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Hazard Analysis of Crude Oil Storage Tank Farm

Article  in  International Journal of ChemTech Research · November 2018

DOI: 10.20902/IJCTR.2018.111132

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 International Journal of ChemTech Research
CODEN (USA): IJCRGG, ISSN: 0974-4290, ISSN(Online):2455-9555
Vol.11 No.11, pp 300-308, 2018

Hazard Analysis of Crude Oil Storage Tank Farm

H. A. Ibrahim1*, H. S. Syed2
1
Environmental Engineering Department, L.D Engineering College,
Ahmadabad-India
2
Associate Professor of Environmental Engineering, Government
Engineering College, Bhuj, India

Abstract : The major accidents in petrochemical facilities occur during storage processes.
Many disastrous accidents occurred in the past, causing death or injury for workers, huge
economic losses and massive environmental pollution. Thus, this work aimed to conduct
profound and adequate hazard analysis in the oil storage facility. Firstly, the potential
undesired accidents in the oil storage farm were identified using Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP). Secondly, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was carried out to analyze all the identified
hazards and effectively determine the basic events (BEs) that lead to such hazards. The FT
was evaluated by generating of the Minimal Path Sets (MPSs) and calculation of the Structural
Importance Degree (SID) for each BE. Thirdly, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was implemented
to analyze the occurrence path of accidents and estimate their frequencies. The results revealed
that the most significant accidents in the storage farm are fire and explosion. The qualitative
analysis of the FT has shown that the most critical BEs for causing the tank fire and explosion
are (formation of flammable cloud) and (Confinement between cloud and air).Additionally, it
is found out that the occurrence frequency of pool fire is higher than other scenarios. Finally,
based on the analysis, some preventive and mitigation measures have been given to reduce the
consequence severity of tank accidents, which in turn improve the safety climate in the storage
tank farm.
Keywords : Hazard analysis, HAZOP, Fault Tree, Event Tree, Safety measures.

1. Introduction:
Petroleum and chemical products are primary resources in our life and considered one of the most
important basic building blocks for sustainable development. The growing demand of hazardous chemicals has
brought a significant increase in risk to human and its environment [1].Hazardous chemicals have intrinsic
hazards for the environment, which may damage it the human and properties around the accident area [2].
OSHAhas defined a hazardous chemical as any chemical, which has a physical hazard such as (fire and
explosion) or a health hazard such as (acute or chronic effects) [3].The results of a historical analysis have
shown that 17% of major accidents in the chemical industries were during storage processes[4]. According to
the NFPA report in 2009 [5], 13% of the fire accidents that occurred in the USA took place in storage farms,

H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308.

DOI= http://dx.doi.org/10.20902/IJCTR.2018.111132
H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 301

causing death or injury for workers, tens million dollars as losses and cause huge environmental pollution.
Many catastrophic accidents happened in the history such as Bhopal disaster in 1984,which caused thousands of
fatalities and tens of thousands of people were injured[6]. Thepossible hazards are a function of both the
inherent nature and the involved quantity of the chemical[7].Therefore, it is important to conductaprofound and
adequate hazard analysis of the oil storage facility to figure out the potential scenarios having damage to life
and property as well as provides a clear picture for the decision makers to be satisfied with the safety levels in
the storage tank farm.Hazard Analysis is animportant process and has a vital role in studies related to hazardous
chemicals handling. Hazard identification(HAZID) is the initial step in any hazard analysis process and includes
the identification of all possible accidents in the facility. The most used technique in HAZID is HAZOP study
[8]. HAZOP is a systematic review of the design and operation of the system to predict the possible accidental
leaks of hazardous material[9].

The defined hazards can be analyzed using many tools such as FTA and ETA. FTA is a systematic and
deductive approach that focuses on hazardous outcomes (top event) and develops further to the basic causes
(bottom event) that lead to such unwanted outcomes [10]. FTA is also used widely in hazard analysis of the
various storage facilities [10-15]. ETA is agraphical and inductive tool that presents all the final
consequencesresulting from a particular initiating event, with considering the states (failure/success) of the
installed safety barriers [9]. The accidents frequencies can be estimated by ETA if the data about initiating and
heading events are known. Otherwise, it can be derived from databases such as OGP [16]or HSE [17]. The
major goals of this studyare (i) preventive goals to provide all possibilities, which assistto prevent accidents and
injuries in the crude oil storage tank farm, (ii) protective goals toprovide protection for workers,equipment and
maintain workplace safety.

2. Hazard Identification (HAZID):

HAZID phase involved a review of the storage conditions andthe layout of storage tanks. Using this
information, a review of relevant accident histories, knowledge, experience with similar facilities, and good
engineering practices, the possible hazardous events in the facility were determined. The potential hazards
associated with the crude oil tank are almost same to similar facilities throughout the world. The class of
hazards depends on the materials being stored (physical and chemical properties), type of storage tank, storage
conditions, and protection and mitigation measures provided. HAZOP process is implemented by applying a set
of guidewords to identify the potential all parameters deviations design intent, which may adversely
affectpersonnel and plant safety.

Figure.1 presents a schematic diagram for the fixed roof tank. HAZOP study was conductedfor a
deviation of three parameters (pressure, level,and flow). HAZOP resultsfor crude oil storage tankwere presented
in Tables 1,2,3.

Figure1.Fixed roof tank diagram for HAZOP study.

H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 302

Table 1. HAZOP (Parameter: Pressure)

Guide Word Deviations Possible Causes Possible

Consequences
Tank exposed toan
external heat source Possible explosion
Thermal expansion of oil due to rising build up
in the storage tank due to pressure in the tank
fire or strong sunlight
Outlet pipe ofthe storage
tankblocked duringtransfer
More pressure Failure of the
MORE inside the storage pressurerelief valve Pressure increases in
tank poor ventilation the tank that could
Failure of the automatic lead to fire and
pressure control system explosion

Table 2. HAZOP (Parameter: Level)

Guide Word Deviations Possible Causes Possible

Consequences
Tank top unattended
The level indicator fails
The wrong valve opened
The alarm doesn’t work
More level in properly
the storage Expansion of oil in case of
MORE
tank exposure to higher Crude oil leakage to the
temperature atmosphere, which may
initiatethe fire if any
ignition source exists.
Consequently, this may
Cracking or corrosion of heat the nearby tanks or
the tank. cause burns toworkers
Damage of tank body seal due to exposure to heat
Less level in Weak joints between the radiation.
LESS the storage roof and tank shell
tank Damage of valve and
flange
Rupture of a tank due to
integrity loss
H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 303

Table 3. HAZOP (Parameter: the flow of crude oil to or from the storage tank)

Guide Word Deviations Possible Causes Possible consequences

Pressure increases
rapidly in the pipeline.
Outlet line closed
Consequently,the leak
Outlet valve blocked
No flow(A) of and explosion
Pump Fail
NO Crude oil to the probabilities grow up.
Rupture of Pipeline
Storage tank

Minor/major flammable
liquid release

Partial opening ofthe Possibility of pressure

outlet valve build up in the storage
Less flow(A) of line
Inlet pipeline rupture due
LESS Crude oil to the
to mechanical damage
storage tank Minor release of
Minor leak from
thePipeline crude oil to the
atmosphere

Tank empty No significant hazard

Outlet valve closed
Line fracture Pressure increase in
No flow (B) of Outlet line blocked the storage tank and
NO
Crude oilfrom rupture of pipeline probability of leak
the storage
tank Major flammable liquid
release

Partial opening of Potential of excessive

the unloading valve pressurein the storage
line
Less flow(B) of
Minor leak from the
LESS Crude oil from
Pipeline Minor release of
the storage
Crude oil to the ambient
tank
atmosphere nearby tank

3. Hazard Analysis:

The identified hazards by HAZOP study have been analyzed by FTA to determine their root causes. FT
usesBoolean logic symbols (AND gates, OR gates).FT construction [18] begins at the top event; then, it
identifies level by level all the root causes that initiate the top event; after that, it determines the logical
relationships between the causes and the top event.
H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 304

Figure 2. Fault Tree of crude oil tank fire and explosion.

H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 305

Fault Tree for crude oil storage tank accidentshas constructed as shown in Fig. 2.In FTdiagram, there
are 62 events. F stands for the top event, ( to ) stand for the intermediate events. ( to ) represent the
BEs. The FT analysis and evaluation are generally achieved in two stages, quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The qualitative analysis includes the determination ofMinimal Path Sets (MPSs) or minimal cut sets
(MCSs) of the fault tree for the storage tank.From the constructed FT, it is clear that the number of OR gates
more than AND gates. Therefore, to facilitate the analysis process, FT has been transformed into the success
tree. Then, the success tree has been simplified by using Boolean algebra to produce the MPSs, which represent
the system safety.A MPS is thesmallest combination of basic events whose non-occurrence, it is sure that top
event does nothappen. Reference to the definition of the MPS, The basic events are multiplied for OR gates and
added for AND gates. The analysis of the success treeis presented in detail as follows:

F= + + (1)
= . . . . .
=( + )
= . .
= . .
=( . . . . + . . . . )
=( . . . )+( . . . )
= .
=( + ). . . . . . . . .{( . . . )+( . . . )}.
{( . . . . + . . . . )}. (2)
= . . . . . . . . + . . . . (3)
= . + (4)
By substitution of Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) in Eq. (1), the MPSs of FT can be generated as below:

={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . }
={ . . . . . . . . }.
={ . . . . }.
={ . }.
={ }.
={ }.

From analysis, there are 13 Minimal Path Sets were produced for the storage tank fire and
explosion.MPSs includes4 MPS of order 19 (number of BEs), 4 MPS of order 18, 1 MPS of order 9, 1 MPS of
order 6, 1MPS of order 3, 2MPS of order 1.This means that there are 13 possible paths to eliminate the oil tank
accidents occurrence.
The quantitative evaluation of FT represents the calculation of the structure importance degree (SID) of
the BEs. The SID evaluates the BE influence on the total logical structure of the top event and exclusively
depends on its location in FT. The larger SID of BE, the higher effect upon the unwanted event structure.
Through the qualitative analysis, SID values werecomputed by using the following quadratic
approximate formula [13]:
H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 306

=∑ (5)

: the number of BEs in MPS that belongs to.

Structural importance degree for basic events has been calculated and then the comparison between
different values was obtained. For example, the SID for X9 can be achieved according to Eq. (5):

= 1.52 *

After that, the results were compared and arranged from highest value to lowest one.The order of BEs
based on their importance degree are illustrated below:
> > = =
> >

> .
The results indicate that the most crucial BEs for causing the fire and explosion accident are X37
(formation of flammable cloud) and X38 (Confinement between cloud and air).The second critical one is poor
ventilation initiators and followed by oil leakage contributors.The control of these critical causes could
considerably reduce the accidents probabilities.

4. Frequency Analysis:

The frequency of the accidents can be estimated usingETAand historical data. ET is constructed from
left to right.The technique is initiated with selecting the appropriate initial event that could lead to unwanted
consequences, the initiating event in this study is the crude oil leakage from storage tanks.The heading
eventsshould describe the undesired situation. It is usually to apply NO(failure state) on the downward branch
and YES(success state)on the upwardbranch. Each heading event is named with a particular letter. Every final
scenario path can then be defined with a unique letters combination. Probabilities of ignition can be obtained
from historical recordsand database.

Event tree for the crude oil leakage as initiating event was presented in Fig. 3. From ET diagram, in the
case of oil leakage and immediate ignition, pool fire can occur. If there is no immediate ignition, the delayed
ignition of the released oil may lead to the delayed pool fire. In some cases, due to confined space or to the
large quantity of the flammable cloud involved, flame front acceleration can happen and the vapor cloud
explosion (VCE)is likely to take place.The outcome frequency wasestimated by multiplying the initiating event
frequency with heading events probabilities along the sequential occurrence pathof the outcome. The frequency
of consequencesoccurrence can be calculated using Eqs. (6), (7) and (8).

Figure 3.Event Tree for the crude oil leakage from the storage tank.

= * (6)
H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 307

= * [1 – ]* * (7)
= * (1 – )* * [1 – ] (8)

Leak frequency according to OGP is 1* [16]. The probability of ignition for storage tanks are given
according to the Purple book [19], as below:
= 0.065.
= 0.065.
= 0.1.
Substitution of ignition probabilities values in Eqs. (6) up to (8), we can calculate the frequency of final
scenarios as follows:

Pool fire frequency = 1* *0.065 = 6.5* per tank per year.

VCE frequency =1* *(1-0.065)* 0.065*0.1 =6* per tank per year.

Delayed pool fire frequency = 1* *(1- 0.065)*0.065*(1-0. 1) =5.4* per tank per year.
From the results, it is apparent that the frequency of pool fire is higher than the frequency of explosion.

5. Preventive and Mitigation Measures

Based on FTA of crude oil storage tank, the most critical basic events which may lead to oil fire and
explosion has been identified. Therefore, to prevent or reduce the accidents probabilities and severities,
common preventive and mitigation measures must be taken into consideration.

5.1. Preventive measures:

 Regular inspection and maintenance must be carried out of all components in the control
system.Moreover,the filling ratio of the tank must be obeyedto avoid the overfilling incidents.
 Good policy regarding periodic maintenance for all equipment utilized in the storage farm.
 Pipe joints/flange should have copper bonding to maintain electrical continuity; flange guard is useful to
divert the leakage of oil.
 Fixed roof tank must be provided with pressure relief valves and breather vents placed on the top of the
tanks.
 Conventional lightning protection system for storage tanks involves installing the lightning masts around the
tank and shield wires above the tank as well as ensuring the tank is well earthed.

5.2. Mitigation measures:

The mitigation measures must be done to limit and minimize the magnitude of the incident.Safety
supporting systems must ensure a continuous supply of basic requirements to the storage tank farm, these
systems comprised of the following:

 Automatic detection systems such as fire detectors, alarm system, heat Sensing and flame Sensing.
 Foam supply and production system for the tank fire protection.
 Tank cooling system that mounted on every tank in order to prevent its exposure to an adjacent fire
 The using of personal protective equipment must be strictly worn by all workers in the storage farms.
 Development of a green belt around the installation area will help in preventingthe spread of fire to other
areas.

6. Conclusions:
The conclusions of the study can be summarized in the following points:

 Hazard analysis study has been conducted for the crude oil storage tank farm.
 H. A. Ibrahim et al /International Journal of ChemTech Research, 2018,11(11): 300-308. 308

 HAZOP study has identified all possible deviations in parameters from design intent (level,flow, and
pressure), which could finally lead to oil leakage or extra pressure and consequently result in undesirable
events such as fire and explosion.
 Fault Tree of crude oil storage tank fire and explosion has been drawn.The qualitative and quantitative
evaluationswere carried out. The results indicate that the most crucial BEs for causing the occurrence of
fire and explosion accident are X37 (formation of flammable cloud) and X38 (Confinement between cloud
and air).The second critical one is poor ventilation initiators and followed by oil leakage contributors.
 The identified critical causes must be given more attention to minimize the probabilities and mitigate the
severity of the accidents.
 The frequency analysis for a crude oil leakage was carried out using ET. The results indicated that the
frequency of pool fire is higher than other accidents frequencies.

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