SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION vs.

CA
G.R. No. 78903 February 28, 1990

FACTS: Ruperto Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel of land, based on a private document of
absolute sale, allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion, who, however denied the fact of sale, contending
that the document sued upon is fictitious, his signature thereon, a forgery, and that subject land is
conjugal property, which he and his wife. The spouses denied claims of Sabesaje that after executing a
deed of sale over the parcel of land. They alleged that they never received their agreed commission on
the administration of Leonardo Sabesaje. And avers Sabesaje's suit, was intended merely to harass,
preempt and forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions. Dalion nonetheless still
impugns the validity of the sale on the ground that the same is embodied in a private document, and did
not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and contracts which have for their object
the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights over immovable property must
appear in a public instrument"

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid.

RULING: Yes. Secs. 21 and 23 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Private writing, its execution and
authenticity, how proved.-Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness. The document was not
forged. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not
for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of
land that this be embodied in a public instrument. When the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing. Delivery may either be
actual (real) or constructive. Thus delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing the vendee in
control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument
(constructive).

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, Petitioner, v. CA

G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998

FACTS: After his mother's death, petitioner filed a complaint against his father, herein private
respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. Private respondent alleged that four (4)
parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name are conjugal properties. Accordingly, private
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its
rightful owner - the conjugal regime. Meantime, to protect the interest, private respondent caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said
annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of
molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court
pending litigation. Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion but to no avail. Petitioner primarily
contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it
was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be
passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained
more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly
assailed in a partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private
respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or
land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.
ISSUE: Whether or not an annotation of lis pendens is considered a collateral attack on the ownership of
property.
RULING: No. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which
requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. The annotation of a notice
of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack
of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of
land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of
a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate
or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent
to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only
the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
petitioner's fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent. What the latter
disputes is the former's claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have
become incontrovertible one year after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private
respondent from questioning his ownership.

REPUBLIC vs. CA
G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

FACTS: The two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose
originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the
Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at
Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Lots were covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was
issued to Laborada and Bombast. The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed
during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner of
Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition. The State filed two petitions for
the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil
Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, held that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish
its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering
Corporation were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not
cancellable and annullable. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reconstitution were valid.

RULING: No. is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or
perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the war. Republic Act No. 26 provides
for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not
fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of
title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. Beyond the purview of that law since the titles
reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a
rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL

G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914
FACTS: On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742(land A)in
Binondo, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered
under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner. Five years and after its registration the City of
Manila filed a petition that that there existed "errors of closure in said plans. the Masonic Temple
Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had
sold all her rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon to them and
requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new
certificate to it. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and claimed
easements or servitudes in the land in the question supposedly owned by Masonic. Respondents aver
that the sale was void because they were not serve the notice of the pendency of the original action to
confirm the title of said property.

ISSUE: whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of
real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration.

RULING: No, personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens
system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require
proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or
claim to the land included in the application. The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No.
496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted
and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name
to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding
would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when
the proceeding is to bar all. In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary
purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of
unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system
for the registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is
not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the
title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of
whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the
certificate issued. If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains
nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title. The
registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels
the claimants to come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no
uncertainly concerning either the character or the extent of such claims. The requirement that
personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the
foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown
claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants.
Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.

CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M. SALEEBY

 G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

FACTS: Plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city
of Manila. There exists a stone wall between the said lots. That the plaintiffs, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. The Court decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. The court also decreed the
registration of the lot. Plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate
granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. Hence, they filed a
petition. The lower court without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that,
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Legarda is the legitimate owner of the wall.

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two
persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.The primary and fundamental
purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely
upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby
has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the
present case, he may lose it all. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.
The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties.

MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL., vs. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-13479. October 31, 1959

FACTS: Plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in 1910; that upon his death
Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said plaintiffs
have always been in actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners pro-indiviso;
sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and
covered by their respective certificates of title. It appears, however, that the land in question has been
placed under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in
the name of defendant’s predecessor-in- interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant
People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation and UP acquired from the original owner a parcel of land
embracing practically all of plaintiffs’ property for which Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in its
favour. It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been registered in the name of defendant’s
predecessor-in-interest since 1914 under the Torrens system and that notwithstanding what they now
claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they
have never taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. The
court dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
RULING: Yes. our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within which to review the
decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes
incontrovertible. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards, and their action (if any) now should be
held barred by their own laches and negligence. A person dealing with registered land is not required to
go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require
him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system. "

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999

FACTS: A mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several properties,
including a parcel of land. TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged
property. Capays alleged that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan.
The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary injunction. On March 17, 1967, the
Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the
disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays' certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to
proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and the property was sold to TRB. On February 25,
1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in
the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was entered in
the bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the certificate of title
issued in the name TRB. Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for
the recovery of the property. The CFI ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272
in the name of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses. TRB
appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB sold the land
to Emelita Santiago was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in
turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to etc. CA ruled that that the non-bank respondents
cannot be considered as purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the property
subsequent to the action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not
carried over to TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees' titles, it was entered in
the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to all persons of such adverse
claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-bank respondents has a better title.

HELD: Yes. There was nothing in the certificates of title or respective predecessors-in-interest that could
have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the
face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same.
To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration,
that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands. In the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother
to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate of title were still
existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject
property had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It was not until after the
land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building their houses on the other lots when the
Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty
of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party
entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,

G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011

FACTS: During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also
acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains
otherwise. The RTC decided that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but
from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-
half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial court’s decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition. CA must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly
issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect
a partition of the properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.

RULING: Yes. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but
that rule is not material to the case at bar. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to
is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by
law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used.

LU vs. MANIPON
G.R. No. 147072 : May 7, 2002

FACTS: On May 9, 1981, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale by installment in favor of spouses
Orlando and Rosita Manipon 350 square meters of the 2,078 square-meter lot he owned, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 137911. The said [D]eed was not registered with the Registry of
Deeds.

On June 10, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(TSLAI). He however failed to pay the loan so the same was judicially foreclosed and sold to TSLAI for
P62,789.18 which was the highest bidder. The latter in turn sold the same on July 15, 1988 in the
amount of P80,000.00 to the Lu. Thereafter, Lu caused the subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots,
one of which is Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square meters covering the lot which was earlier
sold by installment to [respondents]. On 1983, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of
Manipo after the couple paid a total amount of P8,000.00 for the subject lot. The aforesaid Deed was
however also not registered.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lu is the owner of the lot.

RULING: No. Registration is not the equivalent of title.10 Under the Torrens system, registration only
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.11 It was not established as a means of
acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.12 Moreover,
the RTC and the CA have correctly ruled that the preferential right of the first registrant of a real
property in a case of double sale is always qualified by good faith under Article 154413 of the Civil
Code.14 A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the
law cannot be used as a shield for fraud. (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except when the second buyer first registers in
good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33.) Conversely, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints
his registration with bad faith

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., vs. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,

G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963

FACTS: Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and
1641 and originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. The latter sold the
hacienda. Jose Benares mortgaged the Hacienda, to the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first
mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently
foreclosed. A TCT was issued in favour of the bank. The Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P.
Benares, son of Jose Banare in instalments. Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this contract
with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank.
TCT was issued to plaintiff. Despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did
not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged
right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P.
Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale
plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land
occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot
378 in the year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the
commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began the construction
thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot
publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that, "for some reason or other and
for cause beyond comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of
said defendant"; that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 16269. According the testimony of Jose Benares, the expropriation of Lot 378 was
settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and that defendant's failure to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot 378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said
lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan. several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise
agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and that the
expropriation had not been consummated.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation
proceedings.

RULING: No. There was no evidence to support the case. The expropriation proceeding in this case was
not proved. However, Capitol Subdivision is deemed the rightful owner of Lot 378 as a purchaser in good
faith and for value. In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact
that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378.
Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the hospital site had begun, said
lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as
annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to
this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank,
which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on
November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his
rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor
on September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. However, the SC only
order for compensation to Capitol since the same had already been occupied by the hospital.

RICARDO CHENG, vs RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA JOSE & SOCORRO B. DA JOSE
G.R. No. 129760. December 29, 1998

FACTS: Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in
Bulacan. The contract made in public document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and
30 days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price.
Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and as such asked for a 30 day extension.
Pending the extension and without notice to the spouses, Genato made a document for the annulment
of the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K check with the assurance that the
contract between Genato and the spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with the
annulment and persuaded Genato to continue the contract. Genato returned the check to Cheng and
hence, this petition. Notice was not given to the spouses with regard to the recission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rescission of the contract was valid.
RULING: No, The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which is subject
to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the
suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot
be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose
spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired. Even assuming that the spouses
defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus,
Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or
resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.The contract between Genato
and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as
a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to a suspensive
condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be
cancelled or rescinded.Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein
respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer
(PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was
fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under
the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes
unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such
agreement.

In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure
of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.22 It is one where the happening of the event gives
rise to an obligation. Thus, for its non-fulfillment there will be no contract to speak of, the obligor
having failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. In fact with this
circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent, the suspensive
condition not having occurred as yet.23 Emphasis should be made that the breach contemplated in
Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to comply with an obligation already extant,
not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the event which
constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.25 If the suspensive condition does not take place, the
parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006

FACTS: Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 was issued in favor of respondent. Pursuant thereto the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued covering a parcel of land situated at
Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. On July 29, 1983, Angelina Bustamante filed
a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud,
false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded
to respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been residing since
1961.

A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands issued
an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. An ocular investigation and relocation survey
was conducted by the DENR. A report was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of
the titled property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION
of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the
physical possession of Guerrero. The Director of Lands instituted the instant action [Petition for
Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero].
[Respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition …, alleging among other things,
that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands’ petition and that the
said petition was defective in form and substance, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he
secured pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of
registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands
is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.
RULING: It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving
public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in
ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other
similar patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable
title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the court,
and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable. There is no support, therefore, to the
submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales
patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.

EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, et al.
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles
of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul
a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title. Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek
recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima
Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty.
Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners'
Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. Acting on a motion to
dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case
No. 15871. The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.

ISSUE:

RULING: We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper
case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the
continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the
ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial
in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent Judge
Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
 TEODORO ALMIROL vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS: Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land. Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol
went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon
the following grounds: 1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2. That
in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that
both spouses sign the document; but 3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale
was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without first liquidating and
transferring in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of
extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured
by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father. In view of such refusal,
Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register
of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can compel the Registry of Deeds to register the deed of sale in
question.

RULING: Yes. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. The register of deeds is entirely
precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.
The purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards.

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA

FACTS: From 1988-1989, as an engaged couple, Rogelio and Shirley started paying for a piece of land,on
which they plan to build their future home. They got married in 1990. Shirley works as adomestic helper
in Israel, while Rogelio is a seaman. Sometime between 1990-1992, Shirleyheard stories that her
husband had brought home another woman. This news was confirmed in1992, when she came home to
the Philippines.In 1992-1993, Shirley filed 2 cases against Rogelio: (1) Concubinage; and, (2) Legal
Separationand Liquidation of Property. In that same year, she learned that her husband sold their
propertyto Josefina V. Nobleza without her consent. She tried to warn the buyer about the pending
casesshe filed, but still the sale was consummated. Shirley’s petition for legal separation and separation
of property was granted in 1994.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and Josefina Nobleza was valid

RULING: No. NO, the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and Josefina Nobleza was void. Rogelio sold the
propertyin 1992, at the time when his marriage with Shirley was subsisting and that the property
wasconjugal, and part of their community property. Article 96 of the Family Code provides that“ The
administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date ofthe contract implementing
such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated orotherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.

NO. Nobleza was not a buyer in good faith. She did not exercise due diligence inchecking if the property
she was purchasing was actually ripe for selling. She did notcheck the ownership details of the property.
She did not heed the notice sent by Shirley in the form of her warning to the buyer’s sister in relation to
not buying the property since it is the subject of one of her pending cases against Rogelio.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, et al

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
FACTS: The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a
tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961)
and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3,
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their
respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands,
the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm
Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval. the respondent Judge
approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid
to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that — 1) no evidence
whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration; 2) neither the
Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement; 3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of
the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein; 4) that he was
not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and
requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment. The respondents
maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition
that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for
registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement was valid. Whether or not the heirs are the owner of
the land.

RULING: No. It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons who
had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration
proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented
nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the
compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable
proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. The assent of the
Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply
the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents. It was error to disregard the
Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the
reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor
General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IAC

G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987

FACTS: On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then
Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by
purchase from its original owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by
them tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years. The SG opposed the
petition on the ground that that registration is not possible as said land is actually already forest land
and/or part of a military reservation. TC and CA ruled that the land may have been a military reservation
in the past, but no longer. The same report Exhibit "J" relied upon by the Solicitor General goes on to
state that this "former Military Reservation" had already been "delimited and classified by our bureau
(Forestry) as alienable and disposable.

ISSUE: Whether or not a cadastral proceeding may be opened. Whether or not Pasahol acquires
ownership through continuous possession.

RULING: No. The petitioner maintains that Exhibit "J" which is the report of the District Forester
recommending approval of the private respondents' petition is a mere proposal contained in the
Proposed Land Classification Project No. 4 of Mariveles, Bataan, which has not yet been approved by the
President of the Philippines; and that unless the President upon the recommendation of the Minister
(Secretary) of Natural Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable,
its status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation
and cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public
Land Act. Therefore, it was error on the part of the appellate court to rule that the land in dispute has
been in the open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the private respondents for more than
thirty years as to entitle them to register the same and procure a title thereto because possession of an
inalienable land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. We cannot sustain the appellate
court's ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on the basis of a mere
proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot
take the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural land. To
sustain the appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from
exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain.

MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: The appellant, filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the
owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, containing 146
hectares. The Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration and
opposed the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the military
reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of the petitioner,
respondents appealed. The case was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the
petition. The petitioner has brought the case here by bill of exceptions. The petitioner presented no
documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in 1901. By the provisions of
the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only
those effects which the laws give to mere possession.

ISSUE:

RULING: No. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before
the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained
the absolute owner. In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the
public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty
or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal
title thereto.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK vs. ANIANO DAVID, et al.

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972

FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance
with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by
the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892. On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959. Land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public
character for having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is
accretion) The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in
this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. Whether or not David acquired title
thereto.

RULING: No. Yes. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot
claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre
after claiming it as their private property.

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983

FACTS: The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp". Although conceding that a "mangrove
swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. The Director of Forestry,
through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the
public domain.

ISSUE: whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the
private applicants.
RULING: CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE
LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled in the leading
case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it
being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing
that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert
it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest
therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived
from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.