Lagatic vs. National Labor Relations Commission

6/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 285
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 251

Lagatic vs. National Labor Relations Commission
*
G.R. No. 121004. January 28, 1998.
ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
JESUS GO, GRACE LIUSON, and ANDREW LIUSON,
respondents.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Two requisites to constitute a valid

dismissal from employment.—To constitute a valid dismissal from
employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the
employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal
must be for a valid cause.
Same; Same; Company policies and regulations, unless shown
to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and
binding on the parties and must be complied with.—Petitioner
loses sight of the fact that “(e)xcept as provided for, or limited by,
special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.” Employers
may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the
government of their employees, and when employees, with
knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule
becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally
recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to
be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and
binding on the parties and must be complied with. “Corollarily, an
employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable
company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the
company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to
retain the employment of a person whose x x x lack of regard for
his employer’s rules x x x has so plainly and completely been
bared.”
Same; Same; The rule is that denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence which has no weight in law.—Moreover, petitioner made
it worse for himself when he wrote the statement, “TO HELL
WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?” When required to explain,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016b65e929e381e23395003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
he merely denied any knowledge of the same. Cityland, on the

other hand, submitted the affidavits of his co-employees attesting
to his authorship of the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
same. Petitioner’s only defense is denial. The rule, however, is

that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is negative and self-serving evidence which has no weight in law.
More telling, petitioner, while making much capital out of his lack
of opportunity to confront the affiants, never, in all of his
pleadings, categorically denied writing the same. He only denied
knowledge of the allegation that he issued such a statement.
Same; Same; Requisites of Willful Disobedience.—Based on
the foregoing, we find petitioner guilty of willful disobedience.
Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of at least two
requisites: the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful
or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Same; Same; Due Process; The twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute the elements of due process in the dismissal
of employees.—On the procedural aspect, petitioner claims that he
was denied due process. Well settled is the dictum that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of due
process in the dismissal of employees. Thus, the employer must
furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected. The first apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; the second informs him of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of a hearing is complied
with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not
necessarily that an actual hearing be conducted.—Nonetheless,
petitioner contends that he has not been given the benefit of an
effective hearing. He alleges that he was not adequately informed
of the results of the investigation conducted by the company, nor

was he able to confront the affiants who attested to his writing
the statement, “TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!” While we have
held that in dismissing employees, the employee must be afforded
ample opportunity to be heard, “ample opportunity” connoting
every kind of assistance that management must afford the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, it is
also true that the requirement of a hearing is complied with as
long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily
that an actual hearing
253
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 253
be conducted. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard as he

submitted a letter-reply to the charge.
Same; Same; Same; There is no necessity for a formal hearing
where an employee admits responsibility for an alleged
misconduct.—He, however, adduced no other evidence on his
behalf. In fact, he admitted his failure to submit cold call reports,
praying that the same be not considered as gross insubordination.
As held by this Court in Bernardo vs. NLRC, there is no necessity
for a formal hearing where an employee admits responsibility for
an alleged misconduct.
Same; Same; Benefits; Entitlement to overtime pay must first
be established by proof that said overtime work was actually
performed, before an employee may avail of said benefit.—
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, petitioner failed to
show his entitlement to overtime and rest day pay due, to the lack
of sufficient evidence as to the number of days and hours when he
rendered overtime and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime
pay must first be established by proof that said overtime work
was actually performed, before an employee may avail of said
benefit. To support his allegations, petitioner submitted in
evidence minutes of meetings wherein he was assigned to work on
weekends and holidays at Cityland’s housing projects. Suffice it to
say that said minutes do not prove that petitioner actually worked
on said dates. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must
prove his affirmative allegations. This petitioner failed to do.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Chaves, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices for petitioner.

Sabino Padilla, Jr., Emma G. Jalarbal, Ma. Lilia T.
De Guzman and Alberto Wilfredo O. Oxales, Jr. for private
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner seeks, in this petition for certiorari under Rule

65, the reversal of the resolution of the National Labor
Rela-
254

tions Commission dated May 12, 1995, affirming the

February 17, 1994, decision of Labor Arbiter Ricardo C.
Nora finding that petitioner had been validly dismissed by
private respondent Cityland Development Corporation
(hereafter referred to as Cityland) and that petitioner was
not entitled to separation pay, premium pay and overtime
pay.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by
Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on
as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting
sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of
accepting callins, referrals, and making client calls and
cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for
clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing
that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of
finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to
make cold calls. The number of cold calls depends on the
sales generated by each: more sales mean less cold calls.
Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales
staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland
requires the submission of daily progress reports on the
same.
On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written
reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call
reports for September 10, October 1 and 10, 1991. This
notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call
reports for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
22, and 28, as well as for October 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14,
1992. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with
a warning that further non-compliance would result in his
termination from the company. In a reply dated October 18,
1992, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest

omission brought about by his concentration on other
aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse inadequate
and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for three days,
with a similar warning.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning,
petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for
February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He was verbally
reminded to submit the same and was even given up to
February 17, 1993 to do
255
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 255

so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner, on

February 16, 1993, wrote a note, “TO HELL WITH COLD
CALLS! WHO CARES?” and exhibited the same to his co-
employees. To worsen matters, he left the same lying on his
desk where everyone could see it.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a
memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland
should not make good its previous warning for his failure to
submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written
statement aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent
a letter-reply alleging that his failure to submit cold call
reports should not be deemed as gross insubordination. He
denied any knowledge of the damaging statement, “TO
HELL WITH COLD CALLS!”
Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination,
Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him on February
26, 1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a
complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal
deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay,
damages and attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was
affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED
TO SALARY DIFFERENTIALS, BACKWAGES,
SEPARATION PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY

PAY, UNPAID COMMISSIONS, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES.
The petition lacks merit.

To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be
afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a
valid
256

1
cause. In the case at bar, petitioner contends that his
termination was illegal on both substantive and procedural
aspects. It is his submission that the failure to submit a
few cold calls does not qualify as willful disobedience, as, in
his experience, cold calls are one of the least effective
means of soliciting sales. He thus asserts that a couple of
cold call reports need not be accorded such tremendous
significance as to warrant his dismissal for failure to
submit them on time.
These arguments are specious. Petitioner loses sight of
the fact that “(e)xcept as provided for, or limited by, special
laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his2
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.”
Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and
regulations for the government of their employees, and
when employees, with knowledge of an established rule,
enter the service,
3
the rule becomes a part of the contract of
employment. It is also generally recognized that company
policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly
oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and4
binding on the parties and must be complied with.
“Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for
violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation
adopted for the conduct of the company business. An
employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the
employment of a person whose x x x lack of regard for his
employer’s
5
rules x x x has so plainly and completely been
bared.” Petitioner’s continued infraction of company policy
requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances
of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his
dismissal. He cannot be allowed to arrogate unto him-
_______________
1 Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 252 SCRA

531 (1996).
2 Manila Electric Co. vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531 (1996).
3 AZUCENA, THE LABOR CODE WITH COMMENTS AND CASES
(1992), p. 19, citing 31 Am Jur, Section 12, p. 389.
4 Tanala vs. NLRC, 252 SCRA 315 (1996).
5 Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
95449, August 18, 1997, citing Makati Haberdashery, Inc. vs. NLRC, 179
SCRA 448 (1989).
257
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 257

self the privilege of setting company policy on the

effectivity of solicitation methods. To do so would be to
sanction oppression and the self-destruction of the
employer.
Moreover, petitioner made it worse for himself when he
wrote the statement, “TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!
WHO CARES?” When required to explain, he merely
denied any knowledge of the same. Cityland, on the other
hand, submitted the affidavits of his co-employees attesting
to his authorship of the same. Petitioner’s only defense is
denial. The rule, however, is that denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is negative 6
and self-
serving evidence which has no weight in law. More telling,
petitioner, while making much capital out of his lack of
opportunity to confront the affiants, never, in all of his
pleadings, categorically denied writing the same. He only
denied knowledge of the allegation that he issued such a
statement.
Based on the foregoing, we find petitioner guilty of
willful disobedience. Willful disobedience requires the
concurrence of at least two requisites: the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain 7
to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Petitioner’s failure to comply with Cityland’s policy of
requiring cold call reports is clearly willful, given the 28
instances of his failure to do so, despite a previous
reprimand and suspension. More than that, his written
statement shows his open defiance and disobedience to
lawful rules and regulations of the company. Likewise, said

company policy of requiring cold calls and the concomitant
reports thereon is clearly reasonable and lawful,
sufficiently known to petitioner, and in connection with the
duties which he had been
_______________
6 De Guzman vs. CA, 260 SCRA 389 (1996).

7 Stolt-Nielsen Marine Service (Phils.), Inc. vs. NLRC, 258 SCRA 643
(1996).
258

engaged to discharge. There is, thus, just cause for his dis
missal.
On the procedural aspect, petitioner claims that he was
denied due process. Well settled is the dictum that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements
of due process in the dismissal of employees. Thus, the
employer must furnish the employee with two written
notices before the termination of employment can be
effected. The first apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; the
second
8
informs him of the employer’s decision to dismiss
him.
In the case at bar, petitioner was notified of the charges
against him in a memorandum dated February 19, 1993,
which he received on February 23, 1993. He submitted a
letter-reply thereto on February 24, 1993, wherein he
asked that his failure to submit cold 9
call reports be not
interpreted as gross insubordination. He was given notice
of his termination on February 26, 1993. This chronology of
events clearly show that petitioner was served with the
required written notices.
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that he has not been
given the benefit of an effective hearing. He alleges that he
was not adequately informed of the results of the
investigation conducted by the company, nor was he able to
confront the affiants who attested to his writing the
statement, “TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!” While we
have held that in dismissing employees, the employee must
be afforded ample opportunity to be heard, “ample
opportunity” connoting every kind of assistance that
management must afford the employee to enable him to
10
10
prepare adequately for his defense, it is also true that the
requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there
was an opportunity to be heard,
11
and not necessarily that an
actual hearing be conducted. Petitioner had an
_______________
8 Pono vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118860, July 17, 1997.

9 Reply to Memo dated February 19, 1993, Rollo, p. 283.
10 Mirano, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121112, March 19, 1997.
11 Pono vs. NLRC, supra, note 8.
259
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 259

opportunity to be heard as he submitted a letter-reply to

the charge. He, however, adduced no other evidence on his
behalf. In fact, he admitted his failure to submit cold call
reports, praying that the same be not considered as gross
insubordination.
12
As held by this Court in Bernardo vs.
NLRC, there is no necessity for a formal hearing where an
employee admits responsibility for an alleged misconduct.
As to the written statement, “TO HELL WITH COLD
CALLS!,” petitioner merely denied knowledge of the same.
He failed to submit controverting evidence thereon
although the memorandum of February 19, 1993, clearly
charged that he had shown said statement to several sales
personnel. Denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly
when they are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. Given the foregoing, we hold that petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process has not been violated.
As regards the second issue, petitioner contends that he
is entitled to amounts illegally deducted from his
commissions, to unpaid overtime, rest day and holiday
premiums, to moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
Petitioner anchors his claim for illegal deductions of
commissions on Cityland’s formula for determining
commissions, viz.:
COMMISSIONS = Credits Earned (CE) less

CUMULATIVE NEGA
TIVE (CN) less AMOUNTS
RECEIVED (AR)
= (CE - CN)- = Monthly Sales Volume x
AR where CE Commission Rate (CR)

AR = Monthly
Compensation/.75
CR = 4.5%
Under said formula, an increase in salary would entail an

increase in AR, thus diminishing the amount of
commissions that petitioner would receive. Petitioner
construes the same
_______________
12 255 SCRA 108 (1996).
260

as violative of the non-diminution of benefits clause

embodied in the wage orders applicable to petitioner.
Inasmuch as Cityland has paid petitioner commissions
based on a higher AR each time there has been a wage
increase, the difference between the original AR and the
subsequent ARs have been viewed by petitioner as illegal
deductions, to wit:
Wage Date of Amount Corresponding Duration Total

of
Order Effectivity Increase Increase in Up to
Quota (AR) 2/26/93
RA 1/1/88 P265.75 P 353.33 x 62 mos. P21,906.46
6640
RA 7/1/89 780.75 1,040.00 x 44 mos. 45,760.00
6727
NCR 11/1/90 785.75 1,046.67 x 28 mos. 29,306.76
01
13
NCR Grand P96,973.22
01-A Total
Petitioner even goes as far as to claim that with the use of

Cityland’s formula, he is indebted to the company in the
amount of P1,410.00, illustrated as follows:
Petitioner’s Basic Salary = P 4,230.00

= 4,230.00/.75
A.R. = 5,640.00
Petitioner’s Basic Salary – AR = P 1,410.00
While it is true that an increase in salary would cause an

increase in AR, with the same being deducted from credits
earned, thus lessening his commissions, the fact remains
that petitioner still receives his basic salary without
deductions. Petitioner’s argument that he is indebted to
respondent by P1,410.00 is fallacious as his basic salary
remains the same and he continues to receive the same,
regardless of his collections. The failure to attain a CE
equivalent to the AR of P5,640.00 only means that the
difference would be credited to his CN for the next month.
Clearly, the purpose of the same is
_______________
13 Rollo, p. 27.
261
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 261

to encourage sales personnel to accelerate their sales in

order for them to earn commissions.
Additionally, there is no law which requires employers
to pay commissions, and when they do so, as stated in the
letter-opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment
dated February 19, 1993, “there is no law which prescribes
a method for computing commissions. The determination of
the amount of commissions is the result of collective
bargaining negotiations, individual14
employment contracts
or established employer practice.” Since the formula for
the computation of commissions was presented to and
accepted by petitioner, such prescribed formula is in order.
As to the allegation that said formula diminishes the
benefits being received by petitioner whenever there is a
wage increase, it must be noted that his commissions are
not meant to be in a fixed amount. In fact, there was no
assurance that he would receive any commission at all.
Non-diminution of benefits, as applied here, merely means
that the company may not remove the privilege of sales
personnel to earn a commission, not that they are entitled
to a fixed amount thereof.
With respect to petitioner’s claims for overtime pay, rest

day pay and holiday premiums, Cityland maintains that
Saturday and Sunday call-ins were voluntary activities on
the part of sales personnel who wanted to realize more
sales and thereby earn more commissions. It is their
contention that sales personnel were clamoring for the
“privilege” to attend Saturday and Sunday call-ins, as well
as to entertain walk-in clients at project sites during
weekends, that Cityland had to stagger the schedule of
sales employees to give everyone a chance to do so. But
simultaneously, Cityland claims that the same were
optional because call-ins and walk-ins were not scheduled
every weekend. If there really were a clamor on the part of
sales staff to “voluntarily” work on weekends, so much so
that Cityland needed to schedule them, how come no
callins or walk-ins were scheduled on some weekends?
_______________
14 Rollo, p. 299.
262

In addition to the above, the labor arbiter and the NLRC

sanctioned respondent’s practice of offsetting rest day or
holiday work with equivalent time on regular workdays on
the ground that the same is authorized by Department
Order 21, Series of 1990. As correctly pointed out by
petitioner, said D.O. was misapplied in this case. The D.O.
involves the shortening of the workweek from six days to
five days but with prolonged hours on those five days.
Under this scheme, non-payment of overtime premiums
was allowed in exchange for longer weekends for
employees. In the instant case, petitioner’s workweek was
never compressed. Instead, he claims payment for work
over and above his normal 5 1/2 days of work in a week.
Applying by analogy the principle that overtime cannot be
offset by undertime, to allow off-setting would prejudice the
worker. He would be deprived of the additional pay for the
rest day work he has rendered and which is utilized to
offset his equivalent time off on regular workdays. To allow
Cityland to do so would be to circumvent the law on
payment of premiums for rest day and holiday work.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, petitioner
failed to show his entitlement to overtime and rest day pay
due to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the number of

days and hours when he rendered overtime and rest day
work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be
established by proof that said overtime work was actually 15
performed, before an employee may avail of said benefit.
To support his allegations, petitioner submitted in evidence
minutes of meetings wherein he was assigned to work on
weekends and holidays at Cityland’s housing projects.
Suffice it to say that said minutes do not prove that
petitioner actually worked on said dates. It is a basic rule
in evidence16 that each party must prove his affirmative
allegations. This petitioner failed to do. He explains his
failure to submit more concrete evidence as being due to
the decision rendered by the labor arbiter without resolving
his motion for the production and inspection of
_______________
15 Cagampan vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 533 (1991).

16 Jimenez vs. NLRC, 256 SCRA 84 (1996).
263
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 263

documents in the control of Cityland. Petitioner

conveniently forgets that on January 27, 1994, he agreed to
submit the case for decision based on the records available
to the labor arbiter. This amounted to an abandonment of
above-said motion, which was then pending resolution.
Lastly, with the finding that petitioner’s dismissal was
for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and

Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed; Assailed resolution affirmed.
Note.—To validate a dismissal, the employer must show

that (1) there was sufficient or just cause therefor and that
(2) due process was observed. (Shoppers Gain Supermart
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 411

[1996])
——o0o——
264
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6/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 285

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 251

ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

Labor Law; Dismissals; Two requisites to constitute a valid

he merely denied any knowledge of the same. Cityland, on the

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lagatic vs. National Labor Relations Commission

same. Petitioner’s only defense is denial. The rule, however, is

of the results of the investigation conducted by the company, nor

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 253

Lagatic vs. National Labor Relations Commission

be conducted. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard as he

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Chaves, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices for petitioner.

Petitioner seeks, in this petition for certiorari under Rule

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tions Commission dated May 12, 1995, affirming the

1992, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 255

so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner, on

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC

SEPARATION PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY

The petition lacks merit.

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1 Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 252 SCRA

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 257

self the privilege of setting company policy on the

lawful rules and regulations of the company. Likewise, said

6 De Guzman vs. CA, 260 SCRA 389 (1996).

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

8 Pono vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118860, July 17, 1997.

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 259

opportunity to be heard as he submitted a letter-reply to

COMMISSIONS = Credits Earned (CE) less

Under said formula, an increase in salary would entail an

12 255 SCRA 108 (1996).

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

as violative of the non-diminution of benefits clause

Wage Date of Amount Corresponding Duration Total

Petitioner even goes as far as to claim that with the use of

Petitioner’s Basic Salary = P 4,230.00

While it is true that an increase in salary would cause an

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 261

to encourage sales personnel to accelerate their sales in

With respect to petitioner’s claims for overtime pay, rest

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In addition to the above, the labor arbiter and the NLRC

due to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the number of

15 Cagampan vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 533 (1991).

VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 263

documents in the control of Cityland. Petitioner

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and

Petition dismissed; Assailed resolution affirmed.

Note.—To validate a dismissal, the employer must show

vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 411

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