Chapter 7.

PERSONAL IDENTITY AND IDENTITY OVER TIME

“The Ship of Theseus” is a puzzle about the identity of a thing over time. A similar puzzle involves the identity
of persons over time. This is a deep and abstract metaphysical question that cuts to the very heart of the
concept of personhood and the numerical identity of persons over time. As a fundamental metaphysical
question, the issues at stake are quite different than “seemingly” similar discussions within sociology or
anthropology. The “sociological” enquiry focuses on issues such as race, religion, sexual orientation, creed,
politics, self-definition, self-ascription, values, and so on. However, the metaphysics of personal Identity is
concerned with a quite different set of questions—questions that areontologically primordial and fundamental
to the identification of (and conceptual content of) persons qua persons. This means, in part, that any
anthropological or sociological notions of the “self” or “self-definition” are ontologically secondary, and thus
are to be settled only after establishing a theory of the metaphysics of personhood and the numerical identity of
persons as such. Two primary types of questions are at issue: (1) “What is the ontological grounds of
establishing personhood as such?” (2) “How is numerical Identity of persons over time possible?” That is,
“How is it that a distinct individual remainsnumerically the same person over time?”

We can understand the first question as pertaining to the metaphysics of persons qua persons, or persons as
discrete individuals. In other words, the issue pertains to the metaphysics of personal identity in general. The
second question, which is fundamentally related to the first question, pertains to numerical identity of persons
over time. It is concerned with how one and the same individual persists over time so as to retain numerical
identity and distinctness.

Consider the following example. Let us suppose that Sherlock Holmes lives to be 105 years old. On his
104th birthday he is surrounded by friends and family as he opens up a very large photo album. He begins to
point to various pictures, such as a young boy. He proclaims: “This is me with my famous Aunt Charlotte
Holmes when I was just a boy of six years.” Flipping a few pages, he points to another picture in which he is
surround by a group of boys on a lawn. He says, “Yes, this is me at my private prep school. Look, this chap
over here was my mate, and this chap over here was my rival, ha…ha…what fun we had.” Turning a few pages
he points to a university photo of himself at age 20, explaining that he was at Oxford studying every type of
science and that criminal science (at that time) was a new discipline. He next turns to a photo of himself much
older at Scotland Yard, and proclaims that he photo was taken after he caught a jewel thief who had
flummoxed the police for months. In the next photo he is around 50 years old, with Watson. They just arrested
the evil Moriarty, Homes’ arch nemesis. Page by page, the 104 year old Holmes describes the events in the
pictures, proclaiming that it is he, Sherlock Holmes, in each and every picture—despite the photo album
spanning a period of time exceeding one hundred years. As he shuts the book, he proclaims: “These photos are
all of me! They represent each period in my life, starting with my childhood and ending with the present day.”

In respect to the metaphysics of personal identity, let us consider the following: What makes all of those photos
represent the agency and person of exactly one individual, Sherlock Holmes? How do all of the discreet
periods of time depict one and the same person? In what does his identity as a numerically enduring individual
consist? How is it that his identity and agency persists over time? Do we really know that numerically one
person is depicted in the photos (and not, say, one hundred different individuals)? Why do we think that the
photos all depict just one person? Is there a theory of personal identity that can help us analyze these
questions? Let us begin analyzing theories of personal identity, starting with Rene Descartes.

Personal Identity and “Immaterial Substance” Theory

Descartes gives us one of the first theories, within the Modern period, of personal identity. In his Discourse on
Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes unveils his infamous “Substance Dualism.” In so
doing, he devises one of the most infamous theories of personal identity, as well as the beginning
of Philosophy of Mind. Descartes makes an ontological distinction between two radically different and
dissimilar types of substances. A “Substance” designates that which has independent existence and needs
nothing else for its existence. Properties of various kinds “adhere in” substances. Descartes divides everything
in the universe into two categories, two different types of things that are fundamentally (and in their
quintessential constitution) radically different from one another—namely, “Material Substance” and
“Immaterial Substance.” Let us explicate each in turn.

Descartes conceptualizes everything that we normally describe as “material” or “physical” under the category
“Material Substance.” This category will include all of the normal things that we see, feel, sense, taste, and
perceive—such as tables, chairs, the earth, the sky, the stars, plants, animals, fish, bodies, buildings, and so on.
This category will include everything within the “hard” sciences—physics, chemistry, and biology. Material
things, on Descartes’ view, are primarily characterized by being extended in space and time, occupying a
location, and having perceptible qualities (such as force and/or energy). This category would include our
physical bodies, our “brains” (and other bodily organs), as well as pretty much everything that is described my
science. Consider, for example, a toothpick. It is an “extended” thing, with particular qualities such as: weight,
dimensions, shape, size, and location. It is fully analyzable in terms of science; it is also understood by our
sense perceptions. The same could be said of a car, a person’s arm, a lake, a bird, a river, and so on. All of
these items fall into the category of “Material Substance.”

On the other hand, however, Descartes tells us that a radically different type of substances exists, namely
“Immaterial Substance.” Immaterial substance is quite difficult to describe. According to Descartes
Immaterial Substance is identical with our minds, comprises our identities as persons, and allows us to persist
over time. Immaterial Substance has various modes of existence, such as thinking perceiving, imagining, etc.
However, immaterial substance is not part of our physical bodies. It is not associated with our “brains.”
Immaterial substance, in fact, has no physical aspects whatsoever. It has no location, no weight, no dimensions,
no extension in space and time, no weight, no volume, no physical or material attributes at all whatsoever.
Thus, it has a radically different constitution so as to justify its being different in kind, completely and entirely
dissimilar to material substance.
“Immaterial Substance,” according to Descartes, is so dissimilar to Material Substance that we can correctly
say that it is diametrically opposite to (or opposite of) material substance. It has no material aspects /
characteristics in any way. It is not extended in space and time. It has no size, shape, mass, volume, density,
location, etc. Its operations seem to be outside of (or independent of) the laws of nature as we know them.
Mental substance is not the brain, or any part of the body. However, its essential attribute is ‘thought’ or
‘thinking,’ which manifests itself as affirming, denying, perceiving, willing, and imagining. Immaterial
substance, according to Descartes, causes the human ‘body’ to move, or act, or interact with the material
world. Yet, it is (somehow, and in some inexplicable way) independent of all material forces and laws. For
Descartes, this ultimately means that the “mind” is Immaterial Substance.”

Descartes’ view is that the “self” or “I” or “ego” is Immaterial Substance, a “thinking” (but non-bodily)
“thing.” The self is a disembodied “mind” or “soul.” The self, for Descartes, isnot material; it is not the “brain”
or any bodily organ. One’s identity as a person pertains entirely to the “Immaterial,” and, hence, is not subject
to any scientific law of nature. Laws of nature govern the material / physical world, but not Immaterial
Substance. Despite its immateriality, the self / mind / soul causally “interacts” with the material world,
including one’s body. (Explaining how this is possible will ultimately be one of the key downfalls to this
theory.)

The self‘s identity on Descartes’s view consists in its being an “immaterial” or disembodied “thing” that is not
subject to any “change” in a material sense. One’s identity as a person remains numerically identical over time
in virtue of being the same immaterial stuff (or soul) over time. Considering our case of the infamous Sleuth
Sherlock Holmes, his identity consists in his having a “mind” or “soul,” which is Immaterial Substance. His
identity does not consist in his body, brain, or Nero-processes. Put in “religious” language, he has a soul that
gives him individuality, allows him to think, and bears his identity over time. He is identical with the
immaterial substance that is his essence. His body is not essential to him in any way. No particular beliefs or
memories (or any mental content of any kind) isessential to his identity as a numerically persisting individual.
His identity consists in his having or being an Immaterial Soul.

Key Problems for Immaterial Substance Type Theories

Immaterial substance theories are not accepted by contemporary philosophy or contemporary science. The fact
that they are out of the possible scope of scientific analysis is sufficient to rule them out as plausible theories.
The most pervasive problems with immaterial substance theories, as expressed by philosophers from the
seventeenth century onward, can be stated as follows: (1) Immaterial Substance is mostly characterized by
what it isn’t, and is quite elusive when trying to characterize it in non-negative terms. It is, in a nontrivial
sense, incomprehensible. This bodes poorly for any theory, particularly a theory of the self. (2) Infamously,
how is it possible for two radically different types of things—one being “material” and the other being
“immaterial”—to causally interact? This is called “The Causal Interaction Puzzle.” (3) If immaterial
substance theory is outside the scope of science by definition and in principle, is it a legitimate theory for
twenty-first century thinkers? It was surely acceptable in the Dark Ages where superstition reigned and science
was forbidden. But is it plausible in a civilization premised upon science?
Immaterial Substance was characterized mostly in negative terms as “not” having any material or physical
aspects. It has no extension, no size, no shape, no mass, no volume, no weight, no density, no location, no
position in space and time, no atoms, photons, elections, etc. This is quite peculiar since everything in the
universe is essentially characterized in such scientific terms (--even “dark matter” and “dark energy--). Thus, it
is totally and completely mysterious as to “what” Immaterial Substance is. We know a bit about what it isn’t,
but virtually nothing about what it is. One of Descartes’ former students, Elizabeth of Bohemia, wrote a letter
to Descartes claiming that his conception of “Immaterial Substance” was essentially a conception of
“nothingness.” How is Immaterial Substance different from Nothingness? Descartes, essentially, has no
answer. He says a bit about what it does, namely thinks, perceives, and has volition. But this might be even
more problematic, as it gives rise to the causal-interaction puzzle.

The “Causal Interaction Puzzle” is probably the most problematic aspect of Descartes’ Substance Dualism.
This problem renders his theory of the mind utterly unacceptable, as well as his theory of personal identity.
The puzzle asks a fundamental (but quintessential) question: How is it possible for two totally and completely
dissimilar kinds of things, one material and the other immaterial, to casually interact? All causal interaction
known to human knowledge and science involves two material things interacting. Interaction between the
material world and some mysterious “Immaterial” what-not (--whatever exactly it is--) plays no role in science
or human understanding.

Take any two “things” in the universe that “interact” and the story will always be about two material things
interacting according to the laws of physics. Suppose someone’s “hand” picks up a “bottle of water.” Both
the hand and the bottle are material, physical things. The interaction between the two will be fully analyzable
in scientific terms (--gravity, velocity, weight, size, volume, etc.--). Let us consider another example, “the
mind.” According to contemporary neuroscience the “mind” is associated with the brain. The brain is 100%
material and physical (--according to science--). A “mental-state,” such as “being-in-pain,” is analyzed in terms
of “brain-states.” That is, the explanation will involve a story about neurons firing, electrical charges, and
chemical reactions. Explaining “what is causing the pain” will be an analysis that is totally and completely
material and physical. On Descartes’ view, however, the “mind” is not the brain. Hence, explaining a “mental-
state” would not involve any description of the physical happenings in the brain. For Descartes, mental-states
are not brain-states. Descartes insists that the mind is not the brain, nor the body, nor chemicals in one’s head.
The mind is immaterial, and thus allbrain-states and states of consciousness are totally and completely
immaterial. Somehow the immaterial causes “pain” sensations. How this happens is a mystery of unfathomable
proportions.

The problems, as we have analyzed them, involve a fundamental problem—namely “Immaterial Substance” is
incompatible with our best scientific theories. When building a philosophical theory, it is by far “standard
practice” to have a theory that is compatible with current scientific understanding. Since Immaterial Substance
is outside the scope of science and human understanding, it stands upon very shaky ground. Few philosophers
contemporaneous with Descartes accepted Substance Dualism. It is considered a degenerate theory and an
unpromising line of research. Let us turn to Thomas Hobbes, as his theory is often deemed “commonsensical.”
“Sameness-of-Body” Type Theories of Personal Identity

The British empirical philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, disagreed with Descartes and proposed a “commonsense”
and “practical” theory of personal identity. Hobbes is a materialist. According to Hobbes, there is no such thing
as “Immaterial Substance.” Only one type of substance exists: namely, “Material Substance”—which refers to
the material, physical world. Hobbes’ materialism contrasts sharply with Descartes’ Dualism, generating a
radically different kind of philosophy. In respect to “personal Identity,” Hobbes argues for a “Sameness-of-
Body” theory. The problems for Descartes, as adumbrated above, are nonexistent for Hobbes. He does not
posit “Immaterial Substance,” so he does not have an unintelligible or unanalyzable category. Nor does his
view suffer from the causal interaction puzzle. Hobbes’ view is fully compatible with contemporary science.
All bodies, events, happenings, etc. are explained at a material level in accordance with the laws of nature as
we know them.

The sameness of body theory conceptualizes one’s identity in terms of being a unique material thing, and that
numerical identity is possible because an agent is the same bodily-thing or material “stuff” over time. Using
our previous example: The elderly Sherlock Holmes looks over his photo album and says that it is all ‘him’ (--
numerically one and the same individual--) in virtue of being the same “body.” His identity is grounded in his
being a lump of physical material stuff, which we shall call “body.” Homes’ body is a persisting material thing.
He has (essentially) the same body at age 15 as he does at age 90. He might gain or lose a few bits of stuff as
he gains weight or loses weight, but he is essentially the same body over a stretch of time. Homes can admit
that his body changes from time-to-time. For example, he is bald at age 104, and he is certainly one inch
shorter than he was at 20; but he is essentially the same “material-stuff.” He has essentially the same body.

Hobbes views his theory as ‘commonsense.’ The “Sameness-of-Body” theory says that individuating
numerical persons is a matter of counting bodies. Other persons have different bodies. Take, for example,
Samantha Carter. She is a retired eye doctor. Her body is different than her colleague Dr. Ozwald, thus she is a
different person than Ozwald. Her unique body gives her a unique identity. In analyzing her, a “Sameness-of-
Body” theorist would say: Yes, Carter has more moles and wrinkles than she did as a teenager, but she is
essentially the same lump of stuff as she was back then. She has the same body. And when she turns 100, she
will change even further. But such a change in appearance is not important. She will be the same persisting
lump of “matter.” Her identity, as with all persons, resides in her being the same material thing over time.

Problems for the “Sameness-of-Body” Theory of Personal Identity

Most philosopher unanimously agree that Hobbes’ (or a Hobbesian style) “Sameness-of-Body Theory” is a
definitive improvement over Descartes’ Immaterial Substance theory. Hobbes’ theory enjoys a number of
advantages: It is easy to understand; it is rooted in everyday thinking and “commonsense;” it does not face any
of the objections dogging Descartes’ theory. Some contemporary theorists believe that a modified version of
Hobbes’ view is quite acceptable. Nevertheless, Hobbesian “Sameness-of-Body” type theorists face several
non-trivial objections.
In evaluating and testing highly theoretical material, both physics and philosophy utilize “thought
experiments.” These are not experiments done in a lab, but rather in one’s mind (or in one’s imagination).
Thought experiments are strategies of the imagination (or “thought”) used to investigate and analyze
theoretical material. They are crucial tools in a variety of fields, including economics, mathematics,
philosophy, and the sciences in general, most especially physics. Galileo, Sir Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein,
Niels Bohr, and many other theoretical physicists utilized ‘thought experiments’ to test and explore theories—
especially our most prized theories in use today (--such as Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics--).
Philosophy utilizes the same mode of theoretical examination. Thought experiments are a key philosophical
tool. In analyzing “Sameness-of-Body” theory, as well as many others, it is necessary to utilize thought
experiments.

A popular objection to Sameness-of-Body type theories involves a scientific and factual issue. This critic
claims that the theory is factually wrong; it challenges the claim that we (in fact) are the “same” lump of stuff
over time. Normally, this objection claims that “science” has proven that all persons are losing cells at a rapid
rate and that every person has completely “new” cells every seven years. On this view, each person sheds cells
rapidly, acquiring all new “stuff” every seven years. If this objection were true, then Sherlock Holmes at age
35 is composed of entirely different “stuff” at age 43. If Sherlock Holmes lost every atom in his body and
gained entirely new atoms over the stretch of 7 years, then he must be a “new” person every seven years. This,
at least, is what the complaint states. Holmes’ “identity” over time does not persist, especially not in the way
that a sameness-of-body theorists claims. Therefore, the theory is scientifically false.

This objection has some merit. However, it is actually not true to the best scientific analysis of human cellular
degeneration. Thus, it is not a compelling or damaging objection. Our best science tells us that each individual
human being loses many cells and gains many new cells during life. However, the rate of loss and replacement
varies, depending upon what anatomical structure in question. Cells degenerate at different rates depending
upon the organ at hand. Some are lost quickly while others are lost very slowly or not at all. The claim that
every cell is replaced every seven years is not accurate. Scientifically speaking, the “typical” loss of
stuff criticism is misleading and rests upon hasty generalizations and falsehoods. However, let us ask: If it were
true that every cell was lost and replaced every seven years, is this a genuine challenge for a sameness-of-body
theory of personal identity?

A contemporary analysis of the sameness-of-body theory typically adds another quintessential element to the
theory, namely a clause that connects “identity” to an agent’s DNA (--or bio-genetics / biometrics--). Linking
an agent’s “identity” to DNA modernizes the theory in a way that eradicates the “loss of stuff” objection. An
agent’s identity is quintessentially woven into a story involving DNA and biometric factors, which eliminates
any talk of “loss of stuff,” regardless of the alleged seven year timeframe. What matters, of course, is that an
agent is the same DNA stuff that persists over time. Using our example, Sherlock Holmes has the same
geneticics at age 2 as he does at age 90. Specific “cells” or “atoms” no longer play a role in the theory. What
matters is that Holmes is genetically the same over time.
Since each person displays a different genetic profile, identity is quintessentially tied to biogenetic factors and
DNA. Counting and individuating “persons” is a matter of specifying different lumps of DNA-stuff. Some
critics press the theory and demand that some “further” element be added to account for identical twins or
duplicates. If we stipulate that Holmes as an identical twin, it is believed that some further distinguishing
element is need to establish identity. This objection, once again, fails to take into consideration the scientific
facts about identical twins, namely epigenetic factors. Identical twins have verysimilar genetic profiles, but
they are not “identical” in the right way implied by the objection. Epigenetic factors are present in identical
twins, deflating the view that they are 100% identical.

A hypothetical objection, however, could be raised if one focuses upon “clones.” Consider the following: The
evil Dr. Moriarty, “clones” Sherlock Holmes. In this case, it would seem as if we do, in fact, have two
biometrically identical lumps of DNA-stuff. Suppose, further, that no epigenetic factors could be introduced to
“distinguish” one from the other. The objection, now, seems to have teeth. It is likely that the Sameness-of-
Body theorist would invoke some distinguishing principle, such as environment or “causal” history. Within
scholarly debate, many ideas have been proposed. How far one should go in defending the theory depends
upon how much one is committed to the Sameness-of-Body theory. There are good reasons to be wary of any
Hobbesean style theory of personal identity. John Locke (1632-1704) was quite apprehensive of Hobbes’
theory and believed that it was looking for “identity” in the wrong place. Personal identity, a Lockean style
theorist would say, doesnot consist in the sameness of “stuff” (genetic or otherwise).

In a dazzling thought experiment called “The Prince and The Cobbler,” John Locke famously tried to show
that Hobbes’ theory was misguided and that identity does not track “stuff.” Locke asks us to image a fantastic
scenario in which a haughty 18 year old prince goes to sleep in his palace, enjoying every comfort the palace
has to offer. The prince stretches out and quickly falls asleep. On the other side of town, in a small dingy
workshop, a 60 year old cobbler (--shoe maker--), also stretches out, exhausted from his day’s labor, and curls
up with a dirty blanket and falls asleep. As each drifts into a deep slumber, something unbelievable happens;
by means of wizardly, sorcery, magic, or whatever you care to imagine—the “consciousness” of the prince (--
complete with all of his memories, personality, and so on--) is transported into the body of the cobbler; and the
“consciousness” of the cobbler (--complete with all of his memories, personality and so on--) is infused within
the body of the prince.

Upon awakening, the body of the prince awakens (--complete with all of the mentality of the cobbler--), looks
around the majestic palace. In shock and horror, utterly nonplussed, the old man looks into a mirror and sees
the youthful countenance of the prince. Terrified, the youthful “body” of the prince (infused with the
consciousness of the cobbler) sneaks out of the palace and runs towards the workshop.

Upon awakening, the “body” of the cobbler awakens (--with the mentality of the prince--). Shocked and
horrified at the dingy workshop, the “body” of the cobbler throws the dirty blanket aside, gazes into a mirror
with utter horror, and dashes towards the palace. Approaching the palace guards, the elderly looking peasant
calls to the guards, insisting that he is the prince. Laughing, the guards gawk upon an elderly looking man and
threaten to up him in chains.
Locke’s musing story of “The Prince and the Cobbler” requires that we reflect and ask: “After the ‘mind swap,’
who is who?” Hobbes’ Sameness-of-Body theory (in whatever form one prefers) demands that we assert:
“The body of the prince is the prince, and the body of the cobbler is the cobbler.” Hobbes’ theory does not
allow for any other answer. Let us say that T1designates the time before the mind-swap, and T2 represents the
next day, the time after the mind-swap. The Sameness-of-Body theorist maintains that personal identity it tied
to body. Hobbes’ theory gives no consideration to “mental content” or any “psychological” factors. When
looked at from that point of view, nothing interesting has taken place in the story. Hobbesian materialists do
not consider “memory” or “consciousness” as part of the identity equation.

Therefore, at T2 the “body” of the prince is the prince, period. The theory does not permit us to consider mental
content, memories, and consciousness. In like manner, at T2 the body of the cobbler is the cobbler, period.
Again, we have no reason to consider mental content, memories, and consciousness. Locke believes that
analyzing the story in such a manner is counter-intuitive and wrongheaded. A Lockean type theorist would find
the results of a Hobbesean perplexing. It seems as if commonsense and basic intuition would lead us to think
that at T2 the body of the prince contains the identity of the cobbler, and the body of the cobbler contains
the identity of the prince. If this is the correct way to analyze the situation, then a Hobbesean sameness-of-body
theory of personal identity must be wrong. Many philosophers believe that Locke’s example is dead-on and
illuminates a deep and devastating problem with any version of a Sameness-of-Body theory. What actually
comprises identity, Locke holds, is “Psychological Contiguity” or “Psychological Connectedness,” something
completely discarded on a Hobbesean interpretation.

Lockean Style “Psychological Contiguity” Theories of personal Identity

Contemporary philosophers seem to strongly prefer some version of a Lockean-Style Psychological Contiguity
Theory. The story of the “Prince and the Cobbler” is designed to elicit a “reaction” that the Hobbesean theory
“gets it wrong.” A Samness-of-body analysis seems to give us the wrong result. Most philosophers and
laypersons using commonsense hold that at T2 the prince is in the body of the cobbler, and the cobbler is in the
body of the prince. The key, here, is that one’s identity “goes” where one’s mind and consciousness
go.Identity, on this view, tracks psychological contiguity, not body. Hobbes’s theory gets it all wrong by
insisting that body is the source of personal identity.

Locke maintains that an agent’s identity consists in consciousness and the ways consciousness is continuous
(or contiguous) over time. Unanimously, all Lockean-style theories hold that memory is quintessential to
personal identity. The “connections” within consciousness that constitute “continuity” or “contiguity” is
(primarily) memory. Memory is one of the quintessential features that determines identity for it provides the
crucial “links” that makeup contiguity. Turning once again to Sherlock Holmes, we can say that the photo
album we examined earlier, containing numerous time-slices of Holmes, all comprise numerically one and the
same individual because each photo is connected, psychologically to the “whole” psyche and psychological
makeup of Holmes. Each photo depicts a point on the timeline, which recalls memories, feelings, attitudes, and
mental postures appropriate to the episode in the photo. Moreover, the photo itself is part and partial of Holmes
entire psychological history (--of which he is aware and in firm possession of--). When he looks over his photo
album, pointing to different time-periods—his 10th birthday party, his first big case, his finding the jewels, his
retirement party, etc.—he is remembering different episodes in his life. He is psychologically connected (--
primarily through memory--) to those different periods; his consciousness flows contiguously over time to the
present moment.

He is psychologically “continuous” with / “contiguous” with / “connected” by the memories that compose his
psychological history. What makes an agent numerically one and the same distinct individual is the fact that
the agent has a consciousness that flows from the past to the present, which in turn flows contiguously into the
future. The psychological distinctness of each agent pertains to the unique psychological history of each
individual.

Let us reconsider our example of Samantha Carter, the eye-doctor. At age 75, Dr. Carter looks back upon her
life:

Consider the timeline above. At T1 Samantha has fun at her fifteenth B-day party; at T2 she recalls her
graduating High School; at T3 she remembers the stress of medical school; at T4she remembers being
considered the top eye doctor by other professionals; at T5 she recalls retiring; and at T6 she enjoys moving to
Florida and basking in the sun. From the vantage point of the present, T7, Dr. Carter remembers it all and tells
the story of her life to her grandchildren. It is all her, Dr. Samantha Carter. The timeline represents
exactly oneperson, numerically one person (--Dr. Samantha Carter--). Her identity does not consist in her
possessing Descartes inexplicable “immaterial substance;” nor in her having the samegenetic-stuff over time.
Rather, her identity arises out of her psychology, which is connected (primarily) by memory, over time, to the
present moment.

For a Lockean style theorist, it is crucial to spell out, as explicitly as possible, the term “Connectedness.” This
is a point of dispute. What is meant by Connectedness? How “strong” do the connections have to be in order
for an agent to maintain a distinct identity and numerical sameness over time? Lockean style theorists
unanimously agree that “connectedness” must pertain to memory. In our example, Samantha Carter
“remembers” everything in the timeline, telling each event to her grandchildren. But what if the memory links
fail or become faint? The philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) launches a complaint against Locke on
exactly these grounds. His objection goes, roughly, as follows:

The timeline above represents the life of an old general. At T1 he was a young school boy who got caught
stealing fruit and was flogged by his father. At T2 he was a brave young officer at the beginning of his military
career. At T3 he was victorious in capturing the enemy’s standard and winning the great battle. And at T4 he is
an old, retired General looking back upon his life. Now, says Reid, let us assume the following: The Old
General remembers capturing the Enemy’s Standard (C=D); the officer who captured the enemy’s standard
remembers being a young Brave Officer (B=C); the Brave young officer remembers being a boy who stole
fruit (A=B). Given the links of identity just established, plus The Law of Transitivity, it logically (or
mathematically) follows that (A=D). The Law of transitivity can be stated thus:
 The Law of Transitivity:

1. A=B
2. B=C
3. C=D
4. Therefore: A=D → (Logically follows from 1-3, via The Law of Transitivity)

However, let us imagine that the old general does not recall stealing fruit as a young boy and then being
flogged. This would mean that A≠D, which would be a violation of The Law of Transitivity. Since The Law of
Transitivity is definitely true, it follows that Locke’s theory must be false. Any theory that violates The Law of
Transitivity must be false. Reid believed that he dispatched Locke’s theory with this argument. Should we
accept Reid’s conclusion?

Reid’s objection is notorious and considered damaging by anti-Lockean theorists. Reid’s objection is
compelling if and only if his conception of “connection” is realistic, true to human psychology, and logically
coherent. As it turns out, Reid’s objection demands that the “link” between memories is (1) perfectly
transparent, (2) perfect in quality and quantity, and (3) infallible. In other words, his objection only caries
weight if we have one hundred percept crystal clear memories of each and every event within life from
childhood to the present. But we should ask: Is one hundred percent total recall realistic of (--or even possible
for--) human psychology? Such “connectedness” is, unquestionably, far too strong; it is stronger than anything
Locke or Lockean-style theorists would assume or propose. One might even accuse him of committing a
logical fallacy, such as the fallacy of strawman. Anyone who has any training in psychology, not to mention
commonsense, would agree that the proposal is absurd, as nobody has a perfect memory. It is utterly absurd to
assume that the average human being has total recall in respect to her psychological history. Memories fade,
get distorted over time, etc. Yet, we do not deem such shading a problem, no less a loss of identity.

Reid’s complaint is seemingly devastating, as it is setup to give the impression that Locke violates laws of
logic. However, upon close analysis it seems quite unimpressive. It is unrealistic (and in contrast to
neuroscience) to believe that each agent must have a “connection” to every memory that is perfect, crystal
clear, one hundred percent accurate, and similar to an “instant replay” (--to borrow a metaphor from sporting
competitions--). If the old General remembers a great deal of his childhood, but merely forgot one instance or
episode involving youthful discipline, then most philosophers and psychologists would understand the
situation as “normal” and unsurprising. Only a radically false conception of human memory would premise an
objection upon an assumption of totally perfect, crystal clear recall. We will all forget one event or another,
especially as we enter into old age. Whatever the “connectedness” requirement stipulates, it would be way too
stringent to require one hundred percent total recall of every event in one’s life. Medical science will explain
that this is not the way the human mind / memory works. While Reid’s objection is superficial and
unimpressive, there are other possible objections that might illuminate problems or puzzles for a Lockean Style
theorist.

Teletransportation and Puzzles For A Lockean-Style Personal Identity Theorist

Most philosophers believe that some type of a Lockean-style Psychological Connectedness Theory is most
promising, as it seems to accord with many of our commonsensical intuitions about personal identity, as well
as neuroscience and contemporary psychology. A Lockean-Style theory is not susceptible to any of the
objections leveled at Descartes “Substance Dualism,” or the paradox contained within the “Prince and the
Cobbler” thought experiment. Personal identity, as we understand it, appears to
track memory andpsychological continuity, not simply DNA/genetic matter. In debating the merits of a
Lockean-Style theory, the typical and usual complaints revolve around the theorist’s ability to layout and
defend the necessary and sufficient conditions for “connectedness.” Let us consider some other types of
challenges to a Lockean-Style theory by considering a variety of “thought-experiments” designed to test the
theory’s plausibility and our willingness to follow the internal logic and logical implications of the theory.

Let us imagine an alternative timeline for Dr. Samantha Carter, our retired eyes doctor. Let us suppose that late
in life Carter develops an incurable cancerous disease. Her illness is studies by every leading oncologist and
super scientist. After reaching a conclusion, it is established that Carter’s prognosis is quite dismal, as no
treatment option will effectively cure or stop the cancer. Her prognosis is “death” within a week. But an
eccentric genius scientists tells Carter that he has an alternative for her to consider.

Completely unknown to the medical-world, Dr. Cobblepot is an expert in “Mind-transference.” Cobblepot

explains to Carter that he can move her “consciousness,” complete with every memory, personality trait, etc.
into a “new body,” a “drone” that has been construct for just this purpose. He can put her “mind” into the
drone. Cobblepot explains that he has perfected the process. The “drone” body is actually quite remarkable. If
Carter goes through with the procedure, she will live a natural life of, roughly, one thousand years; she will
never suffer from any type of disease or natural debilitation. Carter’s “consciousness” (or “mind”) will simply
be placed into a new vessel. Cobblepot will simply perform a “mind transference.” The process will
be instantaneously. Carter will not have a “gap” in her memory, or any psychological disruption. If we analyze
a time-line, it would go as follows:

The key philosophical question is this: Is the Samantha Carter at stages A, B, and C, “continuous” with her at
stage D—the time after the “Mind-Transference?” If the time-line above represents numerically one person,
Samantha Carter, then her “body” is definitely extraneous and has nothing to do with personal identity and
numerical identity over-time. The “Mind-Transference” case demonstrates that the “body” is not relevant for
(or in establishing) personal identity; nor is it relevant to numerical identity over time. Samantha Carter is
psychologically continuous from T1 to T4. At stage D, T4, she tells the story of her life. When she gets to T4,
she simply proceeds with the narrative, and even mentions that she was “conscious” during the “Mind-
Transference.” Every thought, memory, feeling, emotion, recollection, etc. is the same. She simply “moved”
into a new vessel. Moreover, she will continue on into the future for many, many years (as the drone will last
approximately one thousand years).

A Hobbsean-style “Sameness-of-Body” theorist would radically disagree, staring that the story above in
incorrect. Since the Hobbsean links identity to material stuff (or DNA stuff), Carter’s story would get analyzed
thus: the “Carter” at stages A, B, and C is numericallydifferent from the “new” person that emerges at stage D.
The “psychological connection” between the stages is not important, as the Hobbsean theorist cares nothing
about mental content. What matters is (a) that one body died (the cancerous body) and (b) a new body emerged
(the drone infused with Carter’s mind/consciousness). For many philosophers and laypersons, Hobbesian
analysis just seems incorrect. Most philosophers and scientists prefer to think that Carter is, indeed, the same
person at stage D as she was at stages A, B, and C. The Lockean Style theory seems quite plausible and the
“Mind Transference” thought experiment appears to be more evidence in favor of Locke’s “Psychological-
Contiguity” theory of personal identity.

“Teletransportation” Examples

In the following examples, we shall make use of a fictional apparatus that features in science fiction novels,
main-stream films, T.V. shows, and cartoons. (As a reference, every single “Star-Trek” T.V. episode or movie
utilizes such a device innumerable times.) The “Teletransporter” device works as follows: An agent stands on a
platform as a super computer scans the life-form or “object” and then “records” the exact atomic pattern, down
the subatomic level. It stores this information in its “buffers.” The machine scans, atom by atom, electron by
electron, the total arrangement of the human or object. It then “disintegrates” the structure on the platform. The
pattern of the person or object is stored in perfect form within the computer’s memory. The information is then
sent, at speeds millions of times faster than the speed of light, to a ‘platform’ on the receiving end. The
supercomputer than re-constitutes the person or object by arranging atoms (in every detail and down to the
subatomic level) just as the pattern was stored. Within seconds, the person or object is then downloaded or
reconstituted. The person re-emerges at the receiving endinstantaneously. The whole process takes less than
one second.

Let us consider a simple case in order to understand how the devise is supposed to work. Imagine that a busy
student goes to a Teletransportation center in the middle of town. She steps onto a Platform in San Francisco.
She is thinking about her busy schedule and her needing to grab lunch before going to work. As she is standing
on the Platform with her mind thinking of many such things, the computer scans her atomic pattern, uploads it
into its storage unit, and then “beams” the information to the receiving end in Paris. Instantaneously the student
is re-constructed (atom for atom) in exactly the same pattern. The student is still in mid-thought as she arrives
instantly in Paris. She exists the receiving end and heads for a café before she goes to work. From the student’s
point of view she simply “moved” from San Francisco to Paris in less than one second. It is a fabulous way for
her to travel great distances in no time at all. She fully believes that the person who exists the platform is her,
the same person who entered the platform in San Francisco only a few seconds earlier. From her point of view,
it is just an excellent transportation devise.

Case Study: “Singular-Teletransportation”

Let us imagine that Sherlock Holmes is currently in Scotland Yard but needs to apprehend the devious Dr.
Moriarty who is at his secret lab in Aruba. Instead of taking a long flight, Holmes uses “Teletransportation”
station, arriving in Aruba in less than a second. Holmes steps onto the platform. His pattern is recorded and
beamed to Aruba; his ‘old’ body disintegrates in Scotland Yard as an identical “body” is re-constituted at the
“receiving” station in Aruba. His body emerges within one second. With perfect continuity, Holmes steps off
the platform in hot pursuit of Dr. Moriarty. On a time line it would look like this:

Conventionally understood, ‘the Sherlock Holmes’ that enters the platform is the same Sherlock Holmes that
exits in Aruba. He is one hundred percent psychologically continuous/contiguous. If one were to “test” his
genetic profile, it would be identical. His DNA does not undergo change. The Teletransporter reconstituted his
Holmes’ body “exactly” as it was when he entered the platform in Scotland Yard. The machine “alters”
nothing. Every neuropathway in his brain is identical. The “scar” Holmes received while apprehending Lex
Luther is still in the same spot, as is his childhood scar. Every “mole” is in the same spot. His pattern is
“recorded” with one hundred percent accuracy in every way. He is reconstituted perfectly, exact in every
possible way. The Sherlock Holmes at Time T1 isnumerically identical to the Sherlock Holmes at T2,
regardless of the fact that the Sherlock Holmes at T1 has different atoms than the Sherlock Holmes at T2.
(Recall, an agent’s personal identity is constituted by the psychological continuity between T1 and T2, not
bodily stuff.) As described, a “Single-Case” of “Teletransportation” preserves identity despite the
disintegration of body at one time and the reconstituting of body at another time. For those that follow a
Lockean-Style Psychological Connectedness Theory, there does not seem to be a problem with the “Single
Case” of Teletransportation. If anything, it isevidence in favor of a Lockean-Style theory. However, let us
consider other cases.

Teletransportation, Duplicates, and “The Law of The-Identity-of-Indiscernibles”

Consider a case in which the machine malfunctions, creating two Sherlocks. Let us imagine that at the moment
that each is constituted on the receiving end, they are “identical.” Each Sherlock is in a black room with a
white door. In virtue of The Principle of “The-Identity-of-Indiscernibles,” it would seem that there are two
bodies, but numerically one Sherlock Holmes. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles says that: “If
everything true of A is true of B, then A is numerically identical with  B.” When we look at the situation
described above, we see two persons—Sherlock in room 1, and Sherlock in room 2. How can both be one,
numerically identical persons? This is a puzzle / paradox. Additionally, which “person” is the “real” Sherlock
Holmes? These questions are not trivial. They begin to raise serious doubts about the Lockean-Style theory of
identity. Note the following line schematic for this “Duplication Case” of Teletransportation:

In this case, the Holmes that steps into the Teletransportation machine in Scotland Yard is designated by X,
and the two Sherlock Holmeses that are generated in Aruba are “A” and “B.” In this case, everything that is
true of A is also true of B. At the moment of transportation, each is one hundred percent psychologically
continuous with X. Both A and Bare (--for example--) thinking of the devious Dr. Moriarty and their plans for
capturing him in Aruba. Both A and B have passing thoughts about the sunny skies and beautiful beaches that
are indicative of Aruba. However, how can both A and B be identical with Sherlock Holmes (X)? The Law of
Indiscernibles says that they are numerically the same, which is odd since we can see two individuals, one in
room 1, and the other in room 2. How could we “decide” which one is the “real” Sherlock Holmes? The logic
of the paradox suggests that they are both Sherlock Holmes and that there is numerically one Holmes, just as
there was only one Holmes in Scotland Yard, X. If, for any reason, we reject the idea that A / B is Holmes in
the Duplicate Case, then we should also reject the idea that B is Holmes in the Single Case. And if we reject
the Single Case, it would seem that we should reject any Lockean-style theory of personal identity. The results
of this puzzle are quite troubling. But a more extraordinary case provides the most evidence against a Lockean-
Style theory of personal Identity—the Case of “the Dying Self.”

The “Dying Self” Case-----A Problem for Locke?:

Suppose that Homes and family decide to go on vacation to New Zealand. Holmes’s wife and kids are
exceedingly excited to be “Teletransported” to New Zealand. Holmes’s wife has used the Teletransporter many
times in the past and has no fear whatsoever about stepping onto the platform. While Holmes is apprehensive,
his kids laugh and call him a “chicken.” As they enter the Teletransportation center, with bags packed and
suntan oil already, the technicians prepare for their departure. Mrs. Holmes and kids step onto the platform,
kiss Holmes goodbye and tell him not to worry and that they will see him in a second. Each in turn is
Teletransported to New Zealand.

As Holmes steps onto the platform he “feels” himself begin to “disintegrate.” However, the machine flickers
and stops; nothing seems to have happened. Holmes looks at the technicians, who seem to be in shock, and
asks if anything is “wrong.” Staff, technicians, and a gaggle of people congregate, talk amongst themselves and
then emerge to talk to Holmes: They say: “We have an odd situation at hand…..We have good news and bad
news. The bad news is that the machine malfunctioned. Your body here, in London, was not properly
disintegrated—that is why you are still standing on the platform. We are sorry old chap. This is quite rare and
almost never happens. The good news, however, is that you were in fact transported to New Zealand. But,
unfortunately, your ‘body’ here in London will start to disintegrate within the next twenty minutes. You will be
“gone” within two hours. Since you made it to New Zealand along with your family, we have called New
Zealand and have your ‘other’ self on the phone. We think that it would be helpful if you speak to yourself.
Here, please talk to yourself.”

Dazed and in shock, Holmes picks up the phone and talks to “himself.” The Sherlock Holmes in New Zealand
says to his “Dying-Self”: “Hello mate! I made it just fine and have never felt better. Do not worry, I will take
care of the wife and kids and will continue to solve all future cases as I return to London next week. I’m sorry
the machine malfunctioned and your atoms were not destroyed. But rest assured, I am perfectly fine! Hence,
there is no reason for concern.” The Holmes in New Zealand hangs up the phone, runs off to play in the sun
with Mrs. Holmes and the kids.

Meanwhile, back in London, the “Dying” Holmes is not consoled by the phone-call. Utterly disturbed, he sits
down at the London facility, dying. He cannot help but think to himself that a “strange” man will be cavorting
around with his wife and playing with his kids. The more he considers the matter, he believes that he is the
‘real’ Sherlock Holmes and that the other ‘guy’ in New Zealand is an imposter. A “Clone” (perhaps) that will
carry on with “his” life; but it is not, in fact, his—Sherlock Holmes. On a timeline, the scenario looks
something like this:
The “Dying-Self” Case shows us that, perhaps, our intuitions about a Lockean-style theory of personal identity
are misconceived. Most philosophers who analyze the “Dying-Self Case,” would not be happy with the
situation or believe that the guy running around New Zealand is the real Holmes. Most folks think that the
“real” Holmes is in London dying! This would make the guy in New Zealand some type of imposter or
duplicate or something. But certainly not the “real” Holmes. The imposter will “carry-on” with Holmes life,
but it just isn’t the realHolmes. Even if the “clone” has all of the same memories and is psychologically
continuous with the dying Holmes in London, the case shows us something important about Lockean-Style
theories. If the guy who appears in New Zealand is some type of clone or imposter, and not the same Holmes,
but a numerically different person who just happens to be very much “like” the real Holmes—then something
is quite wrong with Locke’s theory.

We ask: “Which is the real Sherlock Holmes?” If this were a “Single Case” of Teletransportation, then it

would be unproblematic and a Lockean-Style theorists would agree that the person in New Zealand is
numerically one and the same as the person who stepped onto the Teletransporter in London. Recall, the
“Single Case” of Teletransportation is the model that is used in science fiction shows (such as Star Trek).
While the agent that gets Teletransported in the single-case scenarios seems numerically identical, perhaps our
intuitions are wrong.

We must consider with utmost seriousness the “Dying-Self Case.” If the Holmes who steps out at the receiving
end in New Zealand is not the “real” Holmes, then our intuitions have been misled. It must have been the case
all along, despite our not “seeing it,” that all of the Teletransportation cases are misconceived. In all cases the
“duplicate” or “copy” or “clone” is psychologically continuous with the original; but the copy is not the real
person; the “real” person must have died in the disintegration process. If the “Dying-Self” case does not work,
then the “Single Case” of Teletransportation cannot be used to support the Lockean Theory. More importantly,
it would seem to suggest that psychological contiguity is not (in fact) the “key” to personal identity—despite
our earlier intuitions.

In sum, a Lockean Style theory of personal Identity seems quite attractive. It seems to capture many of our
intuitions about personal identity. It seems like an excellent theory with few objections that it cannot easily
handle. However, when we analyze the “Teletransportation” cases, then the theory begins to grate against our
commonsense and intuitions. In cases where the machine malfunctions and generates duplicates or “Dying
Self”—it looks as though the theory is not convincing after all. Perhaps the Lockean theory is not as great as
first imagined. The problem is that if we reject a Lockean Style “Psychological Continuity Theory,” then what
type of personal identity theory is left? The other models seemed quite problematic. The last “candidate” is a
radical proposal that has few advocates.

David Hume’s No-Self Theory / The Bundle Theory

In his Treatise on Human Nature, David Hume (1711-1776) famously claims that the idea of a “self” is just a
fiction. Hume says that no matter how hard he “looks” into himself—no matter how hard he inspects his
various sense experiences (--his “sense-data”--)—he only finds various “perceptions.” He is never without a
perception. Some of the perceptions are vivid and complex, others are faint and vacuous. At any moment he is
always having one perception or another. The term “perception” here is used broadly to include everything that
we might call “conscious experience” (--a thought, an idea, a visual perception, a feeling, an emotion, pain or
pleasure, etc.--). Hume says he is never without a perception, but no matter how hard he looks at, inspects,
introspects—his perceptions do not contain an ‘I’ or “self.” While it is certainly “convenient” and “useful” to
talk as if all of his perceptions referred to a singular “self,”—he claims that there is no perception of self. The
“self” is a useful fiction, but in reality there is no self that is anything like a “subject” of experience. Hence
there is no “self” or “I” in the sense of personal identity. Experiences flow over one’s consciousness, but an
“experience’ or “perception” of “self” never occurs.

There is no “self” according to Hume. Persons are merely “bundles” of perceptions. Thus, Hume’s theory is
often referred to as a “Bundle Theory.” The idea is that we are just a bundle of perceptions without any real
coherence that could justify a numerically persisting “self” or “subject” of experience. Strictly speaking,
“selves” do not exist, no less selvesthat have a unique identity that persist over time as a numerically identical
individual. All “self” talk is fictional, just like all “Tooth fairy” talk is fictional. The “self” has the same
ontological status as Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, Dracula, and all other fictional things. It just turns out that
“self” talk is pragmatic and useful in many cases. But when it comes right down to an ontological inventory of
the universe, “selves” are not on the list of actually existing things. What we call “selves” are just bundles of
perceptions loosely construed.

Hume’s “no-self” theory has had very few advocates, as it is radically anti-commonsense. It grates against
commonsense to dispose of the notion of personal identity. It does not seem reasonable to accept such a radical
conclusion. Hume’s conclusion is motivated by his highly dubious empiricism which can be shown to be false
given contemporary epistemology and science. It is premised upon a “picture-theory” of the mind, as well as
sense-data theory that is reject by today’s philosophers and scientists. Neither theory is tenable in today’s age.
Or, at least, the evidence for Hume’s epistemology is severely lacking. It flies in the face of modern science,
common sense, and basic philosophical models about the nature of things. Hence, contemporary philosophers
rarely accept Hume’s radical conclusions.

General Conclusion

Descartes’ “Substance-Dualism” is completely untenable as a serious philosophical theory. Hume’s “No Self”
theory is similarly reject, albeit for different reasons. This leaves variations of Hobbes-ish “genetic stuff” type
theories and Lockean-Style “Psychological Contiguity” theories. The latter is typically preferred and thought to
be most reasonable; however, it brakes-down when analyzed in rigorous detail, especially when considered in
light of teletransportation cases, such as “The Dying-Self.” However, if we abandon a Lockean-style theory of
personal identity it is unclear what alternatives seem better. If we dismiss Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and
Hume, it would seem that few substantively different theories remain. We all “know” that we have a unique
and numerically persisting “self.” But giving a rigorous philosophical account to personal identity and
numerical identity over time is exceedingly difficult.