Berghahn Books

What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power?

Author(s): Peter Morriss
Source: Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, Vol. 59, No. 132, Freedom and
Power Part II (SEPTEMBER 2012), pp. 1-25
Published by: Berghahn Books
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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power?
Peter Morriss

Abstract: In this article, I try to embark on an understanding of the work that

the concept of freedom does, by distinguishing it from the concept of power.
When we are interested in our power, we are interested in what we are able
(and not able) to do; it is plausible to think that when we are interested in
freedom, we are interested in something else. The article is largely concerned
with looking for this 'something else'. I suggest that freedom differs from
power in focusing on the constraints that we are (or are not) under. When we
are interested in freedom, the importance of these constraints is not particu-
larly that they stop us doing things, because that is covered by considering
our powers. I suggest that the constraints are important - if they are important
at all - because some constraints insult our dignity. This suggests an alterna-
tive approach to the current focus on freedom as a property of actions : that of
freedom as a property of persons. This idea is explored and defended. In a
final section on republican freedom, I argue, against Pettit, that there is no
distinctive concept of republican freedom (as distinct from the standard
liberal understanding of freedom); but that there is a different - and a highly
attractive - political theory present in republicanism.

Keywords: freedom, Kramer, Pettit, power

Introduction

The underlying idea behind this article is that it might help us to understand
the concept of freedom by considering it alongside the concept of power. I
shall say little here about what 'power' is, for the simple reason that I have
already written a book on this concept, and I still stand by most of what I said
in it.1 Instead, I shall try to say something about freedom that is compatible
with what I have already said about power.
I shall, then, start with two assumptions. The first is that there is a concept
of power that can be called 'power-to', or an ability concept of power; it can
often be replaced by the much simpler word 'can'. It is the concept that we
use when we say that America had the power to overthrow the government of
Saddam Hussein. In my book, I argued that this is the main (and most impor-
tant) concept of power, by contrast with its main rival, which is usually called
'power over'. I still stand by that claim, but in this article I only need the much

Theoria, September 2012 doi: 10.3 167/th.20 12.59 13202

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2 Peter Morriss

weaker one tha

see how that w
the rest of thi
power-as-abilit
My second ass
'freedom', thes
sure of this ass
fail, then I wil
would seem to
were two term
to say that Am
standard free
expressed in t
rather different
Before going f
have thought
becoming a sort
Swift, in an ot
'effective free
to act
cert in a
that 'Someone'
wish ...'.5 Both
standing of 'fr
ther seems to
freedom and po
Many others h
ously, identifie
power to act or
the best recen
develop an acc
Carter mention
of asides.6 One
account of free
(Carter 1999: 6
and inability i
that 'the extent
me'8 - that is,
It may be that
words 'freedom
the existence (
purposes of thi
Hence my ques

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What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 3

The Claim that Lack of Freedom is a Subset of Lack of Power

A common idea is that freedom is a subset of power, or, more usually, that
lack of freedom is a subset of lack of power. That is the idea that I will explore
in this section. The recent writer who has given this idea most attention is
Matthew Kramer (in Kramer, 2003). On his account, having the ability to do
X is a necessary condition to be either free or unfree to do X. One is unfree to
do X if one is able to do it, but is prevented from doing it by an appropriate
constraint; one is free to do X if one is able to do it and is not prevented from
doing it by any appropriate constraint. But if one is unable to do X, then one
is neither free nor unfree - one is merely unable. As Isaiah Berlin said, we
cannot fly like an eagle or swim like a whale,10 but that does not make us
unfree to do those things. And, having made this distinction, advocates of neg-
ative liberty then usually go on to advance the Primacy of Freedom Thesis ,
which is that it is far more significant if you are unfree to do something than
if you are merely unable to do it.1 1
I will not go into any detail yet about what might make a constraint an
'appropriate' constraint; instead, I will stick with the key idea, which is that a
constraint that is introduced intentionally and purposefully by another human
being is a freedom-reducing constraint; a constraint that is entirely natural is
not a freedom-reducing constraint. A standard example of this is to consider
two similar unfortunate cases: in both you are exploring a cave, and, whilst
you are inside, a large boulder rolls over the only entrance, completely block-
ing it, and trapping you so that you cannot get out. In the first version (Sce-
nario I), the boulder was placed there deliberately by your enemy, who wanted
to trap you; in the second version (Scenario II), the boulder was dislodged by
an earthquake, rolled down the hillside, and, by bad luck, happened to end up
blocking the entrance to the cave. In both cases the same boulder is in the
same place, making you unable to leave. But Kramer, along with most theo-
rists of negative liberty, say that you are made unfree to leave only in Scenario
I, and not in Scenario II.12
This is standard stuff, but I want to continue this story somewhat. I want
you to imagine that you are trapped in this cave. You have just spent an
unhappy few hours convincing yourself that the boulder is far too heavy for
you to move, and that it is blocking the entrance so completely that you cannot
possibly squeeze past it. You also do not have your mobile phone with you (or
maybe it does not work in the cave), and you have established that there is no
other possible way out. You are therefore contemplating slowly starving to
death, trapped in this cave. And then - and what a great relief! - you hear a
voice outside; and it turns out that a local farmer is passing by, with a tractor,
and he hears your cries for help. Upon ascertaining your predicament, he then
surprises you by asking how the boulder got there. You reply, surely not unrea-
sonably: 'But it doesn't matter how it got there; could you please let me out?'.
But then this farmer says, 'Ah, but it does matter, you see. I've just been read-

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4 Peter Morriss

ing Kramer, a
that would be
who values fr
there naturally
and that would
and discovers
you are not un
to die in peac
It is not clear
any sense at a
meet is to give
and act like th
Kramer hims
thought that t
important is t
get out. If the
reason to rescu
dom. In other
than lack of f
ual story: wh
what matters
selves). So it s
more importa
negative freed
matter at all ,
Perhaps befor
couple of coun
have over-sim
freedom, a rat
one is free and
version of the
you if doing s
a ratio cannot
the boulder h
increase this
trapped, releas
dix for the cal
increased, the
you. I do not t
The second co
have suggeste
infringement
farmer refuse
what happens

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What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 5

Freedom Thesis. It remains the case that, whil

you are unable but not unfree to leave the
cludes that therefore he will not rescue y
miraculously - you become unfree as well as u
to rescue you, because you are unfree and h
turns round and hitches his tractor to the bo
to rescue you, so your unfreedom evaporates a
an obligation to rescue you anymore; so he
he returns - and so on, ad infinitum. Presuma
never-ending cycle, the farmer will eventu
macy of Freedom Thesis, whilst he is not und
ple who are unable but not unfree, he is not u
them either; and rescuing you is the only way
So he has a prudential, but not a moral, reason
that an inspiring theory of freedom.17
So, if a failure to rescue someone who is una
a bad thing in its own right, not bad because
failure to rescue someone who is unfree to lea
one's account of freedom. Such a move is mer
a mistaken theory: it is to force the cherished
come as its rival, because one is too intellectua
theory in favour of the superior new one. Ju
Ptolemaic theory of the universe, with its epic
theory, once we got over our fixation with th
move - so we should abandon, rather than rev
sis, and realise that it is lack of power, not lack

I am tempted to end this article here, and cha

what way freedom matters that is different fr
may be that there is indeed no adequate answe
in a way distinct from the way that power m
that were the case. But I think that there a
carve out a space for freedom, and I will spend
them - for I think that there are ways that fre
are both different and connected. The one I sh
son's freedom of action ; the next is about bei
look briefly at a form of political freedom.

Being Free and Unfree to Do Th

I want to start this section in a somewhat rou

ration for the meanings of words, I often t
inspiration came from a late eighteenth-cen

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6 Peter Morriss

scanned and i
which means n
the use of tha
surprised to f
words; and it
'whiteness' wa
from gloomin
dom from pa
although 'fre
one of the me
piler did not s
Thinking of f
want to start
cific to suit w
concerns to s
seem to be a c
This is relative
account of fre
dyadic: it is si
this the third
mark the abs
clearly a larg
have this powe
the person can
to have power,
is considered p
I now want to
lum's account
outline, there
convention of
complicated.
dyadic concept
then there mu
We should on
one, when th
America was
had the power
an absence of
mind that the
can hegemony
absence of con
the actor can o
If we are draw
that absence h

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 7

is, after all, what we are doing). Now it w

'general theory of noteworthiness'; but u
Nevertheless, there would seem to be some
ing the absence of something if we might h
we would either like it to be present or are g
reasons occur in the dictionary definitions
sumably the absence of colour because we w
is the absence of settled rules (also define
settled rules; ease is the absence of pain bec
I think that we still use 'free' in these thr
free-style in swimming all refer to the abs
expect, and whose absence is thereby notew
the absence of desired constraints used t
archaic: to be free with someone meant t
straints that one should not ignore;19 simila
friendly with someone. As another early
always does more or less violence to the d
individuals' (Crabb 1818: 498).20 But I thin
that we adopt now - certainly in political p
the absence of unwelcome constraints.21 If
be free to do something when we are able t
constraint, which would prevent us from
unwelcome constraints allows us to adopt
not a lack of freedom to be prevented fr
1690: sec. 57).
Let us suppose, then, that to be free to do
when we also want to point to the absence o
power. There seem to me to be advantages t
is clear why freedom would be a thing to v
unwelcome constraint is necessarily desir
Cohen called a 'moralized' definition of freedom.22 We avoid it because the
normative operator is internal not external: I am saying that freedom is the
absence of an unwelcome constraint, not the welcome absence of a constraint.
It is perfectly possible for a constraint to be unwelcome, and yet that it be wel-
come (all things considered) that it is in place. So there is no difficulty, on this
account, in saying that a prisoner is unfree when he is justly imprisoned: the
constraints on the prisoner's actions are unwelcome, even when the prisoner
himself recognises that they are rightfully imposed.
The exemplar of lack of freedom of this sort is a prisoner: I think there is
little doubt that a prisoner suffers from unwelcome constraints. But things
might be more problematic if the prisoner wants to be in prison, perhaps
because he would otherwise be homeless and he wants to get out of the cold.
Clearly such a contented prisoner is unable to get out of jail; it seems (to me)
to be more problematic to say that he is unfree. If we did, I suggest that it

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8 Peter Morriss

would be on th
they are not in
and nobody els
come, freedom
What I have b
Carter's sense
are unwelcome,
used a slightly
said that we co
ate.23 The poin
Concepts of Lib
'The nature of
about 'ill will'
and (merely) un
And this allow
Kramerian farm
response to you
suffering cause
all other concer
relatively mino
how the inabil
cave example.
the one that is
the other exit
whether you w
might well mat
the second exit
to you that at
Some people p
imagine someo
Kramerian far
about the ill w
abilities, and n
freedom would
So my attempt
in different w
think that this
of freedom: th
been put as we
his autobiograp

I was not born w

could know. Free
stream that ran
broad backs of

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 9

It was only when I began to learn that my b

when I discovered as a young man that my free
me, that I began to hunger for it. ...
But then I slowly saw that not only was I not f
were not free. . . . [T]he freedom of everyone w
That is when ... the hunger for my freedom becam
dom of my people. It was this desire for the freed
with dignity and self-respect that animated m

It is the idea contained in this passage that

understand freedom.

Being a Free or Unfree Person

The second sense of freedom which I would like to consider is being a free
person , which is exemplified by not being a slave. For whilst the prisoner is
the exemplar of the person who has little or no freedom of action , the slave is
the exemplar of the unfree person.21
Prisoners are unfree, I have suggested, because there are few things that they
are free to do ; that is not the case with slaves. Some slaves were free to do a
great deal, and a great deal more than many non-slaves. Slaves, in many slave-
owning cultures, could become very rich, could gain considerable political
power, could themselves own slaves, and could hold respected positions in soci-
ety.28 We do not discover that a person is a slave by looking at what they are
able or free to do , and deciding on that basis whether they are a slave or not.
Rather, to be a slave is to have a certain legal status. For that reason, slave-
hood does not admit of degrees: one cannot be more or less of a slave; one
either is a slave or one is not.29 Neither is slavehood a threshold concept, such
that those who score below a certain level on some dimension are slaves,
whilst those who score above are riot; there is no such dimension. The distinc-
tion between being a slave and being free is an absolute one.
Certain facts follows from the fact that one is a slave, one of which is that
one is subject to the more-or-less arbitrary power of one's master.30 But the
logic does not go the other way around: one is not considered a slave because
one is subject to arbitrary power; one is subject to arbitrary power because one
is a slave. Even that is misleading. In many slave societies, the lowest status of
all was to be free; for one then had no protector, and was therefore subject to
the arbitrary power of everyone.31 The slave, on the other hand, was subject
only to the arbitrary power of his master. Hence the slave could be subject to
rather little arbitrary power.
In order to understand what it meant to be a free man,32 as opposed to
being a slave, we have to take seriously the importance of status , and that is
not easy given the ideologies that most of us hold. Arguments about status in
modern political philosophy tend to occur at the periphery: there is a consid-

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 10 Peter Morriss

erable literature
tend to take it f
status matters:
dominance of lib
status, and has l
does is to make
believe deeply i
probably think
againstnon-liber
heads round the
owning society.
a slave should be considered so valuable.
If to be unfree is to be of a lower status, this is unfreedom of a different sort
from the unfreedom of the prisoner. A prisoner does not necessarily lose status
by being imprisoned.35 A king who is thrown into a dungeon might still be a
king: indeed, he would not be incarcerated in that way if he was not seen as a
king.36 And one of the standard theories of punishment (retributivism) claims
that to punish is exactly to respect the status of the punished, as a rational
human being.37

Isaiah Berlin noted that advocacy of liberty 'is comparatively modern. There
seems to be scarcely any discussion of individual liberty as a conscious polit-
ical ideal ... in the ancient world' (Berlin, 1958: 176). He then proceeded to
give a sketch of how liberty had developed as an ideal, which was tailored to
his own purposes. I want also to give a very quick excursion into how the con-
cept of freedom entered our language (that is, English - but I think that much
the same is true of other European languages).38 It was not directly from the
Latin contrast with slavery.
Initially, 'free' was used to refer to states that were independent; and this
principle of national liberation was once again dominant when Isaiah Berlin
was writing on freedom, and he was highly sceptical of it, since such move-
ments for national liberation were motivated by a desire to produce free states ,
not necessarily free persons?9 This call for national liberation is really an
inheritance of a medieval world-view, in which the idea of freedom could only
be applied to collective entities, not to an individual person.40 By extension,
its usage was extended from states to those corporate entities, within a state,
which were free of royal or baronial interference. Thus one of the earliest Eng-
lish usages of the word 'liberty' was to describe an area in which the standard
rights of rulers did not apply. This sense of Liberty, as a distinct form of local
government, was not abolished until the Local Government Act of 1888, and
there is still a part of Dublin which is called 'The Liberties': it is an amalga-
mation of a number of smaller areas, each of which was a Liberty.41 Entities
such as guilds and cities were also called 'free' when they possessed, or were
granted, immunities from obligations that existed elsewhere. Thus the Treaty

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 1 1

of Constance (1 183) granted the towns of the L

erties from the obligations that existed elsewhe
making them free towns and cities.
By extension, a member of such a free corpor
But the inference went from the freedom of the collective to the freedom of
the individual, not the other way round; and there is no reason to believe that
an inhabitant of a Liberty or free city had any greater individual liberty than
anyone else. This is not our sense of freedom. We have turned this around: we
now think of freedom as a direct property of people, not a derived one. And it
is a property, of course, that all should have.
The sense of freedom at work in this story is that of an exemption, immu-
nity, or privilege.42 The exemption or privilege was worth noting, presumably,
either because it was a new exemption (for instance, those created by the
Treaty of Constance), or because (as with the Dublin Liberties) it was an
exemption that members of the appropriate class (in this case, other areas in
Dublin) usually lacked. But this creates a paradox. We only note an immunity
or a privilege when it is somehow unusual; if everybody has the immunity,
then it cannot be considered a privilege. Hence if everybody is free, it ceases
to be worth remarking upon, which means that it can easily be overlooked. I
think that this has happened with the notion of the status of a free person. It is
because it is now ubiquitous that we do not notice it; but we do notice differ-
ences in people's freedom of action - because freedom of action is a scalar
property, unlike status. But because everybody has something does not make
it unimportant. Indeed, the status of being a free person is widespread precisely
because it has been thought to be important (and rightly so).

Part of the reason that freedom has become so important to us is that we have
adopted a Romantic vision of the human condition. This contains an ideal of
man as a creator, ; someone who imposes his will on the world, and moulds it
to his purposes.43 Importantly, each of us is the creator of our own life (if of
nothing else).44 And, as significantly, each of us has to be recognised by others
as the sort of person who is the creator of his own life. It is only with this addi-
tional factor that it becomes demeaning in itself to be a slave, and demeaning
to be treated as a slave by others; it is in this world- view that to be demarcated
as a slave is intrinsically hurtful, and not just instrumentally undesirable.
This idea has been expressed as well as I know by Berlin - not in his 'Two
Concepts', but in a lecture he gave on Rousseau at much the same time. I can-
not do better than quote him at some length:

For him [Rousseau], liberty is identical with the human individual himself. To say
that a man is a man, and to say that he is free, are almost the same.
What is a man for Rousseau? A man is somebody responsible for his acts - capa-
ble of . . . following the path either of right or of wrong. ... If a man is not free, if a
man is not responsible for what he does, if a man does not do what he does because

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 12 Peter Morriss

he wants to do it
achieves somethi
he does not do th
If a man is coerc
circumstances, t
a thing, a chatt
selection betwee
native goals becau
if he is determin
because he is bu
somebody else w
ulated like a pup
(Berlin 1952: 3 1

Such a person i
Berlin on Rous

For a man to wi
degrading. ... 'T
man ...'. (Berlin

The conclusion
sense in which f
person you are -
a cow or a chattel. This is the sort of consideration that allows us to talk about
people being able to 'hold their head high', however little they are able to do.
And it connects with my previous idea that having freedom of action is to be
not subject to insulting constraints.46 Something along these lines has, I think,
motivated those who have actually fought for freedom in societies in which it
could not be taken for granted.

Republican Freedom

In this section I want to consider briefly some aspects of Philip Pettit's 'repub-
lican' theory of freedom.47 1 shall suggest that there are problems with Pettit's
account, but that these problems can be solved and the political parts of the
theory rescued and put on a firmer basis. During the course of this section, I
shall draw attention to a couple of oddities and historical anachronisms in Pet-
tit's account, and suggest that we can draw important conclusions from them.
The first is the following. At the core of Pettit's theory is the claim that
what republicans hated most was slavery: 48 Yet, on the face of it, this is a
strange claim. Two of the major republican periods best known to Anglo-
phones are republican Rome and the early republic in the U.S.A. Not only
were both slave societies, but the republicans themselves were usually slave-

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 1 3

owners and not, it seems, ashamed of it. Mo

modern period were also slave economies. It is ju
torical republicanism there is any principled ob
ate republicanism with opposition to slavery ap
true that there was much talk by republicans of
slavery - but most of that was metaphor for rhe
complaints about the degradation suffered b
whilst ignoring the plight of real slaves.
Instead there is, in the republican literature
opposition to tyranny: 49 It is strange that 'tyr
Pettit.50 I suggest that it is likely to be more fr
can opposition to tyranny, than to slavery.
Tyranny and slavery differ in several ways, o
The first is that tyranny is a 'public bad', whils
is, when a tyrant exists, all (or nearly all) wi
jected to this tyranny. A slave is someone who
it is a property that the slave has, which is why
individual. To live under a tyrant, on the other
erty, and is therefore not a recognised status, an
haps for this reason that there is no English wor
what follows I will use the inelegant neologism
which may be why republican writers have so r
jected to tyranny as slaves, or (perhaps more of
is a mistake to infer from this that the objectio
objection is to tyranny.
Since being a tyrannizee, unlike being a slave,
individual solutions to tyranny (apart from exile
umission. Hence the only solution to tyranny is d
get rid of the tyrant and ensure that he (or she)
is as bad. We are here necessarily considering po
thing that we do consider political action when w

Pettit's second historical anachronism sheds doubt on his central claim about
the nature of republican freedom. Pettit draws a distinction between 'republi-
can' (un)freedom and (what he calls) 'liberal' (un)freedom. On a liberal
account of freedom, Pettit says, you are only unfree to do some X if you are
actually prevented from doing X; for the republican, however, you are unfree
if you could be prevented from doing it. Putting this in the language of power:
for a republican you are unfree in so far as you are subject to the power of
another; for the liberal, you are only unfree in so far as the power-holder exer-
cises their power, so as to interfere with your actions.
Matthew Kramer has drawn attention to an undesirable implication of Pet-
tit's theory, by introducing what he calls 'a rather far-fetched example' of a
Gentle Giant. Kramer introduces the example as follows:

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14 Peter Morriss

Suppose that, in
From adolescenc
gent than any of
cratic sway ove
coercing some of
one would dare
becoming a tyra
his community.
the nearby hills
he spends his tim

On the republic
the community
dom at all. Kram
a significant ad
I would agree -
Virtually all th
U.S.A. and Brit
believe that the
nity; they calle
us mortals as to
that this power
wise enough to
blasphemy to
phemy must be
ceptual confusio
our freedom. In
destroys freedo
This indicates t
argues Pettit, i
that power is
nasty way);53 so
tyrant.54 As Kr
licans think of
republican unde
of absolute pow
they thought o
and not the rep

However, that i
of the story. F
(for some that
welcomed; He w
same, however,
quite explicit. M

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What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 1 5

who, in fact, is worthy of holding on earth power

who far surpasses all others and even resembles
The only such person, as I believe, is the son of
(Milton 1651: 427-8)

So it was believed to be a fact - whether conce

here matter - that God was good; but it was, arg
fact that humans, given extraordinary power, w
be - or become - tyrants. We therefore had t
power. And from this claim follows the whole o
as sensitively sketched by Pettit in Republica
make much difference whether we think that b
constitutes unfreedom conceptually, or inevitab
either way, we want to avoid being in the pow
republicans were political activists; and politi
not take much care to distinguish conceptual
we can indeed find in the literature statements
the claim that there is a conceptual connectio
power and being unfree, but that does not m
claims as good philosophy, rather than effect
distinctive about republicanism is not its (con
but its political theory.

So my case can be summed up as follows. The

of freedom. Instead, there is the belief that freed
that tyranny is the exercise of power in a nasty
reasons to fear that, in the societies the republi
ple who possess large quantities of power ove
power in a tyrannical way. The republican agend
ensure that such power does not exist unchec
from liberals not in their conception of freedom
cern with avoiding tyranny, and their empirica
- or often - be used tyrannically.
This account of republican freedom allows us to
ing that if we are within the power of a Gentle G
or spouse, we are necessarily without freedom
political elements of actual republicanism - el
extremely valuable. I therefore think that it is a p

I now want to look briefly at the question of wh

answer is clear in the literature, and can be trace
seeks what benefits himself, the king what bene
far as the republicans thought that kings were v
the contrast is better drawn between a tyranny,

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 16 Peter Morriss

on the other. Ro
a res publica is
under which the
. . . ' (Wirszubski
despots in that t
part of what was
There is here so
under it, the ma
answer (or a sk
not have the fre
they can resist
power: what peo
Pettit in an earl
cal programme
gross disparitie
distinctive conce
not need) a conc
And rightly so.

Conclusion

In this article I have argued for the following claims. First, that power is far
more important than most contemporary political philosophers have recog-
nised. Second, that the difference between lacking the power to act and lacking
the freedom to act is (very roughly) that lack of power injures (for you cannot
do things) whilst lack of freedom insults (you cannot do things because of a
constraint which demeans you). Third, that therefore the Primacy of Freedom
Thesis implies that insult should be given priority over injury, and so it is only
plausible when that priority is plausible. Fourth, that we do well to contrast
three different exemplars of an unfree actor: the prisoner, the slave, and the
subject of tyranny. Fifth, that being a free person rather than a slave matters
because (and in so far as) our status as a (certain sort of) person matters. Sixth,
that the republican approach is best seen as a combination of a concern (even
an obsession) with such status, and also an opposition to tyranny - and this
latter itself is best thought of as a concern with well-being rather than freedom,
and the recognition that power is needed in order to resist and curb tyranny.
If I am even half-way right, then we need to change much of our attitude to
political philosophy. We need to distinguish far more carefully between (con-
ceptual) political philosophy and (empirical) political theory; and restore the
validity of the latter. And we need to reinvestigate nearly obsolete concepts,
such as status and tyranny. After all, freedom became a dominant value in
opposition to the ruling ideologies within very status-conscious and hierarchi-
cal societies: it was a revolutionary value. It may be that we cannot detach this

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 1 7

value from these oppositional concerns. If that i

in less status-conscious societies, then it is not s
of freedom are no longer of interest to us - and
fused about what was important about freedom.
ever, is not formed within, or against, any dom
matters to us.

Peter Morriss is the author of Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manches-

ter: Manchester University Press, 2002 [1987]). He has also written many arti-
cles on power, on applying political philosophy to various issues, and on the
politics of South Korea. He has taught political philosophy in the National
University of Ireland, Galway, Liverpool University and Manchester Univer-
sity, amongst others. He has also been a Visiting Professor at Korea University
(Seoul) and a Visiting Fellow at Australian National University (Canberra).

Acknowledgements

Much of the work on this article was done whilst I was a Visiting Fellow in the
School of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Social Sci-
ences, Australian National University. I am grateful to Keith Dowding for
arranging this visit, and for the National University of Ireland, Galway (my
then employer) for awarding me the sabbatical leave that allowed me to go to
ANU. Whilst there I benefitted particularly from frequent conversations with
Keith Dowding and Pamela Pansardi.
Earlier, preliminary, versions of this article were presented to the ANU
School of Politics and International Relations' Seminar series in Canberra,
Australia (March 2010); to the Symposium on Power, Freedom and Democ-
racy, University of Birmingham, England (September 2010); and to the Work-
shop on Power and Freedom, University of Pavia, Italy (June 201 1). I am most
grateful to the organisers of these events for their kindness in inviting me (and
looking after me when I was there). I also benefitted greatly from the com-
ments made in the discussions after my presentations, which forced me into
significantly altering the direction of my arguments. I have also gained a lot
from further comments from Geoff Cupit, Cecile Hatier and anonymous
reviewers for this journal.

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 1 8 Peter Morriss

Appendix

Matthew Kramer's measure of a person's overall freedom is given by the

formula F2/(F + U), where F is 'the range of each person's combinations of
conjunctively exercisable liberties' and U is 'the range of each person's com-
binations of consistent unfreedoms' (Kramer 2003: 359). We have to compare
the size of this ratio if the farmer releases you with its size if he does not
release you. Let capital letters denote the values of F and U if you are released,
and lower-case letters denote their values if you are not released. Then releas-
ing you increases your measure of freedom if, and only if,

(1) F2 f 2
(F + U) (f+u)

We can, for simplicity, assume that F > f > 0. (f is greater than zero since it is
certainly the case that there are some things which you are free to do in your
cave, though there are not very many. It is true that there are some things you
are free to do in the cave that you are not free to do if released: think in peace,
perhaps. But it is fair to assume that these are trivial compared to the things
you would be free to do if released and not free to do if not released - which
is, presumably, why you want to be released. Hence F is bigger than f.)

Scenario I: The boulder was placed there by your enemy.

On Kramer's account, you are now made unfree to do everything you are
now prevented from doing, which is represented by (F - f). Hence the things
you are now unfree to do are all those things you were unfree to do before
(U) plus all the things you have now been made unfree to do (F - f). Hence
u = U + F - f. Thus the denominator in the right hand side (hereafter RHS) in
(1) is (f + U + F - f), which is (F + U); this is the same as the denominator in
the LHS. (This is clearly correct, as being made unfree to do some actions
does not alter the total you are free or unfree to do.) But since F > f > 0, then
F2 > f2. Hence the inequality always holds, and in Scenario I, when you are
released, your measure of freedom is always increased.

Scenario II: The boulder was dislodged by an earthquake.

On Kramer's account, you are now made unable , but not unfree, to do every-
thing you are now prevented from doing. However, when trapped in the cave,
there are no actions you are unfree to do since, ex hypothesi, nobody can inter-
fere with your actions within the cave. (Let us assume, for simplicity, that the
cave contains no unfreedom-creating devices left there by previous occupants,
such as man-traps or a wall cutting the cave in half; perhaps you were the first
human to set foot in this cave. Nothing is changed by this simplifying assump-
tion.) Since there are no actions you are unfree to do, u is zero. So the RHS of

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 1 9

(1) is ř/f = f. Hence the measure of your fre

released if and only if

(2) F2 f.
(F + U)

I can see no reason why inequality (2) must, necessarily, hold. It is true that
we are assuming that F is greater than f, but we know nothing about the relative
values of F and U. If U is very large relative to F - that is, if our measure of the
actions you are unfree to do if released is much larger than the measure of the
actions you are free to do - then (2) will not be true.
It might appear that you would indeed be better off in the cave, if the range
of unfreedoms you suffer outside is so large. But note that this follows solely
from Kramer's different treatments of the two Scenarios: if the boulder was
placed there by your enemy, you should be released even when U is huge rel-
ative to F. It is only because Kramer treats the two scenarios so differently that
we get these different results.
Hence the Kramerian farmer in my example, when responding to your pleas
to be released, has to obtain two sorts of information. The first is the one men-
tioned in the text: how the boulder got lodged in the mouth of the cave. The
second, which is required only when the boulder got there naturally, is enough
information about your various freedoms and unfreedoms to establish whether
inequality (2) holds. If he decided that your U was too high relative to your F,
he would then have to tell you that you would not be sufficiently free to war-
rant releasing. (But, to repeat, he would release you if the boulder was put
there through human agency, however little freedom and much unfreedom you
might have outside.) That response seems even less warranted than the one
given in the main text.

Notes

1 . Morriss (1987). A second edition, with a new introduction, appeared in 2002.

2. I will suggest later that if we did want to say this, it would have a particular significance:
see p. 6.
3. However, few have explicitly defended this identification. Those who have done so tend to
be advocates of the ideal of positive liberty, of whom the clearest is Lawrence Crocker: see
Crocker (1980).
4. Swift (2001: 55; see further 55-61).

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20 Peter Morriss

5. Dworkin (2011
imposed by other
your ability to do
should perhaps ad
6. More recently,
2007, and Carter,
have a slightly m
7. Carter (1999: 2
8. Carter (1999: 17
provided by his u
dom (pp. 97, 250);
dom' is omnipote
allowing us to gai
money and power
9. Like most writ
are not complete
corresponding to
ferences in the w
10. Berlin (1958: 16
1 1 . Kramer seem
tionship between
between an unfre
12. For this to be
impact at all on th
that the boulder to
discussed in somew
(2009: 58-62).
13. This counter-ar
14. See Kramer (2
15. Morriss (2009
1 6. This counter-a
Power, Freedom,
17. It might instea
that your predica
But then, when (a
(because you are no
ing theory either.
18. The definition
unrestraint; ease o
19. The OED gives
speech or behavio
the third [online]
20. The OED gives
this as obsolete. A
generous, magnan
coexist because the
ignored was desir
2 1 . That was the
. . . ' the only two
itions of whitene
because Walker as
of colour as unde

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 2 1

22. Cohen used the term is a series of writings; see, for

definition, which I shall call the moralized definition
does or would unjustifiably interfere with me, when wh
from doing what I have a right to do'.
23. Morriss (2009: 63^). The Benn passage was from B
earlier attempt to contrast freedom and power in Morr
24. J. -J. Rousseau, Émile , book 2: vol. 4, p. 320 in Oeuvr
from Berlin (1958: 170).
25. I am not aware of anybody who has given an extend
have hinted at it. Kristjánsson (1996: 1 1 n. 23), in an as
We can imagine a person paralysed from the waist dow
in a society where he is free to [sic] various things wh
do, for he realises how it would add insult to injury if
unfree, to do them.
And Scanlon (1998: 402 n. 29), also in an aside in a foo
. . . when questions of freedom are raised, what is ofte
of an agent's situation but a question of whether an ag
other agents or by the social institutions of his socie
restrictions that result from alterable human actions or i
significance than those due to unalterable forces of nat
26. Mandela does not, of course, engage in a philosophic
freedom. But I find it reassuring that someone who ha
different aspects of lack of freedom mentions in passing a
in this article.
27. This contrast is also drawn by Fabian Wendt, in Wend
constructing this article. Wendťs analysis of slavery is d
28. The best modern accounts of slavery, on which I hav
terson (1982, 1991).
29. This applied well into the medieval period: there wer
free men were equally free, 'and every serf is as much a
Maitland 1893: 412). See the whole section titled 'T
same was true elsewhere in Europe, as was summarised
two conditions, that of the liber and that of the serv
Fourquin's book traces how this sharp distinction bec
France during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
30. Even that is not fully true: in many slave-owning soci
mistreated slaves could leave their masters - though on
master.

3 1 . Thus, to quote one passage from Orlando Patterson ( 1 99 1 : 23) from many:
[I]n nearly all traditional societies [p]ersonal freedom had no place .... Indeed, such a
condition amounted to social suicide and, very likely, physical death. In many respects it
was a condition worse than slavery ....
See also Tarling (2007: 143):
How far the possible advantages of hierarchy might apply to slaves perhaps depends on
the nature of the slavery involved. ... At least in respect of some of its forms in South-
east Asia, my own area of expertise, it [being a slave] was seen as an advantage.
32. I am afraid that it really is impossible to avoid sexist language in this context: in many
slave-owning societies there was no such thing as a free woman.
33. This is, I think, not quite true. Much of the argument about gay marriage is about status: the
status of being married. Those who advocate gay marriage do indeed do so in part to obtain
a range of benefits for long-term gay couples that previously only heterosexual couples
could enjoy. But when the argument is that some sort of Civil Partnership, bringing all those
benefits, is not enough, and that only marriage will do, it is about status and nothing else.

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22 Peter Morriss

34. Consider the h

with white men i
this equal status r
35. James Whitma
that there should
cans take the opp
away from the pu
non-demeaning, f
the text will seem
Whitman does not
dela claims that th
his dignity' (Man
36. Recall also ca
demanded that th
for instance, bein
were to be execut
(according to Whi
aries precisely to
execution) to all;
in status, in death
37. Thus C. S. Lew
treatment, along
To be 'cured' aga
reached the age o
and domestic an
because we 'ough
1954: 197-8)
38. For a somewh
Skinner and van G
39. As his biograp
to call national lib
nial revolts, and
pation they prom
40. See Harding (
41. See Milne (20
42. These three w
OED. (The first is
etc.') Note also th
dictionary of 17
43. It is again anac
this tradition thou
44. This is to be co
in one's place with
Ishiguro (1989).
45. See also Berli
46. A similar poin
suggested that res
when certain acts
47. See Pettit (199
48. See, for instanc
as non-domination
49. For the central
(1968); for Englis

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 What Is Freedom if It Is Not Power? 23

too obvious to need arguing that opposition to tyranny

periods.
50. In Republicanism , Pettit uses the word just twice (Pettit 1997: 12, 52), both in asides, and
both about majority tyranny. Quentin Skinner, in his historical writings on republicanism,
also does not give opposition to tyranny the central place it should have.
51. Hence 'governments classified by their critics as tyrannical, despotic ... [etc.] were often
described as treating their subjects like slaves' (Richter 2005: 225).
52. Unfortunately, Kramer makes no further reference to the idea of tyranny in this article.
53. 'Nasty way' is here shorthand for Pettiťs much longer analysis of this exercise being arbi-
trary and not tracking the interests of those over whom it is exercised.
54. Note the classical distinction 'between tyranny ex defectu tituli (with respect to the illegit-
imate and non-consensual acquisition of power) and tyranny quoad exercitium (with respect
to the way of exercising power)' (Kalyvas 2007: 422, referring to Jászi and Lewis 1957:
26-7). It is the latter that is relevant here: exercising power tyrannically.
55. This is Milton's translation of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk VIII: 10, copied into his
Commonplace Book: Milton (1642: 443 [erroneously placing it in Book 9]).
56. There is also the important concern with the status of being a free actor, as discussed in the
previous section.

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