CONFUCIAN COSMOPOLITANISM1

Philip J. Ivanhoe

ABSTRACT
Scholars in the humanities and social sciences are keenly aware of and
often deeply engaged with more global or cosmopolitan approaches to their
respective fields; nevertheless, theories of cosmopolitanism remain exceed-
ingly controversial and arise exclusively from Western philosophical sources.
Recently, Martha Nussbaum presented a contemporary Western liberal
cosmopolitan theory and sought to integrate it with a call for multicultural
education. In this essay, I describe, analyze, and criticize Nussbaum’s
conception of cosmopolitanism and argue that it does not sit comfortably
with her laudable advocacy of multicultural education. I then draw upon
resources within the Confucian tradition to sketch two alternative concep-
tions of cosmopolitanism, which I argue are both more powerful than what
Nussbaum proposes and better support the kind of multicultural education
she so eloquently advocates.
KEY WORDS: Confucian, cosmopolitan, cultural diversity, ideal guest, Kant,
multicultural education

God loves from Whole to Parts: but human soul

Must rise from Individual to the Whole.
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
The centre mov’d, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads,
Friend, parent, neighbor, first it will embrace,
His country next, and next all human race.
–Pope (1968, 546)2

1. Introduction
In this essay, I use Martha Nussbaum’s views on cosmopolitanism and
the responses of a number of her critics to trace the main currents within

Philip J. Ivanhoe is Chair Professor of East Asian and Comparative Philosophy and Religion
in the Department of Public Policy at City University of Hong Kong. He specializes in
East Asian philosophy and religion and their potential for contemporary ethical and social
theory. Philip J. Ivanhoe, Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong,
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, [email protected].
1
This work was supported by a grant from The Academy of Korean Studies funded by the
Korean Government (MEST) (AKS-2011-AAA-2102).
2 This poem by Alexander Pope was greatly admired by Kant, who is said to have recited

long passages from it to his students.

JRE 42.1:22–44. © 2014 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 23

contemporary Western philosophical discussions of cosmopolitanism.3

I argue that Nussbaum actually presents two incompatible views about
cosmopolitanism: the first describes cosmopolitanism in terms of a par-
ticular, Kantian-style moral principle concerning the value of persons—
this is her theoretical account of cosmopolitanism; the second describes
cosmopolitanism in terms of a particular moral response to the fact of
cultural diversity—this concerns her views on “cosmopolitan education.”4
While Nussbaum presents these two views as related to one another, with
the latter serving as a practical implication of the former, in fact, the
second account is not implied by nor sits well with the first.
Almost all of the objections raised by Nussbaum’s critics are directed
against her first view, her particular liberal theoretical account of cosmo-
politanism. For the most part, these objections overlook the distinctive
nature and importance of her second view of cosmopolitanism, the one she
uses to present her ideas about cosmopolitan education. This second view
is insightful, plausible, and important; it can and should be disconnected
from its Kantian predecessor and considered on its own merits as I shall
do below. Once I have described Nussbaum’s views and explored some
of the problems with her first account of cosmopolitanism, I draw upon
resources from the Confucian tradition to sketch two alternative concep-
tions of cosmopolitanism. I show how these not only are consistent with
but also strongly support Nussbaum’s policy of cosmopolitan education.5
I intend to show that these Confucian-inspired alternative conceptions are
more powerful and potentially productive ways of thinking about cosmo-
politanism than the first view presented by Nussbaum.
One’s conception of and view about the value of cosmopolitanism, like
one’s view of just about any other kind of value, are inextricably caught

3 Nussbaum’s essay is called “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” (1996). It and the

responses I discuss, along with several others, can be found in Cohen 1996. Her essay and
versions of several of the responses I will explore here first appeared in Boston Review: A
Political and Literary Forum (Nussbaum 1994). As noted, my concern is with a number of
influential philosophical conceptions of cosmopolitanism, but sophisticated and influential
views about and conceptions of cosmopolitanism are being explored by a wide range of social
and political theorists. For a splendid introduction to some of these, see Vertovec and Cohen
2002. Thanks to Ray Forrest for bringing this literature to my attention.
4 Nussbaum goes into much greater detail about the nature and function of such an

education in Nussbaum 1998. While I fully endorse almost all of what she says in advocating
such an ideal, I see the same tension between competing conceptions of cosmopolitanism in
this work.
5 In her response to Nussbaum’s essay “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” Sissela Bok

(1996) cites the passage from Pope which appears as the epigraph of this essay and goes
on to argue that Rabindranath Tagore, whose work Nussbaum cites to support her first
conception of cosmopolitanism, actually followed a more gradualist theory of moral educa-
tion, beginning with a child’s home tradition and then extending outward to embrace others,
which, as we shall see, is what Confucian cosmopolitanism recommends.
24 Journal of Religious Ethics

up with one’s understanding of what human beings are. Roughly speak-

ing, one’s view about what a human being is largely determines what
kinds of things one thinks human beings do or should value. If you regard
human beings as defined essentially and primarily, if not exclusively, by
their possession of abstract rational moral capacities, you will tend to see
little or no importance in the particular and contingent features of life and
instead look to universal principles and policies. If you think that human
beings are inevitably creatures tied to particular conditions, histories,
places, and traditions, then you will tend to see greater value in contin-
gent but actual features of human life: ethnicity, family, history, and
culture.6 These and other conceptions of what a human being is are
neither simply given nor ruled-out by facts about our species; each can
appeal to empirical support and each presents appealing possibilities for
how to live one’s life.
Not all versions of cosmopolitanism are appealing. For example, a
number of scholars have pointed to a form of cosmopolitanism among
well-to-do, privileged, politically unengaged global elites, what John
Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge (2003, 221–41) call “cosmocrats,”
who have few and only weak ties to any particular nation, culture, or
place. Christopher Lasch describes this class of modern cosmopolitans by
saying, “The privileged classes in Los Angeles feel more kinship with their
counterparts in Japan, Singapore, and Korea than with most of their
countrymen. This detachment from the state means they regard them-
selves as ‘world citizens’ without any of the normal obligations of national
citizenship” (1995, 46). Richard Sennett points out how this kind of
culturally anonymous attitude has begun to take hold in “physical urban
forms” (2002, 46), arguing this manifests the strong preference of a certain
kind of global corporate mentality. Sennett recalls touring the Chanin
Building in New York with Jack Welch, who was then head of General
Electric Corporation. After exploring and discussing the magnificent art
deco architecture of the building, with its ornate and highly articulated
spaces, Welch commented, “Well if the General Electric (GE) Corporation
were here you know I would tear this building down because it would
give people a sense that they actually belong here” (2002, 46). As these
comments and the essays we discuss make clear, our understanding and
estimation of cosmopolitanism are inextricably connected with more fun-
damental issues concerning the nature of human beings and the values
they hold dear.

6 These contrasting conceptions of what a self is reflect a long-standing debate between

Kant and his followers, advocating things like the principle of respect for persons as rational
agents (Moralität), and Hegelians, who champion the critical importance of particular
cultural backgrounds and practices (Sittlichkeit).
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 25

2. Nussbaum on Cosmopolitanism
Nussbaum begins her presentation of cosmopolitanism by quoting clas-
sical sources and most prominently Diogenes Laertius who claimed to
be “a citizen of the world.” It repays us to pause to consider what it might
mean to be “a citizen of the world.” Nussbaum offers several different,
potentially incompatible possibilities. For example, she claims that the
cosmopolitan is a “person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community
of human beings” (1996, 4) and someone who gives “reason and moral
capacity, our first allegiance and respect” (1996, 7). Depending on how we
understand the first view, it could describe an ideal that a wide range of
figures, religious as well as secular, embrace. For example, the Christian
ideal of agapē seems like an example of this view. If, though, we take it
in light of the second claim, which is what Nussbaum clearly intends, then
it describes a much more specific, Kantian, conception of cosmopolitan-
ism.7 On such a view, the primary and overriding concern of each person
is the rational moral capacities of others. I am to regard each and every
person as an equal member of what Kant called the “kingdom of ends.” My
first obligations and fidelity are not to my family, community, tradition,
or state—such things are “morally irrelevant” (1996, 5)—but to the “moral
community made up by the humanity of all human beings” (1996, 7).
What makes persons worthy of respect and moral regard, what makes
them human, is their status as rational agents; this is what they essen-
tially are.
There are a number of challenges, both practical and theoretical, for
such a view of cosmopolitanism. These may not be fatal, but they are
formidable. I will mention only two, before turning to the criticisms raised
by others. The first is one of many practical problems. As a matter of fact,
people live in states which require them to do things like pay taxes. The
taxes they pay are used by the state primarily to defend and support
the citizens of the state. Someone who really tried to live as a citizen of
the world should refuse to pay taxes to any “mere state.” At least in the
world we live in, this simply is not possible. Nussbaum herself pays taxes
in the United States, and this leaves her recommending an ideal that she
does not and cannot follow. One might respond by saying that such an
objection does not challenge the philosophical cogency of her position, but
the practical problem identified here points to a more basic philosophical

7 It is important to emphasize that Nussbaum’s interpretation of Kantian theory does not

begin to exhaust the range of readings that are available nor should my criticisms of her
interpretation be taken as applying to every other interpretation of Kant’s theory. Certain
aspects of Kant’s ethical philosophy are important resources for cosmopolitanism. For
example, his advocacy of a conception of disengaged reason is important for helping us to
look up from our particular conceptions of the good to search for more universal principles
and concerns.
26 Journal of Religious Ethics

issue. Kant himself insisted that ought implies can; so if states and other
kinds of social institutions are necessary in order for individuals to work
out and practice any adequate kind of moral life, this presents a profound
challenge to Nussbaum’s view. From a purely conceptual point of view, in
the absence of any kind of institutional structure it is difficult to under-
stand how one could be a citizen at all. The very notion of being a citizen
implies allegiance to some particular social group; this is what distin-
guishes citizens from aliens. If taken literally, being “a citizen of the
world” either implies the establishment of a single world government or
inclines toward incoherence.8 If we try to qualify our way out of this
criticism by saying that “citizen of the world” means only that one feels
some allegiance to the other nations, cultures, and people of the world,
then the notion of cosmopolitanism becomes more plausible but much less
dramatic and radical. All it then means is that one shows some level of
concern for the other people of the world.
Another ambiguity in Nussbaum’s conception of cosmopolitanism is
found in her notion of allegiance toward all of humanity. She draws a
contrast with “patriot” views, which entail showing preference for the
fellow citizens of one’s state, and recommends that we treat everyone in
the world equally. What, though, such equal treatment amounts to is far
from clear. Take for example her use of the metaphor of “concentric
circles” to illustrate her position (1996, 9). On such a view, we are to see
ourselves as existing in an innermost circle around which are larger and
larger circles representing close family, friends, neighbors, fellow citizens,
and ultimately everyone in the world. This is a common way people
describe the Confucian view (though one does not find this particular
image in traditional Confucian writings). Nevertheless, Confucians insist
that our first and primary duties always remain focused on families. We
extend our feelings beyond our families and out to those in the outermost
circle, but our love for them (our allegiance to them) is much less direct
or intense. Nussbaum seems to agree with this general approach when
she says the goal is to make “all human beings more like our fellow
city-dwellers” (1996, 9, emphasis added). Her view, though, is only asking

8
Establishing a single world government makes sense conceptually, but there are serious
problems with such a view. First and foremost, it undermines the celebration of diversity,
which is a key feature of Nussbaum’s view. Second, it requires that the various existing
states in the world will somehow agree to dissolve and merge into one, an aspiration that
shows no sign of being realized. Third, it eliminates the important role that a diversity of
states offers. A single world government would lack any alternative perspective or break
upon its power and easily invite tyranny. I argue that such diversity of perspective is one of
the reasons we should embrace the fact of ethical pluralism as a good thing. See Ivanhoe
2009a. Of course, the United Nations remains both appealing and plausible, but it is not a
world government; it is a formal association of states affording the governments of the world
an institution and set of procedures for meeting to discuss and adjudicate their differences.
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 27

us to treat strangers more like distant neighbors. It is less demanding

than the traditional Confucian ideal, which calls upon us to treat stran-
gers on the model of our family.9 In any event, Nussbaum’s description
here advocates nothing close to equality in affection and care for others.
It simply asks that we include others in our larger sense of the world and
remain in conversation with them. If that is all cosmopolitanism requires,
it is again a more plausible but much less dramatic and radical view than
it initially seemed to be.
In light of what has been said above, we can begin to see that
Nussbaum employs at least two conceptions of cosmopolitanism. On the
first, more radical view, cosmopolitanism expresses a specific moral prin-
ciple; human beings are first and most importantly moral individuals. As
such they owe deep allegiance to no particular people, places, religions,
cultures, or states; their ultimate and overriding allegiance is to what is
right, with right understood in terms of the duties appropriate for a
particular type of Kantian moral agent. On the second conception, cos-
mopolitanism is a moral response to the diversity of good human lives
and a call for greater appreciation of other particular people, places,
religions, and cultures.10 While Nussbaum seems philosophically com-
mitted to the first conception—and that is the part of her essay that
almost all of her critics exclusively focus upon—much of her article is
really about the second. As she presents it, this second conception is
not a view about the nature of persons or their primary allegiance as
much as it is a view about what kind of education will produce better
global citizens in light of the diversity we find in the world. I would like
now to discuss what Nussbaum calls her views about “cosmopolitan
education.”
Nussbaum argues, rightly, that contemporary students should receive
a cosmopolitan education, by which she means a broad, globally more
comprehensive education. Students should not just learn about their
own home culture and its history; they should understand and be led to
appreciate a variety of the world’s cultures. They should receive such an
education because it will help them avoid thinking that their familiar
way of looking at the world is the only one worth valuing, and it will
enrich their lives by opening up other ideas, practices, and ways of being
that they might adopt or borrow from as they work out their lives and

9 As we shall see when we describe our second Confucian conception of cosmopolitanism,

Analects 12.5 teaches that “all within the four seas are brothers” (四海之内皆兄弟也) (Kongzi
1972). The ideal for early Confucians is thus like that expressed in Friedrich Schiller’s
immortal lines in To Joy: “Alle Menschen werden Brüder, wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.”
10 One might be hostile, disappointed, or simply indifferent to the fact of ethical plural-

ism, but Nussbaum’s advocacy of cosmopolitan education seems clearly aimed at a moral
ideal that celebrates such diversity. For more on different responses to ethical pluralism, see
Ivanhoe 2009a.
28 Journal of Religious Ethics

contribute to their home culture. In the context of education, cosmopoli-

tanism is not so much opposed to patriotism as it is to provincialism.
Given the errors that such an education helps us avoid and the goods it
offers to students and those they care about, it seems clearly to be a moral
response to ethical pluralism.
There is considerable tension between Nussbaum’s endorsement of
cosmopolitanism as a moral principle and her advocacy of cosmopolitan
education. For if we regard people as equal and respect them in virtue of
their rational moral capacities alone, it is not at all clear why we need to
bother finding out about the particular kinds of lives they lead in the
different cultures around the world. If the rational moral capacities of
human beings are of such great value, then it would seem that culture,
history, and particular relationships, all those contingent aspects of life
that could have been otherwise, fade into relative insignificance. Neither
one’s home culture, particular place in the world, or the cultures and
various stories and narratives of others have any robust role to play or
contribution to make to moral life. These things still might be seen as
important in the way people think National Geographic Magazine is
important: a source of information about faraway places and the people
who live there. Some of these examples may illustrate how human
rational capacities can craft different expressions of a common set of
moral principles, but only those practices and beliefs that in fact cohere
closely with the preferred universal moral principles can serve this
purpose. On such a view, there is value in many other cultures but only
when they meet our criteria for what is valuable.11
Such a view is morally problematic, for reasons I describe below, and it
also risks presenting the task of understanding other cultures as much
less complicated and demanding than it actually is, which undermines the
approach and goal of cosmopolitan education. On such a model the task of
working one’s way sympathetically and charitably into alien points of view
and forms of life becomes reduced to recognizing a particular conception
of liberal core values in other beliefs and practices. The point is that if “the
moral point of view” is of such paramount importance, culture in all its
forms seems to be a minor issue, a kind of wrapping or window dressing
for what is really important. On the other hand, if cosmopolitanism is
understood as representing a distinctive moral perspective on the diver-
sity of good human lives and a call for greater appreciation of other
particular people, places, religions, and cultures, then the beliefs, prac-
tices, and particular histories of different peoples must somehow be seen
as having moral value.

11 I explore this set of issues, concerning what it might mean to respect a variety of

different moral traditions, in Ivanhoe 2010, 161–73.

 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 29

Think of the study and appreciation of different cultures on the analogy

of tasting and coming to appreciate different cuisines.12 On what I have
been calling the rational moral capacities view, all these different cuisines
can be reduced to a finite set of chemical principles (corresponding to
moral principles). Someone who knows the chemistry can see how this or
that flavor manifests the underlying chemistry, but it is the chemistry
that is fundamental and establishes the value of the dish. This is very
roughly analogous to how someone who grasps rational moral principles
can appreciate how they might get manifested in this or that cultural
practice.13 The practices themselves are valuable if and only if they are
manifestations of the principles. This though is not how we think about
coming to appreciate different cuisines. We tend to think that becoming
familiar with the variety of flavors and the ways in which these are
combined into different types of cuisines is itself really valuable. If
someone gives me complete descriptions of the underlying chemistry of
different cuisines I might find this interesting, but I would not find it
particularly valuable for my appreciation of these cuisines; it surely would
not be more valuable than the experience of tasting the different foods in
the world. In a way, people who think the chemistry is more important
are like people who think the recipe is more important than the meal.
They might choose to contemplate and savor the recipe, but this would
leave them clueless about which meals or cuisines are better or worse.
If cosmopolitanism is to serve a moral purpose, there must be something
of moral value in the process or achievement of coming to understand
different cultures and ways of life.
In his response to Nussbaum’s essay, Kwame Anthony Appiah voices
his concern that the kind of cosmopolitanism Nussbaum advocates seems
inclined toward the production of a homogeneous world culture (1996, 23).
Further developing the analogy I have drawn above between cultures and
cuisine, Nussbaum’s view seems to endorse the development of a single
world cuisine, a kind of culinary Esperanto.14 As she herself admits, this
universal culture is less “colorful” and inherently attractive than the
historical cultures it seeks to replace, but this is a much greater weakness
than she implies. Such a “culture” is monotonous, the cultural equivalent
of bland food. Food that is sufficiently bland no longer warrants being

12
As we will see below, when we discuss Hilary Putnam’s response to Nussbaum’s view,
a similar argument could be made by comparing the study of other cultures with the study
of different traditions of music (Putnam 1996).
13 It is important to distinguish the view I am describing here from the notion of a moral

connoisseur. The latter is someone whose appreciation and ability to distinguish flavors is
based not upon a grasp of theoretical principles but upon broad reflective experience of
different tastes. For a splendid analysis of this kind of view, see Hutton 2002, 167–86.
14 In his response to Nussbaum’s essay, which I will not discuss in detail here, Robert

Pinsky likens her view of cosmopolitanism to cultural Esperanto. See Pinsky 1996, 85–90.
30 Journal of Religious Ethics

regarded as cuisine at all, much less excellent cuisine. Similarly, a form

of life that is eviscerated and wholly devoid of characteristic human
particularity is hardly a human life at all and certainly not a good one.
If things like families, cultures, traditions, and states are not seen as
morally important and only rational moral capacities serve as the basis of
respect and admiration, it seems that cosmopolitanism becomes synony-
mous with a culture of global liberal humanism. There is deep irony here;
cosmopolitanism started out as a perspective that celebrated the marvel-
ous diversity of the world, but in the form Nussbaum argues for it
promotes a bland and monotonous uniformity.
As an alternative, Appiah suggests “rooted cosmopolitanism,” a world
in which everyone is “attached to a home of his or her own, with its own
cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other,
different, places that are home to other different, people” (1996, 22,
emphasis mine). As he notes later in his essay, the cosmopolitan not only
enjoys other cultures but “also celebrates the fact that there are different
local human ways of being” (1996, 25). This is an important improvement,
for now cosmopolitanism is clearly distinguished from Nussbaum’s brand
of humanism, which allows for if not encourages “global homogeneity.”
At least this part of Appiah’s account of cosmopolitanism does not
present cosmopolitanism as centrally concerned with morality; it is more
a kind of cultural tourism, a source of “pleasure,” something close to the
National Geographic Magazine model mentioned earlier. He goes on to
argue that states are important not only because people care about them
but because they are where people discuss and negotiate the particular
forms of life they pursue: both traditional and new.15 This seems right and
much more important; moreover, it points toward a robust role for cos-
mopolitanism. Such a view shows why one might take a justified and yet
critical pride in belonging to one particular state: for this is the political
institution in which one lives and where one struggles and continues to
struggle to work out how one wants to live. As noted earlier, this feature
of the current state of the world also has value because different states
can and do challenge and inspire one another.
Appiah’s argument could and should be extended to traditions and
other aspects of culture as well. The reason these are morally significant
is that these are where people live and construct their particular views
in the world. If one’s conception of oneself involves being a member of
a particular culture or tradition, this need not entail a lack of critical
perspective or desire to see one’s culture and tradition improve. This
would only be true if one were intensely provincial, one did not care what
others believe, feel, and do, or if one really believed that one’s culture was
more or less perfect. Even in cases where one feels a deep need to improve,

15 A more complete treatment of the subject can be found in Appiah 2006.

 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 31

one’s sense of oneself as an ethical being and the ways in which one
perceives and thinks about moral problems reflect the culture or tradi-
tion of which one is a part. This is why such institutions are inherently
valuable. It is also why a true cosmopolitan celebrates diversity in culture.
On this view, there is no single privileged culture or tradition for working
out how people should live. Nussbaum belongs to the Western Enlight-
enment tradition, and this is one among many ways to understand oneself
and work to improve one’s society. It is a tradition that has contributed to
other modern cultures as well. Nevertheless, it is only one among equals
in the eyes of rooted cosmopolitans.
Gertrude Himmelfarb presents even stronger criticisms of Nussbaum’s
view, arguing that the cosmopolitanism Nussbaum describes is not only
an illusion but dangerous. She expresses at least three different kinds
of concerns about Nussbaum’s analysis. Her first objection hinges on
Nussbaum’s attempt to describe a form of cosmopolitanism that rests
primarily on abstract moral principle and she notes that while such
principles can describe a universal morality they cannot support a state-
less community (polis) (1996, 74). The idea here is that people do not live
in a world defined by abstract moral principles but in one ordered by
actual political institutions. Only the latter offer us the mechanisms by
which to order and enforce a way of life. States are not constituted or
sustained by moral principles alone; they have particular histories and
command the allegiance of people who live in these concrete, ongoing
communities.
Himmelfarb’s second objection is that Nussbaum’s description of
cosmopolitanism is idealist both in how it describes the world and what
it hopes for (1996, 74–75). In regard to the first, Nussbaum repeatedly
appeals to things like the “world community of justice and reason” (1996,
8) and the “common aims, aspirations, and values of humanity” (1996, 9).
She further claims that one of the basic imperatives of cosmopolitanism is
the “vivid imagining of the different” (1996, 9–10). This seems to present
a tension: on the one hand we are told that people in the world already
agree about the most important parts of life; on the other hand, we are
told to imagine and appreciate differences. Himmelfarb makes a separate
but related point: there is no world community of justice, reason, and
common values. Different cultures embrace profoundly different and irrec-
oncilable ideas about morality.16 Nussbaum is not reporting how the world
is; she is projecting her own liberal values onto the world and seeking to
reform it in this image. This hardly seems like an exercise in imagining

16 Himmelfarb’s descriptive claim does not rule out the possibility of much greater moral

consensus, and there are good reasons to be a bit more optimistic than she seems to suggest
on this score. Nevertheless, her description of the current state of the world strikes me as
accurate and sobering. Others are much more sanguine about the degree and future of moral
32 Journal of Religious Ethics

the different at all. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is overly

optimistic to think that human beings will abandon their particular
cultures and histories and embrace the disembodied cosmopolitan com-
munity that Nussbaum envisions. We see very little evidence of any such
trend when we look at history or the contemporary world.
Himmelfarb’s third objection concerns Nussbaum’s conception of what
human beings are like and the kinds of things they value. A fundamental
feature of her view is the idea that people are not really attached to
parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage culture, tradition, com-
munity, or nationality. Nussbaum claims these all are “accidental” attrib-
utes of individuals and not the real locus of value (1996, 7). Himmelfarb
rejects this idea for reasons that are both empirical and philosophical. She
points out that in fact the list of supposedly accidental attributes are what
people identify as their most essential qualities and highest values (1996,
77). If you ask most people “What are you?” they will reply by saying
things like “I am a father; I am Chinese; I am a Muslim”, etc. Aside from
a few philosophers, most of whom are long dead, none will reply, “I am a
citizen of the world” or “I am a rational, free, and autonomous moral
agent.” Himmelfarb strongly implies that it cannot be any other way.
Human beings are not brought into the world as rational moral agents; we
come in as someone’s daughter or son, in particular communities, with
specific heritages, etc. As we mature, it is through these social aspects of
life, that we come to understand ourselves and others. We can choose to
alter or abandon what we are given in life, but if we do that, we do it from
a perspective that we did not choose for ourselves. It does seem hard to
imagine what life would be like for someone who repudiated everything
they inherited, someone who chose to undergo complete cultural and
historical amnesia. Nussbaum notes that the life of her kind of cosmo-
politan is lonely (1996, 15); this is an important insight and worthy of
further analysis. It makes good sense that such a life would be lonely and
deeply disorienting as well, for such a person repudiates not only their
given identity but participation in any actual human community. The
admission of loneliness vastly understates the case; it would be more
accurate to say that such people are alienated, perhaps even lost; they are
certainly more than just lonely. While Nussbaum insists on calling such
people citizens of the world, this sounds like whistling in the dark; as
noted earlier it is inaccurate and misleading, for they belong to no state.
They are unmoored, free-floating individuals, not citizens at all.
Hilary Putnam argues that patriotism and cosmopolitanism (in the
sense of universal reason) are mutually indispensable. He begins by

disagreement in the world. For example, see Moody-Adams 1997. In my view, this particular
work takes the principle of charity to excess and relies too heavily on arguments about what
one can imagine being so.
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 33

noting that Nussbaum’s rejection of patriotism is strongly reminiscent of

a commonly heard criticism of religious belief. In both cases, the basic
argument is that these have been the basis for great wickedness and so
should be abandoned. Putnam points out that this is to mistake the
pretexts of aggression and cruelty with aggression and cruelty themselves
(1996, 92). Just because people have used love of country or religious
belief for bad ends is no reason to equate such love or faith with the bad
ends themselves. Such an approach could be used to criticize anything.
People have used scissors to commit murder but scissors are not malevo-
lent nor do they always lead to or encourage murder. They should not be
blamed and banned because some people have misused them.
Putnam goes on to make two deeper and philosophically more impor-
tant points. The first is that the disembodied kind of universal reason
which Nussbaum invokes as the foundation for her form of cosmopolitan-
ism is too thin to support morality. Such a view is, in his words, “empty”
(1996, 94).17 Putnam illustrates the idea by asking how we would go about
judging good music apart from any tradition of music and in light of
universal reason alone. He makes a complementary point about particular
traditions and communities. Such things cannot serve as the absolute
standards of moral judgment any more than pure reason can. We must
and do use universal reason, as well as other methods, to evaluate,
criticize, and improve our actual historical traditions. One might add that
this is also more or less how we practice the various branches of natural
science. This part of Putnam’s view is well put by his comment, which
echoes Kant himself, that “tradition without reason is blind” (1996, 94).
We need reason to reflect on tradition, but we need tradition to provide a
target and focus for our reflections. Actual moral reasoning always is
situated within a historical tradition of one kind or another. Universal
reason is a mode or form of reflection, not an actual way of life.
Putnam defends the need for both the particular, historically embedded
perspective of tradition and the general, abstract, complement of uni-
versal reason. If we take up these different perspectives and inquire
and reflect well, he thinks we will be led to a kind of cosmopolitanism, a
perspective that will recognize certain universal features of morality while
understanding and appreciating the irreducible variety of good human
lives that one might choose to live. This will not make us citizens of the
world, but it will make us more comfortable and decent members of it;
people who are at home in one or perhaps more cultures as appreciative
guests, visitors, or students of many others. This leads me to Confucian-
ism and more specifically how we might construct a Confucian form of
cosmopolitanism.

17 Putnam’s remark here recapitulates Hegel’s famous criticism of Kant’s moral philoso-

phy in paragraph 135 of the Philosophy of Right as an “empty formalism” (Hegel 1996).
34 Journal of Religious Ethics

3. Confucian Cosmopolitanism
As noted above, Hilary Putnam argues for the necessity of both the
particular, historically embedded perspective of tradition and the general,
abstract, complement of universal reason in order to think both critically
and substantially about ethical issues. Kongzi made a similar point when
in Analects 2.15 he said, “Study without reflection is a waste; Reflection
without study is a peril” (學而不思則罔；思而不學則殆) (Kongzi 1972). We
cannot either simply chant and defend the classics or seek some abstract
Archimedean point for ethical leverage; any such point is purely imagi-
nary; it hangs in mid-air; it offers no real fulcrum. Such a view means
that any viable form of cosmopolitanism must see value in both these
perspectives.
As we saw in reviewing the criticisms of Nussbaum’s Kantian-inspired
conception of cosmopolitanism, such a view fails to provide any solid
grounding in the actual world of value; this leads to serious problems
both theoretical and practical. No such difficulties plague Nussbaum’s
discussion of cosmopolitan education, but, as argued above, this latter
conception of cosmopolitanism seems to assume that ongoing traditions
of belief and practice are critically important not just to the people who
hold them but to a plausible account of a cosmopolitan point of view.
This suggests an alternative conception: a cosmopolitan is not a citizen
of nowhere but an interested guest or visitor18 of various cultures and
ways of life who is comfortable around the world. A cosmopolitan is not
the cultural equivalent of a speaker of Esperanto but rather a fluent,
multilingual traveler who knows and appreciates the special character-
istics and tenor of different natural languages and how each offers
distinctive insights into our common humanity. This is the kind of ideal
I would like to construct by drawing upon different aspects of the
Confucian tradition. To be precise, I will describe two different versions
of cosmopolitanism each developed around a core metaphor taken from
traditional Confucian writings. These share the common quality of rec-
ognizing and appreciating the irreducible pluralism that one finds
among the traditions of the world; the two conceptions differ, if at all,
in the degree of intimacy they envisage between different cultures. I will
not argue for the superiority of either but instead offer them together
as pointing toward the possibility of Confucian-inspired conceptions and
theories of cosmopolitanism.
Our first conception of Confucian cosmopolitanism is inspired by
Analects 3.15, which says,

18 Stalnaker suggests the ideal of a “visitor” as a useful perspective for understanding

and assessing other cultures or traditions (2008, 439–40).

 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 35

When the master entered the ancestral temple,19 he asked about each and
every thing done there. Someone remarked, “Who says this son of the man
from Zou20 understands the rituals? When he entered the ancestral temple,
he asked about each and every thing done there!” When the master heard of
this remark, he said, “This is just what ritual requires.” (Kongzi 1972)21

This passage has been interpreted in different ways, but a point shared
by many traditional commentators and most contemporary translators is
the idea that in asking about the affairs of the ancestral temple Kongzi
was displaying considerable humility. As an expert in the Zhou rituals,
he would of course know about every little thing done in the ancestral
temple, but because he genuinely does not think of himself as some kind
of absolute authority, he humbly inquires about each and every thing done
in the temple.22 A further point, not inconsistent with this reading but
going beyond it and changing the focus, is that such a practice recognizes
and engages the people in the ancestral temple in an agreeable and
humane way. By asking about each and every thing in the ancestral
temple, Kongzi shows an interest in these people and what they hold dear,
and he brings them into the common cause of Zhou tradition. Such an
interpretation seems to make better sense of why such a practice would
itself be considered a ritual; it does much more than display humility, it
joins people together in an important, shared social activity.
I would like to suggest that we make something like Kongzi’s behavior
our practice and use this as a basis for our first conception of cosmopoli-
tanism. The idea is that we should sincerely inquire about the cultural
treasures of other people when we visit their countries, the religious
symbols and rituals of those we meet when we encounter them in the
course of our lives, the possessions people put on display when we enter
their homes, and the customs, beliefs, and norms they follow when we
visit and move among them. Such a practice can help us to understand
these people and the lives they live; more importantly, the very act of
asking—the ritual of inquiry—about such things will help develop as well
as express and convey our respect for and interest in them.
The guiding image behind this conception of cosmopolitanism is that
of an ideal visitor or guest: someone who comes to another’s country,
temple, home, or life with an attitude of open curiosity, a characteristically
Confucian “love of learning” (好學), and a desire for and anticipation of

19 A number of commentators believe, quite plausibly, that this refers to the ancestral

temple in Lu, which would make it the temple dedicated to the ancestors of the Zhou
dynasty’s ruling line.
20
Kongzi’s father had been an official in this town and hence is referred to here as “the
man from Zou.”
21 A short passage in Book Ten also tells us that Kongzi asked about each and every thing

whenever he entered the ancestral temple. See The Analects 10.14.

22 Compare The Analects 1.10 (Kongzi 1972).
36 Journal of Religious Ethics

experiences that will deepen not only their knowledge about but appre-
ciation of what it is to be human. Such an attitude does not see the value
of other people primarily, much less exclusively, in terms of their moral
agency; it is much more focused on the particular products of human
feeling, imagination, and reason that constitute the ongoing tradition and
culture one is visiting. It seeks to understand the complex expressions of
value and meaning instantiated in actual traditions and cultures and how
they hang together to constitute particular forms of life.
As good guests, we defer judgment, at least in most cases, about the
things we are seeking to understand until we are confident that we can
see their true significance within the larger frame of this particular form
of life. We are willing to try on, in sympathetic imagination, different
beliefs, attitudes, and practices in order to plumb more fully the depths
of our shared humanity. Such a visitor or guest does not immediately
measure every new event or experience against the norms of her home
tradition—as if this offers some absolute and universal standard. There is
nothing worse than a visitor who is always rushing to compare every new
experience with what is familiar, behaving like a child who refuses to
taste or sincerely attempt to appreciate a new dish because it does not
look like or remind them of what they eat at home.
The openness and spirit of adventure and curiosity of a cosmopolitan
does not prevent her from evaluating another culture or its practices.
Such judgments are part of what it is to respectfully consider another
point of view and way of life. Perhaps just as often, such cosmopolitans
will come to see considerable value in a particular foreign practice that
was not at all apparent on first consideration. The effect is not unlike how
we gain a different appreciation of a small patch of color when we step
back and see it playing a part within a larger and more complex tapestry,
mosaic, or canvas. The cosmopolitan as ideal visitor or guest will also
often be led to see her home culture and its various practices in new and
different lights. While one can of course question the beliefs, attitudes,
and practices of one’s home tradition without comparing them to others,
it is much more difficult to gain the imaginative traction one needs to do
so in the absence of clearly articulated alternatives. In any event, what
one cannot do without such comparison is to consider one’s home beliefs
in light of the actual existing traditions around one, many of which have
successfully served as the basis for ways of life for millennia, as is the case
with Confucianism. Since one of the aims of ethical practice and reflection
is to responsibly engage and respond to the people around us—and not
merely hypothetical or notional people—this kind of sympathetic com-
parative study seems to be a moral imperative of the first order. Without
such study and everyday practice, claims about respecting other human
beings become vanishingly thin and one risks leading a narrow, cramped,
and provincial life. This last set of points is very important and leads back
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 37

to Nussbaum’s rich and insightful discussion and enthusiastic advocacy of

cosmopolitan education. We shall return to this issue in our conclusion,
but first we must describe the second form of Confucian cosmopolitanism.
Our second conception of Confucian cosmopolitanism is inspired by
Analects 12.5, which says,

Sima Niu, feeling distressed said, “Others all have brothers; only I have
none!” Zixia replied, “I have heard the saying: Life and death are matters of
fate; Wealth and honor depend upon Heaven. Cultivated people are rever-
ently attentive and do nothing amiss; they are respectful and practice the
rites, regarding all within the four seas as brothers. How could cultivated
people ever worry about having no brothers?” (Kongzi 1972)23

This passage describes the attitude of cultivated people toward others

in terms of the notion of a shared, universal family; it encourages us to
regard non-kin, even distant strangers, on the analogy of the feelings we
have for our own siblings. This remains an important feature of contem-
porary Chinese culture within which people call and refer to one another
using familial terms such as “sister” (姐姐), “brother” (弟弟), “aunt” (阿姨),
and “uncle” (叔叔). This gives rise to our second conception of Confucian
cosmopolitanism: cosmopolitanism as the attitude of seeing other people
as part of one’s family.
At first, the familial conception of cosmopolitanism appears to be much
more demanding than the visitor or guest conception we described above.
It seems to ask us to love even strangers as much as we love our own
siblings. This, though, would be to take the analogy too literally. Confu-
cians have always insisted emotional commitment and ethical responsibil-
ity diminish as one moves out from the center of the family. We are to
extend our love, but the amplitude of love decreases as the circle expands.
As noted in our discussion of Nussbaum’s view, drawing upon classical
Stoic philosophers, she too invokes the image of “concentric circles” to
describe part of her conception of cosmopolitanism and says that the goal
is to make “all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers.” She is
on the right track with this kind of image, but this very success highlights
some of the core problems with the particular liberal conception she
advocates as her primary theoretical view. We do feel more sympathy for
and fidelity to those who live in the same city than we do in relation to
those who live in foreign cities or even in other cities within our home
nation: consider how the citizens of Boston and New York feel about
each other, especially during the height of baseball season. On the one
hand, identifying more with the residents of one’s own city is in some
tension with Nussbaum’s ideal of equal and disinterested treatment; on

23 Compare footnote 9.
38 Journal of Religious Ethics

the other hand, the appeal to our fellow-feelings for those in the same city
is rather weak, and this is brought out when compared to the Confucian
alternative.
If we try to think about and feel for other people on the analogy of
how we feel about our own siblings, we are called on to have much greater
sympathy for those we do not know. We are asked to take a more active
interest in their welfare, to be more accommodating regarding their
differences with us, and more forgiving of their faults. These features of
the Confucian perspective actually are quite familiar to most people, for
almost all of us regularly invoke Confucian-style arguments when we
deliberate or seek to persuade others to adopt our views about a range
of ethical issues. For example, if someone physically harms, mocks,
harshly criticizes, or shows inadequate understanding for or patience with
another, we often ask them to imagine how they would feel if someone
acted in the same way toward their brother or sister. It is not uncommon
for people who harbor deep and repugnant prejudices about things like
sexual orientation or race to find a way through them when they find their
own sister or daughter is a lesbian or marries someone from the race they
despise. Such appeals lose almost all of their force if we ask others to
imagine how they would feel if someone mistreated someone from their
city rather than their own brother or sister. Of course, not everyone
presented with such arguments is able to think and feel their way to
decency even with the right comparisons, but the fact is such connections
often do provide a way to reach a fair and proper appreciation of others.
In successful cases, when people come to see such prejudices for what they
are and succeed in appreciating “alien” others for the fellow human beings
they are, they achieve these ends by the welling-up and extension of moral
feelings and not the descent from on high of abstract moral principles to
straighten out the affairs of daily life.24 Confucians ask us to extend the
love, generosity, patience, and understanding we naturally tend to have
for our siblings to everyone in the world. This is a much better aim and
method than seeking to extend a sense of city fellow-feeling, for the latter
is not deep or committed enough to carry us through the difficulties that
extension entails.25

24 Mengzi was the first to develop an explicit Confucian view about the extension of

moral feelings. His view has been explored by David S. Nivison, Kwongloi Shun, Bryan W.
Van Norden, David B. Wong, and Craig Ihara. I have summarized their accounts and offered
my own interpretation in Ivanhoe 2002, 221–41.
25 It is important to recognize the amount of work required to pursue the ideal of

cosmopolitanism, and Confucian discussions of the need for and difficulties of self cultivation
are important in this regard. As noted in section 2 of this essay, the kind of cosmopolitan
education Nussbaum advocates is more challenging than it might at first seem; it requires
a serious commitment to learning about other cultures and the sympathetic cultivation of
understanding and appreciation.
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 39

Such a conception of cosmopolitanism is not unlike the earlier form of

the ideal visitor or guest. In both, we are asked to focus on and develop
greater commitment to the welfare of others, greater curiosity about
what things they value and why, greater acceptance of differences, and a
greater capacity to overlook and forgive faults. If we think of other people
as our brothers and sisters, and from a biological point of view such
distinctions really are matters of relatively minor genetic variation, we
will not only tolerate difference but come to welcome and embrace much
more of it. We will come to see many other forms of life as interesting
variations on a theme we all are trying and still learning to play. Such
differences not only are wholly acceptable but good, for they teach us
about our own humanity and common aspiration to find full and mean-
ingful lives.26

4. Conclusion
We have presented Martha Nussbaum’s analysis and defense of
cosmopolitanism, arguing that she actually offers two accounts of cosmo-
politanism: the first describes cosmopolitanism in terms of a particular
Kantian-style moral principle concerning the value of persons; the second
describes cosmopolitanism in terms of a particular moral response to the
fact of cultural diversity, what she refers to as cosmopolitan education.
Her first version of cosmopolitanism is close to the classical statement by
Diogenes Laertius, who claimed to be “a citizen of the world.” We have
argued that this view risks developing into various forms of totalitarian-
ism or lapses into incoherence, since the very notion of being a citizen
implies membership in a particular polity. Human beings do not and
cannot live in the thin air of some abstract conception of “the world”; they
do and must live in actual communities and through ongoing traditions;
they work out the forms their lives might take within such familiar
environments. We have explored a range of different criticisms that all
support, in different ways, this general objection to Nussbaum’s first
description of cosmopolitanism as a way to fill out and strengthen the
general perspective we seek to defend.
We then went on to describe two forms of cosmopolitanism inspired by
parts of the Confucian tradition. The first describes cosmopolitanism in
terms of an ideal visitor or guest, while the second is inspired by the idea
that we should regard all people in the world as our brothers and sisters.
Both these forms of cosmopolitanism avoid the kinds of problems that
were discussed in regard to Nussbaum’s liberal expression of cosmopoli-
tanism. Neither asks us to abandon our actual, historically embedded

26 I argue for such a view in Ivanhoe 2009a.

40 Journal of Religious Ethics

lives or to see others shorn of their particularity and revealed only in

the stark light of a moral conception of what it is to be a person. Rather,
they ask us to see ourselves as fundamentally connected to other human
beings, to work at extending out from our familiar ethical perspectives,
and through sympathy and imagination to take up and come to under-
stand and appreciate the perspectives of others.
In neither Confucian conception is cosmopolitanism primarily a politi-
cal ideal; it is a view about values and humanity that places the rela-
tionship between self and the rest of the world before any political order.
In this respect it is a distinctively humanistic point of view. One of the
aims of such humanistic cosmopolitanism and of ethics in general is to
responsibly engage and respond to the people around us; as noted earlier,
this kind of sympathetic comparative study seems to present a moral
imperative of the first order. This last point about what we owe one
another is an explicit feature of many ethical theories, but most do not go
on to ask what practical implications follow from such concerns and
especially in regard to education. This leads us back to Nussbaum’s rich
and insightful discussion and enthusiastic advocacy of cosmopolitan
education.
It should be clear that unlike her own liberal form of cosmopolitanism,
our two Confucian conceptions of cosmopolitanism offer clear and solid
moral justifications and motivations for the kind of education Nussbaum
so skillfully describes. One cannot be a good visitor or guest, that is, one
who recognizes the limits and contingent nature of her own views and
respects those of others, if one never visits another and does not commit
oneself to a life of reaching out to and learning not only about but also
from others. One cannot learn the virtues associated with being a good
visitor or guest well without venturing out regularly into the wide world
and finding one’s way. The cosmopolitan as ideal visitor or guest will not
only feel at home in the world, she will also be welcome in most parts of
it. Moreover, the cosmopolitan style of visiting can enrich both guest and
host; as Confucians have endeavored to describe throughout the course of
their tradition, both guests and hosts have their respective duties and
each can experience their distinctive and at times common forms of joy.27
Similarly, one cannot be a good brother or sister without actively
inquiring into the lives of one’s siblings in a way that is open, encourag-
ing, and supportive, though not always uncritical. Good brothers or sisters
devote considerable time and energy to understanding and appreciating

27
Another implication of the first form of Confucian cosmopolitanism is that there is a
corresponding set of virtues appropriate to those who serve as hosts. Among other virtues,
a cultural host will need to have patience, forbearance, enthusiasm, and creativity in order
to welcome, educate, and edify guests. A teacher of a multi-cultural curriculum will also need
to cultivate and manifest similar virtues when entertaining her student “guests.”
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 41

as best as they can the values, ideals, and practices of their siblings. They
put their shared relationship before their personal perspectives and
preferences. Even when they disagree, they will do everything possible to
avoid being disagreeable and work to ensure that they never lose sight of
the bond between them.
The Confucian conceptions of cosmopolitanism sketched in this essay
not only avoid the problems we have explored in regard to Nussbaum’s
liberal conception but also offer the outlines of an appealing model
for what cosmopolitanism might be as a moral attitude and practice.
I have not here argued to replace the Kantian moral principle behind
Nussbaum’s conception of cosmopolitanism with an alternative Confucian
moral principle; instead, I have described the Confucian view as a moral
response, not a moral theory.28 Nevertheless, almost all forms of Confu-
cianism are best understood as expressions of virtue ethics, which points
the way to a better view of the underlying theoretical foundations of
Confucian cosmopolitanism.29 Moreover, we can see the outlines of this
foundation in Nussbaum’s views about education and in the very notion of
cosmopolitanism itself. The intuitive appeal of a cosmopolitan education
lies primarily in the ways it expresses an ideal for being a respectful,
curious, well-informed, and open-minded person. In other words, the
justification for such a life lies in the appreciation of certain virtuous
dispositions or a certain kind of character. A large part of what attracts us
about cosmopolitanism is that it offers a clear sense of what it is to be a
wise and worldly person: the cosmopolitan, like Kongzi’s “cultivated
person” (君子), presents an appealing picture of a good way to be.
The two forms of cosmopolitanism I have presented here by no means
exhaust the resources to be found in the Confucian tradition. For example,
the “Evolution of the Rites” (禮運) chapter of the Book of Rites (禮記)
describes an ideal age in which, “The world is for everyone” (天下為公); in
the same work, this is called the period of “Great Unity” (大同). These
ideas served as inspirations for cosmopolitans like Kang Youwei (康有為)
(1858–1927)30 and might serve as important sources for crafting alterna-
tive Confucian conceptions of cosmopolitanism. The Ming dynasty Confu-
cian Wang Yangming (王陽明) (1492–1529) taught that in some deep sense
all the people, creatures, and things of the world are united and form “one
body.”31 He insisted that seeing the world as one body is the proper ideal

28 I earlier noted the potential value of the Kantian approach to cultivating a cosmopoli-

tan point of view (see footnote 7) and of course this is not the only way in which Kant’s moral
theory remains valuable to human beings today.
29
For my understanding of the Confucian tradition as a form of virtue ethics, see Ivanhoe
2013a.
30 For an introduction to Kang and his thought, see Hsiao 1975.
31 For an introduction to Wang and his writings, see Ivanhoe 2009b. Nussbaum briefly

notes Marcus Aurelius’s use of the same metaphor (1996, 10).

42 Journal of Religious Ethics

of every cultivated person. While the metaphysical beliefs underlying this

way of looking at the world will strike many today as implausible, there
are alternative ways of conceiving of such underlying oneness that are
more wholly consistent and attentive to our best contemporary science
and psychology than many of the views that inform contemporary con-
ceptions of the relationship between self and world (Ivanhoe 2013b). The
point is, we can be inspired by and follow his ethical vision even without
accepting the particular metaphysics he used to justify it. Wang’s view
offers yet another remarkably powerful resource for crafting Confucian
conceptions of cosmopolitanism (Chai 2011). In his case, cosmopolitanism
is more than a view about how we should relate to other human beings;
it concerns our relationship with “all under Heaven” (天下) (that is, the
world). It calls on us not to be citizens of the world, but see ourselves as
one with it.32

REFERENCES
Appiah, Kwame Anthony
1996 “Cosmopolitan Patriots.” In For Love of Country: Debating the Limits
of Patriotism, edited by Joshua Cohen, 21–29. Boston: Beacon Press.
2006 Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in A World of Strangers. New York: W. W.
Norton and Company.
Bok, Sissela
1996 “From Part to Whole.” In For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of
Patriotism, edited by Joshua Cohen, 38–44. Boston: Beacon Press.
Chai, Shaojin
2011 Wang Yangming’s Cosmopolitanism of Oneness: Graded Care and
Integral Pluralism. PhD diss., University of Notre Dame.
Cohen, Joshua
1996 For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Hegel, G.W.F.
1996 Philosophy of Right. Translated by S. W. Dyde. Amherst, N.Y.:
Prometheus Books.
Himmelfarb, Gertrude
1996 “The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism.” In For Love of Country: Debating
the Limits of Patriotism, edited by Joshua Cohen, 72–77. Boston:
Beacon Press.

32
I dedicate this essay to Bridget Dorothy Slater to welcome her into our marvelous,
challenging, and if all goes well increasingly cosmopolitan world. Thanks to Shaojin Chai,
Erin M. Cline, Michael R. Slater, Aaron Stalnaker, Justin Tiwald, and two anonymous
readers for the JRE for very helpful corrections, comments, and suggestions on earlier
drafts.
 Confucian Cosmopolitanism 43

Hsiao, Kung-chuan
1975 A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and
Utopian, 1858–1927. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press.
Hutton, Eric L.
2002 “Moral Connoisseurship in Mengzi.” In Essays on the Moral Philoso-
phy of Mengzi, edited by Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe, 163–86.
Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company.
Ivanhoe, Philip J.
2002 “Confucian Self-Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension.”
In Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, edited by Xiusheng
Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe, 221–41. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett
Publishing.
2009a “Pluralism, Toleration, and Ethical Promiscuity.” Journal of Religious
Ethics 37.2 (June): 311–29.
2009b Readings from the Lu-Wang School. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett
Publishing Company.
2010 “Moral Tradition Respect.” In Ethics in Early China, edited by Chris
Fraser, Dan Robins, and Timothy O’Leary, 161–73. Hong Kong:
University of Hong Kong Press.
2013a “Virtue Ethics and the Confucian Tradition.” In Cambridge Compan-
ion to Virtue Ethics, edited by Daniel Russell, 49–69. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
2013b “Senses and Values of Oneness.” In The Philosophical Challenge from
China, edited by Brian Bruya, forthcoming. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Kongzi
1972 A Concordance to the Analects of Confucius. Taipei: Ch’eng-wen
Publishing Company.
Lasch, Christopher
1995 The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge
2003 A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of
Globalization. New York: Random House.
Moody-Adams, Michele M.
1997 Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C.
1994 “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” In Boston Review: A Political
and Literary Forum 19.5 (October/November). Available at: http://
new.bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.html (accessed September
16, 2013).
1996 “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” In For Love of Country: Debating
the Limits of Patriotism, edited by Joshua Cohen, 3–20. Boston:
Beacon Press.
44 Journal of Religious Ethics

1998 Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of reform in Liberal Edu-

cation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Pinsky, Robert
1996 “Eros against Esperanto.” In For Love of Country: Debating the
Limits of Patriotism, edited by Joshua Cohen, 85–90. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Pope, Alexander
1968 The Poems by Alexander Pope. Edited by John Butt. London:
Methuen.
Putnam, Hilary
1996 “Must We Choose between Patriotism and Universal Reason?” In For
Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, edited by Joshua
Cohen, 91–97. Boston: Beacon Press.
Sennett, Richard
2002 “Cosmopolitanism and the Social Experience of Cities.” See Vertovec
and Cohen 2002, 42–47.
Stalnaker, Aaron
2008 “Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison.”
Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September): 425–44.
Vertovec, Steven and Robin Cohen, eds.
2002 Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice. New
York: Oxford University Press.