Eprocurement Integrity Matrix Rev 9 CVC V 2
Eprocurement Integrity Matrix Rev 9 CVC V 2
Eprocurement Integrity Matrix Rev 9 CVC V 2
V-2
Page 1 of 23
e-Procurement Integrity Matrix
(encompassing some Security/ Transparency and related Functionality Issues
in e-Tendering/ e-Procurement for ensuring Integrity at Application level)
Preamble:
In view of the dearth of awareness about the intricacies of e-tendering, and to ensure
that the due diligence by the Government entities is done in a consistent manner, e-
Procurement Integrity Matrix is being provided herein. This matrix brings out the
concerns relating to Security, Transparency and Functionality in e-tendering at the
application level that must be effectively addressed by the e-Tendering solution a
Government entity chooses to use or deploy. The matrix does not intend to prescribe
any specific solution.
While procuring software and/ or services for e-tendering, each Government entity
should ensure that the e-tendering software or services offered by vendors satisfactorily
address the concerns outlined in the matrix, and is fully compliant with the requirements
of this Matrix. The assertions made by the vendor in his bid should be verified through
taking a comprehensive demonstration of the software, and doing related due-diligence
before selection of the vendor. This should be the main eligibility criteria. No other
eligibility criteria should take precedence over the security, transparency and other
requirements outlined in this Matrix.
The e-Procurement Integrity Matrix has been reviewed and validated by leading
Industry/ IT-security experts.
[TII has the permission from its member and the original author, Mr Jitendra Kohli, who is a pioneer and an
innovator in the area of e-tendering for public procurement, to reproduce this work for the benefit of all
organizations and Governments of various countries.
Mr Jitendra Kohli has not given permission for reproduction of his work for commercial gains.
Mr Jitendra Kohli wishes to acknowledge Prof. Pandu Rangan (Professor of Computer Sciences at IIT
Chennai, and a leading cryptography expert) for inspiring him to create the original work]
© Jitendra Kohli
Page 2 of 23
e-Procurement Integrity Matrix
(encompassing some Security/ Transparency and related Functionality Issues
in e-Tendering/ e-Procurement for ensuring Integrity at Application level)
Important Note:
While inviting bids for e-tendering software/ services, vendors must be asked to furnish
their response to this matrix. Response to each issue/ concern/ requirement mentioned
in this matrix/ questionnaire should be based on the current availability of these features
in the vendor’s e-tendering application software. They should not make assertions
merely by looking at the matrix/ questionnaire. The vendors should be able to prove that,
as on the date of the submission of bids, the e-tendering application software being
offered by them had the required features/ functionality as being confirmed by them in
the response to the matrix. Some relevant Eligibility/ Qualifying Criteria are outlined in
section VIII of this matrix.
(I)
General:
Page 3 of 23
(II)
Concerns relating to Implementation of e-Procurement Systems using PKI-based Bid-
Encryption (ie a system in which Public Key of a Tender-Opening Officer or of any other officer
of the purchase department, or of any person from the service provider’s organization) is used
for bid-encryption, and corresponding Private-Key used for Decryption
Assumptions:
a) In this section it is assumed that bids are encrypted at the bidder’s computer with public-
key as mentioned above, and the encrypted bids, with additional SSL encryption, reach
the e-tendering server through file-upload and/ or filling of online-forms.
The following ground realities have to be kept in view while addressing the concerns listed in the
table given below and while validating the security and transparency aspects of e-tendering
systems.
a. For secure and transparent functioning of the e-tendering system, it cannot be assumed
that there will never be any ‘black sheep’ in the Purchase organization (ie Buyer
organization)
b. For secure and transparent functioning of the e-tendering system, it cannot be assumed
that there will never be any black sheep in the e-tendering Service Provider’s
organization
c. While all efforts must be made to ensure that no spyware is put in the server which can
make clandestine copies of a file or data (encrypted or unencrypted) being uploaded to
the server, and then sending this clandestine copy to a secret destination, the possibility
of such spyware being planted in the web-server cannot be totally ruled out. This
undesirable eventuality could occur due to connivance of the administrators of the
Service Provider, or even through remote injection. For secure and transparent
functioning of the e-tendering system, it cannot be assumed that there will never be such
a possibility of the spyware being planted in the e-tendering server. In this context,
reported occurrences in the last few months (during the year 2008) of spyware being
planted in the servers of the World Bank and the Ministry of External Affairs (Govt of
India) are noteworthy.
d. If the spyware is planted at the kernel level, there may not be any audit trail.
e. Audit Trails (both application level, and Operating system level) are essentially reports.
To that extent it is possible to fudge these. Also, other than application-level audit trail
reports, the other audit trail reports can be quite complex and impractical to analyze for
ongoing operations of this nature. In spite of this, audit trail-reports are useful and should
be there as supporting evidence. However, in a sensitive application of this nature, audit
trails cannot be depended upon as the sole protection against any malafide act.
S# Typical Implementation Concern/ Implication in Has the concern been If ‘Yes’ has
Practices/ Ground e-tendering addressed in the been said in
Realities/ some PKI offered system the previous
Aspects column,
Yes/ No/ N.A. explanation
of how it
has been
done
1. Private Key with 1a. If a clandestine copy of a bid
which decryption is is made as described under GR-
done, is available (c) above before the ‘tender
with the concerned opening event (TOE)’, and if the
officer before the concerned tender-opening officer
Page 4 of 23
Public Tender (TOE-officer) connives in
Opening Event decrypting the bid before the
TOE, the confidentiality of the bid
is compromised.
(III)
Concerns relating to situations where bids before being transmitted from the bidder’s
computer are protected with only SSL Encryption, and Database-level Encryption is done
before the bid is stored in the Database Server
The following ground realities have to be kept in view while addressing the concerns listed in the
table given below, and while validating the security and transparency aspects of e-tendering
systems.
Page 5 of 23
being planted in the web-server cannot be totally ruled out. This undesirable
eventuality could occur due to connivance of the administrators of the Service
Provider, or even through remote injection. For secure and transparent functioning
of the e-tendering system, it cannot be assumed that there will never be such a
possibility of the spyware being planted in the e-tendering server. In this context,
reported occurrences in the last few months (during the year 2008) of spyware being
planted in the servers of the World Bank and the Ministry of External Affairs (Govt of
India) are noteworthy.
d. If the spyware is planted at the kernel level, there may not be any audit trail.
e. Audit Trails (both application level, and Operating system level) are essentially
reports. To that extent it is possible to fudge these. Also, other than application-
level audit trail reports, the other audit trail reports can be quite complex and
impractical to analyze for ongoing operations of this nature. In spite of this, audit
trail-reports are useful and should be there as supporting evidence. However, in a
sensitive application of this nature, audit trails cannot be depended upon as the sole
protection against any malafide act.
S# Typical Implementation Concern/ Implication in Has the concern been If ‘Yes’ has
Practices/ Ground e-tendering addressed in the offered been said in
Realities system the previous
column,
Yes/ No/ N.A. explanation of
how it has
been done
1. Assuming that ‘only 1a. If a clandestine
SSL encryption’ is copy of a bid is made as
applied to a bid while described under GR- (c)
it is being transmitted above in the interim
from the bidder’s period which would be
computer to the before the ‘tender
server, it is a fact the opening event (TOE)’,
role of SSL and if the administrator
encryption is limited connives, the
to the transmission confidentiality of the bid
phase (ie is compromised.
transportation to the
server), and that on 1b. The above concern
reaching the server with the difference that
the SSL encryption is the copy of the bid is
removed. The bid is made with the
now presumably connivance of the
encrypted again with Database Administrator
PKI or Symmetric (DBA) and decryption
Key. Albeit small, done in connivance with
there is an ‘interim the person holding the
period’ before the bid decryption key.
is encrypted again. In
the interim period the
bid is actually in an
unencrypted state
and to that extent
vulnerable.
Irrespective of
whether PKI or
Symmetric Key is
Page 6 of 23
used for encryption at
Database-level, the
encrypting key is
available/ accessible
to some officer of the
purchase
organization, or an
administrator of the
e-tendering Service
Provider, or the DBA.
(IV)
Clarifications about Symmetric-Key based Bid-Encryption done at the Bidder’s Computer
NOTE: If the Bid-Encryption process used in the offered e-tendering/ e-procurement software is
not covered by any of the sections II, III and IV above, please provide detailed explanation of
how it is done in a secure manner, while keeping in view the various concerns outlined in
sections II, III, and IV above.
Page 7 of 23
(V)
Concerns/ Clarifications based on s-42(1) of the IT Act 2000 relating to Digital Signatures,
a User Organization’s Administrative Hierarchy, and some related aspects
Note: Some other aspects of the IT Act 2000 are indirectly covered in Section-VI of this matrix.
S# Clarification Sought Response
Page 8 of 23
activities within each
department, and which could
vary from tender to tender,
would inter alia include –
deciding methodology and
rules pertaining to a particular
tender, creation of tender
notice, approval/ rejection of
tender notice, creation of
corrigendum, approval of
corrigendum, creation tender
document forms, approval of
tender document forms,
overall approval/ rejection of
tender documents, providing
responses to clarification of
tender documents, uploading
minutes of pre-bid meeting,
one or more officers
conducting public online
tender opening event (TOE),
approving minutes of the
public online TOE, short-
listing responsive bidders for
the next stage (where
applicable), managing roles
of various personnel, and
assigning alternative
personnel in case the original
assignees are absent, etc.
b) The offered e-tendering
system has facility, such that
roles with conflict of interest
can be offered to different
persons within the
organization, so that conflict
of interest is avoided.
Page 9 of 23
each Buyer organization, ie
external to its tendering
departments) who can
access the application-level
audit-trail (ie audit-log)
reports. Other users of the
organization should not have
access to these reports.
Page 10 of 23
role in a secure manner
with full accountability, and
with no need for any re-
assigning of
responsibilities. It is being
clarified that the objective
here is not to provide a
full-fledged virtual office to
the executives, but to
provide adequate facilities
within the application for
multiple executives of
multiple departments to
carry out their respective
tendering related activities
with proper security and
full accountability. Roles
relating to various
tendering activities within
each department, and
which could vary from
tender to tender, would
inter alia include –
procuring tender
documents and related
addenda, seeking
clarification to tender
documents, preparation
and submission of various
bid parts, attending public
online tender opening
event, managing roles of
various personnel, and
assigning alternative
personnel in case the
original assignees are
absent, etc.
b) The offered e-tendering
system has facility such
that roles with conflict of
interest can be offered to
different persons within
the organization so that
conflict of interest is
avoided
Page 11 of 23
changes must be audit-
trailed in the application.
The credentials of this
overall coordinator must
be verified.
d) There should be
provision for having
separate authorized user
(at the corporate level of
each Supplier
organization, ie external
to its sales departments)
who can access the
audit-trail (ie audit-log)
reports of the application.
Other users of the
organization should not
have access to these
reports. Even the user
authorized for audit trails
should not have access
bid-submission data till
the tender-opening-event.
e) Under no circumstances
will it be required for any
executive to hand over
his/ her private-key (used
for digital-signing, or bid-
encryption/ decryption if
applicable in the offered
system) to anyone else –
within the organization,
or to anyone in the
service provider’s
organization, or to
anybody else.
Page 12 of 23
necessitate that the private key of
such an officer be handed over to
anybody else for the scheduled
tendering processes to continue
uninterrupted. Please explain how
this is achieved.
4. There could be occasions when an
authorized executive of a Supplier/
Vendor organization is on leave, gets
transferred, resigns or his/ her
services are terminated. There
should be no requirement in the e-
tendering system which may
necessitate that the private key of
such an executive be handed over to
anybody else for the scheduled
tendering processes to continue
uninterrupted. Please explain how
this is achieved.
5. No new digital signing, or login (in
case private key is used for such
purpose in the offered e-tendering
system) should be allowed in the e-
tendering system with a key whose
digital certificate has expired.
(VI)
Some Other Functionality/ Security/ Transparency related Requirements of a Manual
Tendering System and Conformance its Availability in the Offered E-Tendering system
Page 13 of 23
(which is an electronic
record), should have an
audit-trail within the
application of its creation/
approval/ posting. Also, the
tender notice should be
digitally signed by an
authorized officer of the
Purchase/ Buyer
organization.
Please confirm.
2. A Corrigendum is issued c) At a higher level, there
after internal clearance/ should be clearance (which
approval. Once a is audit-trailed within the
Corrigendum to a Tender application and digitally
Notice is published in a signed) before a
newspaper, it becomes an Corrigendum is issued.
authentic record. d) For authenticity and for
assurance that it has not
been tampered, the
electronic Corrigendum
(which is an electronic
record), should have an
audit-trail within the
application of its creation/
approval/ posting. Also, the
Corrigendum should be
digitally signed by an
authorized officer of the
Purchase/ Buyer
organization.
Please confirm.
.
3. Once Tender Documents a)For authenticity and for
are published, and sold with assurance that it has not
official receipt and serial no. been tampered, the
for each copy sold, these electronic Tender
become an authentic record. Documents (which is an
electronic record), should
have an audit-trail within
the application of its
posting. Also, the Tender
Documents should be
digitally signed by an
authorized officer of the
Purchase/ Buyer
organization.
b) At the time of online sale/
downloading of the tender
documents, official serial
number should be given
along with the receipt.
Please confirm.
Page 14 of 23
4. An Addendum is issued after a) At a higher level, there
internal clearance/ approval. should be clearance (which
Once Addendum to Tender is audit-trailed within the
Documents are published, application and digitally
and distributed, these signed) before an
become an authentic record Addendum is issued.
b) For authenticity and for
assurance that it has not
been tampered, the
electronic Addendum
(which is an electronic
record), should have an
audit-trail within the
application of its approval/
posting. Also, the
Addendum should be
digitally signed by an
authorized officer of the
Purchase/ Buyer
organization.
Please confirm.
Page 15 of 23
respond accordingly. elsewhere in this matrix/
questionnaire.
a) Single-stage, single-
envelope
b) Single-stage, two-
envelope
c) Two stage (with
facility for
‘technical
conformance’, and
if required, ‘revised
tender
documents’)
d) Two-stage, two-
envelope
e) Where required, the
above may be combined
with a Pre-qualification
stage
f) In some cases, the
Purchaser may allow
submission of one or
more Alternative bids
g) Each bid part (eg
technical, financial) may
be required to be
submitted in a
‘summary format’ along
with a ‘detailed bid’.
The latter could be a
large file.
h) After having
submitted the ‘original’
bid for each bid-part, a
bidder has a right to
submit:
- ‘Modification’ bid
- ‘Substitution’ bid
Or ‘Withdrawal’ bid for
all his bid-submissions.
Page 16 of 23
the box is opened during the or elapsed, and till all the
public tender opening event. authorized Tender-Opening
Officers have formally
instructed the system to do
so with PKI-based Digital
Signatures
Page 17 of 23
submitted, or has been allowed, then the
exemption claimed following should be ensured:
with basis thereof is
disclosed to the - That the offline bids
participants. are opened first and
d) Salient points of their salient points
each opened bid are entered into the system
read out aloud for before the online bids
the benefit of the are opened. This is all
participating bidders, done in the presence
and to ensure that of the online bidders
no change is made who are
in the bid contents simultaneously
later on with witnessing this
connivance. exercise.
e) Clarifications may be - The compiled/
sought from a bidder integrated data of the
whose bid has been both the online and
opened and record offline bidders should
is made of the query be made available in
and the response. the form of an online
f) Each page of the comparison chart to all
opened bid is the participants.
countersigned
during the TOE itself
(by each tender
opening officer
(typically up to 3) to
ensure that no
change is made in
the bid contents later
on with connivance.
g) After all the bids are
opened and
countersigned by the
TOE-officers, the
minutes of the
meeting (ie TOE)
are to be recorded.
h) Each bid part may
be opened in a
separate tender
opening event in
which only the
authorized bidders
are allowed. This is
supposed to be
done in a very
transparent manner
with proper
scheduling of events
and proper
information to the
concerned bidders.
i) Bid parts which are
due for opening in a
Page 18 of 23
subsequent tender
opening event are
securely stored till
that event.
j) If in a particular
TOE, it is decided
not to open the bid
of a bidder, then
such bids are
returned opened.
(VII)
Concerns/ Clarifications relating to preventing other Bidders from Bidding in the
e-Tendering Scenario, and Miscellaneous Concerns/ Clarifications
Specifically:
Page 19 of 23
user-hierarchy and role
authorization), which is
viewable only to the
authorized user of that Buyer
organization. Other users of
the organization should not
have access to these audit
trail reports.
ii) Similarly, there should be
audit trail reports for -- each
tender of each Supplier/
Bidder organization, as well
as, non-tender specific
activities (like creation of
user-hierarchy and role
authorization), which is
viewable only to the
authorized user of that
Supplier organization. Other
users of the organization
should not have access to
audit trail reports.
iii) As backup, and as protection
against tampering of audit-
trail reports saved by an
individual organization at its
end, facility should be
available for the authorized e-
procurement application
administrator to have parallel
access to such reports of
both Buyer organizations, as
well as, Supplier
organizations. Furthermore,
information pertaining content
of bids and Bid Submission
[which is sensitive till the
Tender-Opening Event
(TOE)], should not be
accessible to the e-
procurement application
administrator till the start of
the TOE.
iv) The authorized administrator
of the e-procurement/ e-
tendering application should
also have access to audit trail
reports of other
administrators within the
application.
v) The application should not
provide any facility to modify
or delete audit logs, or
suspend logging operations
Page 20 of 23
5. There should be facility for Reports
relating to Tendering-Activities, and
corresponding MIS Reports which are
accessible to the relevant authorized
users of that organization.
Please confirm.
7. As mentioned in section-V, it is
important that officers of a Buyer
organization involved in procurement
related activities continue to perform
their related roles without re-
assigning or abdicating
responsibilities. A pre-requisite to
enable officers to perform their roles
is the existence of comprehensive
virtual hierarchy and role-
authorization as outlined in the above
sections.
Page 21 of 23
used. Please clarify how this is
achieved.
(VIII)
Concerns/ Clarifications relating to Bidders making false assertions based on non-
existing functionality in their e-tendering software (Important Eligibility/ Qualifying Criteria)
Note (For Government Entities, which as Buyer/ Purchaser, are planning to procure e-
procurement/ e-tendering software/ services): To encourage competition and new vendors of e-
procurement/ e-tendering software/ services, the Government entity may consider new vendors
Page 22 of 23
if they can authentically demonstrate (with verifiable written proof which can be independently
audited), the availability of software with them which is adequately tested , and satisfactorily
addresses the concerns outlined in this matrix.
V-2
Page 23 of 23