Angara vs. Electoral Commission Scire Licet

Angara vs.
Electoral Commission ~ Scire Licet

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63 PHIL 143
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be
named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position
be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that
last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral
Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and
the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not
through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral and constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole,
under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the
Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond
the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

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On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

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