Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners, 

Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.

Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana
that an order of respondent Judge was issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an
independent civil action filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondents here, 1 failed to reserve their
right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was
commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111. 2 It does not take
into account, however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123.3 What is worse, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the
principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave
constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure being limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 4 It thus appears clear that the
petition for certiorari is without merit.

The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its
origins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its
passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and
Estelita Nemeño. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the
accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise
being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such decision to the
Court of First Instance.  At this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filed with
5

another branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge,
a separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless
driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana.  In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana,
6

as the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of
Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was
already on appeal. 7

Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is a
motion to dismiss this case on the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by
the City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil
action or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as required in Section 1, Rule
111, Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City Court
convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was vacated and a
trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying said criminal case. In
the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file.
The Court is of the opinion that at this stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action
because the judgment of the City Court is vacated and a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of
this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the
accused and in favor of the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby
denied. ..."  There was a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition.
8

The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order there was
a grave abuse of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effect that
upon the institution of a criminal action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves
his right to institute it 
separately."  Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from
9

city courts.  It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent that it
10

could yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive right. Such an interpretation
is to be rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.

1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this
Court : "That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the
institution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the
criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court."  It admits of no doubt that an
11

independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal. Nor was there
any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of Ozamis.
Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the
unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred. In the
first place, such an inference does not per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be
looked upon plausibly as a non-sequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what
is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall be tried in all respects
anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court."  Unlike
12

petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court has made clear that its
observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory.  In a 1962 decision, People v.
13

Carreon, Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905 decision, Andres v.
14

Wolfe.  Another case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons,  where Justice Malcolm
15 16

emphasized how deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. In the latest case in
point, People v. Jamisola,  this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine in these
17

words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case 'shall be
tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that
court.'"  So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40.  Again, there is a host of decisions
18 19

attesting to its observance.  It cannot be said then that there was an error committed by respondent
20

Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable if this petition were to prosper.

2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive
interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation but
also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In
cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."  That is a substantive
21

right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the
offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. As referred to
earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter,
does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.  It is a well-settled
22

doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give
rise to a constitutional doubt. Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack
awareness of the undesirable consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another
insuperable obstacle to the success of this suit.

3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal
propositions impressed with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client would
be served. That is though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is this other consideration. He is
not to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He
is not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The law as an
instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be
fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant
being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.  The commitment of this Court to such a
23

primordial objective has been manifested time and time again. 24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Costs against petitioners.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

Footnotes

1 The private respondents are: Geronimo Campaner, Marcelo Lamason, Maria

2 The aforesaid sections read as follows: "Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." .

3 Section 7 of Rule 123 reads as follows: "An appeal case shall be tried in all
respects anew in the Court of First Instances as if it had been originally instituted in
that court."

4 According to Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935 Constitution: "The Supreme Court
shall have the power to promulgate runs concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." The present Constitution,
in its Article X, Section 5, paragraph (5), empowers this Court to promulgate "rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the National Assembly. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."

5 Petition, pars. 2 and 3.

6 Ibid, par. 4.
7 Ibid, par. 5.

8 Ibid, par. 9.

9 Cf. Rules of Court, Section 1 of Rule 111.

10 Cf. Section 7 of Rule 123, Rules of Court.

11 Petition, Ground for Reversal of the Court Order Involved, 4.

12 Cf. Section 7 of Rule 123 (1964).

13 Cf. People v. Jaramilia, 97 Phil. 880 (1955); Escudero v. Lucero, 103 Phil. 672
(1958); People v. Malayao, L-12103, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 628; People v.
Carreon, L-17920, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 252; People v. Jamisola, L-27332,
November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 555.

14 L-17920, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 252.

15 5 Phil. 60.

16 41 Phil. 368 (1921). Cf. People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 (1935).

17 L-27332, November 28, l969, 30 SCRA 555..

18 Ibid, 556-557.

19 Section 9 of Rule 40 reads: "A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the
judgment of the justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the action when duly
docketed in the Court of First Instance shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in
accordance with the regular procedure in the court, as though the same had never
been tried before and had been originally there commenced. If the appeal is
withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed
revived and shall forthwith be remanded to the justice of the peace or municipal court
for execution."

20 Cf. Lichauco v. Guash, 76 Phil. 5 (1946); Torres v. Ocampo, 80 Phil. 36 (1948);

21 Article 33 includes the other cases of deformation and fraud.

22 Cf. Article X, Section 5, par. 5 of the Constitution and Article VIII, Section 13 of the
1935 Constitution.

23 Cf. Avila v. Gimenez, L-24615, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 321.

24 Cf. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, L-30362, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 137.