubtedly exist in this city,39 but a society so simple and innocent (a
city of pigs, Glaucon calls it) cannot endure, and its virtues are not de¬
fined. The inquiry passes to a second city, whose involvement in warfare
dictates the addition of a warrior class to the farmers, craftsmen, and
tradesmen of the first (373D ff.).
The ground is laid for a distinction between sophrosyne and andreia by
the recognition of two opposing temperaments, the gentle and the
spirited (7rpaov kcll iieyaXoOvfiov), which must be combined in the
guardians through their proper education in music and gymnastics.40
Training in humane studies (mousike) comes first; and since poetry is the
chief form of mousike, Plato illustrates the standards that should be
applied, by reviewing passages from Homer and accepting or rejecting
them according as they do or do not instil andreia or sophrosyne. Hence
the need for a provisional definition of each virtue. Sophrosyne cbs
7r\r]6ci (“as usually understood” or “for the majority”) involves such
things as these: to be obedient to those in authority and to rule the
pleasures that have to do with the appetites for drink, sexual indulgence,
and food (389D-E).41 The phrase cbs TrXpOei indicates that sophrosyne
is here interpreted on a popular level, and the Homeric passages next
considered confirm this judgment, for they contain examples only of
obedience and self-control and their opposites.42 Since the form of poetry
also has moral consequences, Plato next discusses the ethical value of the
various poetic types and the musical modes and rhythms; he shows, in
39 Presumably sophia and andreia do not exist there, since the classes to which they belong
do not yet exist; as individual virtues, however, they may be present in the souls of citizens.
40 Cf. Lach. 196E; Charm. 159B ff.; Prot. 331D, 347E; Laws 963E; Statesman 306C-311C;
Theaet. 144A; as well as Rep. 410B ff. and 503C. The persistent coupling of sophrosyne and
andreia in Plato is discussed by Edouard des Places, S. J., Pindar et Platon (Paris, 1949),
118-21.
41 Aristotle confines his concept of sophrosyne to these two facets of the Platonic virtue:
obedience {Pol. 1260a 20-24) and control of appetite (Eth. Nic. 1118a 23-26).
42 The further criticism of mimetic poetry in Book X depends on the tripartite psychology
not yet established in Book III. Plato there accuses the poets of stimulating the appetitive
element—thus weakening the rational (606D-E)—and of enthroning pleasure and pain
instead of law as rulers of the State (607A).
connection with the second of these subjects, a characteristic preference
for simplicity (haplotes), which generally has favorable connotations in
Greek thought.43 Simplicity in music is a source of sophrosyne in the
soul, while in gymnastics it produces health of body (404E); the parallel
is important in the Republic, as in the Gorgias.
The aim of the early musical and gymnastic education is summed up
near the close of Book III, where the excess or deficiency of each tem¬
perament is described once more, and the proper harmony of the two is
said to result in the sophron and brave soul (410E). Although it is the chief
aim of this part of the dialogue to prove that both qualities are necessary
in the guardian class, there is a strong hint of the differentiation of
value which later becomes explicit in the Laws, when Plato describes as
philosophical the nature that he has called gentle in Book II (375C). The
perfection of this philosophical nature is sophrosyne, and to the extent
that the philosophical life—the contemplative life of the Gorgias—is
superior to the active life, sophrosyne is superior to andreia. In the long
history of opposition between the two temperaments—which, as we have
noted, is one of the enduring themes of Greek literature—Plato is the
first to suggest that the sophron physis is superior to the spirited. In the
Republic this superiority is for the most part only implied,44 but it becomes
43 Simple rhythms express andreia and kosmiotes (399E, 401A ff.). Poikilia (“complexity,
intricacy”) is usually repugnant to Plato, as if somehow opposed to orderliness; we note that
poikilia prevails in the corrupt democratic constitution of Rep. 557C, and that it is again
condemned in music in Laws 812D-E. The influence of Damon’s theory of musical ethos on
Plato is assessed by Warren Anderson, T.A.P.A. 86 (1955), 88-102. See Damon, Frag. 4 DK
on the power of music to reveal courage, sophrosyne, and justice in the soul; and consult
Jaeger, Paideia, 2. 404, n. 110. A controversial conclusion in Rep. 399B is that the Phrygian
mode is sophron and metrios; Aristotle regards it rather as ecstatic (Pol. 1342b 4-13) and
recommends only the Dorian mode for the education of younger pupils (1340a 34-1340b 5).
It is likely that the traditional Greek approval of the Mean enters into the preference for
these two modes, since both the Dorian and the Phrygian are midway between the high-
pitched Mixolydian and Syntonolydian and the low-pitched Ionian. The lyric poet Pratinas
recommended the Aeolian scale as midway between the high and the low pitch; see
D. B. Monro, The Modes in Ancient Greek Music (Oxford, 1894), 8-9. Ptolemy explains the
power of the Dorian mode to induce order and stability in the soul on the basis of its mean
position; see Ingemar During, Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios (Goteborg, 1930), 99.
Plutarch, On Music, summarizes ancient theory on the moral effects of the different modes.
Rhythm also had a part in musical ethos, if we may trust the anecdote about Pythagoras (or
Damon) who quieted a riotous mob through the influence of spondaic measures (Quintilian
1. 10. 32); consult Hermann Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik (Leipzig, 1899),
54-55, 126-65. Plutarch terms sophron the paean, the special verse form sacred to Apollo
(Mor. 389B).
44 The primary education described in books II and III is more concerned with sophro¬
syne than with andreia, and the chief standard applied to the materials and methods of edu¬
cation is the effect they have on the development of sophrosyne (e.g., 390A-C).
1J2 Sophrosyne
one of the basic premises of the Laws. Such a hierarchy among the
virtues could be conceived of only at a level below the highest (where all
the virtues are united). In the Laws, where Plato is for the most part
concerned with an inferior kind of virtue, he repeatedly arranges the in¬
dividual aretae in a hierarchy and always puts andreia at the bottom
of the scale.
With the emergence of three classes in the State (for to the farmers
and craftsmen of the first city have been added the guardians, who are
now divided into rulers and auxiliaries), the second city is fully estab¬
lished; and it becomes possible to locate justice, since it is arbitrarily
assumed that the city will be characterized by wisdom, courage, sophro¬
syne, and justice. If the first three are identified, what remains must be
justice. Here is the canonization of the four virtues that left so deep and
permanent an impression on later Greek thought, although in the
scheme of the Republic it is provisional, and the definitions themselves are
valid only on the comparatively low level of understanding required at this
stage of the argument.45 Sophia and andreia are easily located as the
characteristic virtues of the two highest classes, and andreia is significantly
described as politike, being distinguished from the quality of courage
found in animals and slaves because it is based on education and is there¬
fore tenacious of right opinion (430C). As in the reference to to 7T\f\6os
(“the majority”) when sophrosyne was under discussion in Book III

(389D), Plato thus warns us that the arete here described is inferior to that
which derives from philosophical understanding; what he says of andreia
applies equally to the other virtues, even to sophia or phronesis,46
Sophrosyne is now defined anew: to the two elements of the earlier
definition (obedience and self-restraint) is added a third and highly sig¬
nificant one, on which rests the true importance of this virtue to the State.
Sophrosyne is first said to be like a kind of concord (symphonia) or
harmony (430E) and then: “It is a kind of cosmos, somehow, and
a control of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say when they call
someone master of himself in some fashion.” The extremely tentative
nature of this definition and the subsequent detailed explanation of the
mysterious phrase “master of oneself” suggest that sophrosyne is a more
complex virtue than either sophia or andreia. Plato explicates each term
45 The plurality of aretae, as noted above, is another indication that the definitions are not
final. They employ the empirical terms required by consideration of the phenomena of the
State and the soul, and are “dianoetic” rather than “noetic.” See Gould (pp. 180-81) for an
attempt to correlate the stages in the “plot” of the Republic (up to Book VII) with the seg¬
ments in the Divided Line. Books II to IV correspond to the sphere of dianoia.
46 Phronesis is virtually equivalent to eubouha, “political [or] practical wisdom” (428B).
Plato 173
in the definition with a reference to the relation of the conflicting elements
in the State, and concludes that if the rulers and the ruled hold the same
opinion about which should rule, the city will possess sophrosyne in the
sense of harmoma. Unlike sophia and andreia, which are virtues of certain
parts of the State, sophrosyne is a virtue both of the whole and of each
part. Hence it is properly compared to a harmony “sounding the same
note in perfect unison throughout the whole,” and to a symphoma of the
naturally inferior and the naturally superior on the question which
should rule (43 2 A).47 As the omission of every other element in the final
definition shows, Plato regards concord or harmony as the essential
sophrosyne—for the purposes of the Republic.
The parallel of the soul and the State requires that the same three
elements be found in the microcosm as in the macrocosm; the soul
is therefore said to be composed of three parts—the rational, the spirited,
and the appetitive—which achieve their proper excellence through the
practice of the same four virtues already located in the well-ordered
city.48 Again the essential nature of sophrosyne is found in philia and
symphonia, which exist whenever the ruling part and the two that are ruled
agree that the rational element should be in control and do not rebel
against it (442C-D). Again sophrosyne must be practiced by all three
parts of the soul; it is never, for Plato, as for many later Platonists,
solely the virtue of the appetitive part.49
47 The Pythagorean affinities of this passage have often been noted. Morrison (loc. cit., 215)
comments on the substitution of the harmonic isotes as the bond of union for the geometric
proportion of the Gorgias. Consult Guthrie, 1. 317. See Laws 688A-689B for an interpreta¬
tion of phronesis, rather than sophrosyne, as a symphoma in the soul and the State.
48 The thymoeides and the epithymetikon and the corresponding classes in the State owe
something—as Jaeger has shown (Scnpta Minora [Rome, i960], 2. 309-18)—to the Hippo¬
cratic study of types of character. The description of the Asiatic nations in On Airs, Waters, and
Places portrays them as tame and peaceful, easy to rule, passive because of the climate,
engaged in crafts, fond of gain and sensual pleasures—all traits of the third class in the State
or (mutatis mutandis) of the corresponding part of the soul, while the European nations have
many characteristics that Plato assigns to the second class in the State and the thymoeides in
the soul. Jaeger shows that Plato took the very word thymoeides from the Hippocratics.
49 See Chap. VI, pp. 234 ff. Rep. 433A, which discovers dikawsyne in the division of labor,
has a bearing on sophrosyne, not only because Plato suggests that justice supplies the other
virtues with the power of coming into existence and then keeps them safe (433B)-—an indi¬
cation that justice is the primary virtue among the “civic” aretae, although not necessarily in
other categories—but also because the definition of justice borrows from the traditional con¬
cept of sophrosyne. We are familiar with the definition of sophrosyne as doing one’s own work
(Charm. 16iB), and we have found polypragmosyne opposed to sophrosyne in Thucydides and
the orators. That Plato now defines justice as doing one’s own work and applies this defini¬
tion to the virtue of the soul and of the State, each in its ideal condition, shows that he is
widening the hitherto narrow and legalistic scope of dikaiosyne by endowing it with some of
the attributes of sophrosyne. In this process we have one of the best examples of a most char-
IJ4 Sophrosyne
Precisely as the first definitions of the virtues called forth the exposi¬
tion of elementary moral training by music and gymnastics, so the
second set of definitions leads to the discussion of the advanced intellec¬
tual training of those guardians capable of becoming philosophers.
Books V to VII pursue this topic—supposedly a disgression, but actually
the culmination of the picture of the ideal state and the perfectly virtu¬
ous soul. The education of the rulers requires them to advance beyond
the politike arete described in Book IV and to substitute for the right
opinion that sufficed at the lower level a metaphysical grasp of ethical
values, derived from contemplation of the Form of each separate virtue
and confirmed by an understanding of the Form of the Good. Book VI
contains a description of the activity of the philosopher which amplifies
and revises the “cosmological” passage in the Gorgias. The philosopher-
statesman who gazes at the order and harmony of the eternal realities
(the Forms) tries to imitate them and to liken himself to them as far as
possible. Thus, by associating himself with what is Divine and orderly
(,kosmios), he assumes these qualities himself. If then he is constrained to
practice impressing on the characters of men what he sees in the realm
of the Forms and not just to shape himself, he will prove no mean
craftsman of sophrosyne and justice and all demotike arete (500D). In the
course of his task, he will often glance at the Forms of the virtues
(to cpvoa diKoaov, kolXov, oibcppov, etc.) and then at that which he is re¬
producing in men (50iB).
In this picture of the Demiurge, Plato’s favorite type of intelligent
activity according to a pattern, are depicted the two levels of compre¬
hension of the virtues required in the State. The philosopher-ruler con¬
templates the values as they actually are (tpuaeq “in their nature”)
in the Forms, and cannot resist trying to reproduce them in his own soul.
Thus he becomes as well ordered (koo/ilos, a significant epithet) and
godlike as a man can be (500D), and the irresistible causation exercised
by the Forms is indicated. Then he turns, however reluctantly, to his
duty as statesman and stamps these same characteristics on the citizens,
who thus possess demotike arete—the result, not of episteme on their part,
but merely of right opinion. This passage improves on the corresponding
section of the Gorgias by substituting the Forms for the physical universe
acteristic tendency of Plato’s thought—one that Aristotle decisively rejected. There is, of
course, a vast difference between the meaning of to to. avrov 'npcmuv as Critias explains it
in the Charmides and as Socrates uses it in the Republic. Cf. Joseph Moreau, La Construction de
I’idealisme platomcien (Paris, 1939), 239.
Plato H5
as the model imitated by the craftsman; the most decided advantage con¬
sists in the more direct connection between the Forms and the human
soul.50
The study of the corrupt constitutions in Book VIII, with the analogous
references to the degenerate types of soul, shows the crucial importance
of sophrosyne for the health of each organism. There are two fundamen¬
tal causes of corruption—one emphasized in connection with the State,
the other with the soul—and both result from the absence of sophrosyne.
Loss of homonoia is the first cause: stasis (“discord”) arises with the loss of
the agreement that existed in the ruling class (545D): that is, sophro¬
syne, the harmony and philia of the political organism, disappears, and
the parts become unbalanced. Timocracy, the first stage in the corrup¬
tion of the ideal state, represents the triumph of the thymoeides (the
“spirited element” [547E]), which exaggerates the value of honor, pre¬
fers gymnastics to music (548C), and secretly lusts after wealth and 7
pleasure (548B).51 The second stage is oligarchy, in which wealth is the
criterion (550C), polypragmosyne prevails (552 A), and unity disappears, as
the city splits into rich and poor (55 iD). Democracy develops from
oligarchy when wealth is pursued to the point of wantonness—which is
incompatible with sophrosyne (555C)—and the poor turn against the
rich (557A). Tyranny in turn develops from democracy when the lust
for liberty leads to anarchy and ultimately to the rise of a factional
leader who becomes a despot (564A, 566A ff.).
The parallel corruptions in the soul result from a similar progressive
abandonment of sophrosyne, an upsetting of the balance in which every
element performed its function. The disintegration is marked in the in¬
dividual by the increasing domination of pleasure over Reason—the
second result of the loss of sophrosyne. The timocratic man indeed, like
the corresponding State, covets chiefly honor (548C, 550B) and, while
lacking in Reason (549B), is still not completely given over to the
appetites (550B). It is in the oligarchic man that the epithymetikon (the
“appetitive part”) first reaches the throne (553C), enslaving both Reason
50 Cf. Maguire, 167-68. The Republic fills out several hints of the Gorgias, by defining the
arete of the soul as ruling and administering (353D) and by establishing the existence of parts
of the soul, so that the notion of a kosmos therein becomes more intelligible. This passage in
the Republic is one source of the great Hellenistic commonplace about the duty of the ruler
to provide his subjects with a model of virtue; Isocrates is another, and probably more
influential, source.
51 Cf. Phaedrus 256C-D, where the yielding of the lovers to temptation is the result of their
leading an unphilosophic, philotimos life.
ij6 Sophrosyne
and Spirit. In the oligarch, appetite is still controlled, but with unworthy
motives; thus a kind of akolasia already prevails (554C-D). The demo¬
cratic man emerges when the unnecessary desires get the upper hand
(559A ff.), and the tyrannical man when the lawless desires, which most
men indulge only in their dreams, are victorious (57 iB ff.).
The greater length of the description of the degenerate souls and its
vivid detail suggest that Plato’s primary interest in this section lies with
the individual, rather than with the social, corruption. He often refers to
the violation of sophrosyne on the downward way. In the oligarchic man
the appetitive element, as we have noted, is supreme; he has only the
appearance of homonoia (554E), and already the unity on which the
health of the soul depends has vanished. The democratic man lacks even
the semblance of unity, and in his indulgence of the unnecessary desires
his soul is prevented from attaining sophrosyne and phronesis (559B-C).
A transvaluation of terms strikingly similar to that recorded by Thucy¬
dides in connection with the civil war in Corcyra occurs in the demo¬
cratic soul: aidos is called foolishness; sophrosyne, cowardice; moderation
and orderliness, rusticity and illiberality; while the vices of hybris, anarchy,
wantonness, and shamelessness are correspondingly exalted (560D).
Worse yet, the lawless desires of the tyrant drive out any decent appetites
and purge their victim of sophrosyne (573B). In its place comes madness
(mania) whose forms—like the forms of the bad mania in the Phaedrus—
include eros and drunkenness. At the end of the process of corruption the
two principal signs of sophrosyne—the control of appetite by reason and
the harmonious agreement within the soul that this control should be
exercised—have completely disappeared.
THE PHAEDRUS
Of the remaining dialogues the most important for sophrosyne are the
Phaedrus and the Laws: the first because of its ambiguous attitude to¬
wards this excellence; the second because of the enormously increased
emphasis put on sophrosyne as the goal of education. The Phaedrus
superficially resembles the Symposium because of its concentration on
eros as a way of elevating the soul, a way parallel and not inferior to the
dialectical method outlined in the Republic; but there are equally signifi¬
cant differences. One difference that affects sophrosyne is the appearance
in the Phaedrus of the tripartite soul, a concept with which the Symposium
has no concern. This innovation brings with it a much more detailed
consideration of the role of desire (epithymia). In the Republic each part
of the soul is actuated by some form of desire, the parts being distin-
Plato 177
guished according to the object of desire;52 in the Phaedrus, too, where
the tripartite soul is vividly described in the myth of the charioteer, it is
evident that each part is moved by the force of eros. Hence there is a new
emphasis on sophrosyne, whose function of controlling desire is extended
from the epithymetikon properly so called to the spirited and rational
parts of the soul as well.53
Just as the structure of the Symposium is governed by the symbol of the
ladder that the soul of the lover ascends, so the structure of the Phaedrus
is determined by the pattern of the diaeresis, reaching down from the
Forms and coming ever closer to contact with the particular.54 This
favorite dialectical method of Plato’s later dialogues is applied somewhat
informally to Soul in the first speech of Socrates and to Madness in the
second. Soul is divided into rational and irrational eide or aspects: the
first is able, as we know from the Republic, to reach the Forms independ¬
ently through the instrument of the logos; the second requires the assist¬
ance of two other forces, eros and rhetoric. The first half of the dialogue
(notably the two speeches of Socrates) illustrates the erotic method
of influencing and molding the irrational soul; the second, the rhetorical
method. The goal of each is ultimately the same: training the soul—of
the beloved, in the first section; of the hearer, in the second. Both
sections pay close attention to the problem posed by the differentiation
of souls into various kinds or types—a problem that does not affect the
dialectical method but is crucial for eros and rhetoric. Both sections ex¬
pose a false or base conception—of eros and rhetoric, respectively. And
finally, both methods of education are intimately connected with the
historical Socrates, whose teaching effected the union of logos and eros.
The differences between the erotic and the rhetorical sections of the
dialogue are naturally very great. Certain elements of Plato’s philosophy
52 See especially Rep. 580D 7, where each eidos of the soul has its own epithymia. On
the operation of eros (“a single fund of energy”) through three main channels in the soul, see
Cornford, 71.
53 The direction of the movement of the dialogue constitutes another difference between the
Phaedrus and the Symposium. The emphasis is now on the downward movement, from the
Forms to the individual soul, rather than the upward movement of the soul to the vision of
Beauty itself (Symp. 21 iE), which provides the Symposium with its characteristic ladderlike
structure. In the Symposium the lover has not seen Beauty itself before he begins his ascent; in
the Phaedrus the Forms have been glimpsed before the incarnation of the soul, and it is the
recollection of the Form of Beauty that awakens desire in the lover (250B-C). Thus reminis¬
cence is for the first time connected with eros. Still another innovation in the Phaedrus is the
second method of rehabilitating the irrational soul, the method of rhetoric, which in Plato’s
earlier dialogues would not have been considered capable of conducting the soul to arete.
54 The Phaedrus is analyzed along these lines by Friedrich Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der
aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929), 272-93.
iy8 Sophrosyne
are confined to the first, others to the second, as if the sharp division in
the dialogue allowed Plato for once to separate features of his thought
that were ordinarily combined. Sophrosyne, however, is involved in both
approaches, erotic and rhetorical, and is in fact connected also with the
purely dialectical method, which Plato merely indicates in his diaeresis
of the soul (e.g., 237E) but does not pursue in the Phaedrus. The varied
connotations conveyed by the word sophrosyne enable it to find a place
in the scheme of education intended for both the rational and the
irrational elements in the soul.
The first speech of Socrates finds in every person two motives for
action, the innate appetite for pleasure and the acquired opinion which
seeks the best (237D). If the first prevails, hybris results in the soul; if the
second, sophrosyne. Hybris has many manifestations, corresponding to
the various appetites: here Plato mentions gluttony, drunkenness, and
eros. In this informal diaeresis of the soul, sophrosyne is equivalent
to rationality; and if Plato were to discuss the manner in which the soul
in its rational or sophron state could reach the Forms, he would need only
to refer to the educational system of the Republic, designed to produce the
philosopher-king. In the erotic terminology of the speech (which exposes
the bad kind of eros), nous and sophrosyne are opposed to eros and mania
(241 A), and the conventional superiority of sanity is upheld.55 In the
second speech, while the antithesis is maintained and repeatedly stressed,
the system of values is reversed. Socrates now eulogizes eros as a form of
Divine madness infinitely superior to mere human rationality. For once,
anything connected with human reason, such as sophrosyne or techne, is
disparaged—perhaps the most arresting difference between the first and
the second sections of the dialogue.
If we integrate the analysis of madness in the second speech with the
diaeresis of the soul in the first—as Socrates encourages us to do when
he uses these two passages to illustrate the process of synthesis and
division (265D-266A)—we find that, while the rational or sophron side
of the division remains unchanged, the irrational must now be further
subdivided into epithymia (with all its base manifestations, including the
bad eros) and mama, the Divine madness, which has four forms: prophecy,
orgiastic madness, poetry, and eros. Each form of Divine madness is
superior to the corresponding form of sophrosyne, mere human ration¬
ality (244B, 244D, 245A-B)—a situation somewhat reminiscent of the
contrast between the rational and the irrational in religion which
55 Sophrosyne in this connection is not, however, the noblest aspect of the virtue. It
is comparable, as Hackforth points out (47), to the sophrosyne dia akolasian of Phaedo 68E.
Plato '79
underlies the Bacchae of Euripides.56 The Divine eros is equivalent to the
philosophic eros described by Diotima in the Symposium, and like that eros
depends for its effectiveness on the practice of sophrosyne: not the
sophrosyne of the calculating nonlover in the speech of Lysias and the
first speech of Socrates (which is sophrosyne dia akolasian), but a sophro¬
syne that participates in the Form of the virtue and is therefore entirely
different from mere human rationality.57
Two passages in the myth of the charioteer demonstrate the worth of
the Divine sophrosyne. First, sophrosyne is one of the Forms residing in
the region beyond the heavens, where it is glimpsed by the soul before
incarnation, together with the Forms of the other moral values, of
Episteme, and of Beauty (247D-E, 250B).58 Although Sophrosyne, like
Justice and Phronesis, is unable to arouse recollection in the human soul,
except dimly in some few cases—and therefore cannot by itself inspire a
return to the Forms—its association with Beauty in the Plain of Truth
has still some effect, and indeed a crucial one, when the soul beholds the
beautiful on earth and is reminded of the Form that it resembles. The
passion that causes the soul, under the figure of the charioteer and his
two horses, to desire the beautiful object is restrained if the charioteer
remembers the Form of Beauty that he beheld, together with Sophro¬
syne, on her sacred throne. The hybris of the unruly horse is checked, and
the highest degree of virtue and happiness is attained (254B-E), pro¬
vided the charioteer and the good horse always prevail over the sugges¬
tions of the bad horse.59 Both lover and beloved are self-controlled and
orderly in this life, and after death their souls gain wings and win the
56 Except that in the Phaedrus Divine madness is always a cause of good, whereas in the
Bacchae it has nothing to do with morality or goodness. In Euripides the irrational is superior
to the rational in power alone. For the later development of the concept of Divine madness
in poetry and its contamination with sophron mania, see my article in C.P. 43 (1948), 13-16.
57 It is comparable to the sophrosyne of Socrates described in the speech of Alcibiades in
the Symposium, which illustrates the sophron eros of Diotima’s theory.
58 Since this sophrosyne is Divine, not mortal, it is not included in the disparagement of
244B ff.
59 Although in most respects the symbol of the charioteer and his two horses, one good and
one bad, corresponds to the tripartite psychology of the Republic, it differs in that the bad horse
is bad intrinsically and not just when his epithymia is excessive. The harmony sought in the
Republic is not possible for the human soul in the myth of the Phaedrus. The souls of the gods,
however, which are also represented as tripartite, are perfectly harmonious; all three elements
are “good and of good stock” (246A)—i.e., simple, of one nature. The myth of the charioteer
becomes for later Platonists, pagan and Christian, the standard symbol for the operation of
sophrosyne in the soul, and one that they treat with considerable freedom. See, for example,
Plotinus’ substitution of Sophrosyne by herself on her throne for Plato’s Beauty with Sophro¬
syne in his allusion to Phaedrus 254B (Enn. 1. 6. 9). On the Church Fathers’ habit of
conflating the myth with various Biblical texts, see Chap. IX.
180 S op hr o syne
greatest good that either human sophrosyne or Divine madness can

secure (256B).60 That this achievement depends on sophrosyne and
madness in combination, the one controlling the other, is made perfectly
clear by Plato’s description of the second-best condition: again the recol¬
lection of Beauty arouses desire for the beautiful, but the bad horse
sometimes overpowers the charioteer and the good horse, and as a
result the souls of the lover and the beloved are wingless, although
gifted at least with the desire for wings (256D). The sole difference be¬
tween this state and the first lies in the absence of sophrosyne and
aidosP1 So that we may realize, however, the need for both elements—
madness and sophrosyne—Plato immediately reminds us of the worth¬
lessness of “human sophrosyne” by itself, for Socrates observes that even
the second-best condition is superior to that which results from yielding
to the nonlover, who is tinged with mortal sophrosyne (mere calculation)
and can beget in the soul of the beloved only a false arete (256E).62
The second part of the Phaedrus, devoted to rhetoric, has almost
nothing to say of sophrosyne, but the total emphasis on reason and the
deep interest in techne imply its presence. Plato’s demand for order in a
good speech (277C) recalls the Gorgias, where techne, in oratory as in
every other activity, implies order and sophrosyne. The only explicit
reference to sophrosyne relates it to the moral function of rhetoric,
which is to please God; Socrates says that it is the sophron, the man
of judgment,63 who labors to achieve this end (273E). The word appears
once more with the familiar moral connotations in the prayer at the close
of the dialogue. Socrates asks Pan and the other tutelary divinities of the
place (whose help he has invoked earlier, before his second speech)
to grant him harmony without and within (an important theme of the
Charmides) and only so much wealth as the sophron man can make
off with (279B-C). The prayer links the various themes of the dialogue:
60 This passage is one of those in which sophrosyne of style accompanies a portrayal
of sophron behavior. Hackforth (109) comments on the “strong but controlled eloquence” of
256A 7-B7.
61 In the case of the first soul, the sense of awe inspired by the sight of Beauty is, as Hack¬
forth points out (98), the positive aspect of sophrosyne: “not a passionate self-suppression, but
a passionate self-surrender.”
62 Several passages in the description of the charioteer and his adventures recall the
diaeresis of the soul in Socrates’ earlier speech—particularly the statement that the good
horse is a lover of honor with sophrosyne, aidos, and true opinion (doxa; Hackforth’s transla¬
tion of this phrase as “genuine renown” dulls the echo of the earlier speech [237E]); and the
description of the other horse as a companion of hybns and boasting (253D-E; cf. 237E, 238C).
63 The phrase 6 vovv c'xcoj' in the same passage is equivalent to sophron and confirms
its meaning in this context.
Plato 181
beauty, friendship, wisdom, external and internal goods, and the sophro-
syne that is necessary for intelligent use of all the other goods. It is not
without significance that this, one of the few prayers ascribed to Socrates
in Plato’s dialogues, is a prayer for sophrosyne, the quintessential
Socratic arete.
THE TIMAEUS
Aspects of sophrosyne traditionally linked with the Socrates of the

early dialogues are also emphasized in three of the late ones—the
Timaeus, the Sophist, and the Statesman—even though the figure of Socrates
himself is now diminished in importance and in the Laws finally dis¬
appears. The Timaeus, which has almost nothing explicit to say about
sophrosyne, nevertheless provides a background helpful to the under¬
standing of Plato’s view of the virtue throughout his final dialogues, as
well as his treatment of the closely related concepts of measure (metriotes)
and limit (peiras) in the Philebus, order (taxis) in the Statesman, and sym¬
metry (symmetria) in the Sophist.64 Special significance attaches to the
ethical implications of two problems: the manner in which cosmos is
produced out of chaos, and the relation of the mortal and immortal as¬
pects of the human soul.
In dealing with the first of these questions Plato establishes those
analogies between macrocosm and microcosm, the universe and the
human soul, that were to be of increasing moral significance for later
philosophers, pagan and Christian alike. In both the universe and the
soul, cosmos can be brought out of chaos only through a compromise be¬
tween Reason and Necessity; this compromise is effected in the universe
by the Demiurge, using persuasion, and in the human soul by the partial
triumph of the immortal element (Reason) over the mortal (Necessity),
“built on” to the immortal part when the soul becomes incarnate (69C).
The passions and appetites—which are dreadful but “necessary,” as
Plato repeatedly reminds us (69D), and are the source of disease in the
soul (86B ff.)—are the responsibility of the body. Now for the first
time, in fact, all three parts of the soul are given precise corporeal loca¬
tions: Nous (the only immortal part) in the head (69D-E), Thymos in the
chest (70A-D), and the Epithymetikon, the seat of sensation and desire
64 Gould (201) notes the importance of some of these ideas and terms in the late dialogues
and attributes their presence to the mood of compromise he finds there. See also Gould, 198,
n. 4, on the recurrence of systasis, to indicate the combination of different factors, in the
Timaeus and the Laws.
182 Sophrosyne
(77B), greedy and clamorous, but again “necessary,” below the midriff
(70D-71D).
The fundamental cause of evil in the universe and the human soul alike
is the lack of correct proportion between Reason and Necessity. Hence
Plato emphasizes the need for proportion (symmetria) and order (/cosmos)
in macrocosm and microcosm. The relevance of sophrosyne seems as
obvious here as in the “cosmological” section of the Gorgias or the speech
of Eryximachus in the Symposium, but in the late dialogues Plato normally
confines the word to ethical and political contexts. Yet Cornford’s
analogy between the Timaeus and the Oresteia—which compares the
Furies to Necessity and Athene to Reason and emphasizes the role
of persuasion in reconciling the two 65—is suggestive in this connection.
Without pressing too far the terms of the analogy, it is tempting to con¬
clude that, just as the outcome of the Oresteia is the emergence of
sophrosyne (with justice) in the polls, so, too, the orderly universe of the
Timaeus is an expression of sophrosyne in the cosmos.
Against the new cosmological background, Plato sets some old ideas.
The need for symmetry between body and soul—the most important
kind of symmetry so far as health and arete are concerned (87D)—leads
to the familiar demand for a combination of musical and gymnastic
education, so that soul and body may be equally healthy and evenly
matched (88B). Since soul and body must be brought into harmony
(88C), the best way for man to nourish the Divine element in himself is
to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, so as to make the
part that thinks similar to the object of its thought (90D).66 The
“cosmological’’ passage of the Gorgias is thus recalled, but the concept of
kosmos and the nature of the harmony that must be achieved are now
based on a much more detailed theory of the universe.
The sole reference to sophrosyne in this section of the Timaeus has an
oldfashioned, Socratic ring. Plato explains that the gods—in the effort
to make the mortal kind as good as possible, and knowing that the
appetitive part of the soul is without a share in logos and phronesis—have
made it the organ of divination (traditionally associated with the liver
[71D-E]). No one in his right mind can prophesy truly; only someone
deranged can do so. The interpretation of dreams and prophecies, how¬
ever, is the task of the rational, according to the old saying that to do
65 F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London, 1937), 361-64.

66 This passage, in combination with other Platonic references to the concept of 6juouoais
6(.Q) (“imitation of God, assimilation to God”), had important consequences for sophrosyne
in Patristic thought. See Chap. IX.
Plato 183
and to know one’s own affairs and to know oneself belongs to the sophron
alone (72A). This reversion to one of the oldest interpretations of
sophrosyne is typical of the late dialogues, which tend to revive the as¬
sociation of the virtue with Gnothi sauton and Meden agan\ this is perhaps
another manifestation of the respect for old age, the distant past, and
traditions connected with the oldest layers of Greek thought, which is so
marked a characteristic of the Laws.67 In the context of the Timaeus it- ^
self, the most significant result of this remark is to establish the need for
the co-operation of the irrational and the rational and to identify
sophrosyne with the controlling, ordering aspects of reality. _
THE SOPHIST
The Sophist offers another example of the tendency to revive the old
Socratic nuances of sophrosyne, this time in connection with the problem
of evil in the soul. There are two varieties of such evil: disease and
ignorance. The first is a kind of disharmony (228A), the second a form
of disproportion (228D), and they can be corrected, respectively, by
punishment and instruction. That form of the soul’s disease called
discord (stasis), which results from the conflict of reason and opinion
with desire, appetite, and pleasure (228A), naturally reminds us of the
Republic, where the harmony of these elements is called sophrosyne, but
Plato does not apply the term to this condition here. Instead, he reserves
it for the state that exists when the other evil in the soul, ignorance in
its worst form—thinking one knows what one does not know—has been
expelled by the process of dialectical refutation (the elenchus). When the
soul has been purged of false opinion, as the body is purged by medicine,
it achieves what Plato describes as the best and most sophron state
(230D). Thus sophrosyne is again, as in the Timaeus, linked with
Socratic self-knowledge and with health of soul, the most persistent
Socratic metaphor.
THE STATESMAN
The Statesman, which applies the characteristic methods of Plato’s

later dialogues to the old Socratic subject of the statesman and his
techne, employs some of the cosmological ideas of the Timaeus and makes
their relevance to ethics explicit. The relation to the Timaeus is marked
in the myth of the alternate cosmic cycles, in the first of which the
67 Plato is fond of introducing these ancient commonplaces with some such phrase as: “A
good old saying tells us.” Cf. Tim. 72A with Phil. 45D; and see Menex. 247-48, where
the archaic warning Meden agan is again related to sophrosyne.
184 Sophrosyne
universe owes its movement to the Demiurge and enjoys order and
harmony, while in the other it undergoes a reverse movement, caused
by its own fate and “innate desire” (272E),68 and suffers increasing dis¬
order as a result of the material element always present in nature. In
this myth, as in the Timaeus, Plato reiterates the parallel between
human life and the life of the universe, referring to the relationship as a
kind of imitation—mimesis (273E-274A, 274D)—of the macrocosm by
the microcosm and implying that the same conflicting elements of
kosmos and ataxia are at work in both. Again the word sophrosyne
is avoided in this connection; it is reserved for the strictly ethical discus¬
sion of the statesman’s primary task, that of weaving into the fabric of
the State the two opposing temperaments, the sophron and the andrikos.
To this subject, already extensively treated in the Republic, the Statesman
adds a fresh discussion of several topics,69 including an important
analysis of the opposition between the two as a source of conflict in the
State (307C ff.). The most arresting innovation is the hint that the very
Forms of the sophron and the andrikos are hostile to each other (307C).
Hence their opposition is as deep-seated as can be; the actions and the
individuals in whom these qualities are reflected will by their hostility
endanger the State. Plato indeed shows some hesitation about suggest¬
ing incompatibility among the virtues (306A-D), especially at the level
of the Forms; but most of his discussion is based on empirical observa¬
tion of human types, rather than on a consideration of true arete. The
description of the inopportune and excessive indulgence of the sophron
physis which leads to an unwarlike disposition of the entire State and
ends in slavery (307E) reads like a commentary on the remarks about
the danger of apragmosyne and hesychia attributed by Thucydides to
Pericles and Alcibiades.70 Plato, like Pericles, generally avoids using the
noun sophrosyne to describe undesirable quietism, and substitutes the
68 The same phrase (qucpuros kmdvida) is used in Phaedrus 237D to describe the instinct that
leads the soul to hybris; its antithesis there is doxa (“acquired opinion”), which leads to
sophrosyne.
69 E.g., qualities connected with andreia—quickness, vehemence, sharpness (306E)—and
sophrosyne—quietness, slowness, gentleness (307A)—and a list of terms used to indicate ex¬
cess or inappropriateness in each category (307B-C): hybris and mania in the one case,
cowardice and sluggishness in the other. The need to harmonize these qualities, especially by
the combination of musical and gymnastic education, is one of the most persistent topics in
Plato’s dialogues, and one to which he applies various points of view.
70 See Chap. Ill above. Plato’s awareness of the danger to the State if conflict arises
between the two temperaments reaches its peak in the Statesman. While in the Laws he
discusses at great length the need to harmonize the two, he nowhere expresses such intense
concern as he does in this dialogue.
Plato 185
circumlocution sophron physis or, more often, some form of kosmios, which
is the most persistent synonym for sophron in all its varied connotations
throughout the dialogues (307E, 309B, 309E).
The metaphor of weaving, introduced much earlier in the dialogue as
an illustration of the task of kingship (279B-283A, 287B), finds its true
purpose in the description of the process of constructing a society from
the opposing types. Those who tend towards andreia will form the warp,
those who incline towards kosmiotes the woof (309B); and the two
natures will be bound together by bonds that unite both the Divine and
the animal parts of the soul. The Divine bond is true opinion,71
imparted by the statesman, which renders the andreia physis more gentle
and inclined towards justice and the kosmia physis truly sophron and wise
(309D-E), while the human bonds include intermarriage and adoption.
The weaving together of opposites recalls the emphasis on compromise
and persuasion in the Timaeus and anticipates the great importance of
mixture in the Philebus. Another link with the Philebus is the appear¬
ance in the Statesman of the concept of the Mean (to metrion) as a device
by which to measure excess and defect (283C) and thus to arrive at truth
(284D).
THE PHILEBUS
The Philebus indeed reveals that Plato now sees in the concept of
moderation the key to several important problems.72 The principle of
limit, which is involved in the classification of pleasures, the standard of
the Mean, by which each factor in the good life is judged, the identi¬
fication of symmetry with beauty, even the admission that mixture (of
knowledge and pleasure) is essential for happiness—all indicate the
trend of Plato’s thinking. The hierarchy of goods established at the close
of the Philebus is highly significant. In the first place stands measure (or
the Mean); in the second, symmetry. As Hackforth suggests, these two
are not so much ingredients of the good life as its conditions:73 the first
aims at the proper quantitative determination of each kind of knowl¬
edge or pleasure; the second looks at the good life as a whole and ap¬
prehends the relation of its parts. The ingredients themselves are
71 See Gould (215) on this bond and its reappearance in the Laws.
72 Like Plato, W. B. Yeats in his old age assigned increasing importance to measurement.
Yeats’s contrast between “Asiatic vague immensities” and the “intellect. . . calculation, num¬
ber, measurement,” which he considers the distinguishing genius of Europe (“The Statues,”
Collected Poems of IV. B. Yeats [London, 1952], 375-76), has something in common with
Plato’s attitude in the Philebus and other late dialogues.
73 Richard Hackforth, Plato’s Examination of Pleasure (Cambridge, 1945), 138.
186 Sophrosyne
contained in the subsequent categories, ranging down from wisdom or

mind to a vaguely described sixth class, which admits pleasures such as
those allied with health and sophrosyne (63E).
Sophrosyne in the Philebus generally refers to self-restraint, its classical
role where pleasure is concerned. In one of several anticipations of
Aristotle, Plato says that the sophron man takes pleasure in his sophrosyne
(12D),74 and elsewhere he describes the pleasures of the sophron bios as
moderate and subject to the principle of limit.75 As in the Timaeus and
the Sophist, he revives the connection of sophrosyne with a traditional
theme when he has Protarchus say, not without irony, that it is splendid
for the sophron man to know everything, but the next best thing is for
him to know himself (19C). Socrates alludes to the other Delphic proverb
in his comparison of the pleasures of hybris and of sophrosyne, when he
remarks that the sophron man is restrained by the proverb Meden agan, to
which he gives obedience (45D).
One of the marked differences between Plato’s discussion of pleasure
in the Philebus and his earlier considerations of the subject, especially in
the Gorgias, lies in his new basis for judgment. In earlier dialogues
Plato condemned the pleasures of the body, when excessive, for moral
1 reasons, but now he appeals to metaphysics or even cosmology. Pleasure
\ is akin to the unlimited (31 A); its intensity offends phronesis and Nous
(63E). The standards by which bodily pleasures are measured are the
same standards as those applied to movements and changes in the
universe. It is true that this point of view was already implicit in the
“cosmological” passage of the Gorgias, but it was only a small factor in
that dialogue. Now it has expanded to include almost everything in
Plato’s philosophy; its effects on the final stage of his thought are every¬
where apparent in the Laws.
THE LAWS
The Laws by its very subject invites comparison with the Republic—a
comparison that at every level reveals marked differences, not the least
where sophrosyne is concerned. No longer is there a precise identification
of ethics and politics, resulting from an explicit and repeatedly stressed
parallel between the soul and the State.76 Much of what Plato has to
74 Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099a 15-20, 1104b 4-8.

75 E.g., 45° ff-
76 Traces of the parallel remain, such as the comparison of the part of the soul which feels
pleasure and pain to the common people in the State (689B ff.). The theme of symphoma, which
in the Republic applied equally to the soul and the State, is still important in the Laws but now
refers to the agreement in the soul between phronesis and the appetites; and although in the
discussion of the reasons for corruption in the Athenians and Persians of old, the parallels
Plato i8y
say about sophrosyne in the Laws has no relation to anything but the
individual. He travels, in fact, a long way towards the personal, non¬
political ethics of the Hellenistic philosophers, as may be seen from the
discussion in Book V of the pleasures connected with the sophron life and
the life of wantonness (733D ff.).77 Yet even when no parallel with the
virtues of the State can be adduced, sophrosyne, like the other forms of
S
moral excellence, is always seen within the framework of the State, and
we are often reminded that all legislation is designed to secure arete. It is
one of the great innovations of the Laws that sophrosyne to a consider¬
yS
able extent replaces justice as the aspect of virtue which the lawgiver is
most intent upon securing.
The hierarchies of virtues, goods, and values which are so persistent
a feature of the Laws repeatedly elevate sophrosyne to a position of
greater importance than it enjoyed in the Republic. Although it is never
the leader of the tetrad—a post invariably assigned to phronesis (63 iC 6) IxS
or Nous (963A 8)—it is the quality without which the other goods are
valueless (696B, 697B, 710A, 728E-729A) and is essential even in its
ordinary, unphilosophical form (710A).78 The chief reason for its special
prominence is the orientation of the dialogue towards the education of
the irrational soul, largely through a process of habituation which will
guarantee the correct response to pleasure and pain. Education in the
Laws begins even earlier than in the Republic79 and is directed in a
V
marked degree towards the appetitive principle which, if not controlled,
threatens to overwhelm the element of reason. Since sophrosyne is the
virtue proper to the epithymetikon,80 it is naturally of first importance in
the system of education outlined in books I, II, IV, and VII. Plato’s
between soul and State are clearly set forth (689C), usually the individual is paramount. In
this passage the soul and the State are divided into only two parts—the rational and the ir¬
rational; such bipartition is typical of the Laws.
77 This discussion strongly influenced the Epicurean view of pleasure, happiness, and the
summum bonum. For Epicurean sophrosyne, see Chap. VI, pp. 211-13.
78 But sophrosyne apart from the rest of arete is not worthy of honor (696D) or not worth
talking about (710A). It may be significant that in one hierarchy where sophrosyne is ranked
ahead of justice, it is described as the juera you ouxppcoy xpuyv^ (63iC 1 ff.); while
in another, sophrosyne unaccompanied by phronesis or Nous is rated lower than dikaiosyne—if
the virtues are listed in ascending order (964B 5-6).
79 Regulations designed to improve the physical health of the child begin with directions
for the conduct of pregnant women (798E); and minute care is taken that mothers and
children avoid excessive pleasure and unmixed pain, so that they may pursue a middle way
which will make them cheerful—a condition described as being like God (791C-793A). The
great emphasis on paidia (“play”) as a mode of paideia (“education”) results from the early
beginning of the process of habituation.
80 Although Plato has much to say about epithymia, the term epithymetikon is not common
in the Laws; nor is thymoeides.
188 Sophrosyne
concern for the irrational soul and its appetites is of course one of the
striking features of his later dialogues (revealed, for instance, in the at¬
tention to eros and rhetoric as methods of molding the irrational soul in
the Phaedrus) and is connected with his interest in all the ways in which
movement and change appear in the universe. The appetites and pas¬
sions are one aspect of movement; as such they now claim a place in
the world order and demand to be utilized in society.81 Sophrosyne is
a principal means by which they are enabled to take their proper
place.
Since the texture of Plato’s thought is so closely woven, it is not sur¬
prising to find that his interest in movement and change, the basis of
his physics, is related to another prominent theme of the late dialogues—
that of moderation, proportion, the Mean, symmetry, and harmony—
a theme linked to the problem of adjustment and compromise which
becomes crucial when movement is recognized as a valid aspect of
reality. As we have often observed, these concepts are analogues in one
realm or another of the concept of sophrosyne. There is no break with
Plato’s earlier philosophy, for the importance of order (kosmos, taxis) in
the universe, the State, and the soul was clearly seen in the Gorgias and
the Republic; but Plato’s later study of cosmology and physics gave new
support to his earlier position and resulted in a more lively awareness of
the far-reaching importance of moderation and proportion in all depart¬
ments of being.
Sophrosyne, furthermore, shares with the other virtues the enhanced
importance given all qualities that are akin to soul by Plato’s discovery
that soul (as movement, life) has priority over all soulless things.
Although not specifically mentioned, sophrosyne and justice are
certainly among the ethe (“moral characters”) which Plato describes as
akin to soul, and are therefore prior in status to everything material and
mechanical (896D). The new basis for the primacy of soul is religious,
and a major difference between the Laws and the Republic—which
affects much in the later treatise, including the ethical values—is the
81 See Phaedrus 237D, 255C ff., and 27iB ff. for the integration of the irrational eide
into the structure of the soul, and see Tim. 88-89 an<1 Laws 898B for the recognition of irra¬
tionality as an aspect of movement. In the Epinomis the relation of movement to the irrational
elements in the human soul is made more explicit than in the genuine Platonic dialogues; see
especially 977B-978B, 979C-D. In the Laws the cosmology of Book X is on the whole kept
distinct from ethical psychology. On the relation of Plato’s interest in movement to his view
of the lower parts of the soul as essential, see Solmsen, Theology, 144, 148, n. 39. Consult also
J. B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato’s Later Dialogues (Cambridge, 1942), 113 ff., for the
fusion of ethics with cosmology. The various implications of kinesis in the late dialogues are
discussed by Solmsen, Aristotle’s System of the Physical World (Ithaca, i960), 20-66.
extent to which the State is now founded on religion.82 Religion had a
place in the Republic, to be sure, but it was not the structural basis of
society. In the later work Plato sets forth a new concept of law, as
a product of mind, which is in turn an aspect of soul; and in connection
with this new, divinely produced law, the virtues of justice and sophro-
syne enjoy a position more exalted and more securely founded on
an objective view of nature than in the Republic.
The shifting relation between sophrosyne and justice is one of the
central problems of Platonic ethics. The great tendency of the Republic
was to develop justice away from mere legalism by endowing it with
some of the properties of sophrosyne; the functions of the two virtues in
the soul and the State were complementary. In the Laws, although the
two are often coupled, and justice is clearly an essential quality of the
State, the greater emphasis on the ethics of the individual and on the
training of the irrational soul leads to a more pronounced concern for
sophrosyne. At the highest level sophrosyne and justice are of course
identical, and in the discussion of “true law”—as opposed to class
legislation—they are always named together. But sophrosyne in the Laws
is almost always a less exalted quality than that which in the Republic
(and again in Laws 964A 4 ff.) is identified with the other cardinal
virtues. It is either the power of self-mastery (to KparcLv avrov, to vlkolv
avrov), instilled by education in conformity with the laws, or it is the
ordinary, popular, “natural” virtue which Plato carefully distinguishes
from the philosophic variety—identified with phronesis (710A 5 ff.).83 As
in his treatment of andreia (where “natural” virtue and “civic” virtue
replace the philosophical courage of the Republic),84 so, too, with so-
82 See Solmsen, Theology, 132.

83 The specific statement of what he means by ordinary sophrosyne is part of Plato’s
description of the ideal ruler who can most easily put into effect the ideal constitution.
He must be young, possessed of a good memory (important on the philosophical level in the
myth of the Phaedrus and on the psychological level in the rhetorical section of that dialogue),
facility in learning, courage, and a noble nature. If these qualities are to be of any value, he
must also possess sophrosyne of the ordinary kind (STjjUcoSr/s) which springs up in children
and animals who are moderate in respect to pleasure (710A 5). Like the physical andreia of
Laws 963E ff., such sophrosyne lacks phronesis. The next higher grade of sophrosyne, which
renders a person «petttooi' avrov, and the education by which it may be instilled are the sub¬
ject of the detailed discussion in books I and II. The sophrosyne that is identical with the other
three cardinal virtues is assigned as a subject of study to the guardians in Book XII
(965C 9 ff.). The unity of the virtues is the aspect of the problem of the One and the Many
which has the most immediate relevance to the State.
84 For an analysis of the various levels of andreia in the Laws (physical andreia, civic andreia,
instilled by the education prescribed by law, and that which is accompanied by phronesis), see
Herwig Gorgemanns, Beitrdge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi (Munich, i960), 114-29.
igo Sophrosyne
phrosyne Plato now interests himself chiefly in those aspects that had
received short shrift in the Charmides and even in the Republic.
In view of the great length of the Laws and the persistence of the
themes of sophrosyne, we can do no more than indicate a few passages
in which Plato’s interpretation of this virtue shows some distinctive
novelty or achieves special significance in the structure of the whole
treatise. Books I and II suggest the importance of the cardinal virtues in
general to Plato as he takes up once more the problem of the ideal state.
Where the Republic began by attacking the sophistic theory of the right
of the strong (to which Plato returns in Book IV of the Laws), the later
dialogue begins with a study of various constitutions and the virtues at
which they aim. (It is still assumed that arete is the aim of all legislation
[631B]). Since books I and II serve as a preface to the legislation that
comprises the balance of the treatise, and embody an example of the
proper method for the legislator to follow, Plato’s reasons for choosing to
discuss the education and the laws that will produce sophrosyne are of
interest. One reason is evidently the parallel between andreia, the aim of
the Dorian states, and sophrosyne; since both can be brought under one
heading—self-mastery, resistance to pain (andreia) and to pleasure
(sophrosyne)—the criticism of the Spartan and Cretan constitutions can
be balanced neatly by positive suggestions for instilling the rival virtue.
Furthermore, Plato had ready to hand an easy method of developing
sophrosyne, which was again parallel to a well-known Spartan device
for developing andreia. And, finally, a discussion of the symposium pro¬
vided a direct introduction to the subject of musical education, which is,
if anything, more fundamental in the Laws than in the Republic.
Plato’s method in Book I is first to criticize the Dorian belief that war
is the natural condition of society and that legislation should therefore
aim to produce andreia\ secondly, to set up an opposing ideal, which
substitutes peace for war, and the peaceful virtues, especially sophrosyne,
for andreia; and thirdly, to suggest an institution by which sophrosyne may
be developed, comparable to the common meals (syssitia) of the Dorian
communities. This device is the symposium, which was always an
informal adjunct to the traditional Ionian-Attic paideia85 but was con¬
demned by Sparta as a source of drunkenness and excessive pleasure
(637A). Plato’s adaptation of this time-honored institution to the service
of the State is exactly parallel to his use of eros in the Symposium and the
Phaedrus for the purpose of education. Like Eros, Dionysus becomes
civilized and socially useful through sophrosyne—a truly Greek solution,
85 See Jaeger, Paideia, 2. 176-77.
reminiscent of the way the priests of Apollo had curbed and channeled
the tumultuous energies of the Bacchae centuries earlier.
The Athenian stranger establishes the view of sophrosyne that is to
obtain throughout the Laws, when he points out that no one can become
sophron without fighting against many pleasures and appetites, and con¬
quering them by word, deed, and techne, in play and in earnest (647C).86
The legislator must provide a test (basanos) 87 and a training ground
(melete) for sophrosyne. The drinking party, which offers the State a
cheap, harmless, and quick method of discovering the nature and dispo¬
sition of individual souls (650A-B), tests the capacity of the young for
self-restraint when the inhibitions of sobriety are removed (649A-B)
and (the most original of these ideas) safeguards paideia by enabling older
men to renew their youth. The Chorus of Dionysus in the new state is
to be composed of older men who, becoming more sophrones as the years
go by, stand in particular need of a medicine to relax the crabbedness of
age and to remove the sense of shame that prevents them from singing
in public (665B-D). The establishment of music—the hymns and chants
that cast a spell on the soul and assert that the good life is the pleasant
life (664B)—at the heart of the educational system of the Laws makes it
essential for old as well as young to join the choruses and continue to
enchant themselves throughout their lives. The organized drinking party
accomplishes this end, and, for the purposes of the dialogue, the discus¬
sion of methe (“intoxication”) introduces the first discussion of musical
paideia and the standards by which it is to be judged.
In recognizing sophrosyne as the quality of older men, Plato strikes a
note heard throughout the Laws. In Book III the Athenian stranger calls
the discussion in which the three old men are engaged a paidia presbytike
sophron—an “old man’s sober game” (685A). Shortly thereafter he
describes the dangers inherent in giving supreme power to the young as
a neglect of due measure that leads to disorder, hybris, and injustice
(691C); and he praises the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus for blending with
the bold force of the kings the sophron dynamis—the sober power—of old
age (the elders). The qualities of mixture and moderation (reminiscent
of the Philebus) ensured the survival of the Spartan constitution when the
contemporary governments of Argos and Messene failed because they
had neglected the maxim of Hesiod, “The half is more than the whole”
(690E). The prominence of Hesiodic and Aeschylean themes in the
86 Cf. Antiphon the Sophist, Frag. 59 DK.

87 On the history of the basanos in earlier Greek thought, see Wolfgang Schadewaldt,
Monolog und Selbstgesprach (Berlin, 1926), 119 and nn. 1 and 2.
ig2 Sophrosyne
Laws is one of the striking proofs of Plato’s increased respect for tradition
at this stage of his thinking, and it is even possible that the emphasis on
the wisdom of old age—the old age of the individual and of the culture
—helps to account for the importance given sophrosyne—the flower of
age, as Democritus calls it (Frag. 294 DK)—in this work of Plato’s own
advancing years.
As the Athenian stranger explains the value of the duly regulated
symposium, he introduces most of the psychological principles on which
the Laws will be based: the description of pleasure and pain as the two
springs of human conduct (636D-E); the definition of paideia as proper
nurture, which leads the soul of the child to love that which he must
master perfectly in manhood—that is, arete (643D); the picture of man
as a puppet in the hands of the gods, pulled by the golden strings
of reason and the steel cords of passion (645A, 804B);88 the definition
of arete itself as the complete agreement (symphonia) of reason and habit
with respect to pleasure and pain (653B); and the conception of man as
unique among living creatures in having a feeling for order which, in the
form of rhythm and harmony, is imposed on the instinctive movements
and noises of the young, so as to produce music and gymnastics (653D ff.,
664E ff.). Each of these principles provides a reason for Plato’s emphasis
on sophrosyne—the virtue that controls pleasure and produces order
and harmony.
The discussion of the aim of legislation in Book I introduces a state¬
ment of far-reaching significance, which comes in connection with the first
of several classifications of goods. The stranger maintains that the pur¬
pose of the laws is to make those who use them happy by supplying two
categories of goods, Divine and human. The Divine goods are the
virtues, ranked in order as wisdom (phronesis, not sophia, as in the canon
of Rep. 504A 4-6), sophrosyne joined with Mind (/iera vov), justice, and
courage; while the human goods are health, beauty, strength, and
wealth (631B-C). Nature, which the legislator must follow, has ranked
the Divine goods before the human, and among the Divine goods the
leader is Mind (Nous, 63 iD, there equivalent to phronesis). Mind must
join together all the laws enacted by the legislator and show that they
follow sophrosyne and justice (632C-D). The meaning of this brief pas-
88 The picture of man as a mere puppet in the hands of the gods has contributed heavily
to the impression, recorded by many readers, of weariness and pessimism on the part
of Plato in the Laws (see, e.g., Gould, 79, 100), but its importance should not be exaggerated.
More characteristic of Plato in his last work is the reminder that man deserves honor because
his soul is in some fashion divine (e.g., 727A ff.).
Plato *93
sage unfolds only gradually, as we set beside it two other sections—one
in Book IV, the other in Book IX. The first (714C), which takes up
again the subject of Republic I—the false conception of justice as the in¬
terest of the stronger—criticizes all existing laws as class legislation,
made in the interest of whatever party rules rather than for the good of
the whole (715A-B). With a reminiscence of the myth of the Statesman
(itself an echo of Hesiod),89 Plato says that in the age of Cronus, God
set daemons to rule the human race and provide mankind with peace,
aidos, eunomia, and justice. Such theocracy provides the best rule, and we
should imitate it by obeying what is Divine in us, the law of Mind (714A).
This passage marks the beginning of a new ideology, one that regards
Law as an expression of Mind, which in turn is a manifestation of the
Divine. This line of thought is not fulfilled until books IX and X, where
Plato links Mind with Soul and thereby gives it a high status in accord¬
ance with his belief that Soul—with all its kin (892B; cf. 896D)—
is prior to everything material and mechanical. But Law is a product of
Mind, and individual laws are also vov yepurj/iaTa—“offspring of Mind.”
Hence the laws share in the divinity that belongs to both Mind and Soul.
Now we remember that in Book I the laws of Mind were to follow
sophrosyne and justice, and in Book IV were to aim at the common good
(.koinon). Book IX reiterates that the koinon binds together the State (like
the koinonia of the Gorgias), and that ordinary men need the law to
guard them in putting the public interest before pleonexia and self-
seeking (idiopragia, here antithetical to sophrosyne and justice [875 A-D]).
Hence we must conclude that sophrosyne and justice are the principles
sought by Mind in its legislation (cf. 632C-D), which aims at the good
of the whole; and these two principles are now themselves endowed
with divinity and are based on the new concept of nature which Plato ^
first hints at in Book I (631) and develops in Book X as the basis of his
religion and cosmology.
Book X contains much else that bears on the same problem, notably
the repeated association of sophrosyne with the Divine (e.g., 906A-B).
In the constant battle between Good and Evil in the heavens, the gods
and daemons are man’s allies. We are damaged by injustice, hybris, and
folly (aphrosyne), but we are saved by justice, sophrosyne, and wisdom,
89 The children of Zeus and Themis are Peace, Justice, and Good Order—Eirene, Dike, and
Eunomia (Theog. 901 ff.). Aidos is another moral value important in archaic religious thought
which Plato in the Laws does much to revive. See Jaeger, Paideia, 3. 122, and Friedrich
Solmsen, “Hesiodic Motives in Plato,” Hesiode et son Influence (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1962),
I9I-93-
ig4 Sophrosyne
which dwell in the gods and to a small extent in us. Plato demonstrates
the parallels among all levels of reality by saying that the evil of pleonexia
(“overreaching”) is called “disease” in physical bodies, “pestilence”
in the seasons, and “injustice” in cities and constitutions.90
No passage concerned with sophrosyne in the Laws proved more
influential in later philosophy than those that insisted on its likeness to
the Divine. A memorable statement of the principle in the early books
is contained in the exhortation to the immigrants who are to settle the
new state—an exhortation that anticipates the style of a sermon and
begins with the supposedly Orphic description of God as holding the
beginning, the end, and the middle of all things (715E-716A). Justice
(the Hesiodic Dike) follows God, and in her train comes every man who
wishes to be happy, behaving in a humble and orderly fashion. The
approving reference to being humble (tapeinos), almost unique in classi¬
cal thought, is followed by a denunciation of hybris, not only for its own
sake, but because of the evil consequences it brings to the sinner, his
house, and his country (an Aeschylean motive). Then comes the exhor¬
tation to sophrosyne (716C-D):
What conduct is dear to God and follows after Him? . . . God would be for us the
measure of all things . . . and he who would be dear to Him must become like Him,
so far as possible. According to the present reasoning, the sophron among us
is dear to God, for he is like Him, and the man who is not sophron is not like Him,
but different and unjust.91
This is the key text for the role of sophrosyne in the process of assimila¬
tion to God (ojiiottotm Oeti), on which its value for the Platonists among
the Church Fathers largely depends. Among all Platonic passages deal¬
ing with sophrosyne, it is second in influence only to the myth of the
charioteer in the Phaedrus.
The type of education in music which is described chiefly in Book VII
90 Pleonexia here is equivalent to akolasia in Gorg. 508A; cf. also Symp. 188A and Rep.
609A ff.
91 This passage harks back to the discussion in the Gorgias of the relation of the sophron
person to the gods and to his fellow men (507B ff.): Without sophrosyne it is impossible to be
dear to man or God, for koinonia (“fellowship, sharing”) is essential to philia. The imitation
of God, which is the aim of Plato’s legislation, is actually a contradiction of those traditional
warnings against likening oneself to God which were among the earliest themes of sophro¬
syne. The conflict between hybris and sophrosyne, which had provided tragedy with one ofits
most fruitful subjects, has now largely lost its meaning, but a different conception of sophro¬
syne has developed and is in the process of becoming an essential part of the Platonic notion
of ojuotcoais This new conception results from the belief that God Himself is sophron—an
idea that scarcely occurs in tragedy. The problems inherent in this notion are among
the favorite subjects of Hellenistic philosophy and the Church Fathers.
Plato *95
proceeds from the conviction that sophrosyne makes men like unto God.
A new manifestation of Plato’s lifelong concern with harmonizing the
sophron and the andrikos principles in the human soul appears in the
identification of sophron music with the feminine type, and of andrikos with
the masculine (802D-E).92 There is a corresponding treatment of
sophrosyne and andreia in the dance (815D), culminating in the discus¬
sion of the drama, in which Plato insists on the complete identity of
eudaimonia (“happiness”) and arete and maintains that the work of the
legislator—that is, this very treatise—is the “truest tragedy,” the only
one that will be admitted to the ideal state (817B-D).93
A final proof that sophrosyne is the guardian of the State established
in the Laws emerges when Plato bestows the name Sophronisterion (House
of Correction) on the reformatory to which are to be condemned crimi¬
nals guilty of impiety by^reason ofjblly, without wickedness of charac¬
ter (908E). The institution is without precedent, and the name is
apparently Plato’s own invention; but it is impossible to say whether he
was inspired by Aristophanes’ famous Phrontisterion or by the officer
called Sophronistes who supervised the morals of the Athenian ephebes.94
The term implies that there is hope of a cure for these criminals, whom
the members of the Nocturnal Council are to visit with the aim of
bringing them to their senses (the literal meaning of sophronizein); and
the law provides that such a prisoner is to be released after a minimum
of five years, lav Sort/ oueppove.lv (“if he seems to be of sound mind”).
The Nocturnal Council itself is charged with the safety of the constitu¬
tion, and at the end of Book XII, Plato tells us that the supreme object
92 The need for both praotes (“gentleness”) and orge (“passion”) in the soul (another facet
of the same question) is discussed in Book V, where Plato gives a different reason from the
one offered in the Republic for fostering both instincts. There the guardian needed gentleness
to deal with the citizens and passion or harshness to repulse enemies; here praotes is to
be directed at wrong-doers within the State who are curable, while orge is needed to cope with
incurable sinners (731C-D). The discussion of music in Book VII employs an isolated fore¬
runner to the later aesthetic use of the term sophron. Plato speaks with approval of the
occxppcoi' MoOoa /cat reTay/xe/'T) (“the sober and orderly Muse” [802C]) and opposes to
this austere type of music the yXvutia (“sentimental” or perhaps “vulgar”) Muse. The moral
implications of the word sophron are still predominant, but later, purely aesthetic devel¬
opments are foreshadowed.
93 See Helmut Kuhn, H.S.C.P. 53 (1942), 37-88, especially 77.
94 For epigraphical references to the Sophronistes (the earliest of which is dated 334-333 b.c.),
see Chap. VII, pp. 254-55. The first literary allusion occurs in Aristotle Ath. Pol. 42. The
noun sophronistes in the sense of “corrector, chastiser” becomes current in the late fifth
century; but Wilamowitz (Aristoteles und Athen [Berlin, 1893], 1. 192) maintains that the
office of Sophronistes did not exist in the time of Plato and Isocrates and was instituted only
under Lycurgus. Consult P. W., “Sophronistes” (Oehler). Plato’s originality in establishing the
Sophronisterion is discussed by Glenn Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton, i960), 491.
ig6 Sophrosyne
of their investigation is arete, which they must understand in its plurality

as four virtues and in its unity as one (963A-966B). This knowledge is
specifically distinguished from the mastery of the popular virtues
(1demosiae aretae [968A]) and is, one may suppose, identical with the
object of dialectic in the Republic (537B ff.). Thus the Laws ends, as it
began, with a solemn assurance that the aim of legislation is to realize
in the State the four cardinal virtues; and Plato’s life work ends, as it
began, with the affirmation that the well-being of the polls depends
upon the guidance of the philosopher in whom arete and episteme are
united.95
95 This conviction goes back, not just to the Gorgias and the Republic, but to the Apology,
see, e.g., 29D ff.
VI
Philosophy after Plato
DURING the centuries after Plato, significant innovations in the con¬

cept of sophrosyne belong entirely to the philosophical schools. Neither
literary nor popular usage in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman times went
beyond the connotations developed in the classical period; and although
the whole range of these connotations was maintained here and there in
literature, we note a greater emphasis on the motive of self-control,
a corresponding decline in other meanings, and an especially marked
change in the political implications of sophrosyne. Even among the
philosophers, only a small number took a view of sophrosyne which was
in any way original.1 The Epicureans added almost nothing, while the
Academy after Plato, the later Peripatetics, and the Neopythagoreans
were of secondary importance. But Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neo-
platonists all developed nuances of sophrosyne that were in some way
new and characteristic of their respective systems, and in so doing
permanently affected the history of the concept. This chapter will con¬
cern itself chiefly with these three philosophical approaches and will deal
only summarily with the other schools.
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle’s principal contributions to the doctrine of sophrosyne are

contained in the Nicomachean Ethics and result from three important
trends in his thought: his distinction between intellectual and moral
1/
virtue, his introduction of the doctrine of the Mean into the discussion
1 In philosophy, too, the meanings already developed in classical thought persisted. The
originality we speak of consists, not in wholly new definitions, but in new analyses of the basis
of moral virtue and in new perceptions about the relevance of sophrosyne to other philosophi¬
cal concerns.
197
ig8 Sophrosyne
of moral virtue, and his tendency to limit and define as precisely as pos¬
sible the scope of each individual virtue. His most obvious departure from
Platonic precedent occurred when he abandoned the canon of four
cardinal virtues, but the permanent importance of this step is diminished
by Zeno’s restoration of the tetrad as the basis of Stoic ethical theory.2
The example of Plato and Zeno, rather than of Aristotle, prevailed
among most philosophers and rhetoricians in the Hellenistic and the
Roman periods.
Aristotle did not immediately repudiate the canon, for in the Frag¬
ments of his Protrepticus the four virtues still appear as a group. Iamblichus,
quoting this early work, shows that all men prefer what is in agreement
with their own character—the just man living justly, the sophron in
accordance with to ococppovtiv, and so forth.3 Furthermore, in a citation
from Cicero’s Hortensius, St. Augustine preserves Aristotle’s praise of the
divine bliss of pure contemplation and his description of the Isles of the
Blessed, whose inhabitants, having no human desires, no longer need
justice, courage, temperantia, or even prudence.4 In Book X of the Nico-
machean Ethics, where Aristotle pronounces the life of theoria superior to
the active life, he again dismisses four moral virtues as unnecessary
in the highest state of happiness. It is true that he now substitutes liber¬
ality (eleutheriotes) for prudence (which has in the meantime become an
intellectual virtue) in order to fill out the tetrad, but the other three
qualities of the active life remain the same as in Plato’s canon: justice,
courage, sophrosyne (i 178b 10-18). The appearance of a group of four
moral excellences in such a context seems to be a lingering reminiscence
of the Protrepticus, since elsewhere in the Ethics Aristotle refuses to limit
the virtues to so small a number.5 He had several reasons for rejecting
the Platonic canon: the most obvious was that he drew no such precise
sj parallel between the soul and the State as that on which Plato had
erected his ethical theory in the Republic; furthermore, he so narrowed the
2 See especially SVF 1. 201.

3 Frag. 52 Rose = Frag. 40 During. On the date of the Protrepticus and its place in Aristotle’s
- ,
work, see During, Protrepticus, 33 35 281-86.
4Frg. 58 Rose (= C 43: 5 During) from Augustine De Trin. 14. 9. 12. See During,
Protrepticus, 211-12, for a discussion of the source of this passage in Aristotle. Eloquence
is added to the canon by Cicero, doubtless a concession to the orator Hortensius.
5 In Book II he lists six virtues, to which are later added justice (Book V) and the two in¬
tellectual virtues, phronesis and sophia (Book VI). Cf. Rhet. I. 9, where nine virtues are
discussed. The four Platonic virtues also appear in Pol. 1323a 26-28, 1323b 33-36; while in
1334a 22 ff. Aristotle mentions andreia, kartena, philosophia, sophrosyne, and dikaiosyne, and in
1259b 24-25, sophrosyne, andreia, dikaiosyne, and “all the other dispositions of this kind.” Cf. also
Top. 107b 38-io8a 2, and consult Jaeger, Aristotle, 84, 231.
Philosophy after Plato *99
scope of each virtue that to do justice to the whole range of human con¬
duct he had to recognize a greater number of aretae. Moreover, Aristotle
always tended to bring philosophical theory into greater proximity
to ordinary Greek thought, and although the canon of cardinal virtues
has deep roots in ethical and political tradition, popular thinking always
recognized many other forms of arete as well.
The abandonment of the canon is only the most striking of Aristotle’s
innovations in ethics where sophrosyne is concerned. Of greater perma¬
nent importance is the theory of the Mean. After the early period
in which he agreed with Plato that moral action is based on knowledge
of the Good and that an absolute measure could be found in God,
Aristotle substituted for the absolute, mathematical mean of Plato’s
Philebus (and his own Protrepticus and Eudemus) a flexible mean, relative
to the individual concerned. This doctrine comes into play in the Ethics
when Aristotle treats the moral virtues, after first setting forth a theory
of the soul which requires a distinction between intellectual and moral
aretae. In the first book of the Ethics he distinguishes three faculties in the
soul (1102b 13-25): the vegetative, the appetitive, and the rational; the
appetitive is from one point of view irrational, from another rational.
Moral (or ethical) virtue belongs to the second faculty and is acquired J
through habituation; intellectual (or dianoetic) virtue belongs to the

rational soul and is instilled by teaching.6 Aristotle names sophrosyne
and liberality as examples of the category of moral virtue (1103a 6-7),
c
which he defines as acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and
pains (1104b 27-28),7 and which he locates in a mean between excess
and deficiency (1107a 2-6). No longer is there a connection between V/
metaphysics and ethics—except at the very highest level. Practical ✓

morality can now exist apart from pure contemplation.
In Book II of the Ethics Aristotle explains the doctrine of the Mean in
terms that reveal its growth out of medical parallels: for example, the
application of physical analogies to the virtues, and the discussion of ex-
6 Plato often distinguishes between different kinds of virtue; e.g., in Phaedo 69B he recog¬
nizes civic and philosophic virtue. But both categories include all four cardinal virtues—thus
anticipating the Neoplatonic theory of ‘bathmoi, stages or grades of excellence. In the Republic
the recognition that phronesis is the perfection of the element of Nous in the soul, while andreia
and sophrosyne belong to the irrational faculties, is a step towards the distinction between
dianoetic and moral virtue; but sophrosyne, like justice, is also a virtue of the entire soul, ra¬
tional as well as irrational. D. A. Rees (J.H.S. 77 [1957], 112-18) cites tendencies in Plato
to accept a bipartite soul. See also Werner Jaeger, Scripta Minora (Rome, i960), 2. 491-509,
and Rees, in During, Aristotle and Plato, 191-200.
7 Cf. Laws 653B-C, where true paideia is said to consist in being educated from childhood
to like and to dislike aright.
200 Sophrosyne
cess and defect in moral qualities.8 The more remote background of the
theory must not, however, be forgotten, even though the precise formu¬
lation found in the Ethics owes much to medical precedent. The tradi¬
tional Greek feeling for moderation, which gave rise to the Delphic
maxims, to the pre-Socratic search for proportion and balance in the
physical world, to the myths of hybris in tragedy, to the ethical doctrines
of Democritus, and finally to Plato’s effort to apply to moral decisions
an absolute metron—this feeling finds its most comprehensive expression
in Aristotle’s theory of the Mean. The fact that Aristotle uses the Mean
to arrive at his own definition of sophrosyne should not blind us to the
presence of sophrosyne, in a larger sense, as the very foundation of the
Mean.9
The combination of these two theories—the theory of the soul in
Book I, with the resulting distinction between intellectual and moral
virtue, and the doctrine of the Mean in Book II—is responsible for
most of what is new in the definitions of the virtues in books III and IV.
The third major innovation in Aristotle’s concept of sophrosyne—his
drastic reduction of the scope of the virtue—is the result partly of the
biologist’s habit of separating each species from its neighbors and partly
of the logician’s desire to make his distinctions absolutely precise. There
may also be a reaction against Plato’s way of looking at these matters,
his fondness for extending the scope of the cardinal virtues, breaking
down the barriers, making the many into one. Aristotle’s instinct was
precisely the opposite, and in limiting sophrosyne to a more restricted
field, he returned to the view current in Greek popular morality.
In the Ethics all the moral virtues are related to pleasure and pain,10
8 See Jaeger, op. cit. (above, n. 6), 500 ff.

9 Aristotle’s theory of the Mean may have resulted from his effort to improve upon Plato’s
method of adjusting the appetites and desires according to the dictates of phronesis. In
the Republic each part of the soul has its own specific kind of desire, and it is the function of
the rational part to determine to what extent each desire should be gratified. Sophrosyne causes
all three parts to acquiesce in the judgments of phronesis, courage sustains these judgments, and
the resulting condition is justice. Aristotle evidently sought a more precise method of deter¬
mining the extent to which appetites and passions should be satisfied. His method was
to measure them against a qualitative mean; this method was suggested by Plato himself in
the Philebus, when he, too, sought to improve upon the Republic and find a more reliable, be¬
cause mathematically more exact, process of measuring moral phenomena. Aristotle’s inno¬
vation consisted in rejecting the universal, unvarying, cosmic norm of the Philebus in favor of
an adjustable standard, which he defends in the Ethics by reminding us that it is impossible
to achieve absolute precision in morality. Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, Philosophy 9 (1934), 168-81.
10 As in Plato’s later ethics. The importance of pleasure and pain in moral virtue is
another reason why Aristotle makes sophrosyne, the traditional mistress of the appetites, the
basis of his ethical system.
Philosophy after Plato 201
but sophrosyne is particularly important where pleasure is concerned, for

its specific function is to find the Mean with respect to hedonae (iio 7b
4-6, 1117b 23-6). It is less closely concerned with pain, and only with
the pain caused by the absence of excessive pleasure (1118b 28-33), not
V
the pain that it is the function of courage to endure.11 As the narrowing
process continues, we find that sophrosyne is concerned only with the /
pleasures of the body, and only with those that man shares with the lower
animals, namely taste and touch. But even taste plays a minor role; it
is really the sense of touch that gives pleasure in eating and drinking.12
As a result, sophrosyne is defined as a mesotes (a “mean state”) concerned
with three kinds of bodily pleasure: eating, drinking, and sexual inter¬
course (1118a 23-26). The vice of excess is wantonness (akolasia) with
respect to the same pleasures, and the vice of defect is insufficient enjoy¬
ment of pleasures (anaisthesia), a condition that Aristotle admits is very
rare (1107b 6-7, 1119a 5-7).13 He is careful to correct the current view
that sophrosyne itself is abstinence from pleasure.14 The sophron person
0
enjoys pleasure in moderation; he merely avoids the wrong pleasures
and any pleasure in excess (1119a 11-20, 1153a 27-35). Book III con¬
cludes with a reminder that sophrosyne renders the appetitive element
11 Thus sophrosyne is prevented from overlapping andreia.
12 Aristotle mentions a glutton who wished for a throat longer than a crane’s so as to pro¬
long the sensation of touch as he ate (Eth. Nic. 1118a 32-1118b 1; cf. Eth. Eud. 1231a 16-17,
where the name is given: Philoxenos, son of Eryxis). The famous climax of Catullus 13. 13-
14 is a variation on the jokes made by comic poets about Philoxenus.
13 Doubtless it was merely the pattern of the Mean which induced Aristotle to supply the
unfamiliar vice of anaisthesia to balance nkolasia. Anaisthesia is not to be confused with asceti¬
cism, which regards the pleasures of the body as good, but sacrifices them to secure a
still higher good; nor with the Stoic ideal of apatheia, which would eliminate, rather than
moderate, passion (not pleasure). When the pattern of the Mean was abandoned by later
Peripatetics, akolasia alone survived as the normal antithesis to sophrosyne; see Virtues and
Vices (1250a 21-23). Yet the vast prestige of Aristotle led from time to time to a revival of the
mesotes pattern, with considerable variation in the extremes between which sophrosyne con¬
stituted the Mean. For example, in Philo Judaeus Quod Deus 34. 164, the extremes are
extravagance and meanness; in Gregory of Nyssa De Virg. 283. 17 ff., excessive yielding to
pleasure and utter hatred for marriage, or De Paup. Amand. PG 46. 457C, gluttony on the
part of one’s self and starvation of one’s brother; in Philostratus Vit. Apoll. 29, arrogance and
undue humility in a ruler; in Martin of Bracara Formula 8, p. 249 Barlow, prodigalitas and
sorditas.
14 This is but one of several proofs that even in the classical period a distorted view
of sophrosyne was current (cf. Theseus’ remark to his son in Euripides Hipp. 949-57).
Aristotle’s conception of sophrosyne is entirely humanistic; the sophron man enjoys normal
human pleasures and is not to be confused with the hagnos, who in his purity resembles God.
On this distinction, consult R. A. Gauthier, O.P., and Jean Yves Jolif, O.P., Aristote, L’Ethique
a Nicomaque (Paris, 1958), 2. 238 ff. We shall find that Patristic writers tend to identify so¬
phrosyne with hagneia and thus produce a concept of sophrosyne that would have seemed
inhuman to Aristotle.
202 Sophrosyne
obedient to reason and describes the sophron man as having an appetite

for what he may rightly desire, in the right way, and at the right time
(ccp del teal d)9 del Kal ore [1119b 17]).
Although the difference between the Mean and the two extremes is
usually stated in quantitative terms, it is qualitative as well. Aristotle
specifically observes that there can be no excess or deficiency in sophro¬
syne or courage considered in themselves—that is, rather than as mean
points on a scale—because the excellence that in one sense is a mean is
in another a summum (1107a 1 7-18, 20-27). Thus he refuted in advance,
but did not succeed in forestalling, what was to be a major objection to
Peripatetic ethical theory. The charge that Aristotelian moderation
permitted a certain amount of indulgence in vice, while it set limits to
the pursuit of virtue, proved a serious obstacle to understanding between
Peripatetics and Stoics in Hellenistic and Roman times.15
The theory that moral virtue is a habit of choice (1106b 36) leads not
only to a new emphasis on the agent’s state of mind—as determining the
moral quality of his act (1105a 28-33)—but also to the prominence of
pleasure and pain as an index to the possession of virtue. As Plato in the
Laws held that good moral character depends on the development of the
correct habitual response to these two stimuli—the twin fountains of
morality—so Aristotle maintains that the pleasure or pain attending a
given action will reveal the moral character of the agent. A man is
sophron, for example, not because he abstains from excessive bodily
pleasure, but because he enjoys abstaining (1104b 5-6).16 He who does
not enjoy such abstinence but is obliged to overcome base desires in order
to obey the commands of reason is enkrates (“continent, self-controlled”).
In Aristotelian terms, the charioteer of the Phaedrus who defeats the
promptings of the bad horse after a sharp struggle is not sophron but
enkrates. Sophrosyne is the effortless, because habitual, harmony of
15 See Cicero T.D. 4. 17. 38 ff. for the Stoic view. Opposition to the Aristotelian mesotes
is one manifestation of the perennial hostility to, and radical misunderstanding of, the whole
concept of moderation, which ranges from the Aeschylean Prometheus’ rejection of any limit
to his wrath all the way to Auden’s description of the Star of Bethlehem as most dreaded
by the wise because it pronounces “the doom of orthodox sophrosyne” (“For the Time Being:
A Christmas Oratorio,” The Collected Poetry of W. H. Auden [New York, 1945], 428-29).
16 This statement has its origin in Phil. 12D, where Plato says that the sophron man enjoys
his sophrosyne. For a survey of the differences between Aristotle’s and Plato’s views of so¬
phrosyne and a summary of what they have in common, see Franz Dirlmeier, Anstoteles,
Nikomachische Ethik (Darmstadt, 1956), 348-50. Notable omissions by Aristotle include the
absence of a close link between sophrosyne and andreia, dikaiosyne, kosmiotes, or homonoia. In
common with Plato, Aristotle maintained the relation between sophrosyne and pleasure
already established in the fifth century and the traditional hostility to wantonness. Dirlmeier
calls attention to the likeness of Aristotelian sophrosyne to Plato’s civic virtue, based on right
opinion.
appetite and reason, the perfection of the healthy soul that needs
no physician.
Book VII, which is entirely given over to a consideration of the prob¬
lems of moral strength and weakness, degrees of volition, and the nature
of pleasure, makes the first rigorous distinction in Greek thought between
sophrosyne and enkrateia.17 It begins with the observation that three
kinds of moral character are to be avoided: vice (kakia), incontinence
(akrasia), and brutishness (theriotes).18 This statement in itself reveals
that enkrateia cannot be a virtue, since its antithesis, akrasia, is not iden¬
tical with vice. Akrasia is that condition in which the appetite for exces¬
sive bodily pleasure overcomes the dictates of reason. Aristotle’s discus¬
sion of it constitutes an attack on the Socratic paradox that no one does
wrong knowingly, and lends support to the view expressed by Euripides
in the Medea and the Hippolytus that the logos by itself is unable to
guarantee right conduct.19 Aristotle thus readmits to philosophical con¬
sideration the phenomenon of the video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor 20
and focuses attention upon the element of volition together with the forces
that can overwhelm it. Both the sophron and the wanton (akolastos) act if
deliberately, from choice, without a struggle; the enkrates and the abates
both struggle against their desires, victoriously in the first case, unsuc¬
cessfully in the second. The conduct of the first pair has become habitual;
not so that of the second. If the relation among the four were reduced
to a diagram, we should have a vertical line with the sophron, the man
of principle, at the top, and the akolastos, who has lost all principle,
at the bottom. Above the akolastos is the abates (“incontinent, morally
weak”), who is mastered by passion to the point of abandoning principle,
but not to the point of forgetting it. Above him, but below the sophron, is
the enkrates, who knows that the appetites are evil and so refuses to
follow them; when his obedience to reason becomes habitual, so that he
no longer needs to struggle, the enkrates will become sophron21
The analysis of these four qualities is the most detailed and pains-
17 Plato had defined sophrosyne as cyKpareia riSovtiv (Rep. 430E). Doubtless there was
much discussion in the Academy and later in the Lyceum about the relation of sophrosyne
to enkrateia as well as to karteria (“endurance”). One current opinion refuted by Aristotle held
that the sophron is always enkrates and karterikos, and that the converse also held true (Eth.
Nic. 1145b 14-17).
18 1145a 15-17.
19 Me. 1078-79, Hipp. 375 ff. In contrast to the belief of Socrates and Plato that arete is
episteme, Aristotle explicitly denies that the virtues are forms of phronesis\ he adds, however,
that they are not without phronesis (1144b 19-21).
20 Cf. Ovid Metam. 7. 20-21.
21 The relation between the enkrates and the sophron was still a subject of controversy in
later Peripatetic treatises; see Magna Moralia 1201a 10 ff. and 1203b 13 flf.
204 Sophrosyne
taking in the Ethics,22 but elsewhere in the treatise Aristotle also distin¬
guishes sophrosyne with great precision from such old companions as
aidos,23 andreia,24 karteria23 dikaiosyne,26 and phronesis21 Yet another
virtue, which owes its prominence to Aristotle, is contrasted with sophro¬
syne in a passage of peculiar interest. Megalopsychia (“greatness of soul”)
is the virtue of the man who considers himself worthy of great things and
who is worthy of them. He is contrasted with the man who is worthy of
little and who admits it (i 123b 5). The latter is sophron. In this passage
(as in 1125b 12-13, where it is said that the unambitious man may
sometimes be praised as metrios kai sophron), sophron is clearly used in a
much less technical sense than the one that Aristotle established in
Book II. It now means “modest, unassuming” and recalls the traditional
association of sophrosyne with self-knowledge—although in this case the
great-souled man also knows himself. The distinction between the two
22 Except for the distinction between sophia and phronesis in Book VI.
23 Not a virtue, but a pathos (1108a 30 ff.), a fear of disrepute, suitable only to the young
(1128b 10-21).
24 Another virtue of the irrational soul, but one that has to do with pains rather than
pleasures (1115a 5 ff.).
25 The endurance of pain, related to andreia as enkrateia is related to sophrosyne. Its op¬
posite is softness (malakia), sometimes confused with akolasia, as in the case of persons too fond
of amusement; but the malakos does not pursue pleasure to excess: he merely desires inactiv¬
ity too much. See 1150a 31 ff.
26 Aristotle illustrates the difference between sophrosyne and justice by considering two
cases of adultery, one committed for profit, the other for pleasure. The first is unjust but not
wanton; the second is wanton but not unjust (1130a 24-27).
27 Sophrosyne is the preserver of phronesis (1140b 11-12), a definition based on etymology
(cf. Plato Crat. 41 iE); but phronesis is essential to the very existence of sophrosyne, for only
in conjunction with phronesis can a natural disposition towards sophrosyne be developed into
genuine moral virtue (1144b 1 ff.). One of the main differences between the earlier Eudemian
Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics (a difference that affects the view of sophrosyne in each
treatise) is that in Eth. Nic. 1107a 1-2, where moral virtue is defined, the principle by which
the Mean is determined is the standard of the phrommos, the possessor of phronesis (“practical
wisdom”). In Eth. Eud. 1227b 5-11 the definition of moral virtue omits any reference to
phronesis, which at this stage of Aristotle’s development is still close to the Platonic contem¬
plative wisdom (see Jaeger, Aristotle, 239 ff.). The treatment of sophrosyne in Eth. Eud.,
although briefer than in Eth. Nic., is in most respects similar. It is described as a state of
character, hexis (1220b 18-20), as a mesotes between wantonness and insensibility (1221a 13-
15), is shown in relation to bodily pleasures, and is not identical with enkrateia (1231b 2-4).
Eth. Eud. includes an analysis of akolasia into its subdivisions comparable to the diaeresis of
hybns in Phaedr. 238A-B (1231a 17-21). The diminished range of hybris in the fourth century
is suggested by the substitution of akolasia as the normal antithesis of sophrosyne. Among
the most important additions to the treatment of sophrosyne in Eth. Nic. are: the distinction
between the goods of the body and of the soul, and between common and peculiar desires,
the amplified description of the pleasures of lower animals, the more detailed description of
the sophron and the akolastos, the elaborate comparison of wantonness and cowardice, and the
more detailed account of akolasia in children.
types is Aristotle’s contribution to the recurrent theme of the opposing

strains in the Greek character—a typically dry and unemotional com¬
ment, in contrast to Plato’s elaborate expositions of the danger to the
State when the two conflict.28 Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on
the Ethics, seeks in Aristotle some recognition of the virtue of humility
and, in default of anything more explicit, maintains that in this passage
sophron is equivalent to humilis,29 In Christian morality, sophrosyne
of this kind is a highly desirable form of excellence. To Aristotle, con¬
trasting it with megalopsychia, such sophrosyne is no more admirable
than tapeinotes (“lowliness”) itself.
If Aristotle can use sophron in a purely popular sense even in the
Ethics, it is not surprising that in the Politics and the Rhetoric the word
often carries traditional connotations. In the Politics sophrosyne may
mean the opposite of hybris in the ethos of a State (1334a 25-28) and
must therefore be equated with kosmiotes or metriotes in the language of
contemporary oratory; but more often than not, it implies self-restraint
of some kind (for example, 1335a 22, 1263b 9 ff., 1267a 10), and
this brand of sophrosyne is predicated of the State as well as of the indi¬
vidual, for Aristotle points out that courage, justice, phronesis, and
sophrosyne have the same meaning in both contexts (1323b 33-36).
One of the questions considered in the Politics is whether virtue is the
same for the ruler and the ruled. This problem is part of the larger ques¬
tion of who can possess moral virtue. In the Ethics Aristotle excludes the
lower animals, to whom sophrosyne can be ascribed only metaphorically
(1149b 30-34), and also the gods—how absurd to praise them for not
having evil desires (1178b 15-16)—leaving moral virtue the prerogative
of human kind.30 It remained to consider whether certain types of
human beings—slaves, women, and children—who belong to the cate¬
gory of the ruled could possess sophrosyne and, if so, whether their
virtue was identical with the sophrosyne of the ruler. In the Politics the
problem is solved, quite Platonically, by a reference to the nature of the
soul, which, like the State, contains a ruling and a subject element,
28 Cf. An. Post. 97b 15, where the three exemplars of megalopsychia are Alcibiades, Achilles,
and Ajax, all noted for their lack of sophrosyne.
29 See Gauthier, 456. The passage in the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas is II. 2.
30Cf. De Gen. Anim. 717b 27, on sophrosyne in animals, and see Eth. Nic. 1145a 15-17, for
the contrast between arete and thenotes. The moral virtues or their approximations in animals
became a topic of some interest in later antiquity (see Plutarch Mor. 988 f. on sophrosyne in
animals). Through the Physiologus the subject achieved wide currency in the Middle Ages.
The association of the elephant, the camel, the dove, the ermine, the tortoise, and the uni¬
corn with various aspects of sophrosyne or temperantia is important for the iconography of
this virtue in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
206 Sophrosyne
each with its proper virtue. The various parts of the soul are present to
different individuals in various ways. The ruler must possess intellectual
and moral virtue completely; the others should have whatever is appro¬
priate to their respective natural conditions. Hence sophrosyne is not
identical for men and for women, or for master and slave. The slave needs
just enough of the virtue to prevent him from doing his work badly be¬
cause of wantonness (akolasia [1260a 36]). In this context sophrosyne
obviously refers to control of the appetites. In connection with women
its meaning is a little more comprehensive. For the ruler—and for a man
—sophrosyne is conducive to command. For one who is ruled—and for
a woman—it is conducive to obedience (1260a 20-24; 1277b 17 ff). This
view of feminine arete aligns Aristotle with most of the Greeks (except
Socrates and Plato) and recalls especially the attitude of Sophocles’
Ajax toward Tecmessa.31
A second question concerned with sophrosyne in the Politics is the effect
of good fortune on the individual and the State. Aristotle holds that men
have the same telos individually and collectively; therefore the State needs
the same virtues as the individual. Courage and hardiness are necessary
for the active life; love of wisdom is necessary for times of leisure; and
sophrosyne and justice are needed in both seasons, but especially in time
of peace (1334a 22-25). It is disgraceful for a State to be brave and suc¬
cessful in time of war and yet behave slavishly in peacetime.32 They have
great need of sophrosyne and justice who are considered prosperous and
enjoy all the blessings. Since the sophrosyne of the Ethics could not
be applied literally to the State, its meaning in this passage is broader
and more traditional: “modesty.” Aristotle also tends to maintain the
broader significance of the word in his discussions of Plato’s political
theories, as when he objects to the statement in the Laws that the amount
of property belonging to the State should be large enough for the citizens
31 In Eth. Nic. 1117b 31-32 Aristotle denies that akolasia is a term applicable to those who
gossip too much, but in the context of the Politics he reverts to the tradition that feminine
sophrosyne includes silence; cf. 1277b 17-24. Plutarch (Concerning Talkativeness 11) refers to
gossip as akrasia or akolasia and says that a woman lacks sophrosyne in so far as she fails to
hold her tongue. In his vocabulary, talkativeness is polypragmosyne, now reduced to a narrow
scope.
32 That war usually compels men to be moderate and just, while good fortune and leisure
breed hybns, is a commonplace familiar in rhetoric and oratory from the time of Thrasymachus
and is rooted deep in Hellenic thought. Cf. Hesiod Erg. 314-16 on aidos and tharsos;
Aeschylus and Herodotus on koros, hybns, and ate; Lysias On the Cripple 18; Isocrates Areop.
1-5. Both Andocides and Isocrates apply this commonplace to the State, as do the Roman
historians (e.g., Sallust Jugurtha 41. 1). The opposite view-—held by realists like Euripides
and Thucydides—is less often encountered.
Philosophy after Plato 2oy
to live in a sophron manner. Aristotle prefers “a sophron and liberal

manner,” for without liberality, sophrosyne may degenerate into hard¬
ship (1265a 33-34); this formula (IXevOcplios apxx Kal ooxppovcos) is the
one he actually uses in his own ideal constitution when he discusses the
amount of territory that should be included in the State (1326b 31-32).33
Sophronos in this context means “moderately,” “modestly,” or even
“frugally.”
Nowhere in Aristotle’s discussion of the constitutional government
that he thinks closest to the ideal is there a mention of sophrosyne,
although the very essence of this constitution is moderation in every
aspect of its existence.34 Recalling that arete is a mesotes, Aristotle praises
the mesos bios as best for the State and the individual (1295a 39 ff.); he
describes the middle class (the mesoi) as most ready to obey reason,
least inclined to seek or shun office, and best in achieving friendliness and
a sense of common purpose (1295b 23); and he concludes his eulogy of
the middle way by quoting Phocylides’ wish to be midmost in the State
(Frag. 12 Diehl3). Yet, like Solon and Thucydides, he entirely omits the
word sophrosyne from his vocabulary of moderation. He does indeed
remark that sophrosyne is not characteristic of tyranny or of the worst
form of democracy (1319 b 27 ffi), but he means only that licentiousness
(.anarchia) prevails in both these constitutions because they allow slaves,
women, and children—the classes that should be ruled—to live as they
please.35 For Aristotle sophrosyne never means “moderation in govern¬
ment” nor does it ever have an organic relation to the State.36 As
the Rhetoric reveals, it is hard for Aristotle to conceive of sophrosyne as a
social virtue. In the Ethics, to be sure, when he argues that contempla¬
tion is the highest activity because it is self-sufficient, he points out that
the just, sophron, and brave man requires others towards whom, or with
33 See the comment of Glenn Morrow (in During, Aristotle and Plato, 154-55) that
Aristotle’s fondness for the virtue of eleutheriotes (“liberality”), which does not appear in
Plato’s table, constitutes a real difference between the two men. It might be added that
Plato’s enthusiasm for sophrosyne and Aristotle’s comparative lack of interest represent
another difference. Cf. also Pol. 1333a 30-36, 1338b 9-38. In his criticism of the community
of wives (Pol. 1263b 8-14) Aristotle gives sophrosyne the same meaning as in Eth. Nic. See
also Pol. 1236b 7-14.
34 Ross, 259, suggests that Aristotle has in mind the Constitution of the Five Thousand,
which Thucydides also admired.
35 The tyrant himself and his supporters are advised to practice sophrosyne in bodily
enjoyment (1314b 23-24), so as to avoid arousing public resentment.
36 An application of the idea of sophrosyne, without the word, occurs when Aristotle
describes the Greeks as a mean between the northern barbarians and the Asiatics, combin¬
ing the spiritedness of the first with the intellect of the second (Pol. 1295a 34 ff, 1327b 16 ff).
208 Sophrosyne
whom, he can practice these virtues (i 178a 9 ff.); but this statement is
inspired by the need to distinguish theoria from the moral virtues. The
Magna Moralia, representing a later generation in the Peripatos, reflects
Aristotle’s usual view accurately enough in the observation that the
sophron man is such avros KaO’ kavrov—“in and by himself”
(H93b I4_I5)*
Both the Ethics and the Politics are deeply concerned with the problem
of moral education, which was in the Greek tradition always the respon¬
sibility of the lawmaker. In both works Aristotle relies on the traditional
triad of nature, habituation, and teaching (physis, ethos, and logos, in Pol.
1332a 39-40; physis, ethos, and didache in Eth. Nic. 1179b 20-21). The
contrast between natural capacity for a virtue and its fulfillment, through
habituation and the addition of phronesis, is illustrated by Aristotle’s
distinction between the adjectives sophromkos and sophron (Eth. Nic.
1144b 1 ff.): the former indicates potentiality; the latter, fulfillment.
The special importance of sophrosyne in the process of education
becomes clear with the assertion that unruly passion is the chief obstacle
to learning—because it deafens us to the appeal of reason (Eth. Nic. 1179b
13 ff and 26 ff). Hence the control of passion—sophrosyne—is the
necessary basis for all training in moral virtue. Since the young find it
unpleasant to live in a sophron and hardy fashion, Aristotle believes that
their upbringing should be regulated by law; for once sophrosyne and
karteria have become habitual, they will cease to be painful (Eth. Nic.
1179b 34)-37
The discussions of sophrosyne in the Rhetoric are geared to a special
purpose and are less technical, philosophically speaking, than those in
the Ethics and Politics; although in another sense, of course, they are
highly technical. They comprise the earliest extant consideration of the
role of sophrosyne in rhetoric,38 and they recognize the usefulness of
this quality to epideictic oratory and ethical persuasion. In the Rhetoric,
as in the Ethics, Aristotle refuses to limit the aretae to the Platonic canon
and lists no fewer than nine virtues in all. The very definition of arete
in the Rhetoric (1366a 36-39) is noticeably less precise than that in the
Ethics: virtue is a faculty, dynamis (specifically denied in the Ethics
37 See 1180a 4 ff. for the need to regulate adult conduct by law. Other suggestions about
education to instil sophrosyne include exploiting the moral effects of music (Pol. 1338b 4-8,
1 340a 18-b 19, 1341b 32-1342a 4, 1342b 1 2-33). See Chap. V, n. 43, for Aristotle’s disagree¬
ment with Plato on what constitutes sophron music.
38 The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum does not mention sophrosyne, although the spurious final
chapter includes it with the other three cardinal virtues among the goods of the soul (1. 2,
p. 104 Spengel-Hammer).
1106a 6-10); the element of choice is ignored, as is the standard of the

Mean. In fact, the only aspect of virtue significant for the orator is its
usefulness to society. Arete is therefore defined as a faculty of conferring
benefits, and the greatest virtues are those that are most useful to others.
Plato had regarded sophrosyne as no less a social virtue than justice it¬
self, and even when he was most inclined to treat it as a virtue of the
individual (as in some parts of the Laws), he still regarded it as affecting
the State in various ways; to Aristotle, however, sophrosyne is the most
personal of the virtues and therefore the most difficult to praise in terms
of social utility. His solution is to define it as the virtue that disposes
men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law commands (1366b
13—15), but even so he rates it below justice, courage, and liberality. In
the Topics, however, where he is not bound to consider the effect on an
audience, he values sophrosyne above courage, as being always useful,
while courage is only occasionally needed (117a 36).
The second discussion of sophrosyne in the Rhetoric arises from
the analysis of character according to several categories, including age
and fortune (1388b 31 ffi). The young lack self-control in regard to
sensual pleasures: all their mistakes result from excess and from neglect¬
ing the maxim of Ghilon, Meden agan (1389b 2-7).39 The character
of the old is just the opposite: their appetites are weak, and they appear
sophronikoi (1390a 14-15),40 but in truth their desires have slackened and
they are mastered by love of gain. Aristotle concludes that whereas the
young are brave but lack sophrosyne, the old are sophrones but cowardly.
Men in their prime enjoy a mean state of character, combining courage
with sophrosyne (1390b 3-4).41 The discussion of the effect of good
birth, wealth, and power on human conduct agrees with the correspond¬
ing passage in the Politics and finds that the rich tend towards hybris,
and the poor, weak, and unfortunate towards the opposite condition
(1390b 32-139^ 19). Both topics—the characteristics of the various
times of life and the effects of good and bad fortune—were used in con¬
nection with sophrosyne in Attic oratory as early as the fifth century;
Aristotle merely reduces a well-established tradition to a system. The
39 Cf. Frag. 3 Rose, from the dialogue On Philosophy, which discusses other proverbs of the
Seven, including Gnothi sauton.
40 Note the distinction between sophronikos and sophron, and cf. Eth. Nic. 1179b 32-34 and
Top. 117a 32, where Aristotle says that the young have the greatest need, but the smallest
inclination, for sophrosyne.
41 Theophrastus did not include the sophron man among his Characters, but Aristotle’s
description of him in the Rhetoric gives a fair idea of what such a character sketch might have
included.
210 Sophrosyne
first of these topics remained static, but the second was destined for
further development in the Hellenistic era, when everything connected
with tyche (“fortune”) received the most serious attention. In the
classical period it had generally been agreed that eutychia leads to hybris,
bad fortune to sophrosyne. In the succeeding era there was a shift
of emphasis. Bad fortune was ever in man’s thoughts, and the aim of all
Xj the philosophical schools was to provide an armor against it. We shall
find again and again that sophrosyne came to be looked upon as a part
of this defensive equipment—the aequus animus of Horace. The philo¬
sophical development of this topos belongs not to Aristotle but to
the Hellenistic philosophers, especially Epicurus.42
Both early and late in his career—in the Metaphysics and the Ethics—
Aristotle shows keen interest in the Platonic goal of assimilation to God,
, although he does not use the actual phrase 6[iolooois OcCo. For Plato, as
we have seen, the practice of sophrosyne was one of the ways of becom¬
ing like God, but Aristotle cannot ascribe any moral virtue to the
Divine, whose activity is pure contemplation. In man, therefore, the god¬
like element is Nous (“reason”), and it is the activity of Nous, not
the practice of sophrosyne, justice, or courage, that enables him to share
the life of God. This contradiction between Plato and Aristotle was not
resolved until Plotinus suggested a way in which the moral virtues
(regarded as purifications), while admittedly confined to humanity,
could yet be used as stages on the road to union with the Divine mind.
Since metaphysics and ethics are so distantly related in Aristotle,
his version of the doctrine of Ojiiotcocus 6ccb is relevant to sophrosyne at
only one point, and here the effect of his new attitude is to undermine
an ancient wing of the fortress of sophrosyne.
In the morality of the archaic period, the doctrine of sophrosyne had
manifested itself in the proverb “Think mortal thoughts,” an idea closely
allied with the Delphic maxims, the sayings of the Seven Wise Men,
and other admonitions to avoid excess and preserve due measure. Both
in its gnomic formulations and in the myths of hybris with which the
lyric and the tragic poets dramatized the idea, “Think mortal thoughts”
involved a recognition of the boundaries that separate man from
the gods. When discussing moral virtue, Aristotle upholds the value of
measure (mesotes, the metron) and praises the philosophical content of the
Delphic proverb, Gnothi sauton, but when it comes to the intellectual
virtues, he breaks sharply with tradition. Guided by his conception of
what likeness to God must involve, he denies that man should think
42 See below, p. 213, and cf. Lucretius 5. 1118 ft.
mortal thoughts and even attacks by name Simonides, who, like Pindar,
often employed this theme. Aristotle maintains that man should make
himself immortal, so far as possible: that is, he should exercise to
the greatest possible extent the faculty of reason which is the Divine
element in man.43 Although he does not refer to sophrosyne in either of
the passages in which he recommends that man “become immortal so
far as he can” (c<p5 ooov evSex^Tat aOavajiêiv) they actually mark
a moment of crisis in the history of this virtue. To deny that man must
think mortal thoughts is to set aside the whole complex of ideas
connected with hybris and sophrosyne which had dominated Greek
morality for centuries. Now begins an entirely new orientation of man
in the universe—an orientation that helps prepare for Christianity’s
ultimate acceptance of Aristotelian theology, since Christianity promises
man a destiny so exalted as to justify him in thinking immortal thoughts.
That sophrosyne could still play a part in the process by which man
makes himself immortal and godlike, in spite of Aristotle’s exclusively
intellectual approach to the problem, is the result, first, of Plotinus’
method of reconciling the Platonic and Aristotelian views and, then, of
the great flowering of the whole concept of djioiooois 9e&> in the thinking
of certain Greek Fathers of the Church.44
EPICURUS
In separating ethics from metaphysics to a perceptible degree and in

completely divorcing ethics from physics, Aristotle set an example that
later philosophers (with the important exception of the Stoics) were
content in the main to follow. The physics of Epicurus was in any case
purely mechanistic and would have offered the virtues no such support
as Plato and the Stoa found in cosmology. Epicurus is of all the Hellen¬
istic philosophers—save the Cyrenaics—least significant for the history
of sophrosyne. His concept of its function coincides with popular usage,
and he assigns it only a secondary role in attaining happiness. While his
hedonism is more refined than that of the Cyrenaics,45 Epicurus never¬
theless maintains that pleasure is the beginning and the end of the
happy life (Diogenes Laertius io. 128), the standard by which to judge
what to choose and to avoid (D. L. 10. 34; cf. 129). Because his concep¬
tion of pleasure is not positive enjoyment—the kinetic hedone of Aristippus
43 Aristotle’s phrase dOavariûv e<p’ ooov, etc. (Eth. Nic. 1177b 33, cf. Met. A 2, 982b 30 ff)
recalls, not the key passage in Theaet. 176B, but Tim. 90B. For the whole history of the
concept, consult Merki.
44 See Chap. IX.
45 Yet he regards the pleasure of the stomach as the root of all good (409 Usener).
212 Sophrosyne
— but freedom from pain and distress (ataraxia), Epicurus concedes

a certain value to the moral virtues as being necessary to achieve tran¬
quillity. In the Letter to Menoecus he says that ataraxia results from sober
reasoning,46 which investigates the causes of choice and avoidance and
drives out opinions that upset the soul. Phronesis is therefore the greatest
good, and from it spring the other virtues (D. L. io. 131-32). Phronesis
teaches that the life of pleasure and the life of virtue are inseparable
(D. L. 10. 132). The maxims of Epicurus urge men to be content with
little, to limit their desires and thus to outwit fortune; and he was him¬
self famous for his moderation and even abstinence.47 But virtue, to
him, is only the means; pleasure is the goal. Hence the popular embodi¬
ment of Epicureanism in the picture described by both Cicero and
Seneca: Pleasure surrounded by her slaves, the virtues.48
Cicero observes that Epicurus seldom mentioned the names of
wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance {De Fimbus 2. 16. 51); but
since, according to Diogenes Laertius (10. 28), he wrote a treatise On
Justice and the Other Virtues, the likelihood is that he at least recognized
the Platonic canon. The value of sophrosyne for Epicurus resides in its
connection with the hedonistic calculus, and here he was evidently
influenced by Plato’s discussions of this subject in the Philebus and the
Laws. The classification of desires according to whether or not they are
natural and necessary is a fundamental device in Epicurean ethics.
Plutarch, noting the Epicurean limitation of desires, defines sophrosyne
as a certain shortening or regulation of the appetites, which does away
with alien and excessive desires and imposes moderation and opportune¬
ness on those that are necessary (459 Usener). Cicero further explains
the Epicurean attitude when he says that this school seeks temperantia
because it brings peace and soothes the mind with a certain harmony
{Fin. 1. 14. 47). He describes the function of temperantia, in terms related
to the definition current in the Old Stoa, as that which bids us obey
reason in choice and aversion. Reason alone is not enough. One may
make the proper judgment and yet give way to passion, deceived by
pleasures that are neither great nor necessary. Temperantia is essential,
therefore, to preserve the judgments of reason, so that we will avoid
46 Not sophron but vr)<puv.

47 Even the Christian Fathers sometimes admit this: see Gregory of Nazianzus P.G. 37.
773 ff-
48 Cicero Fin. 2. 21. 61; Seneca Benef. 4. 2. 1; cf. Augustine C.D. 5. 20. Cicero denies that
the Epicurean conception of temperantia can be the true one, for no one can at once praise
temperantia and regard pleasure as the Good (Fin. 3. 32. 118-19).
certain pleasures and even endure certain pains, in order to secure the
ultimate preponderance of pleasure.
Two points are noteworthy here. One is Cicero’s definition of temperantia
in an etymological sense appropriate to the word sophrosyne, but not
to its Latin equivalents.49 More important is his statement of the special
function of sophrosyne according to Hellenistic philosophy: to defend
the judgments of reason against the assaults of passion. Aristotle’s
rejection of the Socratic equation of arete with episteme had given
immense support to the common-sense assumption that something more
than reason is needed to produce right conduct. Sophrosyne seemed to
many an obvious choice for this “something.” Out of the recognition of
this function grew the tendency to connect sophrosyne with conversion
(.epistrophe) from Evil to Good, an idea of which there is as yet no trace
in Epicurean philosophy, but which was to develop in the ethics of
Plotinus and to pass from Neoplatonism to St. Augustine.
It was observed in connection with the Rhetoric of Aristotle that in the
Hellenistic age sophrosyne enters into a particularly close relation with
tyche (“fortune”); this is evident in Epicurean doctrine. Hellenistic
popular theology makes Tyche a goddess, and even those who did not
worship at her shrine endeavored, through the philosophical systems
that promised ataraxia (“tranquillity”), apatheia (“impassivity”), and
autarkeia (“independence”) to immunize themselves against her blows.
An increasingly important function of sophrosyne was to make the soul
impervious to bad fortune. A Fragment of Philodemus shows that the
Epicureans specifically assigned this task to sophrosyne: it describes the
sophron man as one who is not disturbed by the blows of fortune but is
prepared by his modest life to meet whatever comes.50
THE STOICS
Far more dynamic than the Epicurean school, which seldom deviated
in ethics from the doctrines of the founder,51 is the Stoa with its vigor -
49 Cf. Plato Crat. 41 iE, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1140b 11-12, Chrysippus SVF 3. 274, 275.
Temperantia, which Cicero made the most familiar, although not the sole equivalent, suggests
a connection with either time or the action of mixing.
50 Book IX, Concerning Evils. Cf. Lucretius 5. 1118 ff. on the folly of avarice and ambition
(vivere parce aequo animo) and Horace Odes 2. 3. 1-3 (Aequam memento . . . servare mentem . . .
temperatam). For a Stoic version of this commonplace, see Seneca Ep. 85. 114, where the
fickleness of fortune and the shortness of life are considered an inducement to practice
temperantia.
51 Hence the absence of development in ethical doctrine and the unscientific acceptance of
popular connotations for the words sophron and sophrosyne. See, e.g., Metrodorus, Frag. 36
Korte on the duties of a sophron wife.
214 Sophrosyne
ous, continuing debate on a number of topics connected with the nature

and function of sophrosyne. Probably the most far-reaching decision
of Zeno and the Old Stoa was to reinstate the Platonic group of four
primary virtues, thus guaranteeing the survival of the tetrad in
later philosophy. The Stoic theory of a unitary soul implied a unitary
arete, and this in fact is what Zeno himself taught, postulating a generic
excellence of which the particular virtues were manifestations. If a
plurality of virtues was to be admitted, as it was by Chrysippus,
the second founder of the school, nothing in the Stoic psychology
demanded the limitation of these virtues to four. One of the innovations
of Chrysippus indeed was to multiply the virtues far beyond four—“stir¬
ring up a swarm,’’ as Plutarch said.52 Yet even Chrysippus was careful
to maintain the primacy of Plato’s canon and to subordinate all
the other virtues to them as aspects (eide). Zeno accepted the Socratic
doctrine that arete is knowledge—phronesis, however (“practical wis¬
dom”), rather than episteme—but sought to combine this position with a
materialistic physics derived ultimately from Heraclitus. This combi¬
nation led to the apparent contradiction among some writings of the
Old Stoa: those that regard virtue as knowledge, and those that make it
a tension of the physical substratum of the soul. Like the Epicureans, the
Stoics regarded the soul as composed of the same stuff as the rest of the
universe, and explained its operations in purely physical terms. To
account for moral virtue, they had recourse to the phenomenon of
tension (tonos), which according to its strength or weakness gave rise to
virtue or its opposite. Rejecting the Platonic theory of parts of the soul,
the Stoics distinguished functions, the most important of which were
performed by the ruling element (hegemonikon; Latin principatus), usually
located in the head.53 The virtues were traced to a proper tension of
the hegemonikon.
In addition to being materialistic, the Old Stoa was also committed
to rationalism, even to the point of connecting the passions with
the rational soul (the hegemonikon), instead of assigning them to some ir¬
rational faculty, as did the Academic and Peripatetic systems. The
Stoics vacillated between the theory that passion is the result of a false
judgment (SVF i. 209) and the even more rationalistic theory that pas¬
sion is itself a false judgment (SVF 1. 208),54 but they always insisted
on the need for sophrosyne to prevent that domination by the impulses
525FF3. 255. 53 SVF 1. 143.

54 E.g., avarice is a mistaken supposition that money is good; wantonness, a mistaken
assumption that pleasure is good.
('uXtovaopos oppCbv) which allows passion to get out of control. As in
the Epicurean ideal of ataraxia, so with the Stoic apatheia, sophrosyne is
of all the virtues the one most immediately associated with achieving
the summum bonum. It differs from the Peripatetic sophrosyne in that it
has nothing to do with moderation. Whereas Aristotle required only
that the appetites be moderated, the Stoics demanded that passion be
extirpated. The difference between metnopatheia and apatheia became
a major obstacle to a synthesis of Peripatetic and Stoic systems in later
times.55
Moral virtue enjoyed a position of supreme importance in the Old
Stoa. Like their Cynic predecessors, the Stoics adopted as their telos or
summum bonum life in accordance with nature, which was identified with
life in accordance with virtue (SVF i. 179). Virtuous activity constituted
what the Old Stoa called katorthoma: everything that the wise man
(.sophos, spoudaios) does in accordance with right reason (SVF 3. 501).
Since in its earliest stages the Stoa made no essential distinction between
intellectual and moral virtue (all aretae being aspects of phronesis, or all
aretae being themselves epistemae), sophrosyne was not assigned to a
secondary position, as it was in the Peripatos. The cosmic approach to
ethics—the belief in a centralized, teleological universe, every part of
which contributes to the perfection of the whole—restored the Platonic
justification for the practice of the virtues.56 The very notion of a cosmic
harmony—of order, philia (“friendliness”), and syndesmos (“unification”)
coordinating all parts of the universe—recalls the Platonic conception
of sophrosyne as symphoma, but the early Stoics do not connect the two
ideas, because according to their new definition sophrosyne has nothing
to do with order.57
The definition of sophrosyne ascribed to Zeno is a genuine innovation,
reflecting, it is true, earlier ways of looking at the virtue (especially ways
attributed to Socrates), but emphasizing an aspect that had never
before been so prominent. Zeno defined arete generically as wisdom
(phronesis) and explained the other three principal virtues (protae aretae
is the Stoic term) as manifestations of phronesis in different situations:
55 The Stoics themselves distinguished apatheia (“absence of passion”) from total lack of
feeling, which was considered a fault; but to outsiders the distinction seemed a mere quibble.
According to Zeno, passion {pathos) is op/xrj 'nXtovaôvoa {SVF 1. 205); Cicero’s translation:
appetitus vehementior {T.D. 4. 47). Pleonasmos transformed horme into pathos, and it was only the
pleonasmos, not the horme, that the Stoics sought to extirpate.
56 See Solmsen, Theology, 183, and Joseph Moreau, L’Ame du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens
(Paris, 1939), 187.
57 For Panaetius’ revival of the conception of sophrosyne as order, see pp. 222 ff.
216 Sop hr o syne
justice in rendering others their due, andreia in enduring, and sophro-

syne in choosing (kv aipcreois [SVF i. 201 ]).58 The opposite of sophrosyne
is still called akolasia (SVF 1. 190). Where Plato in the Republic had
derived the group of four virtues from his analysis of the soul and the
functions of its parts, Zeno, believing the soul to be unitary, taught the
unity of virtue and justified the various aspects of virtue in terms of
their respective activities. The only organic relation between the Stoic
psychology and the Stoic theory of virtue lies in the doctrine of tension,
which explains how virtue can exist, but not what its function is or how
it should be defined.59 Sophrosyne, in the definition of Zeno, loses
contact with the ideas of measure, limit, and self-restraint which had
been its province in classical times, but gains authority over the whole
area of moral choice and avoidance.
Zeno's successors in the Old Stoa attempted to clarify what was
obscure in his doctrine, especially the role of phronesis, about which
there was some doubt whether it was only the generic virtue or also a
specific virtue.60 Cleanthes of Assos made the application of the theory
of tonos to virtue explicit by stating that when the tension of the pneuma
was sufficiently strong to perform the work of the soul, the result was
strength and power (ischys and kratos), which, being employed in various
circumstances, took the names of the specific virtues (SVF 1. 563).61
Elsewhere, however, Cleanthes held that arete can be taught, implying
agreement with Zeno’s view of arete as phronesis (SVF 1. 567). To remove
58 The conception of arete as knowledge goes back, of course, to Socrates (Aristotle Eth.
Nic. 1145b 23 ff.). Both Plato and Aristotle connect moral virtue with choice among pleas¬
ures. The Aristotelian antecedents are particularly close; e.g., Eth. Nic. 1113a i-b 2, a
fundamental discussion of choice (proairesis), which does not mention sophrosyne but
concludes with a description of how pleasure deceives the polloi into thinking that the
pleasant is the good: “They choose the pleasant as if it were the good, and they flee the pain¬
ful as if it were evil.” Cf. Eth. Nic. 1116a 11 ff., where andreia is defined in terms of choice
and avoidance, and 1172b 19, on Eudoxus’ theory that pleasure is the Good. See also Plato
Gorg. 507B (the sophron person pursues and avoids a 8ti), and Rep. 618B-C (on the power of
phronesis to discern and choose the Good), and Xenophon Mem. 3. 9. 4, which equates sophia
and sophrosyne and ascribes to them the power to choose the Good and to avoid Evil.
59 Zeno’s reputation for sophrosyne is attested by Diogenes Laertius (7. 10. 11). An
Athenian decree honored him for exhorting the young to practice arete and sophrosyne, and
he was presented with a crown testifying to his own possession of these qualities. His epitaph
by Antipater of Sidon says that Zeno scaled heaven by the path of saophrosyne (D. L. 7. 29).
60 Plutarch Sto. Rep. 7.
61 Cleanthes wrote four books on Heraclitus (D. L. 7. 174) and applied the term pneuma
to the fire that was the physical base of the Stoic cosmos. His concept of Zeus, expressed in
his hymn, SVF 1. 537, includes the notion of harmony imposed upon the cosmos by God,
who understands how to adjust what is excessive and put in order the disorderly (Koontiv
TaKoa[xa). Sophrosyne is no part of the vocabulary used to describe this process.
the obscurity of Zeno’s arrangement of the four virtues, Cleanthes listed

the manifestations of “strength and power” as enkrateia, andreia, dikaiosyne,
and sophrosyne (SVF 1. 563). How strong the tradition of four cardinal
virtues must already have been, we may infer from the addition of
a fourth excellence to andreia, dikaiosyne, and sophrosyne, when phronesis
was pre-empted as the generic virtue. The elevation of enkrateia (usually
a virtue subordinate to sophrosyne) to a position of equality may reflect
the influence of the Cynics or Xenophon.62 The duplication that might
have resulted from the appearance of both enkrateia and sophrosyne in
the canon is avoided by defining sophrosyne as the exercise of tonos in
matters of choice, and enkrateia as tonos in endurance. Enkrateia thus
approaches andreia (tonos in resistance) more closely than it does
sophrosyne.63
Ariston of Chios upheld Zeno’s theory of the unity of the virtues,
which he distinguished only according to the category of relation. He
taught that arete is one and receives various names only from the variety
of objects with which it deals (just as a knife is one and the same, no
matter what material it cuts). Two accounts exist of the nature of this
unitary arete: Plutarch’s report that Ariston believed arete to be health
(SVF 1. 375), and Galen’s that it was knowledge of Good and Evil
(SVF 1. 374). The two accounts reflect the two aspects of Stoic virtue,
the practical and the theoretical. Arete requires knowledge, and this
knowledge must be put into practice, with a resulting condition
of the soul which Ariston, like Plato and the Greeks in general, com¬
pared to health. Galen’s report further explains that the soul, when
not active in good things or bad, is sophia and episteme, but in the
actions of daily life it adopts the names phronesis, sophrosyne, justice
and courage. Ariston found Aristotle’s distinction between sophia
and phronesis useful as a means of settling the problem of the generic
and the specific. When phronesis resumes its place in the canon with the
three other specific virtues, enkrateia drops out. The definition of
sophrosyne that Galen credits to Ariston is the same as that of Zeno
and Cleanthes: when it is necessary to choose the Good and avoid Evil,
arete is named sophrosyne (SVF 1. 374). Plutarch, however, ascribes to
Ariston another definition, which includes several traditional elements
and restores to sophrosyne what Zeno had taken away: when virtue
62 See Adolf Dryoff, Die Ethik der alien Stoa (Berlin, 1897), 70 ff.
63 Sophrosyne and andreia more than once overlapped in Stoic ethics of a later period. Cf.
the definition of phobos in Stobaeus 2. 7. 10, p. 90, 11; and consult Gred Ibscher, Der Begriff
des Sittlichen in der Pjlichtenlehre des Panaitios (Munich, 1934), 71 —73.
218 Sop hr o syne
regulates desire and defines the moderate and the seasonable in pleasures,
it is called sophrosyne (SVF i. 375). Again, the two definitions are not
contradictory but complementary.
Chrysippus reacted against the unitarianism of Zeno, Cleanthes, and
Ariston and maintained that the virtues differ according to the category
of essence, not merely that of relation. Instead of saying, with Zeno,
that virtue is knowledge (phronesis), he taught (SVF 3. 95, 264) that all
four primary virtues are epistemae (“wisdom”) and technae (“science”).
The individual virtues, all stemming from the generic episteme, each add
something peculiar and thus produce four different aretae. They are
inseparable because they share common principles, and each has as its
secondary object the accomplishment of the objects of other three.64
Thus the primary object of phronesis is to contemplate and put into
practice what must be done, but it also aims to contemplate and put
into practice what must be awarded to others (justice), what must be
chosen or avoided (sophrosyne), and what must be endured (andreia
[STF 3. 280]). Two accounts of Chrysippus' definition of sophrosyne
survive, and as in the case of Ariston, they reflect the theoretical and
the practical aspects of Stoic ethical theory. One says that sophrosyne
is knowledge (episteme) of things to be chosen and avoided or neither;
its antithesis, akolasia, is the ignorance of these matters (SVF 3. 262,
266). In the other definition its chief function is to render the impulses
steady and to achieve theoretical knowledge of them, while its second¬
ary function is to contemplate and put into practice the objects of the
other three virtues (SVF 3. 280).65 By recognizing that the impulses
(hormae) constitute the field of activity of sophrosyne (as in SVF 3. 264),
Chrysippus provided a bridge between the Old Stoa and Panaetius,
whose interpretation of sophrosyne rejected the intellectual rigor of
Zeno and based itself on a consideration of the role of the impulses and
appetites in moral action.
Most of the doctrine about the virtues in the Old Stoa comes from
Chrysippus. He taught, for example, that virtue is the same wherever
found (a consequence of the closely integrated system that applied the
same laws to microcosm and macrocosm).66 Arete is identical for gods and
64 The inseparability of the virtues is a doctrine of Plato, but the technical term antakolou-
thia is linked with the Stoics and may have originated with Chrysippus; see SVF 3. 295.
65 Chrysippus (SKF 3. 274, 275) defines sophrosyne as a hexis in choice and avoidance
which preserves the judgments of reason (phronesis). Cf. Cicero T.D. 4. 9. 22: temperantia
quiets the appetites and causes them to obey right reason, and it preserves the considerata
iudicis mentis.
66 According to Cicero (Nat. Deor. 2. 14. 37), Chrysippus based his ethical system on the
study and imitation of the universe.
mortals, for men and women (SVF 3. 245, 246, 253, 254)—a return to
the Socratic position which Aristotle had rejected. It is significant that
moral virtue is again ascribed to the divine. The theme of o/rotcocus Oeti
does not appear in the Old Stoa, but when it emerges in the next period,
the moral virtues are once more a bond between man and God.67
Chrysippus was also responsible for the proliferation of virtues in the
Old Stoa, a result perhaps of his effort to systematize what was traditional
in popular morality. To each of the four protae aretae he subordinated a
group of secondary virtues (SVF 3. 264). In the case of sophrosyne
these are eutaxia (“proper arrangement”), kosmiotes (“orderliness”),
aidemosyne (“sense of shame”), and enkrateia (“self-restraint”). As the
common element in all four secondary virtues suggests, sophrosyne is
thought of as controlling or ordering the impulses. The doxographers
preserve several Stoic lists of the primary and secondary virtues. Androni-
cus adds (SVF 3. 272) to the family of sophrosyne austena (“severity”),
euteleia (“frugality”), litotes (“simplicity”), and autarkeia (“independence”),
all of which bring within the orbit of sophrosyne the qualities that had
comprised the telos of the Cynics and were destined to supply one of the
major themes of Stoic popular philosophy. Another list, preserved by
Clement of Alexandria, adds eulabeia (an “avoidance that accords with
reason” [SIT7 3. 275]); this virtue, which is not a traditional attribute of
sophrosyne, is the only one that recalls Zeno’s definition of sophrosyne
as phronesis in matters of choice. It is noticeable that all these secondary
virtues are divorced from any political or social background and have
to do only with the ethics of the individual. This divorce is marked in
the case of kosmiotes and eutaxia, which are defined respectively as
“knowledge of decorous and indecorous movements” and “knowledge of
when and in what order to perform actions” (SVF 3. 264). The position
that both had formerly enjoyed in the city-state is entirely forgotten.68
After the time of Chrysippus, Zeno’s definition of sophrosyne gave way
before the more traditional motive of control of the passions, largely be¬
cause of the increasing prominence of the hormae (“impulses, appetites”)
in later Stoic psychology. Chrysippus himself maintained in all its rigor
the Stoic principle that passion is a mistaken judgment of the ruling
element in the soul (the hegemonikon), which when overmastered by the
power of impulse is swept along to something contrary to reason.
67 See Merki, 8.
68 The persistent alliance of kosmiotes and sophrosyne finds a new expression in a Stoic
doctrine recorded by Diogenes Laertius (7. 100). The four species of the beautiful (kalon) are
the just, the brave, the orderly (kosmion), and the wise. The traditional association of order
with beauty accounts for the substitution of kosmion for sophron, when kalon replaces agathon
as the generic excellence.
220 Sophrosyne
Passion is defined as wicked and wanton reason (poneros kai akolastos

logos), arising from a perverse judgment that has gained force and power
(SVF 3. 459). As the use of the key word akolastos suggests, even this view
of passion gives great weight to sophrosyne, and it was a Stoic proverb
that intemperance is the mother of passion (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
4. 9. 22). When the interest of the Stoics shifted from reason to the impulses,
still further attention was given to sophrosyne. The inconsistency of
Chrysippus’ psychology was criticized, especially by Poseidonius,69 and
Chrysippus was in fact the last influential Stoic to insist on such extreme
rationalism. With Panaetius passions ceased to be judgments and became
once again only the results of judgments, while Poseidonius restored
them to the irrational faculties of the soul.70 The shift of emphasis was
related, not only to the influence of Plato and Aristotle on Panaetius and
Poseidonius, but also perhaps to the concern of these philosophers for
the “probationer”—the man who was not a sage but was trying to
become one—and to their desire to adapt Stoic ethics to the practical
requirements of Rome.
Panaetius brought numerous and radical innovations to his concept
of sophrosyne. Some of them amount virtually to a conflation of Stoic
doctrine with that of Aristotle or the Academy. For example, contrary
to the belief of the Old Stoa that all arete is episteme, Panaetius dis¬
tinguished theoretical from practical virtue (D. L. 7. 92) and located
sophrosyne in the second of these categories.71 If we accept at face value
a statement of Aulus Gellius (12. 5), he also rejected Stoic apatheia.
Cicero seems to support this view when he speaks in De Officiis (2. 5. 18)
of the need to control (cohibere) the passions, instead of extirpating
them.72 Moreover, Panaetius denied that arete by itself is sufficient for
happiness; he recognized the need for health, affluence, and strength as
well as virtue (D. L. 7. 128). A prominent feature of his ethics is the
doctrine of the prepon (decorum, “what is fitting”); this principle was
borrowed from the Peripatetics, but from their rhetoric, rather than
their ethics. The prepon, as we shall see, is inseparable from Panaetius’
69 See Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platoms; ed. Kuhn (Leipzig, 1823), IV. 377-79; ed.
Miiller (Leipzig, 1874), 348, 5-350, 13. Consult Gerhard Nebel, Hermes 74 (1939), 36-40.
70 Panaetius, ap. Cicero, T.D. 2. 47-48; and see Max Pohlenz, Antikes Fiihrertum (Leipzig,
t934), 55 ff.; Poseidonius, ap. Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn V. 429; Muller 405, 5-14.
71 It does not, however, follow that the theoretical virtue of Panaetius is identical with
Aristotle’s arete dianoetike. For sophrosyne as a practical virtue, see Cicero Off. 1.5. 17 and
Part. Or. 76-78.
72 But in Off. 1. 20. 69, he implies, contrary to Gellius, that Panaetius agreed with the Old
Stoa on this subject. Van Straaten (183) questions whether Gellius understood the true mean¬
ing of apatheia.
concept of sophrosyne. His single most important innovation—the one

that dominated his entire approach to morality—was his view that the
appetites or impulses are the source of virtue {Off. 1.4. 11 — 14). While he
accepted the traditional psychology of the Old Stoa—the principle that
passion is a perturbatio ammi (Off. 1. 20. 69; cf. 2. 5. 18)—he altered
its emphasis: where Zeno and Chrysippus had stressed the responsibility
of the logos in attaining arete, Panaetius considered the impulses of greater
significance. For the life according to reason, he in effect substituted the
life according to feeling or instinct and defined the virtues in terms
of the basic impulses of human nature, rather than as knowledge or
wisdom applied to different situations. Each virtue arises in a desire
natural to man: wisdom in the desire for truth, justice in the social in¬
stinct, courage in the desire to protect the family and achieve independ¬
ence, and sophrosyne in the feeling for order, propriety, and moderation
{Off 1. 4- 11-14)*
Furthermore, Panaetius assigned great importance to individual
differences; herein lies another significant innovation, decisive for his
conception of the telos or summum bonum. For the Old Stoa the telos, as we
have observed, was life in accordance with nature {SVF 1. 179, 180-81 ),73
which was always identified with life in accordance with virtue, and was
equated with both happiness and the Good. Panaetius now required
conformance, not only to nature in general (obtaining throughout the
cosmos and including human nature), but, beyond this, to natura propria
nostra {Off. 1. 30. 110-11), that nature peculiar to the individual.74 The
special qualities, even the special ambitions and circumstances, of a
particular person determine what is morally good in his case. The telos
therefore consists in life according to the appetites of one’s own individ¬
ual nature, as regulated and controlled by reason {Off. 1. 28. 101).
From this doctrine follows inevitably the need for the prepon.
In rhetoric the prepon constitutes the fourth Peripatetic virtue of
style.75 Essentially aesthetic, it became, in the system of Panaetius, the
external manifestation of what is morally good—in Greek, kalon; in
Cicero’s translation, honestas or honestum {Off. 1.27. 94-95). Honestum and
decorum, like health and beauty, their physical counterparts, can be dis¬
tinguished only in theory, not in fact. In De Offcns the prepon or decorum
is mentioned first in connection with the fourth division of virtue, which
73 See Van Straaten (139-58) for a detailed exposition of the te/o-j-doctrine of the Stoa and
its development by Panaetius.
74 Clem. Alex. Strom. 2. 21: ^r\v Kara ras SeSopAvas Tj/xtr ex cpvoecos ayoppAs.
75 See Johannes Stroux, De Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi (Leipzig, 1912).
222 Sophrosyne
is sophrosyne. Cicero says (i. 5. 17): “If we bring a certain amount of

measure and order into the affairs of daily life, we shall preserve honestas
and decusand he postpones his discussion of decorum until he expounds
the duties prescribed by sophrosyne. Decorum, we then learn, is twofold:
there is decorum generale, found in moral goodness as a whole; and there
is decorum speciale, which belongs to all the subdivisions of honestum but is
especially manifest in the fourth. In this decorum speciale reside moderatio
and temperantia, together with what Cicero calls a species liberalis, a
gentlemanly appearance (1. 27. 96). The emphasis on outward appear¬
ance, which dictates many of the officia connected with the fourth virtue,
is consistent with Panaetius’ aesthetic approach to morality and with his
ideal of the harmonious personality.
The relation of the two kinds of prepon or decorum to each other and
the relation of the second to sophrosyne may be summarized briefly.
Decorum generale belongs to every action that is morally good, that, in
other words, arises from and is in harmony with one of the appetites of
human nature, controlled by reason. Since, however, human nature
possesses many appetites and impulses, differing with the individual
concerned, it is necessary to adjust and harmonize them, so as to create
order and beauty, what Plato called a symphonia in the soul. When such
a harmony exists, decorum speciale is present; and since it is the function
of sophrosyne to produce this order and equilibrium among the appe¬
tites, decorum speciale is inseparable from the fourth virtue.76
This conception of sophrosyne involves a complete departure from the
definition established in the Old Stoa. Zeno’s “phronesis in matters of
choice” has been replaced by the moral perfection of the basic human
desire for order, measure, beauty, and harmony in deeds and words {Off.
1. 4. 14). The restraint of appetite is still a function of sophrosyne, as in
traditional Greek morality {Off. 1. 28. 101, 1. 29. 102), but is now sub¬
ordinated to the aesthetic function. The triumph of the latter is evident
from the comparison between the beauty of a body whose parts are
harmoniously arranged and the decorum that shines forth (elucet in vita)
when ordo, constantia, and moderatio exist in every deed and word {Off. 1.
28. 98). One result of this aesthetic approach to sophrosyne is a new
emphasis on what Cicero translates as approbatio (“approval”).77 Just as
76 On prepon or decorum, see Van Straaten (160-63) and consult Lotte Labowsky, Die Ethik
des Panaitios (Leipzig, 1934); Max Pohlenz, op. cit.; and Pohlenz, To Prepon, Nach. Gott. Gesell-
sch- 0933)-
77 Another result of the radical shift in the scope of sophrosyne is the transfer to andreia of
certain functions that the Old Stoa had assigned to sophrosyne. See Gred Ibscher, op. cit.,
71-73, and Van Straaten, 180 ff.
physical beauty combined with harmony gives pleasure (deleciat), so

decorum wins approval—movet approbationem (Off. i. 28. 98). Panaetius
shows more concern for the outward aspects of sophron behavior than had
any previous philosopher. It is perhaps for this reason that De Ojficiis
emphasizes verecundia, the virtue that causes us to avoid offending our
fellow men. In verecundia (the sense of shame, decency, Greek al8rjixoovvr\)
the essence of decorum is especially evident (Off. 1. 28. 99; cf. 1. 28. 100,
where precisely the same statement is made about temperantia). Conse¬
quently, when the duties prescribed by sophrosyne are discussed, serious
consideration is given to such matters as controlling the movements of
the body, so as to achieve verecundia and pulchritudo (Off. 1. 35. 126-1. 41.
149), and avoiding the unpleasant physical appearance of those who are
overcome by passion (1. 29. 102). That verecundia has deep roots in
Roman ethical tradition no doubt strengthened its claim to a prominent
place in the Romanized Stoic ethos.
The officia of sophrosyne (for which Cicero could find no single Latin
rendering) reflect Panaetius’ concern for individual differences. Decorum
is attained only if we obey both the universal laws of nature and the
special requirements of our own nature, including those imposed by
chance (such as birth and wealth) and those that we ourselves have
chosen (like the various professions). The concept of the Mean is also
involved in the officia that produce decorum. Panaetius observes that
appetite must be subjected to reason, neither running ahead nor lagging
behind {Off. 1. 29. 102), and in connection with specific duties he often
refers to the need for moderation. His ideal of outer and inward harmony
leads him to prescribe a multitude of officia which will make sophron be¬
havior manifest to the observer; and in the performance of these officia,
mediocritas or moderatio will often be the guide. It is in details such as the
relevance of the Mean to the domestic arrangements of a gentleman (1.
39. 138 ff.) or to his outward appearance and dignity (1. 39. 141) that
Panaetius expresses his fundamentally aesthetic approach to morality
and reveals, without a doubt, the influence of the Roman ruling class,
whose interest lay chiefly in the practical applications of philosophy.78
These are the passages in which it is particularly difficult to distinguish
between the principles of Panaetius and the interpretations supplied by
Cicero.
78 Doubtless it was as a concession to the demand for relaxation of the Old Stoic rigor that
in the Middle Stoa the moral virtues became the concern of the kathekon (Latin officium)—
which is within the grasp of the probationer— rather than of the katorthoma (“right action”),
which is possible only for the sage. This development is discussed by E. V. Arnold, Roman
Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), 301-2.
224 Sophrosyne
The status of sophrosyne in Panaetius’ system depends in part on his

strong feeling for measure and harmony; in part also on his belief that
this excellence, like wisdom, has its origin in an instinct that is uniquely
human. While courage and justice spring from desires common to the
lower animals, even the basic appetites in which wisdom and sophrosyne
originate are exclusively human. Only man has foresight, memory, and
the power of reasoning, from which wisdom is developed; and only
man has a sense of the beauty and harmony in the visible world, by
analogy with which nature and reason develop in him a feeling for
beauty and harmony in thought and action {Off. i. 4. 14). Sophrosyne
becomes, for Panaetius, the psychological prerequisite for any virtuous
activity; as such it achieves defacto primacy among the cardinal virtues
and provides a new basis for the Stoic doctrine of antakolouthia (the
“inseparability of the virtues” [1. 27. 94-96, 28. 100]). Since, however,
its primacy is largely dependent on the doctrine of the prepon, which later
Stoics virtually ignored, it was not sustained in the philosophy of
Poseidonius or the other successors of Panaetius in the Middle Stoa.
At the close of Book I of De Officiis (1. 45. 159), where he arranges the
duties in order of precedence, with justice or commumtas at the top,
Cicero refers to a collection made by Poseidonius of deeds so infamous
that the wise man would not commit them even to save his country. In
such cases alone would sophrosyne (here called moderatio modestiaque)
take precedence over the officia of justice. This collection is lost, and the
Fragments of Poseidonius’ ethical treatises cast only indirect light on his
view of sophrosyne. Unlike Panaetius, Poseidonius had no special feel¬
ing, aesthetic or otherwise, that would lead him to give sophrosyne a
preferred status above the other virtues,79 and in his system it became
once more merely the excellence of the appetitive element in the soul.
It is perhaps significant that the word sophrosyne does not occur in the
extant Fragments.80
The position of sophrosyne in the system of Poseidonius may never¬
theless be determined through a study of his conception of the soul, the
passions, and the summum bonum. In contrast to Zeno, Chrysippus, and
Panaetius, he maintained that the ruling element in the soul (the
hegemonikon or principale) is not purely rational but includes irrational
79 Nebel (loc. cit., 57) suggests that Poseidonius’ special feeling is for Tapferkeit (andreia).
A. D. Nock (J.R.S. 49 [1959], 2) comments that the word for Poseidonius is enthusiasm, as
decorum was for Panaetius.
801 am indebted to Professor Ludwig Edelstein for the opportunity to consult his un¬
published edition of the Fragments of Poseidonius.
faculties as well.81 Only the excellence of the rational element (logikon)

constitutes episteme (or phronesis) and can be imparted by teaching. The
aretae of the irrational faculties (described in Platonic terms as thymoeides
and epithymetikon) are themselves irrational (alogoi) and are acquired
through habituation.82 There is every reason to believe that Poseidonius
considered the excellence of the appetitive soul to be sophrosyne, although
no extant fragment actually attests to this belief.83 Its function would be
to render the epithymetikon obedient to the rational element in the soul—
a most essential function, since according to Poseidonius the cause of the
passions lies in the failure of the irrational faculties to obey the rational.84
More original is another statement, preserved by Galen, who reports that
Poseidonius held the cause of the passions to be “not following in every
respect the daimon in oneself which is akin to and has a nature like that
of the daimon which governs the entire cosmos, but following instead the
inferior and bestial element.” 85 This statement in turn should be taken
in conjunction with the doctrine about the telos ascribed to Poseidonius
by Clement of Alexandria: “To live in contemplation of the truth and
order [taxis] of the cosmos and to fashion oneself in so far as possible ac¬
cording to this, being led astray in no respect by the irrational element
of the soul.” 86
From these three doctrines arose the special importance of sophrosyne
81 These are called Svvapeis, rather than /xepT] or ti'Srj, as in Plato. Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn V.
454-55, Muller 432, 9-15; and Seneca Ep. 92. 8. See Karl Reinhardt, “Poseidonius,” P. W.,
Vol. 22. 1, pp. 739 ff., on Poseidonius’ theory of the soul and its faculties, and their relation
to the passions.
82 Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn V. 466-68, 429, VII. 589; and Muller 444, 11-447, 4; 405. 5-14;
583. 15-584. 10. On methods of imparting virtue, see Seneca Ep. 95. 65-66; note especially
the use of exempla for teaching temperantia. Poseidonius refers to the Platonic myth of the
charioteer and his two horses in discussing the different ways of instilling rational and ir¬
rational virtue (Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn V. 466-68, Muller 445, 15-446, 3 and 447, 1-3). On
the consequences for education of Poseidonius’ psychology, see Karl Reinhardt, Poseidonius
(Munich, 1921), 313 ff.
83 Reinhardt (P. W. 743), discussing the influence of Poseidonius on later Platonists, cites
Albinus’ definition of sophrosyne as the virtue of the epithymetikon (Didask. 29, see below, n. 105).
Poseidonius’ principal contribution to the history of this virtue may be that he lent his
authority to the interpretation of sophrosyne as the excellence of the appetitive element
alone, rather than of the entire soul. As we shall find (n. 105), most of the philosophical schools
of the Empire agree on this doctrine.
84 Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn IV. 377-79 and Muller 348, 5-350, 13. Cf. also Kuhn V. 429 and
Muller 405, 5-14. The passions are not judgments of the rational faculty of the soul, nor
even consequences of such judgments, as the Old Stoa had taught, but arise in the irrational
faculties. Virtue depends on the right understanding of the passions; consult Ludwig
Edelstein, A.J.P. 57 (1936), 286-325, especially 305 ff.
85 Galen, op. cit.: Kuhn V. 469-76 and Muller 448, 11-456, 14.
86 Strom. 2. 21. 129. 1-5 (II. 183, 10 Stahlin).
226 Sophrosyne
for Poseidonius. If the passions—which are the cause of misery and un¬
happiness87—result from the failure of the soul to bring its irrational
faculties into subservience to the rational, sophrosyne is essential for
happiness and virtue—although for reasons entirely different from those
that gave it value for Panaetius. If, moreover, the soul has for its purpose
the imitation of the cosmic daimon, whose special characteristics are
truth and order, such imitation will reproduce these qualities in the soul.
Although Poseidonius does not describe the cosmic order as sophron, the
way is open for a return to the Platonic conception of the imitation of
God as a source of sophrosyne. The affinity between the daimon in the
soul and the daimon in the cosmos—as a link between the human and
the Divine—lends support to the doctrine of bfioLcocns Oeti, which is
in any case strengthened by the parallel of macrocosm and microcosm
in the Stoic system.88
One way in which sophrosyne might be affected by this renewed
emphasis on the contemplation of the heavens is suggested by a passage
in the Tusculan Disputations (sometimes regarded as an echo of Posei¬
donius).89 The Apolline maxim “Know thyself” is here interpreted
in the light of such contemplation. The mind that meditates night and
day upon the world order and realizes that it is itself coniunctam cum divina
mente is filled with joy. When it perceives the bond that unites all things,
and when it is fired with the desire to imitate the eternity of the Divine,
it is filled with tranquillitas animi. From this contemplation come the
cognitio uirtutis and the flowering of all the genera partesque virtutum (5. 25.
70-71). “Know thyself” thus becomes part of the complex of ideas re¬
lating knowledge (cognitio, gnosis) and the imitation of the Divine (OjUOtcoats
Octi) to virtue and happiness. Another echo of these ideas, in the Moral
Epistles of Seneca, shows that the demand for ethical catharsis was not
forgotten. Speaking of the kinship between man and God (socii sumus eius
et membra), Seneca suggests that the telos of the soul is to return to the
heavens, and he maintains that this return can be accomplished only by
renouncing avarice and servitude to the body (Ep. 92. 30-31).90
Some practical applications of Poseidonius’ concept of sophrosyne may
be found in the Fragments of his historical work, which frequently com¬
ment on the virtues and vices of individuals or peoples. Athenaeus, for
87 Galen, op. at.: Kuhn V. 469 and Muller 448, 11 ff.
88 On this subject, see Werner Jaeger, Scnpta Minora (Rome, i960), 2. 469-81, and cf.
Reinhardt, Poseidonius (Munich, 1921), 310.
89 See, e.g., Merki, 8 ff., and consult Cicero Nat. Deor. 2. 153 for the connection among
knowledge, contemplation, virtue, and happiness.
90 Cf. Reinhardt, P. W., 757-58, and Annelise Modrze, Philol. 87 (1932), 300-31.
Philosophy after Plato 22J
example, drawing upon Poseidonius, describes the sophrosyne of the

early Romans and cities Scipio Africanus as an example. Since he
praises the simplicity and frugality of Scipio, in contrast to the extrava¬
gance of Lucullus, who after his victory over Mithridates abandoned
sophrosyne and introduced luxury (tryphe) to Rome (6. 105. 274 f.), it is
clear that Poseidonius’ conception of sophrosyne included moderation
and restraint, even though it is impossible to prove that the actual word
sophrosyne which appears here and in similar passages goes back to
Poseidonius himself.91
A similar interpretation of the virtue prevails in the writings of the
Later Stoa,92 whose most notable representatives—Musonius Rufus,
91 Other passages that reveal Poseidonius’ concept of sophrosyne as it affects conduct

include Athenaeus 5. 211E-215B (on the behavior of the Peripatetic philosopher Athenion)
and Strabo 3. 2. 9 (a diatribe against gold and silver) and 7. 3. 2-7 (on the habits of the
Mysians). The last passage, which comments on the relation of justice to sophrosyne,
interprets sophrosyne in terms of autarkeia and litotes and compares extreme self-restraint to
the Cynic way of life. For a variety of passages in Cicero, Plutarch, Diodorus, and others
that may reflect the views of Poseidonius about sophrosyne and allied virtues in the State or
in statesmen, consult Margaret Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New
York, 1951), 35 ff. Two further beliefs about virtue ascribed to Poseidonius by Diogenes
Laertius affect his view of sophrosyne. Like Panaetius, he denies that arete alone suffices for
happiness (on this problem, see Seneca Ep. 92 and the comments by Annelise Modrze, loc.
cit.) and requires in addition health, affluence, and strength (D. L. 7. 128); and he recognizes
four divisions of arete (7. 92), probably the four cardinal virtues.
92 Among the other representatives of the Middle Stoa, Hecato alone possesses some
importance for sophrosyne, by reason of his emphasis on enkrateia as a virtue parallel to so¬
phrosyne (related to it as fortitudo is related to magnitudo ammi) and his contribution to the
Stoic doctrine of theoretical and nontheoretical virtue. For the influence of Hecato on Cicero
(especially in Off. Ill), on Seneca (in his lost De Officiis), and on Martin of Bracara
(in various passages of his Formula Vitae Honestae where continentia is either added to temperantia
or takes its place in the tetrad), see Heinz Gomoll, Der stoische Philosoph Hecaton (Leipzig,
1933), with the comments of Gauthier, 141 n. 2, 150 n. 1, 161 n. 2. The distinction
between theoretical and nontheoretical virtue, ascribed to Hecato by Diogenes Laertius
(7. 90), is referred to by Cicero T.D. 4. 30 (a discussion of sanitas ammi and its relation to
sophrosyne) and Stobaeus II. 62. 15 (on the distinction between technae or epistemae—the
cardinal virtues—and dynameis, which are beauty, health, and strength of soul). It is impor¬
tant to distinguish Hecato’s use of the terms episteme and dynamis from that of Poseidonius: to
Poseidonius theoretical virtue (episteme) is the perfection of the rational faculty of the soul—
i.e., phronesis. The virtues of the irrational faculties (andreia and sophrosyne) are dynameis
(nontheoretical). To Hecato all four cardinal virtues are theoretical; the dynameis are the
counterparts (simulacra virtutum) which appear in those whose virtue is not yet perfect. What
the Middle Stoa tends to call theoretical and nontheoretical virtue is comparable to the
distinction between perfect (teleiae) and imperfect (euphyiae) virtues found in the Middle Acad¬
emy and among the later Platonists of the second century after Christ. The relevant passages
in Cicero, Stobaeus, and Diogenes Laertius and the differences among members of the Mid¬
dle Stoa on this doctrine are discussed by Robert Philippson, Philol. 85 (1930), 357-413;
Dryoff, op. cit.; Arnold, op. cit., 105; and Gomoll, 39 n. 1. August Schmekel (Die Philosophie
der mittleren Stoa [Berlin, 1892], 290) denies that the Stobaeus passage derives from Hecato.
228 Sophrosyne
Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—abandoned any pretence of an

interest in the theoretical aspects of arete. Without exception these
philosophers were concerned with the practical applications of Stoic
philosophy; as a result it is often hard to distinguish their Stoicism from
the equally practical morality of Platonic or Cynic philosophers in the
first centuries of the Empire. Stoics like Musonius and Epictetus,
Platonists like Maximus of Tyre, Cynics like Dio of Prusa, even rhetors
like Libanius and Themistius, preached essentially the same ethical
doctrine. One of the concepts they share is the definition of sophrosyne
as the restraint of the appetites.
Musonius will serve to exemplify the treatment of sophrosyne by
these later Stoics; 93 although neither as harsh nor as extreme as some
contemporary Cynics, he adopted the Cynic-Stoic approach to morality,
with its emphasis on ponos (“labor”) and askesis (“discipline”) in attain¬
ing virtue. Those traces of the theoretical approach to ethics that remain
in Musonius’ treatises are mere commonplaces and had no effect on his
rules of behavior. He says, for example, that we philosophize with only
a small part of the soul, the intellect (dianoia [XVI, p. 87 Hense]); yet
to Musonius, as to most of his contemporaries, philosophy was not con¬
cerned primarily with the intellect. Philosophy was a matter of correct
living—of being just, useful, sophron, and good (III, p. 9; XVI, p. 87).
When he says that virtue is both theoretical and practical (VI, p. 22),
he means only that we must know what is right and do it. If forced to
choose between logos and ethos, Musonius says, he would prefer the
second, because it is better to be self-controlled and sophron than to
speak correctly about the virtues (V, p. 21).
Sophrosyne in such a context is bound to show affinities with the
Cynic conception of the virtue; and in fact for Musonius it is closer to
frugality (euteleia) and self-control (enkrateia) than to any other qualities,
and manifests itself above all in a love of simplicity. The beginning and
the climax of sophrosyne are found in self-control with respect to food
and drink (XVIII A, p. 94). Frugality is to be preferred because it is
more conducive to sophrosyne and more fitting for the good man (XVIII
B, p. 104). This precept is applied, not only to food and drink, but also
to shelter, adornment, and all other departments of human life.
Sophrosyne (together with the other qualities that conduce to simpli¬
city) receives more frequent and prolonged praise from Musonius than
93 Some contributions of Seneca to the history of sophrosyne will be considered in Chap.

VIII.
Philosophy after Plato 22g
do any of the other cardinal virtues.94 It invariably appears as a private,

individual excellence, never related to the State except as it is the duty
of a ruler to provide his subjects with an example of sophrosyne. Even
in this instance the virtue itself remains entirely personal. Thus in the
Fragment That Kings Should Be Philosophers (VIII), Musonius exhorts the
King of Syria to rise above pleasure and self-seeking, to love frugality
(euteleia) and hate extravagance, to practice aidos, rule his tongue, culti¬
vate order (both taxis and kosmos), and demonstrate propriety in appear¬
ance and action (one of the rare allusions to the prepon after Panaetius).95
Although the allusions to frugality or to taxis and kosmos may be
reminiscent of certain Cynic-Stoic doctrines that constituted an impor¬
tant part of the political philosophy of the Hellenistic and Graeco-
Roman eras (especially the philosophy of kingship),96 most of the
Fragment is a tissue of commonplaces, which had been handled and re¬
handled ever since the Evagoras of Isocrates and were destined to become
the stock in trade of practitioners of the basilikos logos in the Second
Sophistic.
94 The strong emphasis on sophrosyne in all the popular philosophies of the imperial age
reflects social conditions of the kind that also produced satire and diatribe and the denunci¬
ations of pagan luxury, greed, and sexual immorality by early Christian moralists. For a
sketch of the pagan background—religious and philosophical, as well as social—against which
the development of Christian asceticism, including sophrosyne, must be seen, consult A. D.
Nock, Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background (New York, 1964).
95 Cf. also XVIII B, p. 104.
96 The Stoic doctrines that the wise man, who surpasses his fellows in virtue, therefore has
the right to rule over them, and that a world monarchy is justified because it corresponds to
the cosmic reign of Zeus (or natural law) gave support to the ruler cult in the Hellenistic
age and the Roman Empire. Sophrosyne is concerned in both doctrines, since this excellence
is invariably required of the wise man (i.e., the ruler), and in its cosmic form it corresponds
to the order that the wise man must create in his own soul. The Fragment of Musonius’ advice
to the king of Syria typifies Stoic references to sophrosyne in this context, since it takes up
this virtue as one of the tetrad and shows how each in turn must be acquired through the
study of philosophy. Musonius also refers to the theory that the king is “animate law” (nomos
empsychos), but does not explain the implications of this phrase, which is usually linked with
Neopythagorean theories of kingship (see pp. 235-36). To at least some Neopythagorean
theorists, the virtue of a king is different from that of his subjects, but in Stoic writings no
such distinction is made; nor does Musonius here seem to imply such a theory, unless it may
be extracted from his remark that the king must be sophron and oucppovi^CLV his subjects, so
that he himself may rule oaxppoj'cos and they be ruled Kooptus. There is nothing to support
an interpretation that would make sophrosyne the virtue of the king and kosmiotes the excel¬
lence of his subjects, especially since the effect of sophrosyne on both parties is that they avoid
wantonness (pTjfierepot Tpvcptioi). Musonius concludes his discussion of the qualities allied
with sophrosyne by saying that they make the ordinary man semnos and sophron but render
the king godlike and worthy of reverence. Here, too, the difference in the two grades of so¬
phrosyne is one of degree, not of kind.
2jo S op hr o syne
More peculiar to the Stoa, which was traditionally interested in

feminine virtue as part of the doctrine that arete is the same for all—
men and women, human and Divine—are Musonius’ two treatises
entitled Whether Women Should Study Philosophy (III, IV) and the essay On
Sexual Indulgence (XII). In all three, sophrosyne continues to denote the
control of the appetites and passions, and it is clear that the primary
function of philosophy is to instil this virtue. Since the gods give women
the same faculties as men, including the impulse towards virtue, how is
it right—Musonius asks—that they are denied the chance to study
philosophy? All the qualities proper to a good woman may be learned
from philosophy, and the first and most important of these is sophrosyne.
Musonius analyzes the duties of a sophron woman: to avoid unlawful
loves and any kind of incontinence or appetite; to hate strife, extrava¬
gance, and ornamentation; to control anger and grief and every other
passion (III, p. io). All these actions are enjoined by philosophy, and all
are equally necessary for men and women.97
In his discourse On Sexual Indulgence Musonius again treats the equality
of the sexes, this time from a point of view that emphasizes their com¬
mon moral responsibilities. He requires a single standard of sexual
morality, denying to men any further indulgence of their appetites than
is proper for women, and treating this rule as a precept of sophrosyne.
It is just as incompatible with this virtue for a master to cohabit with a
slave girl as for a mistress to do so with a male slave. The extent to which
this precept was, if not practiced, at least preached by pagan moralists
of the Empire is a sign of the common attack made by pagans and
Christians on social and moral abuses of the day.98
97 As III and IV reflect the traditional Stoic concern for the education of women (consult
Dryoff, op. cit., 311 ff.), so XII reflects the special interest of this school in “conjugal philo¬
sophy.” See Bickel, 191 ff. The position of sophrosyne as the excellence proper to the mar¬
ried state seems to have been established in such treatises, which profoundly influenced both
the thought and the vocabulary of Patristic writers on this subject. In IV, Musonius reiterates
the identity of the virtues for men and women and enumerates the Stoic tetrad. A new
reason for cultivating andreia appears in his statement that this virtue is necessary for a
woman to protect her chastity (sophrosyne) in the face of threats and torture (IV, p. 15). This
topic appears in Patristic writings in connection with the theme of the virgin martyr, who
unites sophrosyne with andreia.
98 Cf. Seneca Ep. 94. 26; Julian I. 46D; Plutarch Mor. 144B-145A. Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius say nothing novel about sophrosyne. Epictetus assumes that the wise man will
restrain his appetites in his effort to attain freedom, and a great many of his precepts refer
to self-discipline and its rewards. Sophrosyne is opposed to akolasia and allied to enkrateia
(.Discourses 3. 1. 8; 4. 9. 17-18 Schenkl). Epictetus’ standards of sexual morality are less lofty
than those of Musonius (he does not advocate a single standard), but he frequently
condemns adultery and has much to say about the immorality of Roman matrons. His motto
otidxov Kal anx'xou (“bear and forbear” [Frag. X]) suggests that endurance and self-restraint
One further consequence of the Stoic doctrine of the identity of virtue

may be mentioned, since it leads Musonius to comment on the moral
virtues manifested by God and incidentally reveals the way in which
Stoics of the Empire interpreted the telos of the Old Stoa (life in accord¬
ance with nature) and accommodated it to the doctrine of the imitation
of God. Musonius observes that man will live in accordance with nature
when he realizes that his nature is to be virtuous. Man is an imitation
of God (fiLfirnia 9eov), and we think of nothing in connection with the
gods more than wisdom, justice, courage, and sophrosyne. God is sophron
in that he is not overcome by pleasure or self-seeking (pleonexia) and is
superior to appetite and envy (XVII, p. 90). If man will imitate God in
this respect (6juolcos e'xeu^), he will be truly happy.
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS

There is no need to catalogue the allusions to sophrosyne in the
treatises produced by the Academy, the Middle Platonists, the Peripa¬
tetics, and the Neopythagoreans of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman
periods, for they rarely achieve originality. Electicism is the mark of all
these schools; not until the coming of Neoplatonism did sophrosyne
undergo further significant development. It will suffice to note the chief
tendencies of the other schools, as expressed by one or two of their more
notable spokesmen.
The eclecticism of the Academy shortly after the death of Plato is
already evident in the Definitions ascribed to Speusippus, the second
head of the Academy. Sophrosyne is defined variously as a mean state
of the soul in regard to natural pleasures and desires, as a harmony and
order of the soul in respect to pleasures and fears, as an agreement
in the soul with regard to ruling and being ruled, as doing one’s own
work (autopragia) according to nature, as a reasonable agreement of the
soul concerning Good and Evil, and as a disposition according to which
the possessor chooses and rejects what he ought." The first of these
form the core of his ethical code. Marcus Aurelius also takes sophrosyne for granted as a
virtue that should be sought (3. 2, 3. 6, 4. 49, 5. 12, 8. 1, 12. 27), but he does not speculate
about its nature, and he accepts the current definition as restraint of appetite (3. 2) He him¬
self is praised by Dio for his sophron and enkrates rule of the soldiery (71. 3. 3) and by
Herodian for his sophron bios (1. 2. 4).
99 Speusippus, Frag. 24 Mullach. Interest in sophrosyne and the other moral virtues
remained strong in the generation just after Plato. Xenocrates wrote a treatise On Sophrosyne,
and Diogenes Laertius tells an edifying story about his powers of persuasion. Polemo, who
was akolastos in his youth, became drunk and broke into Xenocrates’ lecture room when the
philosopher was discussing sophrosyne. Polemo was inspired to become a student, adopted a
life of austerity, and ultimately became head of the Academy (4. 12, 16).
2J2 Sophrosyne
definitions has Aristotelian overtones, while the last resembles Zeno’s

concept of sophrosyne. Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus, main¬
tained as the core of his ethical doctrine Plato’s teaching that moral
perfection depends on the rule of nous over the irrational and requires
the soul to free itself from the bonds of the senses.100 His belief that the
disentanglement of the soul from the fetters of passion is the primary
purpose of philosophy is a step in the direction of Neoplatonism and
forecasts the principal importance of sophrosyne for the latter school—
its role in achieving catharsis.
The Middle Academy was too much concerned with skepticism to
spare much attention for ethics, but the New Academy under Philo and
Antiochus returned to the tradition of the founder and restored ethics
to a position of supreme importance. Antiochus, whom Cicero calls
germanissimus Stoicus—the “next thing to a Stoic” (Academica Priora 2. 43.
132)—illustrates the eclecticism of the New Academy in regard to
sophrosyne. His attempt to mediate between the rival schools is manifest
in several of his teachings about arete, as when he maintains that the
virtues are individual but inseparable—thus combining Peripatetic
pluralism with Stoic unity (De Finibus 5. 23. 67); or when he wavers
between Stoic apatheia and Peripatetic metnopatheia.101 Antiochus also
tries to make the best of both schools on the question whether virtue
alone suffices for the happy life, as orthodox Stoics maintained and the
Peripatetics denied.102 He agrees with the Peripatos in distinguishing
intellectual from moral virtue (Fin. 4. 7. 18) and placing sophrosyne in
the second category; but in accepting a canon of four virtues, which
belong to the dominant part of the soul, the mens (Fin. 5. 13. 26),
he leans towards the Stoa. In the midst of this disposition to accom¬
modate the views of every school except the Epicurean, it is not surpris¬
ing that Antiochus finds the function of sophrosyne to be resistance to
pleasure (Fin. 5. 23. 67; cf. Academica Posteriora 1. 6. 23); this conception
persists in Platonism down to the second century after Christ.
The principal spokesmen for Platonism during the early Empire—
Onosander, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius, Hippolytus, and the
100 See Richard Heinze, Xenocrates (Leipzig, 1892), 123 ff., especially 150-51.
101 Hans Strache (Der Eklektizismus des Antiochus von Askalon [Berlin, 1921]) holds that
Antiochus reconciled apatheia and metnopatheia. This view is contested by R. E. Witt (Albinus
and the History of Middle Platonism [Cambridge, 1937], Chap. V).
102 Antiochus’ solution: virtue alone is sufficient for the vita beata but not for the beatissima,
which requires external goods as well (Cicero Acad. Prior. 2. 43. 134). On the ethics of
Antiochus, see, in addition to Strache, Georg Luck, Der Akademiker Antiochus (Bern, 1953),
especially pp. 55 ff.
Commentator on the Theaetetus—apply this interpretation of sophrosyne
to a great variety of topics; but again, lacking the stimulus of a
revolutionary movement in thought, they contribute nothing original
to the history of the virtue.103 Albinus is in many ways typical of the
Middle Platonists of the second century. The principal interest of the
school was now undeniably religious and theocentric, in some cases
mystical; and it would seem natural for sophrosyne to share in the
consequences of this shift of emphasis. Philosophy, as defined in the
Didaskalos of Albinus, is a longing for wisdom or a release of the soul
from the body. The combination of the other-worldly orientation of the
Phaedo with the OjUOicoats-doctrine of the Theaetetus might be expected
103 Onosander’s treatise The General applies the doctrine of the virtues to the special require¬
ments of the military life and makes sophrosyne the first commandment so that the general
will not be drawn away by pleasures from more important concerns (i. 1-2). Cf. Cicero De Imp.
Cn. Pompei 14, where Pompey’s temperantia is commended for precisely the same reason. Plutarch
invariably comments on the sophrosyne of generals (e.g., Alexander, Agesilaus, Pompey,
Sertorius) or their lack of it (Demetrius, Antonius). For Plutarch’s varied use of the concept of
sophrosyne in the Moralia, see below, pp. 248-49. Maximus of Tyre represents a fusion of rhet¬
oric and philosophy, and some of his comments on sophrosyne belong to the no man’s land
between the two disciplines. In Oral. XXV he applies a canon of four virtues to the various genera
causarum: he maintains that the orator must be phrommos as a counsellor in deliberative oratory, a
dikaios pleader in the courtroom, a sophron orator in panegyric, and an epistemon teacher in the
classsroom. The substitution of episteme for andreia and the creation of a fourth genus causarum to
keep the traditional number of virtues demonstrate the prestige of the tetrad. Episteme and
the classroom had obvious attractions for a philosopher like Maximus, but one can easily
imagine situations during the Empire when andreia would be the most essential of all
qualities for an orator. Both as philosopher and as rhetor, Maximus is interested in exempla
virtutum, many of which he finds in Homer (see especially Orat. XXXII), although he also
employs historical examples. For sophrosyne his models include Hector, Achilles, Patroclus,
and Penelope—all represent some aspect of sophron eras {Orat. XVIII, XXVI)—and Odys¬
seus, who is sophron by virtue of his endurance of suffering {Orat. XXVI). Heracles is the
model of the sophronistes, who drives out evil {Orat. XV, XXVI). Examples of akolasia are
supplied by Paris, Thersites, Sardanapalus, Critias, and Alcibiades {Orat. XV, XVIII,
XXVI). The sophron eros of Socrates is the subject of two discourses (XVIII, XIX). A theme
that Maximus shares with the Stoic Musonius (XI, p. 60) is the sophrosyne of country life
{Orat. XXIV). The attention paid to exempla virtutum et vitiorum is characteristic of philo¬
sophical writings in the second and third centuries of our era. The Neopythagoreans and the
Neoplatonists, like the Stoics, delight in the allegorical interpretation of Homer and of myth
in general; this predilection leads them to seek exempla of virtue and vice in epic and tragic
poetry and also to find therein exhortations to moral conduct (just as the Christian Fathers
find exempla and exhortations in the Bible). Iamblichus (Vita Pyth. 11 Deubner) treats Odys¬
seus as a model of conjugal sophrosyne, while his Letter to Arete (Stobaeus III, 5. 45-50, pp.
270 ff.) cites Bellerophon and Perseus as types of masculine sophrosyne (chastity). Their
monstrous antagonists, the Chimaera and the Gorgon, symbolize the passions that result
when the soul is contaminated with matter. Cf. the Neoplatonist Synesius, Encomium of Bald¬
ness 1170A. Julian {Orat. Ill) comments on the sophrosyne of Penelope, and Proclus {In
Rempub. 129 Kroll) defends Homer against the charge that Achilles and Odysseus violate
sophrosyne.
2$4 Sophrosyne
to endow sophrosyne with an ascetical cast, and there are indeed traces
of this view in the Didaskalos. The philosopher, Albinus says, must resist
pleasure if he is to become like God, and this resistance is made the
task of sophrosyne (i). Yet the doctrine of the virtues in chapters 29 and
30 is for the most part merely the familiar conflation of Peripatetic,
Stoic, and Academic commonplaces,104 according to which sophrosyne
is defined as the perfection of the appetitive part of the soul and is
described as an orderly arrangement (taxis) of the appetites and
impulses, and their obedience to the hegemonikon.105 The natural
consequences of the doctrine of the o/Wcoais were not, in fact,
recognized by Albinus. They are more apparent in Apuleius’ De Platone,
especially in the biographical chapters which describe Plato’s effort to
imitate the Pythagorean continentia and castitas (1. 3),106 and in certain
treatises of Maximus of Tyre,107 who was strongly affected by Neopy-
thagorean mysticism; but it remained for Plotinus to define the function
of sophrosyne in the purification that is a necessary prelude to the
6juLoicoois 6eCo.
The Neopythagoreans wrote extensively on the subject of sophrosyne,
and while the extant works tend to show special interest in the effect of
104 E.g., the distinction between dianoetic and ethical virtue; the doctrine of the tripartite
soul; the inseparability of the virtues when they are perfect; the existence also of imperfect
virtues that are not inseparable; the conception of virtue as a mean, in the sense that it lies
between two vices, and as an extreme, in so far as it is perfect. As Hippolytus puts it (Philo-
sophoumena 569. 4 ff. Diels), the virtues are extremes kata timen (so far as value is concerned),
but means kata ousian (according to their nature). Cf. Apuleius De Platone 2. 5 on the virtues
as medietates and summitates. The vice of excess in the case of sophrosyne is always akolasia;
but the vice of defect is given various names, doubtless because the Aristotelian anaisthesia
did not represent a familiar type: misadoma (“hatred of pleasure”) by Theages the Neopy-
thagorean, skaiotes (“gaucherie”) by Hippolytus, elithiotes (“foolishness”) by Ammonius. See
R. E. Witt, op. cit., chaps. VI and VII, for an analysis of Albinus’ debt to Antiochus and
Poseidonius by way of the Epitome of the Stoic Areius Didymus; and consult J. H. Loenen,
Mnemosyne, Ser. 4, 9 (1956), 296-319, and 10 (1957) 35-36, for a defense of Albinus against
the charge of eclecticism.
105 It is typical of post-Platonic philosophy to assign sophrosyne to the appetitive faculty
of the tripartite soul, rather than to all three parts. As a result, one of the Platonic functions
of sophrosyne is transferred to justice, now defined as the agreement of all the parts of the
soul (symphoma, Didask. 29). Cf. Apuleius De Platone 2. 4 (the vice of the third part of the soul
is luxuria) and 2. 6 (its virtue is abstinentia); Theages (Stobaeus III, 117, p. 78); Plotinus Enn.
1. 2. 1; Sallustius, Chap. VIII Nock. Proclus {In Rempub. p. 212. 12 ff. Kroll) seeks to
reconcile Plato’s view with that of the later schools.
106 The Latin equivalents that Apuleius favors for sophrosyne do not include the Cicero¬
nian temperantia. In De Platone 2. 1 the moral virtues are listed as prudentia, iustitia, pudicitia,
and fortitudo; the most important is said to be prudentia, the next continentia (cf. 2. 9). In 2. 6,
sophrosyne is also rendered by abstinentia. In the Golden Ass, Venus refers to her worst enemy
as Sobrietas {Metam. 5, p. 127 Helm).
107 See especially the discourses on demonology (VIII, IX, XIII).
Philosophy after Plato *35
this virtue on married life and the education of children, it is evident
that the school found sophrosyne relevant to every department of human
life, including politics. We have observed that Plato’s acquaintance
with Pythagorean communities in South Italy may have affected his
theory of sophrosyne in the State, as it is developed in the Gorgias and
the Republic,108 Plato’s doctrines in turn dominated the political theories
of later Pythagoreans, both in Hellenistic times and thereafter. The
essence of their political philosophy was the application to the State
of the traditional idea of harmony and the adoption of the Platonic
analogy between the State and the tripartite soul. Iamblichus’ Life of
Pythagoras is instructive in this connection. From it we learn that
government rests upon a Divine foundation; that the rule of the gods is
justified by man’s inclination to hybris, which must be corrected by
sophromsmos and taxis (30. 174-76 Deubner); that the division between
rulers and ruled is natural; and that sophrosyne is the virtue proper to
the subjects. This one-sided interpretation accords with the current
tendency in ethics to make sophrosyne the perfection of the appetitive
element in the soul, which must be obedient to the intellectual faculty,
and to overlook the sophrosyne of the rest of the soul.
Yet Pythagorean treatises on kingship do not entirely neglect the
sophrosyne of the ruler. The scanty fragments of Old Pythagorean
writings suggest that in the early days of the school a theory already
existed which represented God as king of the universe and required the
earthly ruler to imitate Him.109 A development of this theory may be
seen in the Fragments of four later treatises preserved by Stobaeus,
probably Neopythagorean in origin,110 all of which are concerned with
the likeness of the king to God. The treatise by Pseudo-Archytas
(Stobaeus IV. 1. 132 ff.) refers to the king as “animate law” (nomos
empsychos) and maintains that he is to the State what the rational ele¬
ment is to the soul. This principle is developed further by Diotogenes in
his discussion of the duties and character of the king: he is to the State
as God is to the universe; and since the State is a harmony of different
108 See above, pp. 163 ff., and consult Morrison, C.Q. 8 (1958), 198-218.
109 See E. L. Minar, Jr. (Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory [Baltimore, 1942])
for an effort to reconstruct the political doctrines of this school, partly from Fragments of
Aristoxenus’ writings preserved in Iamblichus’ Vita Pyth.; and see Armand Delatte, Essai sur
la politique pythagoricienne (Paris, 1922), 280, 216.
110 On the date and philosophical credentials of these fragments, see E. R. Goodenough,
Y.C.S. 1 (1928), 55-102; Louis Delatte, Les Traites de la royaute d’Ecphante, Diotogene et
Sthenidas (Liege, 1942); E. H. Kantorowicz, H.T.R. 45 (1952), 268; and M. H. Fisch, A.J.P.
58 (1937), 144-49-
2j6 Sophrosyne
elements (an imitation of the order and harmony of the universe), the
king, as animate law, must bring about this harmony in himself. He will
do so by conquering pleasure and ruling his passions (Stobaeus IV. 7.
61-62). Pseudo-Ecphantus (Stobaeus IV. 7. 64) makes it clear that the
king has a unique character which enables him to contemplate God
directly and imitate His virtues. The king’s subjects will in turn
imitate his virtues, which are a reflection of the Divine. A Fragment of
this treatise discusses specific virtues and emphasizes both the need for
autarkeia (“independence”), which makes one self-restrained, and the
danger of extravagance, which leads to incontinence, the mother of
hybris (Stobaeus IV. 7. 65). The king’s imitation of God depends on his
achievement of autarkeia.in
These Fragments are important, not only because they suggest that
for the Neopythagoreans the virtue of the king was somehow different
in kind, not just in degree, from that of his subjects;112 but because they
provide further evidence of the relation between sophrosyne (and allied
qualities) and the imitation of God.
Abundant proof of the central importance of sophrosyne for Neo-
pythagorean private life is supplied by such documents as Iamblichus’
Life of Pythagoras, the Life of Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus, Phintys’
treatise On Feminine Sophrosyne, and the treatise ascribed to Ocellus
Lucanus.113 Iamblichus’ Life is particularly instructive in that it shows
how pervasive the role of sophrosyne in Neopythagorean morality
actually was. Pythagoras, upon whom the later school projected its
contemporary views, is reported to have described sophrosyne as the
111 Autarkeia replaces sophrosyne, perhaps through Cynic (or Stoic) influence, shown also
by the emphasis on the danger of polyteleia (“extravagance”). For Cynic views on kingship,
see Ragnar Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala, 1948).
112 Contrast the Stoic view, as shown, for example, by Seneca; the ruler is not divine
because of his position but has the opportunity, like all men, to become godlike through
virtue (e.g., De Clem. 1.5. 7, 7. 1).
113 Apollonius is portrayed as a teacher of sophrosyne, which is almost always interpreted as
the means of controlling appetite and passion. See, e.g., 1. 13, where Apollonius is said to
have surpassed Sophocles in the famous anecdote about his escape from the mastery exerted
by passion, because Apollonius displayed sophrosyne even in youth; and 1.33, on the dif¬
ference between the so-called sophrosyne of eunuchs and true sophrosyne. Exceptional are
passages in which sophrosyne means the absence of arrogance (2. 20); or the presence of
sobriety (3. 18), good sense (5. 34), or moderation in a ruler (5. 29 and 36): Vespasian
displayed sophrosyne and metnotes in avoiding conduct that was either overbearing or craven.
Phintys’ treatise, On Feminine Sophrosyne, is discussed by Bickel, who suggests that it borrows
from Stoic treatises on conjugal philosophy (Stobaeus IV. 23. 61 and 61 a, p. 588; Bickel, 204 ff.).
Pseudo-Ocellus Lucanus knows sophrosyne exclusively with the meaning continentia; his
remarks on the sophron generation of children are comparable to the doctrines ascribed to
Pythagoras by Iamblichus (Vita 31. 209 ff.); see 24. 14 Harder.
one virtue suitable to both sexes and all ages (8. 41; cf. 27. 132).
Although the meaning “chastity” is prominent in Neopythagorean refer¬
ences to sophrosyne, and writers of the second century were particularly
fond of crediting the founder with precepts of sophrosyne designed to
achieve a minute regulation of marital relations, the chapter in
Iamblichus’ Life which is devoted to this excellence recognizes a wide
range of meaning: the duties prescribed by sophrosyne include the
strenuous study of thedremata, the cultivation of friendship, and the
practice of silence as an askesis (“discipline”) of sophrosyne, as well as
obedience to detailed rules for the intercourse of the sexes and the up¬
bringing of the young (31).114
The mysticism that burst out sporadically in the Neopythagorean
and Middle Platonic schools found its ultimate expression in Neo¬
platonism, whose theocentric philosophy triumphed over the material¬
ism of both the Stoa and the Garden at the end of antiquity and
smoothed the path leading to a Christian philosophy that would lay
great emphasis on the purification of the soul as a means to the imita¬
tion of God.115 Plotinus’ signal contribution to the history of the
cardinal virtues was his use of Plato’s canon in a doctrine of catharsis
derived ultimately from the Phaedo, but owing much to other sources as
114 Iamblichus praises Pythagoras for teaching the Greeks sophrosyne and enkrateia (6. 32)
and describes how he discoursed on this subject to the young, whose appetites place them in
special need of these virtues (8. 41); to the people of Croton, who thereupon dismissed all
the harlots (27. 132, 31. 195); and to the Crotonian women, whom he persuaded to give
up their extravagant ways (x 1). In the course of the Life, sophrosyne is linked with dietary
rules (24. 106; cf. Porphyry De Abstinentia I. 1), with the need for symmetry in all things (31.
187), and with a host of related qualities and practices, such as abstinence from wine,
moderation in eating and sleeping, aidos, and friendly feelings towards comrades. Pythagorean
sophrosyne is illustrated by many anecdotes, including the story of the heroine Timyche,
who bit off her tongue rather than speak under torture (31. 194). The conversion of a young
man from eros to sophrosyne by means of music illustrates the moral efficacy of certain
rhythms (31. 195; cf. 25. 112). Sophrosyne is closely related to the central characteristics of
Pythagoreanism, as they are portrayed by Iamblichus; the praecepta coniugalia, which form a
significant part of the province of sophrosyne in the Life (see especially 31. 209-11), are
omitted from the Life of Pythagoras by Porphyry, who-—as Bickel points out (199)—devotes
more attention to purity (hagneia) than to conjugal sophrosyne. In De Abstinentia, Porphyry
treats anroxv (.iixpvx&v as a means of achieving sophrosyne, which he virtually equates with
hagneia.
115 Nothing of significance for sophrosyne emerges from the Fragments of Peripatetic
writings shortly after Aristotle, although it is known that treatises on sophrosyne were
composed by Theophrastus and others. See Heracleides Ponticus, Frag. 52 Wehrli, Straton,
Frags. 138-40 Wehrli. The most influential of the later Peripatetics, Alexander of Aphrodis-
ias, has little to say about the virtues in his treatise On Fate, except to deny the same virtues
to gods and men (37) and to defend freedom of the will on the ground that to reject it would
be to nullify both virtue and vice.
2j<3 Sophrosyne
well—including Aristotle’s distinction between ethical and dianoetic

virtue, the Stoic doctrine of apatheia, and Pythagorean theories of
transcendence and purification.116 The virtues, as Plato had said, are
purifications (Phaedo 69B-C), and both he and subsequent philosophers
had recognized levels or stages of virtue. Plotinus employed these levels
(bathmoi) as stages in the process of unification with, or absorption in,
the Divine, which he regarded as the goal of philosophy (Enneads 1.2. 1).
His idea of absorption involves, however, not only the purification of
the soul, but also the return of the soul to its origin; it is this combination
of the upward movement with the notion of purification that marks
Plotinus’ theory of the virtues. Like rungs in a ladder (the influence of
the Symposium is evident here), the four virtues—always having the same
names but performing a different function at each stage of the upward
progress—enable the soul to escape from the material and sensible
world and ascend towards the goal of unity with the Divine Mind.
The simplest version of the ladder is given by Plotinus himself in the
First Ennead, where three stages are described: the civic, the cathartic,
and the paradeigmatic. Although Plotinus believes, with Plato, that we
may become like God through the practice of the virtues, he does not
mean that justice, holiness, phronesis, and sophrosyne are Divine
attributes. With Aristotle, he elevates the Divine above moral virtue
and assigns to justice, sophrosyne, and the rest (operating on the moral
level) only a preliminary function, that of preparing the soul to dispense
with moral virtue, as does the Divine (1. 2. 1). The civic aretae, Plotinus’
lowest bathmos, limit and moderate the appetites, while entirely
removing passions and false opinions (1. 2. 2). The essence of these
aretae resides in measure. In Peripatetic terms, they result in metriopatheia;
at this level all four virtues partake somewhat of the nature of sophro¬
syne. Sophrosyne itself belongs only to the appetitive part of the soul.117
It is defined as a kind of agreement and harmony of the appetitive with
the rational part (1. 2. 1). The second stage of arete is that which
purifies the soul from all taint of matter;118 hence the name “cathartic.”
Its result is not metriopatheia, but what the Stoics called apatheia. If the
116 For a survey of the sources of Plotinus’ doctrine of purification, see Jean Trouillard, Le
Purification plotinienne (Paris, 1955). On the development of the theory of bathmoi, consult
Otmar Schissel von Fleschenberg Marinos von Neapolis und die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade
(Athens, 1928).
117 In this respect Plotinus agrees with the Middle Platonists rather than with Plato
himself.
118 Matter is not intrinsically evil but is evil in so far as it is remote from the Divine and
from the One.
soul escapes from the condition that Plotinus describes as being
homopathes (“suffering in common”) with the body, it is practicing so-
phrosyne at the cathartic level (1.2. 3). Plotinus observes that it would
not be wrong to call this stage of arete bpolcooLS 7rpds 6eov (“assimilation
towards God”). Only the third of Plotinus’ bathmoi is positive rather
than negative. It is at this stage that the activity and the essence of the
Divine—that is, the Divine Mind, Nous—are imitated. Although in the
Divine there are no moral virtues (1.2. 3), the imitation of the Divine
Mind produces in the soul the virtues that Plotinus calls paradeigmatic
(exemplary). At this stage the soul no longer has a twofold nature—
rational and irrational—nor is there any need for one “part” to control
the other, for they are unified, as is the Divine (1.2. 6). Sophrosyne
now takes the form of a turning (or conversion) towards the Divine
Mind (rj do to 7rpds vovv oTpocpp), for in the Divine Mind itself sophrosyne
consists in turning towards itself (to 7rpds avrov).119 Thus Plotinus
intellectualizes the virtues, using them progressively to separate the soul
from all that is bodily and to enable it (once every impurity has been
eliminated) to contemplate the Divine Mind and, by contemplating, to
become one with it.
As the Stoics after Zeno multiplied the subdivisions of the canon of
cardinal virtues, so the followers of Plotinus added further rungs to the
ladder of the virtues and complicated the process of the soul’s ascent;
they obscured the dialectical method of Plotinus with mysticism derived
both from the Greek mystery cults and from the Orient. Porphyry, for
example, lists four stages—civic, cathartic, contemplative (or purified),
and paradeigmatic. At the first bathmos the virtues produce metriopatheia;
at the second, apatheia; at the third they enable the soul to turn towards
the Nous and contemplate it, without concern for the passions; and the
fourth set of virtues belongs not to the soul itself, but rather to the Nous
(Aphormai 2. 34).120 Iamblichus adds still a fifth grade: his stages are the
119 It is this definition that Augustine borrows when he wishes to describe temperantia as it
exists in God.
120 Macrobius (In Somn. i. 8) defines these four types of virtue neatly: Has [passiones]
primae [virtutes] molliunt, secundae auferunt, tertiae obliviscuntur; in quartis nefas est nominari. The
Neoplatonists vary the treatment of the bathmoi in many ways. Proclus associates each of the
four virtues with a particular stage of the ascent of the soul; he regards sophrosyne as the
characteristic virtue of the ethical stage, justice as the civic virtue, andreia as the cathartic,
and phronesis as the theoretic (In Rempub. 12. 26 Kroll). Olympiodorus also considers so¬
phrosyne the virtue appropriate to the ethical grade (In Phaed. p. 46 Norvin), but when he
analyzes behavior with regard to pleasure in terms of the four bathmoi, he assigns “true”
sophrosyne to the cathartic level (p. 119). Olympiodorus (In Ale. I) discusses Gnothi sauton in
the context of the bathmoi. Self-knowledge is connected with sophrosyne by way of the
240 Sophrosyne
civic; the cathartic; the theoretic, corresponding to Porphyry’s contem¬

plative or purified bathmos; the paradeigmatic; and the hieratic, which
consists of the virtues of the One (hence they are also called eviction
[Olympiodorus In Phaed. 2. 138 ff.]). The hieratic virtues can be attained
only through mystical union with the One, not through dialectic.
Olympiodorus in his turn erects a structure consisting of seven steps by
inserting two—the physical and the ethical—below the civic virtues,
with which Plotinus had begun. The physical virtues are instinctive
dispositions;121 the ethical ones are the virtues of well-brought-up chil¬
dren; then come the political or civic virtues, which require knowledge
in order to harmonize the three faculties of the soul; next the cathartic;
then the theoretical, or purified, aretae; then the paradeigmatic, whose
functions are the same as in Iamblichus; and at the top the hieratic,
representing the stage of mystical union to be achieved through the
mystery rites practiced by Proclus and his disciples.122
Rather than record the proliferations of the doctrine of the virtues in
the Neoplatonic tradition,123 we shall select a single example, the Life
of Proclus by Marinus of Neapolis, because it shows the use of the bathmoi
as a structural principle in biography. Marinus announces that he
intends to avoid the hackneyed topics of the logographers and to arrange
his eulogy according to the categories of the seven stages of arete (2). He
is in fact conflating rhetoric and philosophy by expanding the regular
topic of the virtues in epideictic oratory until it embraces the entire
kliscourse.124 Philosophy contributes merely the multiplication of the
doctrine of conversion (epistrophe), which belongs especially to this virtue. For the interpre¬
tation of the civic, cathartic, and theoretical stages of sophrosyne as different kinds of
epistrophe, see 215. 4-12 Westerink (on Ale. I. 130D-133C).
121 Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1144b 8.
122 See Trouillard, op. cit., 186 ff.
123 Neoplatonic interest in sophrosyne expressed itself in a variety of ways, in addition to
the theory of purification. Some valuable sources include Iamblichus’ Letter to Arete, which
exalts sophrosyne as the source and savior of all the virtues and finds cosmic sophrosyne in the
order of the months and the mixture of the elements (Stobaeus III. 5. 45-50, pp. 270 ff.);
Proclus’ commentaries on the dialogues of Plato, which interpret allusions to sophrosyne in
the light of current Neoplatonic or Neopythagorean religious beliefs; Hermias of Alexandria,
In Phaedr., with its analysis of sophron eros (43. 5 ff. Couvreur) and its study of 17 rex^^fj
oooypoovi'ri, the excellence that belongs to such men of science and practical wisdom as
Asclepius and Heracles (92. 28); the sophistic Encomium of Baldness by Synesius, which associ¬
ates baldness with sophrosyne and cites a number of mythical and historical exemplars, such
as Silenus and Socrates; the Orations of the Emperor Julian, which combine Neoplatonic
doctrine on the virtues with rhetorical commonplaces from epideictic oratory and Cynic-Stoic
topics traditionally connected with the sophronizon logos.
124 See Menander Rhetor On Epideictic II. IX. p. 222. Spengel.
canon of four virtues by seven, to produce the physical, ethical, political,

cathartic, theoretic, theurgic, and “ineffable” virtues; the last are so far
beyond man as to be incapable of being named by him.
Marinus’ Life of Proclus demonstrates the usefulness to rhetoric of the
Neoplatonic doctrine of bathmoi and occasionally introduces a novel
interpretation of one of them. For example, in connection with the first
category, that of physical virtues, Marinus differs from others of his
school (such as Olympiodorus)125 in defining the physical aretae, not as
natural dispositions, but as excellences of the body. Euaisthesia (“excel¬
lence of the sense perceptions”) is “somatic” phronesis, strength of body
is “somatic” andreia, beauty is bodily sophrosyne, and health is bodily
justice. As sophrosyne is seen in the symphbnia and homologia (“agree¬
ment”) of the faculties of the soul, so beauty consists in a certain sym¬
metry of the organic parts. Here the traditional analogy between
sophrosyne and health is replaced by the more specialized Platonic
comparison between sophrosyne and beauty (in the sense of symmetry).
As a result, health is now considered analogous to justice. A bizarre
aspect of Marinus’ biography is his effort to correlate the stages in Proclus’
acquisition of the virtues with geographical stops on his journey through
life. Thus Byzantium, where he was born, is linked with the physical
virtues; Xanthus, where he was consecrated to Apollo, with the ethical
bathmos; and Athens, where he studied philosophy and came to know
the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic and Laws of Plato, with the
political aretae (6, 14).126 This device, too, is merely an adaptation of
the practice of the rhetors, who used famous cities of the Graeco-Roman
world as collective exemplars of the virtues and the vices.127
Such a fusion of rhetoric and philosophy is entirely typical of the
writers of the third and fourth centuries—pagan and Christian alike—
in their discussions of sophrosyne. The speculations of the philosophical
schools became the commonplaces of the rhetorically trained historians,
125 Olympiodorus assigns physicae aretae to irrational beasts: lions possess andreia, cattle
sophrosyne, storks justice, and cranes wisdom (In Phaed. 45 Norvin). Other irrational
creatures that Neoplatonic writers credited with sophrosyne include the turtledove (Elias
Proleg. Philos. 19. 30 ff.) and the raven (Joannes Philoponos Com. in Cat. 141. 25). Cf.
Porphyry De Abstin. III. 11 on the sophrosyne of the ringdove. —
126 The process is not, however, carried through for the entire series of bathmoi. The later
stages are associated with the travels of the mind, under the guidance of
_...
Chaldaean doctrines.
127 See also Lucian’s account of the life of Nigrinus, which depicts Athens as the home of
philosophy and sophrosyne, Rome as the seat of hedone and vice (B 12-16). The rhetorical
topos concerned with eulogy and invective about cities is discussed by Quintilian 3. 7. 26; see
also Menander Rhetor 3. 359 ff. Spengel.
242 Sophrosyne
biographers, essayists, and epideictic orators; and the total interpenetra¬

tion of the two dominant disciplines accounts for the monotony prevail¬
ing in literary references to sophrosyne from the Hellenistic period on.
It was only when Christianity infused new life into philosophic and
religious thought that the development of the concept of sophrosyne,
which had been arrested for centuries, began again. For Patristic
writers concerned with this virtue, the most impressive contribution
made in the final stages of pagan philosophy was the Neoplatonic as¬
sociation of sophrosyne with the process of catharsis and the consequent
assimilation of this excellence to katharotes, hagneia, and other qualities
related to purity, with which it was only occasionally identified in
classical Greek thought.
VII
Literary and Popular Usage

after Plato
IF Greek literature after the close of the classical period yields no star¬
tling development in the concept of sophrosyne, it nevertheless offers a
wealth of allusions in poetry, prose, and inscriptions which reveal the
pervasive importance of this excellence. The Fragments of New
Comedy, elegy, epigram, versified Cynic diatribe, and Theocritean
idyll—to mention only those remains of Hellenistic poetry that contain
references to sophrosyne1—present a remarkably unified view. Sophro¬
syne is nearly always interpreted as the control of appetite, usually erotic.
Menander, for example, normally employs the word sophron with the
meaning “chaste” and applies it indifferently to men and women.2 The
phrase kosmios kai sophron is now entirely devoid of political implications
and means only “decent and respectable” (Samia 129).3 The scope of
sophron in the Monostichae is somewhat broader; it includes “modest” or
1 Several important Hellenistic authors—Aratus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Bion, Moschus,

Herondas—ignore sophrosyne. Theocritus uses the word sophron only once, to describe a
modest and respectable woman (28. 14).
2 Epit. 702, Samia 129, Frags. 610, 238. The use of sophron in fragments of Middle and New
Comedy corresponds to its meaning in a third-century poem in praise of an officer at the
court of Alexandria (Page, Select Papyri, III, 466, No. 111), where it makes one of a long list
of adjectives: some were familiar in classical Attic usage (xpôtos, evyevps)-, while others
reflect the Alexandrian background ((ptAo/SaotAevs, (ptAe'AAijr). Here sophron implies the
rather vague commendation (like our “decent”) so often found in Isocrates. Otto Skutsch
(C.Q. 13 [1963], 94-95) compares with this fragment a similar list of qualities in Ennius
(Ann. 234-51), where prudentem (250) or possibly suo contentus (245) might represent sophron.
3 The proper name Sophrone (Prudence) became a stock name for the old nurse in New
Comedy (Menander Epit. and Hero; Terence Eunuch).
243
244 Sophrosyne
“unassuming” (with respect to tyche, 189, or to the conduct befitting a

stranger, 392) and “law-abiding” (380, 580), but most often here too it
means “chaste” or “discreet” (160, 505, 555, 634).
In Alexandrian epigram and elegy the rare allusions to sophrosyne
relate it either to chastity or to moderation in food and drink.4 Cal¬
limachus, for example, mentions his inability to maintain a sophron
thymos under the influence of Eros (Anth. Pal. 12. 118), and Meleager
confesses that he has been captured by Eros, who has stationed him at
the gate of his loved one, like a statue inscribed with the words (12. 23):
“Spoils won from Sophrosyne.” Leonidas of Tarentum relates sophrosyne
to another appetite when he dedicates cauldrons, pots, and pans to
Gluttony and Voracity and bids them (6. 305): “Receive these evil gifts
of an evil giver, and never grant him sophrosyne.” The epigrams of the
Anthology, whether Hellenistic or later, display two general tendencies in
their treatment of sophrosyne, depending on the purpose of the epigram:
if they are erotic, they revile sophrosyne as an impediment to pleasure
and perpetuate the canard that a sophron woman is always ugly;5 but if
they are honorary epigrams, they treat sophrosyne with respect,
especially when they make it the virtue of philosophers. Antipater’s
epitaph for Diogenes the Cynic describes his wallet, cloak, and staff as
the weapons of independent (autarkes) sophrosyne (7. 65), and Simmias’
epigram on Plato (7. 60) refers to his sophrosyne and “just habit
of mind” (ethos dikaios).6
The Cynic-Stoic diatribe, whose avowed purpose was to instil
sophrosyne (hence its customary designation as sophronizon logos), some¬
times found expression in verse or contributed moralizing common¬
places to poets who were not themselves Cynics. A fragment of an
iambic poem by Phoenix of Colophon, apparently a diatribe against
wealth, alludes to the folly of piling up riches if one is not made sophron
by edifying discourse (Frag. 1 Diehl3), while Cercidas of Megalopolis
(Frag. 2a Diehl3) perverts the normal meaning of sophrosyne in
his comment on a line by Euripides which attributes to Eros two gales
4 In the Anthology as a whole, allusions to sophrosyne are not infrequent: of some forty-
seven references, about thirty have to do with chastity, the rest with some other form of
restraint.
5 E.g., 11. 196. Occasionally a poet defies convention and denies this, as in 10. 56 (cf.
Plutarch Advice to Bride and Groom 142A). For the hostility to sophrosyne which is part of the
warfare of the wine-drinking poets against the water drinkers (the sophrones), see my article,
C.P. 43 (1948), 12-14.
6 Cf. the epitaph for Zeno (D. L. 7. 29).
Literary and Popular Usage 245
or breezes (Sthen. Frag. 16. 22-25 Page).7 According to the Cynic view,
the sophron breeze, which blows gently from the right, represents
the kind of love that is satisfied by harlots, while the violent blast from
the left symbolizes intrigues with married women. Cercidas recom¬
mends the voyage with sophrosyne, guided by Aphrodite from the agora
(Horace’s Venus parabilis), rather than the dangerous adventure with the
wind from the left. This perversion of sophrosyne into mere calculation
(recalling the sophron nonlover of the Phaedrus) not only is typical of the
Cynic attitude towards sex but also illustrates that transvaluation of
words that was one of the Cynic heritages from Diogenes of Sinope.
That sophrosyne in one form or another was linked with this school is
evident not only from the epitaph for Diogenes mentioned above, but
from the famous elegy by Crates of Thebes in which the Cynic ideal of
frugality (euteleia) is described as the child of glorious Sophrosyne (Frag.
2 Diehl3).8 Wherever Cynic influence is felt—whether in poetry,
oratory, or satire—sophrosyne is close to euteleia and has as its antithesis
extravagance (tryphe or polyteleia).
The two major influences on the prose literature of the Hellenistic
and Graeco-Roman periods were philosophy and rhetoric, and there is
at least one point at which the two streams converge: the cardinal
virtues. The Academy and the Stoa had centered their ethical doctrines
upon the canon, with the result that from the fourth century b.c. any
writers, in whatever genre, who were in contact with either school
tended to employ this convenient category for moralizing comments.
Plutarch is a notable example, and among the historians, Polybius. But
at some unknown moment in the Hellenistic age the rhetorical schools
had also made the Platonic-Stoic virtues their own. When Aristotle in
the Rhetoric applied the topic of the virtues to epideictic oratory
7J. U. Powell and E. A. Barber (New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature [Oxford,
1921], 8 ff.) discuss the relation of these fragments of Cercidas and Euripides. Cynic
elements in Phoenix and Cercidas are traced by Gustav A. Gerhard, Phoimx von Kolophon
(Leipzig, 1909), 36-41, 205 ff.
8 Cf. Anth. Pal. 10. 61, where Pallas calls Poverty the mother of Sophrosyne, an association
that goes back at least to Aristophanes Plutus 563-64. Plutarch (On Borrowing 828D) observes
that the sanctuary of Frugality is always open to the sophron. The claim of various schools
to instil sophrosyne is satirized in a fragment of Lycophron’s play Menedemus (Frag. 3
Nauck), which describes that philosopher’s frugal banquets and says: “After a temperate
feast a scanty cup was passed around in moderation, and for dessert those who wished to
listen had a sophronistes logos.” The twofold meaning of sophron—referring both to moderation
in food and drink and to the philosophic discourse—lends whatever point there is to the
jest. For another attempt to play upon the meanings of sophron, see Leonidas of Tarentum
Anth. Pal. 7. 452.
246 Sophrosyne
and ethical persuasion, he did not confine his list to four; and it is un¬
certain what rhetor was the first to do so. Both Cicero in the De Inven-
tione and the anonymous Auctor ad Herennium, reproducing what is clearly
the commonplace Hellenistic rhetorical doctrine, use the canon of four
virtues both in epideictic and in the topic of the honorable (honestum or
rectum), which belongs to deliberative oratory. The definitions offered in
both treatises seem to be Stoic in origin,9 but beyond this meager clue
there is no evidence to determine who, after Aristotle and before Cicero’s
model in De Inventione, took this important step. If we turn back to the
oratory of the fourth century b.c., we find that groups of virtues
are often mentioned, but the Platonic four—just these and no others—
are not common. The sophistic eulogy of Eros which Plato ascribes to
Agathon in the Symposium, and the panegyrics of Evagoras and Nicocles
by Isocrates stand almost alone in making specific use of the tetrad.10
The loss of so much of Hellenistic rhetoric and the gap in Greek oratory
between the fourth century and the beginning of the Second Sophistic
conceal from our gaze the growth of this topos.
When sources once more become available, we find that treatises
concerned specifically with epideictic oratory—such as those of Menander
—and the handbooks that include encomium among the preliminary
exercises (progymnasmata)—such as those of Hermogenes, Aphthonius,
Theon, Nicolaus the Sophist, and Aristides—follow a uniform pattern.11
The four cardinal virtues are dealt with under the heading of Achieve¬
ments (praxeis), sometimes divided according to war and peace, in
which case andreia is naturally considered a warlike virtue, and the
other three are considered the virtues obtaining in time of peace
(Menander 3. 372-73 Spengel). Theon alone goes beyond the Stoic
tetrad and adds piety and Aristotle’s two favorites, liberality and
magnanimity. The place of sophrosyne in rhetoric and oratory is a
special topic which cannot be briefly summarized, but it is relevant to
the present discussion of sophrosyne in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman
literature to point out that the rhetorical treatment of the virtues had
wide influence, especially on the writing of history from the fourth
century on. The special affinity of history to epideictic is shown in
the use of the topics of praise and blame by the historians of Philip and
9 See Wilhelm Kroll, Philol. 90 (1935), 206-215.

10 Xenophon, however, knows and uses the tetrad in both eulogy and historiography. He
begins his praise of Agesilaus with piety (eusebeia) and then proceeds to the four cardinal
virtues.
11 See Georg Reichel, Quaestiones Progymnasmaticae (Leipzig, 1909). On epideictic in general,
consult Theodore C. Burgess, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 3 (1902), 123 ff.
Alexander, who readily adopted the commonplaces of the virtues and

vices by now traditional in Attic oratory. Lucian says that Theopompus
was “more an accuser than a historian” (De Hist. Conscr. 59);12
and Ephorus notoriously interrupted his narrative with moralizing
platitudes and indulged his taste for panegyric. All the Isocratean
historians show a strong belief in moral training as a function of history,
while the transmission of ethical precepts as commonplaces in the
rhetorical schools led to the convention by which the historian judged
leading figures according to the canon of the cardinal virtues and their
opposed vices.
Polybius, who frequently criticizes rival historians for confusing
history with panegyric, and who himself applied different standards to
his discussion of the career of Philopoemen in his Encomium and his
History (10. 21. 6-8), nevertheless castigates Philip V and Agathocles
for their licentiousness and other vices in terms appropriate to the
rhetoric of the courtroom (for example, 10. 26, 15. 23. 5, 15. 25. 22).
The influence of philosophy is even stronger, however, especially in two
famous passages involving sophrosyne. The discussion of the mixed
constitution in Book VI adapts Plato’s remarks in the Republic about the
need to unite andreia and sophrosyne in the soul and the State and, with
an echo also of the Laws, condemns the Lycurgan constitution in Sparta
for failing to make the state as a whole autarkes and sophron, to match
the character of the individual Spartans (6. 48. 4-7). In Book XXXI
Polybius describes in detail the origin of his friendship with Scipio
Aemilianus and explains in the process how the young Scipio deliber¬
ately set out to acquire a reputation for sophrosyne and megalophrosyne.
The first of these he sought by defeating his appetites and molding his
life so that it would be in every way consistent and harmonious. At the
end of five years he had established a universal reputation for eutaxia
(“harmonious character”) and sophrosyne (31. 22. 25). Although it has
been suggested that the philosophical influence at work here is the
Greater Alcibiades, the resemblances are at least as great to the ethical
terminology of the Middle Stoa, especially to that of Panaetius, another
member of the household of Scipio.13
12 For examples of Theopompus’ censorious attitude towards individuals and states, see
Chap. IV above, n. 76. On the moralizing tendencies of Hellenistic historians as a group,
consult Laistner, 14-15.
13 Paul Friedlander (A.J.P. 66 [1945], 337-40) points out that the same virtues are
mentioned in the Polybius passage and in Ale. I. 122C. But they are not mentioned alone,
as a single group, in Ale. I., and the vocabulary employed by Polybius (ojuoAoyofijaeror,
ov/x(po)vov, evra&a) might equally well be Stoic. Polybius frequently refers to the importance
248 Sop hr0 syne
Plutarch is perhaps the best illustration of a man of letters whose

wide familiarity with philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry enriched his
concept of sophrosyne with reflections of every stage in its historical
development. Himself a Platonist, Plutarch normally reproduces the
doctrines of Middle Platonism in the Moralia—although he follows
Aristotle in many aspects of the system expounded in the treatise On
Moral Virtue.14 In both the Moralia and the Lives, Plutarch makes so¬
phrosyne profoundly important for education and morality. He habit¬
ually scrutinizes the record of his biographical subjects for this excellence
when estimating their moral character; for example, he describes the
austerity of Lycurgus and Numa, both of whom sought to instil
autarkeia and sophrosyne in their people; the purity of Aristides and the
sophron (“frugal”) way of life of Cato the Elder; the clean-handedness of
Coriolanus; and above all the continence of Alexander, whom Plutarch
(unlike most of his biographers) hails as a model of sophrosyne.15 When
Plutarch wishes to encourage his readers to live a better life through
contemplation of an exemplum horribile (as he says in his introduction to
the Life of Demetrius), he chooses for special emphasis and rhetorical
amplification those episodes that will show the degeneration of his
subject from sophrosyne to licentiousness.
While the Moralia contain no novel interpretation of sophrosyne,
they are full of curious and enlightening remarks about its relevance to
a surprising variety of problems. These include the relation of tyche to
the virtues of Alexander, the symbolism of the tortoise in statues of
Aphrodite and Athene, the need for a sophron woman to cultivate
charm, the superiority of rooks and daws to Penelope herself where
sophrosyne is concerned, the ruler as an image of God, made like Him
by virtue, and the search for exempla of sophrosyne in Homer.16 The
wide scope of sophrosyne in Plutarch’s usage is betrayed by its numerous
of the prepon and the kathekon (decorum, offcium) and often comments on the need for sophro¬
syne in the character of kings and statesmen, but the word normally refers only to self-
control and avoidance of luxury, not to political moderation or prudence. See 7. 7. 8 on the
sophron bios of Hiero; 18. 41. 8 on the character of Attalus; 8. 10. 10 on the companions of
Philip I, who were kingly by reason of their acts of high-mindedness, their cuocppoovvais, and
their daring. The use of the plural is unusual at this date.
14 See R. M. Jones The Platonism of Plutarch (Menasha, Wise., 1916).
15 Lycurgus: Life (Loeb edition) 5. 6, 11. 4, 17. 2, 31. 1. Numa: Life 4. 3, 20. 7.
Aristides: Comparison with Cato 6. 1. Cato: Life 1. 3, 5. 1, 19. 3. Coriolanus: Comparison with
Alcibiades 5. 2. Alexander: Life 4. 4, 21. 3, 22. 4, 47. 4.
16 Moralia on tyche of Alexander: 97C, 326E ff., 337B, 339A; on tortoise: 142D, 381E; on
charm: 141F-142A; on Penelope: 988F ff.; on ruler: 780D; on Homeric exempla: 31A-C,
32B ff.
antitheses; in addition to the familiar akolasia, mama, and hybns, we find
ataxia (“disorder”), terpnon (“sensual pleasure”), asotia (“drunkenness”),
philedonia (“love of pleasure”), erotikon (“the erotic”), and many others,
mostly connected with the domination of the appetites over the rational
element.17
One final group of Greek authors may be considered as representing
the literary treatment of sophrosyne, before Christianity injected new
life into the moribund topics of virtue and vice: the members of the so-
called Second Sophistic, who flourished under the Empire. They
achieved their greatest prominence from the second to the fourth
centuries after Christ and mingled in their ethical discourses and
panegyrics the commonplaces about sophrosyne that we have already
found in the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman philosophers. Since there is
so little originality to enliven such masses of material, it will be sufficient
to glance at one of the more significant members of the group, the
Emperor Julian, and note how rhetorical and philosophical influences
united to produce his concept of sophrosyne.18
Julian reflects the rhetorical technique of the great Sophist Libanius,
while his brand of Neoplatonism is derived largely from Iamblichus.
Like Iamblichus in the Life of Pythagoras (31), he gives to the word
sophrosyne a wide range of meaning: mastery of the sensual appetites,
moderation, obedience to law, military judgment, prudence, and
feminine virtue. His familiarity with classical Greek literature is evident
in a host of exemplars of sophrosyne drawn from tragedy or epic
poetry: Amphiaraus, by the absence of a device on his shield, exemplifies
masculine sophrosyne in the sense of modesty (303D), while Penelope,
Evadne, and Laodamia serve as models for women (110B, 127C). The
feminine exemplars are cited in three panegyrics of Constantius and
Eusebeia, all of which derive from the basilikos logos of the rhetorical
schools. In the case of the emperor, sophrosyne has two principal facets,
moral purity and lack of arrogance (especially moderation shown
towards conquered enemies)— 19 both of which were thoroughly famil-
17 Synonyms are the conventional aidos, enkrateia, kosmiotes. Eunomia is no longer related to
sophrosyne, which has purely individual connotations (97E). Mikrologia (“stinginess”) may
be termed sophrosyne by flatterers who call sophrosyne itself agroikia (“boorishness” [57C]).
18 Other prominent representatives of the Second Sophistic include Dio of Prusa, Aelius
Aristides, Libanius, Themistius, and Himerius; all of them employed many of the same
commonplaces of sophrosyne as did Julian, especially in discourses concerned with eulogy
and the nature of kingship. Although Lucian of Samosata had the same sophistic back¬
ground, he was much more than a Sophist and employed the familiar topics only to mock
them.
19 The moral purity of Constantius was so great that he could serve as a model, not just
2go Sophrosyne
iar as topics of sophrosyne from the time of Isocrates and Xenophon.

Julian contrasts Constantius with Alexander the Great and Cyrus,
traditional models of megalopsychia and philotimia, but lacking in so¬
phrosyne. Constantius is their equal in the heroic virtues, but unlike
them he exhibited enkrateia and sophrosyne in his relations with his
father and brothers (41C) and, after he became emperor, in his treat¬
ment of his subjects (45C ff.). In the case of the empress, sophrosyne is
even more important, since it is the central virtue to which all other
qualities are subordinated. When Julian entered the presence of Eusebeia,
he thought that he beheld a statue of Sophrosyne erected in a temple,
and when she spoke, it was as though he heard the voice of Sophrosyne
herself (123B-C). The benevolence and generosity of the empress and
her humane influence on the emperor are the most arresting conse¬
quences of her sophrosyne (114B ff.). The words praotes and epieikeia are
often linked with sophrosyne in the eulogies and elsewhere,20 and it is
not unlikely that Julian is here influenced by the Roman concept of
dementia.
The philosophical treatises dependent on Neoplatonism have little to
say about sophrosyne, in spite of Julian’s assertion that Iamblichus’
teaching rid him of insolence and attempted to make him more sophron
than he was by nature (235B). Rather it was the Cynic-Stoic diatribe
that left the greatest impress on Julian’s conception of sophrosyne. An
admirer of the early Cynics, he berates the degenerate Cynics of his
own time for their lack of the true autarkeia and sophrosyne that
Diogenes, Crates, and Zeno had possessed (202A-D, 213A). His
Misopogon (Beard-Hater) is a sophronizon logos in the manner of the Cynic
diatribe, a satire on the wanton and undisciplined behavior of the
people of Antioch, whom he castigates for their luxury and frivolity,
much as his model, Dio of Prusa, the Cynicizing Sophist, castigated the
people of Alexandria in his famous Thirty-Second Discourse, which aimed
for other men, but even for women (16B, 32C, 46D, 101B). His moderation and clemency
towards his brothers is termed sophrosyne (41C; cf. also 94B, 100C, 17A-D, 45C, and the
comments on his sophron use of victory, 95A). The conformity of Julian’s panegyrics to the
precepts of Menander Rhetor is discussed by M. Boulanger, L’Empereur Julien et la rhetorique
grecque (Lille, 1927), 17 ff.
20 Praotes and sophrosyne: 123C, 303D, 343A, 365D; epieikia: 356C, 129D. The second
panegyric of Constantius refers to the ideal ruler as a sophron autokrator (88A) and describes
in detail the emperor’s sophrosyne (moderation, clemency, 95A). The Discourses on Kingship
(Oral. I-IV) of Dio of Prusa exemplify the Cynic doctrine of the ideal king upon which
Julian drew. See especially I. 15-28 and (on the sophron king) II. 71 and IV. 20-23. Consult
on this theme Ragnar Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala, 1948).
to give the Alexandrians, if nothing else, one hour of sophrosyne (30).

The central message of the Misopogon is the supreme value of sophro¬
syne, which Julian interprets in the Cynic fashion as frugality, austerity,
and the endurance of hardship. A passage of special interest is that in
which Julian describes sophron conduct by the device of putting into the
mouths of the Antiochenes an attack on his own sophrosyne. They
maintain that they do not even know what sophrosyne is, but suppose,
from the way Julian conducts himself, that it must consist of slavery to
the gods and to the laws, fair and gentle behavior towards one’s equals,
protecting the poor against the rich, enduring every kind of abuse with¬
out losing one’s temper, and abstaining from pleasures, even from those
that are not improper (343A-C). The people of Antioch equate so¬
phrosyne with slavery and oppose to it their ideal of liberty.21 Julian’s
sophrosyne in religion is contrasted to the noisy gatherings of the Antio¬
chenes, who throng the temples of the gods merely to flatter the
emperor (344B-345B).
Throughout the address Julian accuses himself with heavy irony of
boorishness and stupidity. He equates his semnotes (“holiness”) with
agroikia (“boorishness”) and his sophrosyne with anaisthesia (“absence of
feeling,” one of the Aristotelian extremes opposed to sophrosyne), while
his andreia consists of refusing to yield to his appetites (35 iC). He lays
the blame for his austerity on his tutor Mardonius; and to justify his
attempts to discipline (sophronizein) Antioch, he appeals to Plato, quot¬
ing his advice in the Laws that a king should behave with aidos and
sophrosyne, in order to instil these qualities in his people (354B). Julian
associates himself with the Celts, who share his temperament—even his
hatred of the theater (359C-D)—and with the cities of Asia Minor near
Antioch which have attacked the Christians (361 A); and he announces
his intention of departing from Antioch and taking with him his
metriotes and sophrosyne, which so offend the Antiochenes (364D). He
persistently classes under the virtue of sophrosyne certain aspects of his
governmental policy, notably his insistence on fair prices in the market
(365D) and moderation in the law courts (344A). Other references to
the sophrosyne of the ruler occur in the satiric work The Caesars, which
describes Antoninus Pius as sophron, not only towards Aphrodite but
21 Cf. 355B, 356B. Even the very donkeys and camels of Antioch carry eleutheria to an
extreme, being led along the stoas as if they were brides. Johannes Geffcken (Kymka und
Verwandtes [Heidelberg, 1909], 139-46) discusses the place of the Misopogon in the tradition
of the Cynic diatribe.
2J2 Sophrosyne
towards the State as well (312A), and terms Probus a sophron (“wise”)
administrator (314B).22
A final source of evidence about sophrosyne in the Greek world after
the classical period is the corpus of inscriptions, which show that
ordinary people laid claim to this virtue in sepulchral inscriptions, that
honorary decrees ascribed sophrosyne to benefactors of diverse kinds,
that proper names derived from the word sophron spread over the
Mediterranean world, and that a cult of Sophrosyne existed here and
there in Asia Minor. The evidence is abundant, but only a few
examples need be selected, since the use of sophrosyne in epitaphs and
honorary inscriptions tends to become stereotyped.
We have already observed 23 that Attic epitaphs of the archaic period
often bear a terse formula, “In memory of arete and sophrosyne,”
or merely list a number of excellences, like the fifth-century epitaph:
“Sophron, clever, prudent, and versed in what is fair” (I.G. 1 2 1026, 3),
or even more briefly: ayaOos kou oucppcov avpp (Kaibel 4). In such
epitaphs, where sophrosyne is linked with arete or agathos (the archaic
equivalent of andreia, andrikos), it seems to denote the virtue of the
citizen in time of peace, while arete still implies excellence in war. The
formula arete kai sophrosyne persists in sepulchral inscriptions down
through the centuries24 long after the independent polis that inspired it
had ceased to exist; but the epitaphs tend to grow longer and more
circumstantial as time goes by. A Delian epitaph (dated by Kaibel after
168 b.c.) praises the threefold arete of a certain Polycleis, to whom his
fellow citizens erected a memorial because he was best in council, brave
in action for his fatherland, and sophron in his private life (854). This
inscription effectively demonstrates the restriction of sophrosyne to
private morality in the Hellenistic age. Epitaphs for women in the
early period often employ the same formula as masculine inscriptions—
ayaOp kai odxppcov (Kaibel 51) or odxppcov koll XPV°TV (Kaibel 60)—but
the words undoubtedly refer to the usefulness, excellence, and modesty
proper to women, rather than to courage and moderation. In feminine
epitaphs of the later centuries, sophrosyne is the virtue most elaborately
amplified, doubtless because it had always been the special virtue of
women. A certain Cleopatra, who was buried beside the road from
Naples to Nola in the first century of our era, had an epitaph (Kaibel
22 Sophrosyne in some form is also ascribed to Augustus (309C), to Tiberius (309C), to
Marcus Aurelius (317C, 333C), and to Trajan (333A).
23 See Chap. I, pp. 13-14.
24 E.g., Kaibel 2, 39 (both fourth century), 55 (fourth or third century), and Geffcken 183
(third century).
560) exhorting the passer-by to stop and look at the tomb of one whom
envy, not time, led down to Hades. To her Cypris granted possession of the first
place in beauty and Athena the pleasant works of saophrosyne, while the Muse gave
her both wisdom and the lyre. . . . Even though the tomb hides your young
beauty, Cleopatra, and the dust possesses your vanished body, still the goodness
of your life remains for ever with the living, disclosing the glorious sophrosyne of
your soul.25
Sophrosyne is the primary virtue of women in Greek inscriptions,

often the only one mentioned, or the only moral virtue amid a list
of physical qualities, social attributes, and domestic accomplishments. An
example is an inscription in Rome whereon the dead woman, Messia by
name, is praised for her youth, beauty, intelligence, accomplishments,
and sophrosyne (Kaibel 682). Similarly an epitaph to a woman of
Cotiae named Theodora describes her as famous for her beauty, stature,
and especially her sophrosyne (Kaibel 368).26
But sophrosyne is by no means limited to women, even in the period
of the Empire, when its archaic position as a masculine civic virtue had
long since been forgotten. A physician of Tricca in the first century be¬
fore or after Christ is said to have guarded the pure (notOapa) virtue of
sophrosyne (Kaibel 506). A certain Artemidorus of Cyprus is praised for
living a holy life (ac/xôs /3los) and is bidden to rejoice even among the
dead by reason of his sophrosyne (Kaibel 288a). In these two epitaphs,
sophrosyne unquestionably implies moral purity or continence (as the
association with katharotes and semnotes shows), but in many inscriptions
down to the end of antiquity there is no clue to its precise meaning,
especially when it stands alone. Since courage largely disappeared from
epitaphs after the classical period of the city-state, and opportunities to
display justice became rare when democracy died out, while wisdom
ceased to be felt as a moral virtue, sophrosyne alone of the traditional
canon seemed universally applicable.
A small number of late inscriptions refer to a personified Sophrosyne
with cult worship in a few places in the Near East, Asia Minor in particu¬
lar. Mentioned but rarely in Greek literature and never clearly deline¬
ated, she is alluded to on one Attic epitaph of the fourth century b.c.—
25 Metrical requirements in the pentameter dictate the use of the archaic and the classical
spellings in vv. 4 and 12, respectively.
26 Exempla are often mentioned: thus a woman of Naxos is compared to Alcestis and
Penelope because of her sophrosyne (Kaibel 277), and a Spartan woman is compared to
Penelope (Kaibel 874). See Richmond Lattimore (Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs
[Urbana, 1962], 290-301, 335 IT.) for the virtues referred to in pagan and Christian epitaphs
and for the principal themes in epitaphs for women.
254 Sophrosyne
“Queenly Sophrosyne, daughter of high-minded Aidos” (Kaibel 34); but

there is no suggestion of anything like a cult in Athens or elsewhere on
the mainland. It is significant, however, that in this Attic inscription she
is linked with Arete “victorious in war” as well as with Aidos; both parts
of the archaic formula arete kai sophrosyne undergo personification. In
Pergamum Arete and Sophrosyne had two altars. One was set up in the
age of Hadrian by L. Castricius Paulus, who also erected a similar altar
to Pistis (Fides?) and Homonoia (Concordia?). The other altar to Arete and
Sophrosyne was erected by Julia Pia, in honor of her husband Claudius
Silanus.27 It is not surprising that the dedicators of these altars should
bear Roman names, since personified abstractions received much more
attention in Roman religion than in Greek. Evidently the Romans
recognized in Arete and Sophrosyne a pair of virtues as quintessential^
Greek as Fides and Concordia were typically Roman.
Another inevitable pairing is that of Hygieia and Sophrosyne, health
of body and mind. A Phrygian inscription at Synnada honors a high
priest, Artemon, who was priest of Hygieia and Sophrosyne, and who
served as gymnasiarch for two years at his own expense.28 In this case
the choice of personifications is dictated by the obvious connection
of health with the gymnasium and of sophrosyne with health. Hygieia
and Sophrosyne constitute the Greek equivalent of Juvenal’s famous
mens sana in corpore sano (10. 356). Finally, Emesa in Syria yields the
tomb of Ammia, a priestess of Sophrosyne, whose grave is said to be
blessed in that it contains her holy body.29
Honorary tablets fall into several categories, including ephebica,
agonistica, and dedicatory inscriptions. Agonistica rarely refer to sophro¬
syne,30 and I know of no inscription recording the triumph of a contest¬
ant in one of the feminine contests in sophrosyne mentioned by Athenaeus;
he does not explain what form such contests took (VI. 105. 273A-B).31
The other two classes of inscription have much to say about sophrosyne,
especially in connection with the supervision of the ephebes. Athens in
27Mitteilungen des deutschen archaeologischen Instituts in Athen 35 (1910) 459, No. 41. Cf. Max
Frankel, Altertiimer von Pergamon (Berlin, 1890-1895) No. 310, p. 232.
28 Bulletin de correspondance hellemque 17 (1893), 284, No. 86.
29 Inscriptions grecques et latines de Syria, deuxieme sene (Beyrouth, 1907) No. 20. For the as¬
sociation of Sophrosyne with Tyche and Eros in Roman prayers on the first of December,
according to Johannes Lydus De Mens. 4. 154, consult R W. “Sophrosyne” (Turk).
30 An exception is Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscnptionum Graecarum3 (Leipzig, 1917) 3. 1073,
5, in honor of Rufus of Smyrna, victor at Olympia, ca. a.d. i 17, who is said to have excelled
other contestants in andreia and sophrosyne.
31 Possibly these contests were similar to one reportedly held at St. John’s College, An¬
napolis, Maryland, in April 1962, in order to award the title “Miss Sophrosyne.”
the fourth century erected tablets bearing annual lists of ephebes and
giving the names of the special officers appointed to superintend their
training.32 The office of sophronistes appears first on an Athenian inscrip¬
tion of the year 334-333 b.c.; the earliest literary reference is in Aristotle’s
Constitution of Athens (ca. 328-325 b.c.), which explains the function and
the method of selection of these officers: they were men over forty years
of age, and one was chosen from each tribe. The sophronistes bought pro¬
visions for all the cadets in his tribe and looked after other business con¬
nected with their garrison duty. The name sophronistes indicates the
nature of the office, and several inscriptions reveal that the ephebes
were expected to learn discipline, orderliness, and self-control during
their period of service. An Attic bas-relief represents three sophromstae
holding in their hands willow withes, the symbol of their authority
(C. I. A. 3. 1152). After 303-302 b.c. these officers disappear abruptly;
they are not seen again until the age of Hadrian, when they once more
appear on inscriptions as supervisors of the ephebes, often accompanied
by lower officials called hyposophronistae. A typical inscription is that
of 334-333 b.c., which lists the ephebes and their supervisors, adding
that the boys obeyed the sophronistes, and awarding this official a golden
crown for looking after the boys of the Cecropian tribe honorably and
well (C.I. Supp. 4. 2. 563b).33 Another type of inscription is exemplified
by a herm (again in Athens) inscribed with the boast of a sophronistes that
he has returned the boys to their parents after performing many works
of sophrosyne (Kaibel 973).
The prevalence of names based on the adjective sophron is another clue
to the importance of this excellence in Greek life. Literary and epigraphic
evidence testifies to ten names from this root, including Sophrosyne itself
—the name of one of the daughters of Dionysius of Syracuse; her sister
was Arete.34 The masculine name Sophrosynos appears on an inscrip¬
tion from Mytilene.35 The best-known names are probably those of
32 See Kaibel 969, 973, 971, and consult P. W. “Sophronistes” (J. Oehler).
33 In each of the inscriptions belonging to this type, the sophronistes is rewarded with a
golden crown, often of specified value. The last epigraphic allusion to this office is dated
a.d. 262-263 (I. G. III. 1199, 1202). An inscription from Tenos (Kaibel 948) describes a
gymnasiarch Philiscus as jutSewy acotppoaurrjs (“guardian of good conduct”), but the title
sophronistes occurs only in Attic records, which also attest the existence of an officer called
kosmetes (I. G. III. 1120, 1144). One inscription records a father and son serving as sophro¬
nistes and hyposophromstes (I. G. III. 1116). For further inscriptions regarding this office and
the changes in the number and duties of the sophronistae under the Empire, see Oehler,
loc. cit.
34 Plutarch Dion 6.
35 C. I. G. 2. 2206 (with Aeolic doubling of the sigma, Sophrossynos).
256 Sophrosyne
Sophroniscus, the father of Socrates; Sophron, the Sicilian author of

mimes; and Sophrone, another name for the nymph Daphne and, as we
have noted, the name often assigned to the nurse in New Comedy.36
Sophronas, Sophronicus, Sophronia, Sophronis, and Sophronius are also
attested. Inscriptions indicate that these names were popular in Attica,
where Sophron appears often, especially in the Roman period.
Sophronius gained favor in the Christian era, as we learn from Fabricius,
who lists under this name twelve Fathers of the Church.37 There was
also a martyr Sophronia, whom Eusebius calls “in truth the most chaste
(ococppoveoTarri) of women,”38 leaving no doubt about the popular
interpretation of the name.
And yet, in spite of the apparent predominance of the moral nuance
of the word sophron, there is evidence that the original, etymological
meaning “of sound mind” continued to influence popular usage.
Pausanias, in his description of Thebes, relates the story (8. n. 12) told
by the natives about a stone, apparently no longer on view, with which
Athene forestalled Heracles’ maddened attack on Amphitryon. After
killing his children, the hero was about to turn on his father, when
Athene rendered him unconscious by a blow from a stone, which was
thereafter known as the sophromster lithos, (“the stone that healed the
mind”).39 A stone with the opposite effect was said to exist somewhere
on the banks of the Meander River in Asia Minor, at the spot where the
eponymous hero Meander slew his wife and children in a fit of madness
sent by the Mother of the Gods. At the spot where he threw himself into
the river after regaining his senses (ouxppovTjoas), there stood a rock
called by antiphrasis sophron, because anyone struck by it became mad
and slew one of his kinsmen.40
A more learned use of the concept of sophrosyne in which the intel¬
lectual nuance is uppermost is the name for the wisdom teeth—
sophronisteres—in the Hippocratic Corpus and in the lexicographers.41
Presumably the name arose from the common belief that wisdom is the
36 A. E. Housman (C. R. 2 [1888], 242 ff.) argues for the existence of a common noun
sophrone from which the proper name would be derived.
37 Bibliotheca Graeca 9. 158-59.
38 Eusebius Hist. Ecc. 8. 14. On nomenclature derived from the word sophron, see Wilhelm
Pape, Worterbuch der gnechischen Eigennamen (Braunschweig, 1884), and Friedrich Bechtel, Die
historischen Personennamen der Gnechen bis zur Kaiserzeit (Halle, 1917).
39 For ancient belief in the therapeutic value of stones, see Ludwig Radermacher, Rhein.
Mus. 67 (1912), 139-41.
40 Plutarch De Fluv. 9. 2-3 (1153. 30 ff.). Cf. Aristotle De Mirabil. Auscult. 846b 26.
41 Hippocratic Corpus, Cam. 13; Rufus Medicus, Onom. 51.
fruit of age and experience, although the fourth hebdomad (the time at
which the Hippocratic author tells us that the wisdom teeth usually
appear) seems too early for the ergmata sophrosynes, to use Theognis’
phrase. According to Solon’s poem on the ages of man, the fourth
hebdomad brings strength and courage to their prime, but the mind is
not at its best until the seventh and eighth.42
42 Solon 19 Diehl3. According to the New English Dictonary, the English term “wisdom
teeth” (as well as the Arabic equivalent) was inspired by the Greek sophromsteres.
VIII
Sophrosyne in Rome
OF all the forms of Greek arete, sophrosyne proved the most difficult to
assimilate to the virtus Romana. In its origins—social and political, as well
as temperamental—it was entirely foreign to Rome. At the deepest
level, sophrosyne is related to the Greek tendency to interpret all kinds
of experience—whether moral, political, aesthetic, physical, or meta¬
physical—in terms of harmony and proportion. At a level more suscep¬
tible to historical analysis, it is an expression of the self-knowledge and
self-control that the Greek polis demanded of its citizens, to curb and
counterbalance their individualism and self-assertion. And at a level still
more accessible to understanding and imitation, sophrosyne is a quality
distilled from many generations of literary and philosophical reflection
upon the collective experience of the Greeks. Only this third stratum
could easily be adapted by Rome, whose national temperament and
historical development had endowed her with quite a different set of
values.1 Among the four Greek cardinal virtues, which became known
to the Romans in their earliest contacts with rhetoric and philosophy,
only two, courage and justice, were close enough to native Roman
values to be readily assimilated. Sophia, in so far as it was contemplative
rather than practical, was regarded with a degree of suspicion, even by
Roman philosophers; and sophrosyne was so intensely Hellenic that in
its totality it always remained an exotic in Rome.2
1 Richard Heinze (Vom Geist des Romertums [Leipzig and Berlin, 1939]) regards sophrosyne
as something opposed to the popular Roman concept of the bona mens, which, like good health,
is a gift of the gods, not to be striven for. Heinze suggests that fides, constantia, and gravitas are
Roman qualities for which the Greeks have no equivalent, while eudaimonia and arete
lie at the heart of Greek ethics. Karl Buchner (Humamtas Romana [Heidelberg, 1957]) selects
as basic Roman virtues constantia, pietas, Jides, auctontas, dignitas, honos, and gloria.
2 For some examples of Roman distrust of contemplative wisdom or intellectual activity
258
Sophrosyne in Rome 259
Yet, with all these qualifications, it is possible to find in Roman

literature, from the second century b.c. to the end of antiquity, repeated
attempts to transplant this exotic; and to a remarkable extent it, here
and there, took root. The variety of connotations possessed by the word
sophrosyne enabled the Romans to select those that most nearly corre¬
sponded to traditional values among the mores antiqui—notably the fru¬
gality, self-control, and feminine chastity which ancient observers, both
Greek and Roman, were wont to regard as virtues of the early Republic.* * 3 4
It is undoubtedly true that, from the second century b.c. on, the accepted
picture of the mos maiorum was profoundly affected by acquaintance
with Greek ethics, particularly the Stoic, and efforts were made to find
exempla domestica to match imported theory. As Crassus says in De
Oratore (3. 137): “We must look to the Greeks for doctnna, to the Romans
for virtutes.” 4 But in spite of the radical suggestion that the mos maiorum
is little more than an invention of the second century, under the influ¬
ence of Stoic ethics,5 the traditions preserved by Ennius and still later
accepted by Cicero and Livy testify to a deep-rooted and genuinely
Roman respect for such qualities as modestia, pudicitia, abstinentia, and
f ruga litas.
The authentic ideals of early Rome presumably found expression in
ways we can no longer examine. Epitaphs, funeral eulogies, and (if they
devoid of practical results, see Cicero Off. i. 19 and 153; Seneca Ep. 88. 30 and 111. 2. Only
under exceptional circumstances did Cicero regard sophrosyne as the virtus maxima, as in Pro
Deiot. 29, where political considerations govern his choice, or in De Offciis, where he follows
Panaetius. The hierarchy of the cardinal virtues is repeatedly rearranged throughout its
history. Thus during the period of sophistic dominance in Greek thought, courage and
cleverness (the products of physis) are often preferred to justice and sophrosyne (the results of
nomos); while in the next century Plato elevates justice and wisdom above the other two, and
Isocrates prefers justice and sophrosyne, on the ground that andreia and sophia may belong
even to the base. The author of Epinomis sets wisdom at the head of the list (977C-D), and
in the Old Stoa this excellence becomes the generic virtue that gives rise to all the others.
3 Ancient observers: Polybius 6. 53-56; Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. Rom. 2. 18;
Poseidonius ap. Athenaeus VI. 105. 273A-B; Cicero Legg. 2. 1 (3), De Sen. 16 (55); Sallust Cat.
9. 105, Jug. 41. 2, 9; Livy throughout the First Decade; Horace in the Carmen Saeculare.
Modern commentators find in the Roman character a variety of excellences that are allied
with sophrosyne. Einar Lofstedt (Roman Literary Portraits [Oxford, 1958], 23-24) notes in
Livy’s preface a spirit of restraint and moderation closely related to sophrosyne. Erich Burck
(Gymnasium 58 [1951], 167-74) comments on the moderation shown in Rome’s conduct
towards the Italian allies, which he regards as the product of a long historical formation.
A. J. Vermeulen (The Semantic Development of Gloria in Early Christian Latin [Nijmegen, 1956])
discusses moderatio as an element in Livy’s conception of glory (p. 32) and the combination of
gloria and moderatio in Roman ideals from Decimus Brutus on (p. 128).
4 Cf. Quintilian 12. 2. 30: “If the Greeks excel in precepts, the Romans excel in exempla.”
5 Skepticism about the authenticity of the mos maiorum is expressed by R. L. Henry,
Proceedings of the Classical Association 34 (1937), 7-28. His views are refuted by Laistner, 92-94.
260 Sophrosyne
ever actually existed) those songs sung at banquets which contained

laudes atque virtutes (Cicero Brutus 75, Tusc. Disp. 4. 3) were perhaps their
most direct expression. We have only comparatively late specimens
of epitaphs and laudationes, subject of course to the influence of Greek
ideas.6 Since, however, the language of epitaphs tends to be conservative,
their testimony is of great value. In the case of prominent men, such as
the Scipios, the bare list of offices and achievements was early supple¬
mented by the claim to specific virtues, notably courage and prudence
(practical, rather than theoretical, wisdom).7 In the case of the obscure,
for whom no cursus honorum existed, it was the more necessary to praise
their moral qualities; thus a stereotyped set of attributes developed.
Two examples will suffice, one masculine, the other feminine, both from
the first century b.c.
The epitaph of Aulus Granius, an auctioneer at Rome, describes him

as pudens homo frugi cum magna fide (“a decent, upright, thoroughly
trustworthy man" [CIL 1. 1210]). That of Sempronia Moschis, also at
Rome, employs very similar terms: Hie est ilia sita pia firugfi], casta,
pudic[a] Sempronia Moschis (“Here lies a woman who was devout, upright,
chaste, and modest” [CIL 1. 6. 26192]). The words castus, pudens (or
pudicus), frugi, and fidus described qualities that could be attributed
to both men and women;8 and while the simplicity of the earliest
epitaphs gives way to elaborate detail during the imperial age, these
priscae virtutes continue to be celebrated. Thus the famous conclusion to
the epitaph of Claudia, around 135-120 b.c.—domum servavit, lanam fecit
(CIL 1. 1211)—is echoed in later and longer inscriptions, such as the
6 The earliest laudatio funebris was said to be that delivered by Publicola for Brutus, the first
consul. The development of such eulogies and of sepulchral inscriptions under Greek influ¬
ence is discussed by D. R. Stuart Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography (Berkeley, 1928), 189-
220. The tradition of the banquet songs is attacked by Hellfried Dahlman (Zur Uberlieferung
uber die altromischen Tafellieder [Wiesbaden, 1950]), who regards it as an invention based
on the Greek precedents of skolia sung at symposia.
7 The process is clearly demonstrated in the succession of Scipionic epitaphs, which devote
increasing attention to moral excellence and, by the time of Cn. Cornelius Hispanus (ca. 135
b.c.; Dessau 1. 6), display a consciousness of family tradition (virtutes) which the hero must
augment by his own mores. L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus is described as fortis vir sapiensque
(Dessau 1. 1) and L. Cornelius Scipio, son of Scipio Hispallus, is said to have possessed magna
sapientia multasque virtutes (Dessau 1. 7). Sapientia here is practical intelligence, that of the
magistrate or genera\\fortis sapiensque is the Roman counterpart of the Attic formula ay ados
kai odxppoov. For the use of prudens to describe the virtus of a Roman general, see the speech
of Decius Mus in Ennius Annates 200-202 Warmington. The aristocratic Roman ideal of
virtus, as revealed by inscriptions and early literary remains, is analyzed by Earl, 18-27; see
Historia 10 (1961), 235-43, and 11 (1962), 469-85, for virtus in Plautus and Terence and its
relation to political life.
8 For castus applied to a man, see the epitaph of Q. Brutius (CIL 1. 2. 1259): frugi castus.
Sophrosyne in Rome 26i
Laudatio Murdiae, which lists among the virtues modestia, probitas, pudicitia,
opsequium, lanificium, diligentia, and Jides (Dessau 8394). The epitaphs
of women are not unlike those of their Greek counterparts, although the
Roman inscriptions show a greater emphasis on domestic skills.9 As
sophrosyne is the dominant virtue of women in Greek inscriptions, so
pudicitia and castitas are most often ascribed to women in Roman epitaphs.
For men who are not of Senatorial rank or Equestrian class, Roman
epitaphs reveal a concentration on the virtues of private life which
is distinctly different from the classical Greek practice—although it
is similar to what we have found in Greek epitaphs of the Hellenistic
period and later. Nothing points more reliably to the respect for the
virtues of restraint and self-control in Roman popular morality than the
prominence of pudens and frugi in such inscriptions.
The earliest Latin literary remains are already too late to preserve a
purely Roman tradition. The first Fragment of the writings of the first
Latin author, Appius Claudius Caecus—Tu animi compote es ne quid
fraudis stuprique ferocia pariat (“Control yourself, lest savage anger give rise
to some treachery and disgraceful conduct” [Frag. 1 Morel])—has been
pronounced thoroughly Roman in its approval of self-control and its
recognition of the moral dangers inherent in the opposing vice, yet
in all probability it has antecedents in Greek New Comedy.10 Later
literature is still more thoroughly permeated with Hellenism. Such poets
as Plautus and Terence, who adapted Menander, Ennius and Pacuvius,
who translated Greek tragedy, or Lucilius, who knew Plato’s Charmides,n
had every opportunity to become acquainted with the Greek concept of
sophrosyne. And in spite of the familiar complaint of Lucretius about the
egestas patrii sermonis (3. 260; cf. 1. 136-39), the Latin vocabulary avail¬
able to translate the various nuances of sophrosyne was extensive and
flexible. The Fragments of early Roman literature and the comedies of
9 Richmond Lattimore (Themes in Greek and Roman Epitaphs [Urbana, 1962], 296) observes
that the ideal of the good housewife was more prominent in Latin than in Greek epitaphs.
See pp. 290 ff. and 335 ff. for the enumeration of virtues in Greek and Roman epitaphs, pagan
and Christian. A thesis by Jacob C. Logemann (De functorum virtutibus in carminibus sepulcrali-
bus Latinis laudatis [Rotterdam, 1916]) discusses continentia sive sobrietas, castitas sive pudor, as
well as other virtues (e.g., dementia) more tangentially related to sophrosyne. I am indebted
to Professor J. W. Zarker of Dartmouth College for calling this thesis to my attention.
10 Paul Lejay (Rev. Phil. 44 [1920], 92-141) sees no Greek influence on the poetry of
Appius Claudius and finds the Fragments of his Sententiae full of the qualities of the Roman
genius: self-mastery, energy, activity. Henri Bardon (La Litterature latine inconnue [Paris, 1952],
1. 25) demonstrates the dependence of several of the Sententiae on Philemon.
11 Lucilius (Sat. 29. 959-60 Warmington) quotes Charm. 154B. See lines 1196-1208
Warmington, for a list of maxims that comprise a definition of virtus.
262 S op hr o syne
Plautus and Terence abound in the verb temperare, the nouns pudor,
modestia, verecundia, and pudicitia, and the adjectives castus, frugi, and
sobrius, with their corresponding adverbs; thus the principal Latin
translations of sophronein, sophrosyne, and sophron became familiar long
before the systematic effort to find philosophical equivalents began
in the first century.
Temperare brings to the concept of sophrosyne a whole train of associ¬
ations absent from the Greek word. Since its basic significance is that of
mixing, its natural Greek counterpart is Kepavuvpn.12 The participle
temperatus may always indicate the results of proper mingling, and the
noun temperantia, while generally equivalent to sophrosyne (especially
after Cicero had made it the preferred translation), is nevertheless a pos¬
sible translation of eukrasia (“proper mixture, harmony of elements”), and
these nuances enriched and expanded the Roman concept of sophrosyne.
We shall find passages—such as Horace Odes 3. 19. 3 and Cicero Orator
6. 21, 16. 51, 26. 95—in which the idea of a mixture of opposites
is combined with the notion of restraint or moderation, both connota¬
tions being present in the word temperare. The Romans found this com¬
bination of ideas especially helpful in discussions of literary style and the
mixed constitution, where temperare often has implications not found in
the Greek sophronein. Such cognate words as tempus, temperies, temperamen-
tum, and temperatio also possessed associations lacking in the Greek
cognates of sophrosyne. Tempus was particularly important in establish¬
ing the implications of temperantia, when it became for the Romans the
usual translation of sophrosyne. Later, in the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance, tempus helped determine the iconography of the personified
virtue, which is often represented with an hourglass or a clock.
As early as the time of the elder Cato the adverb temperate conveys the
meaning “moderately” in the phrase temperate tepebit (“it will be moder¬
ately warm” [/?./?. 69. 2]). Ennius uses temperare in the sense of “refrain,
forbear” when Priam in the Alexander is bidden to refrain from acknowl¬
edging Paris as his son (temperaret tollere puerum [Frag. 48 Warmington]).
12 Ernout-Meillet, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine, s.v. temperare. See also the
extensive study of temperare in relation to the concepts of mixture and harmony by Leo
Spitzer (Traditio 3 [1945], 318 ff.), which proposes for temperare an ultimate derivation from
tempus (a segment of time) interpreted as “the right time.” Temperare would signify the inter¬
vention at the right time of a wise moderator, who adjusts, adapts, mixes, softens, or hardens
a substance (such as wine or iron). See also Edouard des Places, S.J., Revue de Philologie 16
(1942), 143-45; E. Benveniste, Melanges Ernout (Paris, 1940), 11 — 16 (tempus is to temperare as
kairos is to kerannymi)', and Marbury Ogle A.J.P. 43 (1932), 55-61, on the use of temperare by
Horace and Virgil, with the comments by Fraenkel, 344, n. 2. For the interaction of the
words temperare, sophronizein, and kerannuein, see my article, C.P. 43 (1948), 10-12.
Plautus employs the word freely with this significance—linguae tempera

(Rud. 4. 7. 28), temperes in amore (Ep. 1. 2. 8);13 and the participle
temperans appears in Terence with the meaning “self-restrained,” notably
in a line from the Self-Tormentor which speaks of a homo frugi et temperans
(3. 3. 19), a characteristic combination of epithets.14 The abstract noun
temperantia became common in the generation of Cicero, Caesar, and
Sallust and was from then on the normal equivalent of the Greek
sophrosyne.
The noun modus (“limit”) and its numerous derivatives—especially
modestia, a very ancient abstract noun, moderatio, moderare and moderari—
expressed one of the central themes of sophrosyne from the very begin¬
ning of Latin literature. Thus Ennius in the Alexander (57-58) assigns to
Hecuba a speech about Cassandra in which she says: “Where is she who
not long ago was in her right mind, with maidenly modesty (sapiens
vuginah modestia)?” 15 Plautus couples modus and modestia (Bacch. 613) and
explains intemperans as non modestus (Merc. 54). Both modestus and modeste
occur frequently in the early poets;16 and while Cicero has been credited
with coining the noun moderatio,11 its appearance in the Rhetorica ad
Herennium 3. 2, where it defines modestia (the Auctor’s translation of
sophrosyne in the list of cardinal virtues), suggests that it was current
before Cicero had begun his activity as translator of Greek philosophical
terms.
Of all the popular renderings of sophrosyne, pudicitia probably has the
deepest roots in the Roman ethical vocabulary. Livy reports the exist¬
ence of a shrine of Pudicitia Patricia in the Forum Boarium before 296 b.c.
(10. 23. 3) and the institution of a cult of Pudicitia Plebeia in the Vicus
Longus in that year (10. 23. 6-10).18 Although of first importance
13 The verb temperare admits a variety of constructions: the dative or in with the ablative,
as in these two examples; the infinitive as in Poen. prol. 33 and 22; ne and the subjunctive in
Stick. 1. 2. 60.
14 See also Phorm. 2. 1. 40: famae temperans.
15 Sapiens and modestia render in two words the concept that Greek could express with the
one word sophron.
16Modestus: Plautus Tnn. 4. 1. 12; Terence Adelphi 5. 8. 7. Modeste: Plautus Pers. 3. 1. 18 (modice
et modeste), Men. 5. 6. 5; Terence Phorm. 1. 3. 18, Eun. 3. 5. 32. Moderare: Plautus Mil.
2. 2. 115. Moderari: Plautus Cure. 4. 1, True. 4. 3. 57. Modice (with verecunde): Ennius Hecuba
214. Modus: Plautus Poen. 1. 2. 21, Merc. 3. 4. 67. In Cato R.R. 5, bono modo means
“moderately.”
17 M. O. Liscu, Etude sur la langue de la philosophie morale chez Ciceron (Paris, 1930), 260 ff.
18 The cult was originally limited to women who had been married only once. For the
special recognition of pudicitia or sophrosyne as the virtue of married women, see pp. 307
ff. On the alleged shrine in the Forum Boarium, see also Festus 242, 243; and cf. Platner
and Ashby (A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome [Oxford, 1929], 433 ff.) who suggest
264 Sophrosyne
as a feminine virtue (witness the statement of Verginia in Livy 10. 23.

7-8 that pudicitia should be for women what virtus is for men), it main¬
tains itself as a masculine virtue also throughout Roman literature,
especially in eulogy, where it corresponds precisely to that variety of
sophrosyne which is the virtue proper to young men in Greek epideictic
oratory. Pudor priscus—as Horace calls it (C.S. 57-58)19—pudens, and
pudicus are also current in early Latin literature: pudor, which (like aidos
in Greek) suggests a sense of compunction or decency in a variety
of situations,20 is more general in meaning than pudicitia, which usually
signifies chastity.
To judge by the vocabulary of Roman comedy, a familiar equivalent
of sophron—as used by Menander and the other poets of New Comedy
—is sobrius (etymologically the negative of ebrius, “drunken”). It is not
unlikely that a similarity in pronunciation between sophron (the phi
sounded like an aspirated p) and sobrius (the b approximating a p before
the r) encouraged the tendency to equate the two words, and sobrius in
both literal and metaphorical senses (“sober” and “sensible”) occurs
often in Plautus and Terence.21 As with modeste ac modica, proba et pudica,
sobrius was inevitably coupled with an alliterative companion of like
meaning, often siccus or sanus, both of which were themselves capable of
either literal or metaphorical interpretation.22 The ultimate in allitera¬
tive play on these words is achieved by Afranius with his sollers, sicca,
sobria, sana (148 Ribbeck).
that there was no such shrine, and that the veiled statue of Fortuna in her shrine in this
area was mistaken for one of Pudicitia. Cf. W. H. Roscher, Ausfiihrliches Lexikon der griechischen
und romischen Mythologie (Leipzig 1884-1886), 3. 3273-75, and consult Gerhard Radke, P. W.
“PudicitiaThe sacellum of Pudicitia Plebeia dedicated in the house of Verginia, wife of a
plebeian, L. Volumnius, on the Quirinal (Livy 10. 23. 6-10, Festus 236, 237) is referred to
by Juvenal 6. 308 as still in existence.
19 Horace associates Pudor with Fides, Pax, Honor, and Virtus in the Carmen, and in Odes
1. 24. 6 links it with Fides and Veritas.
20 Pudicitia: Plautus Cist. 1. 1. 90; Epid. 3. 3. 24, Amph. 929-30; L. Piso, Frag. 38 Peters
{pudicitiam subversam). Pudicitia as an excellence of the young: Cicero Pro Caelio 3-6. Pudor:
Naevius, Frag. 61; Ennius ap. Nonius 2. 696. Pudor also translates aidos (as in some Latin
versions of Herodotus 1. 8; on these, see Bickel, 205, n. 1). Pudens: Terence Heaut. 1. 1. 78.
Pudicus: Plautus Trin. 4. 2. 104, Cure. 1. 1. 51. Manutius (see Fausset on Pro Cluentio 12):
pudor ammi, pudicitia corporis. The alliteration common in Roman poetry leads to the coupling
of pudicitia and pudor: Plautus Amph. 2. 2. 209. Proba is linked with pudica by Afranius,
Frag. 8 Ribbeck.
21 Literally: Plautus True. 4. 4. 2 (opposed to madens), Amph. 3. 4. 18 (madidus). Metaphor¬
ically: Plautus Epid. 4. 1. 38 (sobne et frugaliter), Pers. 4. 1. 1, 4. 5. 2; Terence Andria 1. 2. 15,
Heaut. 4. 3. 27, Eun. 4. 4. 36.
22 Terence’s phrase Satin’ sanus es aut sobrius {Heaut. 4. 3. 27) perhaps renders the verb
ooxppovcis (“are you in your right mind?”) in the colloquial usage found in comedy
and oratory.
Sobrius, the opposite of ebrius, was probably still felt as a negative by

the Plautine audiences, but it is doubtful that the Romans felt castus
(“chaste”) as a negative after rhotacism had obscured its relation to carere
(“to be lacking”). Like pudicus, castus translates only one facet of sophron,
but this facet is an important one, especially in the Hellenistic literature
that was closest in time to Roman imitators of Greek culture. Castus and
castitas often appear in lists of Latin equivalents enumerated in the
effort to convey the total impact of sophrosyne.23 As we have noted,
these two words are ubiquitous in feminine epitaphs where sophron
or sophrosyne would appear in Greek. Continens, too, is negative in con¬
notation, though not in derivation. Plautus and Terence employ it with
the meaning “restrained, self-controlled” 24 and Plautus connects it with
frugi and siccus (Asin. 857). The noun continentia, which Cicero later
associates frequently with temperantia, as in De Inventione 2. 164, already
exists in Terence, who speaks in the Andria of a magnum exemplum
continentiae (92). When a distinction is made, continentia usually renders
the Greek enkrateia, and temperantia sophrosyne, but frequently the two
Latin words are used as synonyms (as by Cicero in De Imp. Cn. Pompei
14.41).
The interest in finding Latin translations for important Greek ethical
terms that is so evident in the first period of assimilation left traces
in several passages in Ennius, Afranius, and Plautus which equate
sapientia with sophia or phronesis.25 Although there is no comparable pas¬
sage for sophrosyne, it is clear that a long list of possible translations
could have been compiled by the time of Terence. The most notable
characteristic of the group as a whole is their emphasis on the negative
aspects of sophrosyne, the repression of appetites and desires. Either in
etymology (sobrius, castus) or in meaning [temperans, moderans, continens)
these terms imply restriction or denial.26 It was much easier to grasp the
23 E.g., Cicero Pro Balbo 9; Horace A.P. 207 {frugi castusque verecundusque). Some early ap¬
pearances of castus in Latin literature include Plautus Poen. 1186, Rhet. ad Her. 4. 16. 23;
Catullus 16. 5. The abstract noun castitas seems not to appear before Cicero. For its use with
a more general meaning (“moderation, temperance”) or as the generic virtue of purity
(hagneia) in Latin Christian writing, see Ambrose Vid. 4. 23, De Virg. 17. 108; Jerome Adv.
Jov. 1. 27, Com. in Eph. 1. 22-23.
24 Plautus Most. 31; Terence Eun. 227.
25 Ennius Ann. 227 Vahlen: sophia sapientia quae perhibetur (see Hermann Frankel, Hermes
67 [1932], 303-11); Afranius Sella, Frag. 1 Ribbeck: Usus me genuit, mater peperit Memona,
Sophia vocant me Grai, vos Sapientiam; Plautus True. 78: Phronesis est sapientia.
26 Verecundus (etymologically “full of compunction,” from vereri, “to be afraid”) is another
early synonym for sophron whose significance is basically negative. For its importance in
Cicero, see p. 282 and n. 64. Like pudor, verecundia is also a common translation of aidos or
aidemosyne. The antonyms to sophrosyne that appear during this early period include ferocia
(1orge) in Appius Claudius, Frag. 1; confdentia (hybris?) in Pacuvius Frags. 44, 55; ignavia
266 Sophrosyne
negative than the positive significance of sophrosyne, just as it was

easier to assimilate the concept in a fragmentary way than to embrace
its totality. It remained for later generations, more deeply imbued with
Hellenism, to develop the possibilities of these same Latin words and
endow some of them with a positive significance; or, more radically still,
to devise entirely new ways of rendering the Greek word, as Horace does
when he asks Apollo for an integra mens (Odes i. 31. 18-19), or as
Juvenal does in his prayer for a mens sana (10. 356). The single excep¬
tion to the rule is a word that occurs with great frequency on early
epitaphs and in comedy, often in association with pudicus, temperans,
or sobrius, one that Cicero selects as the most nearly adequate equiva¬
lent to sophron. This word is frugi (“upright, serviceable”).27 Cicero’s
attempt to elevate frugalitas to the canon of cardinal virtues 28 shows a
real sensitivity to the nuances of the Roman vocabulary. Far from being
restricted to the narrow scope of its English derivatives, frugi has for Rome
a status comparable in some ways to that of sophron or agathos in early
Greek inscriptions. Without being precisely equivalent in meaning to
either of them, it resembles them both in conveying something essential
and highly characteristic in the system of values to which it belongs.
Cicero no doubt exaggerates its scope when he seeks to make it include
all four cardinal virtues, but his instinct is sound in so far as he recog¬
nizes it as a virtus Romana with a positive content which embraces some
fundamental aspects of sophrosyne.
An illustration of the manner in which Romans of the second century
b.c. became acquainted with sophrosyne—not through formal study of
philosophy or rhetoric, but through the theater, the great Hellenizing
medium of the early period—is provided by the Mostellaria of Plautus, a
comedy probably derived from the Phasma of Philemon. The hero
Philolaches sings a charming little song which compares a man to
a house, carefully protected by the craftsmen who built it, but sub¬
sequently damaged by negligent owners and the violence of the weather.
The parallel is worked out in some detail. The parents are the fabri
liberum, the “builders” of their children (120 ff.), and Philolaches him-
(.malakia?) in Plautus Most. 137. Luxuria (akolasia) and cupido (epithymia) are frequent in
comedy.
27 E.g., Plautus Asm. 5. 2. 9, 1. 3. 23, 5. 3. 12; Poen. 4. 2. 27; Trin. 2. 2. 39; Terence Heaut.
3. 3. 19. Frugaliter: Plautus Epid. 4. 1. 38; Poen. 4. 1. 1. CIL 10. 4327; 11. 6216. Frugi is often
used to describe a slave as useful: Plautus Amph. 959; Aul. 587; Cas. 255, 268. Its antitheses
include improbus (Cas. 268), malus, and especially nequam, as in Plautus Pers. 454. Cf. Cicero
De. Or. 2. 248, T.D. 3. 8; and Horace Ser. 2. 7. 3.
28 T.D. 3. 8.
Sophrosyne in Rome 26/
self was frugi. . . et probus (“sound and upright”) while he was in their
charge. But afterward, he says (133-45):
When I was on my own, I ruined the work of the fabn. Idleness [ignavia) overcame
me; that was my bad weather [tempestas]. It upset my modesty [verecundia] and vir¬
tue’s Mean [virtutis modum] and ripped off my roof then and there. Afterwards I
was too lazy to cover myself. From then on, in place of rain, love came into
my heart, it dripped into my breast, and flooded it. Now at the same time my
property, my good name [/ides), my reputation, my virtue, and my honor [decus]
have abandoned me. I have become completely good-for-nothing.
The following scene is the celebrated one in which Philomatium, that

speculum speculo, adorns herself in the street before her house, and
Philolaches, watching her unseen, exclaims (161 ff.): “This is that storm
I spoke of, which ripped off all the modestia with which I was covered,
when love and desire rained into my heart, and never again can I put
on a new roof. Now the walls of my heart are drenched.” 29
Whether or not the Greek original actually referred to sophrosyne,
the essence of the situation is the young man’s recognition that he has
lost this quality, in its typical Hellenistic significance of self-control.
There is nothing specifically Greek about this episode. Its very uni¬
versality has made possible the transfer from the Greek to the Roman
29 Philemon likes to symbolize the loss of sophrosyne by the image of a house damaged by
a storm. This image appears also in Plautus’ Trinummus (from Philemon’s Thesauros), when
the father, Philto, warns his son, Lysiteles, against the example of those who praise the mores
maiorum yet violate them, and urges him to live according to the monbus antiquis, as he him¬
self does. Philto preaches a sermon on self-mastery (305-12), to which the son replies piously
that his father’s precepts have been an integumentum for his youth (313), and that he has kept
these precepts in good repair by his own modestia (317). Philto reminds him that only one
who does not regard himself as probus et frugi is genuinely probus: Bene facta bene factis aliis
pertegito ne perpluant (“Protect good deeds with other good deeds, lest the rain pour in”
[321-22]). As Friedrich Leo observes (Plautimsche Forschungen [Berlin, 1895], 177 ff.), a note of
philosophizing runs all through the Trinummus, even to the remarks of the slave, Stasimus,
on the veteres . . . mores, veteres parsimoniae (1028 ff.). The comedies of Plautus and Terence
in fact abound in moral commonplaces, some of which impinge on sophrosyne as it was
presented in Hellenistic comedy. See e.g., the recommendation of the Golden Mean in
Terence And. 61 (ne quid nimis the most expedient rule of life); the description of a good
woman in Plautus Stick. 120 as one who, although she possesses the opportunity to do evil,
restrains herself (temperat); the list of vitia that should be expelled from Athens which is put
comically into the mouth of the Virgo in Plautus Per. 549 ff.; the discussion of education in
Terence Adelphi (especially the use of the exemplum, 412, parodied by the slave, 428); the
references to Fortuna in Plautus Pseud. 678 ff. and the complaint of Palaestra in Plautus Rud.
that her suffering is undeserved, because she has been careful to do nothing impious—has
been, as Leo points out (op. cit., 102), sophron. Leo also suggests that in Rud. 194 indecore,
inique, and immodeste represent, in the Greek of Diphilus, reproaches to the gods for not being
epieikeis, dikaioi, and sophrones. A comic reference to self-knowledge occurs in Pseud. 974-75.
268 Sophrosyne
stage; and it was on the same plane of universality that sophrosyne

could be transplanted. The nuance that Rome was able to comprehend
at this period of her history was the one least special to Greece—the
sophrosyne of Hellenistic poetry and popular philosophy. The next step
in the process of naturalization was the systematic attempt to capture
the full content of the virtue, although the moral implications would
always remain stronger than the intellectual, even to Cicero and Horace.
CICERO
The key figure in the naturalization of sophrosyne—the deliberate

process in the first century, after the random assimilation in the second
—was of course Cicero. No part of his intellectual achievement was
more enduring than his creation of a philosophical vocabulary for
Rome, and probably no element in that vocabulary presented greater
difficulties than the translation of the word sophrosyne. It is true that
in his earliest rhetorical treatise, De Inventione, Cicero renders sophrosyne
as temperantia (2. 59. 177) without comment on the problems involved,
thereby strongly suggesting that the equivalence of the two words had
already been established in the schools of rhetoric. In 45 b.c., however,
after years of grappling with the problems of translation, he candidly
admits the absence of a single, precise equivalent. Characteristically,
however, he transforms what might have seemed a confession of
inadequacy on the part of the Latin language into an implied criticism
of the Greek, because it has no word for frugalitas. In the Tusculans
Cicero observes that the Greeks apply the term sophrosyne to the virtue
that he calls temperantia or moderatio, occasionally modestia, or even
frugalitas. He explains that the last word has a wider meaning in Latin
than the Greek interpretation would suggest, since the Greeks call the
frugi XPVOLl10L (“useful, serviceable”),30 while frugalitas is really equiva¬
lent to complete self-restraint and clean-handedness (ab-stinentia, in-
nocentia). The Greeks, he maintains, have no name for this concept,
although one might render it by the word ablabeia (“harmlessness”), since
innocentia is a disposition to harm no one. Frugalitas itself embraces,
according to Cicero, not just sophrosyne but the entire canon of cardinal
virtues. If its meaning had not been so extensive and if it had been bound
by the narrow limits of ordinary usage, it could not have supplied the
cognomen for L. Piso, the consul of 133 b.c. Since no one who is
cowardly, unjust, or stupid is called frugi, Cicero maintains that frugalitas
30 XP1?01/'105 is actually used as a synonym for sophron in Attic oratory of the fourth century,
where both words (like XP1?01"0*) refer to the useful, public-spirited, democratic citizen. See
Demosthenes 38. 26.
Sophrosyne in Rome 26g
may properly include courage, justice, and wisdom, but he adds that it
has a special relation to the fourth virtue, for it is the peculiar
function offrugalitas to rule and subdue the movements of the appetitive
soul and always to preserve steadfast moderation (moderata constantio) in
opposition to libido. The contrary vice is called nequitia (T.D. 3. 8).31
This passage in the Tusculans lists some of Cicero’s favorite renderings
of sophrosyne. His consciousness that no single word will really serve
leads him often to pile up partial equivalents, as in De Officiis, where the
fourth virtue receives no specific name but is said to include verecundia,
ornatus vitae, temperantia, modestia, omnis sedatio perturbationum ammi, modus
rerum, and one variety of decorum (1. 93).32 Pudor and pudicitia sometimes
appear in these lists also,33 while abstinentia is pressed into service
to designate sophrosyne in the comparatively limited sense of “clean¬
handedness,” the special excellence of magistrates.34
The third book of the Tusculans, which deals with the alleviation of
distress and is concerned exclusively with private and personal problems,
demonstrates the place of sophrosyne in Cicero’s conception of the
contemplative life. The person who is frugi (or moderatus et temperans) is
shown to be free from distress and is therefore sapiens, a sage.35 But this
31 For frugalitas as a translation of sophrosyne, see also Pro Font. 40, Verr. 3. 78, Pro Deiot.
9. 26. Cicero casts much light on the problems of translating Greek ethical terms, because he
so often gives the Greek original (e.g., Off. 1. 142 on ordo and modestia as translations of eutaxia
in two different senses), and also because he frequently lists the cardinal virtues as a group,
so that there can be no doubt about the Greek terms he is translating (e.g., Off. 1. 43. 153;
Cat. 2. 63. 25; De Inv. 2. 53). Moreover, he sometimes translates a Greek passage available
for comparison (see T.D. 5. 34. 101, where he renders sophron in Plato Ep. 7. 326C as
moderatio).
32 Cf. 3. 33. 116, which adds continentia.
33 Legg. 1. 19. 50 (moderatio, temperantia, continentia, verecundia, pudor, pudicitia) and Fin. 2. 22.
73 {pudor, modestia, pudicitia, temperantia).
34 E.g., Off. 2. 22. 76. Cicero sometimes links temperatio with moderatio to indicate proper
mixture, due proportion of physical elements {Div. 2. 45. 94: caeli temperatio). See T.D. 4.
13. 30, where moderatio corporis is called sanitas (“health”), moderatio animi, temperantia. For
temperamentum, see Legg. 3. 10. 24. Cicero’s choice of Latin words to designate the various
nuances of sophrosyne had profound influence on later generations. Apuleius is one of the
few subsequent writers to depart significantly from his example of preferring temperantia as
the normal equivalent. See Chap. VI, n. 109 for Apuleius’ preferences in De Platone; for his
use of temperantia in De Mundo to describe chemical or medical proportion, see Spitzer, loc.
cit., 322. The most notable additions to the Latin vocabulary of sophrosyne after Cicero are
dementia (see pp. 300 ff.) and tempenes (used by Claudian and Ausonius for metrical reasons;
see below, nn. 130 and 148). The most common antitheses in Cicero are intemperantia {Fin.
3. 11. 39), libido {De. Sen. 12. 41, Fin. 1. 16. 50), luxuria {Cat. 2. 26), and avaritia {Verr. 3. 76).
Intemperies appears in Rep. 2. 27. 63.
35 See also T.D. 4. 16. 36, where Cicero equates moderatus, modestus, temperans, constans, and
continens and derives them all from frugalitas. He quotes the proverb Homo frugi omnia recte
facit and identifies the homo frugi with the Stoic sage.
2J0 Sophrosyne
is only one side of Cicero’s ideal way of life. There is a deep and
permanent chasm between the active life and the contemplative. The
sage of the Tusculans belongs to the facet of Cicero’s nature which yearns
for the peaceful satisfactions of the study and is therefore inclined
to accept the Platonic and Aristotelian estimate of wisdom as the
highest good. But the other side of his nature, the side that longed for
glory and sought to win renown in the Senate House and on the rostra,
j put the social virtue of communitas (Cicero’s rendering of dikaiosyne in his
list of the four virtues in Off. i. 153) at the top of the hierarchy and led
him to describe iustitia as the regina virtutum (Off. 3. 6. 28).36 Cicero
never succeeded in reconciling these two ideals—the sage and the
orator-statesman—and the conflict between the forms of excellence that
characterized the two ways of life—contemplative wisdom on the one
hand and on the other a combination of justice with the civilis prudentia
or providentia essential to the pnnceps {Rep. 2. 25. 45)—remained
insoluble, however sincerely Cicero might repeat the Platonic and Stoic
doctrine that the virtues are inseparable. It is precisely here that
temperantia seems to take on special significance for him. Since neither
the sage nor the orator-statesman can achieve perfection without
subduing his appetites and subjecting impulse to reason, temperantia may
be regarded as a link between the two ideals. It is the virtue essential to
both, although it is first with neither. While temperantia remains the
same, whether it is concerned with the active or the contemplative life,
it manifests itself in different ways, enabling the statesman, for example,
to restrain his greed and thus win popularity with the masses, and help¬
ing the philosopher to achieve the mental equilibrium that constitutes
wisdom. Since, however, in the sum of Cicero’s literary achievement,
the active life receives more attention than its rival, it is the social aspect
of sophrosyne which is more often discussed in his works.
This aspect is of necessity prominent in the rhetorical treatises and
36 Cf. Rep. 3. 3. 4-6 for an expression of Cicero’s preference for the life of the statesman
over that of the pure philosopher. The division in his own nature is brought out with special
force in the discussion {Off. 1. 43. 153) of possible conflicts among the duties arising from
the four cardinal virtues (here called cognitio, communitas, magnanimitas, moderatio). After admit¬
ting that sapientia {cognitio, sophia) is the highest excellence, Cicero insists that the duties
prescribed by justice must take precedence because they concern the welfare of our fellow-
men, than which nothing is more sacred. Speculation is selfish unless translated into action.
It is only fair to point out that even Plato in the Republic emphasizes at one point justice, at
another, wisdom, as the primary virtue, depending on the context. Although it is an over¬
simplification for the historian to identify the active life with the Roman and the contem¬
plative with the Greek, poets and orators often used this topos; see Eduard Norden, Kom-
mentar zur Aeneis Buck VP (Leipzig, 1926), on Aen. 847 ff.
Sophrosyne in Rome 2JI
the orations, where Cicero (like Aristotle in the Rhetoric) emphasizes the
effects of sophrosyne that benefit society rather than the individual. De
Inventione, the work of his youth, reproduces, probably without much
originality, the school doctrine of ffellenistic rhetoric, including the
instructions for the use of the topic of the virtues which had developed
in the period after Aristotle. This handbook and the roughly contem¬
poraneous Rhetorica ad Herennium possess great significance as the earliest
Latin works to discuss the four cardinal virtues as a group. They differ
from the Rhetoric of Aristotle, in which numerous virtues are treated
among the topics of epideictic oratory (i. 9), by confining themselves
to the four Stoic virtues and discussing them in the context of deliberative,
as well as epideictic oratory.37 Cicero calls the fourth virtue temperantia
and defines it as the unwavering and moderate control (Jirma et moderata
dominatio) exercised by reason over lust and other improper impulses of
the soul. He lists as its subdivisions continentia, dementia, and modestia
(2. 54. 164), which recall the subsidiary virtues that the Stoics attached
to sophrosyne 38—provided that dementia is understood as gentleness or
mercy, rather than pity, which is not a virtue according to the Old
Stoa. The corresponding passage in the Rhetorica ad Herennium uses a dif¬
ferent equivalent for sophrosyne (modestia) and defines it more suc¬
cinctly, as the continent control of the appetites (continens moderatio
cupiditatum), without listing subsidiary virtues.39
In his later rhetorical works Cicero relied on Peripatetic, more often
than on Stoic, sources for his discussion of the virtues. In De Oratore, for
example, this topic is considered in relation to the epideictic genus
causarum, as it was in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and the virtues are not limited
to four. Cicero now observes that panegyric must deal with the goods of
37 Wilhelm Kroll (Philol. 90 [1935], 206-15) suggests a Stoic source for the definitions of
the virtues in both works.
38 Cf. SVF 3. 264, where the subdivisions of sophrosyne are eutaxia, kosmiotes, aidemosyne,
and enkrateia; see also Stobaeus II. 75. 8 and D. L. 7. 87. In De Inv., continentia probably
translates enkrateia; modestia, eutaxia; and dementia, perhaps praotes (see SVF 3. 71. 22 and
160. 20). According to Cicero’s definitions here, continentia restrains desire (cupiditas), and
dementia, hatred (odium); the function of modestia is to allow pudor to establish its rule and
authority.
39 The Auctor ad Herennium also refers to the virtues in his treatment of epideictic oratory
(3. 6. 10; cf. De Inv. 2. 59. 177) and links temperantia cupiditatum with the praise of good
health, a physical advantage (3. 7. 14). It is significant that the Auctor uses modestia, moderatio,
and temperantia to translate sophrosyne; all three must have been current in the second
decade of the first century b.c. The Auctor discusses the use to be made of the topic of modestia
(3- 3- 5)) emphasizing the notion of “limit” implicit in the word, and also tells how to
controvert the opponent’s use of this topic: what he calls modestia you must call inertia et dis-
soluta negligentia (3. 3. 6).
2J2 Sophrosyne
nature and fortune, as well as those of the soul 40 (a tripartite division

Platonic in origin), and virtue is of course a good of the soul. Cicero
furthermore divides the virtues into two classes, those that benefit society
and those that benefit the possessor (2. 84. 343)—a distinction also made
by Aristotle {Rhet. 1. 9. 1366b)—and, like Aristotle, he assigns sophro-
syne/temperantia to the first category. In De Partitione Oratona, where the
virtues are again treated as a topic of epideictic, Cicero retains the tripar¬
tite classification of goods (74) but divides the virtues into two different
(though still Aristotelian) categories, the intellectual (scientia) and the
moral or practical {actio, 76). Temperantia belongs to the second of these
divisions—again a Peripatetic tradition. The definition of temperantia as
moderation of the appetites and rule over the impulses of the soul (76)
would be acceptable to any of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, but
the warning against adjacent vices is basically Peripatetic. In the case of
temperantia, the adjacent vice is brutishness in despising pleasures {im-
manitas in voluptatibus aspernandis, 81), which is obviously akin to the
vicious extreme of anaisthesia (“insensitivity”) in Aristotle’s Ethics.41
Nowhere does Cicero specifically discuss the use of the topic of the
virtues in juridical oratory, although he does point out that a knowledge
of the virtues and vices is valuable in this type of speech {De Or. 2. 84.
349). His rhetorical treatises do not, in fact, provide an adequate
analysis of his own oratorical technique, for he nowhere discusses in
detail that adroit use of the topic of virtue and vice in emotional
appeals which is a special strength of his oratory, particularly his
invective. The appeal to the emotions had been a feature of Roman
oratory from its early days. Acquaintance with Greek technae merely
made more systematic the devices already in use. It has been demon¬
strated that Cicero in his earliest orations already went far beyond the
stereotyped doctrine of the Hellenistic handbooks and approximated
the more analytical approach to emotional persuasion suggested by
Plato in the Phaedrus and elaborated by Aristotle in the Rhetoric 42 In
40 2. 84. 341.
41 A special refinement in Part. Or. is the recognition of two functions of temperantia, both
displayed in good fortune {res commodae): not seeking that which is lacking and refraining
from the enjoyment of what is in one’s power (77). It is noticeable also that fortitudo is here
virtually an aspect of temperantia (shown under adverse circumstances, res incommodae). The
guardian of all the virtues is said to be verecundia (79), whose importance for Cicero is linked
with his belief that it is a fundamental excellence of early Rome. Quintilian, the last of the
great rhetoricians, also treats the virtues in his discussion of epideictic (3. 7. 15), where his
name for sophrosyne is continentia. In Book XII. 2. 17 he abserves that the epideictic orator
will have much to say about abstinentia and temperantia.
42 Friedrich Solmsen, T.A.P.A. 69 (1938), 542 ff., and C.P. 33 (1938), 390-404. For Cato’s
appeal to the emotions in oratory, see Frags. 66, 74, 76, 83, and 87 Malcovati.
his speeches, whatever their formal category, the epideictic element of
laudatio and vituperatio is almost always prominent. Thus, for one
example, the oration on the Manilian Law, while technically deliberative,
actually consists of an elaborate eulogy of Pompey and treats in detail
the traditional virtues of the imperator. Juridical oratory, by its very
nature, relies heavily on praise and blame; and it is here that Cicero
makes the most extensive use of the topic of temperantia and its opposites.
The oration for Sextus Roscius, for example, seeks to establish the
moral purity (innocentia) of the defendant. The Pro Caelio contrasts the
alleged pudicitia of Caelius with the impudicitia of Clodia. The Pro
Fonteio insists on the frugalitas, moderatio, and temperantia of the defendant.
The reversal of the topic in vituperatio is one of Cicero’s strongest
weapons, used with sovereign effectiveness in the Verrines, the Catilinar-
ians, and the Philippics, as well as in single orations like the In Pisonem.
The wide range of temperantia becomes apparent through a study of its
antitheses—principally libido, intemperantia, luxuria, and avaritia. The recog¬
nition of avaritia as a prevailing Roman vice in fact added a new facet to the
topic of sophrosyne in oratory. Although Greek orators of the fourth cen¬
tury frequently imputed avarice to their opponents and even connected it
with lack of sophrosyne, when they equated failure to perform a “liturgy”
with bad citizenship, the topic underwent enormous development in
Rome, both because the opportunities for indulging in avaritia and cupiditas
were there much greater than in Athens, and because Cicero made a con¬
scious effort to select those parts of the topic of sophrosyne which could
be related to the public welfare. The honesty and integrity of the
proconsul or other magistrate were now added to the varied nuances of
sophrosyne that had been recognized by the Greeks. Cicero observes
significantly in De Ojjiciis that Panaetius praised Scipio Africanus
Aemilianus for his abstinentia, but the praise belonged rather to his
times, for in those days extortion was unknown (2. 22. 76). He adds that
there is nothing worse than avaritia in public life and nothing better
than abstinentia and continentia for winning the good will of the people.
His belief that clean-handedness on the part of magistrates was a basic
part of the mos maiorum gave this aspect of sophrosyne/temperantia great
significance in both his oratorical and his philosophical writings; this
attitude was transmitted to the historians and biographers who followed
him.43
Certain themes are persistently linked with the topic of temperantia in
43 The recognition of avaritia and cupido as the cardinal Roman vices is not original with
Cicero and is not confined to oratory. Polybius had already isolated greed and luxury as
Rome’s principal failings (31. 23-30).
2J4 Sophrosyne
Ciceronian oratory—notably those of the mos maiorum, the vita rustica,

and the closely related theme of degeneratio, all illustrated by extensive
reference to exempla domestica. In his lavish appeal to the mos maiorum
Cicero develops a topic already traditional in Roman oratory.44 His
early speech Pro Roscio (delivered in 81 b.c.) handles the theme easily
and effectively. Not only Roscius himself, so notable for his innocentia,
but also his wife, Caecilia, preserves the vestigia antiqui offici (io). Their
virtue is linked with that simple rustic life which from the time of Cato
the Censor had been considered a major source of true Roman integrity.
Cicero contrasts the innocentia of the country with the vices of the city:
in the city is born luxuna; from luxuria comes avaritia; from avaritia,
audacia; and from this, every crime. Country life, on the other hand, is
the teacher of parcimonia, diligentia, and mstitia (27). Both themes, the
mos maiorum and the vita rustica, have their counterparts in Greek
literature. Isocrates, for example, ascribes to Solon and Cleisthenes the
sophrosyne that Athens has lost in the fourth century, and one has only
to think of the Clouds and the Acharnians to realize how closely Aristo¬
phanes associates the oldfashioned country life of Attica with the
cultivation of sophrosyne and aidos45 Yet here, too, as with the themes
of avarice and luxury, Rome found a special relevance in the thread¬
bare topics. Her exaggerated devotion to her heroic past gave the
theme of the mos maiorum even greater popularity than it had enjoyed
in Greece, and the nostalgia for the country which increases in direct
proportion to the size of the metropolis in which one lives now endowed
the vita rustica with unprecedented appeal. Used with fresh enthusiasm
and a wealth of Roman coloring, this topic underwent development,
not only in oratory and popular philosophy, but even more memorably
in lyric and elegiac poetry, where it continued to embellish the topic of
temperantia.46
The theme of the mos maiorum is but a prelude to the topic of degene-
44 It appeared in the oratory of the earliest period, that of the laudatio funebris, if Polybius
6. 53 is to be trusted.
45 Isocrates Areop. 20. 48-49; of. Cicero Verr. 2. 2. 7. The Oikonomikos of Xenophon also
reflects the importance of country life for the cultivation of virtue. Cf. Cato R.R., Intro.; Varro
R.R. Ill, Intro.; and the Adelphi of Terence.
46 For temperantia and the vita rustica in Horace, see pp. 294-95. Among the elegiac poets
Propertius applies the theme to erotic contexts; see, e.g., 2. 19. 3: nullus castis . . . corruptor in
agns. The theme of the rura is important in satire: see Horace Ser. II. 2 and 6; Juvenal 3
and 6. 1-20 (where the pudicitia of the Golden Age is essentially that of the untainted
countryside). A variation on this theme is the association of the hunter’s life with chastity, a
topos that goes back to the myths of Atalanta and Hippolytus. Some references to this tradi¬
tion are discussed by Bruno Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley, 1964), 37-38.
ratio, the decline of public and private morality from the early days of
the Republic. Cicero, who uses this topic with great virtuosity, often
accuses his opponents of greed and corruption (Pro Cael. 33-34, Pro Flac.
28, Pro Mur. 76) and contrasts their baseness with the clean-handedness
and integrity of the ancestors. A special development is the appeal to
exemplars of the virtues, usually heroes of the early Republic or the
Punic wars.47 Nowhere is this device used to greater effect than in the
Verrines, where exempla constitute a principal means of arousing indignatio
and odium. The chief model of continentia and temperantia is Scipio
Africanus Major, who appears in the speech De Signis as a contrast to
the rapacity and lust of Verres. Cicero draws attention to the antithesis
between the two men by his indignant account of Verres’ confiscation
of a statue of Diana, the virgin goddess, which had been dedicated
to Scipio, a man of the utmost decency and holiness {temperantissimi
sanctissimique viri).48 It is an outrage that Verres should adorn his house,
full of lust, infamy, and dishonor, with such a monument. A character¬
istic touch is the statement that Scipio excelled Verres, not merely in
temperantia, but also in good taste where statues and vases were concerned
(5- 38. 44)-

It is evident then that Cicero’s use of the topic of the virtues goes
beyond anything to be found in Greek oratory, but—more than this—
it is noticeable that of the four cardinal virtues temperantia receives by
far the greatest attention in laudatio and vituperatio. Accusations of
luxuria and avaritia are obviously felt to be more effective than charges
of injustice in arousing indignation; and scarcely anyone is accused,
except incidentally, of cowardice or folly.49 Not only do accounts of the
vile conduct of the lustful Verres or the drunken Antony possess a
dramatic element, but Cicero shrewdly makes use of the tradition we
have already mentioned, according to which luxuria and avaritia are the
cardinal sins of Rome. That he is not alone in his emphasis on such
themes is suggested in the Pro Caelio, where he remarks that the
prosecutor has said a great deal concerning intemperance and inconti¬
nence (11). Quintilian, too, observes that for Romans of the early days
luxuria was the summum crimen (3. 7. 24).50 However stereotyped these
47 Rambaud (27-35) provides a tabular view of the exempla in Cicero’s orations and
treatises.
48 Cicero uses the identical phrase to describe Rutilius Rufus, another model of unim¬
peachable integrity in public life (Pro. Font. 38).
49 Verres (3. 2. 78) is charged with inertia and ignavia, but these are comparatively minor
accusations.
50 The satirists single out these vices for persistent attack. To mention only Horace and
2y6 Sophrosyne
topics may have been, it is doubtful that any earlier orator had used
them with comparable skill. Cicero adapts his remarks to the circum¬
stances of each case in a way that infuses fresh life into the topic. The
use he makes of Clodia’s notorious impudicitia, especially in the celebrated
prosopopoeia where Appius Claudius Caecus confronts his unworthy
descendant, shows how adroitly Cicero could underscore contemporary
scandal with appeals to the mos maiorum. Another opportunity for the
effective use of the topic of luxuna and voluptas presented itself when
Cicero prosecuted the Epicurean Piso and made the popular conception
of Epicurean hedonism an additional charge against the defendant,
denouncing him for his luxuria and libidines (27) and maintaining that
he was attracted to the Epicurean school precisely because it made
voluptas its goal (28).
The Pro Fonteio, a speech unusually rich in Roman color (including
the appeal to historical exemplars of temperantia and frugalitas), shows
Cicero adapting yet another time-honored oratorical technique to the
topic of temperantia—this time a device of the advocate, rather than of
the prosecutor. The appeal for pity in the peroration traditionally intro¬
duced the aged parents or the little children of the defendant. Cicero
uses this device in a uniquely Roman fashion by substituting for these
familiar props of the Greek courtroom the sister of Fonteius, who is a
Vestal. The fact that she has no husband or son to protect her becomes
an argument for the acquittal of Fonteius, her sole kinsman, and Cicero
contrives to remind the jury of the sacrifice that her life of chastity
requires and of the debt that Rome owes to the Vestals. There is even
an element of danger to Rome in the peril of Fonteius: his sister may
extinguish the fire of Vesta with her tears (21. 46)! Cicero has already
described Fonteius himself as frugi et in omnibus vitae partibus moderatum
ac temperatum, plenum pudoris, plenum offici, plenum religionis (40). He now
strengthens the link between chastity and religio by reminding the jury
of the prayers by which the Vestals have won Divine help for Rome in
various crises (49).
All the great sequences of denunciatory speeches—the Verrines, the
Catilinarians, and the Philippics—take special care to relate temperantia
and its antitheses to the State. The worst of Verres’ sins is that he
disgraces Rome by his conduct as a magistrate, by his rapacity and
Juvenal, we note that Horace castigates avaritia in Ser. I. 1 and II. 3 and Ep. I. 6, and exces¬
sive indulgence in various appetites in Ser. I. 2 and 3 and II. 4 and 8. Juvenal attacks greed
and extravagance in 1. 81-146, 12, and 14, and sexual perversion or excess in 2, 9, and 6; he
uses the theme of the cena in 5.
brutality towards the provincials as well as towards Roman citizens. It

is the appearance of the tribune Antony, drunken and debauched, in
the sight of the people that inspires the famous descriptive passage in
the Second Philippic (25. 63). In the case of Piso, too, it is the combination
of drunkenness with the office of consul that Cicero, with special force,
condemns (10). But the passage that demonstrates most clearly the link
between virtue and the welfare of the State is the description in
the Second Catilinarian of the virtues and vices fighting respectively for
the Republic and for the conspirators, a passage that might well have
inspired the Psychomachia of Prudentius. Cicero says (2. 25):
On this side fights Pudor, on that Petulantia, on this Pudicitia, on that Stuprum, on
this Fides, on that Fraudatio, on this Pietas, on that Scelus, on this Constantia, on that
Furor, on this Honestas, on that Turpitudo. On this, finally, Aequitas, Temperantia,
Fortitudo, Prudentia, virtues all, struggle against Imquitas, Luxuna, Ignavia, and
Temeritas. The very gods will help the glorious virtues to overcome the vices.51
Although the negative use of the theme of temperantia in public life is

unquestionably more dramatic and memorable than the positive,
Cicero does not neglect the other side. One prolonged discussion of the
virtues with special reference to the behavior of the imperator, the
Roman general, was destined to linger in the memory of Roman orators
and historians from the younger Pliny to the Latin Panegyrists, all of
whom adapted the praise of Pompey in the oration on the Manilian Law
to the eulogy of the emperor.52 As we have noted, this speech, although
technically deliberative, derives most of its effect from its manipulation
of the topics of epideictic, especially the virtues of the general, a com¬
monplace in Greek history from Thucydides and Xenophon on. Not
only does Cicero contrast the honesty of Pompey with the avaritia of
other generals, but he maintains that temperantia makes possible the
wonderful speed with which Pompey moves on campaign: he is not
held back by avarice, lust, pleasure, curiosity, nor even the need for
rest (14).53 So great is Pompey’s continentia that the provincials actually
51 The first group of virtues includes traditionally Roman qualities, while the second
recognizes the Greek virtues.
52 On the Latin panegyrists, see £douard Galletier, Panegynques latins (Paris, 1949),
especially Introduction, pp. vii-xxxvii.
53 Cf. Phil. 2. 26-28, where the virtuous Pompey is contrasted with the impudicissimus
Antony. The Greek commonplace that the true imperator is he who restrains his desires and
scorns pleasure is repeated in Par. St. 5. 33. The need for continentia and modestia, not in the
general, but in the legionary soldier, is set forth by Caesar B.G. 7. 52, where he interprets
these virtues as military discipline and says that they are as essential as virtus and magmtudo
animi (another instance of the tension between sophrosyne and andreia and their reconciliation
2j8 Sophrosyne
think him sent down from heaven. The continentia of Rome now becomes
credible to other peoples, who at last understand that not without
reason in the days when Rome had magistrates of such temperantia did
other nations choose to serve the Roman people, rather than be rulers
in their own right (14. 41).
The same view of temperantia as an instrument of imperial policy
recurs in a letter to Quintus, written in 60 b.c., concerning his conduct
as governor in Asia. Here Cicero couples moderation and culture
(,moderatio and doctrina) as prime necessities for the Roman who is to
govern Greeks, and mentions the special claim of the inhabitants of Asia
Minor to consideration, since with them originates humanitas (Ad Q.F.
1. 1. 22; cf. Ad Fam. 13. 65. 1). According to this letter, the first duty of
a praetor is to be abstinens and to restrain his emotions (32). In the case
of Quintus, it is iracundia that Cicero especially fears, for humanitas
vanishes when anger is aroused (37).54
Towards the close of Cicero’s career the topic of the ruler’s temperantia
takes an ominous turn. The speeches of the year 46 b.c. select for
emphasis a new aspect of the virtue, dementia or misericordia (“mercy”
or “compassion”). It will be recalled that in De Inventione, dementia
appears as one of the virtues subordinate to temperantia, possibly
representing praotes in some Stoic source. In the Pro Sulla Cicero had
praised his own lenitas (“mildness”) and misericordia in dealing with the
Catilinarian conspirators (1; cf. 87, 92), and in a letter to Cato he
mentioned his mansuetudo (“humaneness”) and continentia in Cilicia (Ad
Fam. 15. 3. 2; cf. Cato’s reply, Ad Fam. 15. 5). In the oration on the
Manilian Law the mansuetudo of Pompey was celebrated (14. 42). Now
in the Pro Ligario, the Pro Deiotaro, and the Pro Marcello there suddenly
appear many references to the dementia or misericordia of Caesar.55 The
Pro Deiotaro in fact reaches its climax and conclusion with the words
clementiae tuae (15. 43). The Pro Marcello begins with a definition of
mansuetudo or dementia as moderation in all things when one has supreme
under ideal circumstances). The topic of disciplina militaris is a favorite with Livy; see
pp. 289 ff. for his identification of this excellence with the mos maiorum. Cf. Sallust Jug. 45,
where the temperantia of Metellus restrains the soldiers’ ignavia and restores modus; and Jug. 46,
where his innocentia frightens Jugurtha himself.
54 Pliny imitates this letter in Ep. 8. 24.
55 Pro Lig. 1. 1; 2. 6; 4. 10; 5. 15, 16; 6. 19; 12. 37-38. Pro Deiot. 11. 34; 14. 40, 43. Pro
Mar. 1. 1; 8. 3; 3. 9, 12; 6. 18. On the dementia Caesaris, see M. Treu, Mus. Helv. 5 (1948), 197
ff. Cf. Sallust Cat. 54 on his mansuetudo and misericordia, and cf. Suetonius Julius Caesar 75 on
his moderatio and dementia. Note also the remark of Caesar himself: “Haec nova sit ratio vincendi
ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus” (ap. Cicero Ad Att. 9. 7. 1).
power (in summa potestate rerum omnium modus [i. i]). Even the hackneyed
commonplace that the conquest of passion and the moderate use of
victory are characteristic of the Divine (3. 8) takes on a new significance
in the context of this speech. Granted that Cicero is ironic in his
references to the dementia Caesaris, eulogists of later Caesars imitate in
deadly seriousness, if not sincerity, his apparent adulation. Cicero’s
speeches of the year 46 mark the beginning of a process that reaches its
nadir in Seneca’s De Clementia, addressed to Nero; 56 and the association
of temperantia in the use of power, under the name clementia, with the
divinity of an absolute ruler, becomes one of the orator-statesman’s
most enduring legacies to subsequent orators and historians.57
Cicero’s philosophical works, written for the most part close to the
year of these final speeches, show his desire to bury himself in study and
thus avoid contemplating the effects of the civil war; they also demon¬
strate his continued concern for the State, which now takes the form of
speculation about the history of Rome, the sources of her past greatness,
and the best government consistent with her true nature. The two
tendencies are the final expression of Cicero’s lifelong wavering between
his two ideals, the sage and the orator-statesman. His attempts to com¬
bine them are perhaps most conspicuous in those treatises that adapt
Hellenistic philosophy, largely concerned with the ethics of the individual,
to the Roman exaltation of public life and the mos maiorum. The treat¬
ment of sophrosyne in such works is a fair example of the Ciceronian
approach to Hellenistic ethics in general. It is most clearly seen, not in
the Tusculans or De Finibus—important though they are as evidence for
Greek views of sophrosyne58—but in the works that display the greatest
56 Chaim Wirszubski (Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early
Principate [Cambridge, 1950], 150 ff.) points out that Cicero distinguishes between monarchy
and tyranny by the criterion of justice, while for Seneca the criterion has become clementia.
57 The need for sophrosyne in the character of a king is also touched on in Pro Deiot.,
whose antecedents include Isocrates’ Evagoras as well as the Hellenistic basihkos logos. After
extolling the magmtudo ammi, gravitas, and constantia of the king, Cicero mentions his singular
and admirable frugalitas (29). This is not common praise for kings, he admits, since it is a
private virtue, in contrast to such regiae virtutes as courage, justice, and the like. Yet frugalitas
—that is, modestia and temperantia—is the virtus maxima. It is not at all characteristic of Cicero
to rank temperantia first among the virtues, and it is distinctly sinister that he should do so
now, when temperantia has been transformed into the virtue of an absolute ruler.
58 In Ciceronian discussions of individual ethics, sophrosyne plays the same part as in
Hellenistic philosophy. It is interpreted as the moderatrix commotionum and therefore as the
source of tranquillity, the goal of both Stoics and Epicureans. The Stoic view, which makes
intemperantia the fons perturbationum, is seen in T.D. 4. 9. 22. Fortitudo and temperantia are suf¬
ficient for happiness (T.D. 5. 14. 42). Fin. 2. 14. 46-47, a Stoic interpretation of the cardinal
virtues, gives an aesthetic bias to sophrosyne and identifies it with humanitas. The Epicurean
theory that temperantia bestows peace of mind is cited in Fin. 1. 12. 47-48.
280 Sophrosyne
Roman color: De Officiis, De Senectute, and De Amicitia (all written

in 45-44 b.c.), and the earlier De Republica (54 b.c.) and De Legibus
(52-46 b.c.). The effect of this deliberate Romanizing is essentially the
same as in the orations: sophrosyne is interpreted as the primary means
of restraining avantia, luxuria, and cupido; its external manifestations are
emphasized, especially in De Officiis;59 the continentia of public figures is
considered to have enormous effect on the general level of morality
(Legg• 3. 14. 32); and by associating it with pudor and verecundia, two of
the most firmly established of the priscae virtutes, Cicero makes sophro¬
syne an essential part of the mos maiorum.
The link between sophrosyne and the prepon (the most original element
in the ethical doctrine of De Officiis) has been noted in Chapter VI as a
contribution of Panaetius. For Cicero himself the treatise is remarkable
in three respects. First, only in this one of his philosophical works does
he implicitly assign to sophrosyne the dominant place in a system of con¬
duct. Although formally he weighs the claims of justice and wisdom to
first place among the virtues,60 actually, by accepting the view of
Panaetius that the virtuous life depends on the proper ordering of the
impulses of the soul—an ordering that is the specific function of sophro¬
syne—he gives primacy to this excellence. Nowhere else in Cicero’s
philosophical treatises does this situation recur. As is the case with
St. Ambrose, when he in turn adapts De Officiis to Christian morality,
special circumstances produce a unique attitude towards sophrosyne.
Secondly, in De Officiis Cicero finds a philosophical justification for his
habit of linking sophrosyne with humanitas—a habit that deserves to be
recognized as his most original contribution to the history of the virtue.61
This justification is another result of following the lead of Panaetius and
basing virtue, not on pure episteme as had been done by the Old Stoa,
but on impulses (aphormae) guided by reason (1. 4. 11-14). Two of
the cardinal virtues, justice and courage, are developed from instincts
that man shares with the lower animals, but wisdom and moderation,
59 See 1. 142 on the power of the fourth virtue to win approbatio. Panaetius, whom Cicero
follows in the main in books I and II, was himself influenced by conditions in Roman
society and paid more attention to law and politics than the Old Stoa considered proper.
See S. E. Smethurst, Phoenix 9 (1955), 111-21.
60 E.g., 1. 19; 1. 153; 3. 28.
61 With Off. 1.4. 14, cf. Fin. 4. 7. 16, where only man is particeps pudoris ac verecundiae; and
Consolatio, Frag. 12 (Lactantius 3. 19. 3), where purity (castitas) and humanistic culture are
cited as two characteristics that enable man to fly to the gods—i.e., ad naturam sui similem.
In Som. Scip. 29, however, it is service to the State combined with purification that accom¬
plishes the assimilation to the Divine. For sophrosyne and paideia (“culture”) in Isocrates,
see Chap. IV, n. 80.
Sophrosyne in Rome 2(9/
even on the instinctive level, are uniquely human. Man is the only ani¬
mal that has a feeling for order, propriety, and moderation (1.4. 14), and
the special connection of sophrosyne with behaving like a human being
(suggested, for example, in 1. 100) is an inescapable consequence. The
emphasis placed on beauty as the outcome of order (1. 4. 14) reinforces
this tendency on Cicero’s part, since there is a strong aesthetic element
in his conception of humamtas.
Thirdly, De Officiis gives expression to sophrosyne in rules for every¬
day conduct that are specifically designed for Roman rather than Greek
consumption, and the minute consideration of the ojjicia suitable to
various age groups, occupations, and types of personality is what gives
such a peculiarly Roman flavor to the treatise. Many details—such as
the relevance of temperantia to the choice of a home (1. 138 ff.) and to the
preservation of dignitas in outward appearance (1. 130) and conversation
(1. 134), in winning popular esteem (2. 46), and in avoiding the vice of
avaritia in public life (2. 77)—speak clearly of the Roman background
and show in a remarkably specific way what aspects of sophrosyne were
\i
most readily adapted to Roman life among the upper classes.
De Senectute offers an example of the naturalization of sophrosyne by
weaving it firmly into a pattern composed of the most intensely Roman
traits and sentiments. In this essay venerable commonplaces about the
relevance of sophrosyne to old age—such as the famous anecdote about
Sophocles and his release from bondage to eros (14. 47)—are assimilated
to one of Cicero’s favorite models of frugahtas and abstinentia, the Elder
Cato. Throughout the essay Cicero represents temperantia as one of the
artes and virtutes that equip senectus (10. 34), and his choice of a spokes¬
man is peculiarly apt. Plutarch records that as early as 189 b.c. a statue
of Cato erected in the temple of Salus (Health) at Rome bore an inscrip¬
tion concerning his sophrosyne (Cato 19. 4). The location of the statue
suggests that the Romans even at this period were inclined to exploit the
traditional link between health of mind and health of body. In De
Senectute the subject of the vita rustica (perhaps the most appropriate of
all topics for Cato to discuss) is connected with self-restraint—in this case
the continentia of Manius Curius (16. 55); 62 and the power to enjoy old
age is made to seem a result of both moderatio and humanitas (3. 7), a very
Ciceronian iunctura.
Cato is also prominent as an exemplum virtutis in De Republica: Book I
opens with a tribute to his admirable industria (1. 1. 1), and Book II with
62 Valerius Maximus (4. 3. 5) cites Curius as the exactissima norma Romanae frugalitatis,
idemque fortitudinis perfectissimum specimen.
282 Sophrosyne
praise of his modus in dicendo (2. 1. 1). This dialogue employs to the full
the device of idealizing the early Republic and holding up for imitation
examples of the virtues drawn from that period; in so doing, it provides
the most sustained treatment we have of Roman sophrosyne in the con¬
text of the State. Such an approach to the virtue is marked, predictably
enough, by two principal techniques: the inclusion of several aspects of
sophrosyne among the priscae virtutes, and the attempt to relate certain
familiar Greek themes of sophrosyne to the dominant Roman idea
of service to the State. Among the facets of sophrosyne that Cicero here
makes part of Roman morality, pudor and verecundia are particularly
noteworthy. An enumeration of qualities clearly intended to suggest
sophrosyne in a list of cardinal virtues names pudor and continentia (1.2.
2),63 while the discussion of moral standards for the young and for
women refers to verecundia in a sense precisely like that given sophrosyne
in comparable Greek passages (4. 4. 4, 4. 6. 6).64 Clementia and mansuetudo
are also given an honorable place among early Roman values by being
ascribed to Numa Pompilius himself (2. 14. 27). A special feature in De
Republica is Cicero’s theory of the ideal princeps, modeled perhaps on
Numa, perhaps on Scipio Aemilianus, perhaps even on Pompey.65
Although the princeps must possess all four Platonic virtues,66 he has a
unique claim to moderatio, because his chief duties are to foresee the
cycles in political life and control their course (moderantem cursum, 1. 29.
45) and to balance and harmonize all the elements in the State; thus he
effects a concordia that Cicero, using the familiar Pythagorean and
Platonic metaphor, likens to a harmony of dissimilar tones in music (ex
dissimillimarum vocum moderatione, moderata ratione, 2. 42. 69). Hence Cicero
describes the princeps not only as rector (2. 29. 51) but as moderator (5. 6.
8), and the ideal constitution over which he presides is said to be
63 Also included here are the avoidance of disgrace and the search for glory, notable ad¬
ditions to the concept of sophrosyne in a treatise that assigns such importance to gloria.
Other references to pudor include 1. 43. 67, 3. 18. 28, 5. 4. 6. There seems to be a reminis¬
cence of the Greek tension between the active and the passive virtues in the description of
Marcellus as acer et pugnax and of Maximus as consideratus et lentus (5. 8. 10). Cf. Plutarch
Marcellus 9. 3.
64 Verecundia receives more attention in Cicero’s account of early Roman morals than any
comparable virtue does in Polybius, but the word is not always to be interpreted as a trans¬
lation of sophrosyne. The verecundia of Book V, which deters the best citizens from wrong¬
doing (5. 4. 6) is closer to aidds, as is pudor in the same passage.
65 Possible sources are discussed by G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith, Cicero on the Common¬
wealth (Columbus, Ohio, 1929), 93 ff.
66 Rep. 6. 6. 6 (Macrobius In Somn. Scip. 1. 1.8). See Friedrich Solmsen, C.P. 35 (1940),
423-24.
moderatum et permixtum (1. 29. 45), modice temperatum (2. 29. 65) and
aequatum et temperatum (1. 45. 69).
The vocabulary of the ideal state in De Republica provides an example
of what might be called the linguistic Romanization of sophrosyne. The
comparison of the rule of a king to the command of reason over the pas¬
sions (1. 38. 60; cf. 2. 40. 67) is of course a commonplace in Greek
treatises on kingship, but the discussion of the mixed constitution, also
Greek in origin, takes on a distinctly Roman air with the terminology
derived from temperare and moderari. Since temperare has the etymological
meaning “to mix,” it is natural for Cicero to describe the mixed consti¬
tution as temperatum (for example, the draught of liberty which the
people drink should be modice temperatam rather than nimis meracam,
1. 43. 66),67 just as it is natural for the cognates of modus to be used in
describing the activities of the moderator who presides over the moderatum
et permixtum constitution. Although it is sometimes implied in Greek
discussions of political theory that a mixed constitution is sophron,68 the
meaning of sophronizein does not lend itself to the same interpretations as
temperare and moderari;69 hence in this nuance of the vocabulary of
sophrosyne, Cicero shows genuine originality.
Like Isocrates, whose moral approach to politics he shares, Cicero
demands that the governing class provide examples of good conduct,
especially of self-control.70 Just as he substitutes the early Roman
67 An echo of Plato Rep. 562C-63E.
68 Plato normally describes the mixed constitution as moderate, but employs the words
metron, metriotes, rather than sophrosyne. Laws 691E-92A, on the mixture within the
executive part of the Spartan constitution, speaks approvingly of mingling the sophron
dynamis of old age with the headstrong strength of the kings, to produce the metron. This pas¬
sage is recalled by Cicero Legg. 3. 7. 17, describing the tribunate in Rome as a modica et
sapiens temperatio of the power of the consuls. Plato’s sophron is rendered by modica et sapiens,
while temperatio translates, not any form of sophrosyne, but the idea implied in Plato’s
pdyvvcn (“mingle”). Later on the Latin philosophical vocabulary employed temperantia itself
(as well as temperatio) to translate Greek words for mixture. See Apuleius De Mundo 19. 333,
where the mixture of diverse elements in the State is described as civilis ratioms temperantia;
cf. 21. 336 (the mingling of physical elements in the universe compared to a musical harmony:
natura veluti musicam temperavit) and 22. 337. On the background of the theory of the mixed
constitution, including Pythagorean concepts of mixture, harmony, and proportion, consult
Glenn Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton, i960), 521-43.
69 A like application of temperare to literary style occurs in Oral. 6. 21, where temperatus with
its radical meaning is predicated of the medium genus dicendi. See also Orat. 26. 95 (modica
et temperata) and 16. 51 (the three styles termed gravis, tenuis, and temperata). Cicero cites as an
example of temperata oratio his speech on the Manilian Law (Orat. 19. 102). Only in his rhe¬
torical works does he describe as a temperator one who mixes (Orat. 70); the word does not
occur as a synonym for rector or moderator in the Fragments of the De Republica.
70 A study of Cicero’s debt to Isocrates by S. E. Smethurst (T.A.P.A. 84 [1953], 262-320)
finds among the important similarities the part that each played in creating national myths,
284 S op hr o syne
republic for the ideal State of Plato’s imagination (2. 1. 3), so he gives
to the exemplum virtutis the position that Plato in his Republic assigns to
the Forms: the model to be imitated by the statesman of today, who is
in turn a mirror to his fellow citizens (2. 42. 69).71 Everywhere in De
Republica (as well as in De Legibus) Cicero reveals his conviction that
public service is the supreme good. In Book III he pronounces theoret¬
ical knowledge insufficient without experience in politics, and in the
perennial weighing of the active against the contemplative life he
decides for the active life as more deserving of praise and more
conducive to fame (3. 3. 6). The effect this decision has on his inter¬
pretation of sophrosyne becomes evident in the Somnium Scipionis,
Cicero’s equivalent to the myth of Er, where a special reward is
promised to the man who has deserved well of the State (6. 13. 13).
The Somnium reinterprets the Platonic theme of bfiolcooLS 6ecp in
an attempt to combine Greek and Roman elements. After discussing the
immortality of the soul and the divinity of the mens in a thoroughly
Hellenic tone, Cicero adds a Roman touch by suggesting that the best
use of the soul is to serve the State (6. 24-29). Such service is in fact one
source of immortality; another is detachment from corporeal things,
especially from bodily pleasures—a fundamental cause of likeness to God
in Pythagorean, Platonic, and Middle Stoic thought. The two modes of
achieving homoiosis are united without a truly organic relationship. A
more successful synthesis is achieved in De Legibus where Cicero
combines the Greek doctrine that self-knowledge is knowledge of the
Divine element in man, with the Roman tradition about the primacy
of service to the State. In his analysis of “Know thyself” he first main¬
tains that the proverb requires man to realize his likeness to God and
the attempt of each to use the past as a model for the future, and their emphasis on self-
control as a primary requirement in statesmen.
71 The exempla favored in Cicero’s philosophical works are for the most part identical with
those in the orations. Rambaud (45) notes that in oratory Roman models are cited before
Greek, but in the philosophical treatises the order is reversed. Scipio Africanus Major,
Fabricius, and Piso Frugi exemplify abstinentia on the part of the magistrate: the first because
of his conduct in Sicily; the second because of his refusal of the bribe offered by Pyrrhus; the
third chiefly because of his suggestive cognomen. See Verr. 2. III. 84. 195; Font. 17. 39; De Or.
2. 51; Brutus 106; Legg. 1. 2. 6. In Par. Sto. 3. 48 Fabricius is celebrated for his continentia.
Lucretia and Verginia are always the models for feminine castitas and pudicitia (Fin. 5. 22. 64,
2. 20. 66; Rep. 2. 25. 46, 2. 37. 63). Exempla horribilia among men are Tarquinius Superbus,
Sextus Tarquinius, and Appius Claudius the Decemvir: the first for insolentia and superbia (Rep.
2. 25. 45-46); the second for stuprum (Legg. 2. 20. 66); and the third for intemperies (Rep. 2. 27.
63). The role played by exempla virtutis in his own life is described by Cicero in the Archias
oration (12-14). Consult John H. Taylor, S.J., A.J.P. 73 (1952), 62-70, on the relation
between this passage and Ep. Fam. v. 7.
his place in the cosmos, and then traces the effect of this realization on
man’s behavior as a citizen of the State.72 One consequence is law-abid¬
ing conduct. It is Divine law, not merely written, positive law, Cicero
maintains, that prohibits such behavior as that of the wanton Sextus
Tarquin, which threatens the welfare of the political organism (2. 4. 10).
In a later book of De Legibus Cicero returns to the notion that the
dangerous example of public figures corrupts the State more thoroughly
than their very crimes bring it harm (3. 14. 31); again the bad example
that he singles out is that given by cupiditates principum. The corrective
virtue is here called continentia (3. 13. 30; cf. Brutus 329).
THE HISTORIANS
The prominence of the topic of sophrosyne (under whatever Latin

name) in Roman historiography is in part a consequence of Cicero’s pre¬
occupation with the effect of example in the State and his emphasis on
the particular danger presented by the two vices of avaritia and luxuria,
which it is the function of sophrosyne to restrain. Livy is the historian
who responded most sympathetically to Cicero’s influence and put into
operation the orator’s suggestions about both the style and the moral
framework suitable for composing Roman history. Sallust and Tacitus
were so remote from Cicero in temperament, political sympathies, and
literary style that they to a larger measure—though not entirely—
avoided the Ciceronian impress. Sallust, it is true, often recalls Cicero
in his persistent allusions to the moral decline of Rome and his close
attention to the corrupting effect of avaritia and luxuria.73 Yet these
topics had long since been employed by the Annalists, including
the Elder Cato, for whom Sallust felt particular admiration. Already in
Cato’s Origines the idealization of the ancestors had led to the praise of
the vita Italica for its disciplina (Frag. 76) and the comparison of Sabine
mores to those of Sparta (Frag. 51). The same attitude informs the
discussion of the vita and victus of Romulus by Piso Frugi (Frag. 8
Peters), his denunciation of the moral corruption of the young in his
own day (Frag. 40), and his comment on the subversion of pudicitia
after the year 154 b.c. (Frag. 38). Nor were the Roman Annalists the
only models available to Sallust: he found congenial a number of Greek
721.22. 59.
73 The evidence for Cicero’s influence on Sallust is presented by Rambaud, 123-34.
It consists largely of similar views on the moral character of the leader and its importance to
the State, the moral decline of Rome as a result of cupido, and the dating of this decline from
the reign of Sulla. The various dates for the onset of Rome’s degeneratio, according to various
ancient authorities, are discussed by Earl, 42-44.
286 Sophrosyne
writers—Plato, Xenophon, and above all Thucydides—who could

show him how to manipulate the topics of ancestral virtue and present-
day corruption.74 Among verbal reminiscences of Thucydides in works
ascribed to Sallust is an echo of the famous passage about the trans¬
valuation of ethical terms (3. 82. 4). Thucydides’ to 8e ocdcppov tov
avavdpov 7Tpooxypct becomes pudorem atque modestiam pro socordia aestimant

(.Ep. ad Caes. 1. 6).75 Socordia and ignavia, rather than the Ciceronian
intemperantia, are the historian’s favorite antitheses to the concept of so¬
phrosyne;76 while sophrosyne itself is usually rendered by such ancient
Latin approximations as pudor (or pudicitia), modestia, or continentia, rather
than by Cicero’s favorite, temperantia, which—like frugalitas—is virtually
ignored.77
The relation of sophrosyne to Sallust’s concept of virtus Romana is
explained in the preface to the Bellum Catilinae, where we learn that it
was cupiditas and lubido dominandi (“lust for conquest”) that put an end
to virtus in its early, ideal condition (2. 1-2). When desidia, lubido, and
superbia took the place of labor, continentia, and aequitas, Roman morality
was utterly changed (2. 5); and in Sallust’s own youth pudor, abstinentia,
and virtus were replaced by audacia, largitio, and avaritia (3. 3-4). In his
character sketch of Catiline, Sallust reveals how, in his view, the lack
of sophrosyne may join with other flaws to produce a thoroughly
depraved personality. Prominent among Catiline’s traits were the
failure to moderate his appetites and a passionate lust to seize control
of the State (5. 5-6), while his effect on the young men who flocked
around him was to destroy their modestia (14. 6) and pudor (16. 2-3).
74 Specific debts of Sallust to these and other Greek sources are noted by Paul Perrochat,
Les modeles grecs de Salluste (Paris, 1949).
75 Thucydides’ pleonexia and philotimia become Sallust’s pecuniae cupido and imperi cupido (Cat.
10. 3). Arguments for the genuineness of the Letters to Caesar are given by Karl Buchner,
Sallust (Heidelberg, i960). For a summary of views on the authenticity of the Epistles,
see Karl Vretska, C. Sallustius Crispus, Invektive und Episteln (Heidelberg, 1961), 1. 41-48.
Consult also D. C. Earl, Mus. Helv. 16 (1959), 152-58.
76 Socordia: Jug. 31. 2, 55. 1, 85. 22. Ignavia: Jug. 2. 4; 44. 5; 85. 14. It will be recalled that
ignavia is an antithesis to sophrosyne in Roman comedy, but that Cicero tends to make it a
vice opposed to fortitudo (Cat. 2. 25). Sallust also opposes luxuria and avaritia to sophrosyne, as
Cicero had done. Other antitheses include superbia (Jug. 85. 13), inertia (Jug. 1. 4), luxus (Jug.
2. 4), and lubido (Jug. 3. 4).
77 Temperantia does, however, appear among the virtues of Metellus in Jug. 45. 1, where it
enables him to restore the disciplina maiorum to the Roman army in Africa, which had been
entirely devoid of imperium et modestia (44. 1-2) and given over to ignavia luxunaque (44.
5). Sallust also has Marius comment on the difficulty of maintaining temperantia in the
midst of power (Jug. 85. 9; cf. Cat. 11. 8). Reminiscent of the ethical vocabulary of Roman
comedy is Sallust’s trick of using alliterative phrases, such as sine modo modestiaque (Jug. 41.9)
and licentia atque lascivia (Jug. 39. 5).
After these virtues were gone, there was nothing to restrain the down¬
ward progress of Catiline’s followers.
A complementary account of the positive effect of virtues allied with
sophrosyne in the life of a public figure may be found in Sallust’s
picture of the younger Cato, whom he portrays both through his speech
before the Senate and through contrasting character sketches of Cato
and Caesar. In the speech Cato repeatedly castigates luxuna and avantia
(52. 7, 22), rejects Caesar’s pleas for mansuetudo and misericordia in deal¬
ing with the conspirators (52. 11, 27), harks back to the ancestral virtues
(domi industria, foris iustum imperium [52. 2, 22]), and presents a consistent
picture of unwavering severitas. In the character sketch Sallust distin¬
guishes Cato from Caesar mainly on the basis of Cato’s modestia, decus,
severitas, modestus pudor, and innocens abstinentia (54. 5-6), in contrast to
Caesar’s restless activity, calculated generosity, and ambition. He
concludes the pair of contrasting portraits by applying to Cato the
phrase used by Aeschylus of the sophron Amphiaraus: “He preferred to
be, rather than to seem, a good man.” Unlike Caesar, who actively
sought military experience in order to display his virtus, Cato achieved
glory by the very fact that he did not seek it (54. 6). The whole passage
is Thucydidean in its use of the traditional contrast between the
qualities linked with sophrosyne, the “quiet” virtue, and those allied
with the active temperament; yet Sallust avoids any suggestion that
Cato and Caesar went to undesirable extremes in pursuit of their
respective virtues—as had Nicias and Alcibiades, according to
Thucydides.78
A much closer approximation to the Ciceronian ethical vocabulary
is found in Livy, who in many ways fulfills Cicero’s requirements for a
historian, as set forth in De Legibus. He handles both narratio and
exornatio according to the standards of the orator-statesman, while he
follows Cicero with remarkable fidelity in his pragmatic conception of
the historian’s task, in his belief that history has a moral purpose, in his
extensive use of exempla virtutum et vitiorum, and in his confidence that a
78 Cato Uticensis is cited as a model of both sophrosyne and andreia in Julian’s Misopogon
(358A). Caesar, in Sallust’s portrait, is devoid of qualities associated with sophrosyne, since
there is as yet no well-established connection between this excellence and mansuetudo. In the
Jug. Sallust employs the same ethical vocabulary as in the Cat., assigning to Metellus
(44-46) certain aspects of sophrosyne—notably temperantia and innocentia (“absence of corrup¬
tion”)—and ascribing to Marius others (63. 2)—especially self-restraint (animus . . . domi
modicus, lubidinis et divitiarum victor). Metellus, at one point a model of temperantia, at another
point becomes an exemplar of that hybris (superbia, contemptor animus) that the nobles displayed
towards the homo novus (64. 1).
288 Sophrosyne
great personality has the power to shape the ethos of a whole society.
Among the themes that pervade the History, one of the most ubiqui¬
tous is the condemnation of a small group of vitia, including amor, cupido,
libido, avaritia, and superbia, each of which is in some fashion antithetical
to sophrosyne. In connection with these vitia, Livy makes the greatest
use of historical models, elevating the rhetorical exemplum to a position
of major importance in his didactic approach to his task and perpetuat¬
ing the method—as well as many of the models—already used by Cicero
in his study of the early centuries of the Republic.79 The preface,
which reaffirms the moral purpose of historiography (9) and recognizes
luxuria and avaritia as the special vices of Rome (11), maintains that
these vices arose later there than in any other great state but have
finally brought about a situation in which the body politic is so diseased
that neither the ailment nor its cure can be endured. Livy often applies
to the State the metaphor of disease and health; he uses such terms as
contagio, rabies, furor, and insama to censure conduct of which he disap¬
proves. Since sophrosyne even in its Latin translations—especially
sanitas and sobrietas, but also temperantia—maintains its traditional con¬
nection with health and soundness of mind, the virtues allied with it
tend to be prominent as remedies for the ills of Rome, although it
would be rash to assert that Livy has this connection in mind whenever
he employs the metaphor of health and sickness.80
While the historian emphasizes the negative aspects of Roman morality
in calling attention to the exempla vitiorum, he leaves no doubt about the
qualities that he considers necessary for a healthy political organism.
These include moderatio, especially in the use of power, illustrated by the
behavior of the decemvirs in 451 b.c. (3. 33. 9); temperantia, which
is both restraint of the appetites, as in Scipio’s advice to Masinissa (30.
12. 18), and control of the lust for power and office, as in the case of
Manlius Torquatus’ refusal of a consulship in 211; 81 pudicitia, a theme
79 Livy’s treatment of the virtues and vices is analyzed by Lydia Halle in her unpublished
dissertation “A Study of Moralization in Livy” (Bryn Mawr, 1957). For Livy’s interest
in certain moral qualities, including pudicitia, dementia, and pietas, see P. G. Walsh, A.J.P. 76
(!955), 369-83, and Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961), 46-81.
80 Sanus: 2. 45. 2, 8. 27. 9 (sanus animus); 3. 17. 3 (sana civitas); 23. 7. 4, 45. 10. 11, 32. 121.
37, 40. 6. 4 (sana mens); 3. 17. 3, 2. 29. 6 (sanitas in curia).
81 Livy’s comment on Torquatus’ action contains an obvious allusion to the sophrosyne of
Plato’s philosopher-rulers: not even in a city of philosophers could there be principes graviores
temperantioresque a cupidine imperii (26. 22. 14). Temperantia and gravitas are also linked in 3. 22.
14. For Livy’s approval of temperantia in the use of libertas, see 34. 49. 8; for the connection of
moderatio with concordia, 3. 33. 9; and with gloria, 3. 68. 6, 26. 26. 9. Further examples
of Livy’s approval of moderatio appear in 24. 25. 8, 30. 17. 5, 28. 24. 1-2, 28. 27. 11,
24. 31. 14.
Sophrosyne in Rome 28g
developed in great detail in the stories of Lucretia and Verginia, both

of which are used to illustrate the danger to the State of libido and its
consequences (3. 44. 1); 82 disciplina militaris, which L. Aemilius Paulus
is praised for maintaining;83 and dementia towards the conquered
enemy, said to be a Roman tradition dating from the time of Camillus’
merciful treatment of the people of Tusculum (6. 26. i).84
A single instance of Livy’s technique of combining the exemplum
virtutis with the moralizing speech of exhortation must suffice. This
rhetorical method unites the pure exemplum, familiar in the oratory of
every period, with the fictitious speech composed by the historian
to convey his own moral precepts, to which he gives additional
auctoritas by ascribing them to a figure noted for the very type of moral
excellence being discussed. The most elaborate moral lecture delivered
by any model of sophrosyne in Livy’s History is the speech of Scipio
Africanus Major to Masinissa, King of Numidia, on the occasion of the
king’s hasty marriage to Sophoniba, daughter of Hasdrubal and former
wife of Syphax, a sermon full of echoes of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe.85
Scipio’s disapproval of the marriage, Livy points out, is the more acute
because of Scipio’s own record in Spain, where even in his youth he was
never overcome by the temptations of lust (cf. 26. 49. 1 and 50). Scipio
now tells Masinissa that he prides himself on his temperantia and continentia
more than on the other virtues that Masinissa so much admires in him.
The king, too, should acquire these qualities, because no danger is so
82 Sextus Tarquinius and Appius Claudius the Decemvir are the chief exemplars of
that libido which fosters danger to the State. Cicero had already cited them in this connection
in Fin. 2. 20. 66.
83 For this theme in Livy, see Walsh, toe. cit., especially p. 381, nn. 51-54.
84 Gravitas, pietas, and jides are the other quintessential^ Roman qualities whose absence
from contemporary Rome Livy deplores.
85 Another example of this technique is the speech of the Elder Cato against the repeal of
the Lex Oppia. He rebukes the women who desire its repeal, charging them with luxuria and
lack of pudor (34. 2. 10), then passes from this charge to a general condemnation of luxuria and
avaritia as the two plagues of empire. He links both vices with Greece and Asia. Like Cicero
and Sallust, Livy professes to regard the Roman taste for Greek art as a danger sign
and associates pleasure in such importations with scorn for the old religion. The moral
threat presented by Asia (34. 4. 3, 25. 40. 1-2, 38. 17. 18) is shared by Capua, whose
voluptas, licentia, and utter lack of modus corrupt impartially both the Romans and the army
of Hannibal (7. 31. 6, 7. 32. 7, 18. 10-12, 38. 1). Syracuse, a Greek city, is also a symbol of
luxuria; the beginning of Rome’s admiration for Greek ways is sometimes traced to the
plunder of Syracuse (25. 31. 9). Westward the course of sophrosyne took its way. It will be
recalled that Aeschylus regarded sophrosyne as Hellenic and its opposite as characteristic of
oriental peoples. Now Cato considers moderation and restraint Roman, luxury Greek. Still
later Tacitus was to hold up the barbarians in Germany as models of a certain kind
of sophrosyne (pudicitia) for degenerate Rome. For the rhetorical commonplace based on the
virtues and vices of cities, see Quintilian 3. 7. 26.
2go Sophrosyne
great as that presented by voluptas. He who has bridled and mastered

his appetites by temperantia has won a victory greater than the recent
military victory over Syphax (30. 14). Masinissa, deeply impressed by
this admonition, sends Sophoniba a draught of poison. Livy approves
this ruthless solution at least partly because of Sophoniba’s reputation
for having incited her first husband, Syphax, against the Romans.
Syphax himself blames her for his own furor in deserting Rome (30. 13.
11 ff.) and observes that, in marrying her, Masinissa has behaved more
foolishly and immoderately (stultius atque intemperantius) than he himself
had previously behaved.
This episode is perhaps the most striking instance of Livy’s condem¬
nation of amor or libido as a source of political disaster.86 His most
inclusive designation for the Roman appetite for evil is cupido—espe¬
cially in the Sallustian phrase cupido regni or imperi—a vice manifested in
Roman society as early as the time of Romulus and Remus (1.6. 3-4).
Superbia appears most frequently in a military context and is often
ascribed to the enemies of Rome but may sometimes account for a
disaster suffered by the Romans themselves, as in the case of the superbia
shown to the Samnites at the Gaudine Forks (9. 1. 8) or the arrogance
of Flamininus (22. 3. 4-5). Superbia naturally receives special attention
in the story of the Tarquins, which occupies a position in Livy’s narra¬
tive not unlike that of Croesus in the History of Herodotus, standing as
a kind of prologue which embodies the principal moral themes of the
entire work. In the case of the Tarquins superbia—accompanied by cupido
regni, libido, vis, and contempt for Roman libertas—constitutes an arche¬
type of the threats to the welfare of the State that are described in later
books of the History.
The themes of superbia and libido are particular favorites of Tacitus as
well, but although he employs them with great skill in both the
Histories and the Annals to enhance his account of the imperial vices,
his methods, like his literary style and his very vocabulary, are for the
most part un-Ciceronian. Tacitus indeed uses recognizable common¬
places of sophrosyne in all his extant works, but he shows increasing
independence as he matures. The topics appear in their most conven¬
tional form in the Agricola, where the devices of epideictic oratory
provide a framework for the biography of Tacitus’ father-in-law, and
various facets of sophrosyne appear in traditional order to create the
86 Other examples are those of Flamininus (39. 42. 5-43), Sextus Tarquinius (1. 58.
5), and Antiochus (36. 11. 1-2), whose marriage to a young girl encourages the spread of
luxuria in his army.
desired impression of Agricola’s moderation and integrity.87 The most

original interpretation of sophrosyne in this highly conventional picture
comes towards the end, when the moderatio of Agricola is contrasted, not
only with the ira of the jealous emperor, Domitian, but even more
pointedly with the useless defiance—contumacia and inanis mctatio
libertatis (42)—of the Stoic martyrs. Agricola proved that obseqmum and
modestia (“compliance” and “unobtrusiveness”), no less than ambitiosa
mors, can win glory. With this observation Tacitus makes his own highly
characteristic comment on the antithesis between sophrosyne and
andreia. It is an intensely Roman observation as well in that the goal of
both ways of life, the cautious and the bold, is renown.88
Topics traditionally linked with sophrosyne are present also in the
Germania and the Dialogus de Oratoribus,89 but Tacitus’ special touch
is most evident in the Histories and the Annals, where he uses some
of these topics to bring out the darker side of imperial history. Although
he maintains that the period of the Empire was not barren of virtue and
even produced bona exempla,90 although, in fact, he proclaims that the
pre-eminent function of the Annals is to save virtutes from oblivion,
as well as to hold up to the contempt of posterity base deeds and words
(3. 65. 1), he shows an increasing disposition to treat the topic of the
virtues with reserve. Syme calls attention to Tacitus’ habit of mention¬
ing only ironically or even ignoring altogether those virtues that had
been canonized by writers of the Republican era (especially Cicero)
and that were being progressively debased by the imperial propaganda
machine.91 Thus when he speaks of moderatio in connection with Tiberius,
87 E.g., the rara castitas of Agricola’s mother (4) and the moderatio (7), temperantia (8), and
abstinentia (9) of Agricola himself under various circumstances, all of them connected with
public service as general or governor. Syme (123, 198) comments on the presence of conven¬
tional moralizing topics in the Agricola, including the Ciceronian peroratio.
88 Cf. Sallust’s contrast between the ways in which Cato and Caesar achieved fame (Cat.
54. 5-6), where, however, both the sophron and the andrikos ways of life win the historian’s
approval.
89 Germania: the contrast between the moral purity of the barbarians and the corruption of
Roman society (19). But Tacitus does not make the savage entirely noble. He remarks
the lack of discipline and the intemperance in drink characteristic of the Germans (23).
Dialogus: the topic of degeneratio and the vocabulary of temperantia applied to the criticism of
oratory. Messalla uses the traditional vocabulary when he praises Cicero for sanitas eloquentiae
(25), accuses Cassius Severus of being the first to disregard modestia and pudor verborum (26),
and traces the decline of oratory to the oblivio moris antiqui (28). Cf. Cicero Oral. 19. 64 and
Seneca Ep. 114.
90 Hist., Prol. 1.3.
91 Syme (344 ff. and Appendix 66, 754 ff.) enumerates several terms that Tacitus avoids,
presumably because of his disgust at their abuse: mstitia, aequitas, felicitas.
2g2 Sophrosyne
he at one stroke transforms the virtue into a vice by adding the adjective
adroganti (Ann. i. 8); and when he quotes the emperor as ascribing
temperantia to himself, he makes sure that we will interpret it as hypocrisy
(Ann. i. 14). Clementia is another aspect of sophrosyne which he either
pointedly ignores or mentions only in a spirit of irony (Ann. 4. 74. 2; 11.
3. i).92 The vices that Tacitus ascribes to the various emperors are for
the most part those that constitute a threat to the liberty of Rome: they
have, that is, a strong political significance, in contrast to the private and
personal vices of extravagance and excessive indulgence in appetite
which Suetonius chooses to emphasize.
Suetonius, who pictures Caligula and Nero as notably intemperate,
especially by reason of their gluttony and lust, and draws unforgettable
sketches of other members of the imperial family who depart from tra¬
ditional Roman standards of pudicitia,93 employs many of the techniques
of the satirist, without the satirist’s reforming motive. Inevitably his
depiction of the licentiousness of the Julio-Claudian emperors recalls
those scenes in Roman satire which hold up to ridicule the excesses,
follies, and perversions of the rich. Although the Roman satirists from
Lucilius to Juvenal were indebted in obvious ways to the Greek Cynic-
Stoic diatribe for the theme of intemperantia in appetite,94 they em¬
bellished this theme with a multitude of details drawn from native
sources, so that the topics of the cena, of avaritia, and of impudicitia came
to appear more Roman than Greek, and the sophronigon logos of the
Hellenistic diatribe found a predestined target in Roman society. The
satirists themselves show varying degrees of moderation in their treat¬
ment of these themes. In the history of satire saeva indignatio, whether
that of Juvenal or of Swift, has on the whole been more prevalent than
the Horatian risus; and even Horace in his earlier sermones lacks the de¬
tachment and stylistic sophrosyne that mark his later satires and all the
epistles.95
92 For clementia and moderatio as imperial virtues, see below pp. 300-7.
93 E.g., impudicitia: Caligula 24, 25, 36; Nero 26-29; violentia, saevitia, superbia: Caligula 26-28,
Nero 36-38; extravagance: Caligula 37, Nero 30-31. On the impudicitia, crudelitas, and avaritia
of other emperors, see Julius Caesar 49, 50-52, Augustus 68-69, 71» Tiberius 60-62, Claudius 33-
34, Domitian 10-12, 22.
94 On the sophronizon logos of the Cynics and its influence on Hellenistic and Roman
poetry, see Gustav Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon (Leipzig, 1909), 228-84; and Johannes
Geffcken, Kymka und Verwandtes (Heidelberg, 1909), 1-44. The tradition of the Sdirvov,
the comic treatment of sumptuous dinners, also had great influence on Roman satire dealing
with the cena. Consult L. R. Shero, C.P. 18 (1923), 126-43, and A.J.P. 50 (1929), 64-70.
95 See, e.g., the milder treatment of sexual folly in Ser. I. 2 and 8, contrasted with Ser. II.
3. 247-80.
HORACE AND VIRGIL
It is in Horace, after all, and to a considerable extent in Virgil, that

the Roman effort to transplant sophrosyne came to fruition. Both poets,
in the moral content and in the very form of their verse, succeeded where
earlier writers, even Cicero, had failed. Both managed to express in
Roman terms most of the essential elements of sophrosyne, failing only
where radically different political conditions made success impossible.
Both by temperament and by reason of his thorough formation in
Greek modes of thought, Horace is easily the most sophron of Roman
authors.96 He makes completely his own the themes of Hellenistic
philosophy, including the popular conception of sophrosyne, just as he
makes completely his own the forms of Greek lyric verse. The union of
the personal and the political in early Greek lyric, especially that of
Alcaeus, made these forms peculiarly suitable for the expression of
Horace’s own combination of private and public sentiments. He was
more fortunate than Cicero in that the two sides of his personality
could be united in the figure of the vates, and the convictions expressed
in his earliest poetry, concerned chiefly with the problems of private life,
could in his maturity be applied with equal fitness to Roman society.
The core of Horace’s personal philosophy, as has often been pointed out,
is contentment with little; 97 and for him the fundamental meaning of
sophrosyne is always moderation, to which he gives definitive Roman
expression in the aurea mediocritas (both the phrase and the idea), which
is the keynote of his verse.98 In the Sermones, where the poet is still
searching for his authentic voice, this theme has already emerged as one
peculiarly congenial to him amid the inherited conventions of Lucilian
satura and the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. In the Odes it remains a dominant
concern, treated now with a corresponding sophrosyne of style, which
reveals itself in the exquisite wedding of thought, emotion, and diction
—that apparently effortless control for which Petronius found the
perfect phrase, curiosa felicitas."
96 This is a commonplace of Horatian criticism. See Fraenkel (214) on the combination of
the sophrosyne of the private individual and the sophia of the vates in Odes 2. 16. The
sophrosyne of Horace’s style is analyzed by William Everett, H.S.C.P. 12 (1901), 9, 16.
97 The development of this ideal and its extension from private to public life are discussed
by Friedrich Solmsen, A.J.P. 68 (1947), 337 ff. On the debt of Horace to the example
of Archilochus and Alcaeus in uniting the personal and the political in lyric poetry, see
Viktor Poschl in L’Infiuence grecque sur la poesie latine de Catulle a Ovide (Vandoeuvre-Geneve,
1953)-
98 See especially Odes 2. 10. 5-8 and Ser. I. 1. 106, 2. 25, 6. 68; II. 3.
99 Consult Solmsen (loc. cit.) on the difference in diction between the Sermones and the Odes,
2g4 Sophrosyne
The degree to which the Horatian theme of moderation is absolutely

personal, not acquired, is evident from the ease with which the poet puts
his stamp on the worn coinage of the diatribe and the rhetorical schools.
The vita rustica above all comes to life on the Sabine Farm where the
contrast between city life with its vices and country life with its austerity
for once carries a measure of conviction.100 It is in fact the Sabine Farm
that unifies and gives point to Horace’s use of several topics of sophrosyne,
both the negative themes of degeneratio and avantia and the positive
themes of simplicity, self-knowledge, and contentment with what is at
hand. His most impressive treatment of degeneratio, for example, occurs
in the sixth Roman ode, which contrasts the luxuria and dedecus of the
present with the heroic qualities of the age that stained the sea with
Punic blood. The emotional impact of the poem derives chiefly from the
two stanzas that suggest the manliness of the early Republic through a
vignette of the sons of rustici milites, who are trained to till the soil with
Sabine hoes and perform other tasks at the bidding of a stern mother—
and the way in which the theme of moderation is remolded in accordance with the character
of Horace’s lyric poetry. It would take too long to discuss in detail the sophrosyne of Horace’s
personal odes, a subject to which much attention has been directed of late, but the following
odes deserve special notice:
1. 31, which combines with the honor paid to Apollo, the god of sophrosyne, Horace’s
judicious rejection of various ways of life and his final prayer for contentment with what is
at hand, an old age nec turpem nec cithara carentem, and health of mind and body. Integra mens
is Horace’s most literal translation of sophrosyne.
2. 2, on the temperatus usus of money and the need to rule the avidus spiritus. The significance
of the key word temperato in v. 3 is discussed by A. O. Hulton, C.P. 56 (1961), 173-75, and
William M. Calder III, C.P. 56 (1961), 175-78.
2. 3, on the mens temperata to be maintained in res arduae and bonae. It is indicative of the basic
likeness of the chief Hellenistic ethical systems that Odes 2. 2. and 3 should apply the identi¬
cal terminology of temperantia to both Stoic and Epicurean commonplaces. The past participle
of temperare occurs at precisely the same place in v. 3 of each ode. Cf. the emphatic position
of temperatam in 3. 4. 66. On Horace’s use of temperare, see n. 106.
2. 10, which employs Horace’s favorite image of sophrosyne: the voyager who must steer a
middle course between the treacherous shore and the perilous deep, and which contains the
classical formulation of the theory of the Mean. Sobrius in v. 8 recalls the translation
of sophron favored by the comic poets. See Donald Levin, C.J. 54 (1959), 169-71, on the ref¬
erences to all four cardinal virtues in this ode.
3. 1, in praise of the contentment of the man desiderantem quod satis est. A favorite Horatian
image connected with the antithesis to sophrosyne appears here: the dominus terraefastidiosus,
who builds his seaside villa on piles sunk into the sea itself. For other uses of this image, see
Commager, 82, on Odes 2. 18.
4. 9, in which again the tetrad of Stoic virtues is ascribed to the person addressed, in this
case Lollius (34-52).
100 Epode 2; Odes 2. 18. 1-4; 3. 1. 45-48; 3. 6. 33-34. For some perceptive comments
on Horace’s love of simplicity provided it was not accompanied by rigorous austerity, see
M. E. Taylor, A.J.P. 83 (1962), 23-43.
a pudica mulier like the Sabine or Apulian matron of Epode 2. 39.101 The
choice of the epithet Sabellis to describe the hoes betrays the source
of Horace’s imagery: some typical scene in his own Sabine district,
where the activities that bring the day to a close contrast sharply with
those depicted in the preceding nighttime scene of stanzas six to eight,
involving the matura virgo who delights to learn lascivious oriental dances;
the contrasting types of doctrina in the two scenes form the moral basis of
the ode.
This device of contrasts, so characteristic of Horace, is fully exploited
in Odes 2. 16 (Otium divos), where each set of antitheses contains one term
illustrating moderation and one illustrating excess. Contentment with
little is opposed to greed for wealth and power; the soul that rejoices in
the present is opposed to that which cannot leave care behind; and
enormous wealth, represented by the possession of huge herds, swift
racing mares, and costly apparel, is contrasted with the poet’s own
treasures: parva rura, the gift of lyric song, and the confidence in his po¬
sition as a poet which enables him to scorn the envious throng. Nothing
is lacking except the application of these themes to public, as well as
private, life—the final expression of Horace’s mission as a vates. This step
is actually taken in the preceding ode (2. 15, lam pauca aratro), which
protests the conversion of farmland and vineyards to gardens and extrava¬
gant villas and sets against a detailed description of such unproductive
plots of land the auspicia and veterum norma of Romulus and bearded
Cato.102 The relation between the theme of moderation and the welfare
of the State is presented with great vigor in Odes 3. 24 (Intactis opulentior),
which includes an appeal for someone to check licentia and cupido (29,
51) with a genuine reform. It was his acceptance, however reluctant, of
the Augustan settlement and his deep concern for the destiny of Rome
that induced Horace to transfer to the State the principles that guided
him in his private life, and to praise the princeps for his efforts to restore
a higher standard of morality (Odes 4. 4, 5, 6, 15, especially).103
Yet it is in precisely those odes in which Horace is most concerned to
show the need for sophrosyne in the life of the State that we are most
aware of the chasm between the Greek and the Roman conceptions of
101 L. P. Wilkinson (Horace and His Lyric Poetry [Cambridge, 1945], 29) has a detailed
analysis of this Ode.
102 Solmsen (loc. cit.) points out that Horace uses the very detail selected by Sallust
Cat. 13-14.
103 See Burck, loc. cit., on the moderatio of the Augustan principate. Horace mentions sym¬
pathetically the princeps’ effort to check extravagant building as well as his attempt to
improve family life; temperantia offered a cure for both extravagance and sexual promiscuity.
2g6 Sophrosyne
this quality. The nursery of Attic sophrosyne had been the free and
democratic city-state of the sixth and fifth centuries, but the Roman
oligarchy had never experienced the precise combination of circum¬
stances—the interaction between the self-assertion of the individual and
the restraints imposed by a polls of equally individualistic fellow citizens
—that had nurtured the sophrosyne of Solon and Aeschylus. Hence the
Roman poet knows only two ways of applying sophrosyne to the prob¬
lems of the State: he can preach the morality of restraint for the entire
city, concentrating on the themes of luxuria and avaritia which he had
learned, not from his Greek lyric models, but from Cicero and the
historians; 104 or he can single out the only other aspect of sophrosyne
which carries weight in the principate—namely the moderation of the
princeps himself, which is usually interpreted as restraint in the use of his
power over conquered foes. This is the aspect of sophrosyne—dementia—
that Horace celebrates in the fourth Roman ode, Descende caelo; here, too,
a debt to Cicero is apparent, for the poet echoes in evident sincerity the
note that we have heard sounded in the speeches of the year 46 b.c.—
the praise of lene consilium in an absolute ruler and the implied or

express plea for the merciful use of his power.
This solemn ode, with its Pindaric use of the symbolism of music to
represent the harmony of the State in which warring parties have at last
been reconciled,105 first establishes Horace’s right to speak as a vates
[Musis amicus), then ascribes to the Muses a love for lene consilium, and
after depicting in vivid detail the mythical conflict between the Giants
and the Olympians, sums up the meaning of this ancient story with the
significant words: Vis consili expers mole ruit sua; vim temperatam di quoque
provehunt in maius (65-67). The word consili echoes the earlier lene consilium,
while vis temperata describes in a characteristically Horatian phrase
(almost a callida lunctura) that blending of andreia and sophrosyne which
was the Hellenic ideal. In the context of this ode the chief emphasis falls
104 The influence of Cicero on Horace, especially in the Horatian Epistles, is studied
by Walter Wili, Horaz (Basel, 1948). Edmund Silk (Y.C.S. 13 [1952], 147-58) discusses
specific reminiscences in the Odes. See Poschl (op. cit., 108) for parallels between the second
Roman ode and Cicero’s ideal of the statesman.
105Fraenkel (280-85) discusses the resemblance of this ode to the first Pythian with its in¬
vocation to the lyre, and the eighth Pythian, which contrasts the personified Hasychia with
the giants Porphyrio and Typhoeus. See also T. H. Wade-Gery, J.H.S. 4 (1932), 214,
and, among many commentaries on Odes 3. 4: the explication by Wilkinson, op. cit.; the dis¬
cussions by Steele Commager, Horace, 204-8, and A.J.P. 80 (1959), 37—55', and Louis
McKay, C.R. 46 (1942), 243-45; an<4 the comments by Poschl, op. cit., 114-15, on music as
a civilizing force in Plato’s Laws and the frequency with which Horace invokes Apollo
in the Odes.
on sophrosyne. The possession of vis, by the Giants and the Olympians,
Antony and Octavian, is taken for granted; and it is the presence of
sophrosyne or temperantia 106 that distinguishes the victors—morally—
from the vanquished and wins the approbation of the gods. In this belief
Horace comes close to the fifth-century Greek conception of sophrosyne
as maximum passion under absolute control. The ode also shows Horace
to be more sensitive than most Romans to the essential meaning of hybris.
Whereas his countrymen generally do no more than equate it with
superbia, Horace perceives that hybris in its classical form is the extreme
to which the heroic individual goes when he lacks self-knowledge and
therefore self-restraint. The phrase vis consili expers implies that power or
passion, with the help of wisdom, might still be transformed into sophro¬
syne, vis temperata; and there is no denying the sympathy with which
Horace speaks of Terra and her defeated children. It is at this point that
the Roman interpretation of sophrosyne is added to the Greek, for the
vis temperata of the victorious Olympians is, by implication, to take the
form of dementia, the imperial virtue of Augustus, who is described in
the Carmen Saeculare as bellante prior, iacentem lenis in hostem (51-52).107
A close connection between the Roman odes and the speech of Anchises
in the Aeneid (VI. 847-53) has often been perceived.108 The parallel be¬
tween parcere subiectis et debellare superbos (853) and the virtues celebrated
in Odes 3. 4 and 1 is self-evident. Both Virgil and Horace allude to the
106 Horace’s use of temperate shows the effect of Cicero’s equation of temperantia with
sophrosyne. The poet rarely gives it the etymological significance of “mixture” (exceptions are
Odes 1. 20. 11 and 3. 19. 6). Normally in Horace as in Virgil (see p. 300) temperate
is synonymous with regere; it can also mean “to moderate,” “to forbear,” or “to keep in equi¬
librium.” Especially notable is the zeugma in Odes 1. 12. 14 where, speaking of Jupiter, Horace
says: “qui res hominum ac deorum/ Qui mare ac terras variisque mundum/ Temperat hons.” Men and
gods he rules; the cosmos he also rules, but keeps in a state of balance as well. In 3. 4. 45-48
temperat and regit (used again of Jupiter) are identical in meaning. Other uses include 1. 8. 7
(temperare describes the effect of a harsh curb bit), 4. 12. 1 (the moderating effect of spring
breezes on the wintry sea); 2. 16. 27 (amara lento temperet nsu, said of the sophron man who is
laetus in praesens, 25); 3. 24. 18 (the woman who refrains from harming her stepchildren); and
4. 3. 17-18 (temperas describes the action of the Muse who produces a harmonious sound from
the golden lyre).
107 See Commager, A.J.P. 80 (1959), 37-55, on the appeal for mercy for the Antonians in
Odes 1. 2, and Commager, Horace, 194-209, on the present ode. Consult also Wilkinson, op.
cit., 71. Fraenkel (285) comments on the effect obtained by concluding the list of Giants with
the sympathetic figure of the amator Pirithous (79-80). See J. P. Elder, A.J.P. 73 (1952), 140-
58, for a discussion of Horace’s admiration for audacia, even in the midst of his praise
of moderation in Odes 1. 3.
108 E.g., by George Duckworth {T.A.P.A. 87 [1956], 281-316), who compares the arrange¬
ment of the Roman odes and of Aen. 6. 760-853. See also Henry Rowell, M.A.A.R. 17
(1940), 140 ff., and Walter Wili, Vergil (Munich, 1930), 94 f.
2g8 Sophrosyne
combination of power and moderation, virtus and dementia, which is

hopefully ascribed to Augustus on the clupeus aureus. It would not,
of course, be surprising to find Horace and Virgil celebrating the same
themes in lyric and epic poetry. The existence of other Horatian topics
of sophrosyne in the Aeneid—such as Evander’s praise of simplicity in 8.
327, the eulogy of country life in 9. 603-13, the violation of the Mean
by Turnus, together with the extremely Horatian language in which his
fatal error is described in 10. 501 109—and of equally Virgilian motives
in Horace (notably in Book IV of the Odes) may be accepted without
dispute. But the sophrosyne of Virgilian poetry goes much deeper than
surface allusions prompted by the political and social problems of the
day. If the clupeus aureus had never existed, if Horace and Virgil had not
belonged to a coterie and shared certain ideas, the essential sophrosyne
of the Aeneid would have been what it now is. The Virgilian sophrosyne
is fundamentally an expression of the primary theme of all great imagina¬
tive literature—the victory of order over chaos; but never before the
Aeneid had the theme been developed in such intricate detail or expressed
so richly and deliberately in characterization and imagery.
The ethos of Aeneas himself, whose most memorable traits are pietas
and humanitas, includes as the necessary foundation of them both a
sophrosyne that is repeatedly tested by the powerful assaults of passion
(furor, violentia) and is contrasted at every turning point in the narrative
with the unrestrained and therefore destructive passions of other major
figures, especially Dido and Turnus. Dido’s violation of sophrosyne takes
the form offuror and leads her to betray pudicitia.110 Turnus gives way to
violentia and superbia.nl Both figures represent threats to the ordered and
civilized world that is to emerge from the triumph of justice and consilium
embodied in Aeneas. It is part of Virgil’s vision of reality that these
threats are themselves embodied in personalities so attractive and so
sympathetically treated, like Horace’s amator Pirithous (Odes 3. 4. 79-80).
The victory of Aeneas is in neither case an easy one, nor does the hero
remain unmoved. The symbol of his sophrosyne is the image of the
109 Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae et servare modum, rebus sublata secundis, compared
with Odes 2. 3. See Duckworth, toe. cit., 311-12, on these and other Horatian concepts and on
Virgilian echoes in Odes 4. 4, 5, 6, 15. The presence of the Golden Mean ratio in Virgil’s
poetry and in Horace’s Sermones is demonstrated by Duckworth, T.A.P.A. 91 (i960), 184-220.
110 Furor, mastered or unmastered, as part of the contrast between Aeneas and Dido,
is discussed by Bernard Fenik, A.J.P. 80 (1959), 1 ff.
111 Violentia: Aen. 9. 757-61, 11. 901-5, 12. 735-39. Superbia: 10. 445-514, 12. 326. See
Warde Fowler, The Death of Turnus (Oxford, 1919), 41, on Turnus’ want of temperantia; and
see Aen. 12. 4-7, 103 ff. for the imagery of the lion and the bull as applied to him.
Sophrosyne in Rome 2gg
great oak tree that is shaken to its very roots by the violence of the storm
(4. 393-96) yet still resists disaster. Mens immota manet.
Repetitions of the pattern in which sophrosyne is contrasted with
a contrary quality mark the entire course of the Aeneid. Jupiter and Juno
in Book I set the pattern initially: he stands for order and ultimate peace;
she, for saeva ira and its consequences. Latinus and Amata in Book VII
(at the beginning of the second half of the poem) symbolize the same
opposition: civilization, peace, consilium on the one hand; unrestrained
emotion, egoism, and selfish claims on the other. The association of
sophrosyne with the masculine and of unrestrained passion with the
feminine is an unexpected reminiscence of the Aeschylean point of view,
expressed in the Suppliants and the first half of the Seven against Thebes112
Book VIII is especially rich in contrasts between sophrosyne and some
opposing quality: the conflict between Hercules and Cacus, the warn¬
ing against luxuria implicit in the paupertas of Evander, the picture
of Cato opposing Catiline on the shield of Aeneas. In the last six books
Mezentius by reason of his contempt for the gods and his bestial cruelty
towards men emerges as an embodiment of hybris,113 but in his almost
unrelieved pride and savagery he is less effective (less Greek certainly)
than Turnus, whose courage and heroism are nullified by his lack
of self-knowledge and failure to preserve modus (10. 501-5).
Poschl’s study of the symbolism used in the Aeneid notes the concen¬
tration in Book I of images that convey this fundamental contrast be¬
tween sophrosyne and its opposites.114 The storm establishes the emotional
keynote of the poem, and the saeva ira of Juno, in addition to fore¬
shadowing the hatred of Carthage for Rome, symbolizes the destructive
passions that are ultimately to yield to order, control, and sophrosyne—
all embodied successively in Jupiter, Aeneas, and Augustus.115 The
theme of pacification, which Poschl locates in the scenes where Aeolus
controls the raging winds, Neptune quiets the storm, and impius Furor is
112 See pp. 37-40. Another Aeschylean device, also reminiscent of the Septem, is the sym¬
bolism of the shield of Turnus (Io and Argus) and his helmet (the Chimaera), 7. 85,
contrasted with the shield of Aeneas in Book VIII. Consult Stuart Small, T.A.P.A. 90 (1959),
243 57
- -
113 He is called insultans (7. 570), contemptor divum (7. 647), ardens (10. 889), turbidus
(10. 763). We hear also about his superbum imperium and saeva arma (8. 481) and his boast
dextra mihi deus et telum (10. 773), which recalls the hybris of Ajax.
114 Poschl, 22 ff. According to Poschl, the basic image of the poem is the struggle to sub¬
due the demonic, which takes such forms as civil war, passion, and destruction and death in
nature.
115 Virgil emphasizes consilium in the prophecy of Jupiter, 1. 257-96, especially 281: Iuno
... consilia in melius referet. Latinus in Book VII also represents consilium, but his is vain (586-600).
joo Sophrosyne
enchained in the temple of Janus, is associated verbally with temperantia.

The noun cannot be accommodated to the hexameter, but the verb is
applied to the action of both Aeolus and Neptune in Book I. Aeolus
temper at iras (i. 57) and Neptune temper at aequor (1. 146). The statesman
who quells the mob regit dictis animos (1. 153). Regere and temperare here,
as in Horace, are identical in meaning—further proof of Cicero’s success
in establishing temperare and its cognates as the proper Roman dress for
sophrosyne.116
THE VIRTUE OF THE EMPEROR
In scenes depicting the Virgilian vis temperata, the pnnceps often seems
to hover behind the figure of Aeneas, for the qualities displayed by the
Trojan hero in both conquering and conciliating the Italian tribes are
those urgently needed by the ruler of the Roman Empire. It is not sur¬
prising then that in the post-Augustan history of sophrosyne the virtue
of the emperor receives the most marked attention and undergoes the
most significant development. A study of imperial sophrosyne must be¬
gin with Augustus’ reference in the Res Gestae to the shield presented to
him by the Senate: virtutis clementiaeque et iustitiae et pietatis causa (6. 16-
21, ch. 34). The possible identification of these famous virtues with the
Platonic canon has often been debated.117 The right of pietas to appear
(in place of prudentia) is justified both by the historical position of eusebeia
in early Greek canons of excellence and by Augustus’ concern for the
revival of religion. The real question is whether dementia in some
way represents sophrosyne.
The Greek historians, especially those of the early Empire, clearly felt
uncertain about the proper translation of the Latin word dementia. The
renderings most favored seem to have been epieikeia (the word actually
used in the Greek version of the Res Gestae) and praotes, but philanthropia
sometimes appears and so occasionally does sophrosyne. Since, however,
the most familiar nuance of sophrosyne at this period was restraint
of appetite, it never became a popular Greek translation for dementia.
Yet the Emperor Julian uses it, just as he uses philanthropia, praotes, and
116 See pp. 268 ff. For Virgil’s use of other Latin equivalents of sophrosyne or sophron,
consult M. N. Wetmore, Index Verborum Vergilianus (New Haven, Conn., 1910), under pudor,
modus, and castus.
117 The relevant texts are collected by Hieronymus Markowski, Eos 37 (1936), 109-28.
Important discussions of the problem include the following: Otto von Premerstein, Vom
Werden und Wesen der Pnnzipats (Munich, 1937), which suggests that the virtues are less Greek
than Roman and should be linked with the attempt to represent Augustus as a second
Romulus; Joseph Liegle, Zeitschrift fur Numismatik 41 (1932), 58-100; and Gerhard
Rodenwaldt, Abhandlungen der Priissische Akademie der Wissenschaften 3 (1935), 6-7.
epieikeia, in praising the mercy of Constantius (Or. 2. 100C; cf. Or.
1. 48A-49A); 118 and there can be no doubt that, for those Romans
who were acquainted with Greek philosophy, dementia—moderation in
the use of power—belonged, as early as the last century of the Republic,
to the province of sophrosynz/temperantia. This association was perhaps
a legacy from the Middle Stoa, but in a less formal way Greek writers,
even before the Stoics, had linked sophrosyne with praotes, epieikeia, and
other words connoting gentleness or humanity, especially towards con¬
quered enemies.119 The Old Stoa, as we have seen, excluded pity from
the concept of arete,120 but the Romans distinguished pity (misericordia)
from mercy (dementia, mansuetudo) and specifically linked only the second
of these qualities with sophrosyne/tera/^rarch<2. Representatives of the
Middle Stoa such as Panaetius and Poseidonius considered mercy
praiseworthy.121 Polybius links praotes, philanthropia, and sophrosyne with
andreia as foundations of the State (6. 48. 7; 10. 17. 15; 15. 17. 4) and
in a passage full of significance for Roman political philosophy recalls the
Hellenic antithesis between the heroic and the gentle principles, saying
(18. 37. 7) that it is necessary to be spirited in war (thymikos) but
in victory moderate, gentle, and humane (metnos, praeis, and philanthropos)
—Virgil’s debellare superbos and parcere subiectis. Cicero, as we have noted,
treats dementia as a subdivision of temperantia in De Inventione, and in the
oration on the Manilian Law he praises Pompey’s humanitas and
mansuetudo in the section of the speech devoted to temperantia (14.
40-42).122
118 See Jurgen Kabiersch, Untersuchungen z.um Begnff der Philanthropia bei dem Kaiser Julian
(Wiesbaden, i960), 15-25, for a discussion of Julian’s effort to relate philanthropia to certain
aspects of dementia and for the various Greek words used to translate dementia by Plutarch,
Cassius Dio, and others.
119 Sophrosyne and praotes: Plato Rep. 375C, Polit. 306A-311C; Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1103b
15-19; Xenophon Ages. 10. 1, 11. 2. Sophrosyne and epieikeia: Democritus, Frag. 291 DK,
Hypereides 6. 5 (the first alludes to individual, the second to civic, virtue). Thucydides
occasionally uses sophron with a meaning close to “merciful” (e.g., 3. 58. 1, 59. 1).
120 Zeno: SVF 1. 214, p. 52, 15-17. Chrysippus: SVF 3. 640, p. 162, 35 ff. On the views of
the Old Stoa and their mitigation by Roman Stoics, see W. C. Korfmacher, T.A.P.A. 77
(1946), 44.
121 For the beliefs of the Middle Stoa, see Cicero Off. 1. 11. 35, 25. 88; and consult
Norden, op. cit., on Aen. 6. 847 ff. Rodenwaldt (loc. cit., 8) draws attention to the differences
between Greek and Roman artistic representations of war: the Greek places the emphasis
on the warlike action, while the Roman represents the two results—victoria and dementia.
122 Cicero’s treatment of dementia varies with his Greek source. Sometimes he brings it
close to magnitudo animi (a Middle Stoic substitute for andreia) or even to mstitia. Cf. De Virt.,
Frags. 6, 8 Knollinger; and see Gauthier, 159. Plato in Laws 854D ff. is inclined to relate
mercy to dike in discussing the educative effects of punishment, but it should not be forgotten
that the reformatory where the re-education takes place is called a Sophronistenon (908E).
J02 Sophrosyne
The most substantial theoretical discussion of dementia is Seneca’s

essay on the subject, which, like De Inventione, reflects Stoic doctrine.
According to Seneca, too, temperantia is the basic excellence of which
dementia is a part. He defines dementia as temperantia in one who has the
power to take vengeance and as lenitas shown by a superior towards an
inferior when exacting penalties (2.3. 1; cf. 1. 11. 12). It is the virtue most
suitable for a ruler (1. 5. 2), who by exercising it shares the power
of the gods (cf. Cicero Pro Marcello 3). The practice of dementia dis¬
tinguishes a king from a tyrant (1. 11. 4-12. 3); only in the presence of
this virtue can justice, peace, security, and dignity flourish (1. 19. 8).
Seneca is careful to separate dementia from misericordia, which he classi¬
fies as a vice because it lacks the element of ratio (2. 4. 4).123 The power
to distinguish the curable, to whom mercy should be shown, from the
incurable, is assigned to moderatio, which is here an intellectual, rather
than a moral, virtue and recalls the original Stoic definition of sophro¬
syne as a faculty of choice. The opposite of dementia is crudelitas or
intemperantia animi, exemplified by Alexander the Great (1. 25. 1).
Augustus is a type of dementia (1.9. 1), but Seneca observes that he was
moderate and merciful only in his maturity, not (like Nero) in his youth.
Exhausted cruelty (lassa crudelitas) is not identical with dementia,124 As
for Nero himself, he is his own exemplar of dementia, and Seneca’s essay
is supposed merely to serve as a mirror for the emperor’s virtue (1. 1. 1-6).
At this period in the Empire it had already become conventional to
ascribe dementia to the ruler. After Cicero’s eulogy of the dementia and
mansuetudo of Julius Caesar,125 the dementia Caesaris became a common¬
place among historians. The temple dedicated to this virtue in the first
Caesar 126 evidently set a precedent, for we hear of an altar to the
dementia of Tiberius as well as of a coin celebrating his possession of this
excellence. Since the coin has a twin that refers to the moderatio of the
same emperor, it has been conjectured that the Senate presented him
with a shield comparable to the clupeus aureus of Augustus.127 Other
123 The transition of misericorida from a Stoic vitium to a Christian virtue is traced by
Helene Petre, R.E.L. 12 (1934), 376-89.
124 This warning implies that Seneca’s conception of sophrosyne is positive, rather than,
as in the case of many Romans, merely negative.
125 See above, pp. 278-79 and n. 55.
126 Dio 46. 64.
127 The altar: Tacitus Ann. 4. 74. 1-3. The coins: Mattingly and Sydenham, 1. 108
(B.M.C. Tib. 85-90). On the dementia of Tiberius, see C. H. V. Sutherland, J.R.S. 28 (1938),
129-40; M. P. Charlesworth, Proc. Br. Acad. 23 (1937), 105-33; Syme, 414-15; R. S. Rogers,
Studies in the Reign of Tiberius (Baltimore, 1943), 43-48. The iconography of sophrosyne may
perhaps be said to begin with scenes representing dementia on Roman sarcophagi and other
emperors to whom ancient sources ascribe dementia include Caligula,

Nero, Vitellius, Trajan, Constantius, Julian, Gallienus, Jovian, and, as
a matter of course, most of the subjects of biographies in the Historia
Augusta and the Latin Panegyrics.128 It seems nevertheless that at cer¬
tain times—during the Augustan age and still later, from Vitellius to
Hadrian—the word dementia fell into disfavor, first because of its cynical
association with Julius Caesar and then because it had been ascribed to
the monsters Caligula and Nero. Virgil never refers to dementia but
transfers much of its content to pietas; and Propertius, in praising Rome
for achieving power as much through pietas as through the sword, expli¬
cates the word pietas in terms suited rather to dementia and actually in¬
volving the verb temper are (3. 20. 22): victrices temper at ira manus (“our
anger restrains its victorious hands”).129 This avoidance of a term
abused in official propaganda later finds a parallel in the practice
of Tacitus.
Clementia and temperantia are again linked in a highly unusual passage
in Claudian’s eulogy of Stilicho, which draws on conventional epideictic
theory but also goes beyond it for a conception of dementia not unlike the
cosmic sophrosyne of Greek philosophy. In the beginning, Claudian tells
us, Clementia was the custos mundi, the “guardian of the world.” Her
dwelling is in the sphere of Jove, where she keeps the heavens in a state
of equilibrium between the Cold and the Hot {temperat aethram/frigons et
flammae medio). It was she who first disentangled Chaos, scattered the
darkness, and bathed the world in light (2. 6-11). The consequences of
monuments, and coins depicting clementia, pudicitia, and (rarely) moderatio. Rodenwaldt (loc.
cit., 6) discusses sarcophagi of a type which has four scenes symbolizing four Roman virtues:
a battle (virtus), a supplication (clementia), an offering (pietas), and the clasping of hands
(1concordia). On sarcophagi related to this type, see also P. Barrera, Studi Romani 2 (1914), 93-
120; Inez Scott Ryberg, M.A.A.R. 22 (1955), 163 ff; and Elaine P. Loefffer, Art Bulletin 39
(1957), l~l (see plates 1 and 4 for clementia). Scenes or figures representing clementia also
occur on Trajan’s column (Rodenwaldt, loc. cit., 8) and on coins, including those of Vitellius,
Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Probus. On the Hadrianic coins Clementia is portrayed as a
Junoesque goddess, standing and holding a patera in one hand and a vertical scepter in the
other (see Mattingly 3. 270, Nos. 251-55, and plate 51. 13, 14). The coins of Tiberius
mentioned above carry inscriptions Clementiae S.C. and Moderationi(s) S.C. above a small bust
of Tiberius, in the center of a shield, surrounded, in the one case by a laurel wreath, in the
other by a plain circle. The virtues themselves are not portrayed.
128 See P. W. “Princeps” (Wickert) for the evidence connecting clementia with the
Emperors from Tiberius to Diocletian; consult also P. W. “Clementia” (Aust) and Roscher,
Clementia (I. 1. 910-12).
1291 owe these observations on Virgil and Propertius to the presidential address of
Professor Inez Scott Ryberg before the American Philological Association, December 28,
1962. The absence of clementia from coins between Vitellius and Hadrian is discussed by
M. P. Charlesworth, Proc. Br. Acad. 23 (1937), 112-13.
304 Sophrosyne
Stilicho’s possession of dementia include pardon for the conquered, just

as in conventional eulogy of the ruler, and the personified virtue is
equipped with such stereotyped sisters as Fides and Iustitia,130 but the
cosmic implications of this passage make it worthy of note. Clementia is
identified with the great ordering power of the universe required by most
of the Greek physical philosophies (whether they describe it as philia, nous,
or the sophron krasis), and its function is explained with the verb temperare,
used in a sense like that of Horace when he says that Jupiter keeps the
cosmos in a state of balance (mundum temperat [Odes 1. 12. 14]).
Moderatio is scarcely less notable than clementia as an imperial virtue,
although its traces are mainly literary, rather than numismatic (as in
the case of clementia). The only coin bearing this inscription is that
of Tiberius mentioned above. For this excellence, too, Seneca is a prime
source of information, although the exempla moderationis cited by Valerius
Maximus (IV. 1) are helpful in determining its scope, as contrasted
with pudicitia (VI. 1), continentia (IV. 3), verecundia (IV. 5) and frugalitas
(II. 5). In De Clementia the word moderatio and its cognates are so often
employed to define the function of mercy or compassion in a ruler (as
in 1. 2. 2; 1. 11. 1; 1. 18. 1; 1. 19. 4; 1. 20. 1,4; and 2. 3. 2, 3) as to
make it clear that the two ideas are inseparable, and that moderatio,
even more than temperantia, serves Seneca as the normal translation for
sophrosyne. Although in a Ciceronian enumeration of virtues he refers
to temperantia, along with iustitia and fortitudo, later adding prudentia (Ep.
113. 12, 19), he tends to restrict temperantia to the control of appetite and
passion. Sophrosyne in its broader implications is usually moderatio;
exceptions are the special treatment of the virtue in De Clementia and
the semi-technical rendering of sophrosyne as pudicitia to designate the
virtue of married women.131 Seneca praises salubris moderatio in every
130 Fides: De Cons. Stil. 2. 30; Iustitia: De Man. Theod. Cons. 166. Professor James Hutton
has called these passages to my attention. With the concept of Clementia ordering the cosmos,
we might compare the coin of Probus which shows the emperor holding a scepter sur¬
mounted by an eagle and receiving a globe from Jupiter (a type associated also with
Providentia); the inscription reads: Clementia temporum (Mattingly and Sydenham, 5, 2. 86,
No. 643). Claudian translates sophrosyne in its more restricted nuance (“self-control”) as
tempenes: Temperies instruit . . . ut casta petas (De Cons. Stil. 2. 107). His use of the topic of virtue
and vice in vituperatio is studied by H. L. Levy, T.A.P.A. 77 (1946), 53-65; for sophrosyne
and its antitheses, see In Rufinum 1. 183-95, 220-29. The virtuous man of Alain de Lille’s
Anticlaudianus (inspired by the vicious Rufinus) possesses the gifts of Pudor and Modestia (VII.
110-37).
131 See pp. 307-8. In his versions of Greek tragedy Seneca translates sophron and
sophrosyne by a variety of Latin equivalents, all entirely traditional. See, e.g., in his Phaedra:
sanus (21 2), castus (226, 237, 704), pudor (595, 920). Pudor as usual also renders aidos (141, 430).
Bickel (183 ff.) shows that Seneca differs in his use of castus and castitas, depending on whether
Sophrosyne in Rome joy
conceivable connection: moderation in the exercise of liberty, in the use

of wine, in satisfying desires of all kinds, in the style of philosophical
discourse, even in the pursuit of knowledge; and he describes the animus
moderatus as close to the Divine.132 The high place accorded moderation
in the ethics of Seneca lends support to the tradition that the Formula
Vitae Honestae by the sixth-century Spanish bishop, Martin of Bracara,
actually goes back to the lost De Officiis of Seneca. Although Martin
renders sophrosyne by continentia in the section of the treatise devoted
to this virtue, the entire discussion of all four virtues is dominated by the
spirit of the Mean.133
he is writing poetry or philosophy. In philosophy, where he follows the Neopythagorean

Attalus, castitas always means abstinentia a venere (hagneia) and is not interchangeable with
pudicitia (sophrosyne, “conjugal virtue”), but in the tragedies this distinction is not observed.
See Chap. II, n. ioi, above for Seneca’s repeated use of the theme of moderation in tragic
poetry, even where it is lacking in his Greek models. E.g., Oedipus 882-910 with the imagery
of the ship at sea: temperem gephyro levi vela . . . tuta me media vehat vita decurvens via . . . quidquid
excessit modum pendet instabili loco. Latin words used in Senecan tragedy to denote “control” or
“restraint” and the opposite are studied by Norman T. Pratt, T.A.P.A. 94 (1963), 199-234.
132 Praise of modus and moderatio: De Tran. 17. 2, 9; De Ben. 1. 15. 3; De Ira 1. 21.
1; Ad Helv. 9. 3; Ep. 1. 5, 40. 8, 41. 5, 88. 29-30. Seneca is careful, however, to maintain the
Stoic opposition to Peripatetic “moderation in vice.” See De Ira 1. 7. 2; Ep. 85. 3-4,
116 passim. A Ciceronian list of partial equivalents of sophrosyne occurs in Ep. 88. 30, where
Seneca maintains that moderatio, frugalitas, parsimoma, and dementia cannot be instilled by
liberal studies. Ep. 114. 2-3, 22 discusses literary style as a reflection of character: the siccus
and sobrius style reflects an animus sanus . . . temperans. The virtual restriction of temperantia to
the control of the appetites is illustrated by Ep. 1 20. 11, where Seneca says that this virtue reins
in desires, and Ep. 88. 29 where it puts to flight some pleasures and regulates others, restor¬
ing them to a healthy mean (sanus modus). Cf. De Vita Beat. 10. 3 and Ep. 59. 11. Temperantia
carries a broader significance in De Vita Beat. 16. 3 ff. De Tran. 9. 1 ff.; and Ep. 18. 4, 78. 20,
88. 36. Ep. 108 records the impression made on Seneca by the teaching of the Neopythago¬
rean Attalus; see especially 14, on the praise of castum corpus, sobnam mensam, puram mentem, and
15, on Seneca’s return to the civitatis vitam, in which asceticism was impossible.
133 See especially 6. pp. 247-49, Barlow, on the danger of allowing any of the four virtues
to pass extra modum suum (for the Peripatetic echo, cf. Seneca Ep. 88. 29: sanus modus).
The paragraph entitled in some manuscripts De moderanda continentia advises the reader
to avoid being parcus and to preserve mediocritas even in his continentia. The vicious extremes
are prodigalitas and luxuna on the one side, and on the other sorditas and obscuntas. (In popu¬
lar morality the Peripatetic Mean tended to avoid the extremes of prodigality and meanness,
rather than wantonness and insensibility; see Horace Ser. I. 2 where Tigellius represents prodi¬
gality and Fufidius meanness.) For Seneca as Martin’s source, see Ernst Bickel, Rh. Mus.
60 (1905), 505-51; Claude W. Barlow, Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia (New Haven,
1950), 204-8; and Gauthier, 141-42. Martin’s choice of continentia as a translation for
sophrosyne has been traced to the influence of the Stoic Hecato via Seneca. See Chap. VI,
n. 92, for the possibility that Hecato substituted enkrateia (Latin continentia) for sophrosyne in
his table of virtues. In Off. III. 96, 116, 117, etc., Cicero, too, refers to continentia rather than
temperantia (which is preferred in Off. I and II); here also the influence of Hecato has been
suspected; consult Bickel, loc. cit., 550, and Heinz Gomoll, Der stoische Philosoph Hecaton
(Leipzig, 1933).
jo6 Sophrosyne
The moderatio that ancient authorities often ascribe to Tiberius is, as

Rogers has shown, a word of relatively narrow scope, referring usually
to that emperor’s deliberate limitation of the honors paid to him and
his family.134 In general, however, moderatio as an imperial virtue has
a broader connotation, as Pliny’s Panegyric of Trajan demonstrates.135
This eulogy follows a chronological sequence, introducing the virtues of
Trajan in the context of his life story; but moderatio sets the keynote for
the entire address, for Pliny announces his intention of suiting his
speech to the modestia and moderatio of the ruler (3. 2). In his discussion
of moderatio itself he employs a contrast between this excellence and
fortitudo, which suggests that the traditional Greek antithesis has become
a rhetorical commonplace. When Trajan stood on the bank of the
Danube, knowing that to cross meant triumph, and yet resisted the
temptation, he performed a noble act. To cross would be the proof of
fortitudo; to restrain himself was the result of moderatio (16). The impli¬
cation is clear: moderatio is more difficult and hence more praiseworthy
than fortitudo. The passage is particularly striking because sophrosyne is
rarely cited by ancient historians as a motive for limiting the expansion
of an empire, whether that of Athens or Rome or another, although
Aeschylus relates the imprudent aggression of Xerxes to his want of so¬
phrosyne and Isocrates blames the fall of both Athens and Sparta on
their loss of the sophrosyne that once guided their foreign policies.136
Still another antithesis to sophrosyne/moderatio appears in Pliny’s
description of Trajan’s refusal to accept honors. The emperor will accept
only modici honores, but he must accept some, for to refuse all is a sign of
ambitio. Moderatio requires the choice of the most modest (parcissimos)
honors. Since moderatio with respect to honors is a virtue often ascribed
to Tiberius, Pliny’s purpose here is no doubt to demonstrate the genuine
moderatio of Trajan, in contrast to the ostentatious modesty of Tiberius,
which merely concealed his real ambitio. The implied contrast is not un-
134 Rogers, op. cit., 62-87, cites Tacitus Ann. 1. 14. 1-3, 2. 36. 2, 3. 56. 1, 4. 37 f.; Velleius
2. 122. 1 (in courting danger Tiberius excessit modum, but in accepting honors temperavit);
Suetonius 32. 2 and 57. 1 (on Tiberius’ pretended moderatio). Velleius also refers to moderatio
in the sense of self-restraint and modesty (2. 130. 1). See Rogers, op. cit., 62, for the vocabu¬
lary of moderation, which includes modus and temperare and their derivatives (note the
rare temperamentum in Velleius 2. 130. 1 and in Tacitus Ann. 3. 12. 1) and pudor (Tacitus Ann.
1. 11. 1, 1. 12. 1-3).
135 Studies of the Panegyric, its sources, and its rhetorical conventions include J. Mesk,
Wiener Studien 32 (1910), 230 ff., and Rh. Mus. 67 (1912), 569 ff.; Lester K. Born, A.J.P.
55 (J934)5 2-35; and Marcel Durry, Pline le Jeune, Panegyrique de Trajan (Paris, 1938), 28 ff.
136 Aeschylus, see Chap. II, pp. 33-35. Isocrates, see Chap. IV, pp. 144-45. The conception
is not a Roman one.
like that which Tacitus explicitly draws in the Agricola between the
moderatio of his father-in-law and the ostentation of the Stoic martyrs.137
Pliny includes in his Panegyric several other aspects of sophrosyne and
clearly indicates the antithesis of each. Frugalitas is opposed to luxuria,
dementia to crudelitas, continentia to libido, and pudor to superbia. Of these
terms only pudor deviates from normal usage. As Pliny uses it, pudor
embraces not only the avoidance of haughtiness (24) but also simplicity
in the emperor’s retinue—pudor fascibus (76. 8). So profound is Trajan’s
simplicity, in fact, that the poor find examples of modesty and sobriety
in the palace of the emperor (47). Frugalitas now bears a more restricted
meaning than in Cicero: as practiced by Trajan it amounts to no more
than careful expenditure and deserves mention in the Panegyric because
the benefactions of the emperor do not impoverish the state (41. 1; cf.
49. 5 and 88, and Pliny Ep. 2. 4. 3; 6. 8. 5). Trajan demonstrates
dementia in his capacity as judge (80. 1); but this virtue is on the whole
taken for granted, perhaps because Pliny feels less need to insist on it
than Seneca felt in the case of Nero.138
The Panegyric extends its compliments to the women of the imperial
family, mentioning the verecunditas of Plotina as a parallel to the modestia
of her husband (83. 7-8). Both the empress and Trajan’s sister also
receive praise for their own modestia, which in Pliny’s vocabulary takes
the place of the more usual pudicitia.139 As we have observed, pudicitia
is one of the most venerable and well-established Roman virtues,
already personified in the Amphitryo of Plautus and honored with a
shrine or sacellum in the Forum Boarium as early as the third century
b.c. Throughout Latin literature it is the normal rendering of that so¬
phrosyne which is the virtue proper to women, both married and single,
and to young people of both sexes; but during the early Empire it
achieves a further importance and a new precision in the language of
philosophy as part of the vocabulary used in Roman adaptations of
Greek treatises on conjugal relations. For this development Seneca may
be in large measure responsible, if, as Bickel has suggested, his lost essay
De Matrimonio made available to Roman readers the content of a Stoic
diatribe on marriage, which regarded sophrosyne as the excellence
137 Some echoes of the Agricola in the Panegyric are noted by Richard T. Bruere, C.P.
49 (1954), 161-79.
138 See Tacitus Dial. 41 (possibly composed in the reign of Trajan, according to Syme,
670-73) for the dementia of the judge, which makes prolonged oratory unnecessary under the
Empire.
139 But an altar to Pudicitia was erected in honor of Plotina (Roscher 3. 3375). See
also CIL VIII. 993 for the inscription on a statue of Pudicitia Augusta erected in her honor.
fo8 Sophrosyne
proper to wives.140 This tradition in turn contributed to the Christian

commonplace that there are three grades of purity (hagneia, castitas),
those of the wife, the widow, and the virgin, which the Greek Fathers
designated respectively as sophrosyne, enkrateia, and parthenia, and the
Latin as pudicitia, continentia, and virginitas.141 Seneca’s essay De Matri-
monio (fragments of which have been recovered from Jerome Adversus
Iovinianum I. 41-49) followed the Ciceronian practice of adding Roman
color to Greek theory by inserting exempla domestica. His laudatio pudici-
tiae lists as models of chastity in marriage the traditional Roman
heroines: Lucretia, Bilia, Marcia, Portia (46, pp. 386-87 Bickel),
Cornelia (49, p. 394), as well as Persian and Greek exemplars long
familiar in Stoic and rhetorical commonplaces.142
Pudicitia frequently appears on Roman imperial coins, often those
designed to honor women of the imperial family. The type consists of a
woman, usually seated, drawing a veil over her face with her right hand
and often carrying a scepter. It may be seen on coins of Antoninus Pius,
Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, Elagabalus, Philip, and others down to
the late Empire.143 It would be an error, however, to consider pudicitia
an exclusively feminine quality among the imperial virtues. Manilius
140 Bickel (288-372) discusses the sources for this lost work and comments on the terminol¬
ogy, both Greek and Latin, used by Stoics, Neopythagoreans, and Christians in treatises on
virginity and marriage (see especially 204-10 for a useful summary of pagan and Christian
usage of enkrateia, sophrosyne, hagneia and their normal Latin equivalents, continentia, pudicitia,
castitas). Bickel compares Seneca, Frag. 79 Haase: Mulieris virtus proprie pudicitia est, with the
statement in Phintys’ treatise On Feminine Sophrosyne (Stobaeus IV. 23, 61 and 61a, p. 588, 17
ff.): yvvaiKos 8k paXioTa apera ouxppoovva (p. 589. 1), and concludes that both Seneca and
Phintys drew upon the same Stoic source (204, 364 ff.). Other allusions by Seneca to pudicitia
as marital chastity include Ad Helv. 16. 3-4, De Ben. 3. 16. 3, Ep. 49, 12 and 94. 26 (where
pudicitia is recommended to husbands as well as to wives). Contemporaries of Seneca did not
distinguish between pudicitia and castitas as rigorously as he does in his philosophical works.
Bickel cites a discussion by Seneca Rhetor about the scope of castitas (Contr. 1. 2. 13). On the
implications recognized by writers of the imperial age and by Patristic sources, consult
T.L.L., castitas.
141 See below Chap. IX, n. 62.
142 For a conventional list of heroes and heroines of pudicitia, see Valerius Maximus, VI. 1;
and consult H. W. Litchfield, H.S.C.P. 25 (1914), 28-35.
143 See Michael Grant, Roman Imperial Money (London, 1954), 151 ff. and plates xxii.
4, xxiii. 3, xix. 6; and consult Gerhard Radke, P. W., “Pudicitia.” For the gesture with
the veil, see the archaic relief of Hera as the bride of Zeus from the temple at Selinunte; and
for the identification of the gesture with sophrosyne, see Julian 3. 127D, where Penelope’s
action of holding up her veil (Homer Od. 1. 334) is interpreted as a symbol of sophrosyne. The
increase in devotion to Vesta in the third century has been adduced as a reason for the more
frequent appearance of the Pudicitia-type in coinage at that time (A. D. Nock, H.T.R.
23 [1931], 251-69). The attitude and gesture which constitute the type of pudicitia occur also
in the plastic arts. A marble head of Pudicitia was found in the excavations near the Tomb of
St. Peter beneath St. Peter’s Basilica; see Jocelyn Toynbee and John Ward Perkins, The Shrine
of St. Peter and the Vatican Excavations (London, 1956), 95 and plate 30. See also R. Calza,
attributes it to the Emperor Tiberius (Astron. 4. 546); it appears on
many coins, particularly those of Hadrian, as a masculine excellence;
and it is often allied with masculine temperantia in panegyric.144
Ammianus, who includes under the rubric of temperantia his encomium
of Julian’s castitas after the death of his wife, quotes in this connection
the emperor’s own allusion (25. 4. 2-3) to a statement of Bacchylides:
“As a distinguished painter renders a countenance good to look upon, so
chastity [pudicitia] adorns and elevates a life that is already reaching the
heights.” Temperantia and pudicitia are again treated as synonyms when
Ammianus, embroidering on the theme of degeneratio, contrasts the
temperantia of Julian with the low level of contemporary morality and
draws particular attention to his wakefulness in the study of philosophy,
poetry, and rhetoric, while others sleep (16. 5. 8): “This is a nocturnal
proof of pudicitia and the other virtues.” 145 Julian possessed sophrosyne
in other aspects also. A Greek papyrus fragment uses this term to
describe his economical administration (like the frugalitas of Trajan in
Pliny’s Panegyric).146 It will be recalled that Julian himself in his
eulogies and other writings evinces considerable interest in sophrosyne
Bolletino d’Arte 35 (1950), 201 ff., figs. 1-4, for a Pudicitia found at Ostia. The gesture of put¬
ting the finger to the lips (seen on coins as early as the reign of Claudius, not limited to the
Pudicitia-type, but assigned also to Pax and Pudor) may symbolize silence and restraint,
according to Jocelyn Toynbee, Essays Presented to Harold Mattingly (Oxford, 1956), 214-16. Cf.
Horace Odes 3. 2. 25-26: Est et fideli tuta silentio Merces.
144 On Pudicitia as the holiness of the emperor (as head of the state religion), see Mattingly
III. cxxxi, cxxxv. Valerius Maximus refers to pudicitia as virorum panter ac feminarum praecipuum
firmamentum (VI. 1). Most of his Roman exempla are not women but men who protected the
purity of their sons and daughters or avenged its loss. Temperantia is not among the thirty-eight
virtues ascribed to emperors and empresses on Roman coins (see Wickert, loc. cit.), but
it continues to appear in literary tributes to their excellence. Its omission from the coinage is
perhaps the result of its being considered too much a private, individual virtue to be exploited
in the imperial propaganda. Clementia, pudicitia, and moderatio are the masculine aspects
of sophrosyne which bore a more direct relation to the State, and pudicitia is the overwhelm¬
ing choice for the virtus feminarum. When Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes Romulus
as eusebes, sophron, dikaios, and polemikos (Ant. Rom. 2. 18), he means by sophrbn something closer
to pudicus than to clemens or moderatus. Cf. 2. 24-25, where sophrosyne clearly denotes chastity
and obedience to parents; and see Cassius Dio 72. 45 on Commodus, whose sister Lucilla was
in no way more sophron than he.
145 Pudicitia here has a much wider significance than conjugal fidelity and is probably to
be interpreted like the pudicitia that so often appears on coins of Hadrian (see Mattingly III.
278, Nos. 309 and 355, Nos. 911-13). Ammianus sometimes equates sophrosyne with virtus
simpliciter, as in his translation of Democritus, Frag. 210 DK (tpomtâv ttoXvt€.Xea pkv tvxt)
TTapaTiOrioiv, avrapKia 8e ococppoovuri): ambitiosam mensam fortuna, parcam virtus adponit (16. 5. 1).
146 P. Fay. 20 (an imperial edict; see Moulton and Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek New
Testament [London, 1930], s.v. sophrosyne). With this use of sophrosyne, cf. the edict of
Severus Alexander on his accession, which explains his remission of a tax as being in accord¬
ance with his policy of sophrosyne and urges provincial governors to emulate the emperor’s
kosmiotes, sophrosyne, and enkrateia (cited by Charlesworth, loc. cit., p. 116).
jio Sophrosyne
and gives the word a wide range, including not only restraint of the ap¬
petites, but also obedience to the laws, good judgment in military mat¬
ters, wise administration of the State, and sobriety of diction.147 It is
difficult to find anything specifically Roman in Julian’s own references
to sophrosyne, except that, as has been suggested above, his tendency
to apply this term to the generosity and compassion shown by a
conqueror towards his defeated enemy may reflect the Roman concept
of dementia as an imperial virtue.
The fragmentation of sophrosyne into dementia, moderatio, temperantia,
and pudidtia, each designating a different facet of the emperor’s moral
excellence, recalls what was said at the beginning of this chapter about
Rome’s failure to grasp the totality of the Greek concept.148 Yet at least
one powerful force was always at work to remind Rome of the existence
of a sophrosyne not to be identified with, nor confined to, any one
Roman approximation. This was the canon of Platonic-Stoic virtues,
firmly embedded in many philosophical and rhetorical works familiar
to all educated Romans. Within the framework of the tetrad, sophro¬
syne could always maintain contact with the fullness of its meaning for
classical Greek thought. So long as this could be recalled, it never—
even in Latin—quite lost its identity. By contrast one of the most
serious dangers threatening the survival of classical sophrosyne in
147 See Chap. VII, p. 249.

148 Space does not permit a thorough discussion of the Latin panegyrics of the third and
fourth centuries, which conform closely to the pattern established by Seneca and Pliny; con¬
sult Edouard Galletier, Panegyriques Latins (Paris, 1949), Introduction, xxxi ff. A random
sampling of references to virtues allied with sophrosyne in these eulogies would include the
following: the Panegyric of Maximian (II) maintains the now traditional antithesis between
fortitudo and dementia (4); the Panegyric of Constantine (VI) finds the four virtues in this
emperor to be a resemblance to his father (3) and treats under the rubric of continentia
the observance of the laws of marriage from an early age (novum miraculum . . . iuvems uxorius,
4). The dementia of Constantine finds frequent mention (IX. 20, X. 8). Julian is praised
for his parsimonia (XI. 10), his horror of luxury (11), and his purity of life (13; cf. Ammianus
25. 4. 2). The Panegyric of Theodosius (XII) follows traditional lines, praising the emperor’s
freedom from cupiditas and libido (12), his exemplary modus and frugalitas (13), and his lack of
arrogance (20). A common feature in the rhetors’ praise of emperors is the assertion that
literature is a source of virtue (e.g., Eumenius, V. 8, on the restoration of the schools of Gaul:
litterae fundamenta virtutum, utpote continentiae, modestiae . . . magistras). On this subject the point
of view of the rhetors naturally differs from that of Cynics like Antisthenes (D. L. 6. 103) or
of Stoics like Seneca (Ep. 88. 30). Among other late Latin writers who employ the topic of
the virtues, see Ausonius in his reminiscences of the professors of Bordeaux. The exigencies of
the hexameter led Ausonius, like Claudian, to substitute temperies for temperantia (Lib.
Protrep. ad Nep. 77 Schenkl). Jacqueline Hatinguais (Rev. d. Et. Anc. 55 [1953], 375-87) finds
that modestia and frugalitas were prominent among the virtues of the professors, then as
now. Both terms refer to private life, not to professional qualities.
Sophrosyne in Rome jii
Christian thought lay in its divorce from the canon and in the deter¬
mination of Christian moralists, from the very beginning, to identify it
with a set of virtues central to their own ethical and religious beliefs. It
was not a linguistic difficulty, such as affected the Romans, but a
radically altered view of the very nature and purpose of human life that
caused Christian thinkers to give to sophrosyne a whole new range of
implications.
IX
Sophrosyne in Patristic
Literature
IF the naturalization of sophrosyne in Rome was difficult and only

intermittently successful, its conversion to Christianity involved even
greater problems and in the end produced a still more thorough trans¬
formation. Among these problems the most serious was that which con¬
fronted the early Church at every turn during the first four centuries,
when she was attempting to assimilate substantial portions of pagan
philosophy—namely the fundamental conflict between faith and reason.
To identify moral virtues based on natural reason with virtues originat¬
ing in Divine Grace and to integrate the Greek concept of arete
into Christian morality, required the best efforts of the greatest Fathers
of the Church.
During the long period of transition each of the four Platonic virtues
suffered radical alteration. For sophrosyne the gravest danger lay in the
tendency of many Christian moralists to overemphasize its relation to
chastity.1 They adopted the connotation that was most popular through¬
out the Greek world in the first century of our era—sophrosyne inter¬
preted as control of the appetites—and still further intensified this
concept, claiming sophrosyne (chastity, purity) as a specifically Chris¬
tian virtue, which distinguished the Christian from his pagan neighbor.
As a consequence of this process, which was at work in the first two
centuries, the second major development occurred in the third and
fourth. By the time Christian ascetism began to concern Origen, the
1 This tendency is discussed by Joseph Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance (New York,
I954)> 72-
312
Patristic Literature 3*3
Cappadocians, John Chrysostom, and other influential Greek Fathers, j
sophrosyne was irrevocably allied with the concept of purity; and, like
hagneia (“holiness”) and katharotes (“purity”), it became part of a
semi-technical vocabulary that the Fathers employed in discussions of
the great moral issues of the day: the imitation of God, the purgation
of the soul, and the practice of ascetism.
Most of the other developments in the “Christianization” of sophro¬
syne are in some fashion the product of this radical shift in emphasis. One
such development in both the Greek and the Latin Fathers is a
specifically Christian solution to the problem that has appeared at
many stages in the history of sophrosyne: how to reconcile it with the
opposing principle, variously identified as the heroic virtue, the active
principle, andreia, or megalopsychia. The Christian ideal of the virgin
martyr unites in a new synthesis sophrosyne and megalopsychia, purity
and contempt for death. Although the reconciliation of these opposites
had become something of a rhetorical commonplace in pagan encomium,
the new conditions of Christian life and the new spiritual orientation
gave it a fresh meaning, just as the encounter of Greek arete with
Judaeo-Christian morality gave new life to sophrosyne.)A sign of this
new life is the intense concern, which appears as early as Philo Judaeus,
for discovering in the Bible evidence that the four cardinal virtues
already existed in the Old Testament, that in fact the Greek philosophers
were the pupils of Moses. For sophrosyne this meant that innumerable
texts, in both the Old and the New Testaments, were interpreted
as admonitions or examples intended to instil the virtue. The Ten
Commandments and the Beatitudes are the most fruitful sources of such
texts, but there is no end to the ingenuity and diversity displayed
in this pursuit.2 Inevitably a host of Biblical models replaced the pagan
2 Since this topic is not extensively dealt with in the present chapter, it may be useful to
collect here a list of the Biblical passages most often interpreted as texts of sophrosyne. The
most popular is Matt. 5. 28 (Qui vident mulierem), cited by Justin Martyr I Apol. 15, Athena-
goras of Athens Supp. 31-32, Theophilus of Antioch Ad Autolycum 13, Ambrose Ex. Ps. 118
11. 28, 8. 34, and many others. Among the Beatitudes the following are held to commend
sophrosyne: “Blessed are the poor,” Luke 6. 20 (Ambrose Ex. in Luc. V. 64); “Blessed are
the poor in spirit,” Matt. 5. 3 (ibid.); “Blessed are the meek,” Matt. 5. 4 (Gregory of Nyssa
In Beat., P.G. 44. 1214 ff.); “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” Matt. 5. 6
(ibid.); “Blessed are the clean of heart,” Matt. 5. 8 (John Chrysostom Horn XV in Matt.,
Ambrose Ex. in Luc. V. 64). In the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done” is a prayer for
sophrosyne, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Oral. Dorn., P.G. 44. 1156A). Other Biblical al¬
lusions to sophrosyne include: Matt. 13. 47-48 (Gregory of Nyssa De Virg. 321 Cavarnos);
Matt. 17. 27 (Clement of Alexandria Paed. II. 1. 14, 1); Matt. 19. 12 (Justin Martyr I Apol.
15); Luke 12. 35-38 (Methodius Symp. III. 10); Acts 6. 2, 15. 23-28 (Clement of Alexandria
Paed. II. 7. 56, 1); I Cor. 15. 53 (ibid. II. 10. 100, 2); II Cor. 4. 16 (Augustine De Mor. Eccl.
J14 Sophrosyne
exemplars, and even though the range of sophrosyne in Christian

thought is narrower than it had been in the classical period, it still has
several nuances, which require a variety of exempla. Still another major
development in the first centuries of Christianity is the new interest
shown by all the Greek and Latin moralists in the spiritual possibilities
of women, who have but a minor place in pagan ethical philosophy.
Since sophrosyne had always been, and now continued to be, the
virtus feminarum, it received greatly increased attention in Christian
thought. Finally, the preoccupation of Jewish and Christian thinkers,
from Philo on, with the nature of original sin gave great importance to
sophrosyne, because both pride and intemperance (specifically, gluttony),
the overwhelming favorites in the search for a definition of original sin,
are in obvious ways antithetical to sophrosyne/temperantia.
The concept of arete, which is absolutely central in Greek ethical
thought, is much less conspicuous in the Old Testament; and while it
becomes more important in the Gospels, where the virtues of humility,
charity, and repentance are prominent, it emerges as a key idea in
Christian morality only in the Epistles (even though St. Paul uses the
word arete but once). It is Paul who dominates the first stage of
the history of sophrosyne as a Christian excellence. Three stages in all
may be distinguished: the first two centuries, when Paul’s influence,
interacting with the pagan environment, led the Apostolic Fathers and
the Apologists to consider sophrosyne a virtue that set them off from their
non-Christian neighbors; the third century, when the influence of
Philo prevailed, especially with the School of Alexandria, and Clement
and Origen were already turning to Plato and integrating Greek arete
into Christian philosophy; and the fourth century, when the process was
completed, most brilliantly by the Cappadocians.
Although a distinctively Christian concept of sophrosyne, supported
by philosophical argument, even if still rooted in faith, did not emerge
until the time of Clement of Alexandria, the foundations on which he
and his successors built deserve at least summary treatment. They
include, in addition to Greek philosophy (Platonic, Stoic, and Neo¬
platonic in particular): the rare allusions to sophrosyne in the Septu-
agint and the New Testament; the somewhat more frequent references
by the Apostolic Fathers of the first century and the Apologists of
I. 19. 36); Heb. 13. 14 (Jerome Ep. 66. 3). In the Old Testament: Gen. 3. 3 (Ambrose De lac.
I. 2. 8, De Hel. 4. 7); Gen. 9. 22 (Clement of Alexandria Paed. II. 6. 51, 1); Ecc. 31. 19, 32.
15 (ibid. II. 7. 55, 1-56, 1); Ps. 35. 12 (Augustine De Mus. 6. 16. 53); Wi. 4. 1. 2 (Methodius
Symp. I. 3); Job 18. 19 (Gregory Mor. in Job, P.L. 75. 592).
the second; and, perhaps most influential of all after St. Paul, Philo
Judaeus, whose methods of reconciling Jewish and Hellenic thought
served as a model for Patristic thinkers.
Among the infrequent references to sophrosyne in the Septuagint,3
those in the Book of Wisdom clearly reflect Stoic influence,4 and those
in the uncanonical IV Maccabees, which has for its avowed purpose the
reconciliation of Jewish belief and Greek philosophy, show both Stoic
and Platonic traces.5 The Book of Wisdom celebrates as the fruits
of Sophia the four virtues, sophrosyne, phronesis, dikaiosyne, and andreia
(8. 7) “than which there is nothing more profitable in human life.”6
IV Maccabees, whose enormous popularity with Patristic writers on
martyrdom7 gives special weight to its conception of virtue, also con¬
nects sophrosyne with sophia—of which it is an idea, or type (1. 18)—
and equips it with two antitheses, gluttony and lust (1. 3), which define
its scope. Presently, however, sophrosyne is further defined as the control
(enkrateia) of the appetites, whether spiritual or physical, and is for all
practical purposes equated with reason (logismos), which is also said to
control (epikratein) both types of desire (1. 31-32). The phrase sophron
nous is repeatedly used as a synonym for logismos,8 whose domination
over the passions is the principal theme of the book. In a comprehen¬
sive summary of the function of the sophron nous the author assigns to it
control over ambition, conceit, boasting, arrogance, envy, and anger
(2. 15-17). It is noteworthy that he, like Philo, rejects Stoic apatheia and
gives the sophron nous the task of moderating some passions while
depriving others of their force (2. 18). They cannot be extirpated,
3 Septuagint: sbphrones, Wi. 9. 11; sophrosyne, Wi. 8. 7; Es. 3. 13; II Mac. 4. 37; IV Mac.
1. 3, 6, 18, 30, 31; 5. 23; sophron, IV Mac. 1. 35; 2. 2, 16, 18, 23; 3. 17, 19; 15. 10.
4 The Platonic and Stoic tendencies of the Book of Wisdom and its probable origin in
Alexandria during the Hellenistic age, but before Philo, are discussed by Joseph Reider, The
Book of Wisdom (New York, 1957), 10-19, 27-28. A date after 50 b.c. is suggested by R. H.
Charles, Apocrypha (Oxford, 1913), 1. 519.
5 For the date fa. 40 a.d.) and place of origin (Antioch) of IV Maccabees and its debt to
Plato, particularly the Gorgias, see Moses Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New
York, 1953), 95-118.
6 Wi. 9. 11 (Sophia will guide the author sbphronos, soberly) represents ordinary Hellenistic
usage. II. Mac. attributes to the murdered Onias sophrosyne and eutaxia (4. 37; cf. Polybius
32. 11. 8 on the virtues of Scipio Aemilianus). That II Mac. was written in Antioch, ca. 42
a.d., is the opinion of Solomon Zeitlin, The Second Book of Maccabees (New York, 1954), 27-30.
Hadas dates it about a century earlier (op. cit., 96-97), while Charles dates it about 106 b.c.
(op. cit. 2. 128-29).
7 Hadas, op. cit., 123-24, mentions Gregory of Nazianzus, John Chrysostom, Ambrose, and
Augustine among imitators of IV Mac.
8E.g., 1. 35; 2. 15, 18; 3. 19 (sophron logismos).
Ji6 Sophrosyne
because they were implanted by God (2. 20). The Stoic commonplace
of the sage as king appears in the statement that he who obeys the Law
will rule over a kingdom that is sophron, just, good, and brave (2. 23).
The concept of nomos (“law”), like that of logos (the “word”), serves as
a bridge between the Greek and the Hebrew traditions.9 Later Chris¬
tian attempts to find exemplars and texts of sophrosyne in the Bible have
a precedent in IV Maccabees, where Joseph, who conquered the
appetite for pleasure through reason (dianoia, 2. 2), David, who poured
out in sacrifice the water for which he thirsted (3. 17), Eleazar, the
protomartyr, and the Seven Brothers (15. 10) are all models of the
virtue, regarded as control of the appetites (5. 23). The source of
sophrosyne is found in the Law, specifically in the Tenth Commandment—
“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife nor anything that is his”
(2. 5)—and in the dietary laws which Eleazar refuses, at the cost of his
life, to violate (5. 17 ff.).
THE NEW TESTAMENT
In the New Testament the concept of virtue (as understood in classi¬

cal Greek thought) begins to play a larger role than it did in the Old
Testament; its appearance in the Apocrypha is usually traceable to
Stoic influence on Jewish writers in Alexandria or Antioch. Later
Christian teaching about the virtues found two major sources in the
New Testament: the Beatitudes, which were sometimes interpreted as
specific exhortations to practice the Greek cardinal virtues, and the
characteristics of Christ Himself, particularly His humility. The one
allusion to sophrosyne in the Greek translation of the Gospels occurs in
the versions given by Mark and Luke of the healing of the man
possessed by demons which, after being driven out of him, took refuge
in the Gadarene swine.10 Both Evangelists describe the man, after the
exorcism, as being clothed and in his right mind (sophronounta: Mark 5.
15, Luke 8. 35)—an instance of the survival of the radical meaning of
sophrosyne which has many parallels in ordinary Greek usage through¬
out the Graeco-Roman period.
It is in the Epistles of St. Paul, however, that sophrosyne first attains a
place in Christian ethics and morality. Although its nature is completely
9 See 5. 23 where Eleazar tells Antiochus that the Law (Jewish Law) teaches sophrosyne
(control of all pleasures and appetites), andreia, dikaiosyne, and eusebeia.
10 For the appearance of sophrosyne and related words in the New Testament, see Arndt
and Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature
(Chicago, 1952).
transformed by Paul’s conception of Grace (Tit. 2. 12-14), which makes
even the virtues derived from Greek philosophy essentially different
from their Greek counterparts, its function in the Epistles conforms to
contemporary pagan usage. Paul recognizes three aspects of sophrosyne,
which may be defined in terms of its antitheses: it is opposed to madness
(;mania), to pride (hyperphronein), and to the tyranny of the appetites
(<epithymia); the third interpretation is by far the most common.
The antithesis between madness and sophrosyne, which underlies the
two passages in the New Testament mentioned above, becomes explicit
in the Acts of the Apostles where Paul’s arraignment before Agrippa is
described. When Festus charges him with madness, Paul replies (Acts
26. 25): “I am not mad fou jumVo/rat], rather I utter words of truth and
sophrosyne [a\r]0das Kal acocppoauri]?].” In the Second Epistle to the
Corinthians a like contrast is made between the condition of being
beside oneself and being sophron (5. 13). The opposition between
sophrosyne and pride is expressed through a play on the root—phron—in
the Epistle to the Romans (12. 3), which also recalls such traditional
Hellenic commonplaces as self-knowledge and thinking mortal thoughts.
Paul exhorts the Romans not to have thoughts above what is proper
(jtifj VTTep eppovdv Trap’ 6 Set oppouelv), but to think modest thoughts
((jopovdv ds to oacppovdv), in view of the great diversity of gifts with
which God has endowed mankind. Sophrosyne is not yet equated with
humility, but its connection with self-knowledge suggests a way by
which the identification may ultimately be made.
To Paul sophrosyne usually signifies self-control and mastery of the
appetites. He associates it with aidos (I Tim. 2. 9), with enkrateia (Tit. 1.
8, one of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Gal. 5. 23), with sobriety (Tit.
2. 2, 6; I Tim. 3. 2), and in the case of women, with conjugal love
(philandna: I Tim. 2. 9; Tit. 2. 2, 5). Although, like most moralists in
the Greek world, he construes sophrosyne as the essential virtue of
women (Tit. 2. 6, I Tim. 2. 9), he also enjoins it upon men of every age
(Tit. 2. 2, 6) and specifically lists it among the qualifications of a bishop
(Tit. 1. 8, I Tim. 3. 2).
Since the writings of Paul were diligently studied by the Fathers,
certain of his references to sophrosyne had great influence on later
Christian thought about the virtue. His injunction to women to adorn
themselves with aidos and sophrosyne, rather than with elaborate coif¬
fures and costly raiment (I Tim. 2. 9), was often echoed in panegyrics
of Christian women and exhortations by St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St.
$i8 Sophrosyne
John Chrysostom, and St. Ambrose; while the statement (I Tim. 2. 15)
that woman will find salvation in childbearing was quoted in homilies
on the married state. The conclusion to this verse—“If they persevere
in pistis and agape and hagiasmos with sophrosyne”—suggests, by its plural
verb, that it refers to husbands as well as wives.11 The alliance of so¬
phrosyne with two of the three theological virtues, faith (pistis) and love
(agape), as well as with a word denoting holiness or purity (hagiasmos),
shows how thoroughly it has been Christianized and also indicates
which of its aspects was now prominent. The intrinsically Christian
orientation of hagiasmos is evident in I Thessalonians 4. 7, where Paul
reminds his hearers that God has not called them to impurity (akathar-
sia) but to hagiasmos, and where he shows that sanctification is a
distinguishing mark of the Christian, in contrast to the lust (pathos
epithymias) of the pagans who know not God (4. 5). A like opposition
between sophrosyne and appetite (epithymia), and a similar assumption
that escape from the enslavement to lust is the mark of a convert appear
in the First Epistle of St. Peter. His warning against the rioting and
drunkenness of the pagans concludes with the admonition (4. 7): “Be
prudent and sober in prayer [ococppourjoarc ovv Kai vr/pare]”
Paul never refers to the entire canon of Greek virtues and in fact uses
the term arete only once (Phil. 4. 8). When in I Corinthians 1. 30 he
speaks of four excellences “from God,” they prove to be sophia and
dikaiosyne, to both of which he gives a Christian content, and the
entirely unclassical hagiasmos (“sanctification”) and apolutrosis (“redemp¬
tion”), the first of which becomes a fairly common Christian substitute
for sophrosyne. Even in a reference to three traditional Hellenic
qualities (such as Tit. 2. 12, where the Grace of God is said to teach us
to live modestly—sophronos—justly, and piously) the presence of Grace
as the source of virtue shows that the familiar Greek words are being
used in a new way. What remains the same is the feeling that sophro¬
syne has to do with the restraint of appetite.
In spite of the asceticism evinced in such passages as these, Paul
gives no support whatever to later extremists like Origen and Tertullian.
He approves of marriage and even urges young widows to remarry
(I Tim. 5. 14). While he counsels moderation in the use of the goods of
creation (Rom. 14. 17, 21; Phil. 2. 3) and sanctions fasting and morti-
11 T. E. Bird (Catholic Biblical Quarterly 2 [1940], 259-63) discusses various interpretations

of this passage and the general conception of sophrosyne as a virtue of the priesthood and of
married life according to Paul.
fication (I Cor. 9. 27), he avoids fanaticism and establishes the
principle that all God’s creation is good (I Tim. 4. 3-4).12
In view of later attempts by the Greek and Latin Fathers to reconcile
the heroic and the gentle elements in the concept of arete, one further
passage in the Epistles may be mentioned. In II Timothy 1. 7, Paul
admonishes his disciple not to be discouraged by his sufferings and
reminds him that God has not given us the spirit of fear, but that of
power (dynamis), love {agape), and sobriety (sophronismos). The normal
significance of sophronismos is “castigation, discipline,” but here, as oc¬
casionally elsewhere,13 it implies “moderation, sobriety.” Thus Paul, in
contrasting it with fear (deilia) and linking it with power and love
as qualities that enable the Christian to endure suffering, takes the first
step towards the concept of the martyr who unites sophrosyne with
me galop sychia, or, as Cyprian puts it, pudor with robur,14
THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS AND THE APOLOGISTS
Allusions to sophrosyne in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers of the

first century are infrequent, but they continue the process begun in the
Epistles of assimilating the virtue to Christian morality. There are no
references to the entire canon of Stoic virtues—nor could there be until
Christian thought became less hostile to pagan morality—but the
individual members of the canon are all taking on Christian connotations,
none more swiftly than sophrosyne. Clement of Rome {ca. 96) singles
out sophrosyne, alone among the cardinal virtues, for inclusion in lists
of excellences important for the Christian life. In the summarizing
paragraph of his First Epistle to the Corinthians (62. 2) and in the
prayer for all Christians at the close (64. 1), he mentions sophrosyne in
conjunction with faith, repentance, and love, linking it with enkrateia in
the first passage and with both enkrateia and hagneia in the second. (In
both passages andreia is replaced by hypomone, “endurance.”) Pope
Clement praises the Corinthians for their sophron and epieikes eusebeia
(“sober and reasonable piety” [1. 2]) and describes the representatives
whom he has sent to them as pistous and sophronas (“full of faith and
sobriety” [63. 3]). Sophrosyne is clearly a term of special praise, a
12 The attitude of Paul towards fasting and other types of external austerity is discussed by
Musurillo, 47.
13 E.g., Plutarch Mor. 712C. For the usual meaning, cf. Aeschylus Supp. 992.
14 Ep. 39. 4.
J20 Sophrosyne
worthy companion of faith: its association with enkrateia is an echo of

the past, with hagneia a forecast of the future.15
Hagneia (“purity”) is again linked with sophrosyne in the Epistle to
the Ephesians by Ignatius of Antioch (io. 3), but Polycarp associates
sophrosyne with wisdom in his Epistle to the Philippians (4. 3). Thus
it seems likely that both of the widely accepted connotations of the
word, the moral and the intellectual, maintained themselves in Chris¬
tian circles, as in contemporary pagan usage. The writings of the
Apologists of the second century, however, give evidence of a strong
impulse to emphasize the moral, rather than the intellectual, aspect of
sophrosyne and to select this one of the Greek virtues as a criterion by
which to judge the conduct of Christians and to distinguish them from
the pagans.
There are several reasons for this. One is that standards of sexual
morality were indubitably higher (especially for men) among the Chris¬
tians than in most of contemporary pagan society. Moreover, differing
standards of conduct in this area were probably more noticeable in
practice than differences in the concepts of wisdom, justice, or courage.
Hence sophrosyne soon came to rival charity itself as the visible mark
of the Christian; and it receives even more attention than charity in the
works of the Apologists, probably because of the nature of the charges
that they were obliged to refute. Athenagoras of Athens, Tertullian, and
Minucius Felix make it clear that the enemies of the Christians accused
them of indecent and obscene orgies in the course of those rites and
ceremonies whose secrecy aroused suspicion. Hence the emphasis on
purity and chastity as the signs of Christian morality in the writings of
the Apologists, who confined sophrosyne almost completely to this
sphere. Here begins what has been called “the stubborn and really
quite fanatical preference given to temperantia, especially to chastity,
which runs through the whole history of Christian doctrine as a more or
15 See Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 12-
26, for a discussion of the First Epistle of Clement, especially the Stoic background to its
system of Christian virtues. The Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas do not allude to sophro¬
syne, nor does the Shepherd of Hermas, but the Shepherd often refers to enkrateia, which is the
subject of the Eighth Mandate. The vision of seven women who support the tower is impor¬
tant in the history of the iconography of the virtues. The women represent seven virtues, each the
daughter of the one before; Pis t is (Faith), the foundation of all virtues, is first. After her comes
Enkrateia (Self-control), 3. 8. 1-6. Enkrateia and sophrosyne continue to be closely associated
in Christian morality, as they had been in pagan thought, with enkrateia usually more limited
in scope. Paul’s inclusion of enkrateia among the fruits of the Holy Ghost (Gal. 5. 23) in¬
creased its prestige among the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists.
Patristic Literature 321
less hidden undercurrent.” 16 This distortion must, however, be connected

not only with the reaction to a pagan environment, but also with
a strong tendency within the Christian family itself to go to extremes, to
adopt a contemptuous attitude towards the sensual part of creation and
to reject as sinful all contact with the flesh. This tendency, which had
its outcome in Montanism and Manicheeism, can be seen very early in
the works of both Greek and Latin apologists. There was no more
serious problem in the development of a Christian concept of sophro-
syne than how to avoid such distortion and retain the essential moder¬
ation that belongs to the classical concept of sophrosyne.17
Sophrosyne is recognized as a peculiarly Christian virtue in the work
of the first Greek Apologist, Aristides of Athens, whose Apology to
Hadrian praises the conduct of Christians in general and refers particu¬
larly to Christian women as sophrones (the men are enkrateis: T.u.U. 4, p. 37
Hennecke). The theme is developed at greater length by Justin Martyr
in his First Apology, which contrasts the licentiousness of Christian
converts before conversion with their subsequent devotion to sophrosyne
alone (1. 14). Justin’s Second Apology gives a specific instance of such
conversion. A woman who had been wanton during her life as a pagan
became a Christian and began both to be sophron herself and to try to
persuade her pagan husband, who was still akolastos (“wanton”),
to become sophron; she cited the teachings of Christ and warned her
husband that there would be eternal fire for those who fail to live in a
sophron fashion (2. 2). Justin is the first Christian to cite specific texts in
the New Testament as the teaching of Christ on sophrosyne. He quotes
Matthew 5. 28-29 and 32, and 19. 12(1. 15), and thereby initiates a
powerful tradition. The first of these texts—“But I say to you that who¬
soever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed
adultery with her in his heart”—becomes a special favorite with the
Fathers.18 From these verses Justin draws the conclusion that remarriage
is sinful; this idea was developed to the point of heresy by his pupil
Tatian, who ultimately became an Enkratist and rejected marriage
16 Pieper, op. cit., 72. Sophrosyne as “sobriety” is also regarded as a distinctively Christian
attribute, in contrast to pagan drunkenness. See A. P. McKinlay, Anglican Theological Review
30 (1948), 44-54.
17 The importance of moderation is clearly seen and vigorously expressed by Gregory of
Nyssa De Vug. 7. 353M, p. 282 Cavarnos, and by Augustine De Beata Vita IV. 32-33. Cf.
also Clement of Alexandria Paed. III. 10. 51, 2.
18 Matt. 19. 12 (“For there are eunuchs who were born so from their mother’s womb”)
also reappears as a text of sophrosyne in both Greek and Latin Patristic literature.
322 Sophrosyne
altogether, as he rejected meat and wine. Justin himself does not go to

this extreme, but he shows in a striking manner his belief that sophro¬
syne, as purity, is at the very center of Christian morality. In his First
Apology he expands in the following way (i. 15) the Biblical statement
that Christ came to call, not the just, but sinners to repentance: Christ
came to call, not the just or the sophron to repentance, but the unjust, the
impious, and the wanton (akolastous). Justin is also the first Apologist to
make the assertion, already familiar among Alexandrian Hellenized
Jews, that Plato had learned from Moses (1. 59). The importance of
this fallacy, so enthusiastically adopted by the Fathers, was that it en¬
abled them to make open use of Greek philosophy, on the ground that
it had a respectable origin in the Mosaic Law.
The moderate position of Justin is in great contrast to the ferocity of
Tatian against everything Greek—whether philosophy, education,
rhetoric, or religion—as set forth in his Oratio ad Graecos (T.u.U.
Schwartz 4). According to Tatian, sophrosyne is one of the important
areas in which the Christians surpass the pagan Greeks. Generally, like
Justin, he contrasts it with wantonness (aoeXyeia, 33), but on one occa¬
sion he maintains that Christian ethics is sophron, while that of the Greeks
contains much mania (33). Tatian specifically accuses the Greeks of
shamelessness (aoxvploovvt]) in regard to women, because they erected
statues of women who wrote useless poetry, particularly Sappho, who
sang of her own wantonness. “But our women are chaste (sophrones), and
our girls sing of divine themes” (38).19
The tradition of finding texts of sophrosyne in the Bible is continued
by Athenagoras of Athens, in his Supplication for the Christians, addressed
to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. He, too, cites Matthew 5. 28 as the
teaching of Christ on sophrosyne and uses it to refute a pagan charge
that the Christians are immoral. How can they for whom a wanton look
is adultery fail in sophrosyne {T.u.U. 4. 31-32 Schwartz)? Still another
influential topic, often connected with sophrosyne in Patristic literature,
appears when Athenagoras asserts that many Christians renounce mar¬
riage so that they may come closer to God—a Pauline doctrine that the
Fathers conflate with the Platonic topic of Ojiioicoms 6ca>.20 The most
significant original contribution that Athenagoras makes to the devel¬
oping Christian theory about the virtues appears in his treatist On the
19 Tatian maintains that Homer, as well as the Sophists, learned from Moses (35).
20 Cf. Paul, I Cor. 7. 32-40. Like Justin, Athenagoras emphatically disapproves of remar¬
riage, which he calls genteel adultery (eu77-pe7rrjs potxua [33])- He compares pagans to
harlots, Christians to sophrones women (34), and describes Christian life as metrios and epieikes.
Resurrection of the Dead. The question arises whether virtue belongs only
to the soul or to the whole man, and Athenagoras, perceiving the
philosophical implications of the Resurrection, maintains that it is
absurd to ascribe virtue to the soul alone. He illustrates this absurdity
with reference to the entire group of Stoic virtues, listing first phronesis
and dikaiosyne and all virtue (7raori aperr], 15), later eusebeia and dikaiosyne
and the rest of arete (19), then andreia and karteria, enkrateia and sophro-
syne, and finally phronesis and dikaiosyne once more (22). He asks, for
example, how one can think that enkrateia and sophrosyne could belong
to the soul alone, when there is no desire capable of drawing the soul to
voluptuousness, sexual intercourse, and the other forms of pleasure that
appeal only to the body. Hence it is not unjust for the soul to be reunited
with the body at the Resurrection, for this reunion is necessary in order
that the body may be rewarded or punished with the soul (22). This
argument has an obvious bearing on the old discussion about the exist¬
ence of the moral virtues in the afterlife or in the Divine nature.21
It also proves that Athenagoras was familiar with the cardinal virtues.
In referring to them all in close succession, he antedates Clement of
Alexandria, who is usually regarded as the first Christian author to
mention the entire canon.
Still another Greek Apologist, Theophilos of Antioch, confirms the
theory that before the close of the second century sophrosyne, as purity,
had become a thoroughly Christian virtue. A chapter in his letter Ad
Autolycum contrasts pagan licentiousness with Christian purity and asso¬
ciates sophrosyne with a long list of Christian attributes, including
enkrateia, monogamia, and hagneia (3. 15). He, too, refers to Matthew 5. 28
as containing the teaching of Christ on purity (13). The next step in the
development of Biblical exegesis involving sophrosyne depended on the
wide adoption by Christian writers of the method of allegorical interpre¬
tation which they now began to borrow from Philo Judaeus.
PHILO JUDAEUS
After the Bible itself and St. Paul, the principal influence on early
Christian thought about the virtues is Philo, who pioneered in the inte¬
gration of Jewish theology with Greek philosophy and hit upon methods
of uniting the two traditions which appealed powerfully to many of the
Church Fathers. Philo’s three contributions to the history of sophrosyne
21 An exhaustive list of passages in pagan and Christian writers dealing with this problem
is given by A. S. Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum (Cambridge, Mass., 1955-1958),
n. 1035-36.
324 Sophrosyne
are, first, the allegorical interpretation of Scripture; secondly, the identi¬

fication of the Ten Commandments with Greek ethical teaching; and
thirdly, the selection of exempla virtutum from the Old Testament to
replace the familiar models from Greek myth and history.
The allegorical exegesis of Genesis in Philo’s Legum Allegoria transfers
to the Bible the method already successfully used by the Stoics in their
interpretation of Homer and Greek mythology. It also employs trans¬
parently Platonic notions, such as the statement that God planted in
Paradise earthly virtues that are but copies of the heavenly models (1.
14. 43).22 The allegories relevant to sophrosyne are three in number, of
which the first, the identification of the Rivers of Paradise with the four
Stoic virtues, is much the most influential. Philo interprets the chief river,
which divides into four streams (Gen. 2. 10-14), as generic virtue,
Goodness (agathotes). It takes its start from Eden (the wisdom of God).
Philo then defines the cardinal virtues in Stoic terms (sophrosyne being
concerned with choice) and assigns a river to each, chiefly on the basis
of etymology. Pheison represents phronesis, Gehon andreia, the Tigris
sophrosyne, and the Euphrates dikaiosyne. The Tigris, whose course
is “over against the Assyrians,” symbolizes sophrosyne, the restraint of
pleasure (hedone), which tries to direct the course of human weakness,
because the word “Assyrian” in Hebrew means “directing,” and also be¬
cause the tiger, the most untameable animal, represents appetite
(epithymia). Philo notes that whereas the Pheison and Gehon are said to
“surround” their respective territories, the Tigris and the Euphrates do
not. The reason is that phronesis and andreia can encompass and overcome
folly and cowardice, but sophrosyne cannot “encircle” appetite and
pleasure. Even those who practice enkrateia must resort to food and
drink. Hence Philo rejects Stoic apatheia, except in the case of Moses, for
he was purified by Divine Grace. Ordinary men can expect to achieve
only metriopatheia (Vita M. 2. 68; Leg. All. 3. 156, 144). Although the
22 The comparison of the virtues to trees, and the Tree of Life to generic virtue (I. 17. 56) is
noteworthy in view of the mediaeval metaphor of the trees of virtue and vice, the Arbor bona
and the Arbor mala, rooted respectively in humility and pride. Cf. also Philo De Agr. 11. 43.
The influence of this metaphor is considerable. See, for example, Herrad of Landsberg,
Hortus Deliciarum (12th century), inspired by the tract De Fructibus Carnis et Spintus ascribed
to Hugh of St. Victor (P.L. 176. 997 ff.), where the influence of Gal. 5. 22 is strong. Among
many examples in art of a tree or a plant from which grow virtues related to sophrosyne,
one of the best known is the porch of the Baptistery in Parma (ca. 1200), where castitas is the
source from which flower patientia and humilitas, while spes branches out into prudentia and
modestia. Katzenellenbogen, figs. 64-65, illustrates the Arbor bona and the Arbor mala. The
symbolism of the two trees is discussed by Male, 106-8.
identification of the four rivers with the four virtues became very popu¬
lar with the Fathers, Philo’s equation of individual pairs did not win
universal acceptance; Ambrose, for example, identifies the river Gehon,
rather than the Tigris, with sophrosyne.23
Two other allegorical interpretations of the Old Testament have a
bearing on sophrosyne. The prayer of Jacob in Genesis 49. 16-18 that
Dan may become a brazen serpent biting the horse’s heel is explained
as a prayer that he may become a lover of sophrosyne, because sophro¬
syne wounds and destroys the passions. The four Stoic passions are the
four legs of the horse, and the horseman himself (according to Philo)
symbolizes nous, which, falling backward, is saved from the passions that
carry it along the road that the soul travels (Alleg. Int. 2. 24. 94 ff.). Philo
frequently employs the Platonic image of the horse to represent the pas¬
sions and appetites, but usually pictures someone riding astride, rather
than a charioteer. In De Agricultura he contrasts the true horseman, who
controls his steed, with a mere rider, who is at the mercy of the horse—
that is, of thymos and epithymia. The explication of Jacob’s prayer illus¬
trates Philo’s allegorical method, which here presents in a complicated,
not to say grotesque, visual image the Greek commonplace about
sophrosyne as the savior of phronesis.
Philo embarks upon an even more complex exegesis when he inter¬
prets the episode in the Book of Numbers in which God sends serpents
to destroy the Jews, and Moses heals the sick by making the brazen
serpent (21. 6). In this case both sophrosyne and hedone (“pleasure”) are
represented as serpents: hedone because it glides through the senses, bring¬
ing death to the soul; and sophrosyne because it is the “counterpart” of
hedone. Moses’ serpent (sophrosyne) is bronze because this material is firm
and unyielding, but also because the sophrosyne of those who attain the
virtue only gradually and with effort is not as fine as that of the
theophilos, whose sophrosyne would be like gold. In fact, Philo continues,
23 The identification of the rivers with the cardinal virtues under the influence of Philo
appears in Ambrose De Par., P.L. 14. 296 ff., and Augustine De Gen. contr. Man. 2. 10. 31-34.
In later art this allegory provided an apt motive for the decoration of baptismal fonts, such
as that in the cathedral at Hildesheim (ca. 1240-1250), where the identification of the Gehon
with temperantia indicates that the immediate source is Ambrose rather than Philo. See n. 127.
In illustrated manuscripts of the Speculum Virginum (usually ascribed to Conrad of Hirzau)
the rivers of Paradise are often combined with the flowers of virtue. Consult Arthur Watson,
Speculum 3 (1928), 445-69, and Journal of the Walters Art Gallery 10 (1947), 61-74. Philo
popularized the mystical significance of the number four, which could be applied to a great
many tetrads. For some consequences in art, see George M. A. Hanfman, The Season Sar¬
cophagus in Dumbarton Oaks (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 198 ff.
J26 Sophrosyne
sophrosyne is not the common property of all men, for God commanded
Moses to make a serpent “for thyself.” 24
Philo’s equation of the Greek cardinal virtues with the Mosaic Law
had vast consequences for Patristic writers, who found in this theory the
chief means of bringing together virtues derived from faith and Divine
Grace and virtues based on natural reason. Philo identifies the Law of
Moses with that law which Greek philosophy, particularly the Stoic,
considered the expression of life in accordance with nature. As the nomos
of Plato and the Stoics led to the practice of the four virtues, so the Ten
Commandments aim to instil these same virtues, and Philo analyzes the
Decalogue according to these four headings.25 The first four Command¬
ments instil intellectual virtues, the last six moral virtues, but in fact
each Commandment exhorts to all the virtues (Spec. Leg. 4. 25. 134). The
Sixth and Tenth Commandments have most to do with the control
of appetite and therefore with sophrosyne and enkrateia (usually synony¬
mous in Philo).26 Sophrosyne is interpreted narrowly as chastity in
Book III of the Special Laws, which deals with offenses against the Sixth
Commandment, but in Book IV (on sins against the last three Com¬
mandments) Philo extends the term to include the control of all appe¬
tites. The Tenth Commandment is important in that it prohibits an
emotion, not an action. The discussion of epithymia in Book IV repeats
much of what Philo says in his treatise On the Decalogue (28. 142-53),
where gluttony is regarded as the form of epithymia that leads to all the
other appetites, and Moses’ hostility to it is thereby explained. The
dietary laws are nomoi sophrosynes, “laws of sophrosyne” (Spec. Leg. 4.
16).27 Philo’s emphasis on the primary guilt of indulging in gluttony ex¬
plains the theory, so often expressed by the Fathers, that this form of
intemperantia was responsible for the Fall. Ambrose, the Philo Latinus,
repeatedly makes this assertion; for this reason fasting and sobriety are
central in his ethics.28
The third element in Philo’s treatment of sophrosyne which had
24 Alleg. Int. 2. 19. 77-20. 79.

25 On Philo’s theory of the passions, the virtues, and their relation to the Law, consult
Wolfson, II. 302-21.
26 E.g., De Vir. 167, De Agr. 21. 98. The opposing vice is akolasia (De Agr. 21. 98). For
personifications of Pudicitia and Temperantia in connection with the Sixth and Tenth Com¬
mandments respectively in art of the twelfth century, consult Katzenellenbogen, 47-48, n. 6.
The prohibition of certain kinds of food is at first explained as the result of their being
especially delicious (4. 16. 97), but a more philosophical explanation is later given (106).
The laws concerning circumcision and marriage are also laws of sophrosyne (Spec. Leg. 1. 2.
8-12, 4. 14. 79-24. 131).
28 See especially De Helia and De Isaac.
a pervasive influence in Patristic thought is his choice of exempla virtutum
from the Bible. He makes Abraham the model of all the virtues, includ¬
ing moderation, which is not, however, called sophrosyne, since this term
is usually reserved for the control of the physical appetites. Abraham’s
resignation at the death of Sarah exemplifies the Mean (to metron)
between the vicious extremes of apatheia and excessive mourning (De Abr.
44. 255 ff.). Joseph, who remains a favorite exemplar of sophrosyne in
Patristic literature, already appears in this role in Philo’s De Josepho,
which shows special interest in the effect of sophrosyne on affairs of
state. Joseph is here treated as a type of the bios politikos, and Philo com¬
ments that such continence as he showed in his encounter with Potiphar’s
wife is profitable to society, since history provides many examples of the
misfortunes, even wars, that result from incontinence and adultery. The
results of incontinence (akrasia) are civil strife, wars, and other evils, but
the effects of sophrosyne are stability, peace, and the possession and en¬
joyment of perfect good (11. 57). Philo’s familiarity with Hellenistic
treatises on kingship is evident here.29 In these treatises, as we noted in
Chapter VI, the sophrosyne, aidos and enkrateia of the ruler are cited, not
only for their effect in rendering the king himself virtuous, but also for
their power to sophronizein the entire kingdom. According to Philo, the
sophrosyne of Joseph made the prison in which he was confined in
Egypt a sophronisterion for the other prisoners (86 f.).
It is impossible in a summary treatment of Philo’s contribution to the
history of sophrosyne to do more than suggest his enormous influence.
Among the tendencies in his thought that were continued by the Fathers,
we should not overlook his belief that ascetic effort is necessary to over¬
come the passions.30 In so far as Christian asceticism came to include the
ideas of ponos (“labor”) and agon (“struggle”), it was indebted to Philo,
as it was when it carried on the belief that opotooois 0e& involves the moral
virtues, considered to be reflections or imitations of heavenly virtues.31
Moreover, his synthesis, not only of Jewish and Greek thought, but also
29 Edwin Goodenough (The Politics of Philo Judaeus [New Haven, 1938], 22-23) regards
Joseph in De Somnus 2. 61-66 as a cryptic reference to the despised praefectus Aegypti. He is
portrayed as an enemy of humility and a type of arrogance. Later in the treatise Joseph’s
character improves, beginning with his rejection of Potiphar’s wife. The interpretation of
Joseph in De Somnus differs radically from that in De Josepho, where the theory of Helle¬
nistic kingship is reflected. On this topic, see Goodenough, Y.C.S. 1 (1928), 53-102, with
critical comments by H. M. Fisch, AJ.P. 78 (1937), 59-82.
30 See Jean Danielou, S.J., Philon d’Alexandrie (Paris, 1958), 190 ff. on the topics of askesis,
pathos, and virtue in Philo. In the Lije of Moses the cardinal virtues are ascribed to the austere
life (2. 34. 185).
31 See Merki, 35-44, for this motive in Philo.
328 Sophrosyne
of various elements within the Greek tradition, provided a model for

Patristic writers. The presence of Peripatetic, as well as of Platonic and
Stoic nuances, in Philo’s treatment of sophrosyne is manifest in such
statements as that in Quod Deus Immutabilis Est which describes virtue as
a mean between vicious extremes (34. 162 ff.). To Philo the extremes
between which sophrosyne lies are not wantonness and insensitivity but
careless extravagance (paOvpta) and stinginess (cpetScoAta [34. 164]). It
was to be important also for the Fathers that Philo rejected the Stoic
teaching that all passions are evil and instead found certain passions,
such as righteous indignation, useful. His freedom in mingling Jewish
virtues, like faith and repentance, with Greek virtues and in giving new
meanings to the Greek virtues also served as a stimulus to the Fathers.32
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
It is no accident that the first systematic attempt to integrate Judaeo-

Christian and Greek thought was made by the first Greek Christian who
was thoroughly indoctrinated in the writings of Philo. Clement of
Alexandria did for the Christian concept of sophrosyne what Cicero did
for the Roman. There is a vast difference between his philosophical
approach to the virtue and Paul’s random adoption of a term familiar
in contemporary pagan usage, or the Apologists’ impulse to single out so¬
phrosyne in a limited moral connotation as a peculiarly Christian virtue.
Clement, educated in the city where a long tradition of harmonizing
various cultures already existed, was inspired not only by the example
of Philo, but also by the problem he himself faced—a very different one
from that of earlier Christian teachers. Where the Apostolic Fathers and
the Apologists had emphasized the difference between Christian and
pagan conduct, Clement wrote both for an educated Christian public
and (in the Protrepticus) for pagan readers; and his writings manifest a
deep desire to justify the study of Greek philosophy as a legitimate source
from which to select doctrines that support Christian belief. Under the
influence of Philo he treats Greek philosophy as parallel to Jewish Law,
32 For Philo’s adoption of various elements from different philosophical schools and his
mingling of Jewish with Greek virtues, see Wolfson, II. Chap. 12, passim. Philo’s part in the
development of the concept of sophron mama (“sane madness”) or methe nephalios (“sober
drunkenness”), both referring to mystical inspiration, is treated by Hans Lewy, Sobria
Ebrietas (Giessen, 1929), Chap. 1. Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Eusebius, and
Ambrose all employ the contrast between the drunkenness or madness that results from
natural causes, such as wine, and the “wineless intoxication” or “sane madness” of mystical
union.
a preparation for the full revelation of the Gospel; and he repeats
Philo’s claim that the Greek poets and philosophers learned from the
Prophets.33 Thus what is desirable in Greek philosophy is justified on
two grounds: its descent from the Jewish Law and its origin in the
Divine gift of phronesis, whose proper function is to speculate about the
nature of truth. Sophrosyne is one of the legacies from the Greek tradi¬
tion which Clement most enthusiastically accepts; he gives it, in fact, a
position of special eminence as one of the two effects produced by the
study of philosophy. According to the Paedagogus, this study has two
consequences, intellectual and moral, the first termed episteme, the
second sophrosyne. The object of the Christian Logos is to make the soul
sophron, not epistemonikos (“full of knowledge” [I. 1. 1. 4]).34
As this statement implies, Clement resembles the Apologists in finding
sophrosyne a characteristically Christian excellence—moral, rather than
intellectual—but he does not, as they do, isolate it from the other three
cardinal virtues. His free use of the entire Platonic canon is a mark of
his confident approach to pagan philosophy in general.35 Among the
cardinal virtues, however, it is phronesis whose value for Christians he is
most concerned to justify. Sophrosyne has long since been accepted, and
Clement finds a place in the history of its development mainly because
he extends its function in Christian thought by incorporating certain
Platonic doctrines into the concept of the virtue already known to the
Apologists. The chief result of his innovations is that sophrosyne as
a Christian virtue finds a place in speculations about the assimilation to
God and gnosis, two subjects of great interest to Clement in the Stromateis.
The three major works of Clement—the Protrepticus, the Paedagogus,
and the Stromateis—are addressed to three distinct groups of readers—
pagan, Christian, and Christian gnostic; but one basic conception of
sophrosyne appears in all three.36 The word normally indicates control
of the appetites, although occasionally it extends to other meanings,
33 Strom. II. 18. 78, 1. The works of Clement are cited according to the edition of Otto
Stahlin and Ludwig Fruchtel (Leipzig, 1909-1960). The four Greek virtues were learned
from the Hebrews, Strom. VI. 11. 95, 4.
34 See Strom. VII. 3. 20, 2 for the role of Greek philosophy in purging the soul, and
consult J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., Phoenix 5 (1951), 79-86.
35 The four virtues: e.g., Strom. I. 20. 97, 3; II. 18. 78, 1; VII. 3. 17, 3; Paed. II. 12. 121, 4
(where eusebeia replaces phronesis), III. 11. 64, 1 (where aidos and philagathia are added).
36 The little homily Quis Dives Salvetur? contains nothing of special interest for sophrosyne,
except an allusion to the concept of sophron mama, when Clement says (38. 1) that one who is
filled with agape for his brother “is all aflutter concerning him, is in a sane frenzy about him
[ocoqDpopcos juatWrat].” The Loeb translation “is chastely wild” misses the point of the
oxymoron.
330 Sophrosyne
equally traditional in classical literature—sobriety, sanity, moderation.37

Yet the use made of the concept differs from one work to another,
depending on whether Clement is preaching to the converted or to
pagan readers. In the Protrepticus he contrasts pagan with Christian
morality and, like the Apologists, represents sophrosyne as the principal
and distinguishing Christian excellence, allying it with enkrateia and op¬
posing it to akrasia. He attacks the indecent conduct of the pagan gods,
especially Zeus’s lack of sophrosyne (2. 37, 3), and charges the pagans
with accepting these gods because they themselves desire wantonness,
and with rejecting the true God because they cannot endure sophrosyne
(4. 61, 4). It often seems that Clement regards the process of conversion
to Christianity as a matter of substituting sophrosyne for profligacy. He
says, for example, that the abandonment of the pleasures of the pagan
life is followed by a harvest of the fruits of sophrosyne (11. 117, 5). The
persistent identification of sophrosyne with conversion to Christ is no¬
where better illustrated than in Clement’s exegesis of the Bacchae of
Euripides, a consummate example of the allegorical method of interpret¬
ing poetry which Clement learned from Philo and the Stoics. Comment¬
ing on the scene in which Pentheus, dressed in fawn skins like a maenad
and mocked by Dionysus, behaves as though intoxicated, Clement con¬
trasts his “drunkenness” with the sobriety of salvation. Pentheus becomes
a type of paganism; the rites of Bacchus are contrasted with the mysteries
of salvation, and the maenads on Mount Cithaeron are supplanted, in
Clement’s exhortation, by the daughters of God on the Holy Mountain,
who lead the sophron chorus of the just (12. 119, 1 ff).
The Paedagogus, addressed to Christian readers, is a kind of Greek
Christian De Ojficiis and recalls Cicero especially in the great emphasis
placed on sophrosyne as the virtue that should govern each detail of con¬
duct. Turning away from the contrast between pagan licentiousness and
Christian purity which fills the Protrepticus, Clement now analyzes
sophrosyne in its specific effects on many aspects of everyday life—eat¬
ing, drinking, speaking, sleeping, the choice of dress and adornment,
marital behavior, and social intercourse.38 The outward signs of a
37 Sobriety: Pro. io. 96, 1; Paed. II. 2. 19, 2-20, 2. Sanity: Pro. 12. 118, 5 and 122, 2. Mod¬
eration: Quis Dives 26, 6; Paed. II. 7. 58, 1. In Pro. 10. 109, 2, where the Odyssey is subjected
to allegorical interpretation, Ithaca becomes a symbol of truth, and the abode of truth is
divided into two sections, the women’s apartment and the council of elders. The first is semne
(“chaste”), the second sophron (“prudent”).
38E.g.: Diet: II. 1. 3, 1; 14, 1 and 6. Drink: II. 2. 20, 2; 30, 2; 32, 3. Music: II. 4. 44, 1-5
(the Psalms are sophron music). Speech: II. 6. 49, 1; 52, 1. Sleep: II. 9. 77, 1 ff. (the bed
must not be too soft). Marriage: II. 10 passim; see especially 97, 2, a warning against
Patristic Literature 33*
Christian life are moderation and simplicity, especially in food, drink,
and clothing. The Cynic-Stoic euteleia (“frugality”) reappears as a mark
of sophrosyne (II. 1. 15, 1) but now has Biblical precedent: the blessing
of the loaves and fishes shows Christ’s approval of a frugal diet and His
command to Peter (Matt. 17. 6) His preference for sophron food (II. 1.
13, 2-14, i).39 Clement appeals constantly to the example and precepts
of Christ; hence the sophrosyne of the Paedagogus has much greater
inwardness than does the decorum of Cicero, and its roots are always in
Divine Grace.
Like most Christian writers, Clement displays more concern for the
spiritual and moral problems of women than is customary in pagan
philosophy (except for certain Stoic and Neopythagorean discourses,
whose commonplaces he often, in fact, recalls). Yet with all his attention
to feminine sophrosyne (as in Paed. II. 7. 54, 1 ff.; 8. 65, 2; 10. 109, 4;
III. 2. 4-5, 11), he shows no inclination to treat the virtue as exclusively
feminine. He points out that arete is the same for both sexes; there
is one sophrosyne, one aidos (I. 4. 10, 2). For both men and women, he
repeatedly asserts, the principles of sophrosyne will determine what
adornment to wear. Furthermore, true beauty consists in arete (the four
virtues, II. 12. 121, 4) or in being adorned by the Holy Spirit with
justice, wisdom, courage, sophrosyne, aidos, and love of goodness (III.
11. 64, 1). God rejoices to see us sparkling with intelligence (dianoia) and
clothed with sophrosyne, the pure garment of the body (III. 1. 1, i).40
This commonplace, which can be traced back to Prodicus’ Choice
of Heracles, was given renewed authority by Paul’s injunction to women
in I Timothy 2. 9; most of what Clement has to say about modesty and
simplicity in external things is an amplification of this familiar topic.
What is perhaps most remarkable is his own scrupulous moderation in
dealing with a subject that for many Christian moralists presented an
irresistible temptation to excess. We must aim at moderation (ta metna),
says Clement, avoiding both wantonness and its opposite extreme.
weaving by day the principles of sophrosyne and then at night raveling them, like Penelope
with her web (a reversal of the normal symbolism involving Penelope). Use of scents and
ointments: II. 8. 65, 2 (sophrosyne is the only proper chrism for Christian women). Jewelry:
II. 12. 1 2 1, 1-5. Clothing: III. 2. 13, 2 (barbarian finery and luxury caused the ruin of
Greece); III. 11. 53, 4. Hair dyes: III. 2. 6, 2. Sophron adornment: III. 11. 64, 1.
39 See also III. 6. 35, 3 on euteleia, the child of sophrosyne; III. 7. 39, 1 on Elias as a model
of euteleia and on the Christian provision for the journey to Heaven: euteleia combined with
semnotes sophron (“chaste purity”); cf. II. 1. 15, 1: euteleia sophron.
40 Cf. II. 12. 129, 1 on aidos and sophrosyne as collar and necklace; III. 2. 4, 1 on the
adornment consisting of enkrateia. See also Strom. II. 23. 145, 1, where sophrosyne is to the
body what the fear of God is to the soul.
Sophrosyne
Between extravagance (rpixpri) and stinginess (cpci8co\ia) lies the Mean

—harmonious, sophron, and pure (III. io. 51, 3). The Christian is not
exhorted to a life of austerity in the midst of Alexandrian hedonism; he
is merely expected to use in sensible moderation the good things of the
world and to choose what is simple and natural in preference to what
is excessive and bizarre.
A notable feature of the Paedagogus is the appearance of sophrosyne in
connection with the motive of ogotcocus Oetb (“assimilation to God”).
Clement is the first Christian writer to develop in a systematic way this
topic (which Philo had already linked with Genesis 1. 26, 27), and
while he cites Theaetetus 176B far more often than any other source for
this idea, he also knows Laws 716C-D, which he echoes in the Paedagogus
and quotes verbatim in the Stromateis. It is owing to the influence of this
passage in the Laws that he selects sophrosyne as the virtue through the
practice of which we may become like God (Paed. II. 1. 15, i).41
Contrasting human beings to birds and beasts, Clement says that we
are closer to God than are they, to the extent that we are sophronesteroi,
more self-controlled. We are created, not to eat and drink, but to know
God. In the context sophrosyne clearly refers, not to the principle
of measure in general (as it does in Laws 716C-D), but more narrowly
to the control of the appetites, Clement’s usual connotation for the
word; ypt we note that in his interpretation he relates sophrosyne to a
form of gnosis. He gives great weight to his statement about self-control
as a source of likeness to God by putting it close to the beginning of
Book II of the Paedagogus, which deals with sophrosyne in the practical
details of everyday life. Book III opens with an equally significant
assertion that the greatest lesson taught by the Logos is self-knowledge:
if we know ourselves, we will also know God and be like Him in doing
what is good and having as few needs as possible, and we will please
God by wearing the pure garment of sophrosyne (III. 1. 1, i).42
Thus two of the most familiar aspects of sophrosyne, self-control and
41 See Ladner, 85, on the meaning of homoiosis in Clement; and cf. Merki, 44-60, and E. F.
Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1957), 85-94. For a more detailed
discussion of the doctrine as it relates to sophrosyne, see pp. 347-48.
42 ’OXiyoSda (“needing little”), the human approximation to the Divine quality of being
avev8er)s (“in need of nothing”), is here linked with sophrosyne. Doing good {ayadoepydv or
evirpaTTeiv) appears in the late Stoa as one of the ways of imitating God (Merki, 14-16).
Strom. II. 19. 97, 1 also discusses enkrateia and doing good to others as ways of imitating God.
Other virtues that Clement associates with homoiosis include piety (deoolfieta), philanthropia,
and gentleness (fj/xepOTT]?) in Strom. VII. 2. 13, 4-14, 1 (and cf. the concluding discussion in
Pro. 12. 122. 1 ff.); but purification from the passions and appetites is always of primary
importance.
self-knowledge, are allied with the doctrine of dfioicoois in the
Paedagogus. They are not independent of each other, for both are needed
to achieve that purification which is the essential first step in the process
of homoiosis. In the Paedagogus Clement lays more emphasis on self-
control than on self-knowledge. He maintains, for example, that the
corrupt will become incorrupt when man overcomes his appetites
through enkrateia and attains eternal sophrosyne; such purity will enable
us to live the life of the angels (II. io. ioo, 3). And elsewhere (III. 7.
39, 1): the best preparation for the journey to Heaven is frugality
(euteleia) combined with chaste purity (semnotes sophron). The pagan
doctrine that purification from the passions may serve as a means of
union with God is here stated in terms that recall the vocabulary of the
second-century Apologists. In the Stromateis Clement tends to associate
sophrosyne with apatheia, rather than merely with euteleia and semnotes;
and he also does greater justice to the need for self-knowledge, as is ap¬
propriate in a work addressed to the Christian gnostic.
The imitation of God is a major theme of the Stromateis. To the
original Platonic conditions for o/iolools Oeti, as expressed in the
Theaetetus and Laws, Clement, following in the wake of the Stoics, adds
apatheia (the “state of having overcome the passions”) and, like Philo,
links the pagan notion of assimilation to God with the passage in
Genesis regarding the creation of man in the image and likeness of God.
Already in the Paedagogus Clement himself has added a new and
specifically Christian element, Christ as the model (I. 2. 4, 2; I. 12. 98,
3). The principal way in which man can perfect the image of God in
himself is by the practice of virtue (Paed. I. 12. 99, 1-2), including the
Greek cardinal virtues. In the Stromateis (II. 18. 78, 1) Clement justifies
the presence of these virtues on the ground that Moses’ delineation of
the virtues was the source of Greek ethics.43 Hence the definitions cur¬
rent in the Greek schools are acceptable, and sophrosyne is described
in Stoic terms as that habit of choice and avoidance which preserves the
judgments of phronesis (Strom. II. 1 8. 79, 5; cf. VII. 3. 18, 2). The
virtues are inseparable; he who has one has all, and such a person will
achieve salvation (II. 18. 80, 2-3). But in spite of the formal definition
of sophrosyne as a habit of choice, Clement reverts to his usual concep¬
tion of it as control over the appetites when he examines the implications
of the theory of homoiosis. Strictly speaking, the Divine, being without
43 Cf. VI. 11. 95, 4-5. Clement lists the cardinal virtues and adds subsidiary qualities; to
sophrosyne is subordinated eulabeia, defined as an avoidance in accord with reason (II. 18.
79, 5), an echo of the old Stoa.
Sophrosyne
lack or imperfection and totally passionless (apathes), cannot be termed

sophron or enkrates; but human nature, in its effort to become like God,
must practice these virtues (II. 18. 81, i).44 Man must have sophrosyne
in order to be “deified to the point of apatheia” (IV. 23. 152, 1). Who¬
ever imitates God will strive to rid himself of his appetites. He who has
felt the promptings of appetite and has yet controlled himself is like a
widow who becomes virginal (parthenos) again through sophrosyne (VII.
12. 72, 1-2).
These passages, with their emphasis on the need for purification as a
prelude to assimilation to God,45 describe the stage in the spiritual life
which is termed praxis in the theology of the Cappadocians.46 It is fol¬
lowed by the stage of theoria, an aspect of gnosis; and this stage also is
linked with sophrosyne by Clement, who says that in the theoretikos bios
one who is pure beholds God in a pure manner (hagios), for sophrosyne,
being present and surveying itself without interruption, is as far as
possible assimilated to God (IV. 23. 152, 3). This passage not only
establishes sophrosyne as a requirement at the stage of theoria but
relates it to the “mirror concept” whereby the pure soul looking into
its own purity sees the archetype, the Divine purity. This concept,
ultimately derived from the First Alcibiades—where self-knowledge is
equated with sophrosyne and depends on the soul’s seeing itself in its
most Divine part, as in a mirror (132D-133C)—is crucial for the homoio-
m-theory of Gregory of Nyssa. Usually in the writings of Gregory
sophrosyne gives way to katharotes at this stage of the spiritual journey,
but Clement maintains sophrosyne even here. His description has
analogies to the Neoplatonic definitions of sophrosyne at the level that
Plotinus calls paradeigmatic: the stage at which sophrosyne in the
human soul takes the form of a turning (strophe) towards the Divine
44 Clement generally treats sophrosyne and enkrateia as roughly synonymous, although on
occasion he distinguishes them (e.g., Strom. II. 18. 80, 4). The two words are interchangeable
in the discussion of marriage in Strom. III. 1. 4, 1 ff. What is said there of enkrateia—as
pertaining not just to sexual indulgence, but also to other forms of excess, in speech, the
pursuit of wealth, etc—is true of sophrosyne as well. Cf. III. 6. 59, 2 ff.
45 The need for moderation in food and drink is discussed, both from the positive point of
view (as an aid to homoiosis) and from the negative as well, for Clement holds that the angels
fell through akrasia (III. 7. 59, 2). Important discussions of restraint of appetite include Strom.
11. 20. 109, 1 ff. on melete thanatou (“preparation for death”) and II. 22. 132-33, where Plato
{Laws 716C-D) is quoted. Married life is a state in which enkrateia and sophrosyne should be
practiced; see III. 10. 68, 1 ff. for Scriptural citations in support of marriage if accompanied
by these virtues, and for a refutation of Tatian’s stand against marriage. See also Strom. III.
12. 86, 1 ff.; unlike most of the Fathers, Clement regards the married state as superior to
virginity {Strom. VII. 12. 70, 6-8).
46 Ladner, 98-99.
mind, since in the Divine mind itself sophrosyne consists in a turning
towards itself. In such a context self-knowledge becomes a significant
part of the Christian gnosis.
Clement concludes his detailed description of the sophrosyne of the
gnostic—largely a matter of quietude, orderliness, and absence of desire
—with a definition of Gnothi sauton as “knowing for what we are born”
(VII. 3. 20, 7). In this discussion of gnosis he once again echoes the
Platonic theme of being dear to God (Laws 716C-D) and, in the man¬
ner that was to be typical of the Greek Fathers, combines the Platonic
allusion with a reference to the Beatitudes, saying that he who becomes
pure in heart (Matt. 5. 8) through gnosis is dear to God (VII. 3. 19, 2).
A special and very Platonic feature of Book VII of the Stromateis is
Clement’s examination of the motives for practicing virtue. In the case
of sophrosyne, the Christian gnostic must be superior to passion and
pleasure, not through love of honor, like an athlete, nor through greed
for riches, nor through concern for his own health, nor through boorish¬
ness (agroikia), as if he had no taste for pleasure, nor because of legal
restraints or fear, but solely for its own sake. Sophrosyne will be
perfected and become permanent through gnosis, and the gnostic will be
sophron and apathes, unaffected by pleasure and pain (VII. 11. 67, 6-8).
It is largely the identification with apatheia that distinguishes the
sophrosyne of the gnostic from the ordinary virtue described in the
Paedagogus.47
Among Clement’s borrowings from Plato, we may note his adoption
of the theory that the practice of sophrosyne is a preparation for death:
to be content with the natural desires is termed a melete thanatou, as in
the Phaedo (ii. 20. 109, 1 ff.). Still more important as a Christian
innovation is Clement’s belief that sophrosyne may be a preparation for
martyrdom. In discussing the perfection of women, for whom sophro¬
syne is still the chief excellence, Clement says that they, too, can be
martyrs if they are sophrones. One may love wisdom without being
learned, whether one is a barbarian, a Greek, or a slave, old, young, or
a woman, for sophrosyne is common to all (IV. 8. 58, 2-4).48 The as¬
sociation of sophrosyne and martyrdom is, however, only at its begin-
47 The relation between apatheia in Christian gnostics and the Stoic apatheia is discussed by
Walther Volker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrmus (Berlin and Leipzig, 1952), 188-
94, 524-40. See also Merki, 49. In general the Greek Fathers are more favorably disposed
towards apatheia than are the Latin Patristic writers.
48 This section of the Stromateis deals with the perfection of women and shows, chiefly by
examples from the Old Testament, that women are capable of andreia and other forms of
masculine excellence, and of philosophy and rhetoric, too.
jj6 Sophrosyne
ning in Clement. Origen is the Father who develops it more explicitly,

particularly in his belief that the ascetic life, the life of sophrosyne, is a
substitute for martyrdom, now that the age of martyrdom is past.
Without pretending to exhaust Clement’s contributions to the history
of sophrosyne, we may call attention to one further development, in
which again he follows Philo—namely, his selection of exemplars from
the Bible. Although he cites Penelope as a type of feminine sophrosyne
and terms Odysseus sophron in another sense for silencing Thersites,
Clement prefers models from Scripture and greatly extends the list to
be gleaned from earlier Christian writers. Christ Himself is the greatest
exemplar of sophrosyne in its connection with food and drink. Elias,
with his frugal diet, is a type of euteleia, while St.John the Baptist, with
his honey and locusts, prepares for the humble and sophron life of Christ.
Joseph illustrates the sophrosyne that, by accepting bondage, shows it¬
self superior to unrestrained license. Judith, Esther, and Susanna
exemplify the increasingly important combination of feminine sophro¬
syne with courage.49
Clement marks the first stage in the philosophical consideration of
sophrosyne by Greek Christian thinkers; he introduces or states with
new precision a number of the most dynamic theories that were to be
linked with this concept in the next century: its special relevance to the
imitation of God, its connection with martyrdom and with the ascetic
life which becomes a substitute for martyrdom, and its responsibility for
maintaining the moderation and simplicity in daily life which were the
outward mark of the Christian. None of these is more influential, how¬
ever, than his example in fitting the ethical precepts of the Greek
philosophers into the context of Christian teaching. By his frequent
allusions to the entire canon of cardinal virtues he demonstrates his
freedom and familiarity in the use of pagan learning. After his time
Christian writers no longer felt it necessary to sacrifice the Platonic
virtues to the Pauline; many centuries were to pass, however, before the
two canons were integrated into a single system.50
THE CAPPADOCIANS
In passing from Clement to the Cappadocians, we necessarily omit a

number of writers who contribute to the growth of a Christian concept
49 Penelope: Paed. III. 8. 41, 5. Odysseus: Ibid. II. 7. 59, 2. Christ: Ibid. II. 3. 38. Elias:
Ibid. III. 7. 38, 1. John the Baptist: Ibid. II. 10. 112, 1. Joseph: Ibid. III. 11. 68, 3. Judith,
Susanna, and Esther: Strom. IV. 19. 118, 4-119, 3.
50 Catherine Haines (“The Four Greek Virtues from Socrates to Bonaventure” [Mt.
Holyoke dissertation, unpublished, 1941]) discusses the union of the two groups of virtues
of sophrosyne, but none of these would so richly repay detailed study as
Origen. Even so brief a survey as that offered in this chapter cannot
ignore one major contribution of Origen: his attention to the ascetical
side of sophrosyne. It might be said that Origen was to Clement of
Alexandria as Tatian, in an earlier generation, was to Justin Martyr.
Clement’s conception of sophrosyne as moderation and simplicity in the
essentials of life, which could be practiced in any environment and any
vocation, is replaced in Origen by a fanatical zeal for asceticism.
Clement had taught that virginity is not superior to the married state,
which he exalted as an act of co-operation with the Creator (Paed. II.
io. 83, 2; cf. Strom. III. 10. 68, 1-4; III. 12. 84, 2 ff.; VII. 12. 70, 6-8),
but Origen took so literally the text from Matthew (19. 12) that Justin
had already interpreted as the teaching of Christ about sophrosyne, that
he mutilated himself in order to become a eunuch for the sake of the
Lord. Believing the passions to be the source of sin, Origen demanded
their extirpation and taught that apatheia could be achieved through
fasting and celibacy (In Num. Horn. 24. 2).51 The connection of sophro¬
syne with virginity gives this virtue its importance for Origen, since to
him virginity is comparable to martyrdom. He is the transitional figure
between the writers of the first two Christian centuries, for whom
physical martyrdom was an ever-present possibility, and those of the
third and fourth centuries, who formulated the idea that asceticism is
a spiritual martyrdom.52 To be sure, persecutions continued into
the third century—and Origen himself was tortured under Decius—
but he teaches that the imitation of Christ may equally well be
accomplished through the acceptance of the ascetic vocation. His
Exhortation to Martyrdom mentions all four cardinal virtues as the goal of
a struggle (agon),53 and this notion proved exceedingly influential as
Christian asceticism developed. Origen’s emphasis on the role of agon
(or ponos, “toil”) in attaining arete—so commonplace a notion in Greek
in a sevenfold system, completed by St. Bonaventure in II Sententiae 25. 1. Consult also Odon
Lottin, O.S.B., Melanges Mandonnet (Paris, 1930), 2. 232-59.
51 Origen distinguishes Christian from “Pythagorean” fasting on the basis of the motives
for each; Contr. Celsum 5. 49, Koetschau 2, p. 53. See 4. 46 for the superiority of Joseph to
Bellerophon as a model of sophrosyne.
52 See Edward Malone, O.S.B., The Monk and the Martyr (Washington, 1950), and
Musurillo, 55-62.
53 Origen maintains that even the pagans have taken part in the agon to win these four
virtues, but only the chosen people have sought piety (eusebeia)—Ad Mart. 5, Koetschau 1,
p. 6; cf. 43, 1. p. 40, where Origen mentions four virtues, two of which are gnosis and
dikaiosyne, while the other two are Christian substitutes for sophrosyne and andreia—namely
hagnotes (“purity”) and makrothymia (“endurance”).
jj8 Sophrosyne
popular philosophy, especially in the Cynic-Stoic diatribe—introduced

into Christian theology a tendency to rely on human effort and
responsibility which in turn carried the seeds of the Pelagian heresy.54
The contemporaries and successors of Origen shared his view of the
struggle for virtue as a contest or agon. His great rival Methodius, in
fact, described perpetual virginity as an Olympic contest of chastity,
while John Chrysostom often compared the sophron person to a victorious
athlete who derives eternal pleasure from his triumph.55 Methodius
wrote a Christian adaptation of Plato’s Symposium, substituting eleven
holy virgins for Plato’s six convivial banqueters and replacing eros with
purity (hagneia) as the subject eulogized. Many allusions to sophrosyne
in these speeches prove that Methodius interpreted it as chastity, often
in a physical sense. Marcella, for example, the second speaker, traces
the stages in the history of parthenia (“virginity”) as it rose from the
lowest rung in the ladder (where marriages between brother and sister
occur). At the highest rung is the perfection of virtue, which is the true
likeness to God. Sophrosyne is the penultimate stage—evidently
continence in marriage (i. 2, p. 10-3, p. 11 Bonwetsch). It is not always
so identified, however, for Thalia, who expounds St. Paul (I Tim. 2. 15),
as a summons to purity (hagiasmos) and sophrosyne, insists that marriage
is but a substitute for true sophrosyne, which she equates with hagneia
itself (3. 10, p. 38-11, p. 39).56
54 Jaeger (Two Works, 106 ff.) discusses the great influence exerted on Gregory of Nyssa by
Origen’s philosophical treatment of the ascetical life: both his emphasis on the agon by
which virtue is achieved, and his theory of perfection as a liberation and purification of the
soul from the body and its passions. See also Brooks Otis, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 (1958),
102 ff., on the effects of the body-soul dualism in Origen’s thought and his emphasis on the
proverb Gnothi sauton. Gregory Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric of Origen (P.G. 10. 1052 ff.) contains
a description of the cardinal virtues in the life of Origen himself and relates sophrosyne to
“saving the phronesis of a soul that knows itself” (1084C). Gregory says that while Origen
did not render him just, prudent, sophron, and brave (for no one may assume these virtues
who is not inspired by God), he did teach him to love the virtues. Gregory also describes
sophrosyne as stability (tvoTaOtia) of soul which gives peace to all who possess it (1085B),
and names eusebeia the mother of the virtues (1085C).
55 Methodius Symp. 7, 3, p. 74 Bonwetsch; cf. Philo De Agr. 27. 119 ff. Chrysostom, e.g.,
In Ep. 1 ad Cor. Horn. XXXVII, 3, 5 (P.G. 10. 320).
56 Among many other references to sophrosyne in the Symposium, those in the eighth logos,
that of Thecla, are the most notable, because they adapt the Platonic myth of the soul’s
ascent (Phaedr. 247D-E) and conflate with it Christian notions of Heaven. Methodius
describes the soul as being borne aloft on the wings of sophrosyne (8. 1, p. 82) and parthenia
(8. 2, p. 83), and transforms Plato’s hyperouranios topos, glimpsed by the soul before birth, into
the meadows to which virginal souls are conducted after death. There they behold, among
other Platonic Ideas, Sophrosyne herself (8. 3, p. 83). Here Methodius adds an element from
the Judaeo-Christian Eden—trees of virtue, one of which is the tree of sophrosyne (8. 3,
p. 84); the others are the trees of agape (“love”) and synesis (“knowledge”). The Symposium
The identification of sophrosyne with hagneia is a doctrine that
Gregory of Nazianzus shares with Methodius. The Cappadocians as a
group bring to fruition the tendencies that we have traced in the
development of a Christian concept of sophrosyne. Broadly speaking,
there are two prominent characteristics in their approach to the virtue.
First, they integrate it completely into their teaching about Christian
morality: accepting it as a fundamental virtue—usually the control of
the appetites; recommending its universal practice, through their
sermons, eulogies, occasional poetry, and commentaries on Scripture;
and finding a multitude of exemplars in the Bible. Thus they accomplish
the final assimilation of pagan doctrine about the moral virtues to the
Christian view of virtue expressed by St. Paul. Secondly, they define
more precisely the function of sophrosyne in the ascetic life, which they
regard as the Christian continuation of the theoretical life extolled in
Greek philosophy. The first of these achievements may be studied in the
writings of Gregory of Nazianzus; the second in those of Gregory of
Nyssa.
The total assimilation of sophrosyne and the free use of many topics
associated with it in pagan literature mark both the Carmina Moralia
and the Eulogies of Gregory of Nazianzus, to which this discussion will
be confined. Sophrosyne is frequently mentioned in Gregory’s exhortations
to ascetical fasting and celibacy;57 but it is not identical with either form
of self-denial, since it is for Gregory the generic virtue by which all
kinds of appetites and pleasures are subdued.58 It is most often linked
contains many references to alleged Scriptural exhortations to sophrosyne, such as Luke 12.
35-38; Cant. 4. 9-12; Apoc. 12. 1-6. Methodius’ interpretation of Luke 12. 35-38 (Sunt
lumbi vestri praecincti) makes the girding of the loins a symbol of sophrosyne. Gregory of Nyssa
finds in the lighted lamps rather a representation of the virtue {Horn. XI, In Cant., P.G. 44.
996C-D; p. 317 Langerbeck). For an analysis of the Symposium and its doctrine of purity, see
Herbert Musurillo, S.J., St. Methodius, The Symposium: a Treatise on Chastity (Westminster, Md.,
1958), Introduction, 3-23.
57 For Gregory’s teaching on ascetical fasting, always marked by moderation, see
Musurillo, 40, 51. The Carmina Moralia contain many discussions of parthema (“virginity”),
often associated with hagneia and sophrosyne. See P.G. 37. 521-73 (praise of virginity) and
578-632 (advice to virgins), where Susanna, the model of chastity in marriage, is termed
hagne (v. 194) and is credited with a longing (pothos) for sophrosyne. Gregory also gives many
examples of sophrosyne in the animal kingdom, a favorite topic of Graeco-Roman moralists,
which through the Physiologus had great influence on mediaeval and Renaissance iconog¬
raphy. He cites the turtledove as sbphron, an example for widows (vv. 536-39), and praises
certain species of fish as models of conjugal sophrosyne (vv. 543-44). The salamander, which
lives unharmed in flames, is still another type of sophrosyne (v. 571). Consult Male, 118, for
the possibility that the symbol of Castitas on the reliefs representing this virtue at Amiens
and Chartres and in the rose window of Notre Dame de Paris is a salamander.
58 In a poem of versified definitions Gregory takes up the cardinal virtues and describes
Sophrosyne
with hagneia (“purity”).59 The close association of these two aretae is

guaranteed by the famous poem describing the dream that Gregory had
in boyhood, when he was torn between the demands of the spirit and
the flesh. To support the former, there appear to him two beautiful
women who announce themselves as Hagneia and Sophrosyne. They are
alike in every respect—beauty, stature, simplicity of adornment (the
kosmos akosmia to which Gregory often refers with approval), modest
clothing and veils {P.G. 37, Car. 45, vv. 229 ff.). Both assert that they
are close to Christ the King and rejoice in the beauty of heavenly
celibacy; the effect of the dream is to kindle in Gregory a love for
perpetual virginity.60
Another one of the Carmina Moralia, entitled “To Sophrosyne,” also
proves to be an exhortation to virginity. In this poem Gregory admits
that sophrosyne may be achieved in the married state, but asserts that
virginity is preferable for two reasons; one is the familiar Pauline argu¬
ment that the virgin is free to devote herself entirely to God, and the
other—the reason that becomes increasingly important for the Apologists
and their successors—is that God and the angels are celibate {P.G. 37.
643-48). The effects of sophrosyne on the appearance and conduct of
virgins are described in this poem. They range from merely external
marks—a sophron walk, a modest demeanor, the kosmos akosmia—to more
inward effects, such as control of anger and of the physical appetites.
Although Gregory nowhere condemns marriage as evil, he warns those
who have accepted the vocation of celibacy to avoid backsliding, which
he compares to escaping the fires of Sodom only to run back into the
flames (vv. 58-59); and he regards the remarriage of a widow as a
transgression against hagneia (60-61).
Sophrosyne and hagneia are again virtually equated in the poem “On
Purity” {Peri Hagneias), which immediately follows that to Sophrosyne
{P.G. 37. 648-49). This poem presents in Neoplatonic language a theory
sophrosyne as control over pleasures—kmKpdrr\ois (Car. 34, P.G. 37. 945-64, v. 57).
Although in the case of andreia he defines in Aristotelian terms the vicious extremes between
which the virtue stands as a mesotes, Gregory, like many of his contemporaries, finds only one
antithesis to sophrosyne—wantonness (now called aselgeia). He normally assigns a narrow
scope to enkrateia, control of the appetites for food and drink.
59 Hagneia and sophrosyne appear in the Scala Paradisi of John Climacus on the same rung
of the ladder, gradus fifteen (P.G. 88. 869). For hagnotes and its cognates in pagan and
Christian thought, consult A.-J. Festugiere, La Saintete (Paris, 1942), Chap. 2.
60 M. C. Waites (H.S.C.P. 23 [1912], 1-46) traces the philosophical allegory to which this
poem is related, with particular reference to the lineage of Heracles at the Crossroads. Arete
in Prodicus’ allegory is adorned with katharotes, aidos, and sophrosyne (Xenophon Mem. 2. 1.
22), the original of Gregory’s kosmos akosmia. Cf. D. L. 6. 37 for Crates’ contribution.
Patristic Literature 34i
about the relation of the various stages in the practice of virtue. Briefly,
in only ten lines, and rather cryptically Gregory teaches that all arete,
in the case of the righteous (dikaioi), advances to the extent of one step
(bathmos), so that one who is celibate is made equal to the angels—that
is, to the highest stage of virtue for created beings; one who practices
enkrateia (“continence”) is to be ranked with the celibate; and one who
enjoys lawful marriage is to be considered the equal of the continent.61
“Only practice to sophron [purity], so that you may achieve the next
higher stage,” Gregory concludes. Sophrosyne is here the generic virtue
which manifests itself in all three stages of the life of hagneia: virginity,
continence, and lawful marriage.62
Gregory’s fondness for using pagan commonplaces in his poetry
is especially evident in the Comparison of Lives, which applies topics
familiar in the Gynic-Stoic diatribe—particularly the contrast between
poverty and wealth—to the comparison of the spiritual life and the
worldly life {P.G. 37, 649-67).63 The vita spiritualis proves to be the mo¬
nastic life, which the author, like Gregory of Nyssa, assimilates to the
pagan tradition of the theoretical life. Here and elsewhere in the
Carmina Moralia the Cynics and other pagan moralists are contrasted
unfavorably with Christian exemplars of the virtues. A long poem “On
Arete” (entitled in some manuscripts “On Humility, Sophrosyne, and
Continence”) takes up systematically a Stoic canon consisting of
enkrateia, andreia, sophrosyne, and phronesis (P.G. 37. 680-752). Under the
rubric of sophrosyne (vv. 773 ff.) Gregory recalls the edifying story
of Xenophanes and the harlot, the tradition about the orderly and
sophron life of Epicurus, the conversion of Polemo, and the anecdotes,
familiar to all students of popular philosophy since the Hellenistic age,
about the wife of Dion and about Alexander’s exemplary treatment of
the daughters of Darius. All these Gregory praises, but as being untypical
of pagan morality, whose true standards are to be found in the licentious
behavior of Zeus, Aphrodite, and the other gods. The chastity of Christ
and His followers is adduced in contrast, and the virgin-martyr Thecla
61 The meaning of the first two lines (aperrj 7raoa Sucodocs \ eva ftadpov TrpofiLfiaêL) would
be clarified if ducatois were emended to 8u<atovs, making the verb TTpofiifiasa transitive, as it
normally is. The meaning would then be: “Arete advances the righteous by one stage.”
62 See Bickel, 207-8, for references to this doctrine.
63 H. M. Werhahn (Gregorii Nazianzeni 2uy/cptcus fitcov [Wiesbaden, 1953]) finds the
epitome of Gregory’s aim in the words spoken by the personification of the spiritual life
(v. 175): sophronizomai phobo (“I am disciplined by the fear of God”). Sophronizomai represents
the contribution of pagan philosophy, as in the Cynic sophronizon logos, while phobos recalls
St. Paul (Phil. 2. 12). Cynic influence on Gregory is discussed by Johannes Geffcken, Kynika
und Verwandtes (Heidelberg, 1909), 18-38.
342 Sophrosyne
appears as a type of purity (hagneia, sophrosyne, v. 916). Virginity is

praised as the means of restoring that image (eikon) of God which was
lost through sin. The climax of the section dealing with sophrosyne is
the admonition Hagnize sauton (“Purify thyself”), which now replaces the
Apolline Gnothi sauton (“Know thyself”) as the proverbial expression of
sophrosyne (v. 928).
While it is unusual for Gregory to recognize any aspect of sophrosyne
that is not connected in an obvious way with purity or the control of
the passions, one reminiscence of the ancient contrast between sophro¬
syne and hybris does appear in still another poem “On Arete” (P.G. 37.
667-79), which is concerned primarily with the vast difference between
merely human excellence and the virtue of Christ and the angels. In
this context a warning against presumption is to be expected; and
Gregory couches it in terms that would have been natural for Pindar,
saying that it is the function of sophrosyne to know one’s limitations
(v. 113 ff). Entirely Christian, however, is the parallel warning coupled
with this, a warning against excessive humility or lack of hope: Xirjv . . .
tpopeeiv, xOapaXocppovitiv. Gregory in effect establishes a new, non-
Aristotelian set of extremes, presumption and despair, between which
sophrosyne stands as a mesotes.64
The other context in which Gregory’s views on sophrosyne may be
conveniently studied is in eulogy, where the established topics of epideictic
oratory were adapted to Christian uses. The fourth century is the great
age of the Second Sophistic, and the two Gregories, Basil, and John
Chrysostom were as thoroughly schooled in rhetoric as were their pagan
contemporaries Libanius, Themistius, and the Emperor Julian. Hence
the encomia composed by the Cappadocians, when contrasted with
those of their pagan contemporaries, afford a means of judging the
impact of Christianity both on this literary type in general and on the
topic of sophrosyne in particular. In pagan epideictic of the period the
place of sophrosyne is well defined.65 It should be praised, first in con¬
nection with the parents of the person eulogized (his mother being a
model of sophrosyne or pudicitia), next in connection with his or her own
life. In the case of a woman, sophrosyne is likely to be the principal
64 Cf. Anne-Marie Malingrey, Jean Chrysostome, Lettres a Olympias (Paris, 1947), 50-53, on
Chrysostom’s belief that moderation is needed in order to avoid athymia (accidie, taedium vitae);
and consult Katzenellenbogen, 9, n. 1, for the combat between Sobnetas and Accidia.
65 See Menander Rhetor On Epideictic 3. 372-73 Spengel, and Theon 2. 12. 4 ff. Spengel,
for the eulogy of deeds performed in time of peace that reflect sophrosyne; and consult
Theodore Burgess, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 3 (1902), 123 ff., and
Georg Reichel, Quaestiones Progymnasmaticae (Leipzig, 1909), 90-91.
virtue, as in Julian’s Eulogy of Eusebeia, which reaches its climax with
the comparison of the empress to a statue of Sophrosyne (3. 123A-B).
In the case of a man, sophrosyne may show greater variety but will for
the most part be concerned with the control of the appetites and the
passions. It will receive special praise at two points: first, in the
description of the subject’s youthful career at the university (whether in
Athens, Antioch, or Alexandria), when sophrosyne of this kind will
seem especially admirable; and secondly, at the apex of the man’s
career—usually as a ruler of some kind—when his personal sophrosyne
serves as an example to his subjects.
Christian epideictic orators differ from the pagan, not in their
conception of sophrosyne as such (for both groups, in the fourth
century, it is normally the control of the appetites), but in their belief
that all virtue is dependent ultimately on Divine Grace and that
sophrosyne is essential for the salvation of the soul. The position
assigned to sophrosyne in the structure of the eulogy tends to be the
same as in pagan encomium, although deliberate variations are not
uncommon.66 Gregory’s Eulogy of St. Basil (P.G. 36. 494-605) illustrates
his normal treatment of the topic. In conformity with the principles set
forth by Menander Rhetor in the previous century, he praises Basil’s
parents, describes his education, and then examines in detail the notable
events of his adult career, celebrating the virtues displayed in each.
These aretae include the ones required for pagan eulogy (courage,
wisdom, self-control), but others are added which are distinctively
Christian, and even the pagan virtues prove to have Christian nuances.
Basil’s parents, for example, are praised for their continence (enkrateia)
but also for their performance of the corporal works of mercy. The so¬
phrosyne of Basil, as a student in Athens, is described, but in terms
entirely Christian: he renounced carnal loves because only loves that
are chaste (sophrones) and pleasing to God are eternal (eh. 19).67
The praise of sophrosyne in Basil’s mature life is broken up into
several categories, all treated in a distinctively Christian way: his
66 See, e.g., the eulogies of Gorgonia by Gregory of Nazianzus and of Basil and Gregory
Thaumaturgus by Gregory of Nyssa, in which the pagan topics are ostensibly rejected
as unworthy but are actually employed. Th. Payr, “Enkomion” Reallexikon far Antike und
Christentum, discusses innovations in Christian encomium, including panegyric of the martyrs.
67 Cf. Gregory’s funeral oration for his brother Caesarius (P.G. 35. 756-88), who was noted
for his sophrosyne while studying in Alexandria (see Anth. Pal. 8. 94, an epitaph for
the sophron Caesarius). On the techniques of epideictic used by Gregory of Nazianzus,
see Xavier Huerth, De Gregorii Nazianzem Oratiombus Funebribus (Strassburg, 1907), and
M. Guignet, S. Gregoire de Nazianze et la rhetorique (Paris, 1911).
244 Sophrosyne
conquest of appetite (enkrateia), his virginity (parthenia), his philanthropia,

and his avoidance of pride. The device of contrast, always prominent
in eulogy, appears at frequent intervals; thus Basil is declared superior
to the standard pagan exemplars and is equated with heroes of the Old
Testament and the New (John the Baptist representing purification and
abstinence). It is typical of Gregory that he chooses the Cynics as pagan
models of self-restraint, only to deride them for their ostentation. Basil,
he maintains, surpassed them, because he never chose to take up resi¬
dence in an amphora, like Diogenes, and attract attention; he preferred
to be, rather than to seem, aristos (ch. 6o).68 Humility is a vital part of
Gregory’s Christian sophrosyne.
The climax of pagan eulogy—that the subject deserves to be imitated
for his moral excellence—naturally appears in the Christian counterpart
as an admonition to honor the dead not only by imitating, but also by
praying to, him.69 Thus Gregory exhorts his hearers to pray to Basil,
each according to his own station in life. Virgins should pray to him as
to a nymphagogos, and married women as to a sophronistes (ch. 81)—
a further proof that sophrosyne was in a special sense the virtue of the
married state.
This conception of the virtue dominates Gregory’s Eulogy of his sister
Gorgonia (P.G. 35. 790-818), who, he maintains, excelled all women
past and present in sophrosyne. Because she was married, he is obliged
to devise a form of encomium that will not seem to disparage her for
failing to attain the highest stage of hagneia—perpetual virginity. He does
so by saying that she combined the sublimity of unmarried life with the
stability of marriage, avoiding what is undesirable in each state and
choosing what is best. She was sophron atyphos—chaste without arrogance
(797). Her life proved that neither the unmarried nor the married state
is what binds us to God or separates us from Him. It is the mind that
is important in either condition and offers material to God, as to a
Demiurge, to mold into arete. Gregory describes the sophrosyne of
68 This quotation from Aeschylus Sept. 592 is a favorite with Julian also (see e.g., Letter to
a Priest 303C). Gregory’s echo of Thucydides 3. 82 (on the transvaluation of ethical terms)
reflects the changed social background affecting the meaning of sophrosyne. Where Thucyd¬
ides says that sophrosyne is considered a cloak for cowardice, Gregory says that Basil’s
slanderers who called his integrity arrogance would also call a sophron man a misanthrope
(64). In connection with the Eulogy of Basil it may be noted that an epigram ascribed
to Gregory of Nazianzus and located in the Church of St. Basil in Caesarea refers to a statue
of the four “life-giving” virtues—Zuoyovuv aperCsv Tcrpa/CTUOs (Anth. Pal. 1. 93)—presumably
the Platonic tetrad.
69 For this admonition in pre-Christian eulogy, see, e.g., Isocrates Evagoras 75-76 and
Xenophon Agesilaus 10. 2; and cf. Aphthonius Progym. 8 Spengel 2. 36. 18 f.
Gorgonia in exhaustive detail: her exemplary conduct as a housewife,
fulfilling Solomon’s ideal in Proverbs 31. 10 ff.; her abstinence from
adornment and artifice—the blush of aidos and the pallor of enkrateia
were ornament enough for her; her preservation of the Mean between
austerity and wantonness. Only after doing justice to every category of
feminine sophrosyne does Gregory proceed to other virtues, such as
prudence, piety, charity, and megalophrosyne—manifested in mortifica¬
tion and penance. A specifically Christian note is clearly sounded
throughout the Eulogy. Even though in many of its facets the sophrosyne
of Gorgonia resembles that of pagan women, it is transformed in
its essence by being related to Gregory’s ideal of hagneia and by its
ultimate function of leading the soul to God.
The Eulogy of Basil by Gregory of Nyssa reveals a like familiarity with
the traditional topics of epideictic and an equal determination to show
the superiority of Christian to pagan virtue. In this oration (as in the
same writer’s Eulogy of Gregory Thaumaturgus) the conventional topics
are considered and rejected as unworthy, but actually they are still used
as an organizing principle. Thus the encomium of Basil simply gives a
spiritual interpretation to each of the pagan topics: the genos of Basil
was his nearness to God, his patris was his virtue, sophrosyne was his
household (ephestion), sophia his property, while justice, truth, and purity
were the adornments of his house (P.G. 46. 816).70 Of more significance,
however, is the approach to sophrosyne in the ascetical works and com¬
mentaries on Scripture by Gregory of Nyssa, not because the basic
meaning of the virtue is different from what it is in the eulogies, but
because in these two types of writing he connects sophrosyne with the
key doctrine of opoiuoLs deti and brings to completion the effort of
Patristic writers to assimilate pagan teaching about the virtues, chiefly
by finding evidence in Scripture that these virtues were equally
important in Jewish and early Christian thought.
In sum, Gregory values sophrosyne because of its relation to katharotes,
which is the imitation by mankind of the Divine purity, attained
70 See Sister James Aloysius Stein, The Encomium of St. Gregory on St. Basil (Washington, 1928),
xxxiii, for a discussion of the topics of epideictic in pagan and Christian oratory. In Gregory
of Nyssa’s Eulogy of Gregory Thaumaturgus, sophrosyne is again the virtue most essential in
youth {P.G. 46. 901D). The encomium De Vita Sancti Patris Ephraem Syri (P.G. 46. 820-49)
abandons the conventional scheme of epideictic altogether and directs attention to the
Christian virtues of piety, humility, and love. Several specifically Christian virtues—love,
grace, humility—are linked with sophrosyne in a eulogy of Bishop Meletius {P.G. 46. 857B-
C), when Gregory describes the virtues reflected in his face, which was formed in the image
of God. The Church herself is called sophron in this panegyric (857B).
346 Sophrosyne
by purgation (/catharsis) of what is evil. Katharotes is as important to

Gregory of Nyssa as hagneia to Gregory of Nazianzus. The aim of the
ascetical life, which is the subject of the two important treatises On
Virginity and the Life of Moses, is to restore the image of God in the
human soul which has been obscured by sin. Because sin originates in
uncontrolled passion and the domination of the soul by pleasure, the
process of purification depends on the attainment of apatheia, the human
imitation of the Divine attribute of freedom from passion.71 Sophro¬
syne, defined in On Virginity as the orderly regulation (oikonomia) of all
the movements of the soul, accompanied by sophia and phronesis (320.
1 —3),72 enables man to achieve apatheia. That Gregory links it closely
with katharotes is evident from many passages coupling the two words.
He speaks, for example, of the katharos and sophron way of life, which
cannot be achieved by one who is overcome by the pathos of pleasure
(De Vir. 283. 21 Cavarnos); and he comments, in connection with the
Fourth Beatitude, that he who hungers and thirsts after sophrosyne will
be filled with katharotes (In Beat., P.G. 44. 1245B).73 As was the case with
Clement of Alexandria, apatheia and katharotes are semi-technical terms
in Gregory’s vocabulary. Sophrosyne never becomes absolutely rigid in
its connotations, probably because of its rich background in classical
literary usage. All three concepts derive their meaning from the doctrine
of assimilation to God, which Gregory adopted as the aim of the
ascetical life. A brief recapitulation of this doctrine, which has already
been mentioned in connection with several pagan and Christian
thinkers, will make it easier to understand how sophrosyne is connected
with Gregory’s version of the idea.74
71 On the meaning of human katharotes and apatheia for Gregory, see J. T. Muckle, C.S.B.,
Mediaeval Studies 7 (1945), 55-84, especially 58-59, n. 10. Katharotes is freedom from all affec¬
tion for things not of God. Apatheia is freedom from any ill-regulated movement of the
passions, which in man cannot be completely eradicated, since they are part of human na¬
ture. The relation of these two concepts to gnosis is discussed by Jaeger, Two Works, 74 ff. The
close kinship of sophrosyne and apatheia is symbolized by such illustrations of the Scala
Paradisi as that in Ms. Vat. gr. 394, where the two virtues help the soul as it climbs the four¬
teenth and fifteenth steps (Katzenellenbogen, 23, n. 2).
72 Gregory uses both akolasia and akrasia as antitheses to sophrosyne (De Beat. 1241D, De
Inst. Christ, p. 57 Jaeger).
73 See also De Virg. 340. 7 and Horn. XI, In Cant. Cant. 317. 11-12 Langerbeck. In
Contr. Formcarios P.G. 46. 496D, the equivalence of sophrosyne and katharotes is emphasized
by a chiastic arrangement which places them side by side.
74 In addition to Merki, consult Werner Jaeger, Scnpta Minora (Rome, i960), 2. 469-81;
Muckle, loc. cit.; Robert T. Casey, H.T.R. 18 (1925), 39-101; Jean Danielou, S.J., Platonisme
et theologie mystique (Paris, 1944); and Th. Ruether, Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in
den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandrien (Freiburg, 1949).
The concept of bpoiooots 6eco shows remarkable adaptability from its

earliest formal expression by Plato, through the versions current in the
Middle and Later Stoa, to Philo, Plotinus, and the Patristic writers,
especially Clement, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa. In the Theaetetus of
Plato bfioLcooLS 6c&, the goal of philosophy, is the flight of the soul from
evil, accomplished by becoming as just and holy and wise as possible
(176A). Ethical, religious, and intellectual elements are all implied by
the inclusion in the Theaetetus passage of the words bluaiov ual ocnov
juera eppovrjoeus, and each of these implications was developed by later
philosophers with varying degrees of emphasis. Aristotle, without using
the Platonic formula, adopted the theme of man’s making himself im¬
mortal and found in the use of the intellect the means by which he may
become like unto God.75 The Stoics, too, related homoiosis to various
forms of knowledge (of God, of the cosmos, of oneself), assuming the
identity of Divine and human reason; but they also introduced the
notion that virtuous action, doing good to others, is a way of imitating
God.76 Plotinus intensified the religious implications of the doctrine. To
him opolcools 9ecb meant actually becoming God (debs yeveoOou) through
absorption in the One by a process of purification in ascending stages,
at each of which the four cardinal virtues operate, but with different
effects at each stage (Enn. I. 2. 1 ff., I. 2. 3. 19). Moreover, Plotinus
interpreted the union of the soul with God as a return to its original
home (Enn. I. 2. 6. 2 f.).77
Philo began the conflation of the Platonic bpotcoois dap with the
Biblical doctrine of man as the image of God (Gen. 1. 26; De Op. Munch
15 ff.). Generally he interpreted this imitation in an ethical sense: like¬
ness to God depends on the practice of the moral virtues. Clement
followed Philo, but added an extremely important new element—the
imitation of a model, Christ; and unlike Philo, he bade man strive for
No attempt will be made here to discuss the implications of the homoiosis doctrine in the de¬
velopment of sophrosyne as an arete politike, but it may be noted that Patristic writers
employed this concept in eulogies and exhortations addressed to emperors, and that it forms
a part of the evolution of the topic of sophrosyne in epideictic going back to Isocrates.
75 See Jaeger, loc. cit., 472, on the Aristotelian passages (including Part. An. 2. 10. 656a 8
and Metaph. A2, 982b 30 ff.) that concern this topic.
76 Knowledge: Cicero De Nat. 2. 153; T.D. 5. 70, 4. 57; Seneca De Ira 2. 16. Benefaction:
Seneca De Mor. Lib. 47; De Benef. 3. 14. 4, 1. 1.9 (see Merki, 8-14). Jaeger {loc. cit., 473) dis¬
cusses the role played in the Stoic version of homoiosis by the parallelism between the macro¬
cosm and the microcosm. Merki (15, n. 2) suggests that the addition of eudaimonia to
the theme was the work of Poseidonius.
77 Merki, 17-25. Plotinus makes eros and beauty, as well as purification, sources of
unity with God.
348 Sophrosyne
apatheia, which Philo considered unattainable. Clement admitted other

virtues—notably piety and good works—to a role in the process of
assimilation to God, but gave supreme importance to such qualities as
enkrateia and sophrosyne, because of their special kinship with apatheia.
In his doctrine of Christian gnosis Clement fully recognized the intellec¬
tual aspect of dfiolooois 6e&, which consists in the reflection of the Divine
logos (Strom. II. 19, 102. 6).
Although Plato in the Theaetetus and elsewhere was more likely to
associate justice than any other moral virtue with the imitation of God,
a passage in the Laws, where the role of God as the measure of all things
is under discussion, makes sophrosyne the virtue by which man becomes
like unto God and therefore dear to Him (716C-D). Since sophrosyne
is traditionally linked with measure, this variation is natural, and the
presence of sophrosyne by no means excludes justice. Later philosophers
sometimes recalled the importance of measure in djiolooois Otti (Cicero,
for example, in De Senectute 77), but on the whole they most often ally a
different aspect of sophrosyne with 6{iolo:ols: the control, or even the ex¬
tinction, of the passions. This interpretation, too, appears in Cicero,
when he says, with an obvious reminiscence of the Phaedo, that the
return to God may be accomplished by keeping oneself integer and castus
and pure of contagio cum corporibus (T.D. 1. 72; cf. Phaed. 69C), and
it assumes great significance in Philo, who associates homoiosis with
autarkeia (In Virt. 8), and in Plotinus, with his demand for katharsis and
apatheia. Both elements—purification and gnosis or cognitio—are impor¬
tant in the theory of dfioicoois Otti at each of its historical stages, but
sophrosyne was increasingly limited to purification, although its tradi¬
tional connection with self-knowledge (one aspect of gnosis) equipped it
to share in the task of gnosis as well. In the system worked out by the
Neoplatonists, both pagan and Christian, when the ideal of asceticism
is united with the ideal of contemplation, sophrosyne usually accomplishes
the task of purification which makes gnosis possible, and it is always in
connection with katharsis that Gregory’s ascetical writings discuss
sophrosyne.
The earliest of these works, On Virginity, contains all the essentials of
Gregory’s doctrine of sophrosyne, which appears in the Life of Moses as
well, but is embellished in the later work with more numerous allegorical
interpretations and Scriptural allusions. On Virginity interpretsparthenia as
a metaphysical rather than a physical concept; it is a manifestation of
katharotes, a quality of the soul rather than of the body, a species of de¬
tachment that enables man to partake of the purity of God. God Himself
is completely pure and without pathos. To imitate God man must perfect
himself through the practice of virtue, particularly those virtues that
enable him to bring under control the passions inherent in human
nature.78 Although Gregory sometimes adopts the Aristotelian view of
arete as a mesotes,79 and in both On Virginity and the Life of Moses considers
sophrosyne to be a mean between excessive yielding to pleasure and utter
contempt for marriage (De Vir. 283. 17 ff.; Vita M., PG. 44. 420A ff.), he
more often refers to the virtues as imitations of the Divine attributes,
implanted in man’s rational nature by God. These virtues constitute the
image of God in man—an image that has been disfigured and obscured
by original sin and its consequences.80 Only when katharsis (choosing the
real good in preference to the supposed good, pleasure) has freed the soul
from the “rust” of evil, can man truly reflect the virtues of God {De Vir.
292-93). By contemplating them in the mirror of his own soul, he con¬
templates God (De An. et Res., P.G. 46. 89C; cf. De Beat., Or. VI,
P.G. 44, 1272B). Pleasure was the cause of the Fall; hence the process of
retracing the steps by which man fell away from God involves at the out¬
set the conquest of pleasure. Specifically, marriage would never have been
instituted but for the Fall. Therefore the first step in the return is to re¬
nounce marriage (De Vir. 303). Unlike Origen, however, Gregory (him¬
self perhaps a married man) does not condemn marriage as evil. Indeed,
he defends it vigorously, denouncing as false and extreme the view that
marriage is wrong, and citing Isaac and Rebecca as exemplars of sophron
and metrios marriage (282-84). He holds, however, that marriage is only
for the strong, since few can withstand the passions it arouses and still
achieve perfection. Legitimate pleasures soon lead to excess; virginity is
the safer course (287. 17 ff.).81
In the treatise On Virginity Gregory mentions sophrosyne in connection
with various other pleasures, including those of food and drink. The
pleasures of taste he considers particularly dangerous, because they can
78 Jaeger (Two Works, 25-33) discusses Gregory’s use of the concept of virginity (equivalent
to katharotes and apatheia) to bridge the gap between Christian theology and Greek philosophy.
See Ladner (322-30) for a general discussion of Patristic attitudes toward virginity.
79 E.g., De Virg. 283. 17, Horn. IX, In Cant. Cant. 284. 5 ff. Langerbeck. Gregory’s termi¬
nology is mostly Platonic or Neoplatonic, often with Stoic additions. A Stoic element
(grafted onto the Peripatetic doctrine of virtue as a mesotes) is the theory of tonos (“tension”)
in De Virg. 283. 17 ff.: a deficiency in tonos is a cause of failure to achieve a pure and sophron
life. Gregory’s normal use of sophrosyne recalls the Platonic “control of the appetites” rather
than the old Stoic “knowledge of what to choose”; see n. 82 below for some exceptions.
80 See Muckle, 69 ff. Cf. De Beat. 1272C: KaOaporrjs and avraOeia constitute OeoTrjs.
81 On the doctrine that marriage is a compensation for the expulsion from Eden, see
Gerhard B. Ladner, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 (1958), 84 ff.
350 Sophrosyne
so easily lead to excessive enjoyment. It is necessary to adhere to a

sophron standard, choosing only what is pure and healthful (329. 9 ff.).
The task of sophrosyne is compared to the action of the fisherman in
Matt. 13. 47-48, who separates the good from the bad (321. 15-20).82
Gregory condemns excess in any direction, observing that by extreme
austerity one may weaken himself unduly (329-30). To achieve virgin¬
ity, which can be of the body or the soul, it is helpful to have a model,
and Gregory sketches the character of such a model (revealed elsewhere
to be Basil himself). In so doing he praises those who have grown gray
in what he calls “the purity of sophrosyne”—iv rip KaOapcp rrjs o coupon v vr\ s
(340. 7). From their youth they loved wisdom alone, and although they
were not less subject to temptation than other men, they listened to Him
who said that sophrosyne is the Tree of Life to those who lay hold of it
(Proverbs 3. 18). Significantly, Gregory substitutes sophrosyne for wisdom
in quoting this verse. He adds that on this “tree of sophrosyne” they
sailed across the billows of youth and anchored in the harbor of the Will
of God. The treatise concludes with the statement that the reward for
living a pure life (the life of spiritual parthenia, katharotes, sophrosyne) is
to see God (343).
The model of virtue is even more important in the Life of Moses. This
treatise has two parts: the one deals with the actual events of Moses’ life;
the other, and longer, interprets them allegorically. Moses is the type of
the ascetical life, the life according to virtue. One of the major achieve¬
ments of Gregory, as Jaeger has pointed out,83 is to integrate the con¬
cept of the ascetical life, which in the first three centuries of our era had
been increasingly identified with the truly Christian life, into the Greek
philosophical tradition which exalts the contemplative life as the best
and most virtuous. The fundamental symbol that Gregory finds in the
life of Moses is the ascent from earthly passions to heavenly contempla¬
tion. At the peak of the climb is Hesychia (Quietness), the teacher
of Divine contemplation. That sophrosyne which effected the choice be¬
tween necessary and unnecessary pleasures in On Virginity is paralleled
82 In De Virg. Gregory alludes to several functions of sophrosyne, in addition to the funda¬

mental one of purifying the soul. The sophron kandn (329. 9-10) and the sophrosynes ergates
(“craftsman of sophrosyne” [330. 10-14]), who separates the chaff from the wheat (the
unnecessary from the necessary desires), recall the power of choice exercised by the Stoic
sophrosyne. For the colloquial use of sophron as “sensible” (precisely equivalent to euphron), see
326. 13, 16. Chap. 22 (332. 15 ff.) contains one of several adaptations of the myth of
the Phaedrus: the charioteer who controls the horses is a symbol of sophrosyne. Cf. De
Beat. 1216C.
83 Two Works, 20-24.
Patristic Literature 35*
here by the gnosis of truth, which is a means of purifying our concepts
of being and not-being. Such gnosis leads to the true good, which is
freedom and apatheia, whereas the striving for apparent good leads only
to the tyranny of the passions (cf. De Vir. 292-93). Gregory finds hidden
references to sophrosyne in several texts in the story of Moses. The
ingenuity of his allegories reflects a determination to justify in Scriptural
terms his lifelong enthusiasm for Greek ethical philosophy. He suggests,
for example, that the purple color in the leather of the tabernacle is
meant to represent sophron aidos (385D), and that the girdle that keeps
the garment of life from being uncontrolled is sophrosyne (357B).84
Such allegories abound in Gregory’s exegetical works, among which
the commentaries on the Lord’s Prayer and the Beatitudes best illustrate
his doctrine about sophrosyne: the need of Divine Grace to achieve it,
the link between sophrosyne and katharotes and apatheia, and the essen¬
tial identity of Biblical morality and Greek arete. The treatise De Oratione
Dominica connects sophrosyne with the phrase “Thy will be done.”
Comparing bodily and spiritual health in a manner reminiscent of the
Platonic Charmides, Gregory equates health with doing the will of God
and illness with the victory of appetite over self-control. When God’s will
is done, sophrosyne quenches the wanton and passionate impulse of the
mind, humility destroys conceit, and moderation (metriotes) heals the
disease of pride. To cure these ills is hard, and we need the help of God.
Gregory specifically interprets “Thy will” as referring to sophrosyne.
Plunged into the flesh by sin, we pray that this good may be accom¬
plished through the power of God (P.G. 44. 1164D-1165A). So, too,
justice, piety, and apatheia are included in the one word thelema (“will”).
The great emphasis on the need for Divine help in attaining virtue
balances the emphasis on human effort (ponos, agon) in the earlier
treatise, On Virginity, and, as Jaeger suggests, enables Gregory to arrive
at a kind of mesotes in his view of the spiritual life.85
Other Patristic commentaries relate sophrosyne in different ways to
the Lord’s Prayer,86 and a like diversity is shown in the interpretation
84 The other ascetical works of Gregory are of little special import for sophrosyne, although
all evince a belief in the need for purification from the passions as the first step in the ascent
of the soul.
85 Two Works, 89.
86 Particularly significant, in the light of mediaeval interest in the rhetoric of prayer, are
the attempts—especially in Latin Patristic writing—to apply the precepts of sophrosyne/
temperantia to the voice and gesture of one praying (a special instance of the doctrine of ora¬
torical delivery). See n. 94 below. For an example of mediaeval iconography that links Et ne
nos inducas with the virtue of temperantia, consult Arthur Watson, Speculum 3 (1928), 459-61,
and Plate I.
352 Sophrosyne
of the Beatitudes. For Ambrose, the First Beatitude according to Luke

(“Blessed are the poor”) is an exhortation to practice sophrosyne, while
John Chrysostom interprets the Sixth in Matthew (“Blessed are the
clean of heart”) in this light.87 Gregory finds sophrosyne in the Second
Beatitude according to Matthew (“Blessed are the meek”) and also in
the Fourth (“Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice”), which
in fact he regards as an admonition to practice all four cardinal virtues.
The Neoplatonic notion of progress in virtue as consisting of a series
of steps (bathmoi) inspires Gregory’s interpretation of the Beatitudes as
rungs in the ladder of perfection—an idea that was to have considerable
influence in Patristic thought. The First Beatitude instils humility, be¬
cause our downfall was the result of pride.88 The Second Beatitude
leads Gregory to discuss the meaning of praotes (“meekness”), which he
explains as that which makes us slow to turn towards evil. Man’s will
can turn towards sophrosyne or wantonness (P.G. 44. 1213D). Christ’s
praise of praotes is taken as an allusion to apatheia, which cannot be
achieved by one living in the flesh. Moderation (metriotes) and humility
(tapeinophrosyne) are also involved in the practice of praotes (1216A-B,
1 217 A-B), but Gregory’s chief emphasis is on the control of the passions.
In commenting on the Fourth Beatitude, Gregory asks whether it
would be the reverse of blessed to hunger for sophrosyne, sophia, phronesis,
or any other kind of excellence (1241B). The answer is negative, for what
is said of one virtue is said of all. No virtue divorced from the rest can
be perfect (1241C-D), and all virtues are included under the name of
righteousness. Gregory also discusses the psychology of hunger and
desire, pointing out that nothing is truly satisfying except arete. We can
always practice sophrosyne and katharotes, he says, and the practice will
bring happiness (1244D). Blessed is he who hungers for sophrosyne, for
he shall be filled with katharotes, and this satiety will lead not to aversion,
but only to greater desire (1245B).
87 Ambrose Ex. in Luc. V. 54 ff., 64, CSEL 32. 4, pp. 202-7. Chrysostom In Matt. XV, P.G.
57. 227D ff. According to Chrysostom, the pure are those who have attained complete arete
or who are living in sophrosyne, because no other virtue is so needful for seeing God.
Augustine explains the Seventh Beatitude in Matthew (“Blessed are the peacemakers”)
as an injunction to secure peace of soul by subjecting the passions to reason, but he equates
this Beatitude with the seventh gift of the Holy Ghost rather than with sophrosyne (De Serm.
Dom. II. 9, P.L. 34. 1229-1308). See Piero Rollero, La “Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam” di
Ambrogio come fonte della esegesi agostimana (Turin, 1958), 22-23, f°r a discussion of Gregory’s
originality and the probable influence of his ascetical conception of the Beatitudes on
Ambrose and through him on Augustine.
88 Pride is hyperphama, not hybris. According to his context, Gregory regards sometimes
pleasure, sometimes pride as the cause of man’s fall. In the case of Lucifer, the cause
is always pride.
Unlike Chrysostom, Gregory does not mention sophrosyne in connec¬
tion with the Sixth Beatitude, but here again discusses apatheia. The de¬
mand for detachment and for the conquest of the passions dominates the
entire treatise. The Eighth Beatitude (“Blessed are they who suffer
persecution for justice’s sake”) is linked in a characteristic way with this
demand, for pain and torture are said to be instruments of purification
and antidotes to pleasure. As sin enters the soul through pleasure, so it
is exterminated through its opposite, and the torments of the martyrs
heal the disease caused by pleasure (1297D). Thus Gregory finds philo¬
sophical support for the alliance between sophrosyne and martyrdom
already suggested by Clement of Alexandria.89
THE LATIN CHRISTIAN WRITERS
The history of sophrosyne in Latin Christian thought up to the time

of Augustine closely follows its course in the Greek Patristic writers. The
same tendencies reveal themselves: the early suspicion of pagan ethical
doctrine, the absence of references to the Platonic tetrad as a group until
the late third century, the exaggerated regard for sophrosyne (usually
temperantia or sobrietas) as a virtue peculiarly Christian, the frequent
89 The third of the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Caesarea, is not without significance for
the development of a Christian sophrosyne, although his contribution is less distinctive than
are those of the two Gregorys. Basil assisted in the positive development of the ascetical ideal
through his Rules, which assume the priority of chastity. The mark of the ascetic in the first
two Christian centuries had been the practice of celibacy; with the rise of monasticism in the
fourth century, the vow of chastity still took precedence as the greatest external renunciation
(see Dom David Amand, L’Ascese monastique de Saint Basile, Maredsous, 1949). In the
Rules, Basil discusses enkrateia more often than sophrosyne (enkrateia is the mother of sophro¬
syne, P.G. 31. 965) and extends its scope to include all forms of self-denial. The Rules
throughout are marked by moderation (the best standard of enkrateia is the avoidance of ex¬
cess in either direction, P.G. 31. 875); but the vocabulary for describing moderation does not
include sophrosyne, which for Basil means the control of passions and appetites (see the First
Ascetical Discourse, P.G. 31. 872, where parthema and sophrosyne are virtually synonymous and
are said to be more than merely physical). One function of sophrosyne is to curb—not
extirpate—anger (Horn. X, In Iratos, P.G. 31. 369). Horn. XI adds to the canon of virtues
hypomene (“endurance”) in suffering for the faith (see n. 53 above on Origen’s substitution of
hypomene for andreia). The addition is accounted for by the rich tradition of the Christian
martyr, but Basil already accepts asceticism as a substitute for martyrdom (cf. Ep. 6,
Deferrari 1. 41). Basil’s attitude towards classical literature (as shown in On Reading Greek
Literature) is interpreted as an expression of his sophrosyne by Frederick H. Brigham, Jr.
(Classical Folia 14 (i960), 35-38), who cites Libanius’ praise of Basil’s sophrosyne as a young
man, in a city of pleasure. John Cassian, who promoted the principles of Eastern monasticism
in Gaul, includes in his Conlationes and De Institutiombus Coenobiorum many reminders of
the function of virtues related to sophrosyne in practicing asceticism. In his Latin vocabulary,
castitas renders hagneia; continentia, enkrateia (Inst. V. 6); purification is the task of temperantia
(Coni. I. 4); and discretio (“moderation”) is the genetrix, custos, and moderatrix of all the virtues
(Coni. II. 1-4).
354 Sophrosyne
limitation of its function to the control of appetite, and the consequent

association of sophrosyne with the ascetical life. The systematic integra¬
tion of the cardinal virtues into a coherent Christian philosophy began,
for the Latin Fathers, with Ambrose and reached quick fruition in
Augustine. With these two writers temperantia achieved a distinctively
Christian interpretation, whose origins, however, are clearly traceable
to Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Stoic thought, together with the modifica¬
tions already introduced by Philo and certain Greek Patristic writers.
A brief survey of the tendencies apparent in some of the Latin Apolo¬
gists will make more comprehensible the achievement of Ambrose and
Augustine. It should be noted at the outset that temperantia and the
other Latin equivalents of sophrosyne never became part of any special
Christian language. Even when pudicitia, castitas, or temperantia was
claimed as peculiarly Christian, the basic meaning of each word was the
same as in the usage of Seneca, Apuleius, or the Latin panegyrists of the
fourth century. The Greek Christian writers, whose language the Latin
Apologists translated, were on the whole conservative and so far as pos¬
sible adopted the ethical vocabulary of their pagan contemporaries.
When they began to make use of Platonic and Stoic sources, they had
all the more reason for maintaining traditional connotations for such
words as sophrosyne and enkrateia. With the Latin Christian writers,
therefore, as with the Greek, specifically Christian nuances of sophro¬
syne were more a matter of emphasizing one particular facet of the virtue
than of giving the term an esoteric significance that pagan contemporaries
would not readily have grasped. Like their predecessors in republican
Rome, the Latin Fathers were obliged to choose among many possible
ways of translating sophrosyne, and although temperantia (which had the
authority of Cicero behind it) was the general favorite, sobrietas (or
sobria mens) enjoyed some prestige because of its appearance in Old
Latin translations of Wisdom and the New Testament, while pudicitia
kept its traditional place as the normal translation of sophrosyne when
it referred to the virtue of women and young persons of both sexes.90
90 Sobrius and sanae mentis are the usual Latin renderings of ococppovoOvTa in Mark 5.
15 and Luke 8. 35. See Old Latin Texts, No. Ill (Munich Ms. Lat. 6224), Oxford, 1888; No.
V (Codex Corbeiensis), Oxford, 1907; No. VI (Codex Veronensis), Oxford, 1911; and
consult Adolf Julicher, I tala: das neue Testament in altlateimscher Uberlieferung (Berlin, 1954), on
Luke 8. 35. See also Novum Testamentum Sancti Irenaei Episcopi Lugdunensis (Oxford, 1923) for
various translations of ds to atxxppovdv in Rom. 12. y. adprudentiam, adsobnetatem, adsobrietatem
vel sanam sapientiam. For the translation of sophrosyne and sophron in the Latin version
of Clement of Rome, Epistle to the Corinthians, see D. Germanus Morin, Anecdota Maredsolana
2 (1894): 1. 2: prudentem; 62. 2: sobnetate; 63. 3: sobrios; 64. 1: sobrietatem. Bickel, 205-
There was no Christian Latin word for sophrosyne which had not
already been used by pagan writers.
Latin Christian writing began with such translations from the Greek as
the version of Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians made in the first half of
the second century (where sobrius or prudens renders sophron in the Greek);
but not until the very end of that century did original works by Latin
Christians begin to appear, the earliest perhaps being the apologetic
dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix. Composed by an African lawyer
who was thoroughly familiar with Cicero and Seneca and adopted their
ethical vocabulary, the Octavius shows several of the tendencies mentioned
above, notably the claim to the virtue of purity as a mark of the Chris¬
tians. The writer maintains that the Christians recognize one another
by their innocentia ac modestia (31). Like the Greek Apologists, he casti¬
gates the indecency of pagan rites and myths and contrasts them with
the pudor of the Christians, their monogamy, their sobrietas, as shown at
their banquets where “we temper gladness with seriousness, with pure
conversation” {gravitate hilantatem temperamus, casto sermone), and above
all their castitas, which often inspires the choice of perpetual virginity
(31). Although Minucius nowhere refers to the four cardinal virtues as
a group, he discusses in close succession chastity (31), justice (32),
fortitude (36), and wisdom (38) and gives to each a distinctively
Christian flavor.
Tertullian exhibits in a much more extreme way the exaggerated
regard for chastity in the hierarchy of the virtues, as a consequence of
his conviction that the sin by which the angels fell was intemperantia (De
Or at. 22. 5, CSEL 1. 270). We have already noted in Tatian and Origen
among the Greek Christians an extreme hostility to the flesh which
caused them to adopt a view of sophrosyne incompatible with modera¬
tion. Tertullian’s radical dualism resulted ultimately in the Montanist
heresy, which regarded marriage as evil, and even in his earlier works
some extremist tendencies are manifest. The Apologeticus merely claims
for Christians (as does the Octavius) “the most earnest and faithful
castitas” (9. 19) and praises the modestia and pudicitia of their banquets
(39. 19); but the semi-Montanist and Montanist treatises, with such
revealing titles as De Cultu Feminarum, De Exhortatione Castitatis, De
Monogamia, De Virginibus Velandis, and De Pudicitia, are all marked by a
10, briefly discusses Christian Latin translations of sophrosyne. It is important to remember

that pudor and verecundia, which often render sophrosyne, may also translate aidos and aidemos-
yne, and that continentia is usually enkrateia. See L. R. Palmer, The Latin Language (London,
1954), 180-205, on Christian Latin as a special language.
jj6 Sophrosyne
fanatical insistence that fleshly appetites are evil and a corresponding

distortion of the virtues of modestia, pudicitia, and continentia. Pudicitia is
called the mark of the true Christian, the doorkeeper and priestess of
the temple {De Cultu II. i. i); woman is the diaboli ianua (I. 1.2); and
excessive emphasis is put on the external signs of modesty: the avoidance of
cosmetics, hair dyes, and jewelry (I. 2. 1; II. 5. 2), or the wearing of a
veil. Like Athenagoras of Athens, Tertullian insists that widows must
not remarry, and even suggests that marriage itself is a species of
adultery (De Exhor. 9).
Tertullian stands halfway between pagan and Christian usage in his
choice of exempla virtutum.91 He does not scruple to employ pagan models
of chastity, citing Lucretia and Dido, the latter according to that version
of her story in which she committed suicide rather than marry a second
time.92 His exempla vitiorum include the greatest pagan types of self-
control, Socrates and Cato. Tertullian, like Gregory of Nazianzus,
challenges the pagan philosophers to a contest of pudicitia (Apol. 46. 10),
since they, in the common view, teach the same doctrines and profess
the same virtues as the Christians: innocentia, iustitia, patientia, sobrietas,
pudicitia. He berates Socrates for corrupting the young (46. 10) and
both Socrates and Cato for allegedly exchanging wives with other men
(39. 12).93 In his vocabulary pudicitia evidently refers to self-control,
while modestia is the antithesis of pride, being the virtue ascribed to
Christians who do not even aspire to the aedileship, in contrast to the
ambition of Pythagoras and Zeno, who sought to become tyrants {Apol.
46.13)-
Nothing in Tertullian’s treatment of the theme of virtue and vice is of

more lasting significance than his use of the method of personification
in De Spectaculis, his vigorous denunciation of the circus, the amphi¬
theater, and the theater. Condemning attendance at the theater because
of the impudicitia encountered there (17) and at the amphitheater be¬
cause of the omnipresent saevitia (19), Tertullian contrasts with these
wicked pleasures the innocent delights of the Christians, and to the
battles and wrestling matches of the arena he opposes Christian combats.
Behold, he says, Impudicitia defeated by Castitas, Perpdia slain by Fides,
Saevitia battered by Misericordia, Petulantia overshadowed by Modestia
91 On pagan exempla in Christian writings, see Mary Louise Carlson, C.P. 43 (1948), 93-104.
92 Apol. 50. 5, De Exhor. Cast. 13, Monag. 17.
93 Tertullian confuses the elder with the younger Cato and condemns Socrates because of
the community of wives advocated in Plato’s Republic. For this charge and another of
bigamy, see Bickel, 130-31.
(29. 5). Brief though this passage is, its consequences for literature and
art are incalculable. The pairs of combatants are not identical with
those in the Psychomachia of Prudentius, but the germ of that famous
battle is here. The comparison of the Christian life to an athletic con-'A
test, which was popularized by Paul and led to innumerable references
to the agon of the ascetical life in Greek Patristic literature, gives way
ultimately in Latin Christian writing to the metaphor of the soldier’s
mortal combat. Already in Tertullian’s De Spectaculis the struggle to
achieve virtue is a life-and-death battle; by the time of Prudentius the
allegory of virtue against vice has become entirely military.
Cyprian, Lactantius, and Jerome all contributed to the development
of a Latin Christian concept of sophrosyne; our study will limit itself to
what seems most original or influential in each of these writers. For
Cyprian’s view of sophrosyne the greatest importance probably attaches
to his writings about the virgin martyr. He honors virgins next to martyrs
(De Habitu Virginum 21, CSEL 3. 1) and compares them to angels (22).
A close correlation between the virtues of virginity and martyrdom is
suggested in Epistle 10 which says that every Christian should aim to
achieve the white crown of the one or the purple crown of the other (5); it
becomes explicit in Epistle 38, where Cyprian professes to be uncertain
which to praise more highly in the case of Aurelius—the glory of his
wounds or the modesty of his demeanor, his virtus or his pudor (1). Simi¬
lar is the case of Celerinus (Ep. 39. 4), whose robur and pudor are equally
deserving of praise. The classical Attic formula for the epitaph, arete kai
sophrosyne, here undergoes a Christian metamorphosis, employing, how¬
ever, a Latin phrase already familiar in Tacitus.94
The first precise formulation of a generic notion of virtue in Latin
Christian thought was the work of Lactantius. He rejects the pagan
theory of virtue as knowledge of Good and Evil and regards it rather as
a matter of the will (Inst. 6. 5, CSEL 19. 650-51). Virtue is, however,
dependent on true knowledge of God (6. 17), and the motive for its
94 For the word play, see Tacitus Agr. 45. 2. E. L. Hummel (The Concept of Martyrdom accord¬
ing to St. Cyprian of Carthage [Washington, 1946]) discusses the martyr’s death as the perfection
of all virtue (132 ff.). Cf. Malone {op. cit., 26-40) on the concept of spiritual martyrdom in
Tertullian and Cyprian. Like Tertullian, Cyprian holds in exaggerated regard the external
signs of virginity or chastity—modesty in dress, the absence of jewelry and cosmetics {De Hab.
Virg. 9, 15, 21); and he further resembles Tertullian in emphasizing the practical and exter¬
nal in his comments on the Lord’s Prayer. With Tertullian De Orat. 17 (modesty and
humility in gesture and voice), cf. Cyprian De Dom. Orat. 4 (the need for continentia and pudor
in prayer; the impudens shouts, the verecundus prays modestly). Cyprian himself is praised for
his moderation in the Vita by Pontius, which mentions his lack of superbia and calls him
temperatus et ipse de medio (6, CSEL 3, 3, p. xcvl).
338 Sophrosyne
practice is the hope of immortality (6. io). Lactantius’ concept of virtue

often appears to be more negative than positive, as when he observes
that the whole duty of virtue is non peccare (“to avoid sin” [6. 5]).
He defines virtue as the checking of anger, appetite, and lust; there can
be no virtus without vitium (5. 7). God, in fact, implanted the commotiones
animi in man and, in so doing, planted the material of the vices in the
passions and that of the virtues in the vices. The crown of virtue is
abstinentia voluptatum (6. 23), since like most Christian writers, Lactantius
equates indulgence in pleasure with the death of the soul and regards
asceticism as the path to immortality (7. 12). Although he precedes
Ambrose in transmitting Ciceronian ethical doctrines to Christian
thought, the Ciceronian element is less important in his treatment of
temperantia than it is for Ambrose.95 Furthermore, despite his lavish use
of Cicero, Lactantius never refers to all four cardinal virtues together.
When the tetrad does at last emerge in Latin Christian writing, it is a
sign that in the West as in the East the age of defensiveness against pagan
attack and pagan tradition is over. The period of assimilation has begun.
Jerome refers with considerable frequency to the entire group of
cardinal virtues,96 which he, in fact, is one of the first to call by this
name.97 Yet despite his free allusion to the canon, he does not integrate
it into a coherent system, and his references are little more than casual
citations, seldom of fundamental importance to his thought. It has been
observed that he refers to the whole group most often in his later work,
from 406 to 416, when he was writing his commentaries on St. Paul; it
is possible that at this time he renewed his acquaintance with Cicero’s
philosophical works.98
A characteristic allusion to the tetrad—as an embellishment in eulogy
—occurs in an Epistle dealing with the family of Pammachius (66.
3, P.L. 22. 640). Recognizing the existence of the Stoic doctrine that the
95 Cicero’s equation of sophrosyne with frugalitas is recalled in Lactantius’ discussion of the
moral choice represented by the allegory of the youth at the crossroads. If he does not meet
a doctor frugalitatis, he will take the wrong road (Inst. 6. 3). Lactantius outstrips Cicero in his
criticism of Stoic theories about the passions (e.g., Inst. 6. 14-15) and goes so far as to
say, with reference to anger: caret virtute quisquis ira caret. Cf. Cicero Ad. Q.F. 1. 1. 22.
96 Hagendahl (377-78) lists Jerome’s references to the tetrad and comments on the
various ways in which he employs it.
97 A commentary on Mark, variously assigned to Jerome and Fortunatianus of Aquileia
(Schanz-Hosius, Gesch. der Rom. Lit. 4. 1. 399), and the Ex. in Luc. of Ambrose (CSEL 32. 4)
both speak of “cardinal” virtues. Ex. in Luc. is dated ca. 390; the commentary on Mark pos¬
sibly as early as 361. Jerome alludes to the tetrad in commentaries on Ephesians and
Nahum (ca. 387-389 and 389-392, respectively). After 406 he cites the virtues frequently in
commentaries on Amos, Isaiah, Ezechiel, and Jeremiah.
98 Hagendahl, 377.
virtues are inseparable, Jerome holds that one virtue may yet be more
notable than the others in a given individual. Thus prudentia is the pre¬
eminent virtue of Pammachius himself, mstitia of his wife, fortitudo is
supreme in his daughter, the virgin Eustochium, while in the case of his
married daughter, temperantia is the principal virtue. What, Jerome asks,
is more temperans than the conduct of this woman, Paulina, who, read¬
ing the statement of St. Paul that a spotless marriage is honorable
(Heb. 13. 4), did not venture to seek the happiness of her sister, nor the
continentia of her mother, but preferred to walk safely in humbler ways
rather than flounder with uncertain step on the heights? Hence she
sought the second grade of castimoma. This familiar doctrine appears
often in Jerome’s letters and treatises on virginity, the married state, and
widowhood and is usually illustrated by models for each degree of virtue.
Thus in a letter to Eustochium the exemplars of virginity are the Blessed
Virgin and Thecla, and the models of chastity in marriage and the
widowed state are Sarah and Anna (Ep. 22, P.L. 22. 423-24). What is
unusual in Epistle 66 is Jerome’s reference to conjugal chastity as
temperantia, rather than pudicitia, a variation that illustrates the influence
of context and source on the choice of a Latin rendering. When Jerome
enumerates sophrosyne with the other three virtues, his translation is
normally the Ciceronian temperantia, occasionally a combination of
temperantia and castitas. Thus in Epistle 66, where the effectiveness of his
reference to the virtues depends on the presence of all four, he translates
sophrosyne as temperantia, even though in this case it is specifically iden¬
tified with conjugal virtue. But apart from the tetrad he feels free to
follow another, almost equally strong tradition—going back in all prob¬
ability to Seneca—which makes pudicitia the preferred rendering of
sophrosyne in the doctrine of the three grades of chastity."
Jerome regards the four virtues as spiritual ornaments of the soul,
willed by God and pleasing to Him.100 They are opposed to four vices
99 Temperantia in lists of the four virtues: In Ier. 29. 1 ff., P.L. 24. 890, and the passages cited
by Hagendahl, 378, and nn. 1-3, 5-6. Temperantia and castitas: In Eph. 1. 22-23, PL. 26. 494.
Bickel (205, n. 1) cites two passages in Adv. Iov. where Jerome pronounces pudicitia equivalent
to sophrosyne: I. 35, p. 292D (translating I Tim. 3. 2, a bishop must be pudicum, hoc
emm significat sophrona) and I. 37. p. 297E (ad pudicitiam non ad sobrietatem ut male in Latinis
codicibus legitur for ds to ococppoudu, Rom. 12. 3), and another (I. 27, p. 281C) in which he re¬
jects sobnetas in favor of castitas as a rendering of I Tim. 2. 15 (dyiaa/xu) pera ouxppoovvris, in
■. . sanctificatione cum castitate). Cf. Ep. 107, 6, 1: in . . . sanctificatione cum pudicitia. See Bickel
(185 ff.) on Jerome’s debt to Porphyry and Seneca for his ascetical vocabulary in Adv. Iov.
Other references to the three grades of chastity occur in Ep. 22. 15, 41, Ep. 49. n,
Ep. 66. 2.
100Ep. 52. 13, P.L. 22. 1538 (cited by Hagendahl, 378).
j6o Sophrosyne
—stultitia, imquitas, luxuria, and formido—again a Ciceronian tetrad.101 As

a single virtue, sophrosyne or temperantia continues to receive special
attention in its relation to the ascetical life, which Jerome defends
against the attacks of Helvidius, Jovinian, and Vigilantius. Although he
regards marriage as inferior to virginity, he does not exaggerate the
merits of physical virginity or of fasting but holds them to be merely
stages on the road to sanctification (Ep. 130. 11, P.L. 22. 1116). The al¬
legorical interpretation of Scripture attracts Jerome less than it does
Ambrose, yet passages may be found in which he resorts to this device
in order to find the four virtues in the Old Testament. Thus he identifies
the tetrad with the four living creatures in Ezekiel 1. 5 and the four smiths
in Zachariah 1. 18-20, giving a powerful impetus to the use of number
symbolism in the interpretation of the cardinal virtues, which became
one of the favorite devices of moral treatises in the Middle Ages.
ST. AMBROSE
St. Ambrose holds unquestioned primacy in the West, like Clement in

the East, for the systematic consideration of the four cardinal virtues,102
combining theory (derived principally from Cicero) with the Judaeo-
Christian tradition of allegorical interpretation. His contributions to the
history of sophrosyne in Christian Latinity, extensive though they are,
will here be considered under only three categories: his adaptation of
Cicero’s De Officiis to Christian usage, his discussion of sophrosyne in
moral and ascetical works and eulogies, and his interpretation of Bibli¬
cal passages concerned with sophrosyne. The third category again has
three subdivisions: the borrowing of Philo’s allegory of the four rivers of
Paradise, the interpretation of specific texts as exhortations to sophro¬
syne, and the choice of exempla virtutis from the Bible.
If the vitality of the Greek concept of arete is demonstrated by the se¬
quence of treatises on moral virtues by Panaetius, Cicero, and Ambrose,
the adaptation of a Stoic essay on conduct to the needs of the Catholic
priesthood illustrates the receptivity of the Latin Church towards the
close of the fourth century. In general Ambrose’s principle of selection is
simple: he accepts from Cicero’s De Officiis only what is immediately
applicable to the training of priests, and his alterations and additions are
guided by the same purpose. The ojficia of adolescence, which Cicero
101 In Nahum 3. 1 ff., p. 565; cf. Is. 55. 12-13, p. 653.
102 For his use of the term cardinalis, see (in addition to Ex. in Luc.) De Exc. Frat. Sat. I. 57,
CSEL 73. 239. For the more common term principalis, see De Off. Min. 1. 24. 115 and
De Cain 2. 1, CSEL 32. 1. 396. Cardinalis applied to the gifts of the Holy Ghost: De Sac. 3. 2.
9, CSEL 73. 42.
discusses only briefly (together with the duties of maturity and old age),
are greatly expanded in the Christian version, intended as it is for the
spiritual formation of young men. Verecundia, which Cicero made a sub¬
head of temperantia, is removed by Ambrose from this context entirely and
is developed in its own right and at length, even before he embarks on
the topic of the four cardinal virtues, so that its importance is greatly
enhanced.103 The discussion of the virtutes principales, less systematic
even than Cicero’s, derives a Christian color from the insertion of Bibli¬
cal exempla and the interpolation of specifically Christian ideas, such as
the supernatural origin and goal of virtue. The statement “Fundamentum
Christus est” (1. 50. 247) sums up the basic difference between Ambrose’s
theory of virtue and that of his Stoic model; however close Ambrose
comes to Cicero, it should not be forgotten that his frame of reference is
utterly different. He often seems to invite attention to his divergence
from Cicero, as when he defends his violation of the form of the earlier
De Offtciis by saying that Cicero’s method of defining and discussing the
genera virtutum was mere ars (“artifice”) and calliditas (“cleverness”).
Ambrose himself postpones his discussion of the sources of the officia
until he has given Biblical exempla, asserting that these models are
a speculum disciplinae, not a commentarium calhditatis (1. 25). In effect,
although his imitation of Cicero bears witness to his respect for the
greatest of pagan Roman ethical teachers, Ambrose feels obliged
to contrast his own concern for the essential nature of virtue with what
he represents as Cicero’s preoccupation with mere stylistic excellence.
When Ambrose does arrive at a definition of the principales virtutes, he
uses an entirely Ciceronian vocabulary but achieves greater simplicity
and directness by omitting some of Cicero’s complicated subdivisions of
the honestum. Where Cicero says that the fourth division of the honestum
contains ordo, modus, modestia, and temperantia (1. 5. 15), Ambrose merely
lists the fourth virtue as temperantia, “which preserves modus and ordo in
all that we think should be done or said” (1. 24. 115)- A notable
addition to Cicero’s list of subheads of the fourth virtue is the studium
mansuetudinis (1. 43. 209).104 Still another list of Biblical exempla inter¬
venes before Ambrose takes up the virtues separately; now, instead of
finding a different exemplar for each virtue as Cicero does, he prefers
to show that each model figure displayed all four, like Abraham in the
sacrifice of Isaac, or Noah in the Flood. The treatment of temperantia is
103 Examples of verecundia in its various aspects include Isaac, Joseph, Moses, and Jeremiah.
104 In Inv., Cicero recognizes dementia as one of the partes temperantiae. He discusses mansue-
tudo in Off. 2. 9. 32 but not in connection with temperantia.
j62 Sophrosyne
remarkable for its selectivity, its amplification of points that Cicero

includes but does not emphasize, its addition of specifically Christian
material (such as a long discussion of castimonia), and its use of illustra¬
tions from Scripture, instead of from Roman history or legend.105
The subject of ingenium leads to a brief discussion of the various
functions of the clergy, rather than to Cicero’s long list of secular talents
and professions. It is in this context that Ambrose introduces the topic
of decorum, a striking proof of his dependence on Cicero, since nowhere
else in his ethical treatises does decorum play an important part. Although
temperantia, like the other three virtues, is Christianized in various ways,
it remains closer to Cicero than do the others. A striking omission in the
section on decorum is the absence of any reference to approbatio, the ap¬
proval of one’s fellows, which is essential to Cicero’s treatment of the
subject. Even though Ambrose adopts the Ciceronian vocabulary and
compares decorum with physical beauty, saying that the decorum speciale
(that is, temperantia) excellit et elucet, he omits the next phrase, movet
approbationem (i. 46. 221; cf. Cicero Off. 1. 38. 100). Thus the external
manifestations of temperantia, highly valued by Cicero, are deliberately
diminished by Ambrose, to whom only the approbation of God is
significant.106 He further diverges from Cicero in omitting the discus¬
sion of amusements, individual differences, the selection of a career,
propriety in outward appearance and speech, and vulgar and liberal
occupations; he emphasizes instead the vocation of the Levite, with
particular attention to the duty of preserving castimonia (1. 50. 247), and
concludes with a sweeping application of all four cardinal virtues to the
offcia of the priest.
The concept of temperantia in Ambrose’s De Offciis Ministrorum differs
from his treatment of the virtue in his other writings, not only in being
dominated by the notion of decorum, but also in having somewhat wider
scope than is usual elsewhere. Normally in the works of Ambrose,
temperantia is closely related to asceticism, as we see with special clarity
in the series of homilies and sermons on virginity and in De Helia, De
Nabuthe, and De Noe, all of which deal with ascetical fasting and show
the influence of Philo rather than of Cicero. In this connection Ambrose
does not limit himself to the Latin word temperantia as a rendering for
105 Hagendahl (364-71) lists parallel passages in Cicero and Ambrose; see also A. F. Coyle,
O. F.M. (Franciscan Studies 15 [1955], 224-56) for a detailed comparison of the two treatises.
P. Dominikus Lopfe, O.S.B. (Die Tugendlehre des heiligen Ambrosius [Freiburg in d. Schweiz,
1951], 133-37) analyzes the concept of temperantia according to Ambrose.
106 See F. Flomes Dudden (St. Ambrose: His Life and Times [Oxford, 1935], 2. 529) for the
transformation of the ^decorum-motive” in De Off. Min.
sophrosyne, but is likely to use castitas (De Virginitate I. 18 Cazzaniga) or

sobrietas (varied by sobria mens) as well, sometimes explaining that
sobriety means abstention, not merely from wine, but from bodily lust
and worldly pride, by which we are intoxicated even more dangerously
than by wine (Exhort. Vir. I. 12. 81).107 Ambrose preaches asceticism for
the same reasons as do Philo and the Greek Fathers: the conviction that
intemperantia was responsible for the fall of the angels and of man, and
that temperantia promotes likeness to God, since it is an imitation of the
virtue of Christ and His Blessed Mother. Like Gregory of Nyssa, who
sometimes adopts the theory that pleasure caused the fall of Adam and
Eve (De Virg. 303 ff.), and that the serpent in the Garden was the sin
of lust (De Or. Dom., P.G. 44. 1172), Ambrose regards voluptas as the
serpent. Adam, he maintains, was deceived by the appetite for pleasure:
voluptas . . . nos paradiso exuit (Ep. 63. 14).108 Eating and drinking are
therefore the causa peccandi, and fasting is the teacher of continence, the
school of chastity. The close alliance between fasting and chastity is a
commonplace illustrated by innumerable examples,109 among which the
story of Judith is a special favorite because this heroine combines the
two primary aspects of temperantia: sobrietas and castitas (De Vid. 7. 40).
While the luxuriosus Holophernes was overcome by drunken slumber,
she cut off his head and, as Ambrose puts it, servavit pudicitiam, victoriam
reciperavit (De Hel. 9. 29).110 Judith is also a model of wisdom and
courage, but temperantia alone is designated as the virtus feminarum (De
Vid. 7. 40; cf. Ep. 63. 29).
The conviction that women can best achieve holiness through
asceticism prompted Ambrose to write the homilies and treatises that
made him known as the Doctor of Virginity.111 By his combination of
107 Cf. De Exc. Frat. Sat. I. 51, CSEL 73. 236: Temperantia morum mentisque sobrietas.
108 One of the strongest arguments for temperantia occurs in De Iacob I. 2. 8, CSEL 32. 2.
8-9, where Ambrose holds that God enjoined it on our first parents when He bade them re¬
frain from the fruit of the Tree; their disobedience deprived them of immortality (cf. De Hel.
4. 7, CSEL 32. 2. 416; Ep. 63. 26 ff.). For the view that the pleasure of taste is the mother of
the vices, see Gregory of Nyssa De Virg. 329 Cavarnos.
109 E.g., Christ in the desert, John the Baptist, Peter, Moses, Esther, Anna, Daniel,
and Elias.
110 Judith is a favorite symbol of temperantia in later iconography. See Emil Male, L’Art re-
ligieux de la Jin du moyen age en France4 (Paris, 1931), 309; and cf. Frances Godwin, Speculum 26
(1951), 609-12. The moral significance of Donatello’s Judith is explicated by Edgar Wind,
Journal of the Warburg Institute 1 (1937-1938), 62-63. In the doctrine of the three grades
of chastity, Judith as a widow represents continentia (enkrateia) rather than pudicitia (sophro¬
syne); see Jerome, Ep. 22. 21.
111 Pope Pius XII’s encyclical, Sacra Virgimtas, quotes Ambrose more often than any other
source except the Bible.
364 Sophrosyne
eloquence and moral authority—not by any originality on his part—

he popularized the ideas about asceticism held by earlier Christian
writers, such as the doctrine of the three degrees of chastity (Ep. 63. 40;
De. Vid. 4. 23). To denote this generic virtue Ambrose usually employs
the word castitas—normally equivalent to the Greek hagneia, as used by
Gregory of Nazianzus and other Greek Fathers. In De Virginitate, how¬
ever, castitas unquestionably serves to translate sophrosyne (I. 17-18
Cazzaniga).112 The conflation of Plato and Ezechiel in this treatise
demonstrates the method Ambrose used in reconciling pagan and
Biblical sources, and in fact gives his apologia for doing so. With an
obvious allusion to the Phaedrus, he describes the flight of the soul
to Heaven after the perturbatio equorum has been quieted.113 In the region
supra mundum the soul contemplates eternal virtues—iustitia, castitas,
bomtas, sapientia (I. 17. 108; cf. Phaedrus 247D, where the Forms of
dikaiosyne, sophrosyne, and episteme are seen by the charioteer). Details
of the Platonic myth are ingeniously fitted into the Christian context,
as when Ambrose says that the soul nourished on heavenly virtues
leaves behind envy (invidia), which is outside the chorus of angels, and
appetites (cupiditates), which ought not to defile the temple of God
(I. 17. in; cf. Phaedrus 247B on the absence of phthonos from the
heavenly chorus). Apologizing for his use of material from the pagan
philosophers and poets, Ambrose maintains that they rather borrowed
from “us,” and proceeds to quote Ezechiel and the Psalms on chariots,
animals, and the wings of the soul (I. 18. 112-18). The four living
creatures of Ezechiel 1.3-5 (the man, the lion, the calf, and the eagle) are
explained as symbols both of the powers of the soul (rational, passionate,
appetitive, and dioratikon or perceptive)114 and of the four virtues that
belong to these powers (I. 18. 114-15). The definition of temperantia,
which, as usual in later Platonism, is confined to the appetitive part of
the soul, differs markedly from the definitions given in De Officiis
Ministrorum,115 In De Virginitate it is the virtue that, by the bond of
sacred charity and the contemplation of heavenly mysteries, despises
bodily pleasures (I. 18. 115). The connection of both charity and
contemplation with moral virtue, including temperantia, becomes still
more significant in the ethical doctrines of St. Augustine.
112 In De Isaac 8. 79, CSEL 32. 1. 698, continentia and temperantia together render sophro¬
syne in Plotinus Enn. I. 6. 9. 2; see Pierre Courcelle, R.E.L. 34 (1956), 220-39.
113 On the use of the Phaedrus myth by Gregory of Nyssa and other Fathers, see Musurillo,
40, n. 27.
114See Courcelle, toe. cit., 226, nn. 3 and 4, on possible sources of the term dioratikon
in De Virginitate 18. 110 ff.
115 Yet see De Off. Min. 2. 9, where temperantia is exercised in despiciendis voluptatibus.
De Isaac makes a similar attempt to fuse Platonic and Scriptural

elements in a description of the soul as a chariot having either good or
bad horses. The good horses are the four virtues, the bad are the four
passions—iracundia, concupiscentia, timor, and imquitas (8. 65, CSEL 32. 1.
688).116 Again we find the ingenious collocation of allusions to the
Bible and reminiscences of Plato. The yoke of the good horses, for
example, is the iugum suave of Matthew 11. 29 ff. The charioteer must
keep the horses together, and if temperantia is too gentle, fortitudo too stub¬
born, he must know how to reconcile their discord, so that they will not
tear the chariot apart (8. 65). In this passage Ambrose makes still
another attempt to harmonize the opposing principles, the gentle and
the spirited, this time with a mixture of Christian and Platonic terms.117
Although Ambrose regards virginity as the highest form of castitas, he
does not despise marriage, which is a symbol of the union of Christ and
His Church.118 For temperantia in coniugis St. Paul is the principal guide
(.De Cain II. 6. 21; CSEL 32. 1, p. 396), and the exemplars include
Susanna for women, and for men both Isaac (De Ex. Fr. Sat. II. 99;
CSEL 73. 304) and Abraham (De Off. 1. 24. no). In De Viduis Ambrose
discusses the relevance of all four virtues to the widowed state and, with
Judith as his model, subsumes sobrietas and castitas under the heading of
temperantia (7. 39-40).
Temperantia is important as a masculine virtue, too, and Ambrose dis¬
cusses it in a variety of contexts, not only in De Offtciis, where he is
chiefly concerned with priestly castimoma, but also in the treatise De Joseph
(influenced by Philo), in a number of encomia and consolations, and in
the important letter to the church at Vercelli (Ep. 63). This letter was
inspired by an attack on the virtues of abstinentia, frugalitas, and virginitas
made by two renegade monks who, having renounced their vows,
sought to undermine the faith of other Christians. Here Ambrose
expresses the belief that voluptas was the serpent in Paradise and that
fasting is the means of conquering evil (14). The entire letter is domi¬
nated by the concept of temperantia and the symbolism of the Neoplatonic
ladder of virtue. Ambrose begins with the lowest rung, so to speak, in
the scale of temperantia and praises sobrietas and abstinentia, which quiet
luxuria, the mother of lust (18, 26). He first refers to temperantia itself
with a meaning akin to sobriety: temperantia is suited to nature and to
Divine law, which in the very beginning of things gave us the fountains
116 Consult Courcelle, loc. cit., 230-31, and P. Hadot, R.E.L. 34 (1956), 202-20, on
parallels between Ambrose and Plato.
117 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa De Virg. 332 Cavarnos.
118 See William J. Dooley, Marriage according to St. Ambrose (Washington, D.C., 1948).
j66 Sophrosyne
to drink and the fruit to eat (27), and after many examples of sanctity
attained by fasting, he passes to a higher stage of temperantia, that which is
parca concupiscentiae (32). This aspect of the virtue, too, is fortified
by Biblical precedent and leads to the highest stage of all, the gratia
virginitatis (33). The letter demonstrates in terms applicable to men and
women alike the essential importance of temperantia and its various
manifestations. The ultimate reason for the practice of virginity is that
it is the fons et origo pudicitiae, in quo fonte imago Dei luceat (36). Like his
Greek Patristic models, Ambrose here accepts the doctrine of ojuolgxjls
Oeti as the goal of human effort and sees in the virtues of renunciation
the avenue to this goal.119 As he points out in De Fuga Saeculi—a
sermon to the newly baptized which reflects the influence of Philo’s De
Profugis—God is without sin, and man, in order to imitate God as far
as possible, must flee from adultery, lust, avarice, and faithlessness, rising
to Heaven by the virtues, as by steps (4. 17-22). Perhaps to indicate
that there is no distinction between the sexes in the injunction to imitate
God, Ambrose cites as models both Paul and Susanna (9. 53-54), as well
as Joseph and Sarah (8. 47). Sarah is said to bring forth the sobria
ebrietas of joyfulness in giving birth to Isaac. Ambrose often employs the
Philonian motive of methe nephalios or sobria ebrietas (“wineless [or] sober
drunkenness”), akin to the mania sophron (“sane madness”) which goes
back at least to the Phaedrus and supplies mystical writers, pagan,
Jewish, and Christian, with a metaphor to describe the ecstasy that
comes of contemplation, rather than Dionysiac frenzy.120
Ambrose’s funeral orations and consolations show with special clarity
his conception of temperantia as a masculine virtue; they are important
because they deal, not with the clergy, but with laymen of various ages
and positions in life: Ambrose’s own brother Satyrus and two emperors,
the young Valentinian and the older Theodosius.121 The first of the two
orations on the death of Satyrus adapts to a Christian point of view the
topic of the virtues in pagan panegyric and consolation. It is organized
around a canon of excellences—prudence, piety, courage, temperance,
and justice—to which Ambrose adds gratitude to God, the only
119 Cf. De Fuga Saeculi 4. 17, CSEL 32. 2. 178, and De Bono Mortis 5. 17, CSEL 32. 1. 719.
In general, as Ladner, 328, points out, comparatively little “assimilation ideology” is found
in the Latin Fathers’ treatises on virginity.
120 Cf. De Cain I. 5. 19, CSEL 32. 1. 355, where the ebrietas of grace is contrasted with
physical drunkenness (temulentia).
121 For the four virtues in Ambrosian panegyric, consult Hagendahl, 378-80, and see
Charles Favez, R.E.L. 8 (1930), 82-91, for his adaptations of the consolatio and the funeral
oration.
component of the list absent from pagan encomium (42-62, CSEL 73.
232-41). Under the rubric of temperantia he includes a mixture of pagan
and Christian motives; childlike simplicity (51), verecundia and castimonia
(52-53), dementia (54), parsimonia, also called castitas habendi (55), and
spiritual poverty (56).122 It is not surprising to find Matthew 5. 3
quoted as an injunction to practice temperantia in this sense, because in
his exegesis of Luke, Ambrose links temperantia and the First Beatitude
(“Blessed are the poor”), which he equates with the First in Matthew
(“Blessed are the poor in spirit”).
The second of the two orations on Satyrus, which deals with the
subject of death and resurrection, is rich in the doctrine of the melete
thanatou, the preparation for death. This topic, allied with sophrosyne since
Plato’s Phaedo, is here entirely Christianized by the assertion that Christ
is the death of the body and the life of the soul (II. 40, CSEL 73. 270).
It is necessary to die with Him if we are to live with Him; this death in¬
volves the daily death of the appetites and passions. The importance of
sophrosyne/temperantia lies in the fact that the virtues within its sphere
are the ones specifically charged with producing the imago mortis
(II. 40).123
The oration on the death of the Emperor Theodosius provides a
Christian interpretation of another topic that was familiar in pagan
eulogy from Isocrates on but was now, under the influence of Christian
doctrine and historical conflicts between emperors and bishops, under¬
going a process of rejuvenation—the virtues of the ruler. Ambrose
resembles the Latin panegyrists in praising the moderation of the
emperor, and this is the facet of temperantia which receives the greatest
emphasis in the oration: forgiveness of those who have angered the
emperor (13, 14, CSEL 73. 377 ff.) and moderation in the exercise of
justice (25).124 The topic of temperantia is introduced, however, with a
digression on St. Helen and the finding of the True Cross, one of the
nails from which was worked into a bridle and presented to Constantine.
Ambrose, who himself set an example for later bishops and popes by
acting as sophronistes to the emperor, interprets this as a symbol of the
need for the ruler to curb his insolence and restrain his lust (41-51)—a
122 Contrast the partes temperantiae in De Off. Min. i. 115: modus and ordo.
123 The doctrine of the three deaths—the spiritual, the natural, and the penal—is also re¬
ferred to (II. 36-37), as it is in De Bono Mortis III. 9 and in Ex. in Luc. VII. 35.
124 The emphasis on moderation is partly explained by Ambrose’s desire to instil this
virtue in the heir of Theodosius, the young Honorius. See also De Paen. I. 1. 1-2, CSEL 73.
119-20: Moderatio prope omnium pulcherrima est [virtutum] ... debet enim iustitiam temperare
moderatio.
j68 Sophrosyne
commonplace in the Hellenistic basilikos logos and still an important

nuance of temperantia in Christian panegyric.125 The Consolation on the
death of Valentinian II emphasizes still a third aspect of kingly
sophrosyne, this time the virtue of adolescence: sobriety, renunciation
of the normal pleasures of youth, fasting, and chastity (9, 10, 15-17,
CSEL 73. 334-39). Ambrose is here describing, it has been suggested,
an ideal of arete and sophrosyne, rather than the actual character
of Valentinian.126
In his effort to integrate the ethical tradition of Greek philosophy,
especially the Platonic and Stoic, into Judaeo-Christian religious doctrine,
Ambrose follows the method of Philo and the Greek Christian writers,
particularly Origen. He accepts without question the theory that the
pagan philosophers owed their wisdom to Scripture, and sees no
incongruity in combing the Bible for exhortations to the practice of the
Stoic virtues or for models of these virtues. He follows Philo in the
allegorical interpretation of Genesis, in which the Garden of Eden
represents the soul of man, the serpent pleasure, and the four rivers the
four virtues, although he differs from Philo in details of the allegory. To
Philo, as we have seen, the Tigris represents sophrosyne; to Ambrose,
the Gehon {De Par. 3. 12-16, CSEL 32. 1. 272-75).127 The four periods
125 For an analysis of this speech, consult Sister Mary Dorothy Mannix, St. Ambrose:
Oratio de Obitu Theodosii (Washington, D.C., 1925). The metaphor of the bridle appears also
in De Off. Min. 1. 47-48. 228, De Nabuthe 15. 64, and De Isaac 8. 65 (frenis iustitiae, retinaculis
sobrietatis). De Virginibus III. 2 converts the story of the death of Hippolytus into an exemplum
hornbile of the destructive effect of unbridled passion. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa De Beat., Horn. II. P.G.
44. 1216C, for reason as the bridle of the passions, and see Musurillo, 54, on fasting as the
bridle of the monk in Greek ascetical writing. The symbolism is so obvious that we should
probably be slow to regard Ambrose (influential though he was where iconography is
concerned) as the source of the type so common in Western art: the personified Temperantia
holding—or even, grotesquely, wearing—a bridle or a bit. Among many examples see
Giotto’s Temperanza in the Arena Chapel in Padua, Agostino Duccio’s relief on the fagade of
San Bernardino in Perugia, and the sepulchral figure on the tomb of Pope Adrian VI, Sta.
Maria dell’ Anima in Rome. The function of a bishop as sophronistes to an emperor is
discussed by Synesius of Cyrene De Regno (P.G. 66. 1056B), a sophronizon logos addressed
to Arcadius.
126 Kenneth Setton, Christian Attitude towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century (New York,
1941), 132. The emphasis on sobrietas, castitas, temperantia in mventute corresponds to the tradi¬
tional place of sophrosyne in pagan Greek panegyric.
127 One reason is that the Jews received the command to leave Egypt and eat the lamb (a
symbol of temperantia) beside this river (16). Ambrose also brings etymology to bear: Gehon
means “hole in the earth,” and just as a hole absorbs offscourings and filth, so castitas is wont
to destroy all the bodily passions. The inscription on the font at Hildesheim echoes this ex¬
planation: Tempenem Gehon terrae designat hiatus. The personified Temperantia is represented on
the font mixing water with wine, and the corresponding inscription quotes, not the Bible (as
in the case of the other three virtues), but Horace (Ep. 2. 3. 243): Omne tulit punctum,
of human history embraced in Genesis also have specific links with the
virtues. The second period, from the Deluge to the Law, is the age of
temperantia, according to Ambrose, because the patriarchs of this age,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are noted for this excellence (3. 20). It may
be observed that the influence of the Philonian allegories on later art
and literature in the West is traceable to Ambrose (and Augustine),
rather than directly to Philo’s own writings.128
Again like one of his Greek sources, in this case Gregory of Nyssa,
Ambrose in his longest exegetical work, the Commentary on Luke,
interprets the Beatitudes in the light of the cardinal virtues. Holding
that the four Beatitudes in Luke include the eight in Matthew, he cites
as a parallel the virtues, which are so closely linked that he who has one
has them all (V. 63, CSEL 32. 4. 207), and he interprets each of the
Beatitudes in Luke as an injunction to practice one of the virtues. The
First (“Blessed are the poor”) represents temperantia and includes, not
only the First in Matthew (“Blessed are the poor in spirit”), but also
the Sixth (“Blessed are the pure in heart”); because the poor, having
temperantia, despise the world and seek not its temptations, and temper¬
antia involves purity of heart and soul (53, 64, 68).129 It is obvious that
Ambrose here understands temperantia to be the virtue of renunciation
and asceticism. This nuance takes precedence in the treatises on fasting,
De Jacob and De Helia, which regard ascetical fasting as the basis of
many other virtues, including chastity, continence, purity, and sobriety.130
The attitude of Ambrose towards temperantia in these treatises is identical
with that of the Cappadocians towards sophrosyne and rests in the main
qui miscuit utile dulci. In De Par. Ambrose further justifies his choice of the Gehon by pointing
out that it encompasses Ethiopia, which means “abject and vile” and is black, just as
our bodies are black with sin.
128 On the influence of Ambrose and Augustine, see Male, no, nn. 4, 5.
129 See also De Exc. Frat. Sat. I. 56, where Satyrus’ temperantia includes his being pauper
spiritu. The mosaics of the Cupola of the Ascension in St. Mark’s, Venice, which portray the
cardinal virtues and related excellences (some with allusions to the Beatitudes) include a
personified Modestia, with a cartel reading Beati eritis vos cum odennt homines (Luke 6. 22),
which according to Ambrose’s system of correspondences refers to fortitudo, and a Castitas with
the words Beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Dominum videbunt (Matt. 5. 8). Temperantia has no
motto but is readily identified by her action of pouring water from one vessel into another.
In most representations of this scene the second vessel is supposed to contain wine, but some¬
times in Carolingian art the water is being used to extinguish flames, perhaps under the
influence of Pomerius (Vita Contemplativa 19, P.L. 59. 502B), where one of the functions of
temperantia is to put out the fire of lust (ignem libidinosae voluptatis extinguit). See, e.g., the
dedication miniature of the Cambrai Gospels, where Temperantia holds a torch and a jug
(Katzenellenbogen, Fig. 32).
130De Hel. 8. 22, CSEL 32. 2. 423 ff.; De Iacob I. 2. 5, 8, CSEL 32. 2. 7-9.
jyo Sop hr o syne
on the assumption that since appetite (gula) drove man from Paradise,
only abstinentia can lead him back.131 Hence the favorite Ambrosian
models of temperantia are those associated with fasting: John the Baptist,
Moses, Daniel, and Elias; although Joseph, always the speculum castitatis,
is the favored exemplar of temperantia considered as the extinction of lust
(.De Joseph i. 2, CSEL 32. 2, 74). The models of feminine temperantia are
the familiar representatives of the three stages of castitas, taken over un¬
changed from Greek Patristic writing. Like the Greek Fathers, but un¬
like most of his Latin predecessors, Ambrose prefers Biblical to pagan
exempla, even in passages where he is most transparently adapting pagan
ethical doctrine. In this preference he is followed by Augustine,
especially when, in his sermons, he addresses a popular audience.132
ST. AUGUSTINE
St. Augustine fully embraces the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues,
and we meet them in the context of his most fundamental beliefs.133
Although the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the
Neoplatonists, as well as those of Ambrose and, before him, of Philo and
Origen, are readily apparent in his theory of virtue, Augustine, more
than any other Latin philosopher, pagan or Christian, succeeded in
forming an original and coherent system whose indebtedness to many
predecessors merely makes more arresting its own sovereign independ¬
ence. His definition of virtue as love (De Mor. Ecc. 1. 15. 25, P.L. 32.
1322) and his insistence on the complete dependence of man on God
for the attainment of virtue (C.D. 4. 20, Ep. 155. 12) are the two
foundation stones of his ethics; on these is erected his concept of sophrosyne
together with the other cardinal virtues. The importance of sophrosyne
in his system results from the relation that he establishes between
temperantia and three central ideas: conversio, superbia, and voluntas.
Although much might be said of Augustine’s use of topics concerned
with temperantia in his discussions of Roman history in the City of God’134
131 See Musurillo (17, n. 43) for a list of Greek Fathers who regard gluttony as the first
sin.
132 See Mary Louise Carlson, loc. cit., 94.
133 For a systematic study of the ethics of Augustine, consult Joseph Mausbach, Die Ethik
des heiligen Augustinus (Freiburg, 1909), especially 2. 258-94; on the cardinal virtues see 1.
207-18. See also Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York, i960),
113 ff.
134 For example, the discussion of Roman models of pudicitia (1. 16-19, CSEL 40),
together with the statement that pudicitia has fortitudo for her comrade (1. 18); the danger
of taking pride in one’s castitas (1. 28); the growth of cupido regnandi, avaritia, and luxuria in
Rome (1. 31, 2. 6, 19); the vanity of compelling the four virtues to serve voluptas—as in the
Patristic Literature 37i
in his allegorical interpretations of Scripture, in his choice of exempla
virtutum, and in his sermons, consolations, and exhortations to the
ascetical life, our study will be limited to the three topics mentioned
above, in connection with which his true originality becomes evident.
Most of the relevant passages derive from works written shortly after
Augustine’s conversion, when the influence of Neoplatonism was strong
and pure. The concept of sophrosyne developed on the basis of essentially
Neoplatonic ideas was not rejected in Augustine’s later writings, but the
theological, polemical, and ascetical works of his episcopate were
concerned with other problems and either took for granted the definitions
established in the early writings (wherein the virtues are forms of amor
or caritas) or made use of traditional definitions established by the
earlier Latin Fathers.
Among the many definitions of temperantia (Augustine’s usual render¬
ing of sophrosyne) found in his works, some are patently Ciceronian
(and Stoic), such as the exact quotation from De Inventione in De Diversis
Quaestionibus 83. 31.135 Others have a Peripatetic background, like the
discussion in De Beata Vita which relates temperantia to the concept
of measure (2. 32-33); while still others—and these the most significant
—reflect Plotinus and the Christian Neoplatonists in linking the moral
virtues to purification and love. Through Ambrose, Augustine came
under.the influence of Greek Patristic writers in whose theories of virtue
eros (or agape) and apatheia have a prominent place; 136 and the impact
of Ambrose himself is felt both in Augustine’s interpretation of the
Beatitudes and in his discussions of pudicitia, continentia, and castitas
Epicurean system—or gloria—as was done in Rome (5. 20); control of appetite as a virtue
of the emperor (5. 24), the model being Theodosius; the practice of temperantia by certain
Romani pnncipes, although Rome never deified this virtue (4. 20).
135 See Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Ciceron (Paris, 1958), 2. 1-114, for a list of
quotations from Cicero in the writings of Augustine.
136Fulbert Cayre (Initiation a la philosophie de Saint Augustin [Paris, 1947] 83-92) discusses
the influence of Clement and Origen on Augustine through Ambrose. For the link between
agape and apatheia in the homoiosis-theory of Clement, see Volker, op. cit., 532 ff. Gregory of
Nyssa regards agape as the source of virtue; see his encomium of Basil (11), and consult
Jaeger (Two Works, 76-77) on his adaptation of the Platonic eros (or pothos) directed towards
the good and the beautiful. Ambrose links charity with temperantia in De Virginitate 1. 18. 113.
For eros and katharsis in Plotinus, consult Jean Trouillard, Le purification plotinienne (Paris,
1955), 154 ff. Purification is the first stage in the ascent of the soul described in De Ordine
(II. 18. 48, P.L. 32. 1017), yet Augustine rejects apatheia, not only for mankind (apatheia is a
state of stupor, even worse than vice [C.D. 14. 9]) but even in the case of Christ, for Whom
Clement had worked hard to establish it. Cf. In Io. Ev., tr. 60. 3-5, P.L. 35. 1798-99. Pierre
de Labriolle (Melanges Ernout [Paris, 1940], 215-23) discusses the tendency of the Latin
Fathers to reject apatheia.
Sophrosyne
in exhortations addressed to married women, widows, and virgins.137

Augustine, however, gives the ascetical aspect of temperantia less attention
than does Ambrose; he has a broader concept of the virtue than any
earlier Latin Christian writer and is especially notable for his insistence
that moderation is essential to it. He deplores, for example, the exaltation
of physical virginity or any other form of ascetical virtue to the point at
which pride in such virtue becomes a more serious sin than impurity
itself.138
The most influential of Augustine’s definitions of virtue is that which
regards it as a form of amor or caritas.139 According to De Monbus
Ecclesiae Catholicae (written about 387-389), virtue is nothing other than
summus amor Dei, and the four principal virtues are manifestations of this
love (1. 15. 25; P.L. 32. 1322). A quarter of a century later Augustine
still abides by this definition, maintaining in Epistle 155 (ca. 414) that
virtue in this life consists in loving what ought to be loved—diligere quod
diligendum est (IV. 13)—and again he defines each virtue in relation to
this central concept.140 The definition of temperantia in De Monbus
Ecclesiae may be taken as fundamental: it is amor integrum se praebens ei
137The Beatitudes: De Serm. Dom. i. 4. 11; consult Piero Rollero, Augustinus Magister
(Paris, 1954), 1. 213. Pudicitia, etc.: De Bono Coniugali XVI. 18, XXI. 25; De Bono Viduitatis
IV. 5, XV. 19; De Sancta Virginitate XI. 11, XXII; De Continentia II. 5, V. 12, 13. A
memorable description of continentia, personified as the “Madam of a House of Good Fame,”
occurs in Conf. 8. 27; see Maurice Cunningham, C.P. 57 (1962), 234-35. Pudicitia and sobrietas
are among the traditional topics of eulogy applied to the praise of Monica, in Conf. 9. 9,
where both words designate aspects of sophrosyne. Sobrietas appears as a translation of so¬
phrosyne in Augustine’s references to Wi. 8. 7 (De Mor. Ecc. 27, Retr. 1. 26), doubtless under
the influence of the Old Latin translation. In Sol. I. 1.6, P.L. 32. 872, where the cardinal
virtues are mentioned, purus represents sophron, obviously equated with hagnos.
138 E.g., C.D. 1. 28; De Sand. Virg. XXXIII, XLIII-XLIV. Cf. the praise of Gorgonia by
Gregory of Nazianzus for being sophron atyphos (“chaste without arrogance”), P.G. 35. 797,
and Jerome’s description of the combined temperantia and humility of Paulina’s character
(Ep. 66. 3, P.L. 22. 640).
139 Etienne Gilson (op. cit., 132-42) discusses the relation among love, the will, and moral
virtue in Augustine’s philosophy.
140 See also Ep. 167. IV. 15 and C.D. 15. 22. Thomas Deman, O.P., discusses the
adaptation of the pagan doctrine of the four virtues to Augustine’s theory of virtue as love in
Augustinus Magister (Paris, 1954), 2. 721 ff. The other basic ingredient in Augustine’s theory
of virtue is his doctrine that its source is God. Virtue is a charism (C.D. 4. 20; Ep. 155. III.
12; Serm. 150. VIII, P.L. 38. 812-13). Therefore pagans cannot possess true virtue (Contr.
Jut. Pom. 4. 3. 17, P.L. 44. 745: C.D. 5. 18. 3). Virtue is given by Divine Grace (En. in Ps. 83)
and leads to the state of contemplation, where there is no need for moral virtue. On the
condition of the virtues after death, see De Trin. 14. 12, De Gen. ad Litt. 12. 54, and Ep. 155.
IV. 12: the virtues will survive, but in altered form since there will no longer be temptations
to resist or choices to make. The heavenly virtues will be purified (De Mus. 6. 16. 55) and
will be merged into the virtue of contemplation (Ep. 155. IV. 12). For the distinction
between “civic” virtue and true virtue, see C.D. 19. 25.
quod amatur—“love offering itself in its integrity to that which is loved,”
that is, to God (i. 15. 25). Temperantia, Augustine explains, promises us
the integrity and safety of the love by which we are bound to God. Its
particular function lies in restraining and quieting the passions by
which we lust after those things that separate us from the laws of God
and from the enjoyment of His goodness (1. 19. 35). Hence the clue to the
value of temperantia lies in its relation to cupiditas and thus to purifica¬
tion. The ascent of the soul, as described in De Quantitate Animae and
De Ordine (two further products of the early period, ca. 387-388), is
achieved in three principal stages: the purgative, the illuminative, and
the unitive.141 At the first of these stages the cardinal virtues operate to
destroy the love of all that is not God. Although Augustine recognizes
the existence of other forces that may separate us from God, cupiditas,
the radix malorum (De Mor. Ecc. 1. 19. 35), is more seductive than the
others; and temperantia is man’s chief defense against the desires of the
flesh and the spirit. The essential step in the journey towards salvation
is the first, the conversio in Deum (comparable to the Neoplatonic strophe),
a turning away from self-love towards the love of God.142 Each of the
cardinal virtues has a part in conversio, but as Augustine describes
it, temperantia is the one that effects the actual turning. Prudentia decides
what is worthy to be loved, iustitia recognizes the need to establish
a hierarchy of objects to be loved and to give each its due, fortitudo
resists all pains and terrors in clinging to the decision made by these
two virtues, but temperantia has the crucial task of fighting the cupiditates
and carrying out the conversio amoris, putting off the old man and being
renewed in God (De Mor. Ecc. 1. 19. 35, P.L. 32. 1326).143 It is signifi¬
cant that in De Monbus Ecclesiae Augustine treats temperantia first among
the four virtues and at much the greatest length.
A related discussion of conversio and its dependence on temperantia
141 De Quant. An. I. 33. 70, 35. 79 (P.L. 32. 1073-79), gives seven steps, reduced to the
essential three in De Ord. II. 18. 48 (P.L. 32. 1017).
142 On epistrophe and conversion in pagan and Christian thought, see A. D. Nock, Real¬
lexikon fur Antike und Christentum, under “Bekehrung,” as well as Ladner, 49 ff. The relation
of sophrosyne to the Neoplatonic epistrophe is particularly clear in Olympiodorus In Alcib.
p. 214-15 Westerink.
143 In Ep. 155. IV. 13, where prudentia receives the task of choosing what should be loved,
fortitudo the task of adhering to it in spite of molestiae, temperantia in spite of inlecebrae, and
iustitia in spite of superbia, the role of temperantia is diminished and made strictly co-ordinate
with those of courage and justice. Augustine does not emphasize conversio in this passage,
and temperantia is limited to the control of the fleshly appetites. This narrow definition
prevails also in C.D. 19. 4, in De Lib. Arb. 1. 13. 27 (P.L. 32. 1235), and in Serm. 150. VIII. 9
(P.L. 38. 812); it is common in all the works having to do with virginity and the ascetical
life.
Sophrosyne
occurs in De Musica (a.d. 387-391), which like De Moribus Ecclesiae is

deeply imbued with Neoplatonic theories of virtue. Here Augustine
ascribes to temperantia the extrication of the soul from the love of inferior
beauty, so that it may fly to the safety of God (6. 15. 50, P.L. 32. 1189).
Again the idea of purgation is intimately associated with that of conversio
amons, and this catharsis is shown to be the peculiar function of temperantia.
If prudentia is that by which the soul knows where it must take its stand,
it is temperantia by which the soul betakes itself thither. This process is
further equated with cantas and is said to be accompanied by fortitudo
and iustitia (6. 16. 51, P.L. 32. 1189). Still another treatise begun soon
after Augustine’s conversion, De Libero Arbitrio, casts additional light on
the link between conversio and temperantia. Augustine shows that he who
practices each virtue behaves wisely and is therefore sapiens. Justice is
said to consist in perceiving what relations exist between objects of love
and how to distribute propria suis; prudentia consists in choosing the in¬
corruptible and preferring it to corruption; the third virtue (unnamed,
but clearly temperantia) consists in turning (convertere) to that which
prudence has chosen, and the fourth (also unnamed, but certainly
fortitudo) in being deflected by no terrors from the object that has been
chosen and turned to (2. 10. 29, P.L. 32. 1256-57). Here Augustine’s
language leaves no doubt that temperantia accomplishes the actual
conversio.
That Augustine recognizes a close connection between conversio of any
kind and temperantia is evident from his discussion of self-knowledge in
De Ordine (dated 386). Here he mentions the need for the soul to with¬
draw from things of the senses and concentrate thought on itself, and
he asks what conversio means except turning to oneself away from the
immoderateness of the vices, with the help of virtus and temperantia (I. 8.
23, P.L. 32. 988). The nature of this conversio is different, being preliminary
to the important conversio in Deum, but temperantia is again singled out as
the specific virtue qualified to perform the task.
In all such discussions Augustine takes a broad view of the scope of
temperantia. Although he recognizes from experience as well as theory
that in human life the battle with the flesh cannot be avoided and in
the City of God specifically describes this battle as the concern of
temperantia, “that virtue which the Greeks call sophrosyne” (19. 4. 3), he
includes among the cupiditates other than fleshly appetites. In De Moribus
Ecclesiae where the function of temperantia is said to be “putting off the
old man” and being renewed in God, Augustine explains that this
Pauline formula means scorning all bodily temptations and popular
praise as well, and turning one’s entire affection to the invisible and the
Divine (i. 19. 36). The mention of laus popularis after the temptations
of the flesh is typical of Augustine, who like the Cappadocians regards
physical chastity as only a small part of the virtue of sophrosyne.
In commenting on Galatians 1. 10 as an admonition to avoid human
respect and curiositas, Augustine adds that herein lies the magnum
temperantiae munus (De Mor. Ecc. 1. 21. 38). Pride and the desire for vana
cognitio must be avoided if the soul is to keep itself casta for God.144
This passage, which is concerned with the danger to the soul of ex¬
cessive inquiry into the physical universe if combined with forgetfulness
of the nature of God, serves as an introduction to Augustine’s view of
the relation between temperantia and superbia. He often makes temperantia
the antithesis of pride, which is for him the real initium peccati, more
basic even than voluptas,145 Nothing keeps man from his proper relation
to God so much as pride, which gave rise to the sin of Adam. Among
the Greek Fathers, Origen, followed by Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, had
adopted this view; and Ambrose, although often inclined to give
precedence to the sin of intemperantia, sometimes recognized superbia as
the greatest offence (for example, In Psalm. 118.). De Musica, dating from
Augustine’s early period, characterizes pride as the vice that makes the
soul wish to usurp the place of God, rather than be content to serve Him
(6. 13. 40, P.L. 32. 1184). The City of God owes its organization to the
polarity between pride and humility: by their possession of these two
antithetical qualities, the mundane and the heavenly cities are distin¬
guished.146 Although Augustine nowhere specifically discusses the relation
of temperantia to humility, he takes a long step in the direction of
equating them and thus gives a new importance to sophrosyne as a
Christian virtue.
In classical Greek morality sophrosyne was early recognized as the
antithesis of hybris, but humility {tapeinophrosyne) was not considered an
arete (except in such a rare and prophetic passage as Plato Laws 716A),
nor was sophrosyne explicitly identified with humility. In the Middle
Ages, however, the concept of self-knowledge became a bridge that
144 In Conf. 10. 35, temperantia limits the desire for knowledge and experience. St. Thomas
Aquinas, too, lists curiositas as one of the vices opposed to temperantia (Sum. Theol. II. II. 166;
167).
145 William M. Green (University of California Studies in Classical Philology 13 [1949], 407-
31) discusses the sources for this belief in the Bible. Irenaeus, Origen, Basil, and others. If
pride is the first sin, lust is its sequel (Conf 7. 7. 11).
146 Hence the great development in mediaeval moral treatises and iconography of the
concept of the two trees rooted in humility and pride; see above, n. 22.
jy6 Sophrosyne
linked humility and temperantia, under the inspiration of Aristotle. In

the Ethics the man who knows himself and, being of little worth,
recognizes the fact, is called sophron (i 123b 5). In Christian theology no
created thing possesses independent value, and every man is of little
worth. Hence St. Thomas Aquinas can equate sophrosyne with
humility, commenting that Aristotle describes as temperatus such a man
as nos humilem dicere possumusA47
While Augustine never draws this conclusion, he repeatedly shows
the fundamental opposition of temperantia to pride; this, too, is an idea
that appears early in his writings. The Peripatetic De Beata Vita cites
superbia as one of the results of lack of moderation in the soul (IV. 33,
P.L. 32. 975). More explicitly, De Musica describes superbia as that which
causes the soul to fall from the love and contemplation of God into
actiones quasdam potestatis suae and into apostasy from God (6. 16. 53, P.L.
32. 1190). The amor Dei and the amor sui are unalterably opposed. If the
soul scorns the works of pride, it is said to place its amor in Deo and to
live temperatissime et castissime et securissime. In Psalm 35 (Dixit iniustus),
which Augustine in De Musica expounds in terms of the four cardinal
virtues and their role in purifying the soul, the verse Non veniet mihi pes
superbiae (“Let not the foot of pride come to me” [v. 12]), is interpreted
as an allusion to temperantia. The soul, in refraining (temperando) from
the errors and offenses of pride, clings to God and thus finds eternal
life (6. 16. 53). Later (perhaps 412) Augustine’s Enarratio in Psalm 33
interprets this verse entirely in terms of humility, without reference to
any of the pagan cardinal virtues (17, P.L. 36. 353).
Closely allied to the subjects of sin, pride, and love is that of the will,
and inevitably temperantia is related to the bona voluntas. The connection
of these two ideas is developed in the early dialogues but persists into
the later writings as well, notably the City of God. In De Musica, after
temperantia has been explained as the virtue that prevents the soul from
taking pleasure in acts of pride and restrains it from such actions,
fortitudo is distinguished from it by the statement that as temperantia is
effective (valet) against the lapses that exist in the free will, so fortitudo is
powerful to resist violence, by which the soul might be compelled to do
evil (6. 16. 54). De Libero Arbitrio also implies a close relation between
temperantia and the will, in the rhetorical question asking whether a
person possessed of a bona voluntas could be separated from temperantia,
147 See also Siger de Brabant (Quaestiones morales, qu. 1), where humility is identified with
Aristotle’s temperantia circa honorem (Eth. Nic. 1123b 5). On this whole development, consult
Gauthier, 456, 474 IT.
which restrains the appetites. What is so hostile to such a will as lust

(i. 13. 27, P.L. 32. 1236)? All four virtues are the property of one who
has a good will, but because to Augustine sin is essentially the neglect of
the eternal for the sake of the temporal—the one enjoyed by the mind,
the other by the body (1. 16. 35, P.L. 32. 1240)—it follows that
temperantia has an especially close relation with the good will, since it
alone is charged specifically with the rejection of bodily pleasure. In the
City of God Augustine still makes the same distinction among the
functions of the cardinal virtues. Prudentia teaches (docet) that we should
not consent to evil, and temperantia causes (facit) us to refuse consent
(19. 4). The treatise De Mendacio (395) employs a different vocabulary
but reveals the same attitude, maintaining in a discussion of pudicitia
corporis and castitas animi that the latter consists in bona voluntas and
sincera dilectio (19. 40; CSEL 41).
One of the discussions of temperantia that most clearly reveals the
sources of Augustine’s ideas and vocabulary occurs in De Beata Vita,
where he recalls the association of the virtue with measure and modera¬
tion. The passage is of special interest because while Augustine regards
modus and ordo as two of the perfections necessary for all substance,148
he does not often connect either concept specifically with the word
temperantia. In De Beata Vita, however, where he maintains that happi¬
ness consists in wisdom (sapientia) and identifies sapientia with moderatio
animi (1. II. 1 1) or modus animi, excluding excess and defect (1. IV. 33),
he quotes with approval the popular belief that frugahtas is the mother
of the virtues and, with Cicero [Pro Reg. Deiot. 9. 26), explains frugalitas
as modestia and temperantia (31). He derives modestia from modus and
temperantia from temperies and emphasizes the connection of both words
with the Mean (32); thus he restores to the Latinized concept of
sophrosyne its link with moderation, always less prominent in Latin than
in Greek thought on the subject. The derivation of temperantia, more¬
over, reminds us how different are the results of etymologizing sophro¬
syne and temperantia. The presence of phronesis, ever recognizable in
sophrosyne, guarantees that this excellence will always be explained as
the savior of wisdom, a recurrent definition in pagan and Christian
Greek thought.149 But the kinship of temperantia with a root denoting
proper mixture, recalled by Augustine in the derivation from temperies,
meant that moral rather than intellectual connotations would prevail
148 Gilson, op. cit., 144.

149 Plato Crat. 41 iE, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1140b 11-12, Clement of Alexandria Strom. VII.
3. 18, 2, Gregory Thaumaturgus, P.G. 10. XI. 1084C. See also Philo De Fortitudine II, p. 377-
jy8 Sophrosyne
in Latin analyses of the virtue. In iconography the result was the type
of Temperantia most widespread in Italian art in the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, the personified virtue pouring water into a vessel of wine
and mixing them duly. This attitude, in fact, is the one assumed
by Temperantia on the area of Augustine himself in the Church of
S. Pietro nel Ciel d’Oro in Pavia.150
Our study may fittingly conclude with Augustine, for it was the
authority and prestige of this Father, supplanting the influence of
Origen and the Cappadocians and outstripping that of Ambrose and
Jerome, which guaranteed the survival in the West of the tetrad of
cardinal virtues and thus preserved some portions of the classical concept
of sophrosyne while at the same time completing its transformation into
an authentic Christian virtue. Once again, as in several earlier stages
of its history (notably the transition from tragedy to philosophy in the
fourth century b.c. and the period of Neoplatonic speculation in the third
and fourth centuries after Christ), sophrosyne proved amazingly adapt¬
able. If, as Christian thinkers hold, three qualities above all—charity,
humility, and purity—wrought the most profound changes in the
transformation of pagan society by Christianity, it is remarkable that at
the end of the fourth century sophrosyne showed close affinities with the
second and third of these three. As we have noted, it was from the
beginning especially attractive to Christian moralists, who by a radical
shift in emphasis—making purity the dominant connotation of sophro¬
syne—enabled the concept to survive and even develop with undiminished
vigor in Christian thought, long after the pagan society that nourished
it had died. By adopting the tetrad as a whole, Clement and the
Cappadocians in the East, Jerome and Ambrose in the West, removed
the one serious threat to sophrosyne in the first three Christian
centuries, the danger that it would develop entirely apart from its
Platonic-Stoic companions and thus lose most of its classical identity.
And now Augustine, by integrating sophrosyne into his personal system
of values and developing those nuances that spoke to his condition,
endowed it with fresh life and provided a precedent for later Western
15° The tomb of Augustine (above the crypt where the remains of Boethius are thought to
lie) is embellished with both cardinal and theological virtues, the work of Giovanni
Balduccio, ca. 1362. The element of tempus in temperantia is usually represented (as we noted
in Chap. VIII, p. 262) by the presence of an hourglass or a clock in the neighborhood of
the personified virtue. See, e.g., Temperantia in Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s Fresco of Good
Government in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, and that in the Rouen Ms. of Aristotle’s
Ethics, which inspired the sepulchral figures by Michel Colombe in Nantes (Van Marie, Fig. 57).
theologians who were to find ever new ways of making this virtue
relevant to their own concerns.151
Augustine furthermore reminds us of the crucial importance of
individual thinkers, as well as of great political, social, or religious forces,
in shaping the history of arete. His temperamental affinity for certain
nuances of sophrosyne led him, to a degree unmatched by the other
Fathers, to think out afresh its meaning for himself, to make it in
a special sense his own, and thus to establish its relevance to the concepts
we have discussed, particularly humility and the conversion from error
to truth. The “oscillation between restraint and excess” noted by
a biographer of the young Augustine,152 while most evident in his own
account of his turbulent adolescence and young manhood, affected all
his later work as well, because it determined, for life, his moral
perspective. When his instinctive feeling for restraint had been rein¬
forced by an extraordinarily powerful revulsion from his youthful excess,
there developed in Augustine’s soul a climate highly favorable for the
mature reconsideration of that virtue which more than any other spoke
to him of restraint, purity, and conversion. Like Plato, whose tempera¬
mental affinity for sophrosyne (in his case harmony and proportion)
contrasts so strongly with Aristotle’s relative indifference, or like
Panaetius, with his deep, instinctive sympathy for sophrosyne as the
prepon, in contrast to Poseidonius, Augustine found personal significance
in this virtue, far beyond what Ambrose or Jerome had seen. He is one
of those for whom, in the words of Blake, the road of excess led to the
palace of wisdom.153
Something of his feeling colors the apology with which he concludes
his discussion of temperantia in De Moribus Ecclesiae (P.L. 32. 1328): Haec
dicta sint de temperantia, pro rerum magnitudine breviter, pro instituto tamen opere
fortasse copiosius quam oportebat (“Let this be said about temperantia, little
enough when one thinks of the magnitude of the subject, but perhaps
too much in proportion to the size of this book”). The present study,
which even more than De Moribus Ecclesiae may seem to have discussed
sophrosyne copiosius quam oportebat, can find no more fitting conclusion
than Augustine’s testimony to the magnitudo rerum embraced by
temperantia.
151 For some new applications of temperantia to special problems of the Middle Ages consult
the dissertation by Catherine Haines, op. cit. The exposition of the functions of the tetrad
in connection with monasticism by Odilo of Cluny (P.L. 142. 901) is especially characteristic.
152John J. O’Meara, The Young Augustine (London, 1954), 44.
153 “Proverbs of Hell,” The Poems of William Blake (London, 1931), 161.
Appendix: Imagery Related
to Sophrosyne
THE imagery of the bridle or the bit—foreshadowed by Aeschylus’

references to bridle or yoke in connection with Prometheus’ need to learn
moderation (P. V 1009-10)—constitutes the favorite symbol for sophro¬
syne in ancient literature: the mastery of a wild or unruly beast. I post¬
pone until a later time a discussion of the iconography of sophro-
syne/temperantia in relation to its literary sources, but it may be helpful
to include here a list of the principal types of imagery, without attempt¬
ing to establish connections between a given passage in literature and
later artistic representations. In Greek literature there are seven major
categories; only the first three are important in the classical period,
when the antitheses to sophrosyne, especially hybris, lend themselves to
vivid imagery more often than does sophrosyne itself. The categories are
these:
1. The imagery of health, or the healing of disease. This metaphor is
implicit in the very word sophrosyne, whose etymology suggests saving
the reason or keeping it sound. Plato was particularly likely to exploit
the parallels between health of mind and body; see, for example, the
Charmides, with the background of the palaestra and the discussion of
how to cure Charmides’ headache. When the doctrine of the “goods” of
body and soul became a commonplace in Hellenistic philosophy, so¬
phrosyne was regularly defined as health of soul (e.g., Ariston of Chios,
SVF 1. 375). The metaphor is difficult to convert into a visual image
and has no importance for later iconography.
2. The mastery of a beast. This metaphor goes back to Homeric
380
Imagery Related to Sophrosyne y8i
passages in which it is necessary to restrain one’s thymos, as if it were a

wild animal (for example, in the Odyssey IX. 302, XX. 18-24). The
most influential such image is the comparison of the soul to a charioteer
with two horses, one obedient, the other unruly, in Plato’s Phaedrus
(246A ff.). (The beast representing the passions and appetites is a
favorite metaphor in Plato’s dialogues; see, for example, Rep. 588B, Tim.
70D; and cf. Isocrates Ad. Nic. 12.) Philo Judaeus employs this type of
symbolism in allegorical interpretations of the Bible. See, for example,
the exegesis of Genesis 49. 16-18 in Leg. All. 2. 24-25, which explains
the serpent biting the horse’s heel as sophrosyne wounding the passions
and thereby saving the rider (Nous) from destruction (cf. De Agr. 21. 94
ff.). Patristic writers often conflate the myth of the Phaedrus with
supposed parallels from Scripture, such as Ezech. 1. 3-5 (cf. Jerome, Ep.
52. 13, 2 on the quadriga of the soul). Greek mythology commonly
represents the passions as grotesque animals (such as the Chimaera
conquered by Bellerophon) or as monstrous enemies of the Olympian
gods (Typhoeus, in Pindar Pyth. 8. 11 ff.); and nothing is more familiar in
Greek art than the symbolic battle between the human (or the Divine)
and the bestial, resulting in a victory of order, civilization, sophrosyne
over chaos, barbarism, hybrisA The pedimental sculpture of the temple
of Olympian Zeus and the Pergamene frieze are but the best-known
examples of this type. In Renaissance art, where the scope of Temperantia
was considerably narrower than that of the classical sophrosyne, the al¬
legory is often generalized into a victory of Virtue over Vice: for
example, Hercules subduing one of the monsters involved in his Labors,
or idealized groups like those by Cellini and Giovanni da Bologna. The
symbolism of the wild beast hunt—representing the triumph of reason
over passion—is common in late Roman and Byzantine mosaics and
Roman sarcophagi.1 2 One type of sarcophagus portrays the sophron
huntsman Hippolytus in the neighborhood of such a hunt.3 The Pinax
of Cebes introduces Sophrosyne as one of several sisters of Episteme in a
hunting scene (20-22).4
3. Imagery derived from military equipment. An early example is
1 See Eva Matthews Sanford, C.P. 36 (1941), 52-57.

2 Doro Levi, Antioch Mosaic Pavements (Princeton, 1947), 1. 340.
3 Cf. Anth. Pal. 9. 132 for the personified Sophrosyne and Eros doing battle through their
human representatives, Hippolytus and Phaedra. To Ambrose (De Virginibus III. 2) the death
of Hippolytus, dragged by his frenzied horses, represents the victory of the passions over
reason.
4 For Cebes as one of the antecedents of Prudentius, see Karl Kiinstle, Ikonographie der
chnstlichen Kunst (Freiburg, 1928), 1. 156 ff.
382 Sophrosyne
the contrast between the hybristic blazons of the Seven against Thebes
in Aeschylus’ tragedy and the modest devices on the shields of the
defenders. We have observed (Chap. II, n. 17) that only the blazon of
Hyperbius, among the defenders, is described. Among the attackers,
Amphiaraus has no blazon, and this circumstance, which was for
Aeschylus a sign of the hero’s preference for reality over appearance in
the effort to be aristos (592 ff.), became in later literature a symbol of
his sophrosyne (Euripides, Phoen. 1118, Julian 303C). The breastplate
of sophrosyne and the sheathed sword of severity became something of
a commonplace in addresses to rulers, both Greek and Roman (see
Seneca De Clem. 1. 1. 1-4); and, with the increasing tendency to com¬
pare the life of virtue to a mortal combat against evil, this symbolism
becomes normal. St. Paul (Eph. 6. 14-17) gave impetus to the custom
of describing the virtues as parts of a soldier’s equipment; the shield was
especially popular because it provided a convenient place for attributes
or even scenes depicting the virtue in action. Artistic representations of
the virtues battling the vices are widespread in Gothic art, but the type
derives from the Psychomachia of Prudentius rather than directly from
ancient literature, and usually involves the personification of the virtues
as armor-clad women.5 Attributes identifying the virtues are often
displayed on a shield, as in the reliefs at Notre Dame, Amiens, and
Chartres discussed by Male.6 The sheathed sword is an attribute
of Temperantia in Giotto’s fresco in the Arena Chapel at Padua and on
the Pisano relief on the south door of the Baptistery at Florence.
4. The Tree of Virtue. In classical Greek literature hybris is more often
described as blossom, fruit, or harvest (Aeschylus Sept. 60, Supp. 106;
Sophocles, Frag. 718), but Democritus (Frag. 294 DK) refers to sophro¬
syne as the flower (anthos) of age. The figure became popular only after
the time of Philo, who developed in great detail the allegory of the
Trees of Virtue, under the inspiration of the Trees of Life and of
the Knowledge of Good and Evil in Genesis. Inevitably sophrosyne and
the other cardinal virtues came to be represented as trees in the Garden
5 For the theme of the psychomachia in art, consult Adolf Katzenellenbogen, Allegories of
the Virtues and Vices in Mediaeval Art from Early Christian Times to the Thirteenth Century (New
York, 1964), and Raimond van Marie, lconographie de l’art profane au moyen age et a la Renais¬
sance (The Hague, 1932), 2. 11 ff.
6 The vices are often depicted in scenes below the figure holding the shield. Exemplars of
the virtues and vices are sometimes introduced into such groups. Holofernes, Epicurus, and
Tarquinius Superbus are the favorite exemplars of vices opposed to sophrosyne; Pericles,
Scipio Africanus, and Cincinnatus, as well as Judith, Susanna, and Joseph in Egypt represent
sophrosyne.
Imagery Related to Sophrosyne 383
of Eden. See Philo Leg. All. 1. 14. 43-45, 1. 17. 56-58. St. Paul (Gal. 5.
22, on the fruits of the Holy Ghost) contributed to the popularity of this
symbol. For a conflation of the allegory of the Tree of Sophrosyne in
Paradise and the myth of the charioteer from the Phaedrus, see
Methodius Symp. 8. 3. 83. Consult Male, 105-8, for the Arbor bona
in twelfth-century art.
5. The Rivers of Paradise. This allegory, too, was introduced by
Philo, who identified the cardinal virtues with the four rivers {Leg. All.
1. 19. 63; see 1. 21. 69 for sophrosyne as the Tigris). He was followed by
Ambrose {De Par. 3. 14 ff.; see 3. 16 for sophrosyne as the Gehon) and
Augustine {De Gen. contr. Man. 2. 10. 13-14). Ambrose inspired the
artist of the baptismal font at Hildesheim; consult Male, 110, n. 4, on
the influence of this allegory, and see Arthur Watson, Speculum 3 (1928),
445-69, for the conflation of the allegories of the Rivers of Paradise and
the Trees of Virtue in illustrations of the Speculum Virginum.
6. The Ladder of Virtue. This symbolism, too, was a late development
in Greek literature, even though the inspiration came largely from
Plato’s Symposium. The Neoplatonists described the ascent of the soul in
terms of a ladder, on each rung of which the cardinal virtues operated
in a different way (Plotinus, Enn. I. 2. 1 ff.) or different virtues drew the
soul ever higher and closer to the Divine (Gregory of Nyssa Vita M.; see
Chap. IX, p. 350). Conflated with the idea of Jacob’s ladder, this
conception produced the Scala Paradisi of John Climacus (imitated in
the West by Honorius Augustodunensis, Scala Caeli Minor), which
assigned different virtues to each rung of the ladder. See Male, 105-6,
for the consequences of this imagery in art.
7. Jewelry or adornment. This type of symbolism, which regards so¬
phrosyne (often coupled with aidos) as the best or only proper adornment
for a woman, took its inspiration from the Choice of Heracles (Xenophon
Mem. 2. 1. 22), in which Arete was adorned with these two qualities. It
was popularized by the Cynics (see D. L. 6. 37 for Crates’ contribution
to the topos) and gained great favor in Patristic literature, especially in
eulogies of holy women and the ascetical life; but because of the diffi¬
culty of representing the image visually, it is of no importance in art.
In Latin literature most of these symbols continued popular, but

Roman authors, especially the poets, made a number of original
contributions or varied the Greek types in significant ways.
1. Plautus compares a young man’s practice of modestia, verecundia, and
decorum to the condition of a house carefully built and maintained by
384 Sophrosyne
the fabri (the parents). When the youth breaks away from parental
control and violates the commands of sophrosyne, Plautus likens him to
a house from which the roof is torn off by a violent storm, so that the
rain floods in. The two plays in which Plautus employs this symbol are
both derived from Philemon, who may be its true originator (Most. 161
ff., Trim. 317, 321-22). The metaphor from which the symbolism devel¬
ops occurs in the classical period; see Xenophon Mem. 1. 5. 4 on enkrateia
as the foundation of the palace of virtue.
2. A favorite symbol of sophrosyne in Horace’s Odes is the voyage of
the sailor who prudently avoids the dangerous shallows too close to
shore and the perilous depths too far out at sea (Odes 2. 10). This image
is a special development of the metaphor of the voyage of life, or the
storm-tossed ship at sea, which is found as early as the Odyssey and
becomes common in Greek poetry from Alcaeus on. The connection of
this image with sophrosyne is usually only implied in the classical
period but is explicit in later poetry (e.g., Cercidas, Frag. 2 Diehl3,
on the voyage with sophrosyne, or Seneca Oedipus 882-910). Horace also
uses the image of the merchant who is so avaricious that he makes
repeated, dangerous voyages to the ends of the earth in search of gain,
in contrast to the poet on his Sabine farm, content with little or with
what is at hand (Odes 1. 31; 3. 1). Another Horatian symbol of the lack
of sophrosyne is the rich man who insists on building his seaside villa on
piles sunk into the sea (Odes 2. 18; 3. 1). With Horace’s dominus terrae
fastidiosus, compare the moralizing interpretations of Xerxes’ bridging
the Hellespont, an example of the hybristic violation of the boundaries
set by the gods.
3. Virgil symbolizes sophrosyne with many highly effective images:
the calming of the storm at sea in Aen. I (we have noted on p. 300 the
use of the verb temperare, 57, 146) and the chaining of Furor in the
temple of Janus; the oak tree of Aen. IV. 393-96, which is storm-tossed
but not uprooted; the confrontation of Cato and Catiline on the shield
of Aeneas in Aen. VIII. The sophrosyne of Aeneas is contrasted with the
furor and violentia of Dido and Turnus. Dido’s passion is compared to a
wound, a fire, poison, disease, or madness (IV. 2, 69; I. 688; IV, 389, 8,
67, 78, etc.). The imagery used to depict Turnus’ violation of temperantia
is sometimes reminiscent of the technique of Aeschylus in the Septem; for
example, the shield of Turnus with its blazon depicting Io and Argus,
and his helmet surmounted with the Chimaera (VII. 85).
4. The Roman triumphal procession gave rise to an important
allegorical adaptation, Ovid’s Triumph of Amor (Am. I. 2. 25-52) in
Imagery Related to Sophrosyne 385
which Mens bona (Sophrosyne?) and Pudor (Aidos) are led captive. The
expansion of this motive by Petrarch produced the Trionji, one of which
was the Triumph of Chastity. Chastity is attended by symbolic animals
(the unicorn, the ermine) and by historical, mythical, and Biblical
exemplars (Verginia, Lucretia, Dido, Penelope, Judith).7
5. Imagery drawn from the animal kingdom abounds in Latin
descriptions of virtue and vice, but here again the antitheses of sophro-
syn&/temperantia, rather than the virtue itself, inspired the greater
number of images. Thus Turnus is compared to a lion and a bull (Aen.
XII. 4-7, 103 ff.) which, like the Chimaera on his helmet, represent
his uncontrolled passions. Space does not permit a consideration here of
the extensive subject of animal exemplars of the virtues and vices,
which were common enough in late antiquity (e.g., Plutarch Bruta
Ammalia Ratione Uti,8 Aelian De Nat. Anim.) but became even more
popular in the Middle Ages, in the wake of the Physiologus and the De
Imagine Mundi of Honorius Augustodunensis.9 The varied aspects of so¬
phrosyne required an unusually large number of animal exemplars; in
antiquity the turtledove, the salamander, and the tortoise were familiar
symbols of sophrosyne as chastity: the first because of its reputation for
monogamy; the second because of its supposed power of surviving un¬
harmed in the midst of flames; the third because, by carrying its house
with it, it exemplified the modest seclusion proper to a good woman.
Consult Gregory of Nazianzus (see Chap. IX, n. 57) for the first two
and Plutarch (see Chap. VII, n. 16) for the first and the third. It
is perhaps appropriate to mention here the favorite saying of Augustus,
orrevde /3pa8ccos (Festina lente, “Make haste slowly”), which sums up with
gnomic terseness the need to reconcile the two conflicting temperaments,
the andnkos and the sophron. It came to be illustrated by a dolphin twin¬
ing itself around an anchor; this symbol appears in the statue of
Temperantia by Giovanni da Bologna in the courtyard of the Bargello in
Florence.
7 On the illustrations of Petrarch’s Trionji, see Van Marie, op. cit., figs. 130-41, 160. The
“fettered Cupid” as a symbol of chastity in Petrarch’s Triumphus Pudicitiae is discussed by
Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology (New York, 1962), 126, n. 79.
8 For the sophrosyne of crows, pigs, and goats, see Plutarch, op. cit., 988F-991D. Aristotle
{Hist. Anim. 1. 1 ff.) is the source of much doctrine about approximations to moral virtue in
various animals. Cf. Plato Laches 196-97 on courage in animals, and see Chap. VI, n. 125
on Neoplatonic theories about the physicae aretae in irrational beasts.
9 Animal symbolism involving the cardinal virtues is discussed by Kunstle, op. cit., 1. 119—
32, and Van Marie, op. cit. 2. 445-57. See also E. P. Evans, Animal Symbolism in Ecclesiastical
Architecture (New York, 1896). The proliferation of animals representing temperantia, pudicitia,
and castitas in baroque art reflects the popularity of the emblem books of Alciati and Ripa.
j86 Sophrosyne
s 6. The metaphor, ubiquitous in the erotic poetry of all times, that

likens the passion of love to a flame,10 has as its natural counterpart the
comparison of sophrosyne (pudicitia, temperantia, castitas) to a force
capable of extinguishing the fire. The most influential literary passage
employing this image occurs in the Vita Contemplativa of the fifth-century
Latin Father, Julius Pomerius (3. 19, P.L. 59. 502), in which temperantia
is assigned the task of extinguishing the flame of lust. The Carolingian
type of Temperantia with a torch in one hand, a jug of water in the other,
probably derives from this source.11 In the Psychomachia of Prudentius
the torch of Libido is extinguished, not by water, but by a stone that
Pudicitia throws (40-48). The twelfth-century Byzantine poet Eustathius
describes an allegorical battle between Sophrosyne and Eros, in which
the vessels of fire kindled by Eros are sprinkled by Sophrosyne with dew
from heaven.12
The most wide-spread of all mediaeval and Renaissance types of

temperantia represents the personified virtue as mixing water with wine,
so as to temper or moderate the force of the latter. The etymology of
the verb temperare is enough to account for this image without recourse
to any of the classical or late Latin passages in which temperantia is
interpreted as an agent of mixture or blending (for this interpretation of
temperantia in Apuleius De Mundo, see Chap. VIII, n. 34). The repre¬
sentation of Temperantia with an hourglass (later a clock) seems to be a
purely mediaeval development, without classical antecedents in literature
or art.
10 On Dido’s love as ignis or flamma, and on the antededents of this metaphor, consult A. S.
Pease, Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber quartus (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 86.
11 See, for example, the Rhenish Lectionary and the Cambrai Gospels, and consult
Katzenellenbogen, 54-55.
12 Hysmine and Hysminias 4. 23.
Subject Index
Aidos (“modesty,” pudor), 5, 6, 7, 18, 49, 52, Bathmoi (“stages, steps”) in the ladder of
65, 77-78, 81, 87, 91-92, 114, 128, 143, virtue, 54, 165, 238, 352, 365, 383
156, 180, 193 and n. 89, 204, 229, 317,
327, 33i, 351, 383
Akolasia (“wantonness,” luxuria), 91, 144-45, Canon of cardinal virtues, the, 25, 41, 72-
i59> l66> 176, 179, 201, 216, 218, 249 73, 88 n. 7, 94, 123, 128, 130, 141, 146-47,
Allied virtues to sophrosyne, see Aidos, Apa- I5I, x72, 187, 196, 197-98, 215-16, 232,
theia, Apragmosyne, Autarkeia, Dikaiosyne, 238, 246, 271, 294 n. 99, 300, 315, 324,
Enkrateia, Eunomia, Eusebeia, Euteleia, Hag- 336-37, 355, 358, 360-61,369,372,377-78
neia, Hesychia, Homonoia, Hygieia, Kairos, Charis (“grace”), Charites (“the Graces”),
Karteria, Katharotes, Kosmiotes, Mesotes, Met- 18, 23, 67, 108 and n. 75, 140 and n. 57
notes, Praotes, Prepon, and Tlemosyne Cosmic sophrosyne, 29, 60, 78 n. 114, 162-
Anaisthesia (“insensitivity”), 201, 251 64, 167, 181-82, 215, 303
Andreia (“manliness,” fortitudo), 16, 92, 97, Country life (vita rustica), 129, 274 and nn.
169, 170-73, 185, 189-90, 194, 216-17, 45, 46, 294-95, 298
251, 313, 319, 324, 34i
Animal symbolism, 205 n. 30, 248, 399 n. 57,
385 Dikaiosyne, dike (“justice,” iustitia), 9, 40, 67,
Antitheses to sophrosyne, see Akolasia, An¬ 87, 173 n- 49, i89, 193 n- 89, 204, 315,
aisthesia, Aphrosyne, Atasthalia, Epithymia, 318, 323, 324, 364
Hybris, Mania, Orge, Pleonexia, Polyprag-
mosyne, and Tryphe
Apatheia (“absence of passion”), 215, 232, Education for sophrosyne, 74, 98 n. 51, 120,
238-39, 3*5, 324, 327, 334-35, 346, 348, 123, 126, 129 n. 18, 130-32, 137, 148, 171
351, 371 n. 136 n- 43, 174, 190-91, 195-96, 255
Aphrosyne (“folly”), 3, 18, 20, 23, 131, 159, Enkrateia (“self-control,” continentia), 114,
193 118, 122, 125-31, 133, 146, 153, 203, 217,
Apragmosyne (“aloofness, minding one’s own 219, 228, 308, 320 n. 15, 323, 327, 341,
business”), 96-98, 101, 103, 105, in, 344
136-37, 156, 158, 184 Epithymia (“appetite”), 114, 165, 178, 324-
Arete politike (“political excellence”), 12-17, 26
44-46, 72-73, 86-87, 93, 96, 98-99, 102, Eunomia (“behavior in accordance with cus¬
110-14, 117, 121-22, 135-42, 144, 147, tom or law”), 9, 13, 15, 19, 23, 25, 95,
157, 172, 185, 205, 235, 250-51, 282, 112, 193
367-68 Eusebeia (“piety”), 19, 41-42, 47, 52, 64-65,
Atasthalia (“arrogance”), 9, 18, 23 66-67, 77, 94-95, !25, 3J9, 323
Autarkeia (“independence”), 118, 122, 125- Euteleia (“frugality,” frugalitas), 106 n. 69,
27, 133-34, 153, 219, 248, 250, 348 133, 219, 228, 245, 333
387
388 Subject Index
Exemplars, divine: Apollo, 4, 10-11, 24; Latin translations of sophrosyne, 234 n. 106,
Artemis, 38, 75, 79-80; Athene, 50; 262-66, 269 n. 34, 286, 300, 304 n. 130,
Dionysus, 82, Jupiter, 299 310 n. 148, 354-55, 362-63
Exemplars, human, 1, 19, 103, 105 n. 66,
*39, x53, 233 n- 103, 248, 249, 253 n. 26,
281, 284 n. 71, 289, 298, 308, 316, 327, Mania (“madness”), 21, 77, 90, 115, 178,
336, 356, 359, 361, 370, 382, 385 249
Mama sophron (methe nephalios, sobria ebrietas,
“sane madness, wineless intoxication”),
74 n. 1 o 1, 328 n. 32, 366
Feminine arete (virtus feminarum), 1 n. 2, 21,
Mean, the, 15, 49, 187, 199-202, 293, 294 n.
37, 59, 62, 71, 129, 206, 230, 237 n. 114,
99, 298 n. 109, 305, 327, 349, 377
252-53, 307-8, 3!4, 331, 335, 344~45, Meden agan (“Nothing in excess,” Ne quid
363
nimis), 9, 10, 35, 38, 50, 79, 96, 183, 186,
209
Melete thanatou (“the practice of death”),
Gnothi sauton (“Know thyself,” Gnosce te
165, 335, 367
ipsum), 5, 10, 26, 35, 45 n. 27, 50, 79, 156 Mesotes (“the Mean”), 201, 207, 349, 351
n. 8, 157, 183, 186, 210, 226, 334, 335, 342 Metnotes (“moderation”), 104, 113-14, 138,
M3, 147, 181, 205, 251
Military discipline, or the excellence of the
Hagneia (“purity, chastity,” castitas, casti- general, 61, 103, 128, 130, 132, 233 n. 103,
moma), 31, 242, 308, 319, 320, 323, 340- 277-78, 289
42, 344-45, 364 Mixed Constitution, the, 191, 283
Hagneia, three stages of, 341, 359, 364
Health of soul, parallel to health of body
(hygieia, sanitas mentis), 46, 95, 153, 155, Old age, sophrosyne of, 20, 103, no, 120,
182, 227 n. 92, 241, 254, 281, 351, 380 191, 209, 281
Hesychia (Dor. hasychia, “quietness”), 11, 13, Opposition to sophrosyne, 64, 66, 78-83,
15,95, 100, 102, 133, 137, 156, 184,350 97-98, 102, 108, 161, 176, 244
Homoiosis theoi (“assimilation to God”), 194, Orge (“anger,” ira), 61, 64, 114
210-11, 231, 233-34, 239, 284, 322, 327, Orphism, 30-31
332-34, 345, 347-48, 371 n. 136
Homonoia (“concord, harmony”), 88, 128,
144, 167, 175 Pathei mathos (“From suffering comes wis¬
Hybris (“arrogance, presumption”), 9, 15, dom”), 7, 43, 45 n. 27, 46, 49, 58, 116,
16-18, 28, 32-34, 39, 40-46, 50, 56, 58, 132
78, 91, 144-45, 164, 167, 178-79, 186, Personification of sophrosyne, 18, 95, 133,
193, 211, 235, 249, 297, 342, 380 15L 253, 303, 340, 356-57, 386
Hygieia, see Health of soul Phronesis (“prudence, practical wisdom,”
prudentia), 64, 97, 124, 127-28, 168, 172,
176, 179, 186-87, 192, 205, 212, 214-17,
Iconography of sophrosyne, 34 n. 5, 151,

238, 324, 329, 333, 34L 352
Pleasure (hedone, voluptas), 10, 96-97, 119,
262, 325 n. 23, 368 nn. 125, 127, 369 n.
133, 160-62, 185-86, 192, 201-2, 211-
129, 378 and n. 150, 380-86
12, 324
Inscriptions, Greek, 6, 13-14, 34, 44, 252-56
Pleonexia (“overreaching,” cupido regni), 96,
Inscriptions, Latin, 260-61
106, 107, 109, 142, 161, 167, 193, 286 n. 75
Polypragmosyne (“meddling”), 96, 102, 107,
ill, 142, 144-45, 156, 165, 175
Kairos (“the opportune”), 92, 148 Praotes (“gentleness”), 130, 147, 250, 300-1,
Karteria (“endurance, hardiness”), 125, 130, 352
133, 169, 204, 323 Prepon (“the fitting,” decorum), 40, 93-94,
Katharotes (“purity”), 31, 242, 345-46, 35°, 148, 220-24, 229
352 Pythagoreanism, 29-30
Kosmiotes (“orderliness”), 93-94, 162, 205,
219
Kosmos (“order”), 15, 29, 112, 162-63, J82, Religious implications of sophrosyne, 4, 10,
188, 229 29-3L 49-5°, 75, J8o, 194, 210, 226,
Subject Index 389
Religious implications of sophrosyne (cont.) Sophronizon logos, 63, 134, 244, 250, 292, 341
231, 238-39, 284, Chap. IX passim; see Sophrosyne and the “heroic principle,” ix,
also Exemplars, divine, and Homoiosis theoi 2, 64, 97, 102 ff., 109, 149, 171, 184-85,
Rhetoric and oratory, 72, 90-91, 93-95, 195, 277 n. 53, 287, 291,301, 306, 313, 365
117, 121-22, 135-42, 146-48, 168, 180, Spartan sophrosyne, 95, 102-4, 11C 128,
208-9, 241, 245-47, 270-79, 306-7, 191, 247
310 n. 148, 342-45, 366-68
Rivers of Paradise, the, 324, 360, 368-69,
383 Think mortal thoughts (Thneta phronein), 5,
Ruler, sophrosyne of the, 130, 145, 205, 22, 51, 55, 58, 77, 210
235-3^ 249-51, 278-79, 282, 291 n. 87, Tlemosyne (“endurance”), 8, 22
296, 300 ff., 367-68 Tryphe (“extravagance”), 134, 227, 245, 332
Tyche (“fortune,” fortuna), 100, 103-5, IJ4“
15, IJ9, 146, 210, 213, 244
Sobriety, 20-21, 76 and nn. 108-9, 95, 190-
91, 244 n- 5, 330
Sophron eros, 72 n. 94, 73-74, 140-41, 153, Youth, sophrosyne of, 20, 98, 126, 131, 147,
154, 169, 179 n. 57, 233 n. 103, 234 155, 158, 205, 209, 237 n. 114, 255, 307,
Sophronistes, 112, 195 n. 94, 255, 367 343, 368
Index of Ancient Authors
Aeschines, 135, 139-42 Cicero, 106 n. 69, 129, 221-24, 246, 259,
Aeschines of Sphettus, 132-33 268-85, 348, 360-62
Aeschylus, 32-50, 65, 80 n. 122, 344 n. 68, Claudian, 303-4
382 Cleanthes, 216-17
Albinus, 233-34 Clement of Alexandria, 8 n. 27, 221 n. 74,
Alcaeus, 22, 293 n. 97 328-36, 347-48, 371 n. 136
Aleman, 12, 22, 384 Chrysippus, 214, 218-19
Ambrose, St., 325 n. 23, 328 n. 32, 352, Chrysostom, St.John, 352 n. 87
360-70, 375, 383 Crates the Cynic, 106 n. 69, 133-34, 245
Ammianus Marcellinus, 309 Critias, 70, 92 n. 26, 95-96, 131 n. 23
Andocides, 116-17 Cyprian, St., 357
Antiochus, 232
Antiphon the Orator, 68 n. 89, 90-91, 103 n.
60, 115 n. 90 Democritus, 20 n. 67, 76 n. 108, 87 n. 6, 88 n.
Antiphon the Sophist, 70, 86, 88-90, 91 n. 9, 115 n. 88, 117 n. 93, 118-20, 134, 382
20, 92 n. 26, 95, 131 n. 23, 191 n. 86 Demosthenes, 135, 138-40, 309
Antisthenes, 133
Apologists, Greek, 321-23, 340
Apologists, Latin, 354-57 Epicharmus, 21, 76 n. 107, 103 n. 60
Apostolic Fathers, 319-21 Epictetus, 228, 230 n. 98
Appius Claudius Caecus, 261 Epicurus, 211 — 13
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 205, 376 Euripides, 22 n. 74, 31 n. 95, 42 n. 18, 68-
Archilochus, 22, 56 n. 53, 293 n. 97 84, 108 n. 75, 203
Ariston of Chios, 217
Aristophanes, 66, 89, 97-100
Aristotle, 14, 20 n. 67, 78 n. 117, 80 n. 125, Gorgias, 92-95
89, 170 n. 41, 197-211, 245 Gregory of Nazianzus, St., 31, 339-45,
Augustine, St., 325 n. 23, 370-79 ^ 372 n. 138, 385
Gregory of Nyssa, St., 31, 201 n. 13, 328 n.
32, 345-53, 37i n. 136, 375
Bacchylides, 9 n. 33, 13, 19, 23-24, 56 n.
53, 309
Basil of Caesarea, St., 353 n. 89, 375 Hecato, 227 n. 92
Heraclitus, 26-27, 7^ n. 107, 167 n. 35
Herodotus, 15 n. 54, 19 n. 66, 27-29, 56 n.
Cassian, St. John, 353 n. 89 53, 91 n. 22, 206 n. 32
Cato the Elder, 262, 285, 289 n. 85 Hesiod, 9-10, 19, 56 n. 53, 191, 206 n. 32
Cercidas of Megalopolis, 74 n. 101, 134, Hippocratic Corpus, 256-57
244-45 Homer, 2-8, 56 n. 53, 59, 170, 381
390
Index of Ancient Authors 39'
Homeric Hymns, 8 Plato, 1 n. 1, 12, 20 n. 67, 25, 29, 31, 49 n.
Horace, 21 n. 70, 24 n. 78, 135, 274 n. 46, 35, 54, 70, 73 n. 99, 78, 83, 84 n. 135, 89,
276 n. 50, 293-97, 384 96, 107 n. 72, 115 nn. 88, 90, 149, 150-
Hypereides, 142 96, 207 n. 33, 210, 283 nn. 67, 68, 333,
335, 338, 347, 364-65, 379, 380
Plautus, 261-63, 266-67, 383-84
Isaeus, 138 Pliny the Younger, 129 n. 19, 278 n. 54,
Isocrates, 1 n. 1, 19 n. 66, 128 n. 16, 139, 306-7
142-49, 274 n. 45, 279 n. 57, 283, 344 n. Plotinus, 179 n. 59, 237-39, 371 n. 136
69 Plutarch, 15 n. 54, 17 n. 62, 20 n. 69, 105 n.
66, 206 n. 31, 233 n. 103, 248-49, 385
Polybius, 148, 247, 301
Jerome, St., 357-60, 372 n. 138 Poseidonius, 224-27, 301
Julian, 42 n. 18, 249-52, 300-1, 343 Prodicus, 85 n. 2, 91-92, 98 n. 51, 131 n. 23
Juvenal, 9 n. 32, 266, 274 n. 46, 276 n. 50, Protagoras, 85 nn. 1,2, 86-88
292
Sallust, 285-87
Lactantius, 357-58 Semonides of Amorgos, 21
Latin Panegyrists, 310 n. 148 Seneca, 74 n. 101, 228, 302, 304-5, 307-8,
Livy, 259, 287-90 382
Lysias, 136-38 Seven Wise Men, the, 10-11, 156 n. 11,
209 n. 39
Simonides, 23, 56 n. 53
Marcus Aurelius, 228, 230 n. 98 Solon, 12, 14-16, 20 nn. 68, 69, 45, 49 n. 35,
Marinus of Neapolis, 240-42 57 n. 55, 102 n. 59
Martin of Bracara, Bishop, 201 n. 13, 227 m Sophocles, 1 n. 1, 50-68, 82 n. 133, 103 n.
92, 305 61, 114 n. 87
Maximus of Tyre, 1 n. 1, 8 n. 27, 135, 228, Speusippus, 231-32
233 n. 103 Suetonius, 292
Menander Comicus, 243-44
Menander Rhetor, 240 n. 124, 241 n. 127,
245-47, 342 n. 65, 343 Tacitus, 129 n. 19, 290-92
Methodius, St., 338, 383 Terence, 262-65
Mimnermus, 20 n. 69, 56 n. 53 Tertullian, 320, 355-57
Minucius Felix, 320, 355 Theocritus, 243 n. 1
Musonius Rufus, 227-31, 233 n. 103 Theognis, 6 n. 18, 9, 13, 16-20, 56 n. 53,
57 n. 55, 76 n. 107
Theopompus, 148 n. 74
Neoplatonists, the, 237-42 Thrasymachus, 88 n. 9, 115-16
Neopythagoreans, the, 234-37 Thucydides, 68 n. 89, 70 n. 91, 88 n. 9, 91 n.
22, 94 n. 38, 100-15, !76, 286 and n. 75,
344 n. 68
Onosander, 233 n. 103
Origen, 328 n. 32, 337-38, 371 n. 136, 375
Ovid, 129 n. 18, 203 n. 20, 384-85 Valerius Maximus, 304, 308 n. 142, 309 n.
144
Virgil, 297-300, 384
Panaetius, 220-24, 280, 301, 379
Paul, St., 316-19
Philo Judaeus, 201 n. 13, 323-28, 347, Xenophon, 19 n. 66, 73 n. 99, 74 n. 101,
381, 383 88 n. 9, 122-32, 147 nn. 70, 71, 274 n.
Phocylides, 12, 16, 94 n. 38 45, 344 n. 69, 383
Phoenix of Colophon, 134, 244
Pindar, 9 n. 33, 13, 19, 22 n. 74, 24-26,
56 n. 53, 103 n. 60, 381 Zeno of Citium, 133, 214-16
PA North, Helen
3015 Sophrosyne
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CORNELL STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

HARRY CAPLAN ★ JAMES HUTTON

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

All rights reserved

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published ig66

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-13797

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY THE MAPLE PRESS COMPANY

and to the memory of F. A. D.

’A.pCTTjS KCU OcocppooVVTjS IVtKCt.

WE have had no detailed study of sophrosyne which embraces the en¬

1 Albrecht Kollmann, “Sophrosyne,” Wiener Studien 59 (1941), 12-34. G. J. de Vries,

detail the formative years of the Hellenic people, I am inclined to

merely cautious. Rather it is the harmonious product of intense passion

influences on the development of sophrosyne were the growth of the

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