Dungo v People

FACTS:

Villanueva, a UP Los Baños student, was a neophyte of the APO – Theta Chapter Fraternity and that
Dungo and Sibal, as members of the said fraternity, together with the other fraternity members, officers
and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at
Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation rites  conducted inside the resort, performed
under the cover of darkness and secrecy.

Due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes
haphazardly left the resort, while Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of
Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.

The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of proof of intent to kill the victim will affect the liability of the accused.

RULING:

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum.

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of
initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the rising
incidents of death of hazing victims.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts  mala in se; and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts  mala prohibita. This
distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has
the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of
an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited
act is the crime itself.

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that it is complete and robust in penalizing the crime
of hazing.
It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good faith. It
took into consideration the different participants and contributors in the hazing activities.

Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged
with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.
People v Ejercito

Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656, which affirmed the Decision [3] dated April 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court of xxxxxxxxxxx,[4] Branch 60 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-1300 finding accused-appellant
Francisco Ejercito (Ejercito) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 8353, [5] otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information [6] filed before the RTC charging Ejercito of the aforesaid crime,
the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 10 th day of October, 2001 at past 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal
knowledge with [AAA], a minor, who is only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the
offense against her will and consent and which act demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor
as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the evening of October 10, 2001, AAA, then a
fifteen (15) year old high school student, was cleaning the chicken cage at the back of their house
located in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx when suddenly, she saw Ejercito pointing a gun at her saying, "Ato ato lang
ni. Sabta lang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili madamay imo pamilya." AAA pleaded, "Tang, don't do this
to me" but the latter replied, "Do you want me to kill you? I will even include your mother and father."
Thereafter, Ejercito dragged AAA to a nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear, while he
undressed and placed himself on top of her. He covered her mouth with his right hand and used his left
hand to point the gun at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth
movements. When he finished the sexual act, Ejercito casually walked away and warned AAA not to tell
anybody or else, her parents will get killed. Upon returning to her house, AAA hurriedly went to the
bathroom where she saw a bloody discharge from her vagina. The following day, AAA absented herself
from school and headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if she was okay. At that point, AAA
tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC to remain silent, to which the latter reluctantly
obliged.[8]
Haunted by her harrowing experience, AAA was unable to focus on her studies. Wanting to start her life
anew, AAA moved to the city to continue her schooling there. However, Ejercito was able to track AAA
down, and made the latter his sex slave. From 2002 to 2005, Ejercito persistently contacted AAA,
threatened and compelled her to meet him, and thereafter, forced her to take shabu and then sexually
abused her. Eventually, AAA got hooked on drugs, portrayed herself as Ejercito's paramour, and decided
to live together. When Ejercito's wife discovered her husband's relationship with AAA, the former filed a
complaint against AAA before the barangay. By this time, even AAA's mother, BBB, found out the illicit
relationship and exerted efforts to separate them from each other. Finally, after undergoing
rehabilitation, AAA finally disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito back in 2001 and
reported the same to the authorities on September 3, 2005. [9]

In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, and maintained that he had an illicit
relationship with AAA. He averred that during the existence of their affair from 2002 to 2004, he and
AAA frequently had consensual sex and the latter even abandoned her family in order to live with him in
various places in xxxxxxxxxxx. He even insisted that he and AAA were vocal about their choice to live
together despite vehement objections from his own wife and AAA's mother. Finally, he pointed out that
when AAA was forcibly taken from him by her mother, as well as police authorities, no charges were
filed against him. Thus, he was shocked and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape
which purportedly happened when they were lovers. [10]

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ejercito's conviction for the crime of Rape must be
upheld.

Ruling

In this case, it has been established that Ejercito had carnal knowledge of AAA through force, threat, or
intimidation. Hence, he should be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353. To note, although AAA was only fifteen (15) years old and hence, a minor at that
time, it was neither alleged nor proven that Ejercito was her "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim" so as to qualify the crime and impose a higher penalty. As such, pursuant to the
first paragraph of Article 266-B of the same law, Ejercito should be meted with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as ruled by both the RTC and the CA. Further, the Court affirms the monetary awards in AAA's
favor in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this
ruling until fully paid, since the same are in accord. with prevailing jurisprudence. [47]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Francisco
Ejercito is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.
 Lim v People

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision2 dated April 22, 2016 and Resolution3 dated August 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 37336. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated November 27, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 14-305915, which in turn, affirmed the
Decision5 dated April 29, 2014 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC).

Factual Antecedents

The petitioners are siblings, all of whom are officers of Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel). Their
father, Quintin C. Lim (Quintin), established Pentel. 6 Quintin died on September 16, 1996. 7

In an Affidavit of Complaint dated September 21, 2010, one of Pentel's stockholders, Lucy Lim (Lucy),
alleged that the petitioners falsified the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000, which in turn
contained Pentel Board Resolution 2000-001 dated February 25, 2000. 8 This Board Resolution
authorized Jimmy to dispose the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129824
registered in Pentel's name, located in P. Samonte Street, Pasay City (subject property). 9 Through this
Secretary's Certificate, Jimmy was able to enter into a Deed of Absolute Sale on March 21,
2000, 10 conveying the subject property to the Spouses Emerson and Doris Lee (Spouses Lee). According
to Lucy, the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000 bearing Board Resolution 2000-001 was
falsified, because it was made to appear that Quintin signed it, despite having already died on
September 16, 1996-or, more than three (3) years from the time of its execution. 11

Issue:

In addition to their previous arguments, the petitioners raise for the first time the prescription of the
offense, claiming that the crime should have been discovered at the latest on either: (a) March 21, 2000,
the date of the Deed of Absolute Sale; or (b) March 29, 2000, the date TCT No. 142595 was issued in
favor of the Spouses Lee.37

Ruling

Since the registration of all the documentary requirements for transfer of title, including the falsified
Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000, was made on March 29, 2000, this is the proper
reckoning point from which the prescription of the crime of falsification of a public document began
to run. From this date of registration, there was constructive notice of the falsification to the entire
world, including the complainant Lucy.1âwphi1 She and all other persons were charged with the
knowledge of the falsified Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000, beginning on March 29, 2000.

Having established that the prescriptive period started on March 29, 2000-not from Lucy's actual
discovery of the transfer of title, it is now pertinent to discuss whether the prescriptive period has
lapsed.

Article 91 of the RPC provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.  - The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

It is well-settled that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the prescriptive
period.78 Unfortunately, the records of this case do not show the date when Lucy's Affidavit of Complaint
was filed. This Court notes, however, that the Affidavit of Complaint was executed on September 21,
2010, or more than ten (10) years from the time that prescription commenced to run on March 29,
2000. Considering that Lucy's complaint could not have been filed earlier than its date of
execution, prescription already set in by March 29, 2010, or approximately five (5) months before the
execution of the complaint on September 21, 2010.

As a result, by the time the criminal Information charging the petitioners with falsification of a public
document was filed on May 15, 2012, their criminal liability was already extinguished. On this ground
alone, the case against the petitioners should have been dismissed. The State already lost its right to
prosecute and punish the petitioners for the crime subject of Criminal Case No. 467715-CR then filed
with the MeTC.

In light of the fact that the petitioners' criminal liability is extinguished, there is no reason to discuss the
other arguments raised in the petition. The Court, nonetheless, emphasizes that the merits of the
parties' arguments as to the petitioners' guilt were not simply brushed aside. The Court, however, is
bound to observe the basic substantive law providing for the prescription of offenses.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 22, 2016 and
Resolution dated August 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37336 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 467715-CR against petitioners Shirley T. Lim,
Mary T. Lim-Leon and Jimmy T. Lim is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

International Service v Greenpeace Southeast Asia

The Facts

The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong),  administered pursuant to the Memorandum of
Undertaking5 (MOU) entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños
Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.
(ISAAA), and the University of the Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others. Bt
talong  contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt,  which produces the CrylAc  protein
that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac  protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran
larvae  such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to eggplants. 6

From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB), the implementing
institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bt talong  under the supervision of
the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP). 7 The NCBP, created under Executive
Order No. (EO) 430,8 is the regulatory body tasked to: (a) "identify and evaluate potential hazards
involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new species and genetically
engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks"; and (b)  ''formulate and review
national policies and guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering,
pests and their genetic materials for the protection of public health, environment[,] and personnel[,]
and supervise the implementation thereof." 9 Upon the completion of the contained experiment, the
NCBP issued a Certificate10 therefor stating that all biosafety measures were complied with, and no
untoward incident had occurred.11

On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two (2)-year Biosafety
Permits12 for field testing of Bt talong13after UPLB's field test proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety
risk assessment for field testing pursuant to the Department of Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order
No. 8, series of 200214 (DAO 08-2002),15 which provides for the rules and regulations for the importation
and release into the environment of plants and plant products derived from the use of modern
biotechnology.16 Consequently, field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in North Cotabato,
Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and Laguna.

The Issues Presented in the Motions for Reconsideration

Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration, 54 arguing, among others, that: (a) the case should
have been dismissed for mootness in view of the completion and termination of the Bt talong  field trials
and the expiration of the Biosafety Permits; 55 (b) the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO
08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue; 56 and (c) the Court erred in relying on the studies cited in the
December 8, 2015 Decision which were not offered in evidence and involved Bt corn,  not Bt talong.57

In their Consolidated Comments,58 respondents maintain, in essence, that: (a)  the case is not mooted by
the completion of the field trials since field testing is part of the process of commercialization and will
eventually lead to propagation, commercialization, and consumption of Bt talong  as a consumer
product;59 (b)  the validity of DAO 08-2002 was raised by respondents when they argued in their petition
for Writ of Kalikasan  that such administrative issuance is not enough to adequately protect the
Constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology; 60 and (c) the Court correctly took
judicial notice of the scientific studies showing the negative effects of Bt  technology and applied the
precautionary principle.61

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness.

As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. 62 The requirement of the
existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review
proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before
it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. 63

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.64

At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is deemed
one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action.

Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too short to be fully
litigated. It must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were issued on
March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by
Justice Leonen, respondents filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan  only on April 26, 2012 - just a few
months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing activities were already
over.108 Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the case could be resolved
was due to respondents' own inaction.

Therefore, it was improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which had become moot in
view of the absence of any valid exceptions to the rule on mootness, and to thereupon rule on the
objections against the validity and consequently nullify DAO 08-2002 under the premises of the
precautionary principle.

All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of the
Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with none of the
exceptions to the mootness principle properly attending, the Court grants the instant motions for
reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this pronouncement, no discussion on
the substantive merits of the same should be made.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2015 of
the Court, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated
September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the
reasons above-explained. A new one is ENTERED DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus  and Writ of Kalikasan  with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) filed by respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura,  and others on the ground of
mootness.
 Baguilat, Jr. v Alvarez

The Facts

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17 th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles
surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the
House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after
the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The
petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority
coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the
Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader. 2

On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-
Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the
winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall
belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. 3 Thereafter,
the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight
[(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a
no vote,"4 thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the 17th Congress.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who garnered
the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader -
Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous
follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such. 5

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ
of mandamus  to recognize: (a)  Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;
and (b)  petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"Mandamus  is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw."

After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs
sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates
shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of
the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the
Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without any objection from
any member of Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House
is the essential and formative step conducted at the first regular session of the 17 th Congress to
determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective leaders),
considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the
Minority of those who did not. The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its
Journal No. 1 dated July 25, 2016, 14 which, based on case law, is conclusive 15 as to what transpired in
Congress:

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government." 32

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed
to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and
large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would
not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of
powers doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that]
the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department
itself."34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

CASE 2019-0022: VICE MAYOR SHIRLYN L. BIÑAS-NOGRALES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. NO. 246328. SEPTEMBER 10, 2019, CARANDANG, J.) (SUBJECT/S: ELECTIONS; SPECIAL LAW VS
CONSTITUION) (BRIEF TITLE: BINAS=NOGRALES ET AL VS COMELEC)
  
DISPOSITIVE:
 
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 10524 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.The elections for the representative of the First Legislative District of South
Cotabato, including General Santos City is UPHELD. COMELEC is hereby DIRECTED to CONVENE a
Special Provincial Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM petitioner Shirlyn L. Bafias-Nograles, the winning
candidate, as Representative of the First Legislative District of South Cotabato, including General
Santos City.
 
SO ORDERED.”
  
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
 
“The 1987 Constitution is clear: Elections for Congress should be held on the 2nd Monday of May
unless otherwise provided by law. The term “unless otherwise provided by law” contemplates two
situations ( 1) when the law specifically states when the elections should be held on a date other than
the second Monday of May; and (2) when the law delegates the setting of the date of the elections to
COMELEC.
 
Section 1 of R.A. 11243 categorically states that the reapportionment of the 1st District shall
“commence in the next  national and local elections after the effectivity of this Act.” R.A. 11243 did not
specifically provide for a different date. Neither did it delegate unto COMELEC the setting of a
different date.
 
………..
 
Also, if We were to follow COMELEC’s interpretation, an incongruity would result as the winning
candidate in COMELEC’s special elections34 would serve a term less  than that provided for in Section
7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Similar to Section 8, the only exception is when another term is
“otherwise provided by law.” Again, R.A. 11243 did not provide for a term less than three years, as
provided in the 1987 Constitution.
 
The elections for the First Legislative District of the Province of South Cotabato scheduled on May 13,
2019 should not have been suspended, and the candidate obtaining the most number of votes for the
said position must be proclaimed. Consequently, the holdover provision under Section 2 of R.A. 11243
would be inapplicable since there would already be a newly elected and qualified Representative.”
  

Bucal v Bucal
The Facts

Petitioner Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29, 2005 6 and have a daughter
named Francheska A. Bucal (Francheska), who was born on November 22, 2005. 7chanrobleslaw

On May 7, 2010, Cherith filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order 8(RTC Petition) based on
Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, 9 otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004.” She alleged that Manny had never shown her the love and care of a husband, nor
supported her and Francheska financially. Furthermore, due to Manny’s alcoholism, he was always mad
and would even shout hurtful words at her. Manny’s demean or even affected her health detrimentally,
leading her to suffer dizziness and difficulty in breathing on one occasion. 10Thus, Cherith prayed that the
RTC issue in her favor a Temporary Protection Order (TPO): (a) prohibiting Manny from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly;
(b)ordering a law enforcement officer and court personnel to accompany her to the residence of Manny
to supervise the removal of her personal belongings in order to ensure her personal safety; (c) directing
Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and any of her designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school,
place of employment, or any specified place frequented by her and any of her designated family or
household member; (d) enjoining Manny from threatening to commit or committing further acts of
violence against her and any of her family and household member; (e) granting her custody and charge
of Francheska, until further orders from the court; (f) ordering Manny to absolutely desist and refrain
from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of
Francheska; and (g) directing Manny to provide support to her and Francheska. Cherith also prayed that
after hearing, the TPO be converted into a Permanent Protection Order (PPO). 11chanrobleslaw

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
Cherith’s certiorari petition, thus, affirming the June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 RTC Orders
granting visitation rights to Manny.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

On the matter of procedure, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing Cherith’s certiorari petition
on account of her failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Orders.

The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the
hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would
indicate that he was seeking for such relief.

Neither was it shown that Cherith sought the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband. In
fact, Cherith’s RTC Petition specifically prayed that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly (which would tend
to occur if Francheska would be turned-over to Manny during weekends), order Manny to absolutely
desist and refrain from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody
or charge of Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and
any of her designated family or household members under the limitations set by the court. Further, as
above-intimated, Cherith has repeatedly contested the award of visitation rights during the course of
the proceedings before the RTC, but to no avail. While there appears an intercalation of a prayer for
visitation rights in Cherith’s RTC Petition, it is evident that she never authorized such intercalation
because: (1) she had consistently contested the grant of visitation rights in favor of Manny, and (2) it
was merely penned in the handwriting of an unidentified person, which, thus, renders the same
dubious. Meanwhile, Manny or any of the courts a quo did not proffer any credible explanation to the
contrary.

Hence, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of
Manny, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not
prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which
deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari. With this pronouncement, there is no
need to delve into the other ancillary issues raised herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated
April 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117731 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The portions of the Orders dated June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Trece Martires City, Branch 23granting visitation rights to respondent Manny P. Bucal are hereby
declared VOID.

Toyota Pasig Inc v Peralta

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from a complaint 5 for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, unpaid commission,
annual profit sharing, damages, and attorney's fees filed by respondent against petitioner and/or
Severino C. Lim, Jnalyn P. Lim, Jason Ian Yap, Jorge Tuason, Marissa Operaña, and Arturo P. Lopez
(Lim, et al.) before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-NCR CASE No. 03-03689-12.6 Essentially, respondent
alleged that petitioner - a corporation engaged in the business of car dealership, including service and
sales of parts and accessories of Toyota motor vehicles 7 initially hired her as a cashier in March
1997.8 Eventually in 2004, she worked her way up to the position of Insurance Sales Executive (ISE)
which she held from 2007 to 2012 and where she received various distinctions from petitioner, including
"Best Insurance Sales Executive" for the years 2007 and 2011. 9 However, things turned sour when her
husband, Romulo "Romper" De Peralta, also petitioner's employee and the President of the Toyota
Shaw-Pasig Workers Union - Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (TSPWU-AIWA), organized a
collective bargaining unit through a certification election. 10 According to respondent, petitioner suddenly
dismissed from service the officials/directors of TSPWU-AIWA, including her husband. 11 Thereafter,
petitioner allegedly started harassing respondent for her husband's active involvement in TSPWU-AIWA,
which resulted to the issuance of a Notice to Explain dated January 3, 2012 accusing her of "having
committed various acts" relative to the processing of insurance of three (3) units as "outside
transactions" and claiming commissions therefor, instead of considering the said transactions as "new
business accounts" under the dealership's marketing department. 12 Accordingly, she was preventively
suspended because of such charge. On February 3, 2012, respondent received a Notice of
Termination,13 which prompted her to file the instant complaint, where she also prayed for the payment
of her earned substantial commissions, tax rebates, and other benefits dating back from July 2011 to
January 2012, amounting to P617,248.08. 14

In their defense, petitioner and Lim, et al. maintained that respondent was dismissed from service for
just cause and with due process. They explained that respondent was charged and proven to have
committed acts of dishonesty and falsification by claiming commissions for new business accounts which
should have been duly credited to the dealership's marketing department. 15 They further averred that
respondent's claims for commissions, tax rebates, and other benefits were unfounded and without
documentation and validation.16

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
liability to respondent in the amount of P617,248.08 representing the latter's unpaid commissions, tax
rebate for achieved monthly targets, salary deductions, salary for the month of January 2012, and
success share/profit sharing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The petition primarily argues that the CA erred in awarding respondent her monetary claims despite
failing to prove her entitlement thereto. Corollary, it likewise contends that such monetary claims do not
partake of unpaid wages/salaries, as well as the labor standard benefits of employees as provided by
law - e.g., 13th month pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, night differential pay, holiday pay -
and as such, petitioner, as employer, did not bear the burden of proving the payment of such monetary
claims or that respondent was not entitled thereto. 37

The petition is without merit.

In this case, respondent's monetary claims, such as commissions, tax rebates for achieved monthly
targets, and success share/profit sharing, are given to her as incentives or forms of encouragement in
order for her to put extra effort in performing her duties as an ISE. Clearly, such claims fall within the
ambit of the general term "commissions" which in turn, fall within the definition of wages pursuant to
prevailing law and jurisprudence. Thus, respondent's allegation of nonpayment of such monetary
benefits places the burden on the employer, i.e., petitioner, to prove with a reasonable degree of
certainty that it paid said benefits and that the employee, i.e., respondent, actually received such
payment or that the employee was not entitled thereto. 40 The Court's pronouncement in Heirs of Ridad
v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation 41 is instructive on this matter, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Well-settled is the rule that once the employee has set out with particularity in his complaint, position
paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard benefits he is entitled to, and which he alleged
that the employer failed to pay him, it becomes the employer's burden to prove that it has paid these
money claims. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, and even where the employees
must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment,
rather than on the employees to prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent
personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances, and other similar documents which will show that
overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of the worker have been paid - are not
in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. 42 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In this case, petitioner simply dismissed respondent's claims for being purely self-serving and
unfounded, without even presenting any tinge of proof showing that respondent was already paid of
such benefits or that she was not entitled thereto. In fact, during the proceedings before the LA,
petitioner was even given the opportunity to submit pertinent company records to rebut respondent's
claims but opted not to do so, thus, constraining the LA to direct respondent to submit her own
computations.43 It is well-settled that the failure of employers to submit the necessary documents that
are in their possession gives rise to the presumption that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its
cause.44

Indubitably, petitioner failed to discharge its afore-described burden. Hence, it is bound to pay the
monetary benefits claimed by respondent. As aptly pointed out by the NLRC, since respondent already
earned these monetary benefits, she must promptly receive the same, notwithstanding the fact that she
was legally terminated from employment. 45

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 14, 2014 and July 24, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 131495 and 131558 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Inter-orient Maritime v Candava

The Facts

In January 2002, petitioner Inter-Orient Maritime Incorporated (Inter-Orient) hired Joselito C. Candava
(Joselito) as an able-bodied seaman for its foreign principal, Tankoil Carriers Limited (Tankoil). Joselito
was then deployed to M/T Demetra for a contract period of nine (9) months. 7 Despite expiration of his
contract period on October 28, 2002, Joselito continued to work aboard the vessel due to the
unavailability of a replacement and such work extension lasted until February 2003.

On February 13, 2003, he complained of significant pain in the abdominal region and was rushed to a
hospital. Joselito was diagnosed to be suffering from "direct inguinal hernia strangulated right" and
"acute appendicitis." As such, he underwent two (2) medical procedures, namely right inguinal plasty
and appendectomy, where the doctors further discovered that the tumor in Joselito’s right inguinal
canal "corresponded to a tumor formation dependent on the right testicle" 8 which appeared oncogenic.
As a result thereof, Joselito was repatriated to Manila. Upon his arrival, the company designated
physician examined Joselito and declared him fit to work. Nonetheless, his supplications for work were
rejected.

On March 28, 2003, Joselito, accompanied by representatives of petitioner Inter-Orient, filed a

complaint9 for recovery of sick wages and reimbursement of medical expenses before the NLRC –
National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR). However, on even date, Joselito sought for its Dismissal 10 in
consideration of the sum of ₱29,813.04 and in relation thereto, executed a Release of All Rights 11 and
Pagpapaubaya ng Lahat ng Karapatan, 12 releasing Tankoil and Inter-Orient from any claim arising from
the appendicitis and inguinal hernia he suffered.

A month later, Joselito was diagnosed to have suspected "malignant cells that may also be reactive
mesothelial cells,"13 and thereafter found to have testicular tumor 14 (cancer of the testes15), abdominal
germ cell tumor,16 metastatic carcinoma to the lungs and pleural effusion. 17 Thus, on August 11, 2003,
Joselito, again accompanied by representatives from petitioner Inter-Orient, filed another
complaint18 for medical benefits before the NLRC – San Pablo City. Similarly, on even date, Joselito
sought for the dismissal19 of his complaint in consideration of the amount of ₱77,000.00 and executed a
Receipt and Release,20 releasing Tankoil and Inter-Orient from any claim arising from his employment. In
both complaints, orders of dismissal were issued.

The Issue Before the Court

The pivotal issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether Joselito’s death is compensable as to entitle
Cristina to claim death benefits.

Ruling

The foregoing facts, coupled with Joselito’s failing health, negate his voluntariness in executing his
complaints, motions to dismiss, and release documents and give life to the truism that "necessitous men
are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the
crafty may impose upon them."55 Besides, as a rule, quitclaims, waivers, or releases are looked upon
with disfavor and are largely ineffective to bar recovery of the full measure of a worker’s rights, and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. 56 This is especially true in this case
where instead of promoting the orderly settlement of disputes; petitioners’ acts encouraged the
circumvention of the proper legal procedures and the evasion of the payment of legitimate claims to a
seafarer succumbing to a life-threatening disease. Therefore the settlements that Joselito entered into
must be struck down for being contrary to public policy.

Lastly, despite the declaration of fitness that would have entitled him to reinstatement to his former
position,57 Joselito was not provided work, apparently due to his worsening health. He was thus
constrained to seek medical attention at his own expense and was continuously unable to work until his
death. This only shows that his medical condition effectively barred his chances of being hired by other
maritime employers and deployed abroad on an ocean-going vessel. In a number of cases, the Court
disregarded the medical report issued by the company designated physician that the seafarer was fit to
work in view of the evidence on record that the latter had in fact been unable to engage in his regular
work within the allowable period,58 as in this case.

In view of the foregoing, Joselito’s death is compensable for having been caused by an illness duly
established to have been contracted in the course of his employment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 21, 2011 Decision and March 27, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113342 are hereby AFFIRMED. Therefore, petitioners Inter-Orient
Maritime, . Incorporated and/or Tankoil Carriers, Limited are ordered to pay respondent Cristina
Candava the following amounts: (1) US$50,000.00 as death benefits; (2) US$7,000.00 as benefits to
Joselito's minor child, Jerome Lester; (3) US$1,000.00 as burial assistance; and ( 4) ten percent (10%) of
the total monetary award as attorney's fees.

Mahilum v VECO

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1are the Resolutions dated September 25, 2012 2 and
December 19, 2012 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06329, which dismissed the
certiorari petition filed by petitioners Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU TUCP (the Union)
and Casmero Mahilum (Mahilum; collectively petitioners) against the Decision 4 dated June 30, 2011 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CC(V)-12 000003-10 (NCMB-RBVII-NS-10-12-
10) for failure of their new counsel to show cause why their certiorari petition should not be dismissed
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

It was claimed that, before Mahilum was elected as union officer, he was transferred from VECO's Public
Relations Section to its Administrative Services Section without any specific work. When he was elected
as union secretary, he was transferred to the Line Services Department as its Customer Service
Representative. 7 At the time of his election as union president, VECO management allegedly: (a)
terminated active union members without going through the grievance machinery procedure prescribed
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement 8 (CBA); (b) refused to implement the profit-sharing scheme
provided under the same CBA 9 (c) took back the motorbikes issued to active union members; and (d)
revised the electricity privilege 10 granted to VECO's employees. 11

Thus, on May 1, 2009, union members marched on the streets of Cebu City to protest VECO's refusal to
comply with the political and economic provisions of the CBA. Mahilum and other union officers were
interviewed by the media, and they handed out a document 12 containing their grievances against VECO,
the gist of which came out in local newspapers. 13 Following said incident, Mahilum was allegedly
demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him and restrict his movements. Other union officers were
transferred to positions that will keep them away from the general union membership. 14

On May 8, 2009, Mahilum was issued a Notice to Explain 15 why he should not be terminated from
service due to loss of trust and confidence, as well as in violating the Company Code of Discipline, for
causing the publication of what VECO deemed as a libelous article. The other union officers likewise
received similar notices 16 for them to explain their actions, which they justified 17 as merely an
expression of their collective sentiments against the treatment of VECO's management towards them. 18

On May 20, 2009, the union officers were notified 19 of the administrative investigation to be conducted
relative to the charges against them. During the scheduled investigation, the Union's counsel initially
raised its objection to the proceedings and insisted that the investigation should be conducted through
the grievance machinery procedure, as provided in the CBA. 20 However, upon the agreement to
proceed with the investigation of the Union Vice President, Renato Gregorio M. Gimenez (Gimenez),
through his own counsel, Mahilum and the other union officers likewise agreed to proceed with the
aforesaid investigation, with Gimenez's counsel representing the Union. 21

Prior to the said investigation, the Union filed on May 18, 2009, a Notice of Strike  22 with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) against VECO, which facilitated a series of conferences that
yielded a Memorandum of Agreement 23 (MOA) signed by the parties on August 7, 2009. 24 The parties
likewise put to rest the critical issue of electricity privilege and agreed before the NCMB on a conversion
rate of said privilege to basic pay. Moreover, the administrative investigation on the alleged libelous
publication was deferred until after the CBA renegotiation. 25

However, even before the conclusion of the CBA renegotiation 26 on June 28, 2010, several complaints
for libel were filed against Mahilum and the other union officers by VECO's Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer Jaime Jose Y. Aboitiz. 27 The administrative hearing on the charges against
Mahilum resumed with due notice to the latter, but he protested the same, referring to it as "moro-
mord' or "kangaroo" and insisting that the investigation should follow the grievance machinery
procedure under the CBA. 28 Nonetheless, VECO's management carried on with its investigation and, on
the basis of the findings thereof, issued a notice 29 terminating Mahilum from employment on October
28, 2010. 30

The Issue
Undeterred, petitioners are now before the Court maintaining that the CA erred in dismissing the
certiorari petition on account of the one-day delay in its filing despite the serious errors committed by
the NLRC in absolving VECO from the charge of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal of Mahilum.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed "not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution" sought to be assailed. The provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays,
and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a
pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. 56

The Union admittedly/ 57 received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which denied
their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30, 2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari ended on October 1 7, 2011. But the certiorari petition was
filed one day after, or on October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure to file said petition within the
required 60-day period rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution impervious to any attack through a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the same. 58

The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day is not a legal
justification for non-compliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the
ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one day late.
When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one ( 61) days, as the Court had
previously declared in this wise:

Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid cause. Moreover, as declared by the NLRC, VECO complied
with the procedural due process requirements of furnishing Mahilum with two written notices before
the termination of employment can be effected. On May 8, 2009, 83 Mahilum was apprised of the
particular acts for which his termination was sought; and, after due investigation, he was given a Notice
of Decision 84on October 28, 2010 informing him of his dismissal from service.

The fact that Mahilum served the company for a considerable period of time will not help his cause. It is
well to emphasize that the longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his
responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the
company. 85

As a final word, while it is the state's responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should not be
used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes between labor and
capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. Social justice does not mandate that every dispute
should be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be granted to the deserving and
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. 86

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

 Surigao Del Norte Electric Coop v Teofilo Gonzaga

The Facts

On October 13, 1993, petitioner Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) hired Gonzaga
as its lineman. On February 15, 2000, he was assigned as Temporary Teller at SURNECO’s sub-office in
Gigaquit, Surigao Del Norte.7

On June 26, 2001, petitioner Danny Escalante (Escalante), General Manager of SURNECO, issued
Memorandum Order No. 34, series of 2001 (Memorandum 34-01), with attached report of SURNECO’s
Internal Auditor, Pedro Denolos (Collection Report) and two (2) sets of summaries of collections and
remittances (Summaries),8 seeking an explanation from Gonzaga regarding his remittance shortages in
the total amount of ₱314,252.23, covering the period from February 2000 to May 2001. 9

On July 16, 2001, Gonzaga asked for an extension of three (3) weeks within which to submit his
explanation since he needed to go over the voluminous receipts of collections and remittances with the
assistance of an accountant. On the same day, he sent another letter, denying any unremitted amount
on his part and thereby, requesting that the charges against him be lifted. 10

Attached to the same letter is an Audit Opinion 11 prepared by one Leonides Laluna (Laluna), a certified
public accountant (CPA), stating that the Internal Auditor’s Report cannot accurately establish any
remittance shortage on Gonzaga’s part since the amount of collections stated in the Summaries was not
supported by any bills or official receipts.

In the meantime, SURNECO formed an Investigation Committee (Committee) to investigate Gonzaga’s

alleged remittance shortages. On July 30, 2001, the Committee sent Gonzaga an invitation to attend the
investigation proceedings, in which he participated. 12 Pending investigation, Gonzaga was placed under
preventive suspension from July 31 to August 29, 2001. 13

On August 9, 2001, the Committee tendered its report, finding Gonzaga guilty of (a) gross and habitual
neglect of duty under Section 5.2.15 of the Code of Ethics and Discipline for Rural Electric Cooperative
(REC) Employees (Code of Ethics); (b) misappropriation of REC funds under Section 7.2.1 of the Code of
Ethics; and (c) failure to remit collections/monies under Section 7.2.2 of the Code of Ethics. Thereafter, a
notice of termination was served on Gonzaga on September 13, 2001. Gonzaga sought reconsideration
before SURNECO’s Board of Directors but the latter denied the same after he presented his case. 14 On
October 25, 2001, another notice of termination (Final Notice of Termination) was served on Gonzaga.
Consequently, he was dismissed from the service on November 26, 2001. 15

The Issue

The crux of the present controversy revolves around the propriety of Gonzaga’s dismissal.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the main issue in this case involves a question of fact. In this
light, it is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the CA via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing
errors of law as the former is not a trier of facts. In the Court’s exercise of its power of review, thus, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding as it is not the former’s function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again.43

However, one of the recognized exceptions to this rule is when there resides a conflict between the
findings of facts of the NLRC and of the CA. In such instance, there is a need to review the records to
determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts, 44 as in this
case. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to examine the cause and procedure attendant to the termination
of Gonzaga’s employment.

Records reveal that while Gonzaga was given an ample opportunity to be heard within the purview of
the foregoing principles, SURNECO, however, failed to show that it followed its own rules which
mandate that the employee who is sought to be terminated be afforded a formal hearing or conference.
As above-discussed, SURNECO remains bound by – and hence, must faithfully observe – its company
policy embodied in Section 16.5 of its own Code of Ethics which reads:

16.5. Investigation Proper. The conduct of investigation shall be open to the public.1âwphi1 If there is
no answer from the respondent, as prescribed, he shall be declared in default. Direct examination of
witnesses shall be dispensed with in the IAC. In lieu thereof, the IAC shall require the complainant and
his witnesses to submit their testimonies in affidavit form duly sworn to subject to the right of the
respondent or his counsel/s to cross-examine the complainant or his witnesses. Cross examination shall
be confined only to material and relevant matter. Prolonged argumentation and other dilatory tactics
shall not be entertained.

Accordingly, since only an informal inquiry 58 was conducted in investigating Gonzaga’s alleged cash
shortages, SURNECO failed to comply with its own company policy, violating the proper termination
procedure altogether.

In this relation, case law states that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does
so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.

In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon), 59 the Court pronounced that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. 60 Thus, in Agabon, the
employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. 61

To clarify, Escalante, the general manager of SURNECO, does not stand to be solidarily liable with the
company for the same since records are bereft of any indication that he either (a) assented to a patently
unlawful act of the corporation or (b) is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs. 62

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 29, 2008 Decision and March 30, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The August 31, 2004 and February 1, 2005 Resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. M-007354-2003 are hereby REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. be ORDERED to pay
respondent Teofilo Gonzaga nominal damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) on
account of its breach of company procedure .

Mercado v Manzano

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.

Issue

Whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified
from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Ruling

Private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.  Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

Torres v People

In an Information dated June 9, 2004 filed before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol, Torres was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610: 5

Upon arraignment, Torres pleaded not guilty. 7 Trial on the merits ensued.8

The prosecution presented the victim AAA, AAA's aunt and uncle, Dr. Vicente Manalo Jr., and Barangay
Captain Hermilando Miano as witnesses to testify on the alleged incident. 9 The prosecution established
the following facts during trial:

CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly
caused damage to CCC's multicab. 10 AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to
testify during the barangay conciliation. 11

On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the
conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from
fishing. 12 CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the
conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. 13 Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's
multicab. 14 In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged
CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. 15

Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not
stop. 16 However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's
multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. 17 Torres
continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. 18 CCC came to his nephew's defense
and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain
Hermilando Miano. 19 Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. 20

Issue

(1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised on a
misapprehension of facts; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling

We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck with a wet t-
shirt constitutes child abuse.

It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.44 The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. 45 This Court is not a trier of
facts. 46 It is not duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of
any showing of any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. 47 A departure from the general rule
may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record. 48

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial
courts.49 It is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court. 50 The trial court's findings on the matter are
entitled to great weight and given great respect and "may only be disregarded ... if there are facts and
circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter the results
of the case[.]"51
Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in
a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Petitioner,
as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old
child.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
Resolution dated February 22, 2013 in CA_G.R. CEB-CR No. 00481 affirming the conviction of petitioner
Vam Clifford Torres y Salera for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 are AFFIRMED.

Beumer v Amores

The Factual Antecedents

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years,
the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated
November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36
of the Family Code.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14,
2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:

By Purchase:

a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters
(sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.

b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806
sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.

c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756
sq.m.

d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.

By way of inheritance:

e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area
of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).

f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area
of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.). 7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1
and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth
being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal
funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. 9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her
and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using
her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
payment for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 11

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He
also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. 13

For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal
properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00. 15

Issue

Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to the FACTS
ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONER’S ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY
ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE
PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latter’s name. 26 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to
skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it
should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. 27
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, 28 he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 29 Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where
it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land.
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony 36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound
to protect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.

Casan Maquiling v COMELEC

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

Ruling

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.