PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the
recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and
in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor
General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence,
this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the

January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985
at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved
of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought
of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining
her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of
our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity

as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If
said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based

on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults
and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the
Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends
of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. (Ibid.)

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (Id.)

G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the

subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy
under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiff’s evidence is utterly and patently
insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the
demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting
case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the court’s docket and an
assault on the defendant’s resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly
delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision1 and the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit." 3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 4

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children
were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint 5 for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
93-8098. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint 6 dated November 8, 1993 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological
incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last
witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits 7 dated February 20, 1998.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence)8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to
be filed thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order 9 denying petitioner’s Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner]
must controvert."10 After her Motion for Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22,
1999 Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the
defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to
take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders. 15
The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests
on the sound exercise of the [trial] court’s discretion." 16 Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to
show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without basis." 17

Hence, this Petition.18

The Issues

In her Memorandum, 19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"1) Upon the denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as
what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an
unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so
inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family
Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be
directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

"2) In upholding the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence, did
the Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner
the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February
13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58
SCRA 17)?"20

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a
demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent
weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent’s evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the
immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent
counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.

We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, 21 this Court declared that appeal -
- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave
abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and
allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:

"No appeal may be taken from:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx xxx xxx

"In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." 22

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require."23

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. 24 In Cruz v.
People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

"Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the
assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies." 25

Second Issue:

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances,

this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case falls under the exception;
that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a "patent error" or grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in

an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue."26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a
verdict.27 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. 28

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that
the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any
finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against
him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, 29 false
testimony,30 concubinage31 and deportation.32 According to him, the filing and the
prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted
not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He
contends that this "is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name
and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to the
contrary."33

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not
in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of
absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence
presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases
against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological
incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction

with his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioner’s alleged
psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

"Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by
‘psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.’
What do you mean by that?

A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time
she even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and
she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.34
 xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CHUA:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated?
Will you please elaborate on this what you mean by ‘carefree’ approximating
psychologically incapacitated?

ATTY. MIRANO:

I think we better ask the witness what he means by ‘carefree.’

ATTY. CHUA:

Okay.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child,
she wants me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the
children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor. 35

xxx xxx xxx

"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

‘ATTY. CHUA:

Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant,
did you notice any characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological
incapacity?’

WITNESS:

Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she won’t
talk to me when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her
everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think
that is all."36

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 38 Said the
Court:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use
of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." 39

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be

more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity
or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was
grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of
psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." 41
Respondent’s pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative
sexuality" is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their union.
Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect" was already existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert
testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly
failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:

"ATTY. CHUA:

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties,
meaning the husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which is
normal. That is your conclusion?

WITNESS:

They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that

they are not compatible with each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any
personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?

A. Yes.

Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly
match?

A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who

knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene.

Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call
maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?

A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally
disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried
professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.

Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?

A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just
any from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very
beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody
would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other.
They should not have got married.42

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff,
and you found out that both are normal?

A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.

Q. Normal, simply incompatible.

A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my
last page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will
not mix.

Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about
the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or
major quarrel?

A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels. 43

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

A. Yes.44

xxx xxx xxx

 Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of
those who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?

A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy. 45

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity

existing in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Because of the …

A. The incompatibility.

Q. Incompatibility.

A. Yes.46

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound
further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological
incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on

descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any
psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion47 began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true, x x x."48 The expert witness testified thus:

"ATTY. CHUA

Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material
data from the plaintiff who is the husband?

WITNESS
 A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to
interview Leni, and he said, he doesn’t know.

ATTY. CHUA

Q He doesn’t know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same
personal interview and written psychological examination on the part of the wife,
[w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile." 49

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s
character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the
former’s at least fifteen hours50 of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this
case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records
of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely
insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondent’s argument -- that because Dr. Gauzon’s testimony had never been
objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has
already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of evidence
could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.51

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine
qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence
presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52 Here, however, the totality
of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could
then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further
with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the
Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Court’s rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the
process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and
an unwelcome imposition on the trial court’s docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 53 Any
decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial
pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. 54

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or

adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from
the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of
respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which
would further clog the court dockets with another futile case. 55

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and
the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological
incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Civil Law; Family Code; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological

Incapacity; Requirements; A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—In Santos v. CA, this Court
clearly explained that “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.” Said the Court: “It should be obvious, looking
at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological
incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma’s ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’).
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated,‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina, we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be
more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personali- ties in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The illness should be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will.—In Molina, we
affirmed that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.”

[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003.]

DIANA M. BARCELONA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R.

BENGZON, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision, 1 as well as the 7
August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order 2 dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused
to dismiss private respondent’s Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a
cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon ("respondent Tadeo") filed a

Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona ("petitioner
Diana"). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 ("first petition") before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. 3 On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June
1995.

On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471
("second petition") before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 ("trial
court").chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the
second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 ("Circular No. 04-94") on forum shopping. Respondent
Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion.

The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order
("first order") deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments
in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court,
through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order
("second order") denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge
Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a
cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge
Pison held that contrary to petitioner Diana’s claim, a perusal of the allegations in the
petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeo’s right, thus giving
rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Diana’s claim that
respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison
explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without
prejudice.

Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court
of Appeals assailing the trial court’s first order deferring action on the Motion and the
second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred
in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a
cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial court’s
second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the
trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that
the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid
judgment if proven to be true.

The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To
determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or
a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there
is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without
prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata
because there is no final decision on the merits.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF

MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A
PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND
STATUS. 4

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action

Petitioner Diana’s contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is
untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal
right of the plaintiff. 5 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential
elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. 6

We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 7 The petition
alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy
Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to
the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five
children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto
Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina
Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present
time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

x x x

5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing.
Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister’s house or would play tennis the
whole day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria
and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to
temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a
little freedom from petitioner’s marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that
he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondent’s
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that
the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent’s pregnancy,
the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium
located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and

the Respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondent’s
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex "C"
and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and
the Respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with
Article 39 thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

x x x. 8

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. 9 Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action
rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
which establish the material elements. 10

Petitioner Diana relies mainly 11 on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals 12 as well
as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. 13 Santos gave life to the phrase
"psychological incapacity," a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in
this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. . . .

Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. 14

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in
Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from
the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages ("new Rules").
15 Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages —

x x x.

(d) What to allege. —A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 16
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion need not be alleged"
in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules
do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and
control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeo’s second
petition complies with this requirement.

The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent
Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner
Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court
held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of

action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege
the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done
at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev’t Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action

hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint. 18 Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment
over the case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Diana’s contention that the second petition’s certificate of
non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal
without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94. 19 Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of
Circular No. 04-94 —

1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original
pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith,
to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may
have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. 20
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of
non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the
same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping
should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to
the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself
constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the
complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification. 21

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the
omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

. . . an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to
be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in
Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more
in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to "secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first
petition’s dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471)
about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to
keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before
service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since
respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal "without prejudice."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Circular No. 04-94, 23 now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must
be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the
Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible. 24

A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects. 25 In
rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the
marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this
issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations
in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not
violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a
motion to dismiss on these grounds.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well
as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Marriage; Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; The obvious effect of the new
Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is
also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity—only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause
of psychological incapacity.—Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved
at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert
opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and
behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological
incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. Science continues to explore, examine and
explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do
not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological
disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science
even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules
require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological
incapacity. Respondent Tadeo’s second petition complies with this requirement.

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

Family Code; Marriages; Constitutional Law; The court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.—The Court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.—The guidelines
incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Same; Same; Same; Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified his illness.—We find that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although,
as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
Same; Same; Same; As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.—We
must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of
legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

Same; Same; Same; The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,
the norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless
of nationality.—In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms
used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing
at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court
granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the
lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on
November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.

Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological

incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very
immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent’s
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and

jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after
the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his
family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he
never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code
of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should
petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around
and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code?7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being
a Japanese national.

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity
to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
 obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support
his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did
not care at all to see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an
actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have
been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—The guidelines governing the application of psychological incapacity are: (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755 [2000])

There could be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no

showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. (Id.)

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven
(7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
 In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving

appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of

nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed
by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio

Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayoras maximum.
 SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration
of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial
court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law,
and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does
not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the
first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal
intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in
the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was
in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by
his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the

annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and
423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all
intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under
the eyes of the law, never married." 24 The records show that no appeal was taken from
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In
the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued
and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements; In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, the elements of

bigamy were laid down.—In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4)
the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.

Same; Same; Same; Declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage.—There was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage
as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under
the eyes of the law, never married.

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; The certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best evidence
of its contents.–This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by
a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents.
The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for
the validity of a marriage; The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.–The
marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for
the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.–Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of
the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bigamy; A marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.–As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two witnesses).–Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and
formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any
male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The

Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable
her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He
further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no
record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack
of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS

ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
 (1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies

the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to
prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister
of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National

Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila
on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to

the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent
for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter,
Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage
to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s

valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since
a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond
between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein
the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present
in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard
for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.
Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When
an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic
social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court
which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Note.–Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (Hernandez vs. Court
of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 [1999])