Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Financial intermediation and growth:

Causality and causes夽
Ross Levine *, Norman Loayza
, Thorsten Beck
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA

Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile and The World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA
The World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA

Received 13 October 1998; received in revised form 9 August 1999; accepted 24 August 1999

Abstract

This paper evaluates (1) whether the exogenous component of "nancial intermediary
development in#uences economic growth and (2) whether cross-country di!erences in legal
and accounting systems (e.g., creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting stan-
dards) explain di!erences in the level of "nancial development. Using both traditional
cross-section, instrumental variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, we
"nd that the exogenous components of "nancial intermediary development is positively
associated with economic growth. Also, the data show that cross-country di!erences in legal
and accounting systems help account for di!erences in "nancial development. Together,
these "ndings suggest that legal and accounting reforms that strengthen creditor rights,
contract enforcement, and accounting practices can boost "nancial development and acceler-
ate economic growth.  2000 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classixcation: O16; O40; G28

Keywords: Financial development; Economic growth; Legal system

夽
We thank seminar participants at the University of Illinois, the Federal Reserve Banks of
Richmond and Dallas, the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Minnesota, the Central
Bank of Chile as well as Robert King, Lant Pritchett, Andrei Shleifer, Jonathan Wright, and an
anonymous referee for helpful comments. This paper's "ndings, interpretations, and conclusions are
entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Central Bank of Chile,
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Levine).

0304-3932/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 3 0 4 - 3 9 3 2 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 1 7 - 9
32 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

1. Introduction

Do better functioning "nancial intermediaries } "nancial intermediaries that

are better at ameliorating information asymmetries and facilitating transactions
} exert a causal in#uence on economic growth? Providing evidence on causality
has implications for policymakers and economists. For instance, Hamilton
(1781) argued that &banks were the happiest engines that ever were invented' for
spurring economic growth. Others, however, question whether "nance boosts
growth. Adams (1819) asserted that banks harm the &morality, tranquility, and
even wealth' of nations. Economic theories mirror these divisions. Some mod-
els show that economic agents create debt contracts and "nancial intermediaries
to ameliorate the economic consequences of informational asymmetries, with
bene"cial implications for resource allocation and economic activity. How-
ever, other models note that higher returns from better resource allocation may
depress saving rates enough such that overall growth rates actually slow
with enhanced "nancial development (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; King and
Levine, 1993b). Furthermore, Robinson (1952) argues that "nancial develop-
ment primarily follows economic growth and the engines of growth must be
sought elsewhere. In terms of policy, if "nancial intermediaries exert an
economically large impact on growth, then this raises the degree of urgency
attached to legal, regulatory, and policy reforms designed to promote "nancial
development.
This paper rigorously examines whether the exogenous component of "nan-
cial intermediary development in#uences economic growth. We also present
evidence concerning the legal, regulatory, and policy determinants of "nancial
development. While past work shows that the level of "nancial development is
a good predictor of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993a, b; Levine and
Zervos, 1998; Neusser and Kugler, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998), these
results do not settle the issue of causality. Although this paper does not fully
resolve all concerns about causality, it uses new data and new econometric
procedures that directly confront the potential biases induced by simultaneity,

 The quotations from Hamilton and Adams are taken from Hammond (1991). For an historical
perspective, also see Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1934) on how intermediaries spur economic
growth.
 Also, see Townsend (1979); Gale and Hellwig (1985); Diamond (1984); Boyd and Prescott (1986);
Diamond and Dybvig (1983); and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). For reviews of this literature
see Gertler (1988) and Levine (1997).
 For more on how economic activity in#uences the "nancial sector, see Patrick (1966) and
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 33

omitted variables, and unobserved country-speci"c e!ects that have plagued

previous empirical work on the "nance-growth link.
Methodologically, the paper uses two econometric techniques: (1) generalized
method-of-moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators and (2) a cross-sectional
instrumental-variable estimator. Whereas the pure cross-sectional estimator
follows directly from traditional growth studies, the panel estimator uses pooled
cross-country and time-series data to exploit the additional information pro-
vided by the over-time variation in the growth rate and its determinants. This
added information allows us to obtain more precise estimates and, most impor-
tantly, correct for biases associated with existing studies of the "nance-growth
relationship.
Consider "rst the GMM dynamic panel estimators, which are speci"cally
designed to address the econometric problems induced by unobserved country-
speci"c e!ects and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables in lagged-
dependent-variable models, such as growth regressions. We assemble a panel
dataset of 74 countries, where the data are averaged over each of the seven
5-year intervals composing the period 1960}1995. The dependent variable is the
growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The regressors
include the level of "nancial intermediary development, along with a broad set
of variables that serve as conditioning information. We employ two GMM
panel estimators; both are based on the use of lagged observations of the
explanatory variables as instruments (thus labeled &internal' instruments). In the
"rst GMM panel estimator, we (a) di!erence the regression equation to remove
any omitted variable bias created by unobserved country-speci"c e!ects, and
then (b) instrument the right-hand-side variables (the di!erenced values of the
original regressors) using lagged values of the original regressors to eliminate
potential parameter inconsistency arising from simultaneity bias. This diwerence
dynamic-panel estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1990), has increasingly been used in studies of growth (Caselli et al.,
1996; Easterly et al., 1997). We also use a second GMM dynamic panel
estimator that improves upon the diwerence estimator in so far as the quality of
the instruments is concerned. Speci"cally, lagged values of "nancial develop-
ment frequently make weak instruments for forecasting changes in "nancial
development. This weak instrument problem can induce biases in "nite samples
and poor precision even asymptotically (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1996).

 This paper complements recent microeconomic e!orts aimed at reconciling whether "nancial
development is simply a good predictor of economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that, in
countries with well-developed "nancial systems, industries that are naturally heavy users of external
"nance grow relatively faster than other industries. DemirguK c7 -Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show
that "rms in countries with better-developed "nancial systems grow faster than they could have
grown without this access. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that when individual states of the
United States relaxed intrastate branching restrictions the quality of bank loans rose and per capita
GDP growth accelerated.
34 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

The second GMM panel estimator mitigates this problem by complementing

the diwerence speci"cation with the original regression speci"ed in levels. This
system estimator, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), o!ers dramatic
improvements in both e$ciency and consistency in Monte Carlo simulations
(Blundell and Bond, 1997). These GMM estimators have not been used before to
examine the relationship between "nancial intermediary development and eco-
nomic growth.
Our second econometric method to examine the e!ect of "nancial intermedi-
ary development on economic growth is a cross-sectional estimator. Data for 71
countries are averaged over the period 1960}1995, so that there is one observa-
tion per country. Although the cross-sectional estimator does not deal as
rigorously as the panel estimators with the potential problems induced by
simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved country-speci"c e!ects, the
cross-sectional results are direct descendants of the cross-country literature on
"nance and growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993a; Levine and Zervos, 1998).
Also, the cross-sectional estimator serves as a consistency check on the panel
"ndings. Unlike much of the cross-country growth literature, we use instrumen-
tal variables to extract the exogenous component of "nancial intermediary
development. For this purpose we use the insight provided by LaPorta et al.
(1997, 1998; henceforth LLSV). They note that most countries can be divided
into countries with predominantly English, French, German, or Scandinavian
legal origins and that countries typically obtained their legal systems through
occupation or colonization. Moreover, LLSV (1998) show that national legal
origin strongly in#uences the legal and regulatory environment governing
"nancial sector transactions. Since legal origin explains cross-country di!er-
ences in "nancial intermediary development and since legal origin is (reason-
ably) exogenous, we use legal origin as an instrumental variable to control for
simultaneity bias.
In conducting this research, we construct a new dataset and focus on three
measures of "nancial intermediation. One measures the overall size of the
"nancial intermediation sector. The second measures whether commercial
banking institutions, or the central bank, is conducting the intermediation. The
third measures the extent to which "nancial institutions funnel credit to private
sector activities. Our "nancial development indicators improve on past
measures by (i) more accurately de#ating nominal measures of intermediary
liabilities and assets, (ii) more comprehensively measuring the banking sector,
and (iii) more carefully distinguishing who is conducting the intermediation and
to where the funds are #owing. While the "nancial intermediary indicators are
still imperfect measures of how well "nancial intermediaries research "rms,
monitor managers, mobilize savings, pool risk, and ease transactions, these three
measures provide more information about "nancial intermediary development
than past measures and together they provide a more accurate picture than if we
used only a single measure. Moreover, they produce similar conclusions.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 35

The GMM dynamic panel estimators and the pure cross-sectional regressions
produce very consistent "ndings: the exogenous component of "nancial inter-
mediary development is positively and robustly linked with economic growth.
In interpreting the results, note that the "ndings do not reject the view that
economic activity in#uences "nancial development. Rather, the results show
that the positive link between "nance and growth is not only due to growth
in#uencing "nancial development; the strong positive relationship between
"nancial intermediary development and long-run growth is at least partly
explained by the e!ect of the exogenous component of "nancial development on
economic growth. Economically, the impact is large. For example, the estimated
coe$cients suggest that if Argentina had enjoyed the level of "nancial intermedi-
ary development of the average developing country during the 1960}1995
period it would have experienced about one percentage point faster real per
capita GDP growth per annum over this period.
The regression results pass a battery of diagnostic and sensitivity tests. The
results are robust to modi"cations in the conditioning information set and
alterations in the sample period. Outliers are not producing the results. Speci-
"cation tests support the appropriateness of the instrumental variables. This
gives credence to the conclusion that the estimated positive link between "nance
and growth is not due to simultaneity bias or insu$cient control for other
determinants of growth.
The results favor the growth-enhancing view of "nancial intermediation
espoused by Hamilton (1781), Bagehot (1873), and Schumpeter (1934). In turn,
the results are less consistent with those that minimize the positive role of
"nancial intermediaries in the growth process (Adams, 1819; Robinson, 1952;
Lucas, 1988). Similarly, this paper's "ndings are consistent with theoretical
models that predict that better functioning "nancial intermediaries accelerate
economic growth. Our results do not favor models that emphasize the poten-
tially growth-retarding impact of "nancial development. Finally, this paper's
"ndings highlight "nancial reform. If economists can identify legal, regulatory,
and policy reforms that promote "nancial development, this may positively
in#uence economic growth.
Consequently, we also examine whether cross-country di!erences in particu-
lar legal and regulatory system characteristics help explain cross-country di!er-
ences in the level of "nancial intermediary development. The degree to which
"nancial intermediaries can acquire information about "rms, write contracts,
and have those contracts enforced will fundamentally in#uence the ability of
those intermediaries to identify worthy "rms, exert corporate control, manage
risk, mobilize savings, and ease exchanges. Thus, as argued by LLSV (1997,
1998), the legal and regulatory system will fundamentally in#uence the ability of
the "nancial system to provide high-quality "nancial services. LLSV (1997)
examine securities markets. In contrast, we combine their data on the legal and
regulatory environment with our data on "nancial intermediation to study the
36 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

links between "nancial intermediary development and cross-country di!erences

in legal and accounting systems.
The results provide useful information to policymakers. The data suggest that
countries with legal and regulatory systems that give a high priority to creditors
receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations have better
functioning "nancial intermediaries than countries where the legal system pro-
vides weaker support to creditors. Moreover, contract enforcement seems to
matter even more than the formal legal and regulatory codes. Countries that
e$ciently impose compliance with laws tend to have better developed "nancial
intermediaries than countries where enforcement is more lax. The paper also
shows that information disclosure matters for "nancial development. Countries
where corporations publish relatively comprehensive and accurate "nancial
statements have better developed "nancial intermediaries than countries where
published information on corporations is less reliable. Finally, we con"rm these
"ndings when using the legal origin dummy variables (English, French, German,
Scandinavian) as instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of
the legal, enforcement, and accounting environment: the legal/regulatory system
exerts a powerful in#uence on "nancial sector development. While considerable
research remains, taken together, this paper's "ndings provide support for the
view that legal and regulatory changes that strengthen creditor rights, contract
enforcement, and accounting practices boost "nancial intermediary develop-
ment with positive repercussions on economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the results
using purely cross-sectional data, while Section 3 discusses and presents the
diwerence and system dynamic panel results. Section 4 provides information on
how the legal and accounting environment explain cross-country di!erences in
"nancial development. Section 5 concludes.

2. Finance and growth: Cross-sectional analyses

This section examines the relationship between "nancial intermediation and

growth using a pure cross-sectional estimator. We begin with the pure cross-
sectional estimator because it more directly follows from the large cross-country
growth literature. The next section uses GMM dynamic panel procedures that
more comprehensively confront problems induced by country-speci"c e!ects,
endogeneity, and the routine use of lagged dependent variables in growth
regressions.

2.1. Financial intermediary development

As discussed above, numerous theoretical models show that economic agents

may form "nancial intermediaries to mitigate the economic consequences of
information and transaction costs. More speci"cally, "nancial intermediaries
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 37

emerge to lower the costs of researching potential investments, exerting corpo-

rate control, managing risk, mobilizing savings, and conducting exchanges.
Theory further suggests that, by providing these services to the economy,
"nancial intermediaries in#uence savings and allocation decisions in ways that
may alter long-run growth rates. Thus, modern economic theory provides an
intellectual framework for understanding how "nancial intermediaries in#uence
long-run rates of economic growth.
To evaluate the empirical predictions advanced by a variety of theoretical
models regarding the relationship between "nance and growth, therefore, we
would ideally like to construct measures of the ability of di!erent "nancial
systems to research and identify pro"table ventures, monitor and control
managers, ease risk management and facilitate resource mobilization. It is
impossible, however, to construct accurate, comparable measures of these "nan-
cial services for a broad cross-section of countries over the past 35 years.
Consequently, to measure the provision of "nancial services, this paper con-
structs three indicators of "nancial intermediary development. (We also
consider two additional measures in the sensitivity section.) While each has
particular strengths and weaknesses, we improve upon past measures of
"nancial intermediary development.
LIQUID LIABILITIES equals liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (cur-
rency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank "nan-
cial intermediaries) divided by GDP. This is a typical measure of &"nancial
depth' and thus of the overall size of the "nancial intermediary sector (King and
Levine, 1993a). This commonly used measure of "nancial sector development
has shortcomings. It may not accurately gauge the e!ectiveness of the "nancial
sector in ameliorating informational asymmetries and easing transactions costs.
Also, LIQUID LIABILITIES includes deposits by one "nancial intermediary in
another, which may involve &double counting'. Under the assumption that the

 For example, see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), and King and
Levine (1993b).
 One way this paper improves upon past measures of "nancial intermediary development is by
accurately de#ating nominal measures of "nancial intermediary liabilities and assets. Speci"cally,
while "nancial intermediary balance sheet items are measured at the end of the year, GDP is
measured over the year. Some authors try to correct for this problem by using an average of "nancial
intermediary balance sheet items in year t and t!1 and dividing by GDP measured in year t (King
and Levine, 1993a). This however does not fully resolve the distortion, especially in highly in#ation-
ary environments. This paper de#ates end-of-year "nancial balance sheet items by end of year
consumer price indices (CPI) and de#ates the GDP series by the annual CPI. Then, we compute the
average of the real "nancial balance sheet item in year t and t!1 and divide this average by real
GDP measured in year t. This is described more fully in the data appendix. Although we have
attempted to be as careful as possible in constructing the data, measurement errors undoubtedly
remain. We could not identify any reasons to believe, however, that this would systematically
in#uence this paper's "ndings since we control for a variety of factors } including the level of
economic development } and use instrumental variable procedures.
38 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

size of the "nancial intermediary sector is positively correlated with the provis-
ion and quality of "nancial services, many researchers use this measure of
"nancial depth (Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 1993a; and McKinnon,
1973). Thus, we include it as one measure of "nancial intermediary development.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK equals the ratio of commercial bank
assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. COMMERCIAL-
CENTRAL BANK measures the degree to which commercial banks versus the
central bank allocate society's savings. Again, this measure of "nancial inter-
mediary development does not directly measure the e!ectiveness of banks in
researching "rms, exerting corporate control, mobilizing savings, easing
transactions, and providing risk management facilities to clients. Thus, COM-
MERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK is not a direct measure of the quality and
quantity of "nancial services provided by "nancial intermediaries. The intuition
underlying this measure is that banks are more likely to identify pro"table
investments, monitor managers, facilitate risk management, and mobilize sav-
ings than central banks. Thus, King and Levine (1993a, b) recommend including
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK as an additional measure of "nancial
intermediary development.
PRIVATE CREDIT equals the value of credits by "nancial intermediaries to
the private sector divided by GDP. This measure of "nancial development is
more than a simple measure of "nancial sector size. PRIVATE CREDIT isolates
credit issued to the private sector, as opposed to credit issued to governments,
government agencies, and public enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credits
issued by the central bank. PRIVATE CREDIT is our preferred indicator
because it improves on other measures of "nancial development used in the
literature. For example, King and Levine (1993a, b) use a measure of gross
claims on the private sector divided by GDP. But, this measure includes credits
issued by the monetary authority and government agencies, whereas PRIVATE
CREDIT includes only credits issued by banks and other "nancial intermedia-
ries. Also, Levine and Zervos (1998) and Levine (1998) use a measure of deposit
money bank credits to the private sector divided by GDP over the period
1976}1993. That measure, however, does not include credits to the private

 Levine and Zervos (1998) also examine whether equity markets substitute for credit issuing
intermediaries. They "nd that the answer is no. Measures of banking sector development and stock
market development both enter signi"cantly when included together in simple cross-country growth
regressions. Evidently, banks provide di!erent "nancial services from those provided by securities
markets. Speci"cally, theory suggests that securities markets are particularly good at augmenting
liquidity and allowing agents to custom design risk management tools. Theory suggests that inter-
mediaries have a comparative advantage in reducing informational asymmetries. This paper is very
di!erent from Levine and Zervos (1998) because we are trying to control formally for simultaneity and
omitted variable biases, which they do not do. To do this, we rely on the GMM dynamic panel
procedures and use the pure cross-sectional estimator to con"rm our results. Unfortunately, there do
not exist securities market data over a su$ciently long period and across a su$ciently large number of
countries to conduct our analyses with securities market data from Levine and Zervos (1998).
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 39

Table 1
Summary statistics: 1960}1995

Financial Intermediary Development

Commercial-central
Liquid liabilities bank Private credit

Mean 43.44 78.16 38.29

Median 37.48 83.89 27.01
Maximum 143.43 98.99 141.30
Minimum 9.73 23.72 4.08
Std. Dev. 25.61 18.26 28.71
Observations 71 71 71

LIQUID LIABILITIES " liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank "nancial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times
100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK " assets of deposit money banks divided by assets of
deposit money banks plus central bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT " credit by deposit
money banks and other "nancial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, times 100.

sector by non-deposit money banks and it only covers the period 1976}1993.
PRIVATE CREDIT is a broader measure of credit issuing "nancial inter-
mediaries and its time dimension is twice as long, 1960}1995. We should also
emphasize here that these "nancial intermediary measures are not simply
picking up the relative importance of state-owned enterprises and the overall
level of nationalization. In the analysis below, we control for the role of
state-owned enterprises and this does not a!ect the conclusions. While PRI-
VATE CREDIT does not directly measure the amelioration of information and
transaction costs, we interpret higher levels of PRIVATE CREDIT as indicating
higher levels of "nancial services and therefore greater "nancial intermediary
development.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the "nancial intermediary develop-
ment indicators. The data are listed country-by-country in Appendix A, Table 8.
(Summary statistics and correlations with other variables used in this paper are
provided in Tables 10 and 11.) There is considerable variation across countries.
For example, PRIVATE CREDIT is less than 10% of GDP in Zaire, Sierra
Leone, Ghana, Haiti, and Syria. PRIVATE CREDIT, however, is greater than
85 percent of GDP in Switzerland, Japan, the United States, Sweden, and the
Netherlands. Real per capita GDP growth also exhibits considerable cross-
country variation. For instance, Korea, Malta, Taiwan, and Cyprus all enjoyed
growth rates over greater than 5% per annum over the 35 year period, while
Zaire, Niger, Ghana, Venezuela, Haiti, and El Salvador all su!ered growth rates
of less than negative 0.5% per year from 1960 to 1995. Thus, the dataset o!ers
40 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Fig. 1. Financial development across income groups, 1960}1995.

rich cross-country variation for exploring the link between growth and "nancial
intermediary development.
The positive relationship between income per capita and "nancial develop-
ment is illustrated in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows that all three "nancial intermediary
development indicators tend to increase as we move from low- to high-income
countries. Since conditional convergence is a feature of cross-country data sets
over the post 1960 period (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), the positive correla-
tion between income per capita and "nancial development may then suggest
a negative relationship between "nancial development and economic growth.
Indeed, four out of the "ve countries with the highest level of PRIVATE
CREDIT have slower than average growth rates (Japan is the lone exception).
In any case, these summary statistics highlight the importance of controlling for
the level of real per capita GDP } as well as a host of other economic and
political factors } in assessing the independent relationship between "nancial
intermediary development and economic growth.
Fig. 2 illustrates that countries with higher levels of PRIVATE CREDIT tend
to enjoy faster growth rates over the 1960}1995 period than countries with
lower levels of "nancial intermediary development. Indeed, of the ten fastest
growing countries over this 35-year period, all of them had larger-than-average
values of PRIVATE CREDIT. Many well-known &Asian Miracles', such as
Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, were in the top quartile of
countries as ranked by "nancial intermediary development. It is worth noting
that four European countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) were also
among the ten fastest growing countries during this sample period. Each of these
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 41

Fig. 2. Economic growth and "nancial intermediary development, 1960}1995.

countries also had comparatively well-developed "nancial systems. Certainly,

many factors may account for these economic success stories. At the other end of
the spectrum, seven of the ten countries with negative growth rates over the
35-year period were in the lowest quartile of countries as de"ned by "nancial
intermediary development (Zaire, Niger, Ghana, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Guyana). The banking systems of these countries have been in disarray for
much of the last 35 years (see, for example, Gelbard and Leite, 1999; Mehran,
1998; Sheng, 1996; Caprio et al., 1994 for discussions of the individual countries).
Government ownership of banks, massive o$cial intervention in credit alloca-
tion, high levels of nonperforming loans, controls on interest rates, and numer-
ous restrictions impede the ability of the "nancial systems in these countries
from mobilizing and allocating capital e$ciently. But, these countries su!er
many other economic policy and political maladies. Thus, we now turn to
regression analyses where we control for an array of factors associated with
economic growth (including country speci"c-factors) and also confront poten-
tial biases induced by simultaneity.

 Some countries have e!ectively improved their "nancial systems through a range of "nancial
reforms, e.g., Ghana, as documented in Gelbard and Leite (1999). Thus, it is important to exploit the
time-series dimension of the data. We do this below.
42 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

2.2. Legal origin

To confront the issue of simultaneity, we identify instrumental variables for

"nancial intermediary development. Here, we follow LLSV (1998) in looking to
legal origin. Comparative legal scholars place countries into four major legal
families, English, French, German, or Scandinavian, that descended from
Roman law (Reynolds and Flores, 1996). As described by Glendon et al. (1982),
Roman law was compiled under the direction of Byzantine Emperor Justinian in
the sixth century. Over subsequent centuries, the Glossators and Commentators
interpreted, adapted, and amended the Law (Berman, 1997). In the 17th and
18th centuries the Scandinavian countries formalized their own legal codes. The
Scandinavian legal systems have remained relatively una!ected from the far
reaching in#uences of the German and especially the French Civil Codes.
Napoleon directed the writing of the French Civil Code in 1804. He made it
a priority to secure the adoption of the Code in France and all conquered
territories, including Italy, Poland, the Low Countries, and the Habsburg
Empire. Also, France extended her legal in#uence to parts of the Near East,
Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, Oceania, French Guyana, and
the French Caribbean islands during the colonial era. Furthermore, the French
Civil Code was a major in#uence on the Portuguese and Spanish legal systems,
which helped spread the French legal tradition to Central and South America.
The German Civil Code (Bu( rgerliches Gesetzbuch) was completed almost
a century later in 1896. The German Code exerted a big in#uence on Austria and
Switzerland, as well as China (and hence Taiwan), Czechoslovakia, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Also, the German Civil Code heavily in#uenced
the Japanese Civil Code, which helped spread the German legal tradition to
Korea. Unlike these Civil Law countries, the English legal system is common
law, where the laws were primarily formed by judges trying to resolve particular
cases.
This paper takes national legal origin as an exogenous &endowment' since the
English, French, and German systems were spread primarily through conquest
and imperialism. It is critical to recognize, however, that exogeneity is not
a su$cient condition for economically meaningful instrumental variables. It
must also be the case that there are good reasons for believing that legal origin is
closely connected to factors that directly a!ect the behavior of "nancial inter-
mediaries. LLSV (1998) trace di!erences in legal origin through to di!erences in
the legal rules covering secured creditors, the e$ciency of contract enforcement,
and the quality of accounting standards. Thus, legal origin is connected to legal
and regulatory characteristics de"ning "nancial intermediary activities.
Table 2 presents regressions of the "nancial intermediary development indi-
cators on the dummy variables for English, French and German legal origin,
relative to Scandinavian origin (which is captured in the constant). We extend
the LLSV (1998) data set from 44 countries (with "nancial intermediary data) to
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 43

Table 2
Legal origin and "nancial intermediary development, 1960}1995

Financial intermediary development

Liquid liabilities Commercial-central bank Private credit

C 3.829 0.958 4.506 3.063 4.027 !0.674

(0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.386)
ENGLISH !0.134 0.249 !0.170 0.022 !0.717 !0.090
(0.325) (0.038) (0.002) (0.716) (0.002) (0.646)
FRENCH !0.434 !0.052 !0.270 !0.078 !0.894 !0.268
(0.001) (0.703) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.190)
GERMAN 0.477 0.683 0.048 0.152 0.401 0.738
(0.016) (0.000) (0.100) (0.010) (0.076) (0.002)
INCOME 0.330 0.166 0.541
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 71 71 71 71 71 71
Prob(F-test) 0.001 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.23 0.44 0.12 0.30 0.26 0.55

LIQUID LIABILITIES " liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank "nancial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times
100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK " assets of deposit money banks divided by assets of
deposit money banks plus central bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT " credit by deposit
money banks and other "nancial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, times 100.
Values for the "nancial intermediary development indicators are averages over the 1960}1995
period. ENGLISH " English legal origin. FRENCH " Napoleonic legal origin. GERMAN "
German legal origin. Scandinavian legal origin is the omitted category. INCOME " Logarithm of
real per capita GDP in 1960.

71 using Reynolds and Flores (1996). The data are listed in Appendix A Table 8.
Some of the regressions also control for the level of real per capita GDP. The
major message is that countries with a German legal origin have better de-
veloped "nancial intermediaries. While countries with a French legal tradition
tend to have less well-developed institutions than other countries on average,
this result does not hold when controlling for the overall level of economic
development. Also, as indicated by the P-values of the F-test, the legal origin
variables explain a signi"cant fraction of the cross-country variation of the
"nancial intermediary development indicators.

2.3. Legal origin and growth in a pure cross-section of countries

2.3.1. Cross-sectional estimator

The pure cross-sectional analysis uses data averaged over 1960}1995, such
that there is one observation per country. The basic regression takes the form:
GROWTH "a#bFINANCE #c[CONDITIONING SET] #e ,
G G G G
44 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

where the dependent variable, GROWTH, equals real per capita GDP growth,
FINANCE equals either LIQUID LIABILITIES, COMMERCIAL-CEN-
TRAL BANK, or PRIVATE CREDIT, and CONDITIONING SET represents
a vector of conditioning information that controls for other factors associated
with economic growth.
To examine whether cross-country variations in the exogenous component of
"nancial intermediary development explain cross-country variations in the rate
of economic growth, the legal origin indicators are used as instrumental vari-
ables for FINANCE. Our method of estimation is the generalized method of
moments (GMM). In estimation we have only used linear moment conditions,
which amount to the requirement that the instrumental variables (Z) be uncor-
related with the error term (e). The economic meaning of these conditions is that
the instrumental variables can only a!ect the dependent variable through the
explanatory variables, that is, they cannot have an independent e!ect on
the dependent variable. In the context of the cross-sectional growth regressions,
the moment conditions mean that legal origin may a!ect per capita GDP
growth only through the "nancial development indicators and the variables in
the conditioning information set (that is, the other determinants of growth). We
test this condition.
Testing the validity of the moment conditions is crucial to ascertaining the
consistency of GMM estimates. The speci"cation test we use is the test of
overidentifying restrictions introduced in the context of GMM by Hansen
(1982) and further explained in Newey and West (1987). If the regression
speci"cation passes the test, then we can safely draw conclusions taking the
moment conditions as given. That is, we cannot reject the statistical and
economic signi"cance of the estimated coe$cient on "nancial intermediary
development as indicating an e!ect running from "nancial development to per
capita GDP growth. We can safely discard the possibility that the relationship
between "nancial intermediary development and growth is due to simultaneity
bias or to omitted variables linked to legal origin.

 Due to the potential nonlinear relationship between economic growth and the assortment of
economic indicators, we use natural logarithms of the regressors.
 Two-stage instrumental variable procedures produce the same conclusions.
 Intuitively, the fact that we have more moment conditions (instruments) than parameters to be
estimated means that estimation could be done with fewer conditions. We can use this fact to
estimate the error term under a set of moment conditions that excludes one instrumental variable at
a time; we can then analyze if each estimated error term is uncorrelated with the instrumental
variable excluded in the corresponding instrument set. The null hypothesis of Hansen's test is that
the overidentifying restrictions are valid, that is, the instrumental variables are not correlated with
the error term. The test statistic is simply the sample size times the value attained for the objective
function at the GMM estimate (called the J-statistic). Hansen's test statistic is distributed as s with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of moment conditions minus the number of parameters to
be estimated. We report this statistic in the Tables.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 45

2.3.2. Conditioning information set

To examine the sensitivity of the results, we experiment with di!erent condi-
tioning information sets. We seek to reduce the chances that the cross-country
growth regression either omits an important variable or includes a select group
of regressors that yields a favored result. We report the results with three
conditioning information sets. The simple conditioning information set includes
the constant, the logarithm of initial per capita GDP and initial level of
educational attainment. The initial income variable is used to capture the
convergence e!ect and school attainment is used to control for the level of
human capital. The policy conditioning information set includes the simple
conditioning information set plus measures of government size, in#ation, the
black market exchange rate premium, and openness to international trade.
The full conditioning information set includes the policy conditioning informa-
tion set plus measures of political stability (the number of revolutions and coups
and the number of assassinations per thousand inhabitants (Banks, 1994)) and
ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Thus, for each of the three "nancial
intermediary development indicators, we present regression results for the (i)
simple, (ii) policy, and (iii) full conditioning information sets.

2.3.3. Regression results

The results indicate a very strong connection between the exogenous com-
ponent of "nancial intermediary development and long-run economic growth.
Table 3 summarizes the purely cross-sectional instrumental variable results for
nine regressions, where the instrumental variables are the legal origin variables.
For brevity, we report only the coe$cients on the "nancial development
indicators. Each of the three "nancial intermediary development indica-
tors (PRIVATE CREDIT, COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK, LIQUID
LIABILITIES) is signi"cantly correlated with economic growth at the "ve per-
cent signi"cance level in the simple, policy, and full conditioning information set
regressions. The exogenous component of "nancial intermediary development is
closely tied to long-run rates of per capita GDP growth. Furthermore, the data do
not reject the orthogonality conditions at the ten percent level in any of the nine
regressions. The inability to reject the orthogonality conditions plus the result that
the instruments are highly correlated with "nancial intermediary development
(Table 2) suggest that the instruments are appropriate. These results indicate that
the strong link between "nancial development and growth is not due to simulta-
neity bias. The estimated coe$cient can be interpreted as the e!ect of the
exogenous component of "nancial intermediary development on growth.

 The black market exchange rate premium is frequently used as an overall index of trade,
exchange rate, and price distortions (Easterly, 1994; Levine and Zervos, 1998). The in#ation rate and
size of the government serve as indicators of macroeconomic stability (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
Fischer, 1993)
 46

Table 3
Financial intermediation and growth: cross-section regressions, 1960}1995. Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth, 1960}1995. Instrumental
variables: legal origin dummy variables

Number of
Standard observa- Hansen-test
Explanatory variable Coe$cient error t-statistic P-value tions J-statistic OIR

Regression Set C1: simple conditioning information set

PRIVATE CREDIT 2.515 0.814 3.090 0.003 71 0.00189 0.13
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK 10.861 3.086 3.520 0.001 71 0.01626 1.15
LIQUID LIABILITIES 1.723 0.844 2.041 0.045 71 0.03491 2.48

Regression Set C2: policy conditioning information set

PRIVATE CREDIT 3.222 1.245 2.589 0.012 63 0.00799 0.50
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK 9.641 4.039 2.387 0.021 63 0.0373 2.35
LIQUID LIABILITIES 2.173 0.908 2.394 0.020 63 0.037999 2.39

Regression Set C3: full conditioning information set

PRIVATE CREDIT 3.356 1.150 2.918 0.005 63 0.02239 1.41
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK 11.289 3.258 3.465 0.001 63 0.00325 0.20
LIQUID LIABILITIES 2.788 0.903 3.089 0.003 63 0.03901 2.46

Critical values for Hansen-Test Over Identifying Restrictions (2 d.f.): 10% 4.61; 5%"5.99.
Simple conditioning information set: logarithm of initial income per capita and schooling. Policy conditioning information set: simple set, plus
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

government size, in#ation, black market premium, and openness to trade. Full conditioning information set: policy set, plus indicators of revolutions and
coups, political assassinations, and ethnic diversity. LIQUID LIABILITIES " liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank "nancial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times 100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK " assets of
deposit money banks divided by assets of deposit money banks plus central bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT " credit by deposit money banks
and other "nancial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, times 100.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 47

The regression results also indicate an economically large impact of "nancial

development on growth. For example, India's value of PRIVATE CREDIT over
the 1960}1995 period was 19.5% of GDP, while the mean value for developing
countries was 25% of GDP. The results suggest that an exogenous improvement
in PRIVATE CREDIT in India that had pushed it to the sample mean for
developing countries would have accelerated real per capita GDP growth by an
additional 0.6 of a percentage point per year. Similarly, if Argentina had
moved from its value of PRIVATE CREDIT (16) to the developing country
sample mean, it would have grown more than one percentage point faster per
year. This is large considering that growth only averaged about 1.8% per year
over this period. These types of conceptual experiments, however, must be
treated as illustrative only; they do not account for how to increase xnancial
intermediary development.

2.4. Sensitivity analyses

We have conducted a wide array of sensitivity analyses to gauge the robust-

ness of these "ndings. First, consider the partial scatter plot of the growth
regressions involving Private Credit. Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship between
growth and "nancial intermediary development after controlling for the full
conditioning information set. Since Korea, South Africa, and Niger fall parti-
cularly far from the regression line, we removed these countries and re-did the
estimation. The new GMM results are not substantially di!erent from the Table
3 results. To further check for the potential in#uence of outliers, we examined
the residuals from the GMM estimator. We removed all countries with residuals
more than three-standard deviations away from zero (South Africa and Switzer-
land) and re-ran the regressions. This did not alter the results. Then, we removed

 To get this, recall that the regressors are in logs and note that the ln(25) - ln(19.5) "0.25.
Then, use the smallest parameter on PRIVATE CREDIT from Table 3, which equals 2.5, so that
2.5H(0.25) "0.63.
 These sensitivity results are available on request.
 The partial scatter plot involves the two-dimensional representation of the relationship be-
tween growth and Private Credit controlling for the other regressors. Thus, we regress real per capita
GDP growth against the full conditioning information set and collect these growth residuals. Then,
we regress Private Credit against the full conditioning information set and collect these Private
Credit residuals. The "gures in the text plot the growth residuals against the Private Credit residuals
along with the regression line. Thus, this regression line is the two-dimensional projection in growth
* Private Credit space of the multivariate OLS regression.
 Speci"cally, Private Credit enters with a coe$cient of 2.98 and a t-statistic of 2.10 and the
regression passes all the diagnostic tests discussed above. Furthermore, removing Switzerland,
Japan, and Portugal in addition to Niger, South Africa, and Korea did not alter the conclusion
either, i.e., Private Credit enters with a coe$cient of 4.27 and a t-statistic of 2.64.
48 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Fig. 3. Partial scatter plot of growth vs. private credit.

seven additional countries with residuals more than two-standard deviations

away from zero (Belgium, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Niger,
and Senegal.) This did not change the conclusions either. We followed the
same procedures in checking for the e!ect of outliers for COMMERCIAL-
CENTRAL BANK and LIQUID LIABILITIES. In no case did removing
outliers alter the results. The strong positive connection between the

 Speci"cally, when we remove South Africa and Switzerland the coe$cient on Private Credit
rises to 4.72 and the t-statistics equals 3.65 while the GMM estimate satis"es the litany of diagnostic
tests. Similarly, when the seven additional countries are removed, the Private Credit enters with
a value of 4.53 and a t-statistic of 3.91, while passing the diagnostic tests.
 For the COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK regressions, Haiti's level of "nancial develop-
ment is much less than predicted by its country characteristics. Nonetheless, removing Haiti
increases the estimated coe$cient on COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK to 13.4 (with a t-statistic
of 3.35). Moreover, when removing other potential outliers such as Korea, Niger, and Peru, the
results are unchanged (coe$cient estimate of 9.6 on Commercial-Central Bank and a t-statistic of
2.44). When examining the GMM residuals, Niger, Honduras, Jamaica, Korea, Mauritius, Pakistan,
Senegal, and Taiwan are more than two-standard deviations from zero. Removing these countries
produces an estimated coe$cient of 7.71 on COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK, with a t-statistic
of 2.92, and the regression passes the battery of diagnostic tests discussed in the text. In terms of
LIQUID LIABILITIES, the robustness checks produce similar results. The partial scatter plots
point to Niger and Korea as potential outliers. Removing these countries does not a!ect the results
(The estimated coe$cient becomes 2.24 with a t-statistic of 2.71). Similarly, when using the GMM
residual criteria, Korea, Jamaica, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Zaire fall more than two-standard
deviations away from zero. Removing these countries produces a coe$cient estimate of 2.63 on
LIQUID LIABILITIES, with a t-statistic of 4.24, and a regression that passes the various diagnostic
tests used in this paper.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 49

exogenous component of "nancial intermediary development and economic

growth does not seem to be driven by outliers.
Second, in assessing the independent link between "nancial development and
economic growth, we considered a broad collection of additional control vari-
ables. We included measures of the e$ciency of the bureaucracy, the level of
corruption, the role of the state-owned enterprises in the economy, an index of
the strength of property rights, an index of the costs of business regulation,
a measure of the risk of expropriation, a measure of the degree to which the
country follows the rule of law, and a measure of the accounting standards
employed in the country (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; LLSV, 1998,
1999). These did not alter our "ndings.
Third, we considered as instrumental variables measures of the religious
composition of each country and the distance of the country from the equator,
which have been used in a recent study of the quality of government by LLSV
(1999). This did not alter our results. Furthermore, if we use the LLSV (1998)
indicators of creditor rights, contract enforcement e$ciency, and accounting
standards as instrumental variables, we again "nd that the exogenous compon-
ent of "nancial development is positively associated with faster economic
growth. These alternative instrumental variable estimations pass the test of the
overidentifying restrictions, which implies that these variables, measuring the
quality of the legal and accounting environment, a!ect growth through "nancial
development and the other regressors.
Fourth, as in King and Levine (1993a), we use the measures of "nancial
intermediary development at the beginning of the period (1960) to forecast
growth. We "nd that "nancial intermediary development in 1960 signi"cantly
predicts economic growth over the next 35 years after controlling for an array of
country characteristics. We have also restricted the sample to those countries
for which LLSV (1998) collect legal data. This did not alter the results.

 This result is consistent with the fact that legal origin is a proper instrument for "nancial
development in a growth regression, insofar as the judicial and accounting environment depends on
legal origin.
 While we make the results on the relationship between growth over 1960}1995 period and
"nancial intermediary development measured in 1960 available to readers, there are econometric
reasons for using values of the "nancial development indicators averaged over the entire sample
period as we do in the body of the paper. First, the speci"cation tests support the validity of the
instruments. This supports the interpretation of the estimated coe$cients as being free from
endogeneity bias. Second, the instrumental variables procedures address the issue of endogeneity.
Thus, there is no reason to discard the informational gain provided by using observations over the
entire sample period. Theory stresses the potential connection between growth and the contempor-
aneous provision of "nancial services. Third, by using initial values of the explanatory variables,
there is not only an e$ciency (informational) loss but also a potential consistency loss. Theory
suggests that what matters for current growth is the contemporaneous behavior of the explanatory
variables. By using initial values, we run the risk of grossly mis-measuring the &true' explanatory
variables, which could bias the coe$cient estimates.
50 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Furthermore, we conduct the estimation over the 1980}1995 period. We "nd the
same results: the exogenous component of "nancial development is positively,
signi"cantly, and robustly linked with economic growth.
Fifth, we experimented with two additional measures of "nancial intermedi-
ary development. One measure equals deposit money bank credit to the private
sector divided by GDP. This is smaller than PRIVATE CREDIT, which also
includes other "nancial intermediaries. The second additional measure equals
the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to GDP (and so does not
distinguish between credits issued to the private sector and those issued to the
public sector). These two additional measures also suggest that the exogenous
part of "nancial intermediary development is positively and robustly associated
with economic growth.

3. Finance and growth: Panel procedures

3.1. GMM estimators for dynamic panel models

3.1.1. Motivation
Estimation using panel data, that is pooled cross-section and time-series data,
has several advantages over purely cross-sectional estimation. First, besides
considering the cross-country relationship between "nancial development and
growth, we also would like to take into account how "nancial development over
time within a country may have an e!ect on the country's growth performance.
Working with a panel, we gain degrees of freedom by adding the variability of
the time-series dimension. Speci"cally, the within-country standard deviation of
PRIVATE CREDIT in our panel data set is 15%, which in the panel estimation
is added to the between-country standard deviation of 28%. Similarly, the
within-country standard deviation for growth is 2.4% and the between-country
standard deviation is 1.7%. Thus, adding the time-series dimension of the data
substantially augments the variability of the data.
Second, in a pure cross-sectional regression, any unobserved country-speci"c
e!ect would be part of the error term, potentially leading to biased coe$cient
estimates. This problem plagues previous studies of the growth-"nance relation-
ship. However, in a panel context, we are able to control for unobserved
country-speci"c e!ects and thereby reduce biases in the estimated coe$cients.
Third, our panel estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of all
explanatory variables, while the cross-sectional estimator presented previously
only controls for the endogeneity of "nancial development. The way our panel
estimator controls for endogeneity is by using &internal instruments', that is,
instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory variables. This method
does not allow us to control for full endogeneity but for a weak type of it. To be
precise, we assume that the explanatory variables are only &weakly exogenous',
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 51

which means that they can be a!ected by current and past realizations of the
growth rate but must be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.
Thus, the weak exogeneity assumption implies that future innovations of the
growth rate do not a!ect current "nancial development. This assumption is not
particularly stringent conceptually and we can examine its validity statistically.
Weak exogeneity does not mean that economic agents do not take into account
expected future growth in their decision to develop the "nancial system; it just
means that future (unanticipated) shocks to growth do not in#uence current
"nancial development. It is the innovation in growth that must not a!ect
"nancial development. Finally, we statistically assess the validity of the weak
exogeneity assumption below.

3.1.2. Methodology
We use the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed
for dynamic models of panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). Our panel
consists of data for 74 countries over the period 1961}1995. We average data
over non-overlapping, "ve-year periods, so that data permitting there are seven
observations per country (1961}1965; 1966}1970; 1971}1975; etc.). Thus, the
subscript &t' designates one of these "ve-year averages. Consider the following
regression equation;
y !y "(a!1)y #bX #g #e , (1)
GR GR\ GR\ GR G GR
where y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, X represents the set of
explanatory variables (other than lagged per capita GDP), g is an unobserved
country-speci"c e!ect, e is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent
country and time period, respectively. We can rewrite Eq. (1) as
y "ay #bX #g #e , (2)
GR GR\ GR G GR
Now, to eliminate the country-speci"c e!ect, take "rst-di!erences of Eq. (2),
y !y "a(y !y )#b(X !X )#(e !e ). (3)
GR GR\ GR\ GR\ GR GR\ GR GR\
The use of instruments is required to deal with (1) the likely endogeneity of
the explanatory variables, and, (2) the problem that by construction the new
error term, e !e is correlated with the lagged dependent variable,
GR GR\
y !y . Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, e, is not serially
GR\ GR\
correlated, and (b) the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (i.e., the
explanatory variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of
the error term), the GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment

 We also include time dummies to account for time-speci"c e!ects.

52 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

conditions:
E[y (e !e )]"0 for s52; t"3,2, ¹, (4)
GR\Q GR GR\
E[X (e !e )]"0 for s52; t"3,2, ¹. (5)
GR\Q GR GR\
We refer to the GMM estimator based on these conditions as the diwerence
estimator.
There are, however, conceptual and statistical shortcomings with this di!er-
ence estimator. Conceptually, we would also like to study the cross-country
relationship between "nancial development and per capita GDP growth, which
is eliminated in the diwerence estimator. Statistically, Alonso-Borrego and
Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1997) show that when the explanatory
variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak
instruments for the regression equation in di!erences. Instrument weakness
in#uences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the di!erence es-
timator. Asymptotically, the variance of the coe$cients rises. In small samples,
Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instruments can
produce biased coe$cients.
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual di!er-
ence estimator, we use a new estimator that combines in a system the regression in
di!erences with the regression in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and
Bond, 1997). The instruments for the regression in di!erences are the same as
above. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged diwerences of the
corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments under the following
additional assumption: although there may be correlation between the levels of the
right-hand side variables and the country-speci"c e!ect in Eq. (2), there is no
correlation between the diwerences of these variables and the country-speci"c
e!ect. This assumption results from the following stationarity property,
E[y g ]"E[y g ] and E[X g ]"E[X g]
GR>N G GR>O G GR>N G GR>O G
for all p and q. (6)
The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the
regression in levels) are
E[y !y )(g #e )]"0 for s"1, (7)
GR\Q GR\Q\ G GR
E[(X !X )(g #e )]"0 for s"1. (8)
GR\Q GR\Q\ G GR

 An additional problem with the simple diwerence estimator relates to measurement error:
di!erencing may exacerbate the bias due to errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio
(see Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the di!erences speci"cation, only the most
recent di!erence is used as instrument in the levels speci"cation. Using the other lagged di!erences
would results in redundant moment conditions. (see Arellano and Bover, 1995).
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 53

Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in Eqs. (4), (5), (7), and (8) and
employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and e$cient parameter
estimates.
Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instru-
ments. To address this issue we consider two speci"cation tests suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond
(1997). The "rst is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests
the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the
moment conditions used in the estimation process. The second test examines the
hypothesis that the error term e is not serially correlated. In both the di!erence
GR
regression and the system di!erence-level regression we test whether the
di!erenced error term is second-order serially correlated (by construction,
the di!erenced error term is probably "rst-order serially correlated even if the
original error term is not).

3.2. Results
The dynamic panel estimates suggest that the exogenous component of
"nancial intermediary development exerts a large, positive impact on economic
growth. Table 4 presents the results using the diwerence and system estimators
described above. We also present the results when the panel estimation is
performed purely in levels for comparative purposes. In Table 4, only the results
on the "nancial indicators are given. Table 5 gives the full results from system
dynamic-panel estimation. The analysis was conducted with two conditioning
information sets. The "rst uses the simple conditioning information set, which
includes initial income and educational attainment. The second uses the policy
conditioning information set, and includes initial income, educational attain-
ment, government size, openness to trade, in#ation, and the black market
exchange rate premium. Table 5 also presents (1) the Sargan test, where the
null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with
the residuals and (2) the serial correlation test, where the null hypothesis is that
the errors in the di!erenced equation exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
The three "nancial intermediary development indicators (LIQUID LIABILI-
TIES, COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK, and PRIVATE CREDIT) are sig-
ni"cant at the 0.05 signi"cance level in the levels, diwerence, and system dynamic
panel growth regressions, with one exception. The coe$cient on LIQUID

 In addition, we used the &di!erence-Sargan test', presented in Blundell and Bond (1997), to
examine the null hypothesis that the lagged di!erences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated
with the residuals (which are the additional restrictions imposed in the system estimator with respect
to the di!erence estimator). Giving further support to the system estimator, we could not reject this
null hypothesis at usual levels of signi"cance.
 We do not use the full conditioning information set with data on political and institutional
variables in the panel estimates. These variables frequently have very limited, if any, time-dimension.
54 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Table 4
Financial intermediation and growth: dynamic panel regressions, summary

Conditioning LIQUID COMMERCIAL- PRIVATE Observa-

Estimator information set LIABILITIES CENTRAL BANK CREDIT tions

System estimator Simple 2.163 4.642 2.185 359

(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.313] [0.278] [0.183]
Policy 2.952 2.437 1.522 359
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.713] [0.626] [0.581]

First di!erences Simple 1.135 2.007 1.699 285

(0.035) (0.002) (0.001)
[0.319] [0.184] [0.192]
Policy 1.446 2.065 0.663 285
(0.249) (0.010) (0.001)
[0.080] [0.330] [0.315]

Levels Simple 1.848 4.813 1.838 359

(0.012) (0.011) (0.001)
[0.472] [0.445] [0.345]
Policy 2.958 3.267 2.073 359
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.346] [0.155] [0.180]

Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the coe$cient and numbers in brackets are p-values for
the Sargan-test.
Simple conditioning information set:logarithm of initial income per capita, average years of
secondary schooling. Policy conditioning information set: simple set plus government size, openness
to trade, in#ation, black market premium LIQUID LIABILITIES: liquid liabilities of the "nancial
system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank "nancial
intermediaries) divided by GDP. COMMERCIAL -CENTRAL BANK: assets of deposit money
banks divided by assets of deposit money banks plus central bank assets PRIVATE CREDIT: credit
by deposit money banks and other "nancial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.

LIABILITIES is insigni"cant in the diwerence dynamic panel growth regression

with the policy conditioning information set. While this may indicate a some-
what less robust link when using a purely &size' measure of "nancial intermedi-
ary development, LIQUID LIABILITIES enters the levels and system dynamic
panel growth regressions signi"cantly in all speci"cations. Put di!erently, after
controlling for country-speci"c e!ects, endogeneity, and potential problems
associated with lagged dependent variables and weak instruments, the data
suggest a strong, positive, link between "nancial intermediary development and
economic growth.
The regressions satisfy the speci"cation tests. There is no evidence of second
order serial correlation and the regressions pass the Sargan speci"cation test. It
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 55

Table 5
Financial intermediation and growth: dynamic panel regressions, system estimator

Regressors (1) (2) (3)

Constant 0.06 !5.677 4.239

(0.954) (0.001) (0.001)
Logarithm of initial income per capita !0.742 !0.117 !0.364
(0.001) (0.223) (0.001)
Government size !1.341 !1.13 !1.987
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Openness to trade 0.325 0.497 0.442
(0.169) (0.002) (0.010)
In#ation
1.748 !1.772 !0.178
(0.001) (0.001) (0.543)
Average years of secondary schooling 0.78 0.638 0.639
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black market premium
!2.076 !1.044 !1.027
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquid Liabilities 2.952
(0.001)
Comm. vs. Central Bank 2.437
(0.001)
Private Credit 1.522
(0.001)
Dummy 71}75 !1.074 !0.792 !0.959
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy 76}80 !1.298 !0.825 !1.177
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy 81}85 !3.328 !2.616 !3.179
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy 86}90 !2.614 !1.894 !2.434
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy 91}95 !3.631 !2.77 !3.308
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.713 0.626 0.581
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.588 0.957 0.764
p-values in parentheses

In the regression, this variable is included as log(variable).

In the regression, this variable is included as log(1# variable).
The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
The null hypothesis is that the errors in the "rst-di!erence regression exhibit no second-order
serial correlation.

is also worth noting that many of the other regressors enter signi"cantly with the
expected signs (Table 5).
The regression estimates are also economically large. As shown the coe$-
cients that emerge from the dynamic panel estimation are very close to those
that we obtain from the purely cross-section, instrumental-variable estimation.
56 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

For example, PRIVATE CREDIT has a coe$cient of 2.5 in the cross-section

results (the simple conditioning information set regression in Table 3), while
PRIVATE CREDIT has a coe$cient of 2.2 in the system dynamic-panel results
reported in Table 4. As noted earlier, these coe$cients suggest that exogenous
changes in "nancial intermediary development imply large changes in economic
growth.

3.3. Sensitivity analyses and discussion

The dynamic panel results are also robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses.
For instance, when we use alternative measures of "nancial intermediary devel-
opment (deposit money bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP; and
the ratio of total deposit money bank domestic assets to GDP), we still "nd
a strong of "nance on growth. Furthermore, if we control for terms of trade
changes and population growth, we obtain virtually identical results to those
reported in Tables 4 and 5. Finally, when we include the legal origin variables
as instruments in the dynamic panel estimates, we still "nd a strong, positive
relationship between the exogenous component of "nancial intermediary devel-
opment and economic growth.

4. Searching for determinants of 5nancial intermediary development

This section undertakes a limited search of potential legal and accounting

determinants of "nancial intermediary development. We use LLSV's (1998)
data. Instead of examining the links between the legal/regulatory environment

 There is some divergence in coe$cient estimates between the system dynamic panel estimates,
Table 4, and the cross-sectional IV regressions, Table 3, when the conditioning information set is
expanded to include the policy conditioning information set. The cross-section regression produces
a coe$cient estimate of 3.2 on PRIVATE CREDIT, while the panel yields a coe$cient of 1.4. Besides
exploiting the time-series dimension of the data, the dynamic-panel also recognizes the endogeneity
of the other regressors, which may help account for the di!erent coe$cient estimates.
 Note, that in the system dynamic panel regressions with the policy conditioning information set,
the number of instrumental variables is larger than the number of cross-sectional observations (i.e.,
countries). This &over-"tting' of the data can bias the t-statistics upwards. This arises when the
variance-covariance matrix is constructed from the "rst-stage residuals in order to allow for
non-spherical distributions of the error term } and thereby get more e$cient estimates in the second
stage. (However, this &over-"tting' problem does not plague (a) the simple conditioning information
set regressions, or (b) the level or diwerence estimators because there are many more countries than
instruments in these speci"cations.) More generally, the two-step GMM estimator sometimes
converges to its asymptotic distribution only slowly. Thus, we also considered the "rst-stage results,
which assume homoskedasticity and independence of the error terms. These "rst-stage results also
indicate that "nancial intermediary development exerts a causal impact on economic growth.
 These results are available on request.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 57

and measures of bond market and equity market development as in LLSV

(1997, 1998), we study the ties between the legal environment and measures of
"nancial intermediary development. Moreover, unlike earlier studies, we use
instrumental variables to assess whether the positive association between
legal/regulatory indicators and "nancial development is due to simultaneity
bias.

4.1. The legal and accounting environment

We use three LLSV's (1998) indicators of national legal and regulatory

systems: the legal rights of creditors, the soundness of contract enforcement, and
the level of corporate accounting standards.

4.1.1. Creditor rights

The degree to which the legal system supports the rights of creditors will
fundamentally in#uence "nancial contracting and the functioning of "nancial
intermediaries. Speci"cally, legal systems di!er in terms of the rights of creditors
to (i) repossess collateral or liquidate "rms in the case of default, (ii) remove
managers in corporate reorganizations, and (iii) have a high priority relative to
other claimants in corporate bankruptcy.
AUTOSTAY equals one if a country's laws impose an automatic stay on the
assets of "rms upon "ling a reorganization petition. AUTOSTAY equals 0 if this
restriction does not appear in the nation's legal codes. The restriction would
prevent creditors from gaining possession of collateral or liquidating a "rm to
meet a loan obligation. Thus, all else equal, AUTOSTAY should be negatively
correlated with the activities of credit issuing intermediaries.
MANAGES equals one if "rm managers continue to administer the "rms
a!airs pending the resolution of reorganization processes, and zero otherwise. In
some countries, management stays in place until a "nal decision is made about
the resolution of claims. In other countries, a team selected by the creditors
replaces management. If management stays pending resolution, this reduces
pressure on management to pay creditors. Thus, MANAGES should be nega-
tively correlated with the activities of credit issuing intermediaries.

 Here it is important to highlight a substantive weakness with AUTOSTAY and MANAGES.

They do not measure the e$ciency of the legal and regulatory system in coping with bankruptcy.
For instance, two countries could have very similar legal codes, such that management stays in place
pending the resolution of a bankruptcy hearing and there is an automatic stay on the assets of a "rm
until the bankruptcy courts process the reorganization petition. However, the two countries legal
and regulatory systems may process bankruptcy and reorganization very di!erently. One country's
system may take a long time and be subject to great uncertainty. The other may be very rapid,
e$cient, and transparent. Thus, a major di!erence across countries may be the quality of the
bankruptcy system, not the laws themselves. Currently, there do not exist cross-country measures of
the speed, transparency, and fairness of bankruptcy systems.
58 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

The third measure of the legal rights of creditors is SECURED1, which equals
one if secured creditors are ranked "rst in the distribution of the proceeds that
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt "rm. SECURED1 equals
zero if non-secured creditors, such as the government or workers get paid before
secured creditors. In cases where SECURED1 equals zero, this certainly reduces
the attractiveness of lending secured credit. SECURED1 should be positively
correlated with activities of intermediaries engaged in secured transactions,
holding everything else constant.
CREDITOR is a cumulative index of these creditor rights indicators
and equals CREDITOR " SECURED1 ! AUTOSTAY ! MANAGES.
CREDITOR takes on values between 1 (best) and !2 (worst). One would
expect countries with higher values of CREDITOR to have stronger creditor
rights and better-developed "nancial intermediaries, all else equal.
Table 6 gives summary statistics on CREDITOR, and the data are listed in
Table 8. As shown there is substantial cross-country variation in CREDITOR,
where the maximum value is 1, the minimum value is !2, and the standard
deviation is about 1. Brazil, Colombia, France, Mexico, Peru, and the Philip-
pines (all countries with a French legal origin) are countries where CREDI-
TOR"!2, indicating that their legal systems do not stress the rights of
creditors. In contrast, the legal codes of Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, United King-
dom, and Zimbabwe stress the rights of creditors, such that CREDITOR"1.
CREDITOR is an indicator of legal codes, however, it does not incorporate
information regarding enforcement.

4.1.2. Enforcement
The e!ectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts will materially
in#uence "nancial sector activities. RULELAW, from LLSV (1998), is an assess-
ment of the law and order tradition of the country that ranges from 10, strong
law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. This measure was
constructed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and is an average
over the period 1982}1995. Given the contractual nature of banking, higher
values of RULELAW are likely to positively in#uence banking development.
CONRISK, also from LLSV (1998), is an assessment of the risk that a govern-
ment will } and therefore can } modify a contract after it has been signed.
CONRISK ranges from 10, low risk of contract modi"cation, to 1, high risk of
contract modi"cation. Speci"cally, &modi"cation' means repudiation, postpone-
ment, or reducing the governments "nancial obligation. This measure was

 We could have rede"ned AUTOSTAY and MANAGES such that values of one indicated
stronger (instead of weaker) creditor rights. This would have produced values of CREDITOR
between 0 and 3 and would not have altered the results. We did not do this for consistency: the
variables in this paper are de"ned the same as the variables in LLSV (1997, 1998).
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 59

Table 6
Summary statistics on the legal and accounting environment

Legal and accounting environment

CREDITOR ENFORCE ACCOUNT

Mean !0.3 7.5 61.2

Median 0 8.2 64.0
Maximum 1 10.0 83.0
Minimum !2 3.6 24.0
Std. Dev. 1.1 2.0 13.5

Observations 44 44 40

CREDITOR " index of secured creditor rights. ENFORCE " index of law and contract
enforcement. ACCOUNT " index of the comprehensiveness and quality of company reports.
Values for the legal environment indicators are averages over the 1982}1995 period. Values of
accounting quality are assessments of company reports in 1990.

constructed by ICRG and is an average over the period 1982}1995. Legal

systems that e!ectively enforce contracts will tend to support banking activities.
ENFORCE equals the average of RULELAW and CONRISK. The empirical
analyses focus on this aggregate index of the e$ciency of the legal system in
enforcing contracts. Summary statistics on ENFORCE are given in Table 6, and
the data are listed in Appendix Table 8. As shown, there is substantial cross-
country variation in ENFORCE, where the maximum value is 9.99, the min-
imum value is 3.55, and the standard deviation is 2.0. The countries with very
high values of enforcement, values of ENFORCE greater that 9, are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Neth-
erlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In contrast, countries
where contract enforcement is poor, values of ENFORCE less than 5, include
Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Peru, and Zimbabwe.

4.1.3. Accounting standards

Information about corporations is critical for exerting corporate governance
and identifying the best investments. Accounting standards that simplify the
interpretability and comparability of information across corporations will sim-
plify "nancial contracting. Furthermore, "nancial contracts that use accounting
measures to trigger particular actions can only be enforced if accounting
measures are su$ciently clear. ACCOUNT, from LLSV (1998), is an index of
the comprehensiveness of company reports. The maximum possible value is 90
and the minimum is 0. The Center for International Financial Analysis and
Research assessed general accounting information, income statements, balance
sheets, funds #ow statement, accounting standards, and stock data in company
60 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

reports in 1990. We expect ACCOUNT to be positively correlated with "nancial

intermediary development. As shown in Table 6, ACCOUNT exhibits sub-
stantial cross-country variation. The data are listed in Appendix Table 8. The
maximum value is 83, Sweden, while the minimum value in our sample is Egypt
(24). The United States has a value of 71, which is well above the mean value
of 61.

4.2. Determinants of xnancial intermediary development

Table 7 shows that cross-country di!erences in creditor rights, enforcement

quality, and accounting standards help explain cross-country di!erences in
"nancial intermediary development, even after controlling for the level of
income per capita. Jointly, the variables CREDITOR, ENFORCE, and
ACCOUNT explain a signi"cant amount of the cross-country variation in the
three "nancial intermediary indicators (PRIVATE CREDIT, LIQUID
LIABILITIES, and COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK). Each of the legal/
accounting indicators, however, is not signi"cantly correlated with all of the
intermediary measures. For instance LIQUID LIABILITIES is most closely
associated with ENFORCE and CREDITOR. In turn, PRIVATE CREDIT is
very strongly linked with ENFORCE and ACCOUNT.
Simultaneity bias does not seem to be driving these results. As instrumental
variables, we use the legal origin dummy variables for countries with French,
English, and German legal origins. Since we only have three instruments, we

 This is not necessarily true and raises the need for a general conceptual quali"cation. An
economy with perfect information, perfect contract enforcement and perfect legal codes (i.e., an
economy with essentially zero transaction and information costs) would have little reason for
"nancial intermediaries. Put di!erently, market frictions motivate the emergence of "nancial
intermediaries, e.g., Boyd and Prescott (1986). Conceptually, this implies that at very high levels of
legal system development and information dissemination, a marginal increase in legal e$ciency or
information quality may cause a reduction in the role and importance of "nancial intermediaries.
However, quadratic expressions for ACCOUNT and CONRISK never entered signi"cantly.
 Since CREDITOR, ENFORCE, and ACCOUNT are measured over the 1980s and 1990s, we
use "nancial intermediary measures over the same period. However, we get very similar results when
the analysis uses "nancial intermediary measures over the period 1960}1995. These results are
available on request.
 First, note that the legal origin variables help explain cross-country di!erences in creditor
rights, enforcement quality, and accounting standards. As shown by LLSV (1998), English legal
tradition countries have laws that emphasize the rights of creditors to a greater degree than the
French, German, and Scandinavian countries. French civil law countries protect creditors the least,
with German and Scandinavian civil law countries falling in the middle. In terms of enforcement
quality, countries with a French legal heritage have the lowest quality of law enforcement, while
countries with German and Scandinavian legal traditions tend to be the best at enforcing contracts.
Finally, LLSV (1998) show that countries with an English legal tradition tend to have much better
accounting standards than French or German civil law countries.
Table 7
Legal environment and "nancial intermediary development (1980}1995)

Liquid liabilities Commercial-central bank Private credit

OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV

C 2.830 3.880 4.830 4.402 3.950 3.640 4.200 4.403 1.480 2.557 4.368 4.322
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (0.003)
CREDITOR 0.216 0.179 0.009 0.020 0.125 0.088
(0.001) (0.027) (0.641) (0.504) (0.033) (0.173)
ENFORCE 0.178 0.229 0.008 0.014 0.200 0.253
(0.000) (0.003) (0.022) (0.454) (0.000) (0.000)
ACCOUNT !0.002 !0.001 0.005 0.004 0.017 0.018
(0.745) (0.866) (0.024) (0.042) (0.005) (0.002)
INCOME !0.174 !0.099 !0.05 0.052 0.031 0.007 !0.179 !0.044 !0.039
(0.395) (0.387) (0.672) (0.236) (0.325) (0.844) (0.262) (0.711) (0.804)
LEGAL 0.412 0.361 0.091 0.115 0.606 0.600
(0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Prob(F-test) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-square 0.57 0.59 0.39 0.39 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.66

LIQUID LIABILITIES " liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank
"nancial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times 100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK " assets of deposit money banks divided by assets of deposit
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

money banks plus central bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT " credit by deposit money banks and other "nancial institutions to the private
sector divided by GDP, times 100. CREDITOR " index of secured creditor rights. ENFORCE " index of law and contract enforcement. ACCOUNT
" index of the comprehensiveness and quality of company reports. LEGAL " index of legal environment. Speci"cally, LEGAL is the "rst standardized
principal component of CREDITOR, ENFORCE, and ACCOUNT.
61
62 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

construct a general index of the legal and regulatory environment. We compute

the "rst standardized principal component of CREDITOR, ENFORCE, and
ACCOUNT and use this as the index of the legal/regulatory environment
governing "nancial transactions. We call this index LEGAL. In the simple OLS
regression, LEGAL explains a substantial amount of the cross-country vari-
ation in all of the "nancial intermediary development indicators, even after
controlling for the level of real per capita GDP. When we use an instrumental
variables estimator to control for simultaneity bias, the results are unchanged.
The basic message that emerges from Table 7 is that countries with (i) laws that
give a high priority to secured creditors, (ii) legal systems that rigorously enforce
contracts, and (iii) accounting standards that produce comprehensive and com-
parable corporate "nancial statements tend to have better developed "nancial
intermediaries.

4.3. Discussion of causes

These "ndings } in conjunction with those in LLSV (1998) } are consistent

with the view that countries with particular legal origins tend to create parti-
cular types of laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms. These laws,
regulations, and enforcement mechanisms directly in#uence the functioning of
"nancial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries that are better at ameliorating
information and transactions costs induce a more e$cient allocation of re-
sources and faster growth. While it is di$cult to change legal origin, the results
o!er a strategy for boosting "nancial development and accelerating long-run
growth. Countries can target reforms that ensure that lenders have con"dence
that the legal system will quickly, transparently, and e!ectively enforce their
claims against borrowers and that outside investors have easy access to high-
quality, comprehensive, and comparable information about "rms.

 None of these "ndings changes when the instrumental variable set is expanded to include the
LLSV (1999) exogenous variables, i.e., religious composition of the population, ethnic diversity, and
distance from the equator. These results are available on request.
 The evidence we provide suggests that the strong link between "nancial sector development on
the one hand and the legal/regulatory environment on the other is not due to simultaneity bias.
These results do not suggest that the legal/regulatory environment only impacts growth through
"nancial intermediary development. Rather, these results imply that the legal/regulatory environ-
ment has an important impact on "nancial intermediary development.
 Put di!erently, when countries are endowed with a certain legal heritage, this produces a prob-
ability distribution regarding the laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms that they are likely to
adopt. Thus, for example, the data suggest that countries with a French Civil Code have a lower
probability of selecting laws that give a higher priority to secured credits, selecting accounting
standards that produce high-quality corporate "nancial statements, and enforcing contracts than
countries with English, German, and Scandinavian legal systems. The resultant laws, regulations, and
enforcement mechanisms then a!ect the ability of the "nancial system to research "rms, exert
corporate control, mobilize savings, and provide risk management and transactions services.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 63

5. Conclusions

This paper "rst examined the nature of the e!ect of "nancial intermediary
development on economic growth. We used two econometric approaches. The
"rst, GMM dynamic panel estimators, are speci"cally designed to deal with key
problems plaguing past studies of the "nance-growth nexus: simultaneity bias
and omitted variable bias, including that derived from unobserved country-
speci"c e!ects. As a consistency check, we also used a pure cross-sectional,
instrumental variable. The panel and cross-sectional results tell the same story:
the exogenous component of "nancial intermediary development is positively
associated with economic growth; speci"cally, the large, positive link between
"nancial intermediary development and economic growth is not due to poten-
tial biases induced by omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse causation. In
a sequel to this paper, Beck et al. (2000) examine the channels through which
"nancial intermediary development is associated with growth. In that paper, we
argue that the "nance-growth nexus runs primarily through total factor produc-
tivity growth and not through savings and physical capital accumulation.
Next, we investigated whether cross-country di!erences in the legal rights of
creditors, the e$ciency of contract enforcement, and accounting system standards
help explain cross-country di!erences in the level of "nancial intermediary devel-
opment. The results are clear: countries with (1) laws that give a high priority to
secured creditors getting the full present value of their claims against "rms, (2)
legal systems that rigorously enforce contracts, including government contracts,
and (3) accounting standards that produce high-quality, comprehensive and
comparable corporate "nancial statements tend to have better developed "nan-
cial intermediaries. The paper's "ndings are consistent with the view that legal and
accounting reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and
accounting practices can boost "nancial intermediary development and thereby
accelerate economic growth. Due to data limitations, however, we do not conduct
a comprehensive evaluation of the regulatory determinants of "nancial intermedi-
ary development (e.g., see Calomiris, 1989; Kane, 1985, 1989; Barth et al., 1997;
BIS, 1997; Calomiris and Gorton, 1991; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Kroszner and
Strahan, 1996; Barth et al., 2000). Future work should substantially broaden and
deepen our understanding of the determinants of "nancial intermediary develop-
ment by obtaining additional measures of the legal, supervisory, and regulatory
factors that determine the level of "nancial intermediary development.

Appendix A

The data are listed country by country in Table 8 and the countries in the
sample in Table 9. The summary statistics and correlations with other variables
used in the paper are provided in Tables 10 and 11.
 64
Table 8
Economic growth, "nancial development and policies across countries

Financial Development Indicators Policy variables

Average COMMERCIAL-
Country Country annual growth LIQUID CENTRAL PRIVATE Legal CREDI- EN- AC-
code name rate 1960}1995 LIABILITIES BANK CREDIT origin TOR FORCE COUNT

ARG Argentina 0.62 18.34 74.16 15.69 F !1 5.13 45

AUS Australia 1.98 51.73 92.67 54.82 E !1 9.36 75
AUT Austria 2.89 67.50 98.44 65.30 G 0 9.80 54
BGD Bangladesh 0.71 24.69 86.38 13.55 E
BRB Barbados 2.65 51.59 91.85 40.79 E
BEL Belgium 2.65 49.02 92.01 25.65 F 0 9.74 61
BOL Bolivia 0.36 16.39 31.60 13.14 F
BRA Brazil 2.93 19.16 61.68 22.10 F !2 6.31 54
CAN Canada 2.39 56.50 89.00 60.86 E !1 9.48 74
CHL Chile 1.45 22.96 52.81 27.81 F !1 6.91 52
COL Colombia 2.23 22.41 80.16 22.08 F !2 4.55 50
CRI Costa Rica 1.61 29.38 72.82 21.77 F
CYP Cyprus 5.38 74.49 92.72 62.39 E
DNK Denmark 2.18 49.48 88.10 42.45 S 0 9.66 62
DOM Dominican 2.50 20.58 73.34 19.11 F
Republic
ECU Ecuador 2.39 20.05 62.16 17.99 F 1 5.93
SLV El Salvador !0.61 26.94 72.04 22.85 F
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

FJI Fiji 1.85 37.48 96.95 23.65 E

FIN Finland 2.80 45.35 97.22 51.78 S !1 9.58 77
FRA France 2.43 63.37 96.54 75.47 F !2 9.09 69
DEU Germany 2.45 57.46 97.57 76.46 G 0 9.50 62
GHA Ghana !0.96 17.58 39.78 5.07 E
GRC Greece 3.22 53.34 74.36 36.72 F !1 6.40 55
GTM Guatemala 0.93 20.22 75.16 13.32 F
GUY Guyana !0.28 52.96 58.02 20.52 E
HTI Haiti !0.66 22.60 23.72 7.71 F
HND Honduras 0.60 23.04 76.54 23.86 F
ISL Iceland 3.01 31.76 88.94 34.79 S
IND India 1.92 32.95 63.68 19.53 E 1 5.14 57
IRL Ireland 3.25 54.74 94.73 49.14 E !1 8.38
ISR Israel 2.81 51.95 84.28 37.43 E 1 6.18 64
ITA Italy 2.93 77.48 87.77 59.03 F !1 8.75 62
JAM Jamaica 0.42 36.85 78.09 24.55 E
JPN Japan 4.30 125.94 96.72 128.38 G 0 9.34 65
KEN Kenya 1.96 35.74 81.27 23.93 E 1 5.54
KOR Korea, 7.16 41.02 83.95 66.52 G 1 6.97 62
Republic of
LBR Liberia !0.47 9.73 37.90 10.16 E
MYS Malaysia 4.11 63.74 96.45 47.20 E 1 7.11 76
MLT Malta 6.65 143.43 92.57 43.97 E
MUS Mauritius 3.02 46.87 82.21 24.36 F
MEX Mexico 1.97 25.57 69.38 22.89 F !2 5.95 60
NPL Nepal 0.77 20.27 57.86 7.72 E
NLD Netherlands 2.20 71.41 98.10 86.69 F !1 9.68 64
NZL New Zealand 1.12 49.63 82.43 37.59 E 0 9.65 70
NER Niger !2.75 14.43 83.89 13.05 F
NOR Norway 3.18 54.04 90.02 81.62 S !1 9.86 74
PAK Pakistan 2.70 38.68 67.89 20.77 E 1 3.95
PAN Panama 2.03 33.37 71.97 40.22 F
PNG Papua New 1.12 31.05 89.12 20.84 E
Guinea
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

PRY Paraguay 2.38 17.62 65.29 14.52 F

PER Peru 0.06 18.52 86.04 13.32 F !2 3.59 38
PHL Philippines 1.16 27.50 81.40 27.01 F !2 3.77 65
PRT Portugal 3.65 78.02 90.35 55.01 F !1 8.63 36
SEN Senegal !0.44 22.80 84.54 27.51 F
!0.34
65

SLE Sierra Leone 16.83 49.55 5.07 E

Table 8 (continued) 66

Financial Development Indicators Policy variables

Average COMMERCIAL-
Country Country annual growth LIQUID CENTRAL PRIVATE Legal CREDI- EN- AC-
code name rate 1960}1995 LIABILITIES BANK CREDIT origin TOR FORCE COUNT

ZAF South Africa 0.39 51.44 94.77 71.94 E 0 5.85 70

ESP Spain 2.88 70.31 92.74 65.05 F 0 8.10 64
LKA Sri Lanka 2.70 30.34 57.80 17.11 E 0 3.58
SWE Sweden 1.89 53.49 88.94 89.11 S !1 9.79 83
CHE Switzerland 1.42 123.41 98.99 141.30 G !1 9.99 68
SYR Syrian Arab Rep. 2.51 43.32 46.93 8.83 F
TWN Taiwan, China 6.62 66.97 95.72 57.32 G 0 8.84 65
THA Thailand 4.88 47.79 84.66 48.52 E 1 6.91 64
TGO Togo 0.46 32.90 82.05 21.88 F
TTO Trinidad and 1.12 37.46 91.72 31.20 E
Tobago
GBR United Kingdom 1.96 48.63 83.55 46.31 E 1 9.10 78
USA United States 1.71 62.12 93.11 113.07 E !1 9.50 71
URY Uruguay 1.03 29.47 59.24 21.21 F 0 6.15 31
VEN Venezuela !0.88 36.84 90.90 33.12 F 6.34 40
ZAR Zaire !2.81 16.03 28.58 4.08 F
ZWE Zimbabwe 0.84 46.92 75.80 23.04 E 1 4.36

Countries added to the LLSV (1998) sample. LIQUID LIABILITIES " liquid liabilities of the "nancial system (currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank "nancial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times 100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK " assets of
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

deposit money banks divided by assets of deposit money banks plus central bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT " credit by deposit money banks
and other "nancial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, times 100. Values for the "nancial intermediary development indicators are averages
over the 1960}1995 period. Legal origin: E"English, F"French, G"German, S"Scandinivian CREDITOR " index of secured creditor rights.
ENFORCE " index of law and contract enforcement. ACCOUNT " index of the comprehensiveness and quality of company reports.
 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77 67

Table 9
Countries in the sample

Algeria Greece Norway

Argentina Guatemala Pakistan
Australia Guyana
Panama
Austria Haiti Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh
Honduras Paraguay
Barbados
Iceland
Peru
Belgium India Philippines
Bolivia Indonesia Portugal
Brazil Iran Rwanda
Cameroon Ireland Senegal
Canada Israel Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Italy South Africa
Chile Jamaica Spain
Colombia Japan Sri Lanka
Costa Rica Kenya Sudan
Cyprus Korea Sweden
Denmark Lesotho Switzerland
Dominican Republic Liberia
Syria
Ecuador Malawi Taiwan

Egypt Malaysia Thailand
El Salvador Malta
Togo
Fiji
Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago
Finland Mexico United States of America
France Nepal
Uruguay
Gambia Netherlands Venezuela
Germany New Zealand Zaire
Ghana Nicaragua Zimbabwe
Great Britain Niger

Not in the 71 country pure cross-sectional data set.

Not in the 74 country panel data set.
 68
Table 10
Descriptive statistics, cross-section 1960}1995

Initial Average Black

income years of Com- Govern- Open- market Revolu- Ethnic
GDP per school- Private mercial- Liquid ment ness to In#ation pre- tion and Assass- fractional-
growth capita ing credit central liabilties size trade rate mium Coups inations ization

Mean 1.95 3120 4.06 40.86 79.26 45.21 14.75 59.46 15.56 23.34 0.16 0.29 0.29
Median 1.98 2019 3.65 27.81 83.89 41.02 13.16 54.33 9.08 5.36 0.07 0.10 0.19
Maximum 7.16 9895 10.07 141.30 98.99 143.43 31.37 231.69 90.78 277.42 0.97 2.47 0.87
Minimum !2.81 367 0.20 4.08 23.72 14.43 6.68 14.05 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 1.92 2519 2.50 29.16 17.37 26.26 5.23 36.43 18.25 49.31 0.22 0.50 0.27
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63

Correlations
GDP growth 1
Initial income per capita 0.04 1.00
Average years of 0.30 0.82 1.00
schooling
Private Credit 0.43 0.63 0.57 1.00
Commercial- 0.46 0.48 0.43 0.64 1.00
Central Bank
Liquid Liabilties 0.56 0.39 0.45 0.77 0.59 1.00
Government size 0.21 0.36 0.46 0.30 0.38 0.30 1.00
Openness to trade 0.19 !0.18 !0.04 !0.09 0.08 0.30 0.31 1.00
In#ation rate !0.28 !0.15 !0.10 !0.38 !0.48 !0.42 !0.24 !0.28 1.00
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Black market premium !0.38 !0.28 !0.30 !0.37 !0.54 !0.26 !0.11 0.36 0.27 1.00
Revolution and Coups !0.24 !0.35 !0.30 !0.40 !0.46 !0.44 !0.42 !0.23 0.41 0.20 1.00
Assassinations !0.15 !0.09 !0.14 !0.14 !0.07 !0.17 !0.31 !0.27 0.24 0.02 0.51 1.00
Ethnic fractionalization !0.35 !0.43 !0.47 !0.34 !0.20 !0.29 !0.06 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.01
Table 11
Descriptive statistics, panel 1960}1995

Average Com-
Initial years of mercial- Govern- Black
GDP income sec. Private central Liquid ment Openness In#ation market
Variable growth per capita schooling credit bank liabilties size to trade rate premium

Mean 1.56 4710 1.30 42.71 77.67 45.14 14.83 54.44 17.80 74.31
Maximum 9.86 20135 5.15 205.95 99.98 191.44 38.02 180.09 344.40 10990.70
Minimum !10.02 188 0.04 1.56 14.02 6.72 4.89 9.29 !3.06 !3.68
Standard deviation 2.76 5229 0.95 35.16 20.07 27.07 5.36 27.57 33.03 608.65
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359

Correlations
GDP growth 1
Initial income per capita 0.12 1
Avg. years of sec. schooling 0.13 0.69 1
Private Credit 0.2 0.76 0.62 1
Commercial-Central Bank 0.33 0.54 0.34 0.6 1
Liquid Liabilties 0.22 0.61 0.47 0.84 0.51 1
Government size !0.04 0.45 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.21 1
Openness to trade 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.13 0.2 1
!0.29 !0.18 !0.08 !0.26 !0.26 !0.26 !0.05 !0.22
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

In#ation rate 1
Black market premium !0.2 !0.08 !0.06 !0.09 !0.11 !0.03 0.1 !0.1 0.54 1
69
 70

Table 12
Variables and sources

Variable De"nition Original source Secondary source

Level and growth rate of GDP Real per capita GDP World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
Real per capita GDP (for initial GDP in cross- Penn World Tables
section regressions)
Government size Government expenditure as share of GDP World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
Openness to trade Sum of real exports and imports as share of real World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
GDP
Growth rate of terms of trade Log di!erence of the terms of trade, divided by World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
"ve
Population growth rate Log di!erence of the total population, divided by World Bank, International Loayza et al. (1998)
"ve Economics Department
In#ation rate Log di!erence of Consumer Price Index International Financial
Statistics (IFS), line 64
Average years of schooling Average years of schooling in the population Barro and Lee (1996)
over 25
Average years of secondary Average years of secondary schooling in the Barro and Lee (1996)
schooling population over 15
Black market premium Ratio of black market exchange rate and o$cial Pick's Currency Yearbook
exchange rate minus one through (1989) and World
Currency Yearbook.
Liquid liabilities IFS
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

+(0.5)*[F(t)/P (t)#F(t!1)/P (t!1)],/[GDP(t)/

C C
P (t)], where F is liquid liabilities (line 55l), GDP
?
is line 99b, P is end-of period CPI (line 64) and
C
P is the average annual CPI.
?
Commercial-central bank DBA(t)/(DBA(t)#CBA(t)), where DBA is assets IFS
of deposit money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is
central bank assets (lines 12 a-d).
Private credit +(0.5)*[F(t)/P (t)#F(t!1)/P (t!1)],/[GDP(t)/ IFS
C C
P (t)], where F is credit by deposit money banks
?
and other "nancial institutions to the private
sector (lines 22d#42d), GDP is line 99b, P is
C
end-of period CPI (line 64) and P is the average
?
CPI for the year
Bank assets +(0.5)*[F(t)/P (t)#F(t!1)/P (t!1)],/[GDP(t)/ IFS
C C
P (t)], where F is domestic assets of deposit
?
money banks (lines 22a}d), GDP is line 99b, P is
C
end-of period CPI (line 64) and P is the average
?
CPI for the year.
Bank credit +(0.5)*[F(t)/P (t)#F(t!1)/P (t!1)],/[GDP(t)/ IFS
C C
P (t)], where F is credit by deposit money banks
?
to the private sector (lines 22d), GDP is line 99b,
P is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P is the
C ?
average CPI for the year.
Legal origin Dummy variables for British, French, German Reynolds and Flores (1996) LLSV (1998) and
and Scandinavian legal origin own coding
Accounting Index created by examining and rating Center of International LLSV (1998)
companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion Financial Analysis & Research
or omission of 90 items in balance sheets and Inc.
income statements. The maximum is 90, the
minimum 0.
Rulelaw Measure of the law and order tradition of International Country Risk LLSV (1998)
a country. It is an average over 1982}1995. It Guide (ICRG).
ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

1, weak law and order tradition.

Conrisk Measure of the risk that a government will modify ICRG Knack and Keefer
a contract after it has been signed. It ranges from (1995)
10, low risk, to 1, high risk and is averaged over
1982}1995.
71
Table 12 (continued) 72

Variable De"nition Original source Secondary source

Autostay, Manages, Secured1 AUTOSTAY equals one if a country's laws impose National bankruptcy and LLSV (1998)
an automatic stay on the assets of "rms upon "ling reorganization laws
a reorganization petition, and zero otherwise.
MANAGES equals one if "rm managers continue
to administer the "rm's a!airs pending the
resolution of reorganization proces-ses, and zero
otherwise. SECURED1 equals one if secured
creditors are ranked "rst in the distribution of the
proceeds that result from the disposition of the
assests of a bankrupt "rm, and zero otherwise.
Revolutions and coups A revolution is de"ned as any illegal or forced Banks (1994)
change in the top governmental elite, any attempt
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from
central government. Coup d'Etat is de"ned as an
extraconstitutional or forced change in the top
government elite and/or its e!ective control of the
nation's power structure in a given year.
Unsuccessful coups are not counted. Data are
averaged over 1960}1990
Assassinations Number of assassinations per thousand Banks (1994)
inhabitants. Data are averaged over 1960}1990
Ethnic fractionalization Average value of "ve indices of ethnolinguistic Atlas Narodov Mira (1964); Easterly and Levine
fractionalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, Muller (1964); Roberts (1962); (1997)
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

where higher values denote higher levels of Gunnemark (1991)

fractionalization.
Bureaucratic e$ciency Average of three indices published by Business Business International Mauro (1995)
International Corporation (1984): e$ciency of the Corporation (1984)
judiciary system, red tape and corruption. The
data are averages over the period 1980}1983.
Corruption Measure of corruption, with the scale readjusted ICRG Knack and Keefer
to 0 (high level of corruption) to 10 (low level). (1995)
Data are averaged over 1982}1995.
Index of state-owned enterprises Measures the role of SOEs in the economy, Gwartney et al. (1996) LLSV (1999)
ranging from 0 to 10, with data averaged over
1975}1995. Higher scores denote countries with
less government owned enterprises, which are
estimated to produce less of the country's output.
Property rights Rating of property rights on a scale from 1 to 5. Holmes et al. (1997) LLSV (1999)
The more protection private property receives,
the higher the score.
Cost of business regulation Rating of regulation policies related to opening Holmes et al. (1997) LLSV (1999)
and keeping open a business. The scale is from
0 to 5, with higher scores meaning that
regulations are straightforward and applied
uniformly to all businesses and that regulations
are less of a burden to business.
Risk of expropriation Assessment of risk of `outright con"scationa or ICRG Knack and Keefer
`forced nationalizationa. It ranges from 0 to 10, (1995)
with lower scores indicating a higher risk and
data are averaged over 1982}1995.
Religious Composition Percentage of the population that were (1) Roman Barrett (1982), Worldmark LLSV (1999)
Catholic, (2) Protestant, and (3) Muslim in 1980. Encyclopedia of Nations (1996),
Statistical Abstract of the
World (1995), United Nations
Demographic Yearbook (1995)
and CIA World Factbook
(1996).
R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Distance from equator The distance of the country from the equator, CIA Factbook (1996) LLSV (1999)
scaled between 0 and 1.
73
74 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77

Appendix B

The variables and sources are tabulated in Table 12.

For further reading

The following reference is also of interest to the reader: Political Risk Services,
various issues.

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