Battle of Midway - Wikipedia

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The Battle of Midway was a major naval battle between the United States and Imperial Japanese navies which marked a major turning point in the Pacific Theater of World War II in favor of the US. The US was able to defeat a larger Japanese fleet and inflict heavy losses, including sinking four of Japan's aircraft carriers.

The opposing forces were the United States Navy under Admirals Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance against the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Yamamoto, Nagumo and Kondō.

The battle took place near Midway Atoll, located roughly halfway between Hawaii and Japan, between June 4-7, 1942.

Battle of Midway

The Battle of Midway (Japanese: ミッドウ


ェー海戦, Hepburn: Middowē kaisen) was a
significant naval battle in the Pacific
Theater of World War II that took place on
4–7 June 1942, six months after Japan’s
attack on Pearl Harbor and one month
after the Battle of the Coral Sea.[6][7][8] The
U.S. Navy under Admirals Chester W.
Nimitz, Frank J. Fletcher, and Raymond A.
Spruance defeated an attacking fleet of
the Imperial Japanese Navy under
Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chūichi
Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondō near
Midway Atoll, inflicting devastating
damage on the Japanese fleet that proved
irreparable. Military historian John Keegan
called it "the most stunning and decisive
blow in the history of naval warfare",[9]
while naval historian Craig Symonds called
it "one of the most consequential naval
engagements in world history, ranking
alongside Salamis, Trafalgar, and
Tsushima Strait, as both tactically decisive
and strategically influential".[10]
Battle of Midway

Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

US Navy dive bombers about to attack the


Japanese cruiser Mikuma, 6 June 1942

Date 4–7 June 1942

Location Midway Atoll, Pacific Ocean


28°12′N 177°21′W

Result American victory


Belligerents

 United States  Japan

Commanders and leaders

Chester Nimitz Isoroku Yamamoto


Frank Fletcher Nobutake Kondō
Raymond Spruance Chūichi Nagumo
Tamon
Yamaguchi †

Strength

3 fleet carriers 4 fleet carriers


7 heavy cruisers 2 battleships
1 light cruiser 6 heavy cruisers
15 destroyers 1 light cruiser
350 aircraft 14 destroyers
16 submarines[1] 276 aircraft[2]
Casualties and losses

304 killed 3,057 killed


3 captured 37 captured
1 fleet carrier sunk 4 fleet carriers sunk
1 destroyer sunk 1 heavy cruiser sunk
150 aircraft 1 heavy cruiser
destroyed[3] damaged
248 aircraft
destroyed[4][5][6]
The Japanese operation, like the earlier
attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate
the United States as a strategic power in
the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free
hand in establishing its Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese
hoped another demoralizing defeat would
force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific
War and thus ensure Japanese dominance
in the Pacific. Luring the American aircraft
carriers into a trap and occupying Midway
was part of an overall "barrier" strategy to
extend Japan's defensive perimeter, in
response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo.
This operation was also considered
preparatory for further attacks against Fiji,
Samoa, and Hawaii itself.

The plan was handicapped by faulty


Japanese assumptions of the American
reaction and poor initial dispositions. Most
significantly, American cryptographers
were able to determine the date and
location of the planned attack, enabling
the forewarned U.S. Navy to prepare its
own ambush. Four Japanese and three
American aircraft carriers participated in
the battle. The four Japanese fleet carriers
—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū, part of the
six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl
Harbor six months earlier—were sunk, as
was the heavy cruiser Mikuma. The U.S.
lost the carrier Yorktown and the destroyer
Hammann.

After Midway and the exhausting attrition


of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's
capacity to replace its losses in materiel
(particularly aircraft carriers) and men
(especially well-trained pilots and
maintenance crewmen) rapidly became
insufficient to cope with mounting
casualties, while the United States'
massive industrial and training capabilities
made losses far easier to replace. The
Battle of Midway, along with the
Guadalcanal campaign, is widely
considered a turning point in the Pacific
War.

Background

The extent of Japanese military expansion in the


Pacific, April 1942

After expanding the war in the Pacific to


include Western outposts, the Japanese
Empire had attained its initial strategic
goals quickly, taking the Philippines,
Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East
Indies (modern Indonesia); the latter, with
its vital oil resources, was particularly
important to Japan. Because of this,
preliminary planning for a second phase of
operations commenced as early as
January 1942.

There were strategic disagreements


between the Imperial Army (IJA) and
Imperial Navy (IJN), and fighting between
the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, and a follow-
up strategy was not formed until April
1942.[11] Admiral Yamamoto finally won
the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly
veiled threat to resign, after which his plan
for the Central Pacific was adopted.[12]

Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was


the elimination of America's carrier forces,
which he regarded as the principal threat
to the overall Pacific campaign. This
concern was acutely heightened by the
Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16
United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-
25 Mitchell bombers launched from
USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and
several other Japanese cities. The raid,
while militarily insignificant, was a shock
to the Japanese and showed the existence
of a gap in the defenses around the
Japanese home islands as well as the
vulnerability of Japanese territory to
American bombers.[13]

This, and other successful hit-and-run


raids by American carriers in the South
Pacific, showed that they were still a
threat, although seemingly reluctant to be
drawn into an all-out battle.[14] Yamamoto
reasoned that another air attack on the
main U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor
would induce all of the American fleet to
sail out to fight, including the carriers.
However, considering the increased
strength of American land-based air power
on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7
December attack the previous year, he
judged that it was now too risky to attack
Pearl Harbor directly.[15]

Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a


tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of
the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately
1,300 miles (1,100 nautical miles; 2,100
kilometres) from Oahu. This meant that
Midway was outside the effective range of
almost all of the American aircraft
stationed on the main Hawaiian islands.
Midway was not especially important in
the larger scheme of Japan's intentions,
but the Japanese felt the Americans would
consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl
Harbor and would therefore be compelled
to defend it vigorously.[16] The U.S. did
consider Midway vital: after the battle,
establishment of a U.S. submarine base
on Midway allowed submarines operating
from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-
provision, extending their radius of
operations by 1,200 miles (1,900 km). In
addition to serving as a seaplane base,
Midway's airstrips also served as a
forward staging point for bomber attacks
on Wake Island.[17]
Yamamoto's plan: Operation MI …

Midway Atoll, several months before the battle.


Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground,
and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the
west.

Typical of Japanese naval planning during


World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for
taking Midway (named Operation MI) was
exceedingly complex.[18] It required the
careful and timely coordination of multiple
battle groups over hundreds of miles of
open sea. His design was also predicated
on optimistic intelligence suggesting that
USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming
Task Force 16, were the only carriers
available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During
the Battle of the Coral Sea one month
earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and
USS Yorktown suffered so much damage
that the Japanese believed she too had
been lost.[19] However, following hasty
repairs at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown sortied
and ultimately played a critical role in the
discovery and eventual destruction of the
Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally,
much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding
with the general feeling among the
Japanese leadership at the time, was
based on a gross misjudgment of
American morale, which was believed to
be debilitated from the string of Japanese
victories in the preceding months.[20]

Yamamoto felt deception would be


required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally
compromised situation.[21] To this end, he
dispersed his forces so that their full
extent (particularly his battleships) would
be concealed from the Americans prior to
battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting
battleships and cruisers trailed Vice
Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's carrier force by
several hundred miles. They were intended
to come up and destroy whatever
elements of the U.S. fleet might come to
Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers
had weakened them sufficiently for a
daylight gun battle;[22] this tactic was
doctrine in most major navies of the
time.[23]

What Yamamoto did not know was that


the U.S. had broken parts of the main
Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by
the Americans), divulging many details of
his plan to the enemy. His emphasis on
dispersal also meant none of his
formations were in a position to support
the others.[24] For instance, despite the
fact that Nagumo's carriers were expected
to carry out strikes against Midway and
bear the brunt of American counterattacks,
the only warships in his fleet larger than
the screening force of twelve destroyers
were two Kongō-class fast battleships, two
heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By
contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had
between them two light carriers, five
battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two
light cruisers, none of which saw action at
Midway.[22] The light carriers of the trailing
forces and Yamamoto's three battleships
were unable to keep pace with the carriers
of the Kidō Butai[nb 1] and so could not
have sailed in company with them. The
distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's
forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave
implications during the battle: the
invaluable reconnaissance capability of
the scout planes carried by the cruisers
and carriers, as well as the additional
antiaircraft capability of the cruisers and
the other two battleships of the Kongō-
class in the trailing forces, was unavailable
to Nagumo.[25]

Aleutian invasion …

In order to obtain support from the


Imperial Japanese Army for the Midway
operation, the Imperial Japanese Navy
agreed to support their invasion of the
United States through the Aleutian Islands
of Attu and Kiska, part of the organized
incorporated Alaska Territory. The IJA
occupied these islands to place the
Japanese home islands out of range of
U.S. land-based bombers across Alaska,
making Japan the first foreign nation to
occupy U.S. soil since the War of 1812.
Similarly, most Americans feared that the
occupied islands would be used as bases
for Japanese bombers to attack strategic
targets and population centers along the
West Coast of the United States. The
Japanese operations in the Aleutian
Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more
ships that could otherwise have
augmented the force striking Midway.
Whereas many earlier historical accounts
considered the Aleutians operation as a
feint to draw American forces away,
according to the original Japanese battle
plan, AL was intended to be launched
simultaneously with the attack on Midway.
A one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's
task force resulted in Operation AL
beginning a day before the Midway
attack.[26]

Prelude
American reinforcements …

USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbor days before the battle

To do battle with an enemy expected to


muster four or five carriers, Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every
available flight deck. He already had Vice
Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier
(Enterprise and Hornet) task force at hand,
though Halsey was stricken with severe
dermatitis and had to be replaced by Rear
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Halsey's
escort commander.[27] Nimitz also
hurriedly recalled Rear Admiral Frank Jack
Fletcher's task force, including the carrier
Yorktown, from the South West Pacific
Area.[28]

Despite estimates that Yorktown, damaged


in the Battle of the Coral Sea, would
require several months of repairs at Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were
intact and her flight deck largely so.[29] The
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked
around the clock, and in 72 hours she was
restored to a battle-ready state,[30] judged
good enough for two or three weeks of
operations, as Nimitz required.[31][32] Her
flight deck was patched, and whole
sections of internal frames were cut out
and replaced. Repairs continued even as
she sortied, with work crews from the
repair ship USS Vestal, herself damaged in
the attack on Pearl Harbor six months
earlier, still aboard.[33]

Yorktown's partially depleted air group was


rebuilt using whatever planes and pilots
could be found. Scouting Five (VS-5) was
replaced with Bombing Three (VB-3) from
USS Saratoga. Torpedo Five (VT-5) was
also replaced by Torpedo Three (VT-3).
Fighting Three (VF-3) was reconstituted to
replace VF-42 with sixteen pilots from VF-
42 and eleven pilots from VF-3, with
Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy"
Thach in command. Some of the aircrew
were inexperienced, which may have
contributed to an accident in which
Thach's executive officer Lieutenant
Commander Donald Lovelace was
killed.[34] Despite efforts to get Saratoga
(which had been undergoing repairs on the
American West Coast) ready, the need to
resupply and assemble sufficient escorts
meant she was unable to reach Midway
until after the battle.[35]
On Midway, by 4 June the U.S. Navy had
stationed four squadrons of PBYs—31
aircraft in total—for long-range
reconnaissance duties, and six brand-new
Grumman TBF Avengers from Hornet's VT-
8.[36] The Marine Corps stationed 19
Douglas SBD Dauntless, seven F4F-3
Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U Vindicators, and
21 Brewster F2A Buffalos. The USAAF
contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying
Fortresses and four Martin B-26
Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in
total 126 aircraft. Although the F2As and
SB2Us were already obsolete, they were
the only aircraft available to the Marine
Corps at the time.[37]
Japanese shortcomings …

Akagi, the flagship of the Japanese carrier striking


force which attacked Pearl Harbor, as well as Darwin,
Rabaul, and Colombo, in April 1942 prior to the battle

During the Battle of the Coral Sea one


month earlier, the Japanese light carrier
Shōhō had been sunk, while the fleet
carrier Shōkaku had been severely
damaged by three bomb hits and was in
drydock for months of repair. Although the
fleet carrier Zuikaku escaped the battle
undamaged, she had lost almost half her
air group, and was in port in Kure awaiting
replacement planes and pilots. That there
were none immediately available is
attributable to the failure of the IJN crew
training program, which already showed
signs of being unable to replace losses.
Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps
were employed in an effort to make up the
shortfall.[38]

Historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony


Tully believe that by combining the
surviving aircraft and pilots from Shōkaku
and Zuikaku, it is likely that Zuikaku could
have been equipped with almost a full
composite air group. They also note,
however, that doing so would have violated
Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed
that carriers and their airgroups must train
as a single unit. (In contrast, American air
squadrons were considered
interchangeable between carriers.) In any
case, the Japanese apparently made no
serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for
the forthcoming battle.[39]

Thus, Carrier Division 5, consisting of the


two most advanced aircraft carriers of the
Kido Butai, were not available, which
meant that Vice-Admiral Nagumo had only
two-thirds of the fleet carriers at his
disposal: Kaga and Akagi forming Carrier
Division 1 and Hiryū and Sōryū as Carrier
Division 2. This was partly due to fatigue;
Japanese carriers had been constantly on
operations since 7 December 1941,
including raids on Darwin and Colombo.[40]
Nonetheless, the First Carrier Strike Force
sailed with 248 available aircraft on the
four carriers (60 on Akagi, 74 on Kaga
(B5N2 squadron oversized), 57 on Hiryū
and 57 on Sōryū).[41]

The main Japanese carrier-borne strike


aircraft were the D3A1 "Val" dive bomber
and the B5N2 "Kate", which was used
either as a torpedo bomber or as a level
bomber. The main carrier fighter was the
fast and highly maneuverable A6M "Zero".
For a variety of reasons, production of the
"Val" had been drastically reduced, while
that of the "Kate" had been stopped
completely and, as a consequence, there
were none available to replace losses.[42]
In addition, many of the aircraft being used
during the June 1942 operations had been
operational since late November 1941 and,
although they were well-maintained, many
were almost worn out and had become
increasingly unreliable. These factors
meant all carriers of the Kido Butai had
fewer aircraft than their normal
complement, with few spare aircraft or
parts stored in the carriers'
hangars.[43][nb 2]

In addition, Nagumo's carrier force


suffered from several defensive
deficiencies which gave it, in Mark
Peattie's words, a " 'glass jaw': it could
throw a punch but couldn't take one."[45]
Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and
associated fire control systems had
several design and configuration
deficiencies which limited their
effectiveness. The IJN's fleet combat air
patrol (CAP) consisted of too few fighter
aircraft and was hampered by an
inadequate early warning system,
including a lack of radar. Poor radio
communications with the fighter aircraft
inhibited effective command and control
of the CAP. The carriers' escorting
warships were deployed as visual scouts
in a ring at long range, not as close anti-
aircraft escorts, as they lacked training,
doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft
guns.[46]

Japanese strategic scouting


arrangements prior to the battle were also
in disarray. A picket line of Japanese
submarines was late getting into position
(partly because of Yamamoto's haste),
which let the American carriers reach their
assembly point northeast of Midway
(known as "Point Luck") without being
detected.[47] A second attempt at
reconnaissance, using four-engine H8K
"Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor
prior to the battle and detect whether the
American carriers were present, part of
Operation K, was thwarted when Japanese
submarines assigned to refuel the search
aircraft discovered that the intended
refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off
French Frigate Shoals—was now occupied
by American warships, because the
Japanese had carried out an identical
mission in March. Thus, Japan was
deprived of any knowledge concerning the
movements of the American carriers
immediately before the battle.[48]

Japanese radio intercepts did notice an


increase in both American submarine
activity and message traffic. This
information was in Yamamoto's hands
prior to the battle. Japanese plans were
not changed; Yamamoto, at sea in Yamato,
assumed Nagumo had received the same
signal from Tokyo, and did not
communicate with him by radio, so as not
to reveal his position.[49] These messages
were, contrary to earlier historical
accounts, also received by Nagumo before
the battle began. For reasons which
remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his
plans or take additional precautions.[50]

US code-breaking …

Admiral Nimitz had one critical advantage:


US cryptanalysts had partially broken the
Japanese Navy's JN-25b code.[51] Since
early 1942, the US had been decoding
messages stating that there would soon
be an operation at objective "AF". It was
initially not known where "AF" was, but
Commander Joseph Rochefort and his
team at Station HYPO were able to confirm
that it was Midway: Captain Wilfred
Holmes devised a ruse of telling the base
at Midway (by secure undersea cable) to
broadcast an uncoded radio message
stating that Midway's water purification
system had broken down.[52] Within 24
hours, the code breakers picked up a
Japanese message that "AF was short on
water".[53] No Japanese radio operators
who intercepted the message seemed
concerned that the Americans were
broadcasting uncoded that a major naval
installation close to the Japanese threat
ring was having a water shortage, which
could have tipped off Japanese
intelligence officers that it was a deliberate
attempt at deception.[54]

HYPO was also able to determine the date


of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to
provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order
of battle.[55]

Japan had a new codebook, but its


introduction had been delayed, enabling
HYPO to read messages for several crucial
days; the new code, which took several
days to be cracked, came into use on 24
May, but the important breaks had already
been made.[56]
As a result, the Americans entered the
battle with a good picture of where, when,
and in what strength the Japanese would
appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese
had negated their numerical advantage by
dividing their ships into four separate task
groups, too widely separated to be able to
support each other.[57] This dispersal
resulted in few fast ships being available
to escort the Carrier Striking Force,
reducing the number of anti-aircraft guns
protecting the carriers. Nimitz calculated
that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus
those on Midway Island, gave the U.S.
rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers,
mainly because American carrier air
groups were larger than Japanese ones.
The Japanese, by contrast, remained
mainly unaware of their opponent's true
strength and dispositions even after the
battle began.[56]

Battle

Order of battle …

Initial air attacks …

Torpedo bomber Martin B-26-MA Marauder "Susie-Q"


of the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron, 22nd
Bombardment Group USAAF was flown by 1/Lt James
P M i d i th B ttl f Mid 4J
Perry Muri during the Battle of Midway on 4 June
1942.

Movements during the battle, according to William


Koenig in Epic Sea Battles
Timeline of the Battle of Midway (acc. to William Koenig)
4 June

04:30 First Japanese takeoff against Midway Islands

04:30 10 planes (Yorktown) begin to search for the Japanese ships

05:34 Japanese ships detected by a PBY from Midway I.

07:10 6 TBF Avengers and 4 USAAF B-26 (from Midway I.) attack

07:50 67 dive bombers, 29 torpedo bombers, 20 Wildcats take off (Spruance)

07:55 16 dive bombers of the US Navy (from Midway I.) attack

08:10 17 B-17s (from Midway Islands) attack

08:20 11 bombers of the US Navy (from Midway I.) attack

09:06 12 torpedo bombers, 17 dive bombers, 6 Wildcats take off (Yorktown)

09:18 Nagumo to Northeast

09:25 15 torpedo bombers (Hornet) attack

09:30 14 torpedo bombers (Enterprise) attack

10:00 12 torpedo bombers (Yorktown) attack

10:25 30 dive bombers (Enterprise) attack Akagi and Kaga

10:25 17 dive bombers (Yorktown) attack Soryū

11:00 18 Vals and 6 Zekes take off from Hiryū

11:30 10 planes (Yorktown) take off to search for remaining Japanese ships

12:05 First attack on Yorktown

13:30 Hiryū detected by a Yorktown plane; 24 dive bombers take off against Hiryū (Spruance)

13:31 10 Kates and 6 Zekes take off from Hiryū

13:40 Yorktown again in service, making 18 knots

14:30 Second attack on Yorktown

15:00 Yorktown abandoned

16:10 Soryū sunk

17:00 Dive bombers attack on Hiryū


19:25 Kaga sunk

5 June

05:00 Akagi sunk

09:00 Hiryū sunk

At about 09:00 on 3 June, Ensign Jack


Reid, piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol
squadron VP-44,[58] spotted the Japanese
Occupation Force 500 nautical miles (580
miles; 930 kilometers) to the west-
southwest of Midway. He mistakenly
reported this group as the Main Force.[59]

Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30


for the first air attack. Three hours later,
they found Tanaka's transport group 570
nautical miles (660 miles; 1,060
kilometers) to the west.[60]
Under heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped
their bombs. Although their crews
reported hitting four ships,[60] none of the
bombs actually hit anything and no
significant damage was inflicted.[61] Early
the following morning, the Japanese oil
tanker Akebono Maru sustained the first hit
when a torpedo from an attacking PBY
struck her around 01:00. This was the only
successful air-launched torpedo attack by
the U.S. during the entire battle.[61]

At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his


initial attack on Midway itself, consisting
of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36
Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers, escorted
by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. At the
same time, he launched his eight search
aircraft (one from the heavy cruiser Tone
launched 30 minutes late). Japanese
reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy,
with too few aircraft to adequately cover
the assigned search areas, laboring under
poor weather conditions to the northeast
and east of the task force. As Nagumo's
bombers and fighters were taking off, 11
PBYs were leaving Midway to run their
search patterns. At 05:34, a PBY reported
sighting two Japanese carriers and
another spotted the inbound airstrike 10
minutes later.[62]
Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a
distance of several miles, and interceptors
were scrambled. Unescorted bombers
headed off to attack the Japanese
carriers, their fighter escorts remaining
behind to defend Midway. At 06:20,
Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and
heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-
based Marine fighters led by Major Floyd
B. Parks, which included six F4Fs and 20
F2As,[63] intercepted the Japanese and
suffered heavy losses, though they
managed to destroy four B5Ns, as well as
a single A6M. Within the first few minutes,
two F4Fs and 13 F2As were destroyed,
while most of the surviving U.S. planes
were damaged, with only two remaining
airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was
intense and accurate, destroying three
additional Japanese aircraft and
damaging many more.[64]

Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in


this attack, 11 were destroyed (including
three that ditched), 14 were heavily
damaged, and 29 were damaged to some
degree. The initial Japanese attack did not
succeed in neutralizing Midway: American
bombers could still use the airbase to
refuel and attack the Japanese invasion
force, and most of Midway's land-based
defenses were intact. Japanese pilots
reported to Nagumo that a second aerial
attack on Midway's defenses would be
necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7
June.[65]

Having taken off prior to the Japanese


attack, American bombers based on
Midway made several attacks on the
Japanese carrier force. These included six
Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway
from Hornet's VT-8 (Midway was the
combat debut of both VT-8 and the TBF);
Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241
(VMSB-241), consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and
16 SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s of the
18th Reconnaissance and 69th Bomb
Squadrons armed with torpedoes, and 15
B-17s of the 31st, 72nd, and 431st Bomb
Squadrons. The Japanese repelled these
attacks, losing three fighters while
destroying five TBFs, two SB2Us, eight
SBDs, and two B-26s.[66] Among the dead
was Major Lofton R. Henderson of VMSB-
241, killed while leading his inexperienced
Dauntless squadron into action. The main
airfield at Guadalcanal was named after
him in August 1942.[67]

One B-26, piloted by Lieutenant James


Muri, after dropping his torpedo and
searching for a safer escape route, flew
directly down the length of the Akagi while
being chased by interceptors and anti-
aircraft fire, which had to hold their fire to
avoid hitting their own flagship. During the
fly down the length, the B-26 strafed Akagi,
killing two men.[68][69] Another B-26, piloted
by 1st Lieutenant Herbert C. Mayes, after
being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft
fire, didn't pull out of its run, and instead
headed directly for Akagi's bridge.[70][71]
The aircraft, either attempting a suicide
ramming, or out of control due to battle
damage or a wounded or killed pilot,
narrowly missed crashing into the carrier's
bridge, which could have killed Nagumo
and his command staff, before it
cartwheeled into the sea.[72][73] This
experience may well have contributed to
Nagumo's determination to launch another
attack on Midway, in direct violation of
Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve
strike force armed for anti-ship
operations.[66]

Nagumo's dilemma …

A B-17 attack misses Hiryū; this was taken between


08:00–08:30. A Shotai of three Zeros is lined up near
the bridge. This was one of several combat air patrols
launched during the day.[74]
In accordance with Yamamoto's orders for
Operation MI, Admiral Nagumo had kept
half of his aircraft in reserve. These
comprised two squadrons each of dive
bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive
bombers were as yet unarmed (although
this was doctrinal, dive bombers were to
be armed on the flight deck). The torpedo
bombers were armed with torpedoes
should any American warships be
located.[75]

At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve


planes to be re-armed with contact-fused
general-purpose bombs for use against
land targets. This was a result of the
attacks from Midway, as well as of the
morning flight leader's recommendation of
a second strike. Re-arming had been
underway for about 30 minutes when, at
07:40,[76] the delayed scout plane from
Tone signaled that it had sighted a sizable
American naval force to the east, but
neglected to describe its composition.
Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not
receive the sighting report until 08:00.[77]

Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-


arm the bombers with general-purpose
bombs and demanded that the scout
plane ascertain the composition of the
American force. Another 20–40 minutes
elapsed before Tone's scout finally radioed
the presence of a single carrier in the
American force. This was one of the
carriers from Task Force 16. The other
carrier was not sighted.[78]

Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear


Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier
Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū),
recommended that Nagumo strike
immediately with the forces at hand: 18
Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on Sōryū
and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol
aircraft.[79] Nagumo's opportunity to hit the
American ships[80] was now limited by the
imminent return of his Midway strike
force. The returning strike force needed to
land promptly or it would have to ditch into
the sea. Because of the constant flight
deck activity associated with combat air
patrol operations during the preceding
hour, the Japanese never had an
opportunity to position ("spot") their
reserve planes on the flight deck for
launch.[81]

The few aircraft on the Japanese flight


decks at the time of the attack were either
defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū,
fighters being spotted to augment the
combat air patrol.[82] Spotting his flight
decks and launching aircraft would have
required at least 30 minutes.[83]
Furthermore, by spotting and launching
immediately, Nagumo would be
committing some of his reserve to battle
without proper anti-ship armament, and
likely without fighter escort; indeed, he had
just witnessed how easily the unescorted
American bombers had been shot
down.[84]

Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the


launching of fully constituted strikes rather
than piecemeal attacks. Without
confirmation of whether the American
force included carriers (not received until
08:20), Nagumo's reaction was
doctrinaire.[85] In addition, the arrival of
another land-based American air strike at
07:53 gave weight to the need to attack
the island again. In the end, Nagumo
decided to wait for his first strike force to
land, then launch the reserve, which would
by then be properly armed with
torpedoes.[86]

In the final analysis, it made no difference;


Fletcher's carriers had launched their
planes beginning at 07:00 (with Enterprise
and Hornet having completed launching by
07:55, but Yorktown not until 09:08), so the
aircraft that would deliver the crushing
blow were already on their way. Even if
Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier
doctrine, he could not have prevented the
launch of the American attack.[87]

Attacks on the Japanese fleet …

Ensign George Gay (right), sole survivor of VT-8's TBD


Devastator squadron, in front of his aircraft, 4 June
1942
The Americans had already launched their
carrier aircraft against the Japanese.
Fletcher, in overall command aboard
Yorktown, and benefiting from PBY
sighting reports from the early morning,
ordered Spruance to launch against the
Japanese as soon as was practical, while
initially holding Yorktown in reserve in case
any other Japanese carriers were
found.[88]

Spruance judged that, though the range


was extreme, a strike could succeed and
gave the order to launch the attack. He
then left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain
Miles Browning, to work out the details
and oversee the launch. The carriers had
to launch into the wind, so the light
southeasterly breeze would require them
to steam away from the Japanese at high
speed. Browning therefore suggested a
launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an
hour to close on the Japanese at 25 knots
(46 km/h; 29 mph). This would place them
at about 155 nautical miles (287 km;
178 mi) from the Japanese fleet,
assuming it did not change course. The
first plane took off from Spruance's
carriers Enterprise and Hornet a few
minutes after 07:00.[89] Fletcher, upon
completing his own scouting flights,
followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown.[90]
Fletcher, along with Yorktown's
commanding officer, Captain Elliott
Buckmaster, and their staffs, had acquired
first-hand experience in organizing and
launching a full strike against an enemy
force in the Coral Sea, but there was no
time to pass these lessons on to
Enterprise and Hornet which were tasked
with launching the first strike.[91] Spruance
ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to
target immediately, rather than waste time
waiting for the strike force to assemble,
since neutralizing enemy carriers was the
key to the survival of his own task
force.[90][91]
While the Japanese were able to launch
108 aircraft in just seven minutes, it took
Enterprise and Hornet over an hour to
launch 117.[92] Spruance judged that the
need to throw something at the enemy as
soon as possible was greater than the
need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of
different types and speeds (fighters,
bombers, and torpedo bombers).
Accordingly, American squadrons were
launched piecemeal and proceeded to the
target in several different groups. It was
accepted that the lack of coordination
would diminish the impact of the
American attacks and increase their
casualties, but Spruance calculated that
this was worthwhile, since keeping the
Japanese under aerial attack impaired
their ability to launch a counterstrike
(Japanese tactics preferred fully
constituted attacks), and he gambled that
he would find Nagumo with his flight
decks at their most vulnerable.[90][91]

American carrier aircraft had difficulty


locating the target, despite the positions
they had been given. The strike from
Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C.
Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 265
degrees rather than the 240 degrees
indicated by the contact report. As a result,
Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the
Japanese carriers.[93][94] Torpedo
Squadron 8 (VT-8, from Hornet), led by
Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron,
broke formation from Ring and followed
the correct heading. The 10 F4Fs from
Hornet ran out of fuel and had to ditch.[95]

Devastators of VT-6 aboard USS Enterprise being


prepared for takeoff during the battle

Waldron's squadron sighted the enemy


carriers and began attacking at 09:20,
followed at 09:40[96] by VF-6 from
Enterprise, whose Wildcat fighter escorts
lost contact, ran low on fuel, and had to
turn back.[95] Without fighter escort, all 15
TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down
without being able to inflict any damage.
Ensign George H. Gay, Jr. was the only
survivor of the 30 aircrew of VT-8. He
completed his torpedo attack on the
aircraft carrier Sōryū before he was shot
down, but Sōryū evaded his torpedo.[97]
Meanwhile, VT-6, led by LCDR Eugene E.
Lindsey lost nine of its 14 Devastators
(one ditched later), and 10 of 12
Devastators from Yorktown's VT-3 (who
attacked at 10:10) were shot down with no
hits to show for their effort, thanks in part
to the abysmal performance of their
unimproved Mark 13 torpedoes.[98]
Midway was the last time the TBD
Devastator was used in combat.[99]

The Japanese combat air patrol, flying


Mitsubishi A6M2 Zeros,[100] made short
work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed
TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a
few ship-lengths range of their targets
before dropping their torpedoes—close
enough to be able to strafe the enemy
ships and force the Japanese carriers to
make sharp evasive maneuvers—but all of
their torpedoes either missed or failed to
explode.[101] Remarkably, senior Navy and
Bureau of Ordnance officers never
questioned why half a dozen torpedoes,
released so close to the Japanese carriers,
produced no results.[102] The performance
of American torpedoes in the early months
of the war was scandalous, as shot after
shot missed by running directly under the
target (deeper than intended), prematurely
exploded, or hit targets (sometimes with
an audible clang) and failed to explode at
all.[103][104]

Despite their failure to score any hits, the


American torpedo attacks achieved three
important results. First, they kept the
Japanese carriers off balance and unable
to prepare and launch their own
counterstrike. Second, the poor control of
the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP)
meant they were out of position for
subsequent attacks. Third, many of the
Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.[105]
The appearance of a third torpedo plane
attack from the southeast by VT-3 from
Yorktown, led by LCDR Lance Edward
Massey at 10:00 very quickly drew the
majority of the Japanese CAP to the
southeast quadrant of the fleet.[106] Better
discipline and the employment of a greater
number of Zeroes for the CAP might have
enabled Nagumo to prevent (or at least
mitigate) the damage caused by the
coming American attacks.[107]

By chance, at the same time VT-3 was


sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons
of SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown
were approaching from the southwest and
northeast. The Yorktown squadron (VB-3)
had flown just behind VT-3, but elected to
attack from a different course. The two
squadrons from Enterprise (VB-6 and VS-6)
were running low on fuel because of the
time spent looking for the enemy. Air
Group Commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr.
decided to continue the search, and by
good fortune spotted the wake of the
Japanese destroyer Arashi, steaming at
full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after
having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S.
submarine Nautilus, which had
unsuccessfully attacked the battleship
Kirishima.[108] Some bombers were lost
from fuel exhaustion before the attack
commenced.[109]

McClusky's decision to continue the


search and his judgment, in the opinion of
Admiral Chester Nimitz, "decided the fate
of our carrier task force and our forces at
Midway ..."[110] All three American dive-
bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3)
arrived almost simultaneously at the
perfect time, locations and altitudes to
attack.[111] Most of the Japanese CAP was
directing its attention to the torpedo
planes of VT-3 and was out of position;
meanwhile, armed Japanese strike aircraft
filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked
across the decks as refueling operations
were hastily being completed, and the
repeated change of ordnance meant that
bombs and torpedoes were stacked
around the hangars, rather than stowed
safely in the magazines, making the
Japanese carriers extraordinarily
vulnerable.[112]
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons of
Enterprise's air group split up with the
intention of sending one squadron each to
attack Kaga and Akagi. A
miscommunication caused both of the
squadrons to dive at Kaga. Recognizing
the error, Lieutenant Richard Halsey Best
and his two wingmen were able to pull out
of their dives and, after judging that Kaga
was doomed, headed north to attack
Akagi. Coming under an onslaught of
bombs from almost two full squadrons,
Kaga sustained at least four direct hits,
which caused heavy damage and started
multiple fires. One of the bombs landed on
or right in front of the bridge, killing
Captain Jisaku Okada and most of the
ship's senior officers.[113] Lieutenant
Clarence E. Dickinson, part of McClusky's
group, recalled:

We were coming down in all


directions on the port side of the
carrier ... I recognized her as the
Kaga; and she was enormous ...
The target was utterly
satisfying ... I saw a bomb hit
just behind where I was
aiming ... I saw the deck rippling
and curling back in all
directions exposing a great
section of the hangar below ... I
saw [my] 500-pound [230 kg]
bomb hit right abreast of the
[carrier's] island. The two 100-
pound [45 kg] bombs struck in
the forward area of the parked
planes ... [114]

Several minutes later, Best and his two


wingmen dove on Akagi. Mitsuo Fuchida,
the Japanese aviator who had led the
attack on Pearl Harbor, was on Akagi when
it was hit, and described the attack:
A look-out screamed: "Hell-
Divers!" I looked up to see three
black enemy planes plummeting
towards our ship. Some of our
machineguns managed to fire a
few frantic bursts at them, but it
was too late. The plump
silhouettes of the American
Dauntless dive-bombers quickly
grew larger, and then a number
of black objects suddenly floated
eerily from their wings.[115]
Although Akagi sustained only one direct
hit (almost certainly dropped by Lieutenant
Best), it proved to be a fatal blow: the
bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck
elevator and penetrated to the upper
hangar deck, where it exploded among the
armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity.
Nagumo's chief of staff, Ryūnosuke
Kusaka, recorded "a terrific fire ... bodies
all over the place ... Planes stood tail up,
belching livid flames and jet-black smoke,
making it impossible to bring the fires
under control."[116] Another bomb exploded
under water very close astern; the
resulting geyser bent the flight deck
upward "in grotesque configurations" and
caused crucial rudder damage.[101][116][nb 3]

Simultaneously, Yorktown's VB-3,


commanded by Max Leslie, went for Sōryū,
scoring at least three hits and causing
extensive damage. Some of Leslie's
bombers did not have bombs as they were
accidentally released when the pilots
attempted to use electrical arming
switches. Nevertheless, Leslie and others
still dove, strafing carrier decks and
providing cover for those who had
bombs.[118] Gasoline ignited, creating an
"inferno", while stacked bombs and
ammunition detonated.[115] VT-3 targeted
Hiryū, which was hemmed in by Sōryū,
Kaga, and Akagi, but achieved no hits.[119]

Within six minutes, Sōryū and Kaga were


ablaze from stem to stern, as fires spread
through the ships. Akagi, having been
struck by only one bomb, took longer to
burn, but the resulting fires quickly
expanded and soon proved impossible to
extinguish; she too was eventually
consumed by flames and had to be
abandoned. As Nagumo began to grasp
the enormity of what had happened, he
appears to have gone in a state of shock.
Witnesses saw Nagumo standing near the
ship’s compass looking out at the flames
on his flagship and two other carriers in a
trance-like daze. Despite being asked to
abandon ship, Nagumo didn’t move and
was reluctant to leave the Akagi, just
muttering, “It's not time yet,”. Nagumo's
chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke
Kusaka, was able to persuade him to leave
the critically damaged Akagi. Nagumo,
with a barely perceptible nod, with tears in
his eyes, agreed to go.[120][121] At 10:46,
Admiral Nagumo transferred his flag to the
light cruiser Nagara.[122] All three carriers
remained temporarily afloat, as none had
suffered damage below the waterline,
other than the rudder damage to Akagi
caused by the near miss close astern.
Despite initial hopes that Akagi could be
saved or at least towed back to Japan, all
three carriers were eventually abandoned
and scuttled.[119][nb 4]

Japanese counterattacks …

Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft


carrier, wasted little time in
counterattacking. Hiryū's first attack wave,
consisting of 18 D3As and six fighter
escorts, followed the retreating American
aircraft and attacked the first carrier they
encountered, Yorktown, hitting her with
three bombs, which blew a hole in the
deck, snuffed out all but one of her boilers,
and destroyed one anti-aircraft mount. The
damage also forced Admiral Fletcher to
move his command staff to the heavy
cruiser Astoria. Damage control parties
were able to temporarily patch the flight
deck and restore power to several boilers
within an hour, giving her a speed of 19
knots (35 km/h; 22 mph) and enabling her
to resume air operations. Yorktown yanked
down her yellow breakdown flag and up
went a new hoist—"My speed 5."[124]
Captain Buckmaster had his signalmen
hoist a huge new (10 feet wide and 15 feet
long) American flag from the foremast.
Sailors, including Ensign John d'Arc Lorenz
called it an incalculable inspiration: "For
the first time I realized what the flag
meant: all of us—a million faces—all our
effort—a whisper of encouragement."[124]
Thirteen Japanese dive bombers and three
escorting fighters were lost in this attack
(two escorting fighters turned back early
after they were damaged attacking some
of Enterprise's SBDs returning from their
attack on the Japanese carriers).[125]

Yorktown at the moment of impact of a torpedo from


a Nakajima B5N of Lieutenant Hashimoto's 2nd
chūtai[126]
Approximately one hour later, Hiryū's
second attack wave, consisting of ten
B5Ns and six escorting A6Ms, arrived over
Yorktown; the repair efforts had been so
effective that the Japanese pilots
assumed that Yorktown must be a
different, undamaged carrier.[127] They
attacked, crippling Yorktown with two
torpedoes; she lost all power and
developed a 23-degree list to port. Five
torpedo bombers and two fighters were
shot down in this attack.[128]

News of the two strikes, with the mistaken


reports that each had sunk an American
carrier, greatly improved Japanese morale.
The few surviving aircraft were all
recovered aboard Hiryū. Despite the heavy
losses, the Japanese believed that they
could scrape together enough aircraft for
one more strike against what they believed
to be the only remaining American
carrier.[129]

American counterattack …

Hiryū, shortly before sinking. This photo was taken by


Special Service Ensign Kiyoshi Ōniwa from a
[130]
Yokosuka B4Y off the carrier Hōshō.[130]

Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout


aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise
to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers
(including six SBDs from VS-6, four SBDs
from VB-6, and 14 SBDs from Yorktown's
VB-3). Despite Hiryū being defended by a
strong cover of more than a dozen Zero
fighters, the attack by Enterprise and
orphaned Yorktown aircraft launched from
Enterprise was successful: four bombs
(possibly five) hit Hiryū, leaving her ablaze
and unable to operate aircraft. Hornet's
strike, launched late because of a
communications error, concentrated on
the remaining escort ships, but failed to
score any hits.[131]

After futile attempts at controlling the


blaze, most of the crew remaining on Hiryū
were evacuated and the remainder of the
fleet continued sailing northeast in an
attempt to intercept the American carriers.
Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese
destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and
then departed quickly, Hiryū stayed afloat
for several more hours. She was
discovered early the next morning by an
aircraft from the escort carrier Hōshō,
prompting hopes she could be saved, or at
least towed back to Japan. Soon after
being spotted, Hiryū sank. Rear Admiral
Tamon Yamaguchi, together with the ship's
captain, Tomeo Kaku, chose to go down
with the ship, costing Japan perhaps its
best carrier officer.[131]

As darkness fell, both sides took stock and


made tentative plans for continuing the
action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to
abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling
he could not adequately command from a
cruiser, ceded operational command to
Spruance. Spruance knew the United
States had won a great victory, but he was
still unsure of what Japanese forces
remained and was determined to
safeguard both Midway and his carriers.
To aid his aviators, who had launched at
extreme range, he had continued to close
with Nagumo during the day and persisted
as night fell.[132]

Finally, fearing a possible night encounter


with Japanese surface forces,[132] and
believing Yamamoto still intended to
invade, based in part on a misleading
contact report from the submarine
Tambor,[133] Spruance changed course and
withdrew to the east, turning back west
towards the enemy at midnight.[134] For his
part, Yamamoto initially decided to
continue the engagement and sent his
remaining surface forces searching
eastward for the American carriers.
Simultaneously, he detached a cruiser
raiding force to bombard the island. The
Japanese surface forces failed to make
contact with the Americans because
Spruance had decided to briefly withdraw
eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a
general withdrawal to the west.[135] It was
fortunate for the U.S. that Spruance did
not pursue, for had he come in contact
with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including
Yamato, in the dark and considering the
Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack
tactics at the time, there is a very high
probability his cruisers would have been
overwhelmed and his carriers sunk.[136]

Spruance failed to regain contact with


Yamamoto's forces on 5 June, despite
extensive searches. Towards the end of
the day he launched a search-and-destroy
mission to seek out any remnants of
Nagumo's carrier force. This late afternoon
strike narrowly missed detecting
Yamamoto's main body and failed to score
hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer.
The strike planes returned to the carriers
after nightfall, prompting Spruance to
order Enterprise and Hornet to turn on their
lights to aid the landings.[137]
At 02:15 on the night of 5/6 June,
Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying
90 nautical miles (170 km; 100 mi) west of
Midway, made the second of the
submarine force's two major contributions
to the battle's outcome, although its
impact was heavily blunted by Murphy
himself.[138] Sighting several ships, neither
Murphy nor his executive officer, Edward
Spruance (son of Admiral Spruance), could
identify them. Uncertain of whether they
were friendly or not and unwilling to
approach any closer to verify their heading
or type, Murphy decided to send a vague
report of "four large ships" to Admiral
Robert English, Commander, Submarine
Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC). This
report was passed on by English to Nimitz,
who then sent it to Spruance. Spruance, a
former submarine commander, was
"understandably furious" at the vagueness
of Murphy's report, as it provided him with
little more than suspicion and no concrete
information on which to make his
preparations.[139] Unaware of the exact
location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a
persistent problem since the time PBYs
had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance
was forced to assume the "four large
ships" reported by Tambor represented the
main invasion force and so he moved to
block it, while staying 100 nautical miles
(190 km; 120 mi) northeast of Midway.[140]

In reality, the ships sighted by Tambor were


the detachment of four cruisers and two
destroyers Yamamoto had sent to
bombard Midway. At 02:55, these ships
received Yamamoto's order to retire and
changed course to comply.[140] At about
the same time as this change of course,
Tambor was sighted and during
maneuvers designed to avoid a submarine
attack, the heavy cruisers Mogami and
Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage
on Mogami's bow. The less severely
damaged Mikuma slowed to 12 knots
(22 km/h; 14 mph) to keep pace.[141] Only
at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for
Murphy to be certain the ships were
Japanese, by which time staying surfaced
was hazardous and he dived to approach
for an attack. The attack was
unsuccessful and at around 06:00 he
finally reported two westbound Mogami-
class cruisers, before diving again and
playing no further role in the battle.[133]
Limping along on a straight course at
12 knots—roughly one-third their top speed
—Mogami and Mikuma had been almost
perfect targets for a submarine attack. As
soon as Tambor returned to port, Spruance
had Murphy relieved of duty and
reassigned to a shore station, citing his
confusing contact report, poor torpedo
shooting during his attack run, and general
lack of aggression, especially as
compared to Nautilus, the oldest of the 12
boats at Midway and the only one which
had successfully placed a torpedo on
target (albeit a dud).[138][139]

Over the following two days, several


strikes were launched against the
stragglers, first from Midway, then from
Spruance's carriers. Mikuma was
eventually sunk by Dauntlesses,[142] while
Mogami survived further severe damage to
return home for repairs. The destroyers
Arashio and Asashio were also bombed
and strafed during the last of these
attacks.[143] Captain Richard E. Fleming, a
U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was killed while
executing a glide bomb run on Mikuma
and was posthumously awarded the
Medal of Honor.[144]

Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown


were encouraging, and she was taken in
tow by USS Vireo. In the late afternoon of 6
June, the Japanese submarine I-168,
which had managed to slip through the
cordon of destroyers (possibly because of
the large amount of debris in the water),
fired a salvo of torpedoes, two of which
struck Yorktown. There were few
casualties aboard, since most of the crew
had already been evacuated, but a third
torpedo from this salvo struck the
destroyer USS Hammann, which had been
providing auxiliary power to Yorktown.
Hammann broke in two and sank with the
loss of 80 lives, mostly because her own
depth charges exploded. With further
salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the
remaining repair crews were evacuated
from Yorktown. Throughout the night of 6
June and into the morning of 7 June,
Yorktown remained afloat; but by 05:30 on
7 June, observers noted that her list was
rapidly increasing to port. Shortly
afterwards, the ship turned over onto her
port side, and lay that way, revealing the
torpedo hole in her starboard bilge—the
result of the submarine attack. Captain
Buckmaster's American flag was still
flying.[145] All ships half-masted their
colors in salute; all hands who were
topside with heads uncovered and came
to attention, with tears in their eyes. Two
patrolling PBYs appeared overhead and
dipped their wings in a final salute.[145] At
07:01, the ship rolled upside-down, and
slowly sank, stern first, with her battle
flags flying.[146][147] To most who
witnessed the sinking, the Yorktown went
quietly and with enormous dignity—"like
the great lady she was," as one of them put
it.[145]

Japanese and US casualties

Mikuma shortly before sinking

By the time the battle ended, 3,057


Japanese had died. Casualties aboard the
four carriers were: Akagi: 267; Kaga: 811;
Hiryū: 392; Soryū: 711 (including Captain
Yanagimoto, who chose to remain on
board); a total of 2,181.[148] The heavy
cruisers Mikuma (sunk; 700 casualties)
and Mogami (badly damaged; 92)
accounted for another 792 deaths.[149]

In addition, the destroyers Arashio


(bombed; 35) and Asashio (strafed by
aircraft; 21) were both damaged during the
air attacks which sank Mikuma and
caused further damage to Mogami.
Floatplanes were lost from the cruisers
Chikuma (3) and Tone (2). Dead aboard the
destroyers Tanikaze (11), Arashi (1),
Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oiler Akebono
Maru (10) made up the remaining 23
casualties.[nb 5]
At the end of the battle, the U.S. lost the
carrier Yorktown and a destroyer,
Hammann. 307 Americans had been killed,
including Major General Clarence L. Tinker,
Commander, 7th Air Force, who personally
led a bomber strike from Hawaii against
the retreating Japanese forces on 7 June.
He was killed when his aircraft crashed
near Midway Island.

Aftermath
A rescued U.S. airman on Midway

After winning a clear victory, and as


pursuit became too hazardous near
Wake,[150] American forces retired.
Spruance once again withdrew to the east
to refuel his destroyers and rendezvous
with the carrier Saratoga, which was
ferrying much-needed replacement
aircraft. Fletcher transferred his flag to
Saratoga on the afternoon of 8 June and
resumed command of the carrier force.
For the remainder of that day and then 9
June, Fletcher continued to launch search
missions from the three carriers to ensure
the Japanese were no longer advancing on
Midway. Late on 10 June a decision was
made to leave the area and the American
carriers eventually returned to Pearl
Harbor.[151]

Historian Samuel E. Morison noted in 1949


that Spruance was subjected to much
criticism for not pursuing the retreating
Japanese, thus allowing their surface fleet
to escape.[152] Clay Blair argued in 1975
that had Spruance pressed on, he would
have been unable to launch his aircraft
after nightfall, and his cruisers would have
been overwhelmed by Yamamoto's
powerful surface units, including
Yamato.[150] Furthermore, the American air
groups had suffered considerable losses,
including most of their torpedo bombers.
This made it unlikely that they would be
effective in an airstrike against the
Japanese battleships, even if they had
managed to catch them during
daytime.[153] Also, by this time Spruance's
destroyers were critically low on
fuel.[154][155]

On 10 June, the Imperial Japanese Navy


conveyed to the military liaison conference
an incomplete picture of the results of the
battle. Chūichi Nagumo's detailed battle
report was submitted to the high
command on 15 June. It was intended
only for the highest echelons in the
Japanese Navy and government, and was
guarded closely throughout the war. In it,
one of the more striking revelations is the
comment on the Mobile Force
Commander's (Nagumo's) estimates: "The
enemy is not aware of our plans (we were
not discovered until early in the morning of
the 5th at the earliest)."[156] In reality, the
whole operation had been compromised
from the beginning by American code-
breaking efforts.[157]

The Japanese public and much of the


military command structure were kept in
the dark about the extent of the defeat:
Japanese news announced a great victory.
Only Emperor Hirohito and the highest
Navy command personnel were accurately
informed of the carrier and pilot losses.
Consequently, even the Imperial Japanese
Army (IJA) continued to believe, for at
least a short time, that the fleet was in
good condition.[158]

On the return of the Japanese fleet to


Hashirajima on 14 June the wounded were
immediately transferred to naval hospitals;
most were classified as "secret patients",
placed in isolation wards and quarantined
from other patients and their own families
to keep this major defeat secret.[159] The
remaining officers and men were quickly
dispersed to other units of the fleet and,
without being allowed to see family or
friends, were shipped to units in the South
Pacific, where the majority died in
battle.[160] None of the flag officers or staff
of the Combined Fleet were penalized,
with Nagumo later being placed in
command of the rebuilt carrier force.[161]

As a result of the defeat, new procedures


were adopted whereby more Japanese
aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the
flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and
the practice of draining all unused fuel
lines was adopted. The new carriers being
built were redesigned to incorporate only
two flight deck elevators and new
firefighting equipment. More carrier crew
members were trained in damage-control
and firefighting techniques, although the
losses later in the war of Shōkaku, Hiyō,
and especially Taihō suggest that there
were still problems in this area.[162]

Replacement pilots were pushed through


an abbreviated training regimen in order to
meet the short-term needs of the fleet.
This led to a sharp decline in the quality of
the aviators produced. These
inexperienced pilots were fed into front-
line units, while the veterans who
remained after Midway and the Solomons
campaign were forced to share an
increased workload as conditions grew
more desperate, with few being given a
chance to rest in rear areas or in the home
islands. As a result, Japanese naval air
groups as a whole progressively
deteriorated during the war while their
American adversaries continued to
improve.[163]

American prisoners …

Three U.S. airmen were captured during


the battle: Ensign Wesley Osmus,[164] a
pilot from Yorktown; Ensign Frank
O'Flaherty,[165] a pilot from Enterprise; and
Aviation Machinist's Mate Bruno Peter
Gaido,[166] O'Flaherty's radioman-
gunner.[167][168] Osmus was held on Arashi;
O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara
(or destroyer Makigumo, sources vary); all
three were interrogated and then killed by
being tied to water-filled kerosene cans
and thrown overboard to drown.[169] The
report filed by Nagumo tersely states that
Ensign Osmus, "...died on 6 June and was
buried at sea";[170] O'Flaherty and Gaido's
fates were not mentioned in Nagumo's
report.[171] The execution of Ensign Wesley
Osmus in this manner was apparently
ordered by Arashi's captain, Watanabe
Yasumasa. Yasumasa died when the
destroyer Numakaze sank in December
1943, but had he survived, he would have
likely been tried as a war criminal.[172]

Japanese prisoners …

Japanese survivors of Hiryū picked up by USS Ballard

Two enlisted men from Mikuma were


rescued from a life raft on 9 June by
USS Trout and brought to Pearl Harbor.
After receiving medical care, at least one
of these sailors cooperated during
interrogation and provided intelligence.[173]
Another 35 crewmen from Hiryū were
taken from a lifeboat by USS Ballard on 19
June after being spotted by an American
search plane. They were brought to
Midway and then transferred to Pearl
Harbor on USS Sirius.[174][175]

Impact

This SBD-2 was one of sixteen dive bombers of


VMSB-241 launched from Midway on the morning of 4
June. Holed 219 times in the attack on the carrier
Hiryū, it survives today at the National Naval Aviation
Museum at Pensacola, Florida.[176]

The Battle of Midway has often been


called "the turning point of the Pacific".[177]
It was the Allies' first major naval victory
against the Japanese,[178] won despite the
Japanese Navy having more forces and
experience than its American counterpart.
Had Japan won the battle as thoroughly as
the U.S. did, it might have been able to
conquer Midway Island. Saratoga would
have been the only American carrier in the
Pacific, with no new ones being completed
before the end of 1942. While the U.S.
would probably not have sought peace
with Japan as Yamamoto hoped, his
country might have revived Operation FS
to invade and occupy Fiji and Samoa;
attacked Australia, Alaska, and Ceylon; or
even attempted to conquer Hawaii.[179]

Although the Japanese continued to try to


secure more territory, and the U.S. did not
move from a state of naval parity to one of
supremacy until after several more
months of hard combat,[180] Midway
allowed the Allies to switch to the
strategic initiative, paving the way for the
landings on Guadalcanal and the
prolonged attrition of the Solomon Islands
campaign. Midway allowed this to occur
before the first of the new Essex-class
fleet carriers became available at the end
of 1942.[181] The Guadalcanal Campaign is
also regarded by some as a turning point
in the Pacific War.[182]

Some authors have stated that heavy


losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at
Midway permanently weakened the
Imperial Japanese Navy.[183] Parshall and
Tully have stated that the heavy losses in
veteran aircrew (110, just under 25% of the
aircrew embarked on the four carriers)[184]
were not crippling to the Japanese naval
air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy
had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the
start of the Pacific war.[185] The loss of
four large fleet carriers and over 40% of
the carriers' highly trained aircraft
mechanics and technicians, plus the
essential flight-deck crews and armorers,
and the loss of organizational knowledge
embodied in such highly trained crews,
were still heavy blows to the Japanese
carrier fleet.[186][nb 6] A few months after
Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air
Service sustained similar casualty rates in
the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, and it was
these battles, combined with the constant
attrition of veterans during the Solomons
campaign, which were the catalyst for the
sharp downward spiral in operational
capability.[186]

After the battle, Shōkaku and Zuikaku were


the only large carriers of the original Pearl
Harbor strike force still afloat. Of Japan's
other carriers, Taihō, which was not
commissioned until early 1944, would be
the only fleet carrier worth teaming with
Shōkaku and Zuikaku; Ryūjō and Zuihō
were light carriers, while Jun'yō and Hiyō,
although technically classified as fleet
carriers, were second-rate ships of
comparatively limited effectiveness.[187] In
the time it took Japan to build three
carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned
more than two dozen fleet and light fleet
carriers, and numerous escort carriers.[188]
By 1942 the United States was already
three years into a shipbuilding program
mandated by the Second Vinson Act of
1938.[189]

Both the United States and Japan


accelerated the training of aircrew, but the
United States had a more effective pilot
rotation system, which meant that more
veterans survived and went on to training
or command billets, where they were able
to pass on lessons they had learned in
training, instead of remaining in combat,
where errors were more likely to be
fatal.[190] By the time of the Battle of the
Philippine Sea in June 1944, the Japanese
had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in
terms of numbers, but their planes, many
of which were obsolete, were largely flown
by inexperienced and poorly trained
pilots.[nb 7]

Midway showed the worth of pre-war naval


cryptanalysis and intelligence-gathering.
These efforts continued and were
expanded throughout the war in both the
Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Successes
were numerous and significant. For
instance, cryptanalysis made possible the
shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's
airplane in 1943.[192]

The Battle of Midway redefined the central


importance of air superiority for the
remainder of the war when the Japanese
suddenly lost their four main aircraft
carriers and were forced to return home.
Without any form of air superiority, the
Japanese never again launched a major
offensive in the Pacific.[193][194]

Discovery of sunken vessels


Because of the extreme depth of the
ocean in the area of the battle (more than
17,000 ft or 5,200 m), researching the
battlefield has presented extraordinary
difficulties. On 19 May 1998, Robert
Ballard and a team of scientists and
Midway veterans from both sides located
and photographed Yorktown, which was
located 16,650 feet deep (3.1 miles). The
ship was remarkably intact for a vessel
that had sunk in 1942; much of the original
equipment and even the original paint
scheme were still visible.[195] Ballard's
subsequent search for the Japanese
carriers was unsuccessful.

In September 1999, a joint expedition


between Nauticos Corp. and the U.S. Naval
Oceanographic Office searched for the
Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced
renavigation techniques in conjunction
with the ship's log of the submarine USS
Nautilus, the expedition located a large
piece of wreckage, subsequently identified
as having come from the upper hangar
deck of Kaga. The crew of the Petrel
research vessel, in conjunction with the US
Navy, revealed on 18 October 2019 that it
had found the Japanese carrier Kaga lying
5.4 km beneath the waves. The crew of the
research vessel Petrel confirmed the
discovery of another Japanese carrier, the
Akagi on 21 October 2019. The Akagi was
found in the Papahānaumokuākea Marine
National Monument resting in nearly
18,000 feet (5,490 meters) of water more
than 1,300 miles (2,090 kilometers)
northwest of Pearl Harbor.

Remembrances

The Midway Memorial

Chicago Municipal Airport, important to


the war effort in World War II, was
renamed Chicago Midway International
Airport (or simply Midway Airport) in 1949
in honor of the battle.[196]

Waldron Field, an outlying training landing


strip at Corpus Christi NAS, as well as
Waldron Road leading to the strip, was
named in honor of John C. Waldron, the
commander of USS Hornet's Torpedo
Squadron 8. Yorktown Boulevard leading
away from the strip was named for the
U.S. carrier sunk in the battle.[197]

Henderson Field (Guadalcanal) was


named in honor of United States Marine
Corps Major Lofton Henderson, who was
the first Marine aviator to perish during the
battle.[198]

An escort carrier, USS Midway (CVE-63)


was commissioned on 17 August 1943.
She was renamed St. Lo on 10 October
1944 to clear the name Midway for a large
fleet aircraft carrier,[199]
USS Midway (CV-41), which was
commissioned on 10 September 1945,
eight days after the Japanese surrender,
and is now docked in San Diego, California,
as the USS Midway Museum.[200]

On 13 September 2000, Secretary of the


Interior Bruce Babbitt designated the lands
and waters of Midway Atoll National
Wildlife Refuge as the Battle of Midway
National Memorial.[201]

Tinker Air Force Base, outside Oklahoma


City, Oklahoma is named in honor of Major
General Clarence L. Tinker, Commander,
7th Air Force, who personally led a bomber
strike from Hawaii against the retreating
Japanese forces on 7 June.

John Ford directed two films about the


events: the 18-minute 1942 Movietone
News documentary (released by the War
Activities Committee) The Battle of
Midway,[202] which received the 1942
Academy Award for Best Documentary;
and the eight-minute documentary
Torpedo Squadron 8, which describes the
heroism of Torpedo Squadron 8 of the
USS Hornet.[203][204][205] Ford, who was
USNR Commander at the time, was
present on Midway Atoll's power plant at
Sand Island during the Japanese attack
and filmed the attack.[206] He received
combat wounds from enemy fire in his
arm during the filming.[203][207][208][209]

Portrayals in literature and


popular culture

Movies …
The following is the list of the movies
dealing with the Midway battle or
portraying the act of battle as the crucial
moment of the film's plot:

Hawai Middouei daikaikusen: Taiheiyo no


arashi (1960)
Midway (1976)
Midway (2019)
Dauntless : The Battle of Midway (2019
film)

Other …

The Battle of Midway (film), 1942


documentary about the battle
The battle has been the subject of video
games including 1943: The Battle of
Midway, Secret Weapons Over Normandy,
Blazing Angels: Squadrons of WWII,
Heroes of the Pacific, Battlestations:
Midway and Battlestations: Pacific, with
the last providing an alternate history
timeline in which Japan is victorious at
Midway.
In the 2004 anime series Zipang, the
crew of the JMSDF Mirai, are
transported back sixty years through
time to June 4/5, 1942, the first day of
the Battle of Midway.
Swedish metal band Sabaton included a
song about the Battle of Midway titled
Midway on their 2010 album Coat of
Arms.

See also
First Bombardment of Midway, a 7
December 1941 attack on Midway by
two Japanese destroyers
Imperial Japanese Navy of World War II
Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
WWII carrier-versus-carrier
engagements between American and
Japanese naval forces:
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands
Battle of the Philippine Sea
Battle off Cape Engaño

Footnotes
1. The Kidō Butai ( 機動部隊, "Mobile
Unit/Force") was the Combined Fleet's
tactical designation for its carrier
battle group. This title was used as a
term of convenience and was not a
formal name for the organization. One
month after Midway, the Kidō Butai
was disbanded and its surviving ships
were transferred to Third Fleet.
2. The code names "Val", "Kate" and
"Zeke", which are often applied to
these aircraft, were not introduced
until late 1943 by the Allied forces. The
D3A was normally referred to by the
Japanese as Type 99 Navy dive
bomber, the B5N as the Type 97 Navy
torpedo bomber and the A6M as the
Type 0 Navy fighter; the latter was
colloquially known as the "Zero".[44]
3. Other sources claim a stern hit, but
Parshall and Tully make a case for a
near miss, because of rudder damage
from a high explosive bomb.[117]
4. Parshall and Tully argue that even if
Kaga had been towed back to Japan,
the permanent structural damage
caused by the inferno onboard would
likely have made the carrier unusable
for anything except scrapping.[123]
5. Japanese casualty figures for the
battle were compiled by Sawaichi
Hisae for her book Midowei Kaisen:
Kiroku p. 550: the list was compiled
from Japanese prefectural records
and is the most accurate to date.[5]
. Pre-war Japan was less mechanized
than America and the highly trained
aircraft mechanics, fitters and
technicians lost at Midway were all but
impossible to replace and train to a
similar level of efficiency. In contrast,
the extensive use of machinery in the
United States meant that a much
larger portion of the population had a
mechanical/technical background.[185]
7. Shinano, commissioned on 19
November 1944, was only the fourth
fleet carrier commissioned by Japan
during the war, after Taihō, Unryū, and
Amagi.[191]

Notes …

1. Blair 1975, p. 240 map


2. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 90–91
3. "The Battle of Midway" . Office of
Naval Intelligence.
4. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 524
5. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 114, 365,
377–380, 476
. "Battle of Midway: June 4–7, 1942" .
Naval History & Heritage Command.
26 March 2015. Retrieved 15 June
2016.
7. Dull 1978, p. 166
. "A Brief History of Aircraft Carriers:
Battle of Midway" . U.S. Navy. 2007.
Archived from the original on 12 June
2007. Retrieved 12 June 2007.
9. Keegan 2005, p. 275
10. Symonds 2018, p. 293
11. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 13–15, 21–23; Willmott 1983,
pp. 39–49; Parshall & Tully 2005,
pp. 22–38.
12. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 33; Prange,
Goldstein & Dillon 1982, p. 23
13. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 22–26
14. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 31–32
15. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 33
1 . Willmott 1983, pp. 66–67; Parshall &
Tully 2005, pp. 33–34.
17. "After the Battle of Midway" . Midway
Atoll National Wildlife Refuge.
Archived from the original on 15
January 2009.
1 . Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 375–379; Willmott 1983, pp. 110–
117; Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 52
19. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 63
20. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 50
21. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 53, derived
from Japanese War History Series
(Senshi Sōshō), Volume 43 ('Midowei
Kaisen'), p. 118.
22. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 51, 55
23. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 43–45,
derived from Senshi Sōshō, p. 196.
24. "Oil and Japanese Strategy in the
Solomons: A Postulate" .
www.combinedfleet.com.
25. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 55–56
2 . Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 43–45,
derived from Senshi Sōshō, pp. 119–
121.
27. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 80–81; Cressman 1990, p. 37
2 . Lord 1967, pp. 23–26
29. Willmott 1983, p. 337
30. Cressman 1990, pp. 37–45; Lord 1967,
pp. 37–39
31. Willmott 1983, p. 338
32. Zimmerman, Dwight (26 May 2012).
"Battle of Midway: Repairing the
Yorktown After the Battle of the Coral
Sea" . Defense Media Network.
Faircount Media Group. Retrieved
21 January 2015.
33. Lord 1967, p. 39; Willmott 1983, p. 340
34. Willmott 1983, pp. 340–341
35. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 93–94
3 . Scrivner 1987, p. 8
37. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 96
3 . Willmott 1983, p. 101
39. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 65–67
40. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 63–64, 91
41. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 450–451
42. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 89
43. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 89–91
44. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 78–80
45. Peattie, p. 159
4 . Parshall and Tully, pp. 85 and 136–
145; Peattie, pp. 155–59: Stille, pp.
14–15, 50–51
47. Willmott 1983, p. 351; Parshall & Tully
2005, pp. 98–99
4 . Lord 1967, pp. 37–39; Parshall & Tully
2005, p. 99
49. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 102–104;
Willmott 1983, pp. 349–351
50. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 101–102
51. Smith 2000, p. 134
52. "U.S. National Park Service: The Battle
of Midway: Turning the Tide in the
Pacific 1. Out of Obscurity" .
53. "AF Is Short of Water" . The Battle of
Midway. Historical Publications.
Retrieved 6 September 2011.
54. Baker, Benjamin (8 January 2016).
"What If Japan Had Won The Battle of
Midway?" . The Diplomat. Retrieved
10 January 2016.
55. Smith 2000, pp. 138–141
5 . Willmott 1983, p. 304
57. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 409
5 . Watson, Richard. "VP-44 at Ford Island
and the Battle of Midway" . Archived
from the original on 7 December
2013. Retrieved 5 October 2013.
59. Lundstrom 2006, p. 238
0. Admiral Nimitz's CinCPac report of
the battle. From Hyperwar. Retrieved
13 February 2008.
1. "Interrogation of: Captain Toyama,
Yasumi, IJN; Chief of Staff Second
Destroyer Squadron, flagship Jintsu
(CL), at Midway" . USSBS From
Hyperwar. Retrieved 14 February 2008.
2. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 107–112,
126–128, 132–134
3. Stephen 1988, pp. 166–167
4. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 200–204
5. Lord 1967, p. 110; Parshall & Tully
2005, p. 149
. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 207–212; Parshall & Tully 2005,
pp. 149–152; "Office of Naval
Intelligence Combat Narrative:
"Midway's Attack on the Enemy
Carriers" " . Retrieved 28 January
2012.
7. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 176
. Parshall and Tulley 2005, pp. 151–153.
9. Johnston, Clair (4 June 2010). "WWII
Battle of Midway pilot honored" .
Billings Gazette. Retrieved 8 February
2013.
70. Lord 1967, pp. 116–118
71. Parshall and Tully, p. 549
72. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 151–152
73. Lundstrom, p. 337
74. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 182
75. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 130–132
7 . Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 156–159
77. Isom 2007, pp. 129–139
7 . Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 216–217; Parshall & Tully 2005,
pp. 159–161, 183
79. Bicheno 2001, p. 134
0. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 165–170
1. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 168–173
2. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 231, derived
from Senshi Sōshō, pp. 372–378.
3. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 121–124
4. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982, p. 233
5. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 217–218, 372–373; Parshall &
Tully 2005, pp. 170–173.
. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 231–237; Parshall & Tully 2005,
pp. 170–173; Willmott 1983, pp. 395–
398
7. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 174–175;
Willmott 1983, pp. 395–398
. "1942 – Battle of Midway" . Joel
Shepherd. Retrieved 23 July 2015.
9. Lundstrom 1984, pp. 332–333
90. Cressman 1990, pp. 84–89; Parshall &
Tully 2005, pp. 215–216, 226–227;
Buell 1987, p. 494
91. "Battle of Midway" . Joel Shepherd.
Retrieved 23 July 2015.
92. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 174
93. Mrazek 2008, p. 113
94. Lundstrom 1984, p. 341
95. Ewing 2004, pp. 71, 85, 86, 307
9 . Cressman 1990, pp. 91–94
97. "Recollections of Lieutenant George
Gay, USNR" . Naval History and
Heritage Command. 21 September
2015.
9 . Blair 1975, p. 238
99. "Douglas TBD Devastator Torpedo
Bomber (1937)" . Military Factory.
Archived from the original on 7
September 2015. Retrieved 27 August
2015.
100. Thruelsen 1976, pp. 186, 189, 190
101. "Battle of Midway: June 4 – 6, 1942" .
www.cv6.org.
102. Crenshaw 1995, p. 158
103. Morison 1949, pp. 230–232
104. Patrick, John (2013). "The Hard
Lessons of World War II Torpedo
Failures" . Undersea Warfare (47).
Archived from the original on 23 July
2015. Retrieved 23 July 2015.
105. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 215–216,
226–227
10 . Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 226–227
107. Bicheno 2001, p. 62
10 . "IJN Kirishima: Tabular Record of
Movement" . Senkan!.
combinedfleet.com. 2006. Archived
from the original on 10 June 2007.
Retrieved 6 June 2007.
109. Tillman 1976, pp. 69–73
110. "Accounts – C. Wade McClusky" .
cv6.org. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
111. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
pp. 259–261, 267–269; Cressman
1990, pp. 96–97; Parshall & Tully 2005,
pp. 215–216, 226–227
112. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 250
113. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 235–236
114. Miller 2001, p. 123.
115. Beevor 2012, p. 310.
11 . Keegan 2004, p. 216.
117. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 253–259
11 . Tillman 2012, p. 39
119. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 330–353
120. Lord 1967, pp. 183
121. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 260
122. Bob Hackett & Sander Kingsepp
(1997–2009). "HIJMS Nagara: Tabular
Record of Movement" . Imperial
Japanese Navy Page.
123. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 337.
124. Lord 1967, pp. 216–217
125. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 262, 292–
299, 312
12 . Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 312–318
127. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 312
12 . Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 311, 316,
318
129. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 323
130. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 356
131. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 328–329,
354–359
132. Potter & Nimitz 1960, p. 682
133. Blair 1975, pp. 246–247
134. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 344
135. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 382–383
13 . Blair 1975, pp. 246–247; Willmott
1983, pp. 381–382
137. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 364–365
13 . Blair 1975, p. 250
139. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 359
140. Prange, Goldstein & Dillon 1982,
p. 320; Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 345.
141. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 345–346,
diagram 347, 348
142. Allen, Thomas B. (April 1999). "Return
to the Battle of Midway" . Journal of
the National Geographic Society.
Washington, D.C.: National
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ISSN 0027-9358 . Archived from the
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143. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 377
144. Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 362
145. Lord 1967, pp. 280
14 . "Yorktown" . Dictionary of American
Naval Fighting Ships. Navy
Department, Naval History and
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Retrieved 10 April 2015.
147. Parshall & Tully 2005, pp. 374–375,
383
14 . Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 476
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References
Barde, Robert E. (December 1983).
"Midway: Tarnished Victory". Military
Affairs. 47 (4). ISSN 0899-3718 .
Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second
World War. New York: Back Bay Books.
ISBN 978-0-316-02375-7.
Bicheno, Hugh (2001). Midway. London:
Orion Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-304-
35715-4.
Bix, Herbert P. (2001). Hirohito and the
Making of Modern Japan. New York:
Perennial / HarperCollinsPublishers.
ISBN 0-06-019314-X.
Blair, Clay, Jr. (1975). Silent Victory: The
U.S. Submarine War Against Japan .
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott. ISBN 978-
0-397-00753-0.
Buell, Thomas B. (1987). The Quiet
Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond
A. Spruance. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-562-0.
Chesneau, Roger, ed. (1980). Conway's
All the World's Fighting Ships, 1922–
1946. London: Conway Maritime Press.
ISBN 978-0-85177-146-5.
Crenshaw, Russell Sydnor (1995). The
Battle of Tassafaronga. Baltimore,
Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co.
of America. ISBN 978-1-877853-37-1.
Cressman, Robert J.; Ewing, Steve;
Tillman, Barrett; Horan, Mark; Reynolds,
Clark; Cohen, Stan (1990). "A Glorious
Page in our History", Adm. Chester
Nimitz, 1942: The Battle of Midway, 4–6
June 1942. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial
Histories Pub. Co. ISBN 0-929521-40-4.
Davidson, Joel R. (1996). The Unsinkable
Fleet: the Politics of U.S. Navy Expansion
in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-
55750-156-1.
Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of
the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–
1945) . Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-219-9.
Ewing, Steve (2004). Thach Weave: The
Life of Jimmie Thach. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-
59114-248-2.
Isom, Dallas Woodbury (2007). Midway
Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the
Battle of Midway. Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-
253-34904-0.
Keegan, John (2004). Intelligence in War.
New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 0-375-
70046-3.
Keegan, John (2005). The Second World
War. New York: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-
303573-2. OCLC 904565693 .
Lord, Walter (1967). Incredible Victory.
New York: Harper and Row. ISBN 1-
58080-059-9.
Lundstrom, John B. (1984). The First
Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from
Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-
59114-471-X.
Lundstrom, John B. (2006). Black Shoe
Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at
Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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Thunder: The True Story of Torpedo
Squadron Eight. New York: Little, Brown.
ISBN 978-0-316-02139-5.
OCLC 225870332 .
Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony
(2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold
Story of the Battle of Midway . Dulles,
Virginia: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-
923-0.
Potter, E. B.; Nimitz, Chester W. (1960).
Sea Power: A Naval History. Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
OCLC 395062 .
Prange, Gordon W.; Goldstein, Donald
M.; Dillon, Katherine V. (1982). Miracle at
Midway . New York: McGraw-Hill.
ISBN 0-07-050672-8.
Scrivner, Charles L. (1987). TBM/TBF
Avenger in Action. Carrollton, Texas:
Squadron/Signal Publications. ISBN 0-
89747-197-0.
Smith, Michael (2000). The Emperor's
Codes: Bletchley Park and the Breaking of
Japan's Secret Ciphers. London: Bantam
Press. ISBN 0-593-04642-0.
Stephen, Martin (1988). Sea Battles in
Close-up: World War Two. London: Ian
Allan. ISBN 978-0-7110-1596-8.
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8.
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275-54260-2.
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Toll, Ian W. (2012). Pacific Crucible, War
in the Pacific, 1941–1942. New York:
W.W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-06813-9.
Willmott, H. P. (1983). The Barrier and
the Javelin: Japanese and Allied
Strategies, February to June 1942.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 1-59114-949-5.

Further reading
Evans, David; Peattie, Mark R. (1997).
Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–
1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
Fuchida, Mitsuo; Masatake Okumiya
(1955). Midway: The Battle that Doomed
Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 0-87021-372-5. A Japanese
account; numerous assertions in this
work have been challenged by more
recent sources.
Hanson, Victor D. (2001). Carnage and
Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of
Western Power . New York: Doubleday.
ISBN 0-385-50052-1.
Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese
Destroyer Captain. New York: Ballantine
Books. ISBN 0-345-27894-1. First-hand
account by Japanese captain, often
inaccurate.
Holmes, W. (1979). Double-Edged
Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence
Operations in the Pacific During World
War II (Bluejacket Books). Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-
55750-324-9.
Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The
Comprehensive History of Secret
Communication from Ancient Times to
the Internet. New York: Scribner. ISBN 0-
684-83130-9. Significant section on
Midway
Kernan, Alvin (2005). The Unknown
Battle of Midway . New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press.
ISBN 0-300-10989-X. An account of the
blunders that led to the near total
destruction of the American torpedo
squadrons, and of what the author calls
a cover-up by naval officers after the
battle.
Layton, Edwin T. (1985). And I Was
There: Pearl Harbor and Midway . New
York: W. Morrow. ISBN 978-0-688-04883-
9.
Peattie, Mark R. (2007). Sunburst: The
Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–
1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-664-
3.
Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles:
Command Decision in Harm's Way.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 1-59114-794-8.
Smith, Peter C. (2007). Midway
Dauntless Victory; Fresh perspectives on
America's Seminal Naval Victory of 1942.
Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime.
ISBN 978-1-84415-583-5. Detailed study
of battle, from planning to the effects on
World War II
Stephan, John J. (1984). Hawaii Under
the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for
Conquest after Pearl Harbor. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 0-8248-
2550-0.
Stille, Mark (2007). USN Carriers vs IJN
Carriers: The Pacific 1942. New York:
Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-248-6.
Willmott, H. P. (2004). The Second World
War in the Far East. Smithsonian History
of Warfare. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Books. p. 240. ISBN 1-
58834-192-5.

External links

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related to Battle of Midway.

The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway ,


prepared by U.S. Naval Intelligence from
captured Japanese documents
Battle of Midway (1942) – U.S. Navy
propaganda film directed by John Ford. The
Battle of Midway (1942) on IMDb
Victory At Sea: Midway Is East (1952) –
Episode 4 from a 26-episode series about
naval combat during World War II.
"The Course to Midway Turning Point in the
Pacific" . Archived from the original on 23
October 2014. Comprehensive historic
overview created by Bill Spencer, archive.org
Naval History and Heritage Command
Midway Page
"The Japanese Story of the Battle of
Midway" – ONI Review – Vol. 2, No. 5 (May
1947)
WW2DB: The Battle of Midway
After Midway: The Fates of the U.S. and
Japanese Warships by Bryan J. Dickerson
Animated History of The Battle of Midway
Midway Chronology 1
"Midway Chronology 2" . Archived from the
original on 2 October 2014. Retrieved
26 April 2006.
Destination Point Luck: Voices From Midway
(2008) – U.S. Navy Interviews of Battle of
Midway Veterans

A real tragedy by Ray Daves, a crewman


on the USS Yorktown; from the memoir
Radioman: An Eyewitness Account of
Pearl Harbor and World War II in the
Pacific , as told to Carol Edgemon
Hipperson
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