(Routledge Perspectives On Development 7) Jennifer Elliott - An Introduction To Sustainable Development-Routledge (2012) PDF

An Introduction to
Sustainable Development
This fourth edition has been comprehensively rewritten and updated to

provide a concise, well illustrated and accessible introduction to the
characteristics, challenges and opportunities of sustainable development
with particular reference to developing countries. The contested nature of
sustainable development is explored through a detailed consideration of
changing ideas and practices within environmentalism and development
thinking. The text identifies the different actors involved (from institutions
of global governance through to community based organisations), the
policies and mechanisms through which sustainable development is being
sought, and considers the outcomes for particular groups and environments
in both rural and urban contexts.
This edition places stronger emphasis on the global challenges of
sustainable development with an understanding of interlinked crises in
climate, energy, economy, poverty and social injustice. It explores how
these issues are leading to deep questioning of what sustainable
development is, what it should be, and how sustainable development
policies and mechanisms are being reconsidered. The book gives new
consideration to the challenge of achieving lower carbon growth, climate
adaptation, and the implications on sustainable development of rapidly
expanding economies, including China and India. It contains greater
discussion of how civil society movements influence outcomes of
international climate policy, as well as technological developments in
energy and agriculture. The text also contains a substantially expanded
discussion of how poverty remains central to sustainable development
challenges, as revealed through the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
and Millennium Development Goals.
This invaluable text retains the core message that sustainable development
has become central to debates about environment and development.
Containing a substantial number of new boxed case studies, learning
outcomes, chapter summaries, discussion questions, further reading and
websites, this text provides an essential introduction for students.
Jennifer A. Elliott is Principal Lecturer in Geography at the University of

Brighton.
Routledge Perspectives on Development
Edited by: Professor Tony Binns, University of Otago
The Perspectives on Development series will provide an invaluable, up to date

and refreshing approach to key development issues for academics and students
working in the field of development, in disciplines such as anthropology,
economics, geography, international relations, politics and sociology. The series
will also be of particular interest to those working in interdisciplinary fields,
such as area studies (African, Asian and Latin American Studies), development
studies, rural and urban studies, travel and tourism.
If you would like to submit a book proposal for the series, please contact Tony
Binns on [email protected]
Published: Water Resources and Development

Clive Agnew and Philip Woodhouse
Third World Cities, 2nd edition
David W. Drakakis-Smith Theories and Practices of Development, 2nd Edition
Katie Willis
Rural–Urban Interactions in the Developing World
Kenneth Lynch Food and Development
E. M. Young
Environmental Management and Development
Chris Barrow An Introduction to Sustainable Development,
4th edition
Tourism and Development
Jennifer Elliott
Richard Sharpley and David J. Telfer
Southeast Asian Development Forthcoming:
Andrew McGregor
Global Finance and Development
Population and Development David Hudson
W.T.S. Gould
Natural Resource Extraction and Development
Postcolonialism and Development Roy Maconachie and Gavin M. Hilson
Cheryl McEwan
Politics and Development
Conflict and Development Heather Marquette and Tom Hewitt
Andrew Williams and Roger MacGinty
Children, Youth and Development, 2nd Edition
Disaster and Development Nicola Ansell
Andrew Collins
Climate Change and Development
Non-Governmental Organisations and Development Thomas Tanner and Leo Horn-Phathanothai
David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji
Religion and Development
Cities and Development Emma Tomalin
Jo Beall
Development Organizations
Gender and Development, 2nd edition Rebecca Shaaf
Janet Henshall Momsen
Latin American Development
Economics and Development Studies Julie Cupples
Michael Tribe, Frederick Nixson and Andrew Sumner
An Introduction to
Sustainable Development
Fourth edition
Jennifer A. Elliott
First edition published
by Routledge 1994
Second edition published
by Routledge 1999
Third edition published
by Routledge 2006
This edition published 2013
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 1994, 1999, 2006, 2013 Jennifer A. Elliott
The right of Jennifer A. Elliott to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
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Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon
In memory of my dad
Contents
List of plates ix
List of figures xi
List of tables xvi
List of boxes xvii
Acknowledgements xix
Introduction 1
1 What is sustainable development? 8
2 The global challenges of sustainable development 57
3 Actors and actions in sustainable development 120
4 Sustainable rural livelihoods 189
5 Sustainable urban livelihoods 249
6 Sustainable development in the developing world:
an assessment 302
References 332
Index 351
Plates
1.1a Promoting the messages of sustainable development:

Sign on entry to Kang, Botswana 17
1.1b Promoting the messages of sustainable development:
Fresher’s Fair, University of Brighton, England 17
1.2 The inevitable consequences of development?
Industrial air pollution 42
1.3a The pollution of poverty: Hazardous housing
on a Kolkata roadside 44
1.3b The pollution of poverty: Washing in the Jakarta
floods 44
2.1a The challenges of aridity to human settlements:
Northern Nigeria 95
2.1b The challenges of aridity to human settlements:
Southern Tunisia 95
2.2a Challenging processes of development: London,
England 115
2.2b Challenging processes of development: Stuttgart,
Germany 115
3.1a Generating awareness of HIV/AIDS in Africa:
Zambia 171
3.1b Generating awareness of HIV/AIDS in Africa:
South Africa 171
3.2a Pressures for good governance: Botswana 179
3.2b Pressures for good governance: Cape Town,
South Africa 179
x • Plates
3.3 NGO–state collaboration in slum upgrading, Delhi,

India 183
4.1a Income opportunities in rural areas outside agriculture:
Wage employment in brick-making, India 204
4.1b Income opportunities in rural areas outside agriculture:
Desert tourism, Morocco 204
4.1c Income opportunities in rural areas outside agriculture:
Fishing, Malawi 205
4.2a Cash crops for export: Large-scale tea production,
Indonesia 210
4.2b Cash crops for export: Tobacco production,
Zimbabwe 210
4.3a Harnessing scarce water resources for agricultural
production in Tunisia: Tabia and jessour irrigation 222
4.3b Harnessing scarce water resources for agricultural
production in Tunisia: Water control in the
El Guettar oasis 222
4.4a Women in environmental management: Fuelwood
collection, Zimbabwe 236
4.4b Women in environmental management: Organising
the community – a Lampungese wedding 236
4.4c Women in environmental management: Water
management, Malawi 237
5.1a Urban informal income opportunites: Door-to-door
welding, Harare, Zimbabwe 262
5.1b Urban informal income opportunites: Garment
production, Kairouan, Tunisia 262
5.1c Urban informal income opportunites: Food trading/
transport, Kolkata, India 263
5.2a Low-income housing: Informal housing, Hanoi 272
5.2b Low-income housing: Public housing, Harare 272
5.2c Low-income housing: Tenement blocks, Kolkata 273
5.3a Delivering basic urban needs: Water in Jakarta,
Indonesia 278
5.3b Delivering basic urban needs: Fuel in Kairouan,
Tunisia 278
Figures
1.1 The structure of Agenda 21 10

1.2 The Millennium Development Goals and the
environment 12
1.3 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable
Development: the challenges we face 15
1.4 The UK Government’s Principles of Sustainable
Development 16
1.5 Defining and interpreting the contested concept of
sustainable development 18
1.6 Depictions of sustainable development 20
1.7 Categories of natural capital 23
1.8 The shared essentials of the concept of sustainability 25
1.9 The stages of economic development as modelled
by Rostow 27
1.10 The Frank model of underdevelopment 30
1.11 The principal instruments of structural adjustment 35
1.12 Uneven regional patterns of ICT 37
1.13 The opportunities of ecological modernisation 50
1.14 The principles of Environmental Justice, First National
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit,
1991 52
1.15 The key findings of the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 54
2.1 Human impact on climate warming confirmed by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 58
xii • Figures
2.2a World energy supply by source, 1980–2009 60

2.2b Global water withdrawal by sector, 1900–2025 60
2.3 The notion of ‘Peak Oil’ 61
2.4 E-waste recycling sources and destinations 63
2.5 Total primary energy supply per capita 2007,
selected regions and countries 66
2.6 The ‘perverse principle’ in accessing clean water 74
2.7 Distribution of world population (percentage) by
world region 79
2.8 Projected average annual rate of population change
by major regions, 2010–2100 (medium variant) 80
2.9a Inequality in access to education 2008: Out of school
children by wealth and gender 83
2.9b Inequality in access to education 2008: Out of school
children by area of residence and gender 83
2.10 The Millennium Declaration commitments to the
challenge of global poverty and inequality for
sustainable development 86
2.11 The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day 86
2.12 Major causes of death in neonates and children under
5 globally 88
2.13 Well-being as revealed through participatory poverty
assessments 90
2.14 The components of the Human Development Index 91
2.15 Loss in HDI due to multidimensional inequality
(largest and smallest losses across HDI groupings) 92
2.16 Components of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) 93
2.17 Linkages between ecosystem services and human
well-being 98
2.18 The gendered experience of environmental change 100
2.19 The merging of climate and development agendas 103
2.20 Ongoing questions for climate science 105
2.21 Summary of projected impacts of increases in global
mean surface temperature 106
2.22 Key terms in responding to climate change 107
2.23 Share of global CO2 emissions, 2009 112
2.24 Rich countries dominate the cumulative emissions
account 113
2.25 Different approaches to linking adaptation and
development 114
3.1 Forms of environmental governance and policy
instrument 123
Figures • xiii
3.2 Percentage share of Africa’s ODA budget 134

3.3 ODA as proportion of Gross National Income, 2009 136
3.4 The challenges of aid 137
3.5 The potential risks to livelihood of avoided deforestation
policies 140
3.6 The World Bank Institutions 141
3.7 Countries receiving financial support from the World
Bank 143
3.8 The four-fold environmental agenda of the World Bank 144
3.9 Distribution of GEF funding by focal area, 1991–2010 147
3.10 Pressures of adjustment on the environment 148
3.11 The core principles of the PRSP approach 149
3.12 Strategic objectives for sustainable development at
the World Bank 150
3.13 The rising contribution of developing economies in
world exports 151
3.14 The uneven and concentrated geographies of production,
trade and foreign investment 152
3.15 The Oxfam ‘Making Trade Fair’ campaign 154
3.16 Different views of the effect of trade liberalisation
on the environment 154
3.17 Elements of Marks and Spencer’s ‘Plan A’
commitments 161
3.18 Fairtrade on the rise 163
3.19 Criteria for eligibility for the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative 169
3.20 The Debt2Health mechanism 170
3.21 National plans on energy and climate change 174
3.22 Green stimulus spending, selected countries, 2009 175
3.23 The World Bank dimensions of good governance 178
3.24 Types of World Bank (WB) and civil society
engagement 182
4.1 The multifunctionality of agriculture 191
4.2 Declining investment in agricultural development 192
4.3 Agriculture-based, transforming and urbanised
countries 194
4.4 Disparities in urban and rural sanitation coverage 199
4.5 The potential of mobile phones for rural development 201
4.6 Key concepts in understanding rural change 202
4.7 Sources of rural livelihood 203
4.8 The hierarchy of agro-ecosystems 207
4.9 The modern food system as an hourglass 209
xiv • Figures
4.10 The negative impacts of the integration of rural

producers in the global South into the global
agri-food system 211
4.11 The concerns over GMOs 215
4.12 The global area of biotech crops 216
4.13 Five ‘Rural Worlds’ 219
4.14 Agricultural technologies with high potential
sustainability 221
4.15 Lessons for the achievement of sustainable rural
livelihoods 223
4.16 Changing approaches to agricultural research and
development 225
4.17 Where farmers’ priorities might diverge from those
of scientists 227
4.18 The major components of participatory learning and
action 230
4.19 The essence of social capital 243
4.20 Social capital formation in natural resource
management 244
5.1 Proportion of urban population by region,
1950–2030 250
5.2 The Green and Brown urban environmental agendas 252
5.3 A stylised environmental transition 253
5.4 The environmental advantages of urbanisation 254
5.5 Novel urban configurations 258
5.6 Informal sector activities 260
5.7 Opportunities and challenges of informal sector
employment 261
5.8 The deprivations associated with urban poverty 265
5.9 UN-HABITAT slum indicators 267
5.10 The different kinds of rental and ‘owner-occupation’
housing for low-income groups in cities of the
developing world 271
5.11 The key lessons of the recent privatisation of basic
services 281
5.12 Proportion of population by sanitation practices 1980
and 2008 282
5.13 Common characteristics of sustainable urban
development 293
6.1 Key challenges in assessing sustainable development 305
6.2 The intentions of the national core set of indicators 308
6.3 UK government strategy indicators 308
Figures • xv
6.4 The Bellagio STAMP: SusTainability Assessment

and Measurement Principles 311
6.5 The failings of Gross Domestic Product as a measure
of progress 316
6.6 The shared ethical framework of the Earth Charter
Initiative 320
Tables
1.1 Economic growth rates in the world economy, 1971–2000

(annual growth rates in constant 1990 $US) 32
1.2 Inward foreign direct investment, by major world region,
2000 36
2.1 Carbon intensity of GDP 69
2.2 Child mortality rates by wealth, selected countries
(under-five mortality rates per 1,000 live births) 87
3.1 Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) 128
3.2 World Bank lending by theme, 2010 142
3.3 ENRM lending by region, 1990–2007 146
3.4 The state and corporate power 153
3.5 Debt service as a percentage of exports 166
3.6 Government spending: health and debt servicing
compared, selected low human development countries 167
4.1 Rural employment by sector of activity 206
4.2 Leading biotech growing countries and crops 216
5.1 Industrialisation and employment in selected Latin
American countries, 1963–9 259
5.2 Urban population living in slums, 1990–2010 268
5.3 Disaster risk in populous cities 274
5.4 Proportion of urban population with improved water
sources and sanitation facilities, selected countries,
2008 277
5.5 Questioning environmental improvement 279
6.1 The Happy Planet Index (selected countries) 315
Boxes
1.1 Forms of capital for sustainable development 23

1.2 Modes of thought concerning humanity and nature 41
2.1 E-waste: global recycling or waste trafficking? 62
2.2 Tar sands in Canada 67
2.3 The risks and opportunities of biofuels 68
2.4 Complex concerns around water in Pakistan 73
2.5 Measuring inequality and exclusion in human
development 92
2.6 The development of an international framework on
climate change 102
2.7 The principles of climate justice 112
3.1 Controlling the trade in hazardous waste 130
3.2 The contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism
to sustainable development 132
3.3 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+) 139
3.4 Questioning the role of fiscal incentives for sustainable
change 177
4.1 The World Bank’s three ‘rural worlds’ 193
4.2 Rural–urban migration in Lampung, Indonesia 197
4.3 Improving access to sustainable energy for small
businesses and low-income households in India 200
4.4 Farmer suicides in India 212
4.5 The sustainability of genetically modified cotton in
South Africa 217
xviii • Boxes
4.6 The value of indigenous technologies 228

4.7 Supporting adaptations to climate change in the Andes 230
4.8 Pressures for land reform in Brazil 233
4.9 Building women’s rights in sustainable water
management 238
4.10 Public–private collaborations for enhancing information
and communication for rural development in India 242
5.1 Green and Brown environmental agendas 252
5.2 Addressing the challenges of slum development in
Morocco 268
5.3 The Cochabamba water wars, Bolivia 280
5.4 The environmental impacts of Maquila developments
on the Mexico–United States border 284
5.5 The Orangi Pilot Project of low-cost sanitation in
Pakistan 295
5.6 The work of the Society for the Promotion of Area
Resources Centre (SPARC) in Mumbai 296
6.1 Questioning the routes to sustainable development:
what indicators can reveal 317
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my colleagues and friends for continuing to be

so supportive and patient with me in relation to writing this new
edition. My biggest thanks are to my family and to Hils who will be
the most pleased that it is at last completed.
Introduction
This book is concerned with the continued challenges and

opportunities of finding more sustainable patterns and processes of
development within the international community for the future. Since
the publication of the first edition of this text in 1994, much has been
learnt regarding the principles of sustainable development, the
characteristics of policies, mechanisms and projects that appear to be
more sustainable, and the assessment and monitoring of environment
and development outcomes that are central to sustainable
development. Whilst the idea of sustainable development was
relatively new in 1994, it is now suggested to have ‘come of age’
and forms a staple part of most debates about environment and
development (Redclift, 2005; Adams, 2009). The pursuit of
sustainable development is now stated as a principal policy goal of
many of the major institutions of the world including the United
Nations, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In 2000,
the international community committed to achieving eight
‘Millennium Development Goals’ by 2015. One of these goals refers
explicitly to sustainable development, but all are central in that they
commit to better and more equitable outcomes in arenas such as
health, gender, housing and sanitation that directly affect poorer
groups. Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental
problems and addressing poverty and inequality are long-standing
and central concerns of sustainable development. The global
challenge of sustainable development has been confirmed in recent
years by the interlinked ‘crises’ of climate, economic recession and
2 • Introduction
rising food, fuel and commodity prices that impact hardest and first
on the poorest people in societies. Finding ways to address and
prevent these crises requires interconnected and interdisciplinary
thinking that is also at the core of sustainable development.
Evidently, the context in which sustainable development is currently
being pursued is significantly different to that in the 1990s. An
increasingly globalised world has brought new challenges and
opportunities for the environment and for development. New actors
(such as transnational corporations and civil society organisations)
and new technologies (particularly in computing, information and
communication) now shape outcomes in resource development and
management to a much greater extent than previously. However, the
closer and deeper integration of people and places around the globe
brings new risks as well as opportunities. Farmers, for example, may
be able to access new and wider markets for their produce but have
less direct control over decisions regarding what to grow and when
to sell, to whom. They become increasingly vulnerable to changes in
price and consumers’ tastes set at great distances away.
Climate scientists have also now established the human causes of
climate change. Yet existing patterns of economic development
remain closely associated with increased energy demands and rising
fossil fuel use. Moving towards lower carbon patterns and processes
of development is a challenge for individuals, business and industry,
governments and international organisations globally. However,
contributions to processes of climate change, the experiences of its
impacts and capacity to cope with change already occurring are not
evenly distributed; within current societies, across different countries
or between generations. This is one illustration of the complex
interconnections between environmental resources and the functions
and services they provide for human wellbeing and development. It
also highlights that the challenges and opportunities of sustainable
development are context specific, that is, they lie in the
interconnections of factors of the natural and human environment in
particular places and points in time ensuring that there is no simple
or single ‘route’ to sustainable development.
Economic growth in the past two decades has delivered vast
improvements in human well-being including moving over 400
million people out of poverty. Many of the fastest rates of economic
growth currently are now in countries of the Global South. Brazil,
Russia, India and China (the ‘BRIC’ economies) for example, are
Introduction • 3
now responsible for a significant proportion of world exports and

constitute a powerful group within international trade negotiations.
However, recent economic success has been very unequal across and
within countries; low-income countries (and particularly within the
African continent) remain largely peripheral in terms of world trade
and foreign investment, for example. Income inequality is also
increasing worldwide. Differences in wealth and income are seen
through the text to be important factors in explaining a range of
spatial patterns of ‘unsustainable development’. However, poverty
has many dimensions beyond material wealth including the
opportunity to participate in decisions that affect one’s immediate
environment and to feel valued within local communities. ‘Making
globalisation work better for the poor’ is understood as integral to
many of the challenges of sustainable development; as a human
rights issue, as a moral concern, for peace and security and economic
development in the future.
The primary foci of the book are the challenges and opportunities for
sustainable development in the less economically developed regions
of the world. Fundamentally, this is because it is here that the majority
of the world’s poor reside. This is not to suggest that sustainable
development is mostly a problem for the poor. Indeed, most pollution
(including carbon emissions) and resource consumption are a result of
affluence, not poverty. There are deep challenges for sustainable
development associated with changing consumption patterns in
particular in the Global North. These are identified in the text, but a
full consideration is beyond the scope of this particular book. The
prospects of sustainable development in any one location are also very
evidently shaped in part by forces and decision-making which are
often situated at great distances away. It is impossible therefore to
consider the developing world in isolation from the wider global
community. Furthermore, some of the most innovative responses to
the challenges of sustainable development are now being seen in
countries within these developing regions. However, there are also
particular and distinct issues of sustainable development in the devel-
oping world. For example, these regions encompass many of the
world’s ‘fragile lands’, such as the major arid and semi-arid zones and
forest ecosystems. In these places, bio-physical factors in combination
with some of the lowest levels of human development worldwide can
make them particularly susceptible to degradation (including through
climate change) and make recovery from natural and economic shocks
and disturbance difficult.
4 • Introduction
Urbanisation is also occurring most rapidly in developing regions,

particularly within Asia and Africa. Cities can present a number of
advantages for sustainable development. For example the density of
population can enable infrastructure such as public transport and
waste disposal to be provided more efficiently and cost-effectively.
Such services have major environmental and health benefits.
However, the numbers of people in cities of the developing world
living in slum conditions where basic services in water supply and
sanitation (and in housing) are entirely lacking or severely
compromised is rising not falling.
A key aim of the book is to highlight the progress that has been
made towards establishing new patterns and processes of
development which are considered more sustainable; in terms of the
demands they make on the physical, ecological and cultural resources
of the globe, and the characteristics of technology, societal
organisation and economic production which underpin them.
Understanding the characteristics of successful sustainable
development projects will be essential for meeting the worldwide
ongoing and evolving challenges of balancing present needs against
those of the future. However, not only has the world changed since
the publication of the first edition of this text, so too has how the
challenges of sustainable development are understood. There are now
new debates concerning what sustainable development is and should
be and comprehensive critiques of the policies and mechanisms that
have been used towards meeting the challenges. For example, past
policies based on the privatisation of environmental resources such as
in water supply and in forest conservation are being challenged
(often through the action and resistance of people at the local level).
There is also much rethinking particularly in the context of global
economic recession of ‘conventional’ ideas about the links between
economic growth and human well-being.
As the term ‘sustainable development’ reaches further into popular
consciences worldwide, as more institutions recognise sustainability
as a major policy goal, and at a time of a heightened sense of
urgency in many arenas of environment and development, there is a
continued need to reflect critically on what is trying to be achieved,
whose interests and values may be dominant and what the costs and
benefits of particular interventions, that is, policy responses and
management decisions, are for particular people and local
environments. The origins of the notion of sustainable development,
its varied ‘meanings’ and the contribution of different disciplines are
Introduction • 5
traced in Chapter 1 within an analysis of thinking and practice in

development theory and in environmentalism. Whilst the
interdependence of future environment and development ends has
been embraced in both literatures, it is seen that substantial debate
and contestation characterise both the theory and practice of
sustainable development. The historical overview presented confirms
that the context within which environment and development
objectives are being pursued is changing rapidly, requiring
continuous re-evaluation of the meaning of sustainable development
as presented within particular schools of thinking and major
international summits, for example. The chapter also identifies a
number of ways in which ‘mainstream’ ideas and approaches to the
global agenda of sustainable development are being challenged,
including through better understanding of the environment and
development concerns of the poor, in response to failures of
development on the ground and through change led by citizens,
practitioners and academics from within the developing world.
In Chapter 2, the contemporary global challenges of sustainable
development are considered in some detail. It is seen that
development continues to depend heavily on natural resources for an
increasing number of functions but that inequality in access to
resources has also been a persistent and entrenched feature of past
development patterns and processes. Such inequality is seen to
underpin substantial human insecurity, conflict, ill-health and
premature death as well as resource degradation, confirming that
development is not meeting the needs of current generations. In
addition, the increasing global-scale impacts of human activities such
as through climate change raise very starkly the question of current
development compromising the opportunities of future generations.
In Chapter 3, a range of actions which are being taken at a variety of
levels by some of the core institutions in development towards
ensuring more sustainable processes and patterns are identified.
Importantly, development (and environmental management) is no
longer something undertaken principally by governments: rather
many different kinds of formal organisation (including transnational
corporations, non-governmental organisations and international
financial institutions such as the World Bank) and less formal
arrangements such as within communities and even households,
influence environmental actions and outcomes. A key aim of the
chapter is to consider how these actors in development are changing
what they do, but also how they are working in new ways, together,
6 • Introduction
to address the integrated challenges of sustainable development. The

chapter also considers a number of ‘cross-cutting’ issues of trade, aid
and debt, that illustrate the ways in which people and places across
the globe are interconnected but also how these issues operate to
shape the capacities of particular actors in development.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the particular challenges and opportunities of
sustainable development in the developing world are considered in
rural and urban contexts. It is quickly seen that the two sectors are
not distinct and that the environment and development concerns
therein are often interrelated. Indeed, one of the limitations of past
development policies has been their tendency to consider rural and
urban areas separately, and there is now better understanding of the
complex and multidirectional linkages between the two contexts that
shape landscapes and livelihoods. However, important differences are
also seen, including in terms of the immediate environmental
problems, the options for securing income and livelihood, the hazards
and sources of instability of living and the specific opportunities for
action. The principles which are seen to be now guiding more
sustainable development interventions in practice, however, are
regularly common to both rural and urban settings. Addressing the
welfare needs of the poorest groups, building participatory systems
of research and development and aspects of local governance are
identified as being essential to achieving the goals of development
and conservation in both contexts.
In Chapter 6, progress made towards sustainable development is
considered through the expanding field of sustainable development
indicators and appraisal. The development of indicators of
sustainable development is an important part of reflecting on what is
trying to be achieved (the vision of ‘sustainable development’) as
well as for measuring the outcomes of specific policies and
interventions and monitoring progress towards those goals (i.e.
communicating ‘how far’ from sustainable development we are).
The processes through which indictors are developed and
assessments are made are also proving significant in developing the
conversations and debate amongst different interest groups and
empowering individuals and groups of people to take action on
sustainable development. The evidence that a number of these
‘alternative’ measures of ‘human progress’ are revealing is now
contributing to wider reflections on how development has been
pursued. The final section of the text considers whether a
‘common future’ for sustainable development can currently
Introduction • 7
be identified on the basis of reflections on the substantive chapters

of the book.
Since the publication of the first edition of this text, there have been
many reminders of the very direct relationship between human
society and the resources and environmental processes of the globe.
These have included tsunamis in Thailand, Sri Lanka and Japan
(originating in earthquake activity) and war in Iraq and Afghanistan
(that cannot be divorced entirely from the geography of oil
resources). All have led to the loss of thousands of lives and
removed basic development opportunities for many more. Through
this book, the challenges of sustainable development will certainly be
seen to encompass better scientific understanding of environmental
processes and more cooperative and democratic international
collaborations. But they will also be seen to include for example the
accountability of industry to stakeholders and the power of all
individuals to participate in the decisions that shape the opportunities
for their own development.
1 What is sustainable
development?
Learning outcomes
At the end of this chapter you should be able to:
G Understand why sustainable development is a contested concept

G Understand that sustainable development requires thinking holistically
on linked processes of environmental, economic and social change and
with regard to the future
G Be aware of the historical origins of the idea of sustainable development
G Appreciate that sustainable development is considered an important
challenge by international institutions and governments worldwide
G Identify the principal strengths and weaknesses of past approaches to
development and environmental management
Key concepts
Sustainable development; development theory; globalisation; neo-liberalism;

environmentalism; ecological modernisation; environmental justice.
Introduction
In 1984, the United Nations (UN) established an independent group

of 22 people drawn from member states of both the developing and
developed worlds, and charged them with identifying long-term
environmental strategies for the international community. The report
of the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled
Our Common Future (WCED, 1987) is widely considered to have
been key in putting sustainable development firmly into the political
arena of international development thinking. It used the term
‘sustainable development’ extensively and defined it as
‘Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs’ (p. 43). The report has been translated into more than
What is sustainable development? • 9
24 languages (Finger, 1994) and its definition of the term continues

to be that which is most widely used and cited. For the first time, the
Commission had considered environmental concerns arising through
development processes from an economic, social and political
perspective rather than solely from a science base as in previous
studies. Their recommendations focused on integrating development
strategies and environmental policies and global partnerships to meet
the interdependent environmental concerns and development
opportunities North and South.
The work of the commission was undertaken as the basis for a UN
conference on Environment and Development to be held five years
later. The ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992 was, at
the time, the largest ever international conference held. It was also
the first time heads of state had gathered to consider the
environment. One hundred and sixteen heads of state or governments
and over 8,000 delegates attended. A further 3,000 non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) took part in parallel fora (Adams, 2009). The
central aim was to identify the principles of an agenda for action
towards sustainable development in the future and the challenge was
seen to require consensus at the highest level. A key outcome was
the ‘Agenda 21’ document (extending to 40 chapters and 600 pages)
detailing the issues, the actors and the means for achieving
sustainable development by the start of the twenty-first century.
Putting sustainable development into practice was seen to involve the
participation of a full range of sectors, groups and organisations; in
business and science, youth and church groups within communities
and by local authorities as well as international agencies as seen in
Figure 1.1. A number of important international conventions were
also agreed at Rio, including the Convention on Biodiversity and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change in recognition of the
growing problems of sustainable use of ecosystems and of human-
induced climate change. There was an optimism concerning a
common interest on behalf of countries globally and between current
and future generations that would drive sustainable development into
practice.
Ten years later, 104 heads of state gathered again for the UN World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg,
South Africa. The aim was to reinvigorate at the highest political
level, the global commitment to a North–South partnership to
achieve sustainable development. It has been referred to as ‘by far
the most inclusive summit to date’ (Seyfang, 2003: 227) for the way
10 • What is sustainable development?
Figure 1.1 The structure of Agenda 21
Section 1: Social and Economic Dimensions

Eight chapters, covering international cooperation, combating poverty, consumption patterns,
population, health, settlements and integrated environment and development decision-making.
Section 2: Conservation and Management of Resources for Development

Fourteen chapters on the environment. These cover the atmosphere, oceans, freshwaters and
water resources, land-resource management, deforestation, desertification, mountain
environments, sustainable agriculture and rural development. They also cover the conservation
of biological diversity and biotechnology, toxic, hazardous, solid and radioactive wastes.
Section 3: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups

Ten chapters discussing the role of women, young people and indigenous people in
sustainable development; the role of non-governmental organisations, local authorities, trade
unions, business and scientists and farmers.
Section 4: Means of Implementation

Eight chapters, exploring how to pay for sustainable development, the need to transfer
environmentally sound technology and science; the role of education, international capacity-
building, international legal instruments and information flows.
Source: N. Robinson (1993).
in which more stakeholder groups were brought into formal

meetings, including a bigger presence for business and many more
NGOs from the developing world, representing issues of human
rights, social justice and business accountability, for example. These
activities suggested new ways of addressing sustainable development
at a global level and a ‘more decentralized understanding of where
change comes from’ (Bigg, 2004: 5). There was a new understanding
of the complex interdependencies of environmental, social and
economic development (Potter et al., 2008) and of the difficult
political challenges of sustainable development. Key concerns at the
start of the twenty-first century were for the continued degradation of
environmental systems since Rio, but also for the persistence of
poverty and evidence of widening global disparities.
In 2000, the UN community had committed to the achievement of
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) embracing many of
these concerns. One of these goals refers explicitly to sustainable
development and the actions of governments in preparing national
sustainable development strategies, for example. Many others are
central to sustainable development in that they demand better
outcomes in the arenas that affect poorer groups. Figure 1.2 identifies
the MDG goals, the specific targets set and the principal ways in
which they link explicitly to the environment. However, at the

WSSD, a central concern was the impacts of ‘globalisation’ on the
poor. In short, whilst people and places were becoming more closely
linked together within global markets and through flows of finance,
for example, the benefits and costs of economic globalisation were
not being shared equally across or within countries. Poverty,
inequality and exclusion were identified as threats not just to the
environment and economic prosperity but also to future security and
democracy. Whereas globalisation had not been discussed at the Rio
conference, a decade later it was central to understanding sustainable
development as seen in the Johannesburg Declaration (Figure 1.3).
A further UN summit, ‘Rio+20’ is currently planned for 2012 to be
held again in Brazil. All stakeholders have been invited not just to
the conference, but to contribute in advance to a working document
that will inform what is discussed and the official outcome
documents. The aim of the conference is to secure renewed political
commitment for sustainable development, to assess progress on the
outcomes of previous summits and to address new and emerging
challenges for the global community. Two themes are considered
priorities: the challenges of moving to a ‘green economy’ and what
the future institutional framework for sustainable development should
be. What these challenges entail and how they have emerged is the
focus of the next two chapters. In short, a number of crises are facing
the world – of climate, economy, food and energy, and poverty for
example – that are now understood as interlinked. The notion of the
green economy seeks an economic system that can address and
prevent these crises whilst also protecting the earth’s ecosystems,
provide economic growth and contribute to poverty alleviation.
Questions of the future institutional framework for sustainable
development include whether the formal organisations (including
those within the UN) are ‘fit for purpose’ to guide, monitor and
coordinate progress towards sustainable development in future. They
also embrace many wider issues of ‘governance’ that confirm the
important role across all scales, not only of governments, but also
private business and civil society organisations in shaping the
prospects for sustainable development. They also question the
principles on which decisions are made, whether these are equitable
and participatory, for example.
Evidently, sustainable development is considered a central and
important challenge for international organisations such as the United
Nations and for governments worldwide. It is seen to embrace linked
Figure 1.2 The Millennium Development Goals and the environment
Millennium Development Goal Target Selected environmental links*

1 To eradicate extreme poverty 1 To halve, between 1990 and 2015, the Livelihood strategies and food security of the poor
and hunger proportion of people whose income is less often depend directly on healthy ecosystems, and
than US$1 a day the diversity of goods and ecological services they
2 To halve, between 1990 and 2015, the provide. Natural capital accounts for 26 per cent of
proportion of people who suffer from hunger the wealth of low-income countries.
Climate change affects agricultural productivity.
Ground-level ozone damages crops.
2 To achieve universal primary 3 To ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, Cleaner air will decrease illnesses of children due to
education boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a exposure to harmful air pollutants. As a result, they
full course of primary schooling will miss fewer days of school.
Water-related diseases such as diarrhoeal infections
cost about 443 million school days each year and
diminish learning potential.
3 To promote gender equality 4 To eliminate gender disparity in primary and Indoor and outdoor air pollution is responsible for
and empower women secondary education, preferably by 2005 and in more than 2 million premature deaths annually.
all levels of education no later than 2015 Poor women are particularly vulnerable to
respiratory infections as they have high levels of
exposure to indoor air pollution.
Women and girls bear the brunt of collecting water
and fuelwood, tasks made harder by environmental
degradation such as water contamination and
deforestation.
4 To reduce child mortality 5 To reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and Acute respiratory infections are the leading cause of
2015, the under-five mortality rate death in children. Pneumonia kills more children
under the age of five than any other illness.
Environmental factors such as indoor air pollution
may increase children’s susceptibility to
pneumonia.
Water-related diseases, such as diarrhoea and
cholera, kill an estimated 3 million people/year in
developing countries, the majority of whom are
children under the age of five. Diarrhoea has
become the second biggest killer of children, with
1.8 million children dying every year (almost
5,000/day).
5 To improve maternal health 6 To reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and Indoor air pollution and carrying heavy loads of water
2015, the maternal mortality ratio and fuelwood adversely affect women’s health, and
can make women less fit for childbirth and at
greater risk of complications during pregnancy.
Provision of clean water reduces the incidence of
diseases that undermine maternal health and
contribute to maternal mortality.
6 To combat HIV/Aids, malaria 7 To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse Up to 20 per cent of the total burden of disease in
and other diseases the spread of HIV/Aids developing countries may be associated with
8 To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse environmental risk factors. Preventative
the incidence of malaria and other major environmental health measures are as important
diseases as and at times more cost-effective than health
treatment.
New biodiversity-derived medicines hold promises for
fighting major diseases.
7 To ensure environmental 9 To integrate the principles of sustainable Current trends in environmental degradation must be
sustainability development into country policies and reversed in order to sustain the health and
programmes and reverse the loss of productivity of the world’s ecosystems.
environmental resources
10 To halve, by 2015, the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking
water and basic sanitation
11 To have achieved, by 2020, a significant
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million
slum dwellers
continued . . .
Figure 1.2 . . . continued
Millennium Development Goal Target Selected environmental links*

8 To develop a global 12 To develop further an open, rule-based, Poor countries and regions are forced to exploit their
partnership for development predictable, non-discriminatory trading and natural resources to generate revenue and make
financial system huge debt repayments.
13 To address the special needs of the least Unfair globalisation practices export their harmful
developed countries side-effects to countries that often do not have
14 To address the special needs of landlocked effective governance regimes.
countries and small island developing states
15 To deal comprehensively with the debt
problems of developing countries through
national and international measures in order
to make debt sustainable in the long run
16 In cooperation with developing countries,
to develop and implement strategies for
decent and productive work for youth
17 In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies,
to provide access to affordable, essential
drugs in developing countries
18 In cooperation with the private sector, to make
available the benefits of new technologies,
especially information and communication
Source: compiled from www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ and *UNEP (2007).

Figure 1.3 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development: the challenges

we face
G We recognise that poverty eradication, changing consumption and production patterns, and
protecting and managing the natural resource base for economic and social development
are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development.
G The deep fault line that divides human society between the rich and the poor and the ever-
increasing gap between the developed and developing worlds poses a major threat to
global prosperity, security and stability.
G The global environment continues to suffer. Loss of biodiversity continues, fish stocks
continue to be depleted, desertification claims more and more fertile land, the adverse
effects of climate change are already evident, natural disasters are more frequent and
more devastating and developing countries more vulnerable, and air, water and marine
pollution continue to rob millions of a decent life.
G Globalisation has added a new dimension to these challenges. The rapid integration of
markets, mobility of capital and significant increases in investment flows around the world
have opened new challenges and opportunities for the pursuit of sustainable development.
But the benefits and costs of globalisation are unevenly distributed, with developing
countries facing special difficulties in meeting this challenge.
G We risk the entrenchment of these global disparities and unless we act in a manner that
fundamentally changes their lives, the poor of the world may lose confidence in their
representatives and the democratic systems to which we remain committed, seeing their
representatives as nothing more than sounding brass or tinkling cymbals.
concerns for environmental degradation, poverty and exclusion

currently and regarding the long-term viability of existing approaches
in both environment and development. Figure 1.4 identifies the
principles of sustainable development identified by the UK
government. However, sustainable development is a term that has
currency well beyond international organisations and heads of state,
even becoming ‘hard to avoid’ (Gibson, 2005). It has been taken up
extensively by a range of organisations and interests and is a term
widely used in the media and across academic disciplines, for
example. It is used to sell products, justify policy decisions and
inspire action. For some, the term ‘sustainable development’ has
been redefined so many times and used to cover so many aspects of
society–environment relationships that there are ‘doubts on whether
anything good can ever be agreed’ (Mawhinney, 2002: 1). For others,
sustainable development is an idea that ‘makes a difference’
precisely because it requires debate and resolution of different
interests and because it challenges both researchers and policy-
makers alike (McNeill, 2000).
This chapter considers how and why sustainable development has
become such a widespread but also contested notion. It identifies a
number of different ‘meanings’ within different disciplinary
Figure 1.4 The UK Government’s Principles of Sustainable Development
I. Living within Environmental Limits

II. Ensuring a Strong, Healthy and Just Society
III. Achieving a Sustainable Economy
IV. Promoting Good Governance
V. Using Sound Science Responsibly
Living within Environmental Limits Ensuring a Strong,

Respecting the limits of the Healthy and Just Society
planet’s resources – to Meeting the diverse needs of all
improve our environment people in existing and future
ensuring that the natural communities, promoting well
resources needed for life are being, social cohesion and
unimpaired and remain so for inclusion and creating equal
future generations opportunities for all
Achieving a Sustainable Economy Promoting Good Governance Using Sound Science Responsibly
Building a strong, stable and Actively promoting effective, Ensuring policy is developed
sustainable economy which participative systems of and implemented on the
provides prosperity and governance in all levels of basis of strong scientific
opportunities for all, and in society – engaging people’s evidence, whilst taking into
which environmental and creativity, energy and account scientific uncertainty
social costs fall on those who diversity as well as public attitudes
impose them (polluter pays) and values
Source: Compiled from DEFRA (2005)
perspectives and considers changing ideas about how development

can best be achieved and the actions required to manage
environmental change. Identifying these changes in thinking and
practice from which the notion of sustainable development has
emerged is central to understanding the nature of current challenges
and actions for sustainable development (the focus of Chapters 2
and 3 respectively).
The concept of sustainable development
Literally, sustainable development refers to maintaining development

over time. However, there are possibly hundreds of definitions of
the term currently in circulation, many divergent interpretations
and thousands of variations applied in practice (Gibson, 2005).
Figure 1.5 lists just a small number of such definitions and the varied
interpretations of the concept. Definitions are important, as they are
the basis on which the means (strategies, policies and mechanisms)
for achieving sustainable development are built: how the human and
environmental ‘condition’ is thought about, viewed or understood
underpins subsequent interventions. As will be seen in this section,
Plate 1.1 Promoting the messages of sustainable development
a. Sign on entry to Kang, Botswana

Source: David Nash, University of Brighton.
b. Fresher’s Fair, University of Brighton, England

Source: Elona Hoover, University of Brighton.
different disciplines have influenced and contributed to the

sustainability debate, ‘each making different assumptions about the
relation between environment and the human subject’ (Lee et al.,
2000: 9) and assigning to it quite divergent orders of priority and
recommendations in terms of policies, programmes and projects.
Throughout this text, it will be apparent that although there are many
shared concerns for, emerging principles of and evidence of progress
towards sustainable development, there is also much uncertainty and
contestation regarding how to best promote sustainable change and
concerning the impacts of policies and mechanisms taken towards
sustainable development.
Figure 1.5 Defining and interpreting the contested concept of sustainable development
Definitions of sustainable development
‘In principle, such an optimal (sustainable growth) policy would seek to maintain an
“acceptable” rate of growth in per-capita real incomes without depleting the national capital
asset stock or the natural environmental asset stock.’
(Turner, 1988: 12)
‘The net productivity of biomass (positive mass balance per unit area per unit time)
maintained over decades to centuries.’
(Conway, 1987: 96)
‘Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.’
(WCED, 1987: 43)
‘A sustainable society is one in which peoples’ ability to do what they have good reason to
value is continually enhanced.’
(Sen, 1999)
Interpretations of sustainable development
‘Like motherhood, and God, it is difficult not to approve of it. At the same time, the idea of
sustainable development is fraught with contradictions.’
(Redclift, 1997: 438)
‘It is indistinguishable from the total development of society.’

(Barbier, 1987: 103)
‘Its very ambiguity enables it to transcend the tensions inherent in its meaning.’
(O’Riordan, 1995: 21)
‘Sustainable development appears to be an over-used, misunderstood phrase.’

(Mawhinney, 2002: 5)
As suggested in the quotations in Figure 1.5, the attractiveness of the

concept of sustainable development may lie precisely in the varied
ways in which it can be interpreted, enabling diverse and possibly
incompatible interests to ‘sign up to’ sustainable development and to
support a wide range of practical initiatives and causes. This is what
is termed ‘constructive ambiguity’ in understanding the concept that
enables a ‘strategic flexibility’ in terms of responses. However, it
also confirms the need for ongoing critical consideration of whose
values and interests are encompassed in particular kinds of policy
and practical intervention and who may suffer costs and losses, that
is, it is more than an academic debate. As Jacobs (1991) identified,
sustainable development is a ‘contestable concept’, that like
‘democracy’ or ‘equality’ has a basic meaning that almost everyone
is in favour of, but there are deep conflicts around how they should
be understood and fostered.
Sustainable development as ‘common sense’?

The challenges of understanding what the idea of sustainable
development may mean, and what it entails in practice is evident in
an analysis of the apparently simple definition provided by the
WCED in 1987 (identified above in Figure 1.5). Common sense
could suggest that development today should not be at the expense of
future generations, but what is it that one generation is passing to
another? Is it solely natural capital or does it include assets
associated with human ingenuity and the application of technology,
and what of language or other aspects of culture? The WCED
definition also embraces difficult notions of limits and needs. What
and how are limits set – by biophysical processes, technology or
society, for example? What do we know of the ‘needs’ of future
generations (or even the size and location of populations to come)?
Quite evidently, ‘needs’ can mean different things to different people
and change over time, linked to ‘development’ itself and society’s
ability to satisfy them. In one place, needs may be for open space
and clean air, and in another, for material wealth even at the cost of
greater pollution. How do we reconcile that needs in one place or
amongst particular groups are often fulfilled at the expense of others?
Or that development to date has enabled new needs to be defined
within certain groups (that could be interpreted as ‘wants’) without
satisfying the basic needs (increasingly understood as human rights)
of others? These questions highlight some of the many sources of
contestation in the debates over the meaning of sustainable
development: conflict between the interests of present generations

and those of the future; between human well-being and the protection
of nature; between poor and rich; and between local and global.
These questions frame the global challenges of sustainable
development of Chapter 2.
Framing the concept of sustainable development

A number of frameworks or typologies have been proposed as
a way of simplifying the evidently complex notion of sustainable
development. Commonly, sustainable development is presented as
three pillars, as seen in Figure 1.6. Such ‘architectural metaphors’
confirm the need to consider the social, ecological and economic
arenas together and equally (‘holistically’) if the building is to
Figure 1.6 Depictions of sustainable development
Economic
Sustainable
Development
Environment
Economy
Sustainability
Society
Social Natural
Natural
Social
Economic
remain upright and development is sustainable. However, such

depictions are less effective for communicating the interconnections
between the ‘uprights’ and the need to integrate thinking and action
in sustainable development across traditional disciplinary boundaries
and established policy-making departments, for example. These
principles of sustainable development are perhaps better portrayed by
interlocking circles with sustainable development as where the circles
intersect. Such depictions give attention to the objective of
sustainable development as seeking to maximise the goals across all
three spheres at the same time and the possibility of mutually
supportive (‘win-win-win’) gains that can be made through
sustainable development actions. The small area of overlap relative
to the whole sphere portrays the unsustainable nature of much
activity, but also opens the idea of the potential to expand this area
of positive overlap. Importantly, this model supports understanding
that achieving sustainable development in practice regularly involves
trade-offs across the different spheres; that difficult choices have to
be made at particular points in time and at particular scales as to
what is being pursued and how; that certain goals can be
compromised in the achievement of others; and that any action will
carry unequal impacts for particular interests and for groups of
people. This is the requirement for ‘systems thinking’ in sustainable
development.
A further depiction of sustainable development is of concentric or
‘nested’ circles where the spheres of economy and society are shown
as embedded in a wider circle of ecology. This portrays an
understanding of environmental limits setting the boundaries within
which a sustainable society and economy must be sought. This model
presents a better illustration of how all human activities depend
fundamentally on nature and portrays more clearly how activities that
damage the functioning of natural systems ultimately weaken the
basis of human existence itself.
Most recently, there have been suggestions that a further pillar sphere
of sustainable development is required, that of cultural diversity as
the root of a more moral, spiritual, ethical and sustainable way of
life. This is argued by indigenous peoples in particular and within
initiatives such as the Earth Charter that brings together a wide range
of civil society organisations with shared concerns for the values
underpinning more sustainable development: respect and care for
cultural diversity as well as ecological integrity and for universal
human rights and a culture of peace.
Disciplinary development of the concept

Whilst potentially all disciplines engage in some way with the
concept of sustainable development, early contributions came largely
from the ‘environmental’ spheres. As will be seen through this
chapter, particular environmental disciplines (notably ecology and
conservation biology) were especially prominent in important early
work towards understanding emerging environmental problems and
in designing measures to protect valued environments. These
disciplines provided the evidence to support environmental
movements and were instrumental in international legislation such as
the Convention on Biological Diversity agreed at the Rio Earth
Summit. Research from across the environmental sciences continues
to inform major global studies such as the UN Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and in understanding climate change
(discussed in Chapter 2). Developments in information
communication technology have been very important in enabling the
creation of vast databases and sophisticated modelling that are key to
Earth Systems Science. This relatively new field of study is centred
on integrating the physical, chemical and biological science
disciplines to address the complexity and uncertainties of global
environmental change and for understanding human activities as an
integrated component and planetary-scale force in the Earth system
(Steffen et al., 2004).
The disciplines of economics have also been very important in
shaping the concept and practices of sustainable development. Their
role in developing the notion of ‘critical natural capital’ is explored
in Box 1.1. Ecological economists have also developed a range of
means for applying economic calculations to environmental resources
towards costing resources and resource functions both as inputs to
economic activity and in terms of degradation and pollution. This
work has underpinned a host of what are termed ‘market-based
mechanisms’ towards achieving sustainable development in practice.
These are considered more fully in a number of subsequent sections
and chapters (as they are now widely used but are also heavily
debated). Essentially, market-based mechanisms encompass measures
to alter the economic costs of particular behaviours and production
practices towards more sustainable outcomes. Simple examples are
environmental taxes on petrol use and solid waste disposal that make
these practices more costly to individuals and businesses.
Most recently, it is the third sphere of the models in Figure 1.6 that
has accommodated much work in sustainable development.
Box 1.1
Forms of capital for sustainable development

For economists, various forms of ‘capital’ provide the capability to generate
human well-being. These are human capital (skills, knowledge and
technology, for example), physical capital (encompassed in housing, roads
and machinery etc.) and natural capital (stocks of natural resources such as
oil and minerals, but also biological diversity, atmospheric and hydrological
cycles and such like). Economists query what forms of capital the concept of
sustainable development requires us to consider for future generations; is it
the ‘overall stock’ of human, physical and natural capital (suggesting that all
forms of capital are equal and that a loss of wetlands could be compensated
for by an increase in roads, for example)? Or are particular forms of capital
more ‘valuable’, more important for well-being or more fundamental to
future human survival?
Economists recognise that environmental resources are varied in terms of
their location, volume and the functions that they provide for economic
activity. Furthermore, environmental resources differ in terms of whether
they can be ‘substituted’ or replaced by other resources and/or forms of
capital. Hence, ecological economists differentiate between three categories
of ‘natural capital’ in Figure 1.7. ‘Critical natural capital’ comprises those
assets that cannot be recreated and are lost forever if degraded.
Figure 1.7 Categories of natural capital
Critical natural capital: capital that is required for survival. It can be viewed
as functional (such as the presence of the ozone layer or the atmosphere in
general) or valued (for example rare species valued in terms of their potential
for health care).
Constant natural capital: capital that must be maintained in some form but
can be adapted or replaced.
Tradable natural capital: natural capital which is not scarce or highly valued
and which can be replaced.
The notion of critical natural capital (whilst still debated) has informed ideas
of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability in practice. A weak interpretation of
sustainable development is where the total capital stock passed onto the next
generation is constant or growing and all forms of natural capital can
therefore be traded off and substituted with human capital. Strong
sustainability demands the protection of critical natural capital because once
lost, these assets are lost forever, and they cannot be recreated.
Source: compiled from Pearce et al. (1989); Barr (2008).
Discussions of sustainability as a political process have been taken

up by a number of the social sciences centred on questions of power
and outcomes for particular groups of people, across space and time.
In short, this work raises sustainable development as a moral concept
that seeks to define a ‘fair and just’ development (Starkey and
Walford, 2001). The notion of ‘environmental justice’ is now a
prominent part of contemporary discussions of the meaning and
practice of sustainable development (see Walker, 2012). It points in
particular to the distributional conflicts around the environment as
outcomes of development that are occurring now and being
disproportionately felt by some social groups within the current
generation. The concern is for how environmental ‘bads’ (such as
pollution and the degradation of ecosystem functioning) and ‘goods’
(including access to environmental resources that may be the material
basis for livelihood or green space valued for health and recreational
opportunities) are distributed across society. Environmental justice
also encompasses a concern for the equity of environmental
management interventions (who benefits and who loses through
these) and for the nature of public involvement in decision-making.
Evidently, understanding the concept of sustainable development is
itself a challenge. Gibson (2005: 39) suggests that ‘out of the great
diversity of theoretical formulations and applications, an essential
commonality of shared concerns and principles can now be
identified’. These are shown in Figure 1.8. It is clear that sustainable
development embraces a rejection of things as they are in terms of
the current patterns of environment and development globally.
However, sustainable development is not an identifiable ‘end point’
or ‘state’ but requires ongoing critical consideration of the processes
(the ‘means’) of development and decision making across all spheres
of life. Hence, there is no blueprint for how to achieve sustainable
development; rather the nature of sustainable development will be
specific to particular places and points in time. However, the
challenges of finding more positive alternatives to existing patterns
and processes of development are universal and globally linked. In
order to identify the challenges and opportunities of implementing
sustainable development in practice, the following sections consider
more fully the changes in thinking and practice from which the
concept has developed. As Adams (2009: 26) suggests, sustainable
development cannot be understood in ‘an historical vacuum’.
Of particular importance are the changes in thinking about what
constitutes ‘development’ and how best to achieve it, and changing
Figure 1.8 The shared essentials of the concept of sustainability
The concept of sustainability is:

G a challenge to conventional thinking and practice
G about long-term and short-term well-being
G comprehensive, covering all the core issues of decision-making
G recognition of the links and interdependencies, especially between humans and the
biophysical foundations for life
G embedded in a world of complexity and surprise, in which precautionary approaches are
necessary
G recognition of both inviolable limits and endless opportunities for creative innovation
G about an open-ended process, not a state
G about intertwined means and ends – culture and governance as well as ecology, society
and economy
G both universal and context dependent
Source: Gibson (2005).
ideas about the ‘environment’ and actions required to manage

environmental change. The following sections consider how certain
ideas gained strength within particular political and economic
contexts of the time (and in relation to the development and
environment outcomes on the ground) to shape policies, strategies
and solutions proposed. It will be seen that whilst the development
and environment literatures in the past were substantially separate,
the debates on sustainable development have been important in
reshaping understanding and action in both these arenas and have
brought them closer together.
Changing perceptions of development
Poverty, hunger, disease and debt have been familiar words within the
lexicon of development ever since formal development planning
began, following the Second World War. In the past decade they have
been joined by sustainability.
(Adams, 2001: 1)
Development is often discussed in relation to ‘developing countries’,

but is a concept which relates to all parts of the world at every level,
from the individual to global transformations (Potter et al., 2008) and
ideas about the best means to achieve these transformations are
potentially as old as human civilisation. The origins of the modern
era of international development as a planned activity and of

development studies as a subject is suggested to link back to a
speech made by President Truman of the US in 1949 when he
employed the term ‘underdeveloped areas’ and identified poverty as a
threat to prosperity and peace both within those areas and for the
world as a whole. It was a time of post-war recovery in Europe for
which the US administration had provided financial assistance
through the Marshall Plan. Forty-four countries, largely from the
industrialised world, had also come together at the Bretton Woods
conference in 1944 to form the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
These new international organisations were designed to prevent the
economic crisis and conflict that had characterised the previous
period and ensure future economic stability, prosperity and a more
peaceful world (see Willis, 2011 in this series).
Since these beginnings, the interdisciplinary field of development
studies has seen many changes in thinking regarding the meaning
and purpose of development (ideologies) and in development practice
in the field (strategies of development). The following sections
consider what in retrospect can be identified as key turning points in
thinking about development that reshaped strategies in practice.
Although these shifts are considered chronologically, rarely are
theories totally replaced; rather, new ones find relative favour and
contestation over the prescriptions for development flowing from
them continue (Potter et al., 2008).
Optimistic early decades

During the 1950s and 1960s, development thinking (encompassing
aspects of ideology and strategy) prioritised economic growth and the
application of modern scientific and technical knowledge as the route
to prosperity for countries considered ‘underdeveloped’ at that time.
In short, the ‘global development problem’ was conceived as one in
which less developed nations needed to ‘catch up’ with the West and
enter the modern age of capitalism and liberal democracy.
Underdevelopment was seen as an initial stage through which
western nations had progressed and the gaps in development that
existed could be gradually overcome through an ‘imitative process’
(Hettne, 2002: 7), through a sharing of the experience of the West in
terms of capital and know-how. The process of development was
seen in terms of modernisation and, in turn, modernisation was
equated with westernisation (and an associated faith in the rationality

of science and technology) during this period.
Insights from neo-classical economics as modelled by authors such
as Rostow (1960) were very influential. Rostow suggested a linear
path to economic development through a set of stages seen in
Figure 1.9. His theory was based on the experience and history of the
more developed societies (i.e. a Eurocentric stance) and his work
offered the prospect of almost formulaic growth towards a modern
economy and society that all countries could achieve if they followed
a set of rules. Rostow’s work was published at the height of the
Cold War between the US and Russia and he himself was fiercely
anti-communist. Industrialisation in a capitalist context was the
central requirement in his model for moving from a traditional
society based on agriculture to an urban-based society of high mass
consumption. There was a key role for governments in stimulating
local investment, demand and savings, in setting appropriate levels
of taxes and ensuring that markets could operate efficiently.
International assistance could also help countries reach the critical
‘take-off’ stage, after which the benefits of development and
characteristics of modernisation would inevitably and spontaneously
flow from the core to less-developed regions (both internationally
and internally).
Figure 1.9 The stages of economic development as modelled by Rostow
Exploitation of
comparative
Investment in manufacturing advantages in
exceeds 10 per cent of international trade
national income; development High mass
of modern social, political and consumption
economic institutions Drive to
Installation of physical Development
maturity
infrastructure and emergence of welfare
of political/social elite Take-off services
Transition triggered Development of
by external influences, wider industrial and
interests or markets Preconditions commercial base
Development of a
for take-off
manufacturing
Traditional Commercial sector
society exploitation of
agriculture and
extractive industry
Limited technology
Static society
Source: adapted from Rostow (1960).

This ‘modernisation thesis’ dominated mainstream theories of

economic development from the late 1950s through to the early
1970s. It was an optimistic time: it was thought that
underdevelopment was due to constraints that were internal to these
countries and could be solved quickly through the transfer of finance,
technology and experience from the developed countries and through
the spatial diffusion of modernity from the West and from urban
centres to rural areas. There was the understanding of a linear,
unconstrained path to economic development and an ‘unswerving
faith in the efficacy of urban-based industrial growth’ (Potter et al.,
2008: 94). Development planning in practice was characterised by
large infrastructure, industrial and agricultural modernisation
projects, mobilising new technologies and was increasingly financed
through international borrowing. There was little concern for the
environmental impacts of these policies on behalf of governments
keen to deliver economic growth or amongst international donors
and banks. The concern was ‘grow now, clean up later’ (Willis,
2011: 168).
The optimism of development theorists was generally not borne out
by experience of development on the ground in that period. By the
1970s, inequality between and within countries had in fact worsened.
The empirical evidence concerning economic growth as measured by
gross national product (GNP) suggested that, whilst change had been
achieved, ‘development’ was not shared equally amongst the
populations of these nations. For example in Brazil in 1970, the
poorest 40 per cent of the population received only 6.5 per cent of
the total national income, in contrast to the 66.7 per cent of the total
national income received by the richest 20 per cent of the population
(Todaro, 1997). The optimism about a speedy end to
underdevelopment started to fade.
During the late 1960s and 1970s, development thinking was
influenced strongly by the writings of scholars within the developing
world itself, particularly from Latin America and the Caribbean
(notably those regions most strongly linked to the United States).
They considered the socioeconomic structures and economic
conditions of their countries in terms of the exploitative/dependent
relations with other parts of the world, particularly through
colonialism in the past and with the capitalist economy generally.
The politics of development came to the fore within what became
known as the radical or ‘dependency’ school of thought, most closely
associated with the work of Andre Gunder Frank (1967), a European
economist trained in America, but who carried out much research in

Central and Latin America. In Europe too at this time, there was a
reinvigorated interest in the work of Marx and an emerging ‘New
Left’ movement that linked with the struggles of the Third World
anti-colonial movements (Potter et al., 2008).
Fundamentally, the assertion in dependency theory was that
underdevelopment was not the result of any inadequacies in
economic, social or environmental conditions within those countries
themselves, but the direct outcome of development elsewhere and the
manner in which those countries were incorporated into the
operations of the international capitalist system, that is, the structural
disadvantages of these countries and regions. Rather than seeing the
USA and Europe as the source of a cure for the ills of the developing
world, dependency theorists saw the role of these regions as the
origin of those ills, in actively creating the problems of
underdevelopment. To use Frank’s terminology, development and
underdevelopment were two sides of the same coin. As illustrated in
Figure 1.10, peripheral or satellite regions and countries are
integrated into the world system through processes of unequal
exchange and dependent relations with the metropolitan core. In
consequence, the further entrenched they become in such processes,
the more they are held back in development, rather than enabled to
progress. This ‘development of underdevelopment’ was modelled as
applying to processes of unequal exchange operating both
internationally and internally within countries, and was used to
explain patterns of regional and national underdevelopment in
countries like Brazil.
The barriers to development as modelled by dependency theorists lay
in the international division of labour and the terms of trade, rather
than a lack of capital or entrepreneurial skills as within
modernisation thinking. One of the principal policy responses to flow
from these ideas was import substitution industrialisation (ISI). ISI is
a strategy to enable peripheral countries to industrialise through
looking inward (setting up domestic industry and supplying markets
previously served by imports). It depends on a strong role for the
state in protecting new industries via import tariffs and quotas and
controlled access to foreign exchange. Many Latin American
countries such as Brazil and Argentina had established substantial
industrial bases by the 1960s using this strategy towards providing
consumer goods such as clothing, cars, food and drinks to sizeable
home markets. However, ISI proved less successful in relation to the
Figure 1.10 The Frank model of underdevelopment
Developing metropolitan economy Primary commodities
Underdeveloping satellite economy Manufactured goods
Metropolitan sphere of influence Inter-metropolitan trade
Capitalist world system Flow of surplus profits
Source: adapted from Corbridge (1987).
production of intermediate and capital goods which were more

capital- than labour-intensive (Hewitt, 2000). There were also
internal problems including the lack of domestic capital to invest in
such production and a lack of purchasing power on behalf of local,
relatively poor, citizens. Other means towards ‘withdrawal’ from the
international capitalist economy, such as through the formation of
regional trading areas (as a means for expanding domestic markets),
were not generally sustained over time. In short, dependency theory
did much to expose the structural disadvantages of peripheral
countries in relation to the capitalist core, and therefore how unlikely
it was that they would follow the stages of economic growth mapped
out on the basis of early experiences in Europe and North America

(as modelled by modernisation theorists). However, the internal
problems of local economies were generally underestimated within
dependency theory. Critics also highlight that the fastest growing
economies at that time, Japan and the ‘Newly Industrialising
Countries’ of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, were
pursuing policies based generally on opening rather than closing their
economies to external trade and export-led growth.
The lost decade of the 1980s?

By the 1980s, dependency theory gradually moved ‘out of fashion’,
criticised in particular for its rather deterministic emphasis on the
role of external economic structures in shaping society and
development. Commentators were starting to consider the basic
development conditions and needs of people within countries of the
developing world, to focus on issues of self-reliance in development
and on the internal forces of change. The expression ‘another
development’ is often used as an umbrella term to include a broad
sweep of changes in thinking regarding development and how best to
achieve it from the late 1970s. Phrases such as ‘growth with equity’
or ‘redistribution with growth’ recognised that economic growth
remained a fundamental component within development, but that it
was critical to ensure that the benefits did not fall solely to a
minority of the population. ‘Development’ became seen as a
multidimensional concept encapsulating widespread improvements in
the social as well as the material well-being of all in society.
In practice, these ideas meant that there was no single model or
means for achieving development, rather it required investment in all
sectors, across agriculture and industry and in health and education,
for example. Diverse strategies (with a strong role for rural-based
strategies) of ‘development from below’ (Stohr and Taylor, 1981)
were envisaged, in contrast to single, ‘top-down’ models and urban-
led growth in particular. It was asserted that development needed to
be closely related to the specific local, historical, socio-cultural and
institutional conditions of places, focused on mobilising the internal
natural and human resources through appropriate technologies and
giving priority to basic needs. In stark contrast to the theories of
development up to that time, development in practice was to be more
inclusive, with individual and cooperative actions and enterprises
becoming the central means for (or ‘agents’ of) development. Strong
notions of ‘participatory development’ emerged in recognition of the

shortcomings of top-down, externally imposed and expert-oriented
research and development practice (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).
Furthermore, it started to be understood that development needed to
be sustainable; it must encompass not only economic and social
activities, but also those related to population, the use of natural
resources and the resulting impacts on the environment.
The 1980s, however, have been referred to as the ‘lost decade’ in
development. The suggestion is that with the exception of the ‘Asian
Tigers’, the widespread experience in the developing world was of
‘development reversals’, that is, previous gains were lost and in
many cases went into reverse. Table 1.1 confirms that world
economic growth slowed through the decade, most markedly in
developing regions and in particular in Africa and Latin America. In
contrast, in India, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and
Indonesia, for example, high levels of economic growth were
reached. In combination with the earlier ‘success stories’ of the
region, these experiences have been termed the ‘East Asian miracle’
(World Bank, 1993). The general ‘openness’ of these economies to
foreign investment and a limited role of the state in economic
activities has been widely used to explain the development
performance of these countries relative to other developing regions.
For many developing countries through the 1980s, development had
to be pursued in the context of global economic recession and a
mounting ‘debt crisis’. Starting in Latin America, with Brazil and
Mexico announcing that they could no longer service their official
Table 1.1 Economic growth rates in the world economy, 1971–2000 (annual growth
rates in constant 1990 $US)
GDP per capita 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000
World 2.22 0.20 1.21

Industrialised countries 2.60 2.04 2.07
Developing countries 2.14 –0.17 1.04
Latin America 2.40 –0.83 1.26
Africa 1.04 –0.39 0.30
Asia 3.10 0.57 2.19
China 3.38 7.60 9.34
India 0.78 3.68 3.33
Source: compiled from Nayyar (2008) based on UN data.

debts, concern spread through the commercial banks and northern

governments (that had previously lent huge monies in a context of
low interest rates and global expansion) about widespread defaulting
and the possible collapse of the international monetary system.
Economic recession impacted on developing countries through a
combination of declining international demand, increasing
protectionism in the industrialised countries, deteriorating terms of
trade, negative capital flows, continuing high interest rates and
unfavourable lending conditions. These factors had serious
implications for the environment, as considered in Chapter 3, and
were primary aspects of the context in which sustainable
development was pursued in the 1980s (and remain so). Not only did
interest repayments mean money going out without any direct
impacts on productive development internally, but savings had to be
made, typically in the finance for environment departments and
through cuts in social services. Domestic development policies were
also increasingly shaped by the conditions laid down by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund for further lending, as
detailed below.
Through the 1980s there was also a considered ‘impasse in
development studies’ (Schurmann, 2008). The suggestion was that
‘old certainties’ concerning understanding development were ‘fading
away’ and that existing theories ‘could ever less adequately explain
experiences of development and underdevelopment’ (p. 13), that is,
there was a concern about how development was being theorised as
well as the concerns over the increasingly diverse, inequitable and
often negative experiences of development impacts on the ground.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the early
1990s undermined the strength of Marxist analyses that had
underpinned dependency theories. A ‘post-modern’ critique within
the social sciences generally at this time was also fundamentally
about moving away from an era dominated by notions of
modernisation and modernity. Furthermore, processes of
‘globalisation’ whereby countries and regions of the world were seen
to be becoming more widely and deeply interconnected and ever
more global in character, were also changing the position of the
nation state and national governments across economic, social and
political spheres. Yet the nation state was central to existing theories
of development, as seen above. These factors raised many questions
for those involved in both development thinking and practice through
the 1990s.
The neo-liberal 1990s

From the late 1980s, disillusionment with the record of state
involvement in the economy (and social life more broadly) mounted
in the North. This was illustrated in the ascendancy of conservative
governments and the politics of Reagan and Thatcher in the US and
UK, for example. A belief in what Simon (2008: 86) terms the
‘magic of the market’ developed and neo-liberal ideas of
development took hold. Neo-liberalism is essentially an approach to
development that considers the free market to be the best way to
initiate and sustain economic development. Typical policy
implications of such an approach therefore centre on removing the
influence of the state in markets; removing tariffs on imports and
subsidies on exports, for example, and denationalising public
industries and service provision. The roots of neo-liberalism are in
the neo-classical economics of Adam Smith and ‘this ideology
rapidly became the economic orthodoxy in the North and was
exported to the global South via aid policies and the measures
formulated to address the debt crisis’ (Simon, 2008: 87).
For many developing nations, their entry into the world economy
through the 1990s was increasingly defined by the World Bank (WB)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As confirmed, many
developing countries began to experience severe balance of payments
difficulties in the 1980s that were considered to threaten the
international financial system as a whole. Debt became the concern
of the two ‘mainstays of the global economic order’, the WB and the
IMF. The assessment was that the economic crisis in developing
countries was more than a temporary liquidity issue (as it had been
conceived in the 1970s). Rather, comprehensive, longer-term
solutions were required, based on packages of broad policy reforms
in indebted nations. The term ‘structural adjustment programme’
(SAP) is used to refer to the generic activities of the IMF and WB in
this arena. The central objective of SAPs as defined by the WB was
to ‘modify the structure of an economy so that it can maintain both
its growth rate and the viability of its balance of payments in the
medium term’ (Reed, 1996: 41), that is, to address issues of debt.
Whilst each package of policy reform was tailored for the particular
country, SAPs in practice included many or all of the elements listed
in Figure 1.11. The significance of neo-liberal development ideas in
shaping the policy prescriptions for economic restructuring and
future development are clear; countries needed to increase the role of
the market in their domestic economies and open their economies to
Figure 1.11 The principal instruments of structural adjustment
Cuts in:
G government expenditure
G public sector employment
G real wages
Pricing policies designed to:

G eliminate food subsidies
G raise agricultural prices
G cost recovery in public services
Trade liberalisation involving:

G currency devaluation
G credit reform
G privatisation of state-owned institutions
G higher interest rates
overseas investment and expand exports. The problems were

considered to be internal to the indebted countries and the failings of
past policies (particularly in terms of the over-involvement of the
state in the economy).
It has been argued that the impacts of SAPs quickly went far beyond
the original national contexts for which they were designed, to
become an instrument for global economic restructuring (Reed, 1996)
and through the conditions attached, they enabled the IMF and WB
to ‘virtually control the economies’ of many developing nations
(Hildyard, 1994: 26). The impacts of SAPs on economy, society and
the environment have been widely documented and hotly debated
(including from within the WB and IMF). Whilst they enabled
countries through the period to access development finance (at a time
when commercial lending and bilateral sources were restricted) and
to achieve a degree of economic stability, they did not solve the
challenges of debt. There is also a consensus that SAPs were ‘blind’
both to environmental and gender impacts and underestimated the
social impacts particularly for most vulnerable groups. The impacts
of SAPs on the prospects for sustainable development and the ways
in which the WB has subsequently modified its policies are discussed
in Chapter 3.
In short, what had been a very strong consensus within thinking on
development started to unravel towards the new millennium.
Recognition grew of the unprecedented changes of a global character

occurring in all arenas of economic, social, political (and
environmental) activity and the term ‘globalisation’ became ‘widely
used to explain the causes and effects of most aspects of life at the
turn of the century’ (Willett, 2001: 1). Whilst global links and
interconnections between places and peoples around the world had
existed previously (through colonial ties or the spread of Islam, for
example), globalisation was considered different from earlier periods
including for the immediacy and intensity with which other parts of
the world are now experienced within a ‘speeded up’ and ‘hyper-
connected’ world. Current processes of global integration also now
extend to much more than the flow of resources, people, goods and
services, for example, as illustrated further in Chapters 2 and 3.
However, globalisation was quickly seen to have an uneven reach.
For example, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a key driver of
economic globalisation (Dicken, 2011). It refers to investments made
overseas by companies (including setting up branches and investing
in other firms). In 2000, such investments were largely occurring in
other high income countries, as seen in Table 1.2, and the African
continent could be suggested to be only loosely connected to this
globalising economy. The rapid development and expansion of
information communication technologies (particularly the internet
and mobile phone technologies) has also been an important driver
of economic (and cultural) globalisation. Yet, as illustrated in
Figure 1.12, experience of this digital revolution has been uneven
across world regions. Furthermore, understanding rose through
the 1990s that not only were certain parts of the world being
Table 1.2 Inward foreign direct investment, by major world region, 2000
Total flows, millions of dollars % of world total
World 1,167,337
Low income countries 6,812 0.6
Middle income countries 150,572 12.9
High income countries 1,009,929 86.5
East Asia and Pacific 42,847 4.0
Europe and Central Asia 28,495 2.4
Latin America and Caribbean 75,088 6.4
Middle East and North Africa 1,209 0.1
South Asia 3,093 0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,676 0.6
Source: Compiled from World Bank (2003a).

Figure 1.12 Uneven regional patterns of ICT: a) mobile phones per 1,000 people;
b) internet users per 1,000 people
a b
Number of subscribers Number of users
600 Europe 600
North America
North America
500 500
400 400
300 300
Latin America and Europe

200 the Caribbean 200
West Asia
Asia and the Pacific Latin America and
100 100 the Caribbean
Africa Asia and the Pacific
West Asia
0 0 Africa
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source: UNEP (2007).
‘left out’, but processes of globalisation worked through existing

patterns of uneven development to create increased differences
between places (Castree, 2003).
One of the most radical reactions within development thinking to
these dilemmas of development on the ground and to the limitations
of neo-liberal ideas came from what is known as the ‘post-
development’ school. Theorists such as Escobar (1995) consider
development not in terms of structures of production or trade
markets, but as a discourse and set of practices. Hence, they
scrutinise the ideas, assumptions and power of particular
representations of how societies and economies should develop.
Within this thinking, the very idea of development as a desirable
process itself is questioned given the ways in which it ‘involves a
dependent and subordinate process, creates and widens spatial
inequalities, harms local cultures and values, perpetuates poverty and
poor working and living conditions, produces unsustainable
environments, and infringes human rights and democracy’ (Hodder,
2000: 17). The ‘development project’ is also considered a ‘failed’
project (Rapley, 2008: 177) and is condemned for creating and
producing the opposite of what it promised (Corbridge, 1999). In
short, a post-development era depends on breaking the ‘holds of
westernisation’ be it as organised by the aid industry or by the
activities of western private capital. ‘Defending the local’ (such as
through ecological, women’s and people’s organisations) and
resisting the forces of globalisation are core prescriptions for change.

Post-developmentalists emphasise grassroots participation and the
capacities of organisations at the local level as agents of change (the
suggestion being that the state has failed for the way that it has
facilitated the westernisation of the development project). The post-
development school has been criticised, among other things, for
focusing on the ‘worst’ experiences of the last decades (Rigg, 1997)
and of throwing ‘the baby out with the bathwater’ (Rapley, 2008:
180). However, it has helped reaffirm the importance of
understanding difference and diversity and multiple paths to and
patterns of development that are key principles for moving to more
sustainable development processes, as seen in later chapters.
Rethinking development in the twenty-first century

By the end of the twentieth century, neo-liberal development ideas
and policy prescriptions were increasingly challenged by outcomes
seen in practice. In late 1996, for example, the decision by the
government of Thailand to devalue their currency caused concern
amongst international investors as to the overall stability of the Thai
economy. This led to the withdrawal of large amounts of foreign
capital and the development of a financial crisis that spread rapidly to
countries in the wider region. The outcome was falling levels of
economic growth and rising poverty in subsequent years. However,
as Willis (2011) identifies, just as the Asian ‘miracle’ had many
dimensions, so the experience of ‘crisis’ was different. Taiwan and
Japan experienced little impact for example. Whilst there are
competing explanations of whether the crisis was due to these Asian
countries following the neo-liberal model too closely or not closely
enough, it was confirmation of the diverse and increasingly volatile
nature of economic development at the turn of the century. Neo-
liberal prescriptions for development and the negative consequences
of globalisation processes more widely were also being resisted
politically. A growing ‘anti-globalisation’ movement drew together a
wide array of groups including environmentalists, unions, peasant
farmers, workers and feminists, in respect to what were understood
as their shared concerns. Most visible were demonstrations at major
meetings of those institutions such as the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and the World Bank that were central in promoting neo-
liberalism. In 1999, for example, around 600,000 protesters and 700
different groups took to the streets in Seattle to disrupt the
proceedings of the WTO conference.
The recent global economic crisis is a further source of much

rethinking of previous development models. What started in late
2008 in the US as a financial crisis (within commercial banks and
investment firms) quickly extended into a broader economic crisis
affecting most countries globally. For many commentators, the crisis
has undermined the credibility of the neo-liberal approach
irreversibly. As the UK and US governments, for example,
intervened to ‘bail out’ private banks (considered ‘too big to fail’ if
the international financial system was to be preserved) and developed
varied measures to stimulate and support domestic economies
(through public finances), the suggestion is that this constitutes a
‘dramatic reversal of the neoliberal philosophy that had come to
dominate the political economy of most countries over the previous
30 years’ (Knox and Marston, 2009: 10). Furthermore as Glennie
(2009) suggests, these policy options (of state intervention in
commercial markets on behalf of the public good) had effectively
been denied (by those same governments) to many aid recipient
countries through the conditions of structural adjustment
programmes. A former Chief Economist at the WB suggests
that developing countries are the ‘innocent victims’ of the crisis:
‘those countries that are the most closely integrated into the
global economy, having followed the advice of the international
economic institutions and opened themselves up the most,
have been amongst the worst hit’ (Stiglitz, 2009: 40).
In some senses, development studies finds itself currently in a
context similar to that of its origins; a new era of global cooperation
is widely considered necessary to ensure global economic recovery
that requires resisting a return to national protectionism (Stiglitz,
2009). Cooperation is also essential for addressing the (very much
related) global environmental problems, including of climate change
(Sachs, 2008; Giddens, 2009). The challenges for sustainable
development within this current context are the focus of Chapter 2.
Changing perceptions of the environment
The history of environmental concern is quite similar to that of

development studies: although people have held and articulated
varying attitudes towards nature stretching back many years, it is
since the 1960s that a coherent philosophy and language surrounding
the environment (‘environmentalism’ as defined by Pepper in 1984)
can be identified. In continuity with ‘development thinking’, it is

possible to identify significant differences and changes over time
concerning ideas about the environment; such as regarding
humanity’s fundamental relationship with nature, the influence of
particular environmental disciplines and in terms of the prescribed
conservation requirements. Although the focus here is largely on
‘mainstream’ environmentalism – that is, the broad consensus that
can be identified as forwarded within successive conferences and
publications of international institutions, for example – the diversity
within this mainstream and at particular points in time should not be
underestimated. As Martinez-Alier (2002: 1) suggests, ‘not all
environmentalists think and act alike’; among other things they draw
support from different areas of environmental science such as
conservation biology, environmental economics and political
ecology, as seen through the next section. Box 1.2 illustrates a well-
cited way of thinking through the differences that exist within
environmentalism.
Development as environmentally destructive

In the 1960s, environmentalism was largely a movement reflecting
European and American white, middle-class concerns. The
undesirable effects of industrial and economic development were
beginning to be seen via a number of ‘conspicuous pollution
incidents’ (Bartelmus, 1994: 5) and people were worried about the
effects on their own lifestyles and health: ‘after two centuries of
industrialism and urbanisation, people now began to rediscover the
idea that they were part of nature’ (McCormick, 1995: 56).
Environmentalists in the US and Europe campaigned on issues such
as air pollution and whaling and often received substantial support
from the media. In contrast to earlier nature protection or
conservation movements within these regions, environmentalism
became overtly activist and political. The combination of actual
changes in the environment and people’s perceptions generally at this
time brought widespread public support for the environmental
movement, particularly amongst the younger groups. As Biswas and
Biswas (1985: 25) suggested, ‘the environment and Vietnam became
two of the major issues over which youth rebelled against the
establishment’. For the new environmentalists, it was not solely their
local outdoor environments which were perceived to be under threat,
but human survival itself. A number of very influential ‘global future
studies’ were published in the early 1970s which served to reinforce
Box 1.2
Modes of thought concerning humanity and nature

It is argued that society’s desire to manipulate nature, concomitant with an acceptance
that the Earth nurtures our own existence, is inherent in the human condition.
‘Technocentric’ and ‘ecocentric’ refer to the two extreme positions. In reality, the
distinction between these different perspectives is often blurred. As O’Riordan (1981)
suggests, rarely is the world so neatly divided into two camps; rather we all tend to
favour certain elements of both modes, depending on such factors as our changing
economic status and the institutional setting or issue at hand. The categories should not,
therefore, be thought of as rigidly fixed or mutually exclusive.
Technocentric Ecocentric
Environmental Human-centred: humanity has Earth-centred: the Earth nurtures
philosophies: a desire to manipulate nature humanity’s existence and should
and make the world a more be treated with respect and
certain place in which to live. humility.
Green labels: ‘Dry Green’ ‘Deep Green’
Reformist in that the present Radical in that quite rapid and
economic system is accepted, fundamental changes in economy
but considered to require some and society are desired.
gradual revision.
Belief in political status quo, Supports devolved, political
but more responsible and structures with emphasis on self-
accountable institutions. Self- reliant communities and pursuit
regulation through ‘enlightened of justice and redistribution
conscience’. across generations.
Environmental Reliance on scientific Management strategies geared to
management credibility, modelling and retaining global stability based
strategies: prediction. on ecological principles of
diversity and homeostasis.
Promotes the appropriate New and fundamentally different
manipulation of markets to conservation solutions required
create cost-effective solutions which are flexible and adaptable.
to environmental improvements.
Sustainable development Alternative and appropriate
through rational use of resources, technologies.
better planning and clean
technologies, for example.
Sources: compiled from Pepper (1996), O’Riordan (1981) and O’Riordan (1995).
and spread the fears and influence of western environmentalists. For

example, texts such as The Population Bomb (Ehrlich, 1968),
Blueprint for Survival (Goldsmith et al., 1972) and The Limits to
Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) modelled an ever-expanding
population and mounting demands of society on a fundamentally
finite resource base.
Development and conservation were framed as incompatible: in
conceiving the ‘environment’ as the stocks of substances found in
nature, by definition these resources were considered to be ultimately
limited and pollution and environmental deterioration understood as
the inevitable consequences of industrial development. Based on this
thinking, urgent and profound actions were required including
population control in the developing world and ‘zero-growth’ in the
world economy. The global future predictions gave little attention to
the social, technological or institutional factors which affect the
relationship between people and resources. Further to such
environmental determinism, these reports were ahistorical in the
sense that, for example, they gave no attention to how or why the
world is divided into rich and poor. They were also apolitical in
considering the future of the Earth (rather than people) as the
Plate 1.2 The inevitable consequences of development? Industrial air pollution
Source: Gordon Walker, Lancaster University.

overriding and paramount concern, with no consideration of how the

solutions advocated would favour some nations or groups over
others.
Not surprisingly, this environmental movement found little support in
the developing nations; many such countries (outside Latin America)
had only just gained independence and were sceptical regarding the
motives behind proposals which seemed to limit their development
objectives and remove sovereign control over resources. For
developing nations (and their citizens) their development concerns
were ‘too little industry’ rather than too much and were in stark
contrast to the position of the more industrialised countries which
used and consumed the bulk of resources and contributed most to the
resulting industrial pollution.
In 1972, environmental issues became part of the international
political agenda when 113 countries attended the UN Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm. The conference has been
referred to as a key event in the emergence of the discources of
sustainable development and the integration of human development
and environmental concerns as a global challenge. However, Adams
suggests that ‘it was only partly, and belatedly, concerned with the
environmental and developmental problems of the emerging Third
World’ (2009: 59). The primary impetus for the conference had been
the developed world’s concerns about the international and cross-
border effects of industrialisation (Sweden, for example, being
particularly concerned about acid rain). In the event, the dialogue
between government representatives, and within parallel meetings of
NGOs at the conference, soon moved to wider issues including the
relationship between environment and development issues. The term
‘pollution of poverty’ was used to refer to the environmental
concerns of the poor, such as lack of clean water or sanitation, which
threatened life itself for many in the developing world. It also
encompassed the emerging recognition that a lack of development
could also cause environmental degradation. However, detailed
discussions of the links between poverty and environmental
degradation or indeed the causes of poverty were limited at
Stockholm. Whilst it was made clear that environment and
development should be integrated, it was left unclear as to how this
should happen (Adams, 2009).
Environmental scientists played a key role at this time in explaining
environmental problems and providing the basis for policy measures
Plate 1.3 The pollution of poverty
a) Hazardous housing on a Kolkata roadside

Source: author.
b) Washing in the Jakarta floods

Source: author.
to address them. The principal responses (discussed more fully in

Chapter 3) were through regulation and what have been referred to as
‘command and control’ instruments. To address and manage the
detrimental ‘side-effects’ of economic development, national
governments created a host of laws and regulations to specify the
standards of pollution control that production processes and products
had to meet. In this way, particular types of activity (such as
discharging agricultural and industrial effluents into water courses)
could be controlled, harmful substances (such as DDT) were banned
from use and industry (the largest polluter at the time) was made to
invest in the technologies to reduce polluting emissions. Through the
1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of international agreements
and treaties based on similar regulatory mechanisms were also
developed (termed ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, MEAs).
These set the principles and rules for how individual states should
behave in relation to cross-boundary environmental problems (such
as acid rain but also including trade in certain materials and species),
in relation to common property resources (such as oceans and
fisheries) and in relation to public goods (essentially the atmosphere).
One of the principal outcomes of the Stockholm conference was the
formation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), a new
intergovernmental body to focus environmental action internationally
and to serve as an ‘international environmental watchdog’ and
monitor global environmental change. UNEP continues to oversee
the development of MEAs. However, there are problems in
negotiating and enforcing this regulatory approach to environmental
policy making, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Conservation as dependent on development

By the late 1970s, there was some evidence that the two previously
separate arenas of environment and development were starting to be
seen as interconnected concerns and as global responsibilities. The
challenge for the 1980s was to translate the substantial rhetoric into
policies and actions in practice. A key document was the World
Conservation Strategy (WCS) in 1980, referred to as the ‘launchpad’
for the concept of sustainable development (Mather and Chapman,
1995: 248). The WCS was compiled by the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN),
historically a body concerned with wildlife conservation and nature
protection. However, the WCS emphasised the many ways in which
human survival, future needs in science, medicine and industry are
linked to ecological processes and genetic diversity, and urged the

sustainable use of species and ecosystems. In addition, development
for the first time was suggested as a major means for achieving
conservation rather than being detrimental to it. However, for many
commentators, the WCS remained principally a ‘conservation
document’ and shared the limitations of earlier global future studies,
including its portrayal of a very neo-Malthusian future in which
escalating numbers of people were identified as the source of short-
sighted approaches to natural resource management. Little attention
was paid to the political, social, cultural or economic dimensions of
resource use and how these also shape the prospects for action. The
failure of what was proposed as a global agenda for environmental
action to recognise the political nature of the development process
was particularly problematic. As Reid (1995: 43) states:
To suggest solutions based on such ‘self-evident’ principles as ‘population
increase must be halted’ and ‘carrying capacity must be respected’ without
considering the political realities affecting the chances of their being
implemented is to ignore the rights of local people, neglect the impact of
social and economic forces on their access to and use of resources, and
deny the reality of the effort needed to surmount the many political
difficulties associated with negotiating ‘improvements’ that have
recognisable similarity with ‘obvious’ global solutions.
As identified at the outset of this chapter, the UN established the

World Commission on Environment and Development to identify the
long-term environmental strategies for the international community.
Prior to the publication of their report in 1987, the urgency of finding
actions at a global scale was confirmed. Scientists in 1985, for
example, quite unexpectedly discovered a hole in the ozone layer
over Antarctica and in the following year, the breakdown of the
nuclear reactors at Chernobyl in the Ukraine drew global political
attention as the contamination spread far beyond national boundaries.
The 1987 WCED report extended the ideas of sustainable
development significantly beyond those of the WCS. The WCED
started with people (rather than the environment) and gave greater
attention to human development concerns and the kinds of
environmental policy needed to achieve these: to the challenge of
overcoming poverty and meeting basic needs and to integrating the
environment into economic decision-making. It was underpinned by
a strong ideology that nature and the Earth could be managed (i.e.
there was no spectre of economic disaster as portrayed by the WCS
or in earlier scenarios) and for this, reviving economic growth was
considered essential. No longer was it a question of whether

development was desirable: economic growth was central to the
Commission’s proposals for environmental protection and ‘degraded
and deteriorating environments were seen to be inimical to continued
development’ (Mather and Chapman, 1995: 248). But new forms of
economic growth would be key to sustainable development: growth
must be less material and energy intensive, generate less pollution
and waste and be more equitably shared.
The WCED report was also central in putting questions of
intragenerational equity into the sustainability discourse, that is, the
immediate development and environment concerns particularly in
developing countries and for poorer groups in society specifically.
The report stressed the futility of addressing environmental problems
without tackling the factors underlying world poverty and
international inequality within the current generation. Equity
concerns were also evident in the recognition of differentiated
responsibilities for current environmental impacts and in relation to
the changes in action that are required:
an additional person in an industrial country consumes far more than

an additional person in the Third World. Consumption patterns and
processes are as important as numbers of consumers in the
conservation of resources.
(WCED, 1987: 95)
Similarly, in relation to the objective of a changed quality in

economic growth in the future, the Commission acknowledged varied
responsibilities: ‘if industrial development is to be sustainable over
the long term, it will have to change radically in terms of the quality
of that development, particularly in industrialised countries’ (WCED,
1987: 213).
There is little doubt that the WCED (and the Rio conference held to
assess progress five years on) have been very important in shaping
the ideas and practices of sustainable development. However, critics
focus on the ‘comfortable reformism’ of the WCED report, that is,
the continued prominence given to economic growth and the
suggestion that it can be reconciled with environmental conservation
without any significant adjustments to the prevailing capitalist
system. In turn, the substantial political and economic changes
required in future to achieve sustainable development were
underestimated (Starke, 1990). Adams (2009: 94) suggests that the
Rio agenda remained dominated by northern priorities focused on

issues of the global commons such as biodiversity and climate
change (argued to be more amenable to political and technical
solutions than poverty or global inequality) and was essentially about
‘tuning the economic machine, not redesigning it’. Furthermore, the
principal policy solutions within the WCED report continued to
emphasise large-scale, government-led initiatives, particularly in
agriculture and renewable energy, to achieve sustainable growth with
little reference to the role of the private sector or ‘market
mechanisms’ more widely in environmental policy making. This can
now be considered ‘out of step’ with how economic growth was
actually occurring through the 1990s, as seen in the sections above.
There was certainly substantial optimism at the Rio conference that
new global commitments between North and South could be
achieved (in the political-economic context of the end of the Cold
War and recovery from economic recession). However, many of the
problems of environment and development identified at Rio got
worse through the 1990s and the finances identified as necessary to
implement Agenda 21 generally did not materialise.
Market environmentalism and ecological modernisation

Through the 1990s, environmental thinking and action became
increasingly framed by economic discourses. This was in part due to
the rising interest of the disciplines of economics in issues of
environmental resource use, but was substantially a reflection of the
mounting influence of neo-liberal thinking through this period,
whereby the extension of market relationships into ever more arenas
of society was considered the best way forward. ‘Market
environmentalism’ is a broad set of ideas centred on the market as
the most important mechanism for regulating human use of the
environment. Key ideas include that as market signals change (such
as when resources become more scarce, ‘competition’ increases and
prices rise), use generally will be discouraged and there is the
economic incentive to develop substitutes and raise efficiency in use.
Putting a price on environmental goods and services is also key to
ensuring that markets can then operate for these and ‘rational’
decisions on use and management can be made. Under this ‘free-
market’ thinking, privately owned resources are argued to be more
efficiently managed and conserved, whilst open-access resources are
liable to over-exploitation and degradation.
‘Ecological modernisation’ emerged in the 1980s, particularly in the

Netherlands and West Germany. It can be considered an extension or
sub-set of market environmentalism (Adams, 2009). This thinking,
for example, considers the market as central in delivering sustainable
development, but concedes that substantially ‘free’ (or what is
termed ‘unfettered’) market capitalism does have negative
environmental impacts and carries ecological dangers. It embraces a
belief that markets can, however, be made to work better for the
environment, that capitalism can be shaped to reduce such negative
outcomes and can be made to have positive environmental
improvements. Central to the considered opportunities of ecological
modernisation (seen in Figure 1.13) are innovations in improved
technologies, products and production processes and the greening of
business and corporations. Ecological modernisation also recognises
the role of improved planning and environmental assessment
procedures and regulations that address problems of pollution at their
source. Evidently it embraces a ‘technocentric philosophy’ as
identified in Box 1.2 in the pursuit of ‘rational, technical solutions to
environmental problems and more efficient institutions for
environmental management and control’ (Adams, 2009: 126). It is
optimistic in that institutions can change, people within them learn
and future industrial development will overcome the global
ecological challenges. Furthermore, everyone participates and
benefits, through cooperation between industry, scientists,
governments and environmental groups.
This kind of thinking has profoundly influenced strategies and
actions in sustainable development into the twenty-first century, as
considered in Chapter 3. For some, this reflects the way that market
environmentalism and ecological modernisation offer strategies for
sustainable development based on making only minor adjustments to
conventional growth models that in turn explains their popularity
with politicians and business for example. Critics question the faith
put in the power of consumers to influence business, manufacturing
and retailers to operate in more environmentally benign or indeed
positive ways. For example, whilst purchases of ‘fairly traded’ and
organic produce are expanding (see Chapter 3), there are concerns
whether such ‘greener consumption’ can be ‘scaled up’ to make the
extensive changes required (and whether lower income consumers
can afford it). There are also more fundamental questions of whether
‘shopping can save the planet’, that is, whether society can consume
its way out of environmental crisis. For many, it is the relative
Figure 1.13 The opportunities of ecological modernisation
G The dematerialisation of production processes to make them more energy and resource
efficient, i.e. reducing the energy/resources for each unit of output, will lead at an
aggregate level, to a decoupling of economic growth and resource use.
G Improvements in income and standards of living thereby become less dependent on natural
resource inputs and result in less environmental degradation.
G Pollution prevention pays: businesses reduce costs through technological changes that
reduce waste and pollution.
G Large scale, ‘smoke-stack’ industries that cannot be made ecologically sound are gradually
phased out.
G Markets for pollution abatement equipment and other ‘green technologies’ are growing.
G Green consumerism is stimulating demand for goods that minimise environmental damage
in the way that they are produced and that have reduced environmental impact when used.
G Science and technology support the integration of environmental considerations into the
design, production and final disposal of all products such as through integrated product
policies and life cycle assessment.
G Businesses take account of longer-term, environmental outcomes such as through
environmental management systems and are encouraged to do so through government
taxes and permits that penalise environmentally damaging activities.
G Markets have a key role in the transmission of both ecological practices and ideas.
Knowledgeable consumers encourage manufactures and retailers to advertise the
environmental credentials of their products, processes and outcomes.
Source: compiled from Carter (2007).
silence of this thinking on important North–South issues such as

international trade and globalisation and social justice concerns that
are the principle limitations of ecological modernisation thinking.
Environmental Justice and environmentalism of the poor

In the early 1990s, a critique of environmentalism gathered pace
(particularly in the US) that charged the ‘mainstream’ environmental
movements and organisations for being both insufficiently activist,
and racist and classist (Pezzullo and Sandler, 2007). The early
‘Environmental Justice’ (EJ) movement focused on urban-based
injustices to people, pollution, hazardous waste and the environmental
dangers that were seen to be spatially concentrated in poor and
minority neighbourhoods (Walker, 2012). The movement challenged
the major environmental organisations to expand their agendas into
issues of community health and urban community development and
to be more accountable to poorer communities both in the US and
internationally. Importantly, the movement grew out of particular
cases of local people themselves affected by these issues, taking
action and bringing these to public attention (rather than being led by
environmental professionals as in mainstream environmentalism).
One case that received high profile media attention (including being
the basis of the film Erin Brockovich) was at ‘Love Canal’, a suburb
within Buffalo, New York State in the US. In the late 1970s, the
health impacts of toxic chemicals buried by a plastics company two
decades earlier started to be seen in widespread miscarriages and
birth deformities within neighbouring low income and largely
coloured communities. Lois Gibbs was a resident of the area
concerned about the constant ill-health of her son and linked it to the
location of his primary school. She collected information on illnesses
within the locality, organised petitions and lobbied the authorities to
undertake environmental testing. Further widespread public action
and pressure on local politicians led to the eventual declaration of the
area as unsafe for human habitation and to the relocation of families.
In 1991, more than a thousand activists from the US, Canada and
Central America came together at the First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit. The 17 principles of
Environmental Justice listed in Figure 1.14 that were adopted at the
summit are widely considered to be the defining document for the EJ
movement. As seen, the principles confirm a much expanded
conception of environmental issues to include a range of health,
spiritual and education concerns. The strongly activist stance and call
for efforts to secure justice for all peoples (not only racial justice) is
also seen.
Concurrently through the 1990s, environmental concern and action
was being expressed through a growing range of movements within
developing countries. Martinez-Alier (2002: 14) identifies
‘environmentalism of the poor’ as growing out of thousands of
‘local, regional, national and global ecological distribution conflicts
and caused by economic growth and social inequalities’. Their action
and concern centres on the impacts of ecological conflict on the
livelihoods of peasant farmers, pastoralists and fishing communities,
for example, who are often poor and in many of these countries,
comprise the majority of the population (Martinez-Alier, 2002). As
with the EJ movement, environmentalism of the poor emphasises
what are considered the inevitable distributional conflicts of
continued economic growth and persistent inequality and the
geographies of the environmental and social impacts being felt
currently. It therefore challenges not only mainstream environmental
thinking but also the prevailing development models for the way in
Figure 1.14 The principles of Environmental Justice, First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit, 1991
Environmental Justice:
G affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all
species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction.
G demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free
from any form of discrimination or bias.
G mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable
resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.
G calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and disposal of
toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental
right to clean air, land, water and food.
G affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-
determination of all peoples.
G demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive
materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the
people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production.
G demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making,
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation.
G affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy environment without being forced to
choose between an unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the right of those
who work at home to be free from environmental hazards.
G protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and
reparations for damages as well as quality health care.
G considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international law,
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on
Genocide.
G must recognise a special legal and natural relationship of Native People to the US
government through treaties, agreements, compacts and covenants affirming sovereignty
and self-determination.
G affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities
and rural areas in balance with nature, honouring the cultural integrity of all our
communities, and provide fair access for all to the full range of resources.
G calls for the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the
testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations on
people of color.
G opposes the destructive operations of multi-national corporations.
G opposes military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures
and other life forms.
G calls for the education of present and future generations which emphasizes social and
environmental issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural
perspectives.
G requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little
of Mother Earth’s resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and make the
conscious decision to challenge and reprioritise our lifestyles to ensure the health of the
natural world for present and future generations.
Source: compiled from http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html (accessed 24 February 2012).

which they encompass growing requirements for natural resources

and consumption goods and involve the continued extension into new
geographical frontiers (typically within poorer countries) such as
through palm oil or GM crop technologies. The EJ movement also
highlights the diverse environmental concerns of the poor that are
often associated with immediate material livelihoods and human
well-being and the importance of issues of indigenous rights,
spiritual and cultural values and the sacredness of nature in
defending those livelihoods (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Work in the
discipline of political ecology has done much to inform
understanding of the environmentalism of the poor, particularly
through exposing the (unequal) power relations encompassed in
accessing and managing environmental resources (see Chapter 2).
Substantial confirmation of the importance of these distributive and
justice concerns for future sustainable development came in 2005
with the publication of the findings of the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment. The MEA aimed ‘to assess the consequences of
ecosystem change for human wellbeing and to establish the scientific
basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable
use of ecosystems and their contribution to human wellbeing’ (MEA,
2005: ii). It was a huge undertaking, drawing information from local
communities and practitioners as well from the scientific literature.
In its preparation, four working groups and over 2,000 reviewers
from 95 countries were involved, guided by a Board that had
representatives of five international conventions, five UN agencies,
international scientific organisations, governments, private sector
representatives, NGOs and indigenous groups. The significance of
the MEA in understanding the contemporary challenges of
sustainable development are considered further in Chapter 2. In its
summary, the MEA identified that ‘three major problems associated
with our management of the world’s ecosystems are already causing
significant harm to some people, particularly the poor, and unless
addressed will substantially diminish the long-term benefits we
obtain from ecosystems’ (MEA, 2005: 1). Two of these three
findings in Figure 1.15 explicitly embrace the concerns of
environmental justice and environmentalism of the poor. The
assessment confirms that the degradation of ecosystem services is
already a significant barrier to the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals and many of the regions facing the greatest
challenges in achieving these goals coincide with those facing
significant problems of ecosystem degradation.
Figure 1.15 The key findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
1. Approximately 60% of the ecosystem services examined are being degraded or used
unsustainably; including fresh water, capture fisheries, air and water purification and the
regulation of regional and local climate, natural hazards and pests. Many ecosystem
services have been degraded as a consequence of actions taken to increase the supply of
other services, such as food. These trade-offs often shift the costs of degradation from one
group of people to another or defer costs to future generations.
2. There is evidence that changes in ecosystems are increasing the likelihood of nonlinear
changes in ecosystems (including accelerating, abrupt and potentially irreversible changes)
that have important consequences for human well-being. Examples include the creation of
‘dead zones’ in coastal waters and shifts in regional climate.
3. The harmful effects of the degradation of ecosystem services (the persistent decreases in
the capacity of an ecosystem to deliver services) are being borne disproportionately by the
poor, are contributing to growing inequities and disparities across groups of people and are
sometimes the principal factor causing poverty and social conflict.
Source: compiled from UN-DESA (2005); emphases added.
Conclusion
Evidently, the idea of sustainable development is not new but has a

substantial history. What was new in the 1980s was the way in which
the two literatures of development and environmentalism started to
come closer together, recognising the significant and interdependent
nature of their goals and agendas. Into the 1990s, the concept of
sustainable development encapsulated notions of development based
in the reality of local environments and substantially expanded
notions of the environment and the functions it plays in human
societal development. Importantly, sustainable development was
recognised as a global challenge: ultimately, the achievement of
environment and development ends in any single location or for any
group of people is connected in some way to what is happening
elsewhere, for others. By the turn of the millennium, the world itself
was characterised by unprecedented rates and degrees of economic,
political, social and environmental change and the understanding of
sustainable development came to encompass the challenges and
opportunities presented by a globalising world. In the second decade
of the new century, the concept of sustainable development now
frames the debates concerning climate change, global economic
recession and the persistence of poverty. Not only are these
understood as interlinked challenges of sustainable development,
but the concept of sustainable development now embraces a
comprehensive critique of the ‘governance’ of environment and
development that includes substantial rethinking of the processes

of decision making and the values underpinning the actions of
international institutions, governments, bankers and individual
consumers. Further details of how these debates (and the rapidly
changing context for sustainable development) are shaping the
challenges of sustainable development and the nature of actions
taken by the varied agencies in development are considered in
the following two chapters. The outcomes of these in rural
and urban areas are the focus of Chapters 4 and 5.
Summary
There are many different definitions of sustainable development

coming from various disciplines and with different assumptions
about the basic relationship between society and nature.
Ideas of sustainable development have a long history in the
literatures of both development and environmentalism.
There have been a number of important international conferences
within which actions towards sustainable development have been
debated (and contested) at the highest levels of government.
Ideas concerning the best way of achieving development and
managing environmental resources have changed over time, but are
rarely replaced entirely. Neo-liberalism and ecological modernisation
have dominated mainstream ideas in recent decades but are not
subscribed to by all interests, and are increasingly challenged (in
theory and practice).
Sustainable development is currently pursued in the context of a set of
inter-linked global ‘crises’ of climate, economy and persistent poverty.
Discussion questions
G Select a country and consider the prospects for achieving the

Millennium Development Goals by 2015 in that country.
G How has the role of governments in promoting more sustainable
development changed in the last two decades?
G What are the principal ways in which debt challenges the
prospects for sustainable development as defined by the WCED?
G How important are ‘mega-summits’ for progress towards more

sustainable development?
Further reading
Adams, W.M. (2009) Green Development, third edition, Routledge, Abingdon. This
is a more advanced text but provides a thorough review of both mainstream ideas
in environment and development thinking and how these have been challenged,
including from within the developing world.
Potter, R.B., Binns, J.A., Elliott, J.A. and Smith, D. (2008) Geographies of
Development, third edition, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow. A good
overview text for understanding the major issues in development.
WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987) Our Common
Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford. The landmark text that first defined the
concept of sustainable development and identified the linked challenges of
environment and development for the global community. It continues to shape
how sustainable development is understood and pursued in practice.
Willis, K. (2011) Theories and Practices of Development, second edition, Routledge,
Abingdon. A very accessible and readable introductory text for understanding the
key development theories and how these have shaped development interventions
in practice.
Websites
www.unstats.org An important source for many internationally compiled and
authoritative statistics including regarding progress on the Millennium
Development Goals.
www.maweb.org Home page for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the
extensive research and reports regarding the current condition and trends of the
world’s ecosystems and the services they provide and the consequences for
human well-being.
www.worldbank.org Host to extensive data, resources, reports and publications
concerning development including country-level Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers and the annual World Development Reports.
www.uncsd2012.org Official website for the forthcoming (2012) UN Conference
on Sustainable Development, ‘Rio +20’.
2 The global challenges of
sustainable development
Learning outcomes
G Identify the key global challenges of sustainable development

G Appreciate that the nature of the challenges and opportunities for
sustainable development are socially defined and locally distinct
G Realise how questions of power, poverty and inequality are central to
understanding notions of resource ‘scarcity’ and environmental ‘limits’
to development
G Appreciate the many dimensions of poverty and the complex linkages
between poverty and environmental resources the functions and services
provided for human welfare
G Identify the key features of the challenges presented by climate change
for sustainable development
Key concepts
Environmental limits; resource scarcity; low-carbon development; resource-

curse; poverty; ecosystem services; political ecology; climate warming.
Introduction
Chapter 1 showed that ideas about how best to achieve development

and about society’s relationship with the environment changed
significantly through the last decades of the twentieth century,
particularly as evidence emerged ‘on the ground’ about the successes
and failures therein. Most recently, the global challenges of finding
patterns and processes of development that are more sustainable have
been exposed starkly by the global economic crisis. Previous trends
of globalisation and continuing economic growth that ‘many were
starting to see as unstoppable’ (Forum for the Future, 2010: 17) have
been disturbed. There is much debate as to whether this new context
58 • The global challenges of sustainable development
can provide unique opportunities for sustainable development and for

the ‘world to reconstruct itself’ (UNICEF, 2009) or whether it will
threaten progress made.
This chapter outlines some of the key global challenges of
sustainable development. Subsequent chapters identify how these are
being taken on in practice, across spatial scales and sectors. Many of
the core dilemmas in sustainable development are seen to be long
standing including the resource dependent nature of development, the
persistence of poverty and rising inequality in terms of access to
development opportunities and environmental improvements. The
chapter highlights where new research is shaping understanding of
these ‘old’ challenges. For example, successive reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have now
confirmed the anthropogenic causes of climate change (see
Figure 2.1). Work in both poverty analysis and ecosystem change has
also provided more holistic understandings of the linkages between
environments and human welfare that is now central to strategies for
meeting the MDGs, for example. New challenges for sustainable
development are identified, among them those presented by the rapid
development in the last decade of populous countries including China
and India. Whilst this has delivered substantial benefits (removing
over 400,000 people from extreme poverty, for example), higher
standards of living and increased industrial production bring raised
resource demands and enhanced carbon emissions with global
impacts. The extent and pace of these economic transformations are
unprecedented, as is the economic crisis. Both bring the global
challenge of moving to lower carbon futures into sharp relief.
The emphasis in this chapter is on the challenges of sustainable
development for the global community. However, the nature of these
challenges and the opportunities for sustainable development will
ultimately be manifested spatially and locally defined. Climate
change impacts, for example, are hugely varied by physical location,
Figure 2.1 Human impact on climate warming confirmed by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (emphases added)
1995: The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate
2001: most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities
2007: warming of the climate is unequivocal. Most of the observed increase in globally
averaged temperatures since the mid twentieth century is very likely due to the observed
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.
The global challenges of sustainable development • 59
the capacity to undertake adaptation measures, the structure of a

particular economy and even within households. Similarly, global
projections for population, for future resource consumption and for
economic recovery all depend on a wide range of decisions and
actions at various scales (the focus of Chapter 3) that will shape the
integrated economic, environmental and social outcomes of
development in practice (Chapters 4 and 5). Fundamentally, people
live in places and it is important to know where they live (now and
in the future), the barriers they face and the capacities they bring to
change these processes of development. But people pursue different
activities and practices in different places, including in rural and urban
areas, which generate different environmental and socioeconomic
challenges and opportunities. Furthermore, different places are
characterised by varied resource endowments and by unique ecologies
that emerge through adaptation to local conditions and processes of
change. Again, this ensures that the nature of the challenges and
opportunities for sustainable development are going to be locally
distinct and, indeed, may firstly become evident at this scale.
The centrality of resources in development
Questioning environmental ‘limits’

All forms of economic and social activity make demands on the
resource base: as raw materials such as soil and water within
agricultural production, as sources of inputs and energy into
industrial production and in the construction and maintenance of
human settlements and urban lifestyles. Economic development to
date has been closely correlated with mounting rates of resource
extraction worldwide, as shown in Figure 2.2 in terms of energy and
water. Questioning such global scale human–environmental
relationships and trajectories were seen in Chapter 1 to be key to
understanding the requirement for sustainable development. Indeed,
the predominant resource challenges for development at a global
scale were considered until quite recently in terms of the limits to
stocks of these natural resources such as oil, water and land, the
so-called environmental ‘source limits’ for development. Whilst
many of the predictions made in the 1970s and 1980s of oil
‘running out’ and water as a ‘new oil crisis’ (Biswas, 1993) did not
materialise, the notion and timing of ‘Peak Oil’ remains closely
debated (see Figure 2.3) and oil and water scarcity have profound
Figure 2.2a World energy supply by source, 1980–2009
14,000
Geothermal/solar/wind
12,000 Biofuels
Hydro
10,000 Nuclear
Natural gas
Mtoe
8,000
Oil
6,000
4,000
Coal/peat
2,000
0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Source: adapted from IEA (2011).
Figure 2.2b Global water withdrawal by sector, 1900–2025
5,000
Industry
4,500
Domestic use
4,000
3,500
Agriculture
3,000
Cubic km per year
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025
Source: adapted from UNEP (2008).

Figure 2.3 The notion of ‘Peak Oil’
The theoretical point at which half or more of the world oil supplies are used up. Given that oil
was formed through geological processes in the deep past, this means that all the oil that
there will ever be in a human lifespan already exists. Once society moves past the point of
Peak Oil and into using the second half of the inevitably limited supply, it is argued that oil
becomes more scarce, more scattered and more costly to extract. As such the era of cheap
oil and fossil fuel dependence ends.
impacts on the prospects for sustainable development globally, as

seen in subsequent sections.
All production and consumption activities also produce wastes in the
form of various gases, particulate matter, chemicals and solid matter.
Past development processes have depended substantially on the
capacity of natural systems to absorb, transport and dissipate such
wastes; termed environmental ‘sink’ functions. Where the rate of
waste generation exceeds the natural capacity of the atmosphere,
oceans, vegetation or soils to absorb these, there are detrimental
effects to human health and to the operation of ecological systems. In
1991, the first deaths from air pollution in Britain for more than 30
years occurred in London due to smog build-up from traffic fumes
(Bown, 1994). Currently over 2 million people globally die
prematurely every year through indoor and outdoor air pollution,
largely in developing regions.
Finding physical space for the disposal of solid wastes is an ongoing
challenge, particularly in more developed countries where rates of
production are highest. In the UK, for example, the average person
produces approximately 500 kg of domestic waste annually and
whilst the amount that is recycled is increasing, more than two-thirds
continues to go to landfill (DEFRA, 2009). New challenges for
sustainable development also arise as the nature of production and
consumption changes. ‘E-waste’ (comprising all forms of electrical
and electronic equipment including PCs, refrigerators, air conditioners
and mobile phones that have been discarded by their users) is now the
fastest growing waste stream in industrialised countries (BAN, 2002).
It is growing globally by an estimated 3.5 per cent every year (UNEP,
2007). Whilst there are opportunities in re-use and recycling of
e-waste including the extraction of valuable materials such as copper
and gold, e-waste also includes toxic substances of environmental
health concern including lead and mercury. Box 2.1 considers some
of the challenges for sustainable development presented by e-waste.
Box 2.1
E-waste: global recycling or waste trafficking?

E-waste is a complex and rapidly expanding waste stream. It also constitutes a significant
business opportunity, an expanding economic sector particularly in developing countries,
and is increasingly traded across international boundaries. The ‘export’ of e-waste is
regulated under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste and their Disposal because of the highly toxic elements involved
including cadmium, mercury and lead that require sound environmental management if
not to be hazardous to human and environmental health. However, e-waste also includes
valuable substances including gold and copper that can be recovered, thereby providing a
source of raw materials that are in demand and preventing further primary extractions. In
emerging economies, e-waste imports can provide an affordable source of ICT equipment
through product reclamation and repair, both of which are legal under the convention.
There are strong social and economic arguments for trading in e-waste. As Obsibanjo
and Nnorom (2007: 490) have suggested for Nigeria:
More and more Nigerians today have access to computer facilities at home,
school, business centres and Internet cafes. A great number also have access to
mobile telephones and this is now playing a huge role in the development of the
Nigerian economy . . . These advancements in ICT depend to a large extent on
second-hand/refurbished electrical and electronic equipment.
E-waste imports can be seen as a way of supplying the rapidly increasing demand for
ICT in these countries, supporting the breakdown of the global ‘digital divide’ and
providing opportunities for social and economic development. The economic sense is
also confirmed by the fact that used PCs can be bought in Nigeria at 30 per cent of the
cost of new whilst demand for such ‘second-hand’ goods in exporting countries such as
in Europe and the US is often low. The costs of recycling in exporting countries are also
high, partly because of regulations on landfill and incineration of electronic goods.
However, a study by the Basel Action Network (BAN) found that of over 500 container
loads of second-hand PCs and accessories that are imported for reuse through the
Nigerian port of Lagos every month, 75 per cent were in fact unusable, irreparable,
‘e-scrap’ (cited in Obsibanjo and Nnorom, 2007). BAN is one of many NGOs that are
campaigning for a global system of labelling to confirm usability of second hand
appliances intended for export.
In addition to this question of trade in e-waste occurring in the name of recycling but
actually constituting ‘dumping’, there are substantial concerns regarding the
environmental and health impacts during the methods and processes of reclamation and
recycling and in the ultimate disposal of wastes. In many receiving countries, a lack of
national regulation and/or enforcement has enabled the rapid growth of an informal
sector centred on trading, repairing and recovering materials from e-waste. Whilst this
Figure 2.4 E-waste recycling sources and destinations
KAZAKHSTAN Pacific
MONGOLIA Ocean
KYRGYZSTAN Beijing
NORTH KOREA
TAJIKISTAN
Seoul
SOUTH KOREA JAPAN
Tokyo
AFGHANISTAN
Islamabad CHINA
NEPAL
PAKISTAN New Delhi BHUTAN
Karashi
Gulyu
Guangzhou
Sher Shah
BANGLADESH TAIWAN
INDIA Nanhai
from the Shantou
Arabian Ahmedabad BURMA Hong Kong
Peninsula VIETNAM Macao
LAOS
from North America
Mumbai Gulf of
Bangai South
THAILAND
China
Madras
Chennai CAMBODIA
Sea
PHILIPPINES
SRI LANKA
MALAYSIA
from Europe
Indian SINGAPORE
Ocean
INDONESIA
Main e-waste recycling countries
E-waste recycling sites:

known
suspected AUSTRALIA
main ports where e-waste is received and dispatched
Source: adapted from Basel Action Network, Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, Toxic Links India, SCOPE (Pakistan) and Greenpeace China.
provides opportunities for some people to gain an income (and to build a business if they
have sufficient capital and networks, for example), much of the recycling activities are
actually taking place within crude ‘backyard operations’ and at landfill sites with little
formal regulation and where the health costs fall largely on the urban and rural poor. The
persistence of an international trade could also mean that there is less incentive within
exporting countries to invest in the infrastructure necessary and develop the market for
recycling and disposal ‘at home’. Figure 2.4 identifies the principal destination countries
and cities for e-waste.
In Guiyu town in the southern Guandon Province of China, an estimated 100,000 people
are employed in processing e-waste largely from the US, but also from Japan, South
Korea and Europe. Ship loads of containers come through the port of Nanhai and then
hundreds of trucks depart each day to Guiyo town (BAN, 2002). The work is based on
receiving and recycling obsolete and broken computer equipment: heating printed circuit
boards over charcoal burners to release possibly reusable computer chips; burning of
wires in the open air to recover copper; treatment of circuit boards in open acid baths
next to rivers to extract precious metals; dismantling printer cartridges to collect remnant
traces of toner and for recyclable plastic and aluminium parts. Workers in these
enterprises are totally unprotected: there is no basic safety equipment, they breathe in
toner fumes and are exposed to heavy metal contaminants. Local water sources have
been contaminated to the extent that drinking water has to be trucked in. As a method for
resource/material recovery, this is also inefficient in that it does not fully release the raw
materials that could be.
Whilst China is a signatory to the Basel Convention and has national legislation
prohibiting imports of solid wastes that are unusable as raw materials and severely
regulates imports of wastes that can be used as raw materials, the infrastructure to enforce
the legislation is extremely lacking (with some additional concerns as to the political will
to enforce it). The illegal nature in turn ensures opportunities for exploitation:
impoverished farmers are willing to take the health risks and risks of prosecution through
their desperate need for money, as evidenced by the fact that such activities often take
part under the cover of darkness or re-start immediately once officials leave. Corruption is
also evident as officials take money from operators in the e-waste business.
Concern for the ‘sink’ limits of the earth’s systems also underpins
the global challenge of climate change. Rising concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to human activities are now
understood to be causing unprecedented increases in the average
surface temperatures worldwide. Whilst the implications of climate
warming for the functioning of various environmental systems and
for societies continue to be closely researched (and debated), many
earth system scientists are now exploring environmental limits in the
sense of thresholds or ‘tipping points’. In short, in these cases,
environmental changes do not progress slowly or in a linear manner
(as in the build-up of domestic wastes, for example) but may change
suddenly, dramatically and possibly irreversibly.
However, what constitutes an environmental ‘limit’ on development
is also shaped by the values and decisions of society; in determining
‘acceptable’ levels of resource degradation and which groups of
people, living where should bear the cost of such degradation, for
example. Furthermore, different interests and groups in society may
value different and competing resource and environmental functions
at the same time and in particular places. Reconciling these
differences will be seen to underpin many of the challenges of
sustainable development through this chapter. As Buckles and Rusnak
(1999: 2) suggest, ‘conflict over natural resources such as land, water
and forests is ubiquitous’. Whilst the causes of human conflict are
complex, natural resource use, by the very nature of biophysical and
ecological processes, connects the actions of one individual or group
to another and thereby contains the potential for conflict.
Energy futures and the challenges of low-carbon

development
Energy presents two key global challenges for sustainable
development: concerns for the adequacy (and security) of affordable
supplies into the future and the environmental damage occurring
currently through the consumption of energy. Current rates of growth
in energy demand are unprecedented historically. In China alone,
energy consumption grew at nearly 10 per cent per year between
2000 and 2005 and total world energy consumption is predicted to
rise by 49 per cent (over 2007 levels) by 2035 (UNEP, 2007). Whilst
over 80 per cent of this increase is projected to come from
developing countries, the more economically advanced countries
currently account for almost 50 per cent of world energy demand
(UNEP, 2007). As seen in Figure 2.2a, fossil fuels such as oil, coal
and gas supply over 80 per cent of the world’s current energy needs.
Fossil fuel use is also, however, the principal source of the global
increase in carbon dioxide emissions (IPCC, 2007) making a ‘global
energy revolution’ central to meeting the challenges of climate
change (World Bank, 2010a).
The implications for sustainable development of these two issues
of future energy supply and current patterns of consumption are
extremely wide ranging. They include finding new stocks and
alternative sources of energy and making development more energy
efficient as well as less carbon intensive. They also include meeting

the aspirations of those people who have historically been excluded
from these opportunities. To date, access to commercial energy
sources (fuels such as oil, coal, gas and electricity which have a
commercial value and are often traded between countries) has been
highly inequitable. The International Energy Agency has estimated
that the 20 million inhabitants of New York State use the same
amount of electricity as 800 million people across sub-Saharan
Africa (Webb, 2011). In the mid-1990s, it was estimated that the
annual commute by car into New York City alone used more oil than
the whole of Africa (excluding South Africa) in one year (Edge and
Tovey, 1995: 319). Figure 2.5 confirms the stark regional differences
currently in energy use per capita worldwide. In many developing
countries, as much as 90 per cent of total energy consumption may
be supplied by biomass sources such as fuelwood, charcoal and
animal dung (that are increasingly traded, but within informal rather
than formal markets).
The environmental and social sustainability of the continued
dependence on oil globally is the focus of close academic and
political debate. In Box 2.2, different understandings of tar sands in
Canada as a future global energy source or a ‘curse’ threatening
Figure 2.5 Total primary energy supply per capita 2007, selected regions and countries
8
Tonnes of oil equivalent per capita
2 World average 1.8

1
0
India
Africa
Indonesia
Latin America
China
Middle East
OECD
Australia
US
Country/region
Source: OECD (2010d).

Canada’s previous good environmental record is highlighted. Box 2.3

considers the risks and opportunities of new sources of energy based
on biofuels. The capacity of further technological advancement in
developing new sources of oil was also seriously questioned through
2010 subsequent to the ‘BP disaster’ in the Gulf of Mexico. The
initial explosion on the deep water drilling platform killed 11 people
and had widespread environmental, social and political ramifications
across the region, for the local people, the company and for the
administration of President Obama. Internationally, countries were
prompted by the disaster to consider their own energy independence
and commitments to renewable energies.
Box 2.2
Tar sands in Canada

‘Tar sands’ are deposits of bitumen mixed with sand and clay. They are
considered a very ‘inferior’ source of hydrocarbon in that they contain large
amounts of carbon and very little hydrogen, require a great deal of energy
and water to process into usable oil and produce three to five times as much
greenhouse gas as conventional oil on extraction. Canada is currently
producing 3 million barrels of oil a day from tar sands covering 140,000
km2, largely in Alberta. Canada’s rapid development of tar sands (from
600,000 barrels a day in 2000 to 1.3 million barrels currently, with a planned
increase to 3.5 million by 2030) are argued to be a ‘curse’ for the country.
Canada is the only signatory to Kyoto that has abandoned its targets and is
one of world’s top ten greenhouse gas emitters. However, it was once
celebrated for its environmental record and pristine forests in particular. The
exploitation of tar sands threatens ancient boreal forest and freshwater
systems, with implications for bird migrations and wildlife habitats. Much of
the oil extraction also occurs on lands belonging to First Nation
Communities. Yet these are projects in which international banks, pension
funds and corporations (including BP) are investing. The capacity of
Canada’s national government to direct energy policy (and to restrict tar
sands development) is also constrained by the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) that deregulated the oil sector, removed restrictions on
foreign ownership and prevented import/export restrictions. Furthermore, in
the context of rising oil prices and the US’s search for ‘secure’ energy
sources, there are signs that Canada is becoming an ‘increasingly aggressive
defender of hydrocarbons’ (Nikiforuk, 2010: 8).
Source: compiled from Nikiforuk (2010) and Worth (2010b).
Box 2.3
The risks and opportunities of biofuels

In 2008, the risks and opportunities of biofuel production were the focus of the Food and
Agriculture Organisation’s State of Food and Agriculture Report. At the time, there were
high expectations concerning liquid biofuels and the potential to mitigate climate change,
contribute to energy security and support agricultural producers around the world. Many
governments were introducing policies and measures to enhance biofuel production
justified in these terms. However, there were also mounting concerns for food security,
particularly for the world’s most vulnerable people. Food prices were higher in real terms
than at any time since the 1970s and were rising rapidly, prompting civil unrest and
protest in many countries. A key concern for many UN agencies, donors and NGOs was
the contribution of the recent growth in the use of agricultural commodities (maize,
sugar, oil seeds and palm oils) and land for the production of biofuels to this emerging
food crisis.
The report concluded that biofuels were having minimal influence on world energy use
(and greenhouse gas emissions) but substantial impact on agriculture and food security.
Liquid biofuels remain a very limited part of total energy supply and even in the
transport sector, delivered only 0.9 per cent of total fuel consumption in 2005 for
example (IEA, 2007). There is also concern that any emissions ‘savings’ from such use is
more than countered by the increased emissions that occur through the land use changes
required to produce those crops. Whilst the impact on carbon emissions depends on the
particular crop, where and how production occurs, the report identified that biofuel
production strongly enhances the risk of large-scale land-use change including
deforestation and in many cases, the net effect on emissions is unfavourable. Further
environmental impacts include depletion of water resources and biodiversity.
The report identified the fact that the rapidly growing demand for biofuel feedstocks had
contributed to higher food prices and undermined food security of the poor in both urban
and rural areas. Demand for agricultural feedstocks for liquid biofuels pushes up prices
of these goods and the resources (fertilisers etc.) used to produce them, which impacts
most heavily on the poor. Poorer households spend a larger proportion of their income on
food than richer households and even in rural areas, the poor are net purchasers of food.
Whilst food prices are influenced by diverse factors including weather-related production
shortfalls, increasing fuel costs and population growth and urbanisation, the report urges
carefully targeted safety nets to ensure access to adequate food on behalf of the most
vulnerable.
To date, the production of biofuels has principally been in the US and EU. However,
high targets are being set, particularly in South East Asia where investment is largely
by overseas companies and for export (DEFRA, 2008). For example, Indonesia has
already cleared 18 million hectares of forests for palm oil production and an additional
20 million hectares is identified in regional development plans for further expansion.
Whilst there are now international standards (such as the Roundtable on Sustainable
Palm Oil) developed by the industry in conjunction with conservation organisations and
social justice groups (and Indonesia has its own laws protecting customary rights), there
remain concerns that legal reforms will take some time to be effected and much of the
expansion of biofuels will continue to be at the expense of existing tropical rainforest and
local livelihoods.
If future demands for energy are to be met and the emissions

reductions required to address climate change are to be achieved,
there is widespread understanding that lower carbon growth is an
essential global challenge. Lower carbon growth includes raising
energy efficiency in production, that is, reducing the amount of
energy used to produce each unit of output. It also involves reducing
the amount of carbon emitted for a given amount of energy used as
different fuels produce varied levels of carbon (coal being much
more carbon intensive than gas, for example). A widely used
measure of the carbon intensity of society is the carbon dioxide
produced to deliver a ‘thousand dollars of Gross Domestic Product’.
Table 2.1 confirms that the carbon intensity of the world economy
has been declining in recent years. It also shows that economic
production in the rapidly developing economy of Brazil is currently
less carbon intensive than in the US or UK.
There is optimism that developing countries can achieve faster rates
of improvement in carbon intensity of production through their
industrial transformations than occurred in North America and
Europe based on the more energy efficient technologies that are now
Table 2.1 Carbon intensity of GDP
Metric tons carbon dioxide per US$1,000 GDP
1990 1995 2000 2005
World 0.64 0.63 0.56 0.56

US 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.55
UK 0.48 0.41 0.35 0.31
China 2.03 1.44 0.98 1.13
India 0.65 0.76 0.64 0.55
South Africa 1.72 1.93 1.87 1.66
Brazil 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.27
Russia – 1.59 1.41 1.13
Source: compiled from Energy Information Administration (2006).

available. Forty per cent of energy use in Brazil, for example, comes
from renewable energy sources (Flavin, 2008). Whilst China remains
heavily dependent on carbon-intensive coal sources for energy
production, it has set ambitious targets on renewables in recent years
and is achieving annual improvements in energy efficiency and in
lowering the carbon intensity of production (IEA, 2009). However,
there are no simple linkages between levels of development and
carbon intensity. Energy use is influenced by the structure of
economy (manufacturing and mining are more energy intensive than
agriculture, for example) as well as by climate, which influences
energy use such as for domestic heating and cooling. Energy policies
are also key: countries with higher energy prices and more stringent
regulations tend to be more energy efficient (World Bank, 2010a).
Evidently the challenges of lower carbon growth include enhancing
the use of renewables (such as solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear and
hydro-electric sources) that provide low to zero carbon emissions.
Several developing nations are now world leaders in the use of
renewable energy, suggesting further optimism for lower carbon
growth in future. Brazil is currently the world’s largest producer and
consumer of renewable energy and India has the fourth largest wind
power industry worldwide (Flavin, 2008). Investments in renewable
energy have been rising globally with many countries now having
national commitments and targets on renewable energy, often closely
linked to climate change actions (see Chapter 3). Such patterns and
the substantial known potential of technologies and policies for
further energy efficiencies have led to the suggestion that developing
nations can ‘leap-frog’ more developed nations in their energy
trajectories and lead the way towards lower carbon futures. However,
‘the fact that so much efficiency potential remains untapped suggests
that it is not easily realized’ (World Bank, 2010a: 190). There is also
concern as to whether such ‘decarbonisation’ of development
trajectories can occur at a rate fast enough to stabilise climate
warming at an acceptable level, as discussed below.
Recent efforts to enhance the use of renewable energy sources have
confirmed that the challenges of sustainable development encompass
difficult political choices and trade-offs concerning sustainability
objectives. Renewable energy technologies are expensive to ‘get
started’ and put into operation, at a scale that is understood as
essential to substantially influence national and global energy futures.
Such investments have often relied on political will in the form of
government subsidies and have been closely influenced by general
economic conditions (including oil prices) to make them

economically viable. Such circumstances can change quickly, as seen
in late 2008 when investments in ‘clean energy’ worldwide fell by
over 50 per cent compared to 2007 levels as the global economic
crises emerged (World Bank, 2010a). Many political leaders were
confronted very directly with the challenge of sustainable
development that often include prioritising decisions for the longer
term (and for ‘global’ benefit) over more immediate and overtly
pressing domestic issues. Furthermore, the biggest factor explaining
public opposition to wind technology in Europe is concern over the
visual impact of wind farms on landscape values (Wolsink, 2007),
confirming that environmental resources and functions can be valued
in very different ways by different ‘interests’ and reconciling these
are key challenges for sustainable development.
Finding alternatives to fossil fuels within the transport sector is
particularly important for moving to lower carbon development
patterns. This sector accounts for 30 per cent of total global energy
demand and is responsible for 21 per cent of global annual
greenhouse gas emissions (DEFRA, 2008). However, whilst
‘biofuels’ based on maize, sugar, oil seeds and palm oils, for
example, offer potential for emissions savings, Box 2.3 confirms how
they may compromise other sustainability objectives such as food
security at both global and household levels.
Water ‘scarcity’
The close relationship between past development and rising demands
for water was seen in Figure 2.2b and is the basis of long-standing
sustainability concerns over water availability and of securing future
sources to support development. In the early 1990s, the fears were
that increasing physical scarcity of water could lead to ‘water wars’.
Over 60 per cent of the world’s freshwater supply lies in over 260
international river basins, spanning borders of more than two
countries (Clarke and King, 2004). Two in every five people globally
live in such basins (UNDP, 2006: 20). The concern was that
competition over water could threaten already fragile ties between
states in key regions like the Middle East. In 2005, water scarcity
was identified as a ‘globally significant and accelerating condition’
(MEA, 2005: 51). Global water use relative to accessible supply
increased by 20 per cent per decade from 1960 to 2000 (ibid.). It is
predicted that water withdrawals in developing countries will
increase by a further 50 per cent to 2025 (UNEP, 2007). By the same
date, it is estimated that 1.8 billion people worldwide may live in

water-scarce environments as regional and local precipitation patterns
shift under climate change (ibid.). A key sustainability concern is
that reductions in precipitation will impact hardest in regions already
affected by drought, such as sub-Saharan Africa, that also have the
lowest levels of human well-being (MEA, 2005). Many of the
predicted impacts of climate warming are water-related (discussed
further below) including the disruption of ocean currents and
increased flood events. In the last decade, the devastating tsunamis in
Thailand (2004) and Japan (2011), Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans
(2005) and record-breaking floods in, among others, the UK,
Australia, the US and Pakistan have all brought water issues
prominently into people’s environmental consciousness worldwide.
Water scarcity currently presents a number of complex and
interrelated global challenges for sustainable development. Whilst
water wars have generally been avoided through cooperative
solutions and treaties, many international agreements in water-
stressed regions continue to be tested. Box 2.4 identifies rising
tensions with India over the Indus Water Treaty as one of the current
challenges around water for Pakistan. The box also highlights how
declining water availability can be a source of conflict and unrest at a
local scale, for example when farming livelihoods become untenable
and as competition from urban domestic demand and industrial uses
rise. However, it is the agricultural sector globally that uses the
majority of freshwater resources (see Figure 2.2b) and further
increases in food production will be needed to feed expanding
populations and address undernourishment and food insecurity (see
Young, 2011 in this series). Managing water as a productive resource
for livelihoods efficiently and equitably is an immense challenge
facing governments worldwide (UNDP, 2006, 2007).
The global challenge of ensuring greater equity in access to water as
a fundamental foundation for human development has also been
recognised within the Millennium Development Goals. Currently
over 1 billion people worldwide do not have access to safe drinking
water and 2.6 billion lack basic sanitation and safe removal of waste
water. Whilst it is anticipated that the target to halve the proportion
of the people unserved by 2015 may be met in respect to drinking
water coverage, there remain substantial rural–urban and wealth
disparities. The goal to halve the proportion of people without access
to improved sanitation and waste disposal is not expected to be met.
These challenges are considered further in Chapter 5.
Box 2.4
Complex concerns around water in Pakistan

Despite the national and global attention that is given to the country’s troubles
with terrorism, insurgency and a fragile political order, it may be Pakistan’s
little-noticed water crisis that costs the greatest number of lives. In the long
term, this may prove its most destabilising political issue.
(Waraich, 2010: 34)
In July 2010, record breaking monsoon rainfall in Pakistan led to over 1,000 deaths and
1 million people affected through flooding. Yet, many more perish daily from water-
related diseases (630 children a day from diarrhoea, for example) and water availability
per person per year has fallen in the country by 80 per cent in the last 60 years. One
factor has been population growth; Pakistan is currently the sixth most populous country
in the world with a population of 175 million that is growing at 1.6 per cent per annum.
In addition, much of Pakistan’s water comes from glaciers that are shrinking with climate
change. Water supply in Pakistan is also heavily dependent on the flows of six rivers
from Indian-controlled Kashmir and the Indian Punjab. Whilst these rivers are the subject
of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, the treaty is under strain and was an issue that featured
in the recent failed peace talks between the two countries. India is currently constructing
a water diversion scheme in Kashmir that could prevent water from the Jhelum river
reaching Pakistan, and also has more than 20 hydro projects active on three western
rivers (allocated to Pakistan under the treaty). India argues that these hydro schemes will
return water downstream and therefore don’t violate the treaty.
Ninety per cent of water use in Pakistan is for agriculture, which employs approximately
half of the national workforce and accounts for a quarter of exports. Declining water
supplies are already affecting production in the Punjab (the country’s ‘bread basket’),
where small scale producers have had livelihoods ruined and there are concerns of rising
local unrest that could provide a focus for militant activity. Whilst water- and sanitation-
related diseases are estimated to cost Pakistan’s national economy nearly £1 billion a
year, investments in water infrastructure, in treatment technologies and in improving
agricultural techniques to reduce waste and enhance efficiency, for example, have yet to
be implemented.
Source: compiled from Waraich (2010).
Some commentators continue to argue that the roots of these

challenges are in the rising demands of an expanding population on
the physical water resources of the globe. However, it is more widely
understood that ‘the scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is
rooted in power, poverty and inequality, not in physical availability’
(UNDP, 2006: 2). In water stressed parts of India, for example,

wealthy farmers are able to pump water from aquifers 24 hours a
day, whilst poorer, neighbouring farmers rely on rain fed agriculture
(ibid.). In the West Bank, Israel has restricted Arab farmers from
drilling new wells (leading to decline in irrigated area, loss of
productivity and increased unemployment) whilst Israeli settlers are
able to continue to dig deeper wells, in some cases causing water
tables to fall beyond the reach of the Palestinian wells (Mastny and
Cincotta, 2005). Figure 2.6 illustrates what is termed a ‘perverse
principle’ that applies widely across the developing world in terms
of accessing domestic water: that the poorest people not only get
access to less clean water, but they also pay higher prices (UNDP,
2006: 7). Whilst there is undoubtedly a substantial challenge for
particular regions for delivering on the targets for clean water and
sanitation, domestic water use represents a very small fraction of
national water use and there are many illustrations of inequalities in
access being the product of political choices rather than water
availability (discussed further in Chapter 5). Water shortages for
agricultural development at a country level are also understood to be
one factor driving the recent pattern of large scale leasing of land
overseas (particularly within Africa) to deliver domestic food
requirements. One recent case is of a Saudi billionaire businessman
who has purchased 1,000 hectares of land on a 99-year lease in
Ethiopia to grow wheat, rice and vegetables for the Saudi market
(Vidal, 2010). A key sustainability concern of these and related
land transfers (as seen in Boxes 2.3 and 2.4) is that people with
the weakest rights are often those that lose access to land and
water when more powerful constituencies become involved
(Cotula et al., 2009).
Figure 2.6 The ‘perverse principle’ in accessing clean water
G People living in the slums of Jakarta, Indonesia; Manila, the Philippines; and Nairobi,
Kenya, pay 5–10 times more for water per unit than those in high-income areas of these
cities – and more than consumers pay in London or New York.
G High-income households use far more water than poor households. In Dar es Salam,
Tanzania, and Mumbai, India, per capita water use is 15 times higher in high-income
suburbs linked to the utility than in slum areas.
G Inequitable water pricing has perverse consequences for household poverty. The poorest
20 per cent of households in El Salvador, Jamaica and Nicaragua spend on average more
than 10 per cent of their income on water. In the UK, a 3 per cent threshold is considered
an indicator of hardship.
Source: compiled from UNDP (2006).

The resource curse in development

Whilst resource scarcity and degradation are evidently global
challenges for sustainable development, there is also concern as to
the relationship between natural resource abundance and the
prospects for sustainable development. Auty (1993) was one of the
first to suggest a ‘resource curse’ on the basis of his research that
found slower rates of economic growth in ‘mineral rich’ economies
(defined as having more than 40 per cent of exports based on hard
minerals such as copper, tin and bauxite) than in non-mineral
economies. In 2004, Christian Aid compared six oil producing
nations (Angola, Iraq, Kazakstan, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela),
with six non-oil-producers (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ethiopia,
Peru and Tanzania) over four decades in terms of their human
development performance. They found that the oil economies had
significantly slower economic growth, and life expectancy and
literacy rates improved more in non-oil economies than oil
economies.
Whilst the precise links between natural resource endowments and
human development continue to be researched, there is increasing
concern for how favourable natural resource wealth can be a source
of violent conflict and host to conditions for criminal and terrorist
activities. This has become particularly evident since the ‘9/11’
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 and the
subsequent ‘war on terror’, but is also evident in the global concern
for future energy/oil security. In countries such as the Congo and
Sudan, whilst the trigger for civil unrest and conflict may not have
been the minerals or oil per se, it is understood that the pillaging of
those resources generates the finances that allow conflict to continue
and make it harder to resolve. Often, these lucrative resources
represent one of the few sources of wealth in otherwise very poor
societies and conflicts are very much centred on gaining and
maintaining control over them. It is also understood that conflict
creates territories outside the control of a recognised government
which often become havens for terrorism, presenting global
challenges as confirmed by the current situations in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
There is also widening concern that resource extraction in many parts
of the developing world, whilst not fuelling full-fledged civil (or
international) wars, is having profound consequences. In many
instances, the benefits of logging, mining and so on go to
government elites and foreign investors, whereas the burdens are felt
by local people (and more insidiously) in terms of loss of land,

environmental devastation, social impacts and the abuse of human
rights. One of the most widely known examples is in the Niger delta
of Nigeria (see Adams, 2009). Since the 1970s, oil corporations
(most notably, Shell) and the government have received the benefits
of oil extraction and the Ogoni people have suffered degradation of
the resources on which their livelihoods depend (such as through the
loss of land directly and the sterilisation of soils and water pollution)
and are living in increasingly dangerous and unhealthy environments.
Mass protests by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP) in the 1990s were met with violence and a state campaign
of encouragement of ethnic violence. Over 2,000 Ogoni people were
killed, including Ken Saro-Wiwa (the internationally known
spokesman for MOSOP) and eight other leaders who were executed
by the government itself. Whilst the oil industry is no longer active
in the area, a recent environmental assessment of Ogoniland (UNEP,
2011) confirmed widespread oil contamination throughout the region
that was severely impacting on many components of the environment
and human health. The report concluded that the operation and
maintenance (and the decommissioning and remediation) of the
oilfield had been inadequate and full environmental restoration may
take 30 years. However, it also urges immediate, emergency
measures to address the human health impacts of widespread water
contamination in particular and suggests that these should be funded
by the oil industry and the government.
Beyond these more obvious, high-profile resource conflicts, many
more conflicts occur at local levels centred around access to basic
resources for livelihood. Too often, development patterns in the past
have served to remove, or compromise in some way, the
opportunities for some groups of people over others. The intensity
and level of resource conflict varies hugely, as do the factors
underpinning them; indeed, many conflicts have multiple causes
occurring as resources become more scarce, as new interests enter an
area and raise competition over resources or where particular ethnic
identities or ways of life that are linked to those resources become
threatened (or through any combination of these and other
dimensions). Whether political, class or social and cultural
dimensions dominate:
power differences between groups (of resource users) can be enormous

and the stakes a matter of survival. The resulting conflicts often lead to
chaotic and wasteful deployment of human capacities and the depletion
of the very natural resources on which livelihoods, economies, and

societies are based. They may also lead to bloodshed . . . As in other
fields with political dimensions, those actors with the greatest access to
power are also best able to control and influence natural resource
decisions in their favour.
(Buckles and Rusnak, 1999: 3)
Questions of population, resource demand

and consumption
Questions of population are central to the global challenges of

sustainable development in that the number of people present in the
world is one factor that ‘scales’ humanity’s impact on the planet
(Jackson, 2008). Questions concerning the relationship between
population, resources and development were seen to be central in the
emergence and shaping of mainstream discourses of sustainable
development in Chapter 1. For example, the 1970s was an era of rapid
population growth globally, and particularly in the developing world.
Influential ‘global future scenarios’ including The Limits to Growth
(Meadows et al., 1972) and The Population Bomb (Ehrlich, 1968)
argued for preventative population control in developing countries.
In contrast, a very different view of the population–development
relationship was articulated at the Stockholm conference in 1972
where representatives of the developing nations argued that population
was not the problem, rather the lack of development. Their view was
that ‘development was the best form of contraception’.
Between the time of the WCED reporting in 1987 and 2007, global
population increased from 5 billion to 6.7 billion at an average rate
of 1.4 per cent per annum (UNEP, 2007). At the time of writing,
the number of people worldwide will imminently exceed 7 million.
By 2050, it is projected to be over 9 billion (UNPD, 2009).
Environmentalists have been accused of not facing up to the questions
of population growth, among other things because of the highly
contentious, political and personal issues embraced in questions of
population planning. In recent years, a number of high-profile
environmentalists such as David Attenborough have spoken out:
I’ve never seen a problem that wouldn’t be easier to solve with fewer people,
or harder, and ultimately impossible, with more. Population is reaching its
optimum and the world cannot hold an infinite number of people.
(Attenborough cited in Bahra, 2009)
However, the drivers and characteristics of population change are

complex (see Gould, 2009 in this series) and projections of future
patterns are difficult. The UN Population Division (widely cited as
the most authoritative source of statistics) models a number of
‘variants’ within their projections. These encompass different
assumptions regarding the components of population change
(mortality, fertility and distribution). Under their ‘medium’ variant,
the majority of future population growth will be in less developed
regions where 86 per cent of the world’s population is predicted to
live by 2050 (Figure 2.7), although the rate of growth in all regions
is projected to slow, as seen in Figure 2.8. Such projections assume
all countries will gradually move through similar demographic
transitions; no account is taken of potentially different policies,
responses and development trajectories in particular countries. Yet,
as Gould suggests, ‘China is not likely to follow the same
development path as Chad’ (2009: 271). Furthermore, as seen
through this text, more sustainable development trajectories are going
to depend on substantially different policies, technologies and
governance arrangements, for example, than have been seen to date.
The particular challenges of population for sustainable development
will therefore be shaped at these scales.
There is no doubt that processes of population change in large and
populous nations such as China and India have had (and will
continue to have) an impact on global patterns. Approximately 37 per
cent of the world’s population lives in China and India (UNPD,
2009). Rapid economic development in these countries in recent
years was seen in the section above to have substantially changed the
global energy system. In the following section, the achievements
made in these countries in moving very large numbers of people out
of poverty will be seen. Combined, these patterns have implications
globally for rising consumption and resource demands into the
future.
Issues of population also shape global challenges of sustainable
development in terms of where people live, what barriers they face
and what capacities they bring. The largest form of population
redistribution currently is urbanisation. Fifty per cent of the world’s
population now lives in towns and cities. Between 1995 and 2005,
the urban population of the developing world grew by an average of
1.2 million per week or 165,000 per day (UNHSP, 2010). However,
there is substantial variation between and within countries as to the
pace of urbanisation and the growth rates of particular cities, for
Figure 2.7 Distribution of world population (percentage) by world region
2009
Northern Oceania
America 0.5%
5.1%
Latin America
and Caribbean
8.5%
Europe
10.7%
Asia
60.3%
Africa
14.8%
Projected 2050
Northern Oceania
America 0.5%
5.1%
Europe
7.6%
Latin America
and Caribbean
8.0%
Asia
57.2%
Africa
21.8%
Source: UNPD (2009).

Figure 2.8 Projected average annual rate of population change by major regions,
2010–2100 (medium variant)
3.0
Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
Northern America
2.5
Europe
Oceania
Asia
2.0
Annual population growth (percentage)
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
–0.5
2010–2015
2015–2020
2020–2025
2025–2030
2030–2035
2035–2040
2040–2045
2045–2050
2050–2055
2055–2060
2060–2065
2065–2070
2070–2075
2075–2080
2080–2085
2085–2090
2090–2095
2095–2100
Year
Source: adapted from UN-DESA (2011) World Population Prospects: the 2010 Revision, New York.
example. The rising numbers of people resident in urban areas brings

a range of challenges and opportunities for sustainable development
(considered further in Chapter 5) that include meeting the needs for
housing, employment and infrastructure that can be particularly
difficult in rapidly expanding cities. Yet, cities are also major drivers
of development and are a source of political momentum that can
advance actions towards sustainability. World cities consume more
than two-thirds of global energy and produce more than 70 per cent
of carbon dioxide emissions (World Bank, 2010a: 194). Yet much of
the energy consumed within cities is used in the production of goods
that are consumed elsewhere.
The numbers of people migrating internationally has also increased
in recent decades doubling from 1960 to 190.6 million in 2005
(Williams et al., 2009: 159). However, most international migrations
are either between developing countries or between developed
countries. International migration in relation to total world population
has also remained relatively stable over the last 50 years at 3 per cent
(UNDP, 2009). The flow of money from migrants to family back
home (‘remittances’) is also a very significant source of finance for
development. At a global level, it is estimated to be over 2.5 times
the value of official aid finances (UNDP, 2009). In Chapter 4, the
wider value of remittances for individual households in terms of
social support and knowledge transfers is considered. Furthermore,
migration at a variety of spatial and temporal scales is now
understood as an important strategy through which people are
able to reduce their vulnerability to both environmental and
non-environmental risks and to accumulate assets and move
forward in their lives (Tacoli, 2009).
However, an estimated 42 million people currently are displaced
from their homes by conflict or persecution, with 15.2 million people
living outside their country of origin as refugees (UN-DESA, 2010:
15). Such involuntary migration also presents profound global
challenges for sustainable development that are beyond the scope of
this text. However, it is anticipated that they may become worse
under climate change. Whilst predictions are difficult due to
uncertainty regarding the effects of climate change but also the
complexity and diversity of reasons why people migrate or seek
refuge, Christian Aid (2007) suggests that there may be 1 billion
forced migrations by 2030 as climate change exacerbates existing
problems. It is unlikely that a ‘climate refugee’ will be easily or
suddenly spotted, rather gradual changes in climate combined with
other political, economic and social factors will drive changing

patterns and processes of migration (Forum for the Future, 2010).
Evidently, questions of population numbers, distribution and location
are important in understanding the global challenges of sustainable
development. However, factors of ‘how we live’ (levels of
consumption and lifestyle expectations at individual and societal
levels) are also profoundly important in shaping humanity’s impact
on the planet. ‘Ecological Footprinting’ is a way of quantifying how
much particular citizens extract from the planet to live the way they
do (discussed further in Chapter 6). It is calculated that if everyone
consumed as much as the average UK citizen, it would need more
than ‘three Earths’ to support them (NEF, 2009). There are deep
challenges for sustainable development associated with changing
patterns of consumption, particularly in higher-income countries,
considered further in Chapters 3 and 6. However, it is the
inequalities in ‘how we live’ globally that are increasingly
understood as central to the challenges of sustainable development.
As identified by the WCED (1987: 95):
threats to the sustainable use of resources come as much from

inequalities in people’s access to resources and from the ways in
which they use them as from sheer numbers of people.
But inequality within and between countries is rising globally

(Milanovic, 2005). Tackling inequality within current generations is
at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. It affects the
prospects for global society as a whole, not just for the least well off.
In an extensive analysis of a range of social and health impacts of
inequality in more advanced economies, Wilkinson and Picket (2009)
have shown how social mobility and trust as well as literacy, life
expectancy and child well-being are all much higher in more equal
societies. Incidence of mental illness, obesity and homicide rates, for
example, are much worse in less equitable ones.
It will be seen regularly through this text that persistent (and often
deepening) inequalities underpin many of the challenges of and
actions being undertaken towards sustainable development. These
embrace inequality not only in terms of income, aspects of
consumption and contribution to environmental degradation, but also
in terms of opportunity and power, ranging from access to resources
and environmental improvements (such as energy, water and
sanitation highlighted above) through to having freedom of choice
and action to shape a life you value (Sen, 2000; MEA, 2005). Figure
2.9 illustrates how opportunity to benefit from a consistent education
is shaped by, among other things, wealth, location and gender. Based
on data from 42 developing countries it confirms that inequalities in
wealth are important in shaping the chance of children gaining an
education, with fewer children out of school amongst wealthier
households. However, rural children are twice as likely to be out
Figure 2.9 Inequality in access to education 2008
girls
40
boys
Percentage of children
30
20
10
0
Poorest 20% Second 20% Middle 20% Fourth 20% Richest 20%
a) Out of school children by wealth and gender

Source: adapted from UN-DESA (2010).
35
girls
30
Percentage of children
25
boys
20
15
10 b) Out of school children by

area of residence and gender
Source: adapted from UN-DESA
5 (2010).
0
Rural Urban
of school as children living in urban areas and it is girls in the

poorest 20 per cent of households who have the least chance of
getting an education (being four times more likely to be out of
school as boys in the richest households). Whilst there are multiple
reasons why children remain out of school (evidently including cost),
in many countries educating girls is widely perceived as being of less
value than educating boys (UN-DESA, 2010). Indeed, among the
most persistent inequalities worldwide are gender inequalities.
Globally, there are an estimated 100 million ‘missing women’,
women who would be alive if it were not for practices of infanticide,
neglect and sex-selective abortion (UNDP, 2002). Momsen (2010 in
this series) explores complex factors including the social status of
women, the economic and cultural basis of son preference and
women’s access to education that underpin these practices. Through
this text, it will be seen how inequalities by gender cut across wealth
to shape many opportunities and challenges for sustainable
development. As Satterthwaite et al. (1996: 16) highlighted, ‘women
regularly own a very small proportion of the natural resources and
often face discrimination, when compared with men, in obtaining
land, education, employment and housing’. Most fundamentally,
patterns of inequality confine large numbers of people to poverty.
Poverty presents a persistent global challenge for sustainable
development in threatening both opportunities for development and
the environmental basis for livelihoods, as seen in the following
section.
The challenges of poverty and inequality
Addressing the global challenge of poverty was central to the

recommendations of the WCED in 1987. Meeting the needs of the
poorest sectors of society was considered essential to both protect
environments and ensure development:
Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems.

It is therefore futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems
without a broader perspective that encompasses the factors underlying
world poverty and international inequality.
(WCED, 1987: 3)
For authors such as Anand and Sen (2000: 2030), a focus on

inequalities within the current generation (‘intra-generational equity’)
is central to the entire approach of sustainable development and

raises deep moral questions:
this goal of sustainability . . . would make little sense if the present life
opportunities that are to be ‘sustained’ in the future were miserable
and indigent. Sustaining deprivation cannot be our goal, nor should we
deny the less privileged today the attention that we bestow on
generations in the future.
Through this section, it will be seen that poverty and inequality

continue to deny millions of people basic human rights in the short
term and the potential to achieve development aspirations in the
future. A stark illustration of the failings of current development to
meet the needs of current generations is that over 24,000 children die
every day before their fifth birthday, largely in the developing world
and principally from preventable diseases closely associated with
environmental conditions such as water quality and under-nutrition
(UNICEF, 2009). Over half of these 9 million annual deaths are in
Africa. However, it will also be seen that the linkages between
poverty and the environment are complex and rarely direct; there are
many dimensions to poverty and inequality and multiple factors that
influence behaviour, including as regards environmental resource
management. The section also highlights recent work that considers
poverty less in the sense of ‘unmet needs’ and more in terms of
the capacities that people have to shape their lives and take the
opportunities (including those linked to environmental systems
and services) for moving out of poverty.
Poverty and the MDGs

Addressing poverty and inequality were central to the commitments
made in 2000 by the UN and the global community within the
Millennium Declaration, as seen in Figure 2.10. With less than five
years remaining to the target date for the Millennium Development
Goals, it is anticipated that the first goal (MDG1) of halving the
proportion of people in extreme poverty (over 1990 levels) at a
global scale could be achieved (UN-DESA, 2010). The proportion of
people in developing countries living in poverty (defined as living on
less than US$1.25 a day) fell from 46 per cent in 1990 to 27 per cent
in 2005 and is predicted to continue to fall to 15 per cent by 2015
(World Bank, 2010a: 39). Between 1990 and 2005, 400 million
people escaped extreme poverty, as seen in Figure 2.11. However,
there is a geography to persistent poverty: whilst some regions and

countries (notably East Asia and China) have shown significant
improvements, others are unlikely to meet MDG1. In sub-Saharan
Africa, for example, the proportion of people in poverty was 58 per
cent in 1990 and 51 per cent in 2005. Whilst India is expected to
achieve the Goal (reducing poverty rates from 51 per cent in 1990
to an anticipated 24 per cent in 2015) other countries in southern
Asia are not.
Figure 2.10 The Millennium Declaration commitments to the challenge of global poverty
and inequality for sustainable development
‘We have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and
equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people,
especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future
belongs.’
Millennium Declaration statement 2
‘We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and
dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently
subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to
freeing the entire human race from want.’
‘We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out
in Agenda 21, agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development.’
Figure 2.11 The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day
1,900
People (millions) living on less than $1.25 a day
Middle East and

1,520
North Africa
Latin America
1,140 and Caribbean
Europe and
Central Asia
760
East Asia and
Pacific
380 South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Source: World Bank Global Monitoring Information System.

Table 2.2 Child mortality rates by wealth, There also remain substantial
selected countries (under-five mortality
rates per 1,000 live births)
inequalities globally in the
opportunity to build healthy and
Country Poorest 20% Richest 20% long lives. A child born in Norway
Brazil 99 33
today can expect to live to beyond
Peru 63 11
the age of 80, whereas in Zambia,
Philippines 66 21 life expectancy is currently below
South Africa 87 22 40 years and the gap between
Nicaragua 64 19 wealth and the very poorest
Namibia 55 31 countries is increasing (UNDP,
India 141 46 2009). Life expectancy in 14
Kenya 149 91 African countries was lower in
Nigeria 257 79 2000–5 than it was in 1970–75
Bolivia 105 32 (UNDP, 2007). Wealth inequalities
within countries also shape these
Source: UNDP (2007).
basic opportunities to live a long
and healthy life. In the UK, for example, the difference in life
expectancy between ‘professional’ and ‘unskilled’ social classes are
7.3 years in the case of men and 7 for women (ONS, 2007).
Table 2.2 confirms the large gaps that exist between richer and
poorer groups within countries in terms of child survival.
Whilst differences in wealth and income inequality are evidently
important in explaining spatial patterns of child mortality across
scales, factors of the environment are also key. For example,
90 per cent of all child deaths due to malaria occur in Africa
(UNICEF, 2010). However, more children die before the age
of five in West Africa than in East Africa, linked to the
environmental conditions and the disease ecology of malaria
(Hill, 1991). Research has also shown that children born in
drought years in East Africa were more likely to suffer stunted
growth (and additional afflictions that don’t go away when the
rain comes) that impact on nutritional status, the likelihood of
attending primary school and even their ability to bear children
in the future (UNDP, 2007). A key challenge for sustainable
development is that many of the main killers of children,
such as malaria and diarrhoea (see Figure 2.12), are particularly
sensitive to changes in ecosystems and the abundance of human
pathogens, making children particularly vulnerable to the
effects of climate warming (UNICEF, 2009).
Children are amongst the poorest groups in all societies. They are
also responsible for very little pollution but are themselves extremely
Figure 2.12 Major causes of death in neonates and children under 5 globally
Measles
AIDS
Other neonatal causes Injuries
Malaria
Neonatal causes –
Sepsis
Pneumonia
Neonatal causes –
Asphyxia
Neonatal causes – Diarrhoeal diseases

Prematurity
Other causes
Source: adapted from UN-DESA (2010).
vulnerable to the pollution effects caused by others. In terms of their

physiological immaturity for example, a resting three-year-old
consumes twice as much oxygen and therefore twice the pollution
weight for weight as a resting adult (Satterthwaite et al., 1996). In
addition, children’s underdeveloped kidneys, livers and enzyme
systems are less able to process such pollutants. Children’s activities
may also place them at particular risk: babies instinctively suck much
of what they pick up in their hands and young children play in
dangerous places such as streets or waste tips, aggravating the risk of
contact with contaminated sources. The persistent challenge of
premature deaths of children under five confirms the unsustainable
and unjust nature of current patterns and processes of development
that are evidently not meeting the needs of current generations. It is
not anticipated that the MDG of reducing under-five mortality by
two-thirds by 2015 will be met (UN-DESA, 2010).
Defining poverty
‘Poverty’ is a term open to many different definitions and
interpretations. The earliest and most widespread measure used to
quantify ‘development’ achievements across a population has been
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (as compiled by the World
Bank, for example). GNP refers to the total value of all the goods
and services produced and sold domestically and overseas by a
nation. The estimates of ‘$1.25 dollar a day’ as reported by the
United Nations in the MDGs above is an example of attempts to
establish an international ‘poverty’ line and enable comparisons
between countries. It is based on national assessments of the
expenditure of households required to consume a certain number of
calories or basket of goods and services. The ‘purchasing power
parity’ adjustment widely attached to these assessments enables
differences across countries in the costs of services and value of
currencies and inflation rates to be accounted for.
In 2000, the World Bank undertook a ‘participatory poverty
assessment’ with 40,000 poor women and men in 50 countries as
part of the preparation of the World Development Report on
Attacking Poverty. It was a significant departure from their previous
work on poverty and involved working with focus groups, where
people discussed how they themselves defined their sense of
well-being and impoverishment. The multidimensional nature of
‘poverty’ and ‘development’ that the research revealed is evident
in Figure 2.13, where factors of security, autonomy and self-esteem
(as well as income) were important in shaping peoples’ own
definitions of well-being.
Other institutions and authors incorporate a number of components of
‘human development’ to consider poverty and deprivation. Since
1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has
reported a ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) drawing heavily on
the work of Amartya Sen (1981, 1999). Sen considers human
development in terms of individuals’ capabilities to achieve, to
flourish and live lives they have reason to value. In turn, poverty is
considered as a set of interrelated ‘unfreedoms’ that constrain
people’s choices and opportunity to exercise their individual agency.
The HDI (Figure 2.14) combines four indicators that measure three
dimensions considered essential to enlarging people’s choices and
opportunities to engage in processes of human development: the
Figure 2.13 Well-being as revealed through participatory poverty assessments
G Material well-being: food, shelter, clothing, housing and certainty of livelihood in terms of
possession of assets
G Physical well-being: physical health and strength (in recognition of how quickly illness can
lead to destitution)
G Security: peace of mind and confidence regarding personal and family survival. Includes
issues relating to livelihood, but also war, corruption, violence, lack of protection from
police and access to justice and lawfulness
G Freedom of choice and action: power to control one’s life, to avoid exploitation, rudeness
and humiliation. Ability to acquire education, skills, loans and resources to live in a good
place. Having means to help others and fulfil moral obligations
G Social well-being: good relations with family and community, being able to care for elderly,
raise children, marry. Ability to participate fully in community/society, in gift-exchange,
festivities, weddings, etc.
Source: Narayan et al. (2000).
ability to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a

decent standard of living. In 2010, two new measures were
introduced (see Box 2.5) in recognition that inequality and exclusion
are also important aspects of poverty. To ensure human development
is sustained over time and across generations, the UNDP considers it
essential to address current equity and empowerment concerns.
Understanding poverty and the chance to lead a meaningful life
demands consideration of the distribution of advantage in society and
possibilities to participate in decision-making.
Different definitions and conceptions of poverty are important,
influencing who is identified as poor and the policy measures
undertaken to support poverty alleviation, for example. As
summarised by White (2008: 25):
when poverty is defined solely in terms of income, then it is

unsurprising that economic growth is found to be the most effective
way to reduce poverty. But if basic needs such as health and education
are valued, then the development strategy is likely to put more
emphasis on social policy.
Each definition of poverty has its limitations. Monetary indicators

such as GDP per capita are relatively easy to measure and data is
accessible. However, its failing in terms of capturing the ‘human’
dimensions of development or the non-income dimensions of
poverty have been long-debated in development studies. Recently,
Figure 2.14 The components of the Human Development Index
Four indicators Three dimensions
Life expectancy at birth
Health
Mean years of schooling
Human
Education Development
Index
Expected years of schooling
Living standards
Gross national income

per capita
Source: adapted from UNDP (2010).
concern has also been expressed within ‘developed’ countries over

the adequacy of GDP as the conventional measure of ‘progress’. In
the UK and France, for example, new measures are being developed
to monitor ‘happiness’ and ‘prosperity’ (see Chapter 6). There is
growing unease in particular over how GDP makes no distinction
between transactions that add to well-being and environmental health
or detract from it and enhance degradation.
Box 2.5
Measuring inequality and exclusion in human

development
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) captures the losses in human
development due to inequalities in the distribution of health, education and income.
Across all countries, the IHDI was found to be 22 per cent lower than HDI. Figure 2.15
confirms that inequality compromises human development across countries of very
contrasting levels of HDI and that there are large differences in inequality within these
HDI groups. Evidently, higher levels of human development do not ensure parity in
opportunities (as seen in South Korea and Peru) and greater equity can be achieved in the
context of overall quite low levels of human development, as seen in the case of Ghana.
In more than a third of countries, inequalities in health and/or education were greater
than those of income.
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is a measure of the losses in human development due
to the disadvantages facing women and girls that combine to disempower these groups.
The measure combines five indicators, as seen in Figure 2.16. Losses in human
development due to gender inequality were found to range from 17 per cent in the
Netherlands to 85 per cent in Yemen. Differences in reproductive health constituted the
largest contributor to gender inequality globally.
Figure 2.15 Loss in HDI due to multidimensional inequality (largest and smallest
losses across HDI groupings)
1.0
0.9
17%
HDI
6%
0.8
31% 8% Inequality-adjusted HDI
0.7
44% 14%
0.6
0.5
25%
0.4
45%
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
South Czech Peru Ukraine Namibia Moldova Mozambique Ghana
Korea Republic
Very high High Medium Low
HDI HDI HDI HDI
Note: Numbers beside bars are percentage loss due to multidimensional inequality.

Figure 2.16 Components of the Gender Inequality Index (GII)
Five indicators Three dimensions
Labour force participation Labour market
Educational attainment
(secondary level and above)
Gender
Empowerment Inequality
Index
Parliamentary representation
Adolescent fertility
Reproductive
health
Maternal mortality

Poverty and the environment

Poor people have been regularly portrayed as both ‘victims’ and
‘unwilling agents’ of environmental degradation. In short, living in
poverty can restrict the options people have for resource
management: they may have to cultivate marginal lands, live in
unsafe housing or remove remaining woodlands in order to sustain
their household in the short term, with possibly detrimental effects on
the resource base and their own longer-term livelihoods. Their
environmental concerns are often those associated with immediate
survival needs, such as for fuel, access to clean water and sanitation,
or in securing productive lands. As such, processes of environmental
decline (and the impacts of sudden-onset hazards) often hit poorer
groups hardest. As discussed in Chapter 1, the impacts of environmental
degradation are currently being borne disproportionately by the poor
and at times this is the principal factor causing poverty and social
conflict. However, this section highlights the complex relationship
between poverty and the environment. This includes understanding
the multi-dimensional nature of poverty (as discussed above) and the
diversity of functions and opportunities that environmental resources
and ecosystems can provide in securing not only subsistence needs,
but wider well-being and routes out of poverty.
Worldwide, across rural and urban areas, the poor are often
concentrated in environments that are ‘inherently’ poor, that is, are
ecologically marginal and require high levels of investment in order
to remain productive or be safe for human habitation (the resources
that low income groups often don’t have). In the mid-1980s, research
suggested that 57 per cent of the rural poor and 76 per cent of the
urban poor were resident in areas where ecological destruction and/or
severe environmental hazards threatened their well-being (Leonard,
1989). In 2000, an estimated 1.3 billion people lived in what were
termed ‘fragile’ lands (World Bank, 2003a) defined on the basis of
soil characteristics, aridity and slope constraints (or combinations
thereof). Forty per cent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and
one quarter of all people in Asia for example were resident in such
fragile areas. Furthermore, the research found that these areas were
home to an increasing proportion of the total population of
developing countries (doubling since 1950) and a majority share of
people in extreme poverty, suggesting a ‘geographical retreat’ of
poverty into more impoverished and ecologically marginal areas over
time. Similarly in urban areas, low income groups are often
increasingly concentrated in inherently poor locations such as on
Plate 2.1 The challenges of aridity to human settlements
a) Northern Nigeria
Source: Hamish Main, Staffordshire University.
b) Southern Tunisia
Source: author.
steep hillsides and river beds prone to flooding and mass movements.
In addition, they regularly reside in environments impoverished
through their ‘acquired’ characteristics, such as alongside hazardous
installations or railway tracks. This often reflects the operation of
market forces, these environments having low commercial value (i.e.
demand from other uses) because they are poor. For low-income
groups who are often also politically marginalised, this may enable
them to afford to live there and be able to avoid eviction.
Poorer groups in society also have less power to resist and prevent
‘detrimental developments’ – those that make their environments
more impoverished in some way. As identified in Chapter 1, notions
of environmental justice developed in the US context that centred on
issues of race and class, have more recently been extended to include
concerns for the capacity of low-income groups worldwide to
influence decisions that shape the distribution of and access to both
environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’. The climate justice movement
considered below raises a central question of how developing
countries as a whole contribute very little to greenhouse gas
emissions yet are already suffering from and are likely to be
impacted most by further climate change. Box 2.1 illustrated how
toxic waste materials continue to be transferred from higher incomes
countries to generally lower income countries and how it is regularly
the poorest who suffer environmental damage and health impacts
through such processes. People in the most disadvantaged areas
across England (identified using the Index of Multiple Deprivation)
have also been shown to suffer the least favourable environmental
conditions including proximity to waste management facilities,
industrial and landfill sites, greater flood risk and poorer air quality
(Walker et al., 2005). The lack of voice that poor people often have
in environmental decision-making has been confirmed in China: for
citizens with similar levels of pollution exposure and education,
those living in high-income provinces were more than twice as
likely to file complaints as those residing in low-income provinces
(WRI, 2003). There are many further examples throughout this text
of ‘development’ processes undermining both environmental and
human health, and empowering local voices to enable communities
to resist detrimental developments is seen in Chapters 4 and 5 to
be a critical feature of more sustainable development processes.
Significant steps in understanding the complex linkages between
poverty and the environment have been made recently, including
through the work of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA,
2005). As seen in Chapter 1, the MEA was a very detailed and

extensive consideration of the current patterns and drivers of
ecosystem change across all the principal biomes of the world. The
conceptual framework used in the MEA is shown in Figure 2.17.
Human well-being was considered to have five major components:
security, basic material needs, health, good social relations and
freedom of choice and action. Freedom of choice and action is
identified as being both influenced by and a pre-condition for the
other components of well-being. Ecosystems are seen to underpin
human well-being through a number of ‘services’ that they provide,
in regulating, provisioning, supporting and cultural services. Clearly,
human well-being also depends on other factors such as quality of
education and health systems, aspects of technology and the activities
of institutions and quality of governance. Some aspects of ecosystem
services can also be influenced or ‘mediated’ by socio-economic
factors (such as the possibility of purchasing substitutes for particular
services or engineering flood defences). As a result, the strength of
the relationships between ecosystem services and human well-being
will be different in different ecosystems and according to socio-
economic circumstances. The arrows within the figure depict the
broad intensity of linkages and potential for human intervention.
The assessment confirmed that ‘ecosystem services are a dominant
influence on the livelihoods of most poor people’ (MEA, 2005: 61).
Approximately 70 per cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and
are highly dependent on the ‘provisioning’ services of ecosystems; in
supporting food production (including in agriculture, livestock,
fishing and hunting) and for primary sources of energy (e.g. woodfuel)
and for protecting and providing water resources. The MEA also
confirmed that poor people are highly vulnerable to changes in
ecosystems, most obviously when such provisioning services are
threatened (such as through enhanced water scarcity), but also
through impacting on other components of well-being. Freedom of
choice and action, for example, is compromised through ecosystem
decline when people (often women and children) have to spend more
time in the collection of water and fuelwood for basic household
needs, thereby reducing time for education, care of family members
and employment. In societies where cultural identities may be closely
linked to particular local environments, habitats and wildlife (such as
in the case of pastoral nomadic societies and several Arctic populations),
the loss of ‘cultural’ services through ecosystem decline impacts very
starkly on well-being (and cannot be readily substituted or replaced).
Figure 2.17 Linkages between ecosystem services and human well-being
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES CONSTITUENTS OF WELL-BEING
Security
Provisioning • Personal safety
• Food • Secure resource access
• Fresh water • Security from disasters
• Wood and fibre
• Fuel
Basic material for

good life
• Adequate livelihoods
• Sufficient nutritious food
Supporting Regulating • Shelter Freedom of choice
• Nutrient cycling • Climate regulation • Access to goods and action
• Soil formation • Flood regulation Opportunity to be able
• Primary production • Disease regulation to achieve what an
• Water regulation individual values doing
Health and being
• Strength
• Feeling well
• Access to clean air and
water
Cultural
• Aesthetic
• Spiritual
• Educational Good social relations
• Recreational • Social cohesion
• Mutual respect
• Ability to help others
LIFE ON EARTH – BIODIVERSITY
Arrow’s colour Arrow’s width

Potential for mediation by socioeconomic factors Intensity of linkages between ecosystem services and human well-being
Low Weak
Medium Medium
High Strong
Source: MEA (2005).

The MEA also found that with diminished human well-being,

dependence on ecosystem services increases, creating additional
pressures on ecosystems and potential for further degradation of
ecosystem services. Moreover, many of the regions and groups
facing the greatest problems related to the sustainable supply of
ecosystem services were also found to be those facing the greatest
challenge in achieving the Millennium Development Goals,
confirming the close interdependence of challenges of environmental
conservation and poverty alleviation.
Work in the field of political ecology has also done much to explore
why the poor are so often marginalised ecologically, economically
and politically. Political ecology explores the deeper underlying
factors such as those of political structures and economic and social
relations that in combination with the characteristics of ecology
shape individual resource management decisions. This work has put
issues of power and control over resources central to understanding
many issues of resource degradation, vulnerability to hazards and
environmental change (see Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and
Watts, 2004), as well as to understandings of poverty. In all these
arenas it has become important to understand the varied ‘command’
over environmental resources which people have. This can be
through their individual ownership or via membership of particular
social groups, but also according to such things as their gender.
Different groups of people also have varied capacities to withstand
environmental stresses and shocks and ability to make sustainable
use of these different ‘environmental entitlements’ (Leach and
Mearns, 1991). Figure 2.18 illustrates how questions of power and
control in resource use and environmental change extend to within
households. This work is now very important for understanding the
vulnerabilities of people to move into and out of poverty over time
(central to the achievement of the MDGs) as well as their resilience
to environmental changes (the capacity to absorb shocks and stresses
and to recover but also to take new opportunities for development).
Both these concepts of vulnerability and resilience are investigated
further in relation to adaptation to climate change below.
Evidently, there are significant global challenges in understanding
and responding to the multidimensional (and multilevel) problems of
poverty for sustainable development. Whilst the environmental
concerns and development needs of the poor are certainly often in
stark contrast to those of more ‘wealthy’ groups or ‘northern’
priorities, and typically are associated with securing the most basic
Figure 2.18 The gendered experience of environmental change
Saltwater intrusions/salinity of groundwater is a major problem for people living in

southwestern districts of Bangladesh. Women are generally responsible for collecting water
and often travel 5–10 km each day on foot. This has implications for women’s time and
makes it difficult to fulfil other household roles. It also creates tension within households, with
cases of physical abuse from husbands. Women suffer more illnesses through the strain of
travel, especially when they are pregnant and shortly after giving birth. Environmental change is
also transforming local customs. For example, aged parents are fearful of daughters getting
married and leaving them with no-one to fetch drinking water. Some people living in areas
where the salinity crisis is more moderate are refusing to arrange marriages for their offspring
with people from worse-hit areas.
Research on the impacts of cyclones and resultant flooding in Bangladesh in 1991 found that
the death rate for women was five times higher than for men. This was considered to be
linked to gender roles and cultural norms that restrict women’s mobility. Men were able to
warn each other as they met in public spaces but often did not communicate information to
the rest of the family. Many women are not allowed to leave their home without a male
relative and when floods hit, they waited for relatives to return home and take them to safety.
As in many Asian countries, most Bengali women have never learned to swim.
Source: compiled from IIED (2007).
levels of economic and social well-being, the linkages between

poverty and the environment are complex and rarely direct, ensuring
that there are no simple blueprints for sustainable development, as
will be illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5. However, this section
confirms that poverty clearly denies millions of people basic rights in
the short term as well as their potential to achieve their development
aspirations in the future.
The environment cannot cope
Perhaps the starkest realisation of the need to find new patterns

and processes of development has come from an understanding of
the environmental unsustainability of contemporary development.
At the time of the Stockholm conference in 1972, the primary
environmental problems tended to be national: ‘the environmental
sins of one nation did not generally impinge upon other nations, let
alone upon the community of nations’ (Myers and Myers, 1982:
195). Ten years later, cross-border environmental problems which
affected many nations, such as acid rain or nuclear waste, were being
recognised. By the time of the Earth Summit in 1992, a series of
environmental problems that affected the global community as a
whole were identified in two senses. First, those human impacts on
the environment that have a ‘supranational’ character such as climate
change and ozone depletion through the connectedness of

atmospheric systems where change generated anywhere has potential
effects around the globe. Second, local issues such as the loss of
forest, soil erosion or accessing clean water were occurring
repeatedly in numerous locations (on a worldwide scale), thereby
posing threats to resources on which more and more people of the
globe depend.
The ongoing global challenge of addressing many local-scale
environmental issues reproduced worldwide was confirmed within
the MEA. Whilst substantial expansion in ‘provisioning services’ has
been achieved over the last 50 years, particularly in crop, livestock
and fisheries production, these have been achieved principally at the
cost of the degradation of other ecosystem services. Problems of
over-extraction of ground water and soil degradation are identified as
persistent local problems worldwide. However, it is climate change
that is understood currently to present the most complex challenges
for sustainable development that ‘span science, economics and
international relations’ (UNDP, 2007: 4). Climate change is the
‘archetypal’ global challenge where a ‘a molecule of greenhouse
gases emitted anywhere becomes everyone’s business’ (Clayton,
1995: 110). However, there is substantial uncertainty and
contestation concerning how the climate is changing, about how
human society (and natural systems) will respond and about the
resultant impacts for environment and human development.
In previous decades, climate change was considered principally a
concern for high-income countries and early actions focused on
the ‘mitigation’ or moderation of the impact for future generations.
Such actions include the targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions encompassed in the Kyoto Protocol, as identified in
Box 2.6. It is now understood that climate change is impacting
on many ecosystem services and local level environment and
development opportunities within current generations and particularly
in low-income countries. In short, the climate change and
development agendas have moved closer together in recent years.
This includes understanding that the emerging risks of climate
change will ‘fall disproportionately on countries that are already
characterized by high levels of poverty and vulnerability’ (UNDP,
2007: 25) but also that climate change questions ‘development’ itself
worldwide. As seen in the sections above, moving towards lower-
carbon economic growth is a contemporary concern internationally.
There is also close consideration worldwide as to how addressing the
Box 2.6
The development of an international framework on

climate change
1992: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – the
‘Climate Convention’ – signed by 167 countries at the Rio Earth Summit, came into
force in 1994. A ‘soft’ law that called on parties to the convention to voluntarily commit
to emissions reductions towards the stabilisation of emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.
1997: One hundred and thirteen signatories to UNFCCC agree to the Kyoto Protocol.
This established the principal of legally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions
reduction for ‘Annex 1’ countries (the OECD members plus countries of the former
USSR and Eastern Europe). The Kyoto Protocol commits developing countries to
monitor further and address their emissions towards climate change mitigation. The
Protocol also established the principle that some emissions reduction requirements could
be traded and transferred between countries through a number of ‘Flexibility
Mechanisms’, thereby introducing an official market in carbon.
2001: The Marrakech meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) formally recognises
the challenges of adaptation to climate change for developing countries and links the
participation of developing countries in future climate agreements to finance and
technology transfers from richer nations to support their adaptation needs.
2005: The Kyoto Protocol becomes fully ratified and legally binding. Thirty-seven
Annex 1 countries are legally committed to reducing their emissions by an average of 5%
below 1990 levels by 2012. The US and Australia are not signatories nor subject to these
targets. It expires in 2012.
2009: The UN Climate Conference ‘COP15’ meeting in Copenhagen is held to consider
the post-Kyoto framework for international commitments on actions to address climate
change beyond 2012. Key areas of debate at the conference included:
G The overall goal for limiting the increase in global temperature and therefore the level
of action required (representatives from the Small Island States for example, argued
for 1.5 degree increase rather than the 2 degrees favoured by the G20).
G Which countries in future should be subject to binding emissions targets (whilst Kyoto
placed different responsibilities on ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, a broader
consideration of emissions targets is understood to be needed, particularly as
emissions from BRIC countries rise).
G How to account for efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation (i.e. that support
carbon sequestration) within targets.
G Future funding of adaptation efforts in vulnerable countries.
There was no legally binding outcome from Copenhagen. Rather, 25 parties to UNFCCC
agreed to the Copenhagen Accord, the remaining parties noting the ‘existence of the
accord’. Agreement was made to hold increase in global temperatures below 2 degrees
Celsius but no new emissions targets were negotiated (rather parties will ‘pledge’
voluntary, ‘nationally appropriate’ targets that will be internationally reviewed and
monitored). The Accord proposed short-term funding of US$30 billion to be made
available between 2010 and 2013 to support adaptation activities. A High Level Panel
was also established to identify sources and mechanisms to deliver long-term finances
from developed to developing countries for climate adaptation. This includes
consideration of payments for the protection of forests.
Figure 2.19 The merging of climate and development agendas
G African Development Bank (2003) Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of
the Poor through Adaptation
G UN Development Programme (2007) Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a
Changing World, Human Development Report 2007/8
G UN Environment Programme (2007) Environment for Development, Global Environment
Outlook 4
G Department for International Development (2010) The Future Climate for Development:
Scenarios for Low-income Countries in a Climate-changing World
G World Bank (2010) Development and Climate Change, World Development Report
climate challenge could also deliver opportunities for more

sustainable development as the issues of responding to the global
economic crisis become apparent. Figure 2.19 highlights a number
of recent reports of major institutions that have explored these
common agendas.
Evidently, the challenges that climate change presents for sustainable
development are extensive (as well as often uncertain and heavily
contested). Climate change is not a discrete environmental issue
(as in the case of acid rain for example), but embraces interlinked
concerns for environmental integrity, economic development and
social justice now and into the future. The following sections identify
a number of key features of the challenges of climate change for
sustainable development. In Chapter 3, the way in which these are
being addressed in action are considered, with the outcomes for
particular people and environments following in Chapters 4 and 5.
Climate warming confirmed?

The Earth’s climate system is extremely complex but there is little
doubt that it is continuously under change. What is widely debated is
whether it is warming (and if so, how quickly), what the driving
factors of change are and what could be the projected impacts. In

1988, the UN and the World Meteorological Office established the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a
scientific view on these questions. The IPCC reviews and assesses
the research produced worldwide on climate change with thousands
of scientists contributing to their work. In 2001, the IPCC established
that the climate was warming: global mean surface temperatures had
increased by 0.6 degrees Celsius (+/–0.2 degrees) since the late
nineteenth century. It also reported that most of the observed
warming was due to human activities (as seen in Figure 2.1). By
2009, the evidence for warming was considered ‘unequivocal’ and
the mechanism underpinning climate warming was established:
human activities were leading to rising concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and driving the identified ‘enhanced
greenhouse effect’.
‘Greenhouse gases’, including water vapour, methane, nitrous oxide,
ozone and carbon dioxide, regulate the temperature of the Earth by
controlling the re-radiation of solar radiation back into space; serving
to keep the Earth around 33 degrees Celsius warmer than it would be.
The IPCC established (through direct measurements over the last 50
years plus measurements of historic levels within ice cores) that
concentrations of carbon dioxide moved very starkly from a long
period of stability to exponential growth from around 1750. These
changes in the chemical composition of the atmosphere are causing
the Earth to trap more heat in the atmosphere and therefore to warm
up. Carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas in that it provides
the main warming or ‘forcing effect’ in the atmosphere. At a global
scale, the major source of carbon dioxide is the burning of fossil
fuels, contributing approximately 75 per cent of human-caused carbon
emissions since the 1980s (IPCC, 2001). Once emitted, CO2 and other
greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for a long time, ensuring that
even if emissions were to stop today, warming will continue.
Whilst there is relatively little dispute over the rising greenhouse gas
concentrations and the effect on global mean surface temperatures, it
is less confidently understood how such increases in surface
temperature are affecting (and will go on to affect) the various
complex components of the climate system to impact on weather
patterns, ocean currents and the biosphere for example. Figure 2.20
identifies some of the sources of uncertainty in knowledge regarding
the complexities of climate change. These uncertainties challenge
climate scientists but are also the focus for climate change ‘sceptics’
Figure 2.20 Ongoing questions for climate science
G What are the relative roles of natural and anthropogenic radiative forcing mechanisms in
climate change (little is known for example about changes in solar activity or impacts of
land use change on surface albedos)?
G What interactions exist between different elements of the climate system (for example, the
impact of atmospheric changes on oceanic circulation)?
G What are the effects of feedback loops: ‘positive’ feedbacks, for example, with melting of
ice and snow, less solar radiation is reflected, thereby leading to greater warming; and
‘negative’ loops that include higher carbon dioxide concentrations speeding up plant growth
and carbon uptake, thereby reducing CO2 concentrations?
G What is the potential of ‘tipping points’ in the climate system being reached in future
(where a critical threshold in the control of the system is reached, leading to total loss and
breakdown)? Potential elements include the loss of the Greenland ice sheet and shutdown
of the gulf stream in the North Atlantic.
G What are the different time-scales at which these processes occur?
Source: compiled from Peake and Smith (2009).
or even ‘deniers’ (a controversy that is accepted to be more evident

in the popular media than it is within the scientific communities and
literatures).
Such ‘scientific’ gaps also combine with substantial uncertainties
regarding the future evolution of societies: ‘the effects of human
activities on climate depend on future emissions of greenhouse gases,
and the impacts of the resulting changes in climate depend on the
future state of the world’ (Arnell et al., 2004: 3). The IPCC has
modelled six different ‘emissions scenarios’ based on different
projections of how society, economy, population and political
structures may change in future decades. These different
‘development pathways for the world’ (ibid.) included projections of
land use change, economic growth rates, technological innovation
and attitudes to social and environmental sustainability, for example.
Significantly, they do not take account of any deliberate action to
reduce emissions (such as the impact of the Kyoto Protocol). Each
emission scenario is modelled to have different outcomes in terms of
further temperature change and in turn will have varied consequences
for environmental systems and human societies. Figure 2.21
summarises the impacts on various systems, sectors and regions
relative to the projected temperature increases based on these
scenarios. It confirms that even small changes in surface
temperatures challenge societies worldwide to cope with and adapt to
changes in, for example, food systems, water availability and marine
ecosystems. With larger increases, the risks and burdens become
more extensive and serious. The IPCC identifies 2 degrees Celsius of

warming as the point at which the risk of large-scale human
development setbacks and ecological catastrophe increase sharply. To
avoid such ‘dangerous anthropogenic climate change’, the IPCC
suggests that global emissions need to be reduced by at least 80 per
cent over 1990 levels by 2050. This figure of a maximum 2 degrees
increase in global average surface temperatures is the target used in
current international climate negotiations, as seen in Box 2.6.
Figure 2.21 Summary of projected impacts of increases in global mean surface

temperature
Increased water availability in most tropics and high latitudes

Decreasing water availability and increasing drought in mid-latitudes and semi-arid low latitudes
WATER
Additional people with
0.4 to 1.7 billion 1.0 to 2.0 billion 1.1 to 3.2 billion increased water stress
Increasing amphibian About 20 to 30% species at increasingly Major extinctions around the globe
extinction high risk of extinction
ECOSYSTEMS Increased coral bleaching Most coral bleached Widespread coral mortality
Increasing species range shifts and wildfire risk Terrestrial biosphere tents toward a net carbon source as:
–15% –40% of ecosystems affected
Low latitudes
Decrease for some cereals All cereals decrease
FOOD Crop
productivity
Increases for some cereals Decreases in some regions
Mid to high latitudes
Increased damage from floods and storms
About 30% loss of

COAST coastal wetlands
Additional people at risk of
coastal flooding each year 0 to 3 million 2 to 15 million
Increasing burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases
HEALTH Increased morbidity and mortality from heatwaves, floods and droughts
Changed distribution of some disease vectors Substantial burden on health services
Local retreat of ice in Long term commitment to several Leading to reconfiguration

Greenland and West metres of sea-level rise due to ice of coastlines world wide and
SINGULAR Antarctic sheet loss inundation of low-lying areas
EVENTS
Ecosystem changes due to weakening of the meridional overturning circulation
0 1 2 3 4 5°
Global mean annual temperature change relative to 1980–1999 (°C)
Source: adapted from Houghton (2009), based on IPCC (2007).

Importantly, the IPCC (2001) identified that the impacts of climate

change would not be manifested in the same way in all regions.
Small island states and coastal and delta regions will be especially
affected by the increased risks of coastal and river flooding and
storm surges, as identified in Figure 2.21. Increased water stress and
drought are predicted to impact most profoundly in mid latitudes and
semi-arid low latitudes. Furthermore, the report confirmed that
developing countries are likely to suffer most from the negative
impacts of climate change. This is due to their geographical location
in regions with existing high levels of climate variability, but also
because of the economic importance of climate-sensitive sectors
(such as agriculture and fisheries) within their economies and
individual livelihoods. These countries also generally have more
limited human, institutional and financial capacity to anticipate and
respond to the impacts of climate change. The report confirmed that
mitigation efforts will not prevent climate change from occurring and
closer attention is needed to adaptation efforts. These key terms are
defined in Figure 2.22. The IPCC urged particular attention be given
to adaptation in developing countries where climate change brings
additional threats and compounds
Figure 2.22 Key terms in responding to existing risks and vulnerabilities
climate change within countries with the fewest
Mitigation: an anthropogenic intervention to
resources and where the majority of
reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of the world’s poor live. In short, the
greenhouse gases. 2001 IPCC report was very
Adaptation: adjustments in natural or human important in bringing the
systems in response to actual or expected
development agenda into the
climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial climate change arena. It has helped
opportunities. shift attention to climate change
Adaptive capacity: the potential and capability adaptation and efforts to support the
to change to a more desirable state in the face development of adaptive capacity
of the impacts or risks of climate change.
within low-income countries that
Source: compiled from IPCC (2001). are explored further in the climate
justice section below.
The political and economic challenges

Whilst the scientific evidence for human-induced global warming has
mounted, it is suggested that political responses have been slower to
emerge (UNDP, 2007; Giddens, 2009). As climate change is not a
single problem, political decisions across all sectors and on behalf of
many different organisations are challenged to embed climate change
considerations throughout their strategies and actions. How this is

being developed in practice is considered in Chapter 3. However,
Giddens (2009: 2) suggests a central paradox of climate change that
ensures such political decision-making is difficult:
since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate

or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they
appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete
nature about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute
before being stirred to serious action will, by definition, be too late.
Addressing climate change requires political leaders to take action

now for what are often long-term outcomes (and where the benefits
may fall principally in other geographical regions). Yet, future
generations will already have to live with the consequences of
current emissions due to the inertia within the climate system and
‘with climate change, doing nothing offers a guaranteed route to a
further build up of greenhouse gases and to a mutually assured
destruction of human potential’ (UNDP, 2007: 4). Furthermore, the
challenges of climate change cannot be solved by one generation of
political leaders as sustainable emissions trajectories will be needed
for decades not years. The uncertainty of many aspects of climate,
however, makes assessing the political risk of actions and strategies
to tackle (unpredictable) problems hard to establish. Furthermore,
action on climate change requires a strong role for governments in
intervening in public life and business operations that is substantially
different to previously dominant ideas about how development
should occur, as seen in Chapter 1. A central challenge is for
political leaders to convince their voters of the need for and basis of
these policies and to maintain them when more immediate, local and
visible issues arise. This was seen above in terms of maintaining
public subsidies for clean energy in the context of the current
economic crisis. At their core:
Climate change policies require trade-offs between short-term actions

and long-term benefits, between individual choices and global
consequences. So climate change policy decisions are driven
fundamentally by ethical choices. Indeed, such decisions are about
concern for the welfare of others.
(World Bank, 2010a: 52)
The ethical choices embraced by climate change are at the centre of

the climate justice movement. Its work centres on issues of fairness
and justice of the current impacts of climate change and as a result

of the policies and strategies being undertaken to address climate
change (considered further below).
The political challenges of climate change also include the need for
political leaders to work internationally in often complex
negotiations. As seen in Box 2.6, the Kyoto Protocol is an
international agreement towards mitigating climate change through
setting targets for emissions reduction. The Protocol recognised
‘differentiated’ responsibilities globally; only ‘Annex 1 countries’
(countries of the OECD and of the former USSR and Eastern
Europe) were subject to legally binding emissions targets specific to
their country situation, whilst the emerging economies were required
to ‘monitor further and address’ their emissions. A key part of the
Protocol was the creation of a mechanism for ‘trading’ in these
‘permits to emit’. This was the foundation for a carbon market
that is heavily contested as to its contribution to sustainable
development (considered further below and in Chapter 3). Box 2.6
confirmed the difficulties of international political negotiations as
seen in the most recent UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen in
December 2009.
A further reason why political action has been slow to emerge,
has been that much of the debate around climate change has tended
to be in scientific arenas and in a ‘language’ not well understood
by political leaders. In 2007, publication of the ‘Stern Review’
The Economics of Climate Change is considered to have changed
this. Nicholas Stern (an economist formerly at the World Bank) was
commissioned by the UK government to undertake an assessment
of the costs of acting to avert climate change and those of ‘inaction’.
He concluded that if no action was taken, the global economy could
shrink by 5 per cent each and every year (and up to 20 per cent),
whereas the costs of acting to avert climate change were much
smaller – an estimated 1 per cent GDP per annum to avoid the worst
effects. He urged decisive near-term action to mitigate devastating
future impacts. In particular he argued for a rapid expansion of the
carbon market and an increase in the trading of emissions permits
between nations. Stern’s argument was based on the idea that as the
costs of controlling greenhouse gas emissions are variable across the
world, trading in permits enables ‘comparative advantage’ to be
sought – investments are made where costs are lowest and thereby
the overall economic costs of reducing emissions globally can be
minimised.
Stern’s work has been criticised in terms of both the economics

and the science that it embraces. Stern himself in his latest book
(2009) has suggested that his costings were conservative and that
he underestimated the speed of climate change. However, Peake
and Smith (2009: 191) suggest that the review ‘achieved things
that previous scientific and policy reports had not’ by putting the
climate challenge into the financial terms understood by prime
ministers and presidents (not solely environment ministers) and
taking the debate into new arenas such as meetings of the G20.
For others, particularly in the development field, the Stern Review
was short on strategies for action and underestimated the political
difficulties in ascertaining responsibilities and the appropriate
response.
Climate justice and the challenges of adaptation

Just as climate change has risen up the agenda for political leaders
internationally in recent years, there has also been a wider
politicisation of climate change emerging from many different
‘grassroots’ groups, organisations and coalitions that are increasingly
working together transnationally under the broad banner of ‘climate
justice’. Their activities include public demonstrations (coordinated
by organisations such as Plane Stupid! and Rising Tide), advocacy
and training work (such as that promoted by the Environmental
Justice and Climate Change Initiative based in the US) and looser
networks of people engaging in periodic ‘climate camps’ that often
receive wide media attention. Many of these groups came together
within the Climate Justice Action Network formed in 2009 to draw
global attention to the failings of the UN climate talks, suggested to
be ‘an unjust set of negotiations interested in expanding capitalism
rather than in addressing the global climate crisis’ (Building Bridges
Collective, 2010: 27). For many groups, their concerns may not be
explicitly ‘climate’ related, but based on varied local struggles
against land dispossession, water rights or new urban developments,
with activists North and South making links between their respective
local concerns. Others challenge the dominance of powerful countries
and corporations in international negotiations such as trade. Many
have their origins in the wider anti-globalisation movement of the
1990s (considered in Chapter 1) where their shared concerns were in
the deepening inequalities being caused by capitalism. In 2010, the
Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change and Mother Earth’s
Rights was held in Cochabamba, Bolivia (substantially inspired by
President Evo Morales and in response to the failings of the

COP15 meeting). The aim was to reaffirm the fight for climate
justice, to expose the structural causes of climate change and to
work for radical, alternative measures to ensure the well-being of
all humanity in harmony with nature built on principles of solidarity,
justice and Mother Earth’s rights (http://pwccc.wordpress.com/).
In short, the climate justice movement draws together those who
connect the weak responses to climate change and the many
injustices surrounding the problems of climate change to the
dominance of capitalism. Box 2.7 expands on the key arguments
underpinning climate justice that have helped put climate
change centrally as a human rights issue and an issue of
development itself.
Understanding climate change in terms of human rights and social
justice has demanded closer attention to questions of climate change
adaptation and processes towards ‘climate resilient’ development.
Adaptation includes making adjustments for the impacts of climate
change and supporting people’s capacity to cope in future, as
identified in Figure 2.22. To date, ‘planned adaptations’ have largely
been undertaken in more wealthy nations. Typically these focus on
building dams and physical structures that provide barriers against
extreme events like storm surges and protecting housing and
transport networks (including designing new) that can withstand
the wider and slower onset issues such as higher rainfall and
drainage associated with climate warming. These countries also
have the resources to invest in assessing climate-related risks, in
undertaking analyses of who is most vulnerable, for example, and
in establishing early warning, training programmes and insurance
systems that can reduce future vulnerability and protect those most
at risk. These adaptations are often not available within developing
countries.
However, as Adger et al. (2003: 181) suggest, it is important to
understand that ‘people of developing nations are not passive victims.
Indeed, in the past they have had the greatest resilience to droughts,
floods and other catastrophes.’ As seen above, climate shocks (as well
as other risks) already feature prominently in the lives of the poor and
local communities often have a wealth of knowledge concerning
environmental change and have been adapting to and coping with
unpredictability in weather patterns and extreme events for many
years (IIED, 2009). However, the concern is that ‘climate change will
steadily increase the exposure of poor and vulnerable households to
Box 2.7
The principles of climate justice

1. The rich world should take responsibility. Central injustices include:
G The poorest of the poor are being hit first and hardest through climate change.
Climate change is considered to be causing an additional 150,000 deaths
worldwide through flooding, malaria and malnutrition, the vast majority occurring
in Africa and Asia.
G Impacts of climate change will and do interact with pre-existing social and
economic vulnerabilities, that is, emerging risks fall disproportionately on countries
already characterised by high levels of poverty and vulnerability that are least
empowered to adapt to and change the processes underpinning climate change.
G It is over-consumption in rich countries (and wealthy southern elites) that causes
climate change and is responsible for the principal share of current emissions
(Figure 2.23).
G Financial support should flow from the North to the South for climate adaptation
measures. This is based on the principle that the rich world owes the poor an
‘ecological debt’, in particular given its responsibility for the majority of historical
emissions (Figure 2.24).
Figure 2.23 Share of global CO2 emissions, 2009
US
China
India
Others Russia
Japan
Germany
UK Canada
Iran South Korea
Source: Energy Information Administration (2009).
Figure 2.24 Rich countries dominate the cumulative emissions account: share of
global CO2 emissions, 1840–2004 (%)
Other United States

27.6% 29%
Poland
2.4%
Canada
2.5%
India Russian Federation*
2.5% 8%
France
3% * Includes a share of USSR
Japan
China emissions proportional to the
4%
8% Russian Federation’s current
United Kingdom Germany share of CIS emissions
6% 7%
2. Climate change is caused by the burning of fossil fuels such that action on climate
change must be focused on stopping it at this source.
G Climate justice campaigns for investments in energy efficiency and renewable
energy technologies.
G Campaigns make linkages and remind people what drives the processes of
industrialisation and over-consumption (by whom and who benefits) that are the
root cause of climate change.
G The failures of climate policy are illustrated by the continued expansion of
emissions per capita.
3. Challenging ‘false solutions’ to climate change.
G Climate justice movements campaign in particular around the aggressive
promotion of carbon trading, biofuels (expanding into new geographical
frontiers principally in the Global South) and geo-engineering solutions
(such as carbon sequestration technologies) on the basis that these maintain
the ‘development as usual’ approach and don’t prevent further climate
change or address poverty.
G Climate change results from our current and historical social relations and
to address it, fundamental changes to our political and economic systems are
needed.
G Carbon trading enables responsibility for actions to reduce emissions to be

transferred from the North to the South with business and industry being the
primary beneficiaries.
4. Natural resources should be conserved for the public good.
G Climate justice argues that environmental resources and resource functions such as
the Earth’s carbon cycling capacity should not be turned into property/commodities
that can be bought and sold in a global market.
G The focus should be on a transition to a low carbon society that protects people’s
rights, jobs and well-being.
climate shocks and place increased pressure on coping strategies,

which, over time, could steadily erode human capabilities’ (UNDP,
2007: 17). More recent work on adaptation centres on understanding
the underlying factors that cause vulnerability to climate change and
on reducing these through development interventions that will enable
adjustments not only to the risks associated with climate change but
also other global environmental, social and economic changes, that is,
through more sustainable development processes. The distinction
between these two ideas of climate change adaptation is shown in
Figure 2.25. Taking a vulnerability reduction approach ensures that
adaption to climate change cannot be a ‘stand alone’ issue but must
be integrated into core development strategies to deliver development
processes that enhance resilience to all types of shock and that are
also ‘climate resilient’.
Figure 2.25 Different approaches to linking adaptation and development
Adaptation approach:
Adaptation to climate change impacts → Vulnerability reduction → Development
In this view, adaptation is carried out in response to the observed and experienced impacts
of climate change on society (including ecosystems). These responses ensure that the
vulnerability to the impacts is reduced. This in turn ensures that less is lost each time a
climate-related hazard takes place, which means risk is reduced. With reduced risk,
development can be more sustainable.
Vulnerability reduction approach

Development → Vulnerability reduction → Impact reduction → Adaptation
In this view, development processes help reduce vulnerability to climate change. By reducing
the vulnerability, impacts of climate hazards are also reduced, as there is less sensitivity and
exposure to the hazards. This translates into a process of adaptation to climate change.
Source: Schipper (2007).

Plate 2.2 Challenging processes of development
a) London, England
Source: Julie Doyle, University of
Brighton.
b) Stuttgart, Germany
Source: Jolanta
Gatzanis.
Conclusion
Almost 25 years since the WCED emphasised the urgency of the

challenge of sustainable development, it is evident that environmental
degradation continues to threaten human well-being, social cohesion
and development opportunities worldwide and factors including
population growth and rising resource consumption have placed
increased pressure on the state of the global environment. However,
this chapter has also highlighted how understanding of the
interlinkages between these environment and development challenges
has grown in recent years. The MEA, for example, has confirmed
how environmental systems and services are the very basis for
human well-being worldwide, but particularly for poorer groups and
in regions where human development is currently lowest. Not only is
poverty a challenge for the conservation of resources and
environments, but it is now understood that environmental
degradation threatens basic human rights and is a matter of justice
when some people’s opportunities for development are limited by the
actions of others.
Perhaps most clearly, understanding of the challenges of climate
change has opened a large space for reconsidering not only how
human society is impacting on environmental systems of the globe,
but the very meaning of human ‘progress’. As the UNDP (2007:
15–16) suggests:
There could be no clearer demonstration than climate that economic

wealth creation is not the same thing as human progress . . . There
could be no greater challenge to our assumptions about progress than
that of realigning economic activities and consumption with ecological
realities.
A key question is, if the current model of economic wealth creation

is associated with mounting threats to human development currently
and to the well-being of future generations, can this be considered
‘progress’? As seen in this chapter, moving to lower carbon
economic growth trajectories is understood to embrace challenges
of change in production, transportation and consumption. Whilst
new opportunities for economic development are also envisaged
through technological innovations in energy efficiency and
renewables, these also bring new environmental and political
challenges.
Summary
Many of the core global challenges of sustainable development are

long-standing; rooted in the resource-dependent nature of
development, the persistence of poverty and rising inequality in
terms of access to development opportunities and environmental
improvements.
New challenges for sustainable development are presented by the
rapid economic growth (and associated energy demands) in populous
countries including China and India, but inequalities in ‘how we live’
currently can be argued to be more important in shaping the
challenges of sustainable development.
There are multiple dimensions to ‘poverty’ and the relationship
between poverty and the environment are complex.
Progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals is
identified, but achievements are varied across geographical regions.
Development processes are not meeting the immediate needs of the
current generation, clearly illustrated by the persistent high levels of
infant mortality.
Questions of power are central in understanding the persistence of
environmental degradation and the prospects for sustainable
development in the future.
The challenges of climate change raise complex questions for
science, international relations, economists and development
practitioners.
G Discuss the various ways in which low-income groups may

suffer more from environmental degradation than higher-income
groups.
G What happens to your mobile phone when you update it for a
fresh model?
G Is population growth the primary challenge for global sustainable
development?
G Research the advantages and disadvantages of wind power as a
renewable energy. How do these compare with those of biofuels?
G Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the principles of climate

justice.
G What do you think are the prospects of the current economic
crisis to deliver new opportunities for sustainable development?
Further reading
Many of the texts in this Routledge Perspectives on Development series provide

very accessible texts to follow some of the core challenges of sustainable
development in more detail. They include:
Agnew, C. and Woodhouse, P. (2010) Water Resources and Development
Gould, W.T.S. (2009) Population and Development
Williams, A. and MacGinty, R. (2009) Conflict and Development
Young, E.M. (2011) Food and Development
For very clear reviews of the science of climate change and the challenges of
mitigation and adaptation in practice see:
Houghton, J. (2009) Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Peake, S. and Smith, J. (2009) Climate Change: From Science to Sustainability,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Both these texts have very good supporting illustrations and pointers for student
investigations.
For recent data and reviews of research concerning issues central to the global
challenges of sustainable development, see:
United Nations Development Programme (annual) Human Development Report,
UNDP.
World Bank (annual) World Development Report, World Bank, Washington.
Worldwatch Institute (annual) State of the World, Earthscan, London.
Websites
www.climate-justice-action.org A transnational network for people and groups
committed to promoting and strengthening the rights and voices of affected
people in confronting climate change. Site for exchange of ideas and resources.
www.ipcc.ch Website for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – the
international body that reviews the science of climate change. The IPCC does not
undertake research or monitor climate change directly, but this is a portal for
very influential publications, documents and details of current activities.
www.steps-centre.org A well-established interdisciplinary research and policy

centre that is working to bring development studies and science and technology
closer together to address challenges of poverty and sustainability.
www.maweb.org/ Home page for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the
extensive research and reports regarding the current condition and trends of the
world’s ecosystems, the services they provide and the consequences for human
well-being.
3 Actors and actions in
Learning outcomes
G Identify a number of institutions and organisations and the actions they

are taking towards more sustainable development
G Be familiar with a number of key mechanisms for delivering
environmental policy
G Understand how different organisations have changed the way they work
(and with whom) as understanding of the demands of sustainable
development in practice have evolved
G Understand the significance of international negotiations on trade, aid,
debt and climate change in fostering more sustainable development and
the factors that make these efforts difficult
Key concepts
Governance; multilateral environmental agreements, foreign aid; structural

adjustment; environmental mainstreaming; foreign direct investment;
corporate social responsibility; carbon offsetting
Introduction
It is evident through the previous chapters that taking action towards

new patterns and processes of development that are more sustainable
is a challenge for all levels of society, from individuals to the global
community. This chapter identifies some of the actors, institutions and
organisations considered key to shaping future sustainability: the
international environmental and financial institutions, governments,
business and civil society. Concurrently, a number of core arenas that
explicitly link the prospects for sustainable development in less
developed countries with actors and activities beyond their boundaries
are also investigated: those of aid, trade and debt. The chapter
Actors and actions in sustainable development • 121
considers the broad kinds of activity that they are undertaking and
identifies how these have changed as understanding of the demands of
sustainable development in practice have evolved. Of particular
importance is the way that these different actors in practice
increasingly work together, across different scales and through varied
mechanisms in the pursuit of sustainable development.
From government to governance
Whilst historically, national governments took the predominant role

in decisions regarding environmental management and human
development concerns, it was seen in Chapter 1 that this position has
been substantially challenged, in particular by the emergence of
international environmental problems and processes of economic
globalisation. Currently the actions that governments take are
significantly shaped by international agreements (such as the Kyoto
Protocol) and international financial institutions (such as the IMF),
the decisions of private business investors and corporations as well
as the activities of NGOs and citizen groups. Importantly, all these
institutions now shape the processes through which change occurs,
that is, they influence how decisions are developed and the
mechanisms for action to shape the outcomes for sustainable
development.
The term ‘governance’ is increasingly used across many arenas to
recognise the range of ‘institutions, rules and participants’ that now
operate in complex networks and across scales to ‘steer societal
concerns’ (Peake and Smith, 2009: 239). Whilst it is a difficult
concept, it is thought to have particular relevance in relation to
sustainable development (see Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Adger and
Jordan, 2009; Evans, 2012). As seen, many environmental problems
are affected by decisions, interventions and behaviours at local,
regional, national and transnational levels and have impacts across
those spatial scales. Furthermore, the driving factors behind
environmental problems are many, are interconnected in complex and
uncertain ways and the causes are often de-coupled in both time and
space from their impacts (seen particularly clearly in relation to
climate change). The concept of environmental governance captures
this ‘multiscalar’ character of environmental problems. It also
embraces the many kinds of institution (both ‘formal’ organisations
such as the state, NGOs or corporations and the many ‘informal’
122 • Actors and actions in sustainable development
arrangements that people agree to such as within families and as part

of civil society) that are understood to influence environmental
actions and outcomes. The mechanisms and ‘rules’ of environmental
governance through which change is sought now include
international and national legislation, but also public sector taxes and
subsidies that can restrict or incentivise particular kinds of
environmental behaviour as well as the voluntary undertakings of
individuals.
In previous chapters it was seen that particular actors and
mechanisms have been prioritised towards achieving environment
and development goals at particular times (and within particular
political-economic and environmental contexts). It was seen in
Chapter 1 that the ‘first generation environmental problems’ such as
air and water pollution within countries were addressed principally
by national governments through ‘top-down’ legislation and taxation
to regulate business and industry and to limit particular kinds of
polluting activity, for example. This so-called ‘command and control’
approach to environmental policy also extended to governments
participating in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) to
address emerging international environmental issues such as acid
rain. Through the 1990s the role of private sector organisations and
market mechanisms to deliver environmental improvements became
more widely used (as ideas of ecological modernisation dominated
mainstream thinking on the environment). These were designed to
adjust the economic incentives to business and individuals to
encourage more sustainable production and behaviours. Over the last
20 years, understanding has risen of the need for and potential of a
much broader array of what are termed ‘hybrid governance
strategies’ (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). These recognise the strengths
and weaknesses of particular organisations and mechanisms to
promote sustainable development in isolation and therefore
emphasise partnerships and co-management (such as between the
state and community) and a combination of what can be achieved
through legislation, market incentives and self-regulation. Figure 3.1
identifies a number of such hybrid strategies currently used to foster
more sustainable development at a range of scales. Many of these
approaches are discussed in further detail through this and
subsequent chapters.
Notions of environmental governance are also important in
understanding sustainable development in that they help put focus on
the processes of decision-making and the trade-offs and compromises
Figure 3.1 Forms of environmental governance and policy instrument
Forms of governance Conceptual basis Market component Role of public Examples Issues
authorities
Command and Coercive regulation of None: requires each State (and Remains most widely Regulations costly to
control behaviour of business firm and person to international) used mechanism administer and enforce
and individuals through implement same organisations set,
legislation specifying measure irrespective monitor and enforce Emissions standards Blocks innovation as
standards of pollution of relative costs to standards backed limiting gas releases no incentive to reduce
that a process or them to undertake up by legal system from factories, vehicle pollution below that
product has to meet measures exhausts, agricultural required by law
discharges to water
courses Economically inefficient
as some polluters can
Legislation to ban/ reduce pollution more
phase-out products cheaply than others
or date by which
pollution control
device in place
Clean Air Acts banning

use of coal, Montreal
Protocol to phase
out ozone-depleting
substances, catalytic
converters required
in cars
Cap and trade Ceiling set on total Changes are made International Used widely in Scientific and political
amount of pollutant where and by whom agreements and national energy challenge of setting
allowed they are most cost national legislation industries (trade in sufficiently ambitious
efficient to do so set overall limits SO2, Pb and NOx) ‘cap’
for pollution in a
certain time period
continued . . .
authorities
Quotas and permits Market forces of Public authorities Newer markets in Volatility of markets
to pollute are tradable supply and demand monitor and enforce carbon – specifically hampers investment
shape trading Clean Development decisions
Mechanism of Kyoto
Protocol and EU Trading doesn’t require
Emissions Trading emissions reductions
Scheme and doesn’t address
root cause of environ-
mental problems
Questions of long-
term outcomes for
environment and
social justice
Environmental Based on Polluter Environmentally Government and Host of examples Problems of identifying
taxes/pollution Pays Principle that damaging behaviours public authorities including: who is responsible for
charges cost of preventing become more costly intervene in market, – Taxes on discharge the pollution incident or
pollution or and therefore are set and collect of pollutants e.g. outcome
minimising avoided by firms charges/taxes and use of leaded
environmental damage and individuals make decisions petrol, airline Problems of assigning
should be borne by regarding allocation flights monetary values to
those responsible of revenues from – User charges e.g. degradation of resource
for pollution taxes for vehicle use in functions like
cities and fresh atmospheric health or
Holds that price of water metering landscape beauty
goods should fully – Taxes/charges on
reflect total cost of use of harmful Unequal distributional
production including products e.g. on impacts (such as of
use of public goods pesticide sales fuel taxes)
(land, water, air) for and plastic bags
emissions that are in shops
currently underpriced
in existing markets
Payments for Based on Beneficiary Creates markets for Voluntary UN Reduced Many projects in early
environmental Pays Principle – which resource functions transactions Emissions from stages
services holds that those who (especially regulating between buyers Deforestation and
use and benefit from services such as and sellers of Forest Degradation Uncertain and
environmental services carbon sequestration environmental (REDD+) contested
make payments to and water purification) services environmental and
those who manage currently not traded UN/World Bank human welfare benefits
environmental resources Substantial role for Global Environment
to restore or establish Financial incentives governments in Facility National Scientific uncertainty
land uses with external for local actors to establishing legal programme of about links between
benefits provide/maintain framework, tenure Payments for land use decisions and
those services security, transparent Watershed Service environmental services
monitoring, protecting in Costa Rica and regarding rates
Payments put indigenous people’s of sequestration by
monetary value on rights etc. Agro-environment vegetation type,
external benefits that schemes in many for example
thereby can become EU countries and
internal to farmers’ the US Problems of
and land managers’ establishing baselines
decisions and additionality for
projects
Subsidies Reshape economic Payments made to Public monies used Widely used within Public funding may be
incentives to business firms and individuals to support/incentivise renewable energy withdrawn
to enable change to help them private investment in sector to support
subsequently activities of public ‘start-up costs’ of Time lag between
compete in open benefit new technology investment and
markets Public authorities developments realisation of benefits
administer, accredit and/or to provide
and license etc. guarantees of future Volatility of energy
market access markets
continued . . .
authorities
‘Feed in tariffs’ used

in over 60 countries May require additional
to provide guaranteed legal arrangements
purchase and prices
for electricity generated
from renewable energy
sources
Many target small-

scale generation on
behalf of communities
and individuals not
traditionally engaged
Voluntary/self- Individuals, groups, Assumes action not Not required by law Fairtrade labelling Problems of scaling up
regulation organisations take for financial incentive from diverse, local
action to protect Public authorities Green consumerism successes
environment as good May involve a may provide
ecological citizens willingness to pay infrastructure to Ethical investment Long-term success
extra for benign support (recycling) depends on
products and services Recycling internalisation of
positive environmental
Voluntary attitudes and behaviour
conservation work changes
Voluntary carbon Concern as to whether

off-setting the world can consume
its way out of global
environment and
development problems
Source: compiled by author.

that sustainable development in practice requires. As seen in

Chapter 2, the challenges of sustainable development include
recognising the different values and interests surrounding
environmental resources and functions, for example, and questioning
where the costs and benefits fall, to whom, through particular
development interventions. Sustainable development in practice
cannot be achieved if processes of governance continue to create
social and economic marginalisation, enhanced vulnerability and
conflict. It will be seen through the chapter that improving
‘governance’ is now recognised by many development institutions
as a critical agenda for more sustainable development.
International action
A principal means through which countries can confirm their

cooperation within international efforts to support global
environmental goals has been through their signatures to various
‘multilateral environmental agreements’ (MEAs). These are treaties
that bind international behaviour towards collective objectives that
could not be achieved by nation states acting individually. It is
estimated that there are over 1,500 multilateral and bilateral
environmental agreements currently in operation (Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006). Table 3.1 highlights some of the most important in
that they have the most signatories. Many MEAs have their origins
in major international environmental summits. An average of 16
MEAs were signed each year between the Stockholm and Rio
conferences (1972–1992) and 19 between the Rio and the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Mitchell, 2003).
MEAs are not static documents; rather, they are renegotiated as
parties to the agreement or circumstances change. This was seen in
Box 2.6 in the case of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC) agreed at Rio. At the time of signing it was what
is termed ‘soft-law’ requiring voluntary commitments to reduce
country emissions of carbon dioxide. Only with the full ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 did the convention become legally
binding. However, the effectiveness of MEAs depends on states
being willing to devolve some of their sovereign power to those
created institutions (Werksman, 1996). Delays in the full ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol were substantially due to the refusal of the US
to sign on the basis that it would harm its domestic economy and that
Table 3.1 Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
MEA Purpose Date Entry Number of

adopted into signatories
force in 2010
Ramsar Convention – Convention To conserve and promote the wise use of wetlands. 1971 1975 70
on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat
World Heritage Convention – To establish an effective system of identification, protection, 1972 1975 187
Convention Concerning the and preservation of cultural and natural heritage, and to
Protection of the World Cultural provide emergency and long-term protection of sites of value.
and Natural Heritage
CITES – Convention on International To ensure that international trade in wild plants and animal 1973 1975 175
Trade in Endangered Species of species does not threaten their survival in the wild, and
Wild Fauna and Flora specifically to protect endangered species from over-exploitation.
CMS – Convention on the To conserve wild animal species that migrate across or 1979 1983 101
Conservation of Migratory outside national boundaries by developing species-specific
Species of Wild Animals agreements, providing protection for endangered species,
conserving habitat, and undertaking cooperative research.
UNCLOS – United Nations To establish comprehensive legal orders to promote peaceful 1982 1994 157
Convention on the Law of use of the oceans and seas, equitable and efficient utilisation
the Seas of their resources, and conservation of their living resources.
Vienna Convention – Convention To protect human health and the environment from the effects 1985 1988 188
for the Protection of the Ozone of stratospheric ozone depletion by controlling human activities
Layer that harm the ozone layer and by cooperating in joint research.
Montreal Protocol – Protocol on To reduce and eventually eliminate emissions of man-made 1987 1989 196
Substances that Deplete the Ozone ozone depleting substances.
Layer (Protocol to Vienna Convention)
Basel Convention – Convention To ensure environmentally-sound management of hazardous 1989 1992 176
on the Control of Transboundary wastes by minimising their generation, reducing their
Movements of Hazardous Wastes transboundary movement, and disposing of these wastes
and Their Disposal as close as possible to their source of generation.
UNFCCC – United Nations To stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 1992 1994 195
Framework Convention on at a level preventing dangerous human-caused interference with
Climate Change the climate system.
CBD – Convention on To conserve biological diversity and promote its sustainable use, 1992 1993 168
Biological Diversity and to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilisation of genetic resources.
UNCCD – United Nations To combat desertification, particularly in Africa, in order to 1994 1996 194
Convention to Combat mitigate the effects of drought and ensure the long-term
Desertification productivity of inhabited drylands.
Kyoto Protocol – Kyoto Protocol To supplement the Framework Convention on Climate Change by 1997 Not yet 193
to the United Nations Framework establishing legally binding constraints on greenhouse gas in force
Convention on Climate Change emissions and encouraging economic and other incentives to
reduce emissions.
Aarhus Convention – Convention To guarantee the rights of access to information, public 1998 2001 44
on Access to Information, Public participation in decision-making, and legal redress in
Participation in Decision-Making, environmental matters.
and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters
Source: World Resources Institute EarthTrends http://earthtrends.wri.org searchable database results.

it unfairly favoured developing countries. The latest discussions at

Copenhagen of the post-Kyoto framework have confirmed the
difficulty of such international ‘rule making’ that depend on all
parties committing to an agreed course of action that may
compromise national interests. Further difficulties arise from what
is termed the ‘democratic deficit’, whereby countries participating
may not be democracies, there is unequal distribution of power,
knowledge and resources amongst participating countries and some
countries are able to impose their preferences and undermine the
capacity of other participants to impact on the final outcomes
(Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).
MEAs also depend on the commitment of governments to ensure that
measures are binding on their populations. Canada for example, has
abandoned its commitments to their Kyoto targets on emissions
reductions. Box 3.1 confirms the importance of national governments
in ensuring the protection of environmental and human health in the
context of the Basel Convention that seeks to control the trade in
hazardous waste. Box 3.2 highlights that MEAs can, however,
facilitate new partnerships such as between governments and
business. It is also an illustration of ‘cap and trade’ as a mechanism
to deliver environmental improvements. Despite substantial debate
regarding the future of such ‘state-centred’ institutional
arrangements, it is also considered that whilst MEAs are not perfect,
‘the world would be a much poorer and endangered place if such
international agreements did not exist at all’ (O’Riordan, 2009: 312).
Box 3.1
Controlling the trade in hazardous waste

In 1989, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal was developed as a multilateral environmental
agreement to address the emergent problem of firms (largely from the US and Europe)
‘dumping’ hazardous materials (defined as waste which, if deposited into landfills, air or
water in untreated form will be detrimental to human health or the environment) into
unprotected communities in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America; an emerging trade
that was understood as being related to the rising costs of disposal within the source
countries associated with tightening of domestic environmental regulations. The
convention aims to establish a framework for sound environmental management of
hazardous waste through the minimisation of both the generation and transboundary
movement of such wastes and to ensure disposal as close to the source of production as
possible. Where wastes were to be exported, the exporting country must have ‘prior
informed consent’, that is, written consent from an appropriate authority in the receiving
country with an obligation on the exporter to ensure that the wastes at destination would
be managed in an environmentally sound manner. The only acceptable justification for
hazardous waste export under the convention is if a country lacks adequate technical
capacity to handle/manage those wastes domestically or the importing country requires
the waste as a raw material. An amendment to the convention in 1994 calls for all OECD
countries to ban export of hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries.
Whilst the Basel Convention, along with a number of regional agreements (such as the
Bamako Convention of 1991 which bans the imports of hazardous wastes into Africa)
and national legislation (including within industrialising countries such as China and
India) have served to limit the most obvious cases of the export of hazardous waste in
recent years, the international trade has not been eliminated. For example, in August
2006, the movements of a Panamanian registered ship, the Probo Koala (chartered by a
British-owned oil and commodity shipping company, Trafigura) attracted international
media attention. The focus of concern was the disposal of its waste cargo in a number of
locations around the city of Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast and the subsequent
claim by thousands of local people that they had fallen ill as a result.
Before arriving in Abidjan, the ship had already been turned away from the Dutch port of
Amsterdam where local residents reported the strong smell of ‘rotten eggs’ (hydrogen
sulphide) and the Port Authorities had established the toxic nature of the cargo. A Dutch
company tendered to dispose of the waste for 500,000 Euros. However, days later the
Probo Koala departed for the Ivory Coast where a local company (allegedly registered
only days before the arrival of the ship and involving senior civil servants) was
contracted to dispose of the waste at the substantially reduced cost of 18,500 Euros. In
the weeks subsequent to the offloading of the cargo, as many as 17 people had died and
over 40,000 people had sought medical treatment for effects including headaches,
stomach pains, respiratory problems and vomiting (according to news media in the UK
and US).
The case has prompted high-profile attention including:
G The nine-month-old transitional government in Ivory Coast resigned in September

2006
G Independent inquiries were launched by both the city of Amsterdam and the United
Nations
G A class action was raised on behalf of 31,000 local Ivorians by a UK firm in the High
Court in London (the largest injury case in British history). In 2009 an out-of-court
settlement of £30 million was agreed.
However, there remain questions concerning what was on board the ship, the ports
visited and who could be held responsible in future. Trafigura asserts that the cargo was
‘slops’ from routine washing of tanks, comprising a mixture of water, gasoline, caustic
soda and a small amount of hydrogen sulphide. Other suggestions are that the cargo was
a consignment of coker gasoline (bought from a Mexican, state-owned oil company) that
was subjected to a process of onboard ‘caustic washing’ and resold for a reported profit
of US$19 million. On this basis, Trafigura was looking to dispose of a highly toxic waste
including sodium hydroxide, sodium sulphide and phenols. Trafigura continues to deny
responsibility and suggests that it could not have foreseen the failure of the local
company to dispose of the slops in an appropriate manner (it was allegedly spread over a
number of public dumps, waste ground and roadsides).
However, as signatories to the Basel Convention and under legally binding EU law, it is
also possible that EU countries visited by the Probo Koala could be liable to take the
waste back if they were a country of export. Evidence suggests, for example, that the
Dutch authorities had concerns about the waste on the ship and would have been
obligated under the Convention to prevent the ship from leaving with the waste.
Source: compiled from Evans (2010), Verkaik (2010).
Box 3.2
The contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism

to sustainable development
The Kyoto Protocol became legally binding on ‘Annex 1’ countries in 2004. It set an
‘environmental ceiling’ or ‘cap’ for future global greenhouse gas emissions of 5.2 per
cent below 1990 levels by 2012. A key part (and entirely new principle) of the Protocol
was that some emissions reductions required of countries could be met by transferring to
other counties (‘trading’ emissions permits) under what are known as Flexibility
Mechanisms. The underpinning rationale of these mechanisms was that enabling a cross-
border trade in emissions reductions would facilitate cheaper reductions in emissions
globally. Less developed economies (who were not subject to the binding targets on
emissions reductions) could sell ‘carbon credits’ or so-called ‘certified emissions
reductions’ to countries (and industry) that did have these emissions commitments. As a
result, emerging economies would be supported to make energy savings and to invest in
less polluting technologies. One of the Flexibility Mechanisms was designed to generate
new project-based credits whereby a company or investor from a developed country can
fund a project in a developing country that either reduces emissions or enhances sinks.
This is known as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Such projects must
produce reductions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of certified
project activity. Their explicit purpose stated in the Protocol was that they should assist
Parties not included in Annex 1 in achieving sustainable development as well as
contribute to the overall global objective of lowering emissions.
There is much debate as to the success of the CDM to date. One concern is the
inequitable distribution of projects across developing regions: 73 per cent of
investment/trading in terms of value has been with China, where costs of emissions
abatement have been low (Boyd et al., 2009). Yet China is one of the fastest growing
economies in the world (as well as the largest current greenhouse gas emitter). In
contrast, countries across sub-Saharan Africa have less than 3 per cent of all projects
registered. Furthermore, whilst it was intended that the CDM would stimulate investment
in renewable technologies such as wind, solar and geo-thermal energies, the majority of
projects to date have been in other sectors; in gas capture projects at major chemical and
manufacture plants addressing emissions of HFC and N2O, for example, that are in fact
more ‘minor’ greenhouse gases in terms of their contribution to climate warming than
CO2. Critics question whether companies should be being ‘paid’ to clean up a mess of
their own making. From an environmental justice perspective, the concern is that CDM
projects are being used to provide generous subsidies to companies to use existing
technologies to mop up industrial gases rather than shifting to the low carbon world that
is needed.
There are also concerns as to the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable
development. The process of identifying projects for the CDM include the host
government (through its Designated National Authority) being responsible for defining
the criteria for sustainable development in any project context. Project proposals are then
passed through a UN body for validation. However, an analysis of 65 Indian project
documents for their stated contribution to sustainable development concluded that they
‘offer just lip service regarding expected contribution to socioeconomic development of
the masses, particularly in rural areas’ (cited in Boyd et al., 2009: 822). Whilst many
projects to date have made significant emissions reductions, they are falling short in
delivering local benefits, either directly such as through employment or indirectly
through an improvement in local environmental and social conditions. Furthermore, there
is little evidence for the participation of civil society in the decisions regarding projects,
leading to enhanced local tensions where projects serve to support business and industry
that are in fact causing some of the worst social and environmental problems locally. It is
acknowledged that the CDM can be a useful approach to encourage the development of
emissions-reduction projects in developing countries, but there are a number of issues to
be addressed as part of reforming the CDM that is part of post-Kyoto negotiations.
Aid and finance for the environment
Foreign aid is defined as any flow of capital to the developing

nations which meets two criteria. First, its objective should be non-
commercial from the point of view of the donor; second, it should be
characterised by interest and repayment terms which are less
stringent than those of the commercial world. The notion of foreign
aid is that these grants and loans transfer financial resources from
more wealthy to poorer nations to promote development and welfare.
Historically, what is termed ‘official development assistance’ (ODA)
has comprised grants and concessional loans from individual
governments (traditionally from higher-income countries and in
particular members of the OECD) and through the multilateral

development institutions (such as the World Bank). In recent years,
further aid channels have proliferated to include new sources of
ODA (the governments of India and Korea are now donors despite
also being recipients of aid, for example), an expansion of private
organisations (especially from the US and including the Melinda and
Bill Gates Foundation and Ford Foundation) and increased funding
through NGOs. In addition, new networks combining bilateral
(‘government to government’), private, NGO and finance through
UN organisations are also being seen around specific issues – notably
HIV/AIDS and malaria. Figure 3.2 confirms the many sources of
ODA currently for Africa. In many ways, aid is now a complex
business. Deutscher and Fyson (2008) for example suggest that there
are more than 280 bilateral donor agencies, 242 multilateral
programmes, 24 development banks and about 40 United Nations
agencies now involved and an estimated 340,000 development
projects around the world.
There are long-standing debates over the impact of aid on recipient
nations. Opinions range from the belief that it is an essential
Figure 3.2 Percentage share of Africa’s ODA budget
OECD – DAC
35%
China
30–50%
Brazil
27–30%
Korea
15%
India Turkey
1.5–3.6% Arab 6%
countries
11%
Source: Africa Progress Panel (2010).

prerequisite for development (supplementing scarce domestic

resources) to the view that aid perpetuates neo-colonial and
dependent relationships that prevent development processes including
the spread of democracy. Many of these arguments have been
substantially reinvigorated in the current context, in particular the
proliferation of aid sources, the proximity of the MDG target
deadlines (2015), the global economic crisis and the recognised
challenges of finding new finances to deliver on climate
commitments. Whilst Dambisa Moyo argues for the halting of aid,
suggesting that ‘aid has been and continues to be, an unmitigated
political, economic and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the
developing world’ (Moyo, 2009: xix), the UK government ‘ring-
fenced’ its aid budget in 2009 to ensure that it can deliver on its
existing commitments at a time of severe cuts being made in
domestic social spending. Many authors and institutions call for
‘less and better aid’ (see Glennie, 2008).
As far back as 1970, the UN set targets for ODA, urging developed
countries to allocate 0.7 per cent of GNP annually by 1975. This
target been repeatedly endorsed at international development
conferences yet has only been reached by a few countries, as seen in
Figure 3.3. The US has never signed up to the 0.7 per cent target, but
it is estimated that half of all private philanthropic aid to developing
countries comes from the US (Curto, 2007). Calls for enhancing
levels of aid have been made, for example at the G8 meeting in
Gleneagles in 2005. ‘Scaling up’ aid is recognised as important for
meeting the MDG commitments and in relation to the particular
needs of the African continent. However, there remain concerns as to
whether commitments made at such summits are realised in practice,
arrive ‘on time’ and are ‘additional’ to existing promises (all of
which are essential for planning within host countries, for example).
The Gleneagles commitment to provide a further US$25 billion to
African countries by 2010 in fact realised only US$11 billion (Africa
Progress Panel, 2010).
Rather than finances going directly to governments, aid now flows
through many different channels of disbursement, evaluation and
often staffing. Figure 3.4 identifies a number of problems associated
with these new trends. An overarching concern is the impact on how
development decisions are now made within a country and the
capacity for host countries and people to set their own policy and
priorities. Indeed, Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia have recently turned
down IMF loans under pressure from civil society groups concerned
Figure 3.3 ODA as proportion of Gross National Income, 2009
UN target
(0.7%)
Sweden
Norway
Luxembourg
Denmark
Netherlands
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
United Kingdom
France
Switzerland
Spain
Germany
Austria
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Portugal
United States
Greece
Japan
Italy
Korea
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
ODI/GNI percentage
Source: adapted from OECD (2010a).

that such lending in the past has distorted domestic economic

and social policy. The constant reporting to donors that is required
may also compromise the prospects for developing stronger
governance structures within these host countries. The Monterrey
Consensus signed by members of the UN in 2003 is one attempt to
enhance the coherence, consistency, effectiveness and transparency
of aid in future.
Figure 3.4 The challenges of aid
Aid fragmentation:
In 2005–06, 38 developing countries received ODA from more than 25 DAC
and multilateral donors. In 24 of these countries, 15 or more donors collectively
provided <10 per cent of that country’s total aid (Deutscher and Fyson, 2008: 16).
The average number of donors per country was 12 in the 1960s. It is now 33
(Glennie, 2008).
Aid coordination:
In 2005, Vietnam received 791 missions from donors – more than two a day
including weekends and holidays (Deutscher and Fyson, 2008: 16).
In 2006, Tanzania received 541 donor monitoring missions (Glennie, 2008).
Aid priorities:
In Rwanda, 75 per cent of ODA goes directly through NGOs and/or donor-
managed projects. Malaria is the leading cause of mortality in Rwanda, but
donor funds to anti-malaria activities are one-third of those to HIV/AIDs
(Curto, 2007).
‘Even India is giving aid to Africa . . . with 400 million poor people of its own to
attend to, this largesse is obviously not about poverty reduction’ (Glennnie,
2008: 111).
The burden of monitoring:

Most African countries submit approximately 10,000 quarterly donor reports every
year (Glennie, 2008).
The government of Tanzania declares a donor-mission-free period in each year
such that civil servants can get on with their main jobs (Glennie, 2008).
The Monterrey Consensus:

This urges members of the UN to intensify their efforts as aid donors to:
G harmonise their operational procedures
G move to further untie aid and remove restrictions
G enhance capacity of recipient countries
G use frameworks that are owned and driven by developing countries
G enhance recipient country input to design of technical assistance programmes
G improve ODA targeting to poor.
Aid and environment

Certainly, there is much evidence that aid can be (and has been)
environmentally damaging. In Chapter 1 it was seen that the
widespread damage to environments and local peoples caused by
resettlement projects, large dams and road building, particularly in
Latin America (and those financed by World Bank), were important
in shaping public environmental concern in the US in the 1970s.
Concern regarding the negative environmental impacts of structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) was also identified as the focus for
emerging NGO campaigns and actions both within developing
countries and transnationally. SAPs were the conditions required of
countries to access funding from the World Bank/IMF, but also to be
eligible for debt relief (which ‘counts’ for donor countries as
‘ODA’). They have been important therefore in releasing domestic
financial resources for investments in environment and development.
The section below considers the impact of debt (and measures to
address it) on the environment more fully. As seen above, more
ODA is now disbursed through NGOs and one reason is the
suggested characteristics of NGOs that make them better suited to
effect more sustainable development. This is explored further in the
final section of this chapter.
It is only recently that ODA commitments for environmental
outcomes have been monitored. Whilst there are acknowledged
problems of accounting (such as whether finances go to explicitly
environmental projects or to those that have been modified in small
ways to support those objectives), approximately 30 per cent of
bilateral aid in 2007/8 was considered in support of the environment
(OECD, 2010b). The new commitments being made on climate
finance are also classified as ODA. In 2008, approximately 8 per cent
of total ODA (US$8.5 billion) was aimed at climate change
mitigation, that is, supporting recipient countries to reduce emissions,
enhance carbon sinks and/or integrate climate change concerns into
their development objectives (OECD, 2010c). Finance for climate
change adaptation is largely through the Adaptation Fund set up in
2007 under the Kyoto Protocol. This fund uses finance raised through
the CDM in particular (Box 3.2) as well as other donations to
support measures to anticipate and respond to climate change
impacts. Most recently, under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord,
developed countries have committed to provide US$100 billion per
year to developing countries by 2020 to help responses to climate
change. It is unclear at present if these commitments will be as loans
or grants and whether they will be ‘new and additional’. A concern is

that existing aid commitments could be renamed and therefore
diverted from other important development/environment objectives.
Box 3.3 identifies a scheme that has attracted much interest from
many different donor organisations as a means for raising finances
for the environment and for disbursing their aid commitments under
the Copenhagen Accord. It is an illustration of a ‘market mechanism’
as identified in Figure 3.1 to deliver environmental objectives that
rests on payments being made by the global North to communities
and governments in the South in respect to their commitments to
protect global carbon sinks (particularly forests).
Box 3.3
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest

Degradation (REDD⫹)
In 2007, the parties to the UNFCC committed to place efforts to reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) at the
centre of discussions regarding any new climate agreement when the current Kyoto
agreement ends in 2012. In short, the existing Kyoto Protocol has focused on
responsibilities and targets for GG emissions but has not accounted for any actions to
support and conserve global carbon sinks and in particular forests. Whilst the nature
of the post-Kyoto international agreements on climate remain uncertain, the Copenhagen
Accord indicates continued support for REDD+. Wider political and stakeholder interest
in REDD+ is also high from, among others, the World Bank through its Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility, governments of the EU, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations
(Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea are proactive proponents) and plantation, oil and
gas companies.
The essential idea behind REDD+ is that countries, companies, communities or
individuals could be paid to manage forests and reduce deforestation in recognition of the
role forestry has in carbon sequestration and the significance of land use change in
annual carbon emissions at a global scale. The beneficiaries of such actions – the global
community – would pay forest owners for the services they are providing (maintaining
global atmospheric systems and all that depend on those) and compensate them for any
additional costs and/or loss of income that such longer-term conservation (‘avoided
deforestation’) requires.
The principal of REDD+ acknowledges that powerful economic incentives are needed to
discourage forest clearance given the strength of current economic drivers of
deforestation such as palm oil expansion, conversion to agriculture and industrial tree
planting. It is anticipated that funding could come either from aid money and/or through
the carbon market (the latter being preferred by the World Bank and EU governments).
The UN suggests that REDD+ could generate a North–South flow of finances of
US$30 billion per year (cited in FoE, 2010: 5). As such REDD+ can be considered
a global-scale ‘payments for environmental services’ mechanism, as considered in
Figure 3.1.
Whilst there is currently no international agreement on REDD+, there are several large
scale initiatives including the UN-REDD programme that are already supporting
countries in capacity building, strategy development and pilot projects in preparation to
implement REDD+. ‘Interim’ activities are underway in 54 developing countries (FoE,
2010) with the majority funded through bilateral aid. Norway, for example, is currently
in collaboration with both Indonesia and Brazil for projects worth US$1 billion in each
(FoE, 2010: 11). However, there are fears that without international agreement, decisions
will be donor driven and fragmented. In addition, such top-down policy driven by global
agencies and governments could have serious negative impacts, as seen in Figure 3.5, on
forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples whose culture and livelihoods are
closely linked to those forests. There is also the overarching ethical concern regarding
carbon markets, where industrial and corporate interests pay for carbon credits to be used
within schemes such as REDD+ whilst continuing to pollute and extract fossil fuels
elsewhere (potentially at a cost to other people). Further problems include the fact that
REDD+ does not address the underlying drivers of deforestation to reduce demand for
timber and agricultural commodities or the fundamental challenge of creating lower
carbon economies to mitigate climate change. A suggestion is that REDD+ could become
about creating new carbon markets and opportunities to make money.
Figure 3.5 The potential risks to livelihood of avoided deforestation policies
G Increased state and ‘expert’ control over forests
G Overzealous government support for anti-people models of forest conservation (evictions

and expropriation) with forests seen as lucrative carbon reservoirs
G Unjust targeting of indigenous and marginal peoples as the drivers of deforestation
G Violations of customary and territorial rights
G State and NGO zoning of forests without informed participation of forest dwellers
G Unequal imposition of the costs of forest protection on local communities
G Unequal and abusive community contracts
G Land speculation, grabbing and conflicts
G Embezzlement of international funds by national elites
G Increasing inequality between those in receipt of funds and those who are not
G Potential conflict within communities over acceptance or rejection of schemes.
Source: compiled from Griffiths (2007).

The World Bank in sustainable development
The ‘World Bank’ (WB) comprises a number of institutions, as

shown in Figure 3.6. The origin of the World Bank (and its ‘sister’
organisation, the International Monetary Fund) is the Bretton Woods
Conference of 1944, and was part of a framework aimed at ensuring
the reconstruction and development of Europe after the Second
World War. In operation, since 1950 the World Bank has loaned
monies increasingly to the governments of developing nations. To
qualify for WB loans, countries must first be members of the IMF
(which is concerned with economic and financial stability and sets
and oversees codes of economic conduct on behalf of its members).
The WB is the major source of multilateral finance for developing
countries. In 2010, gross disbursements from IBRD and IDA totalled
US$58.7 billion (World Bank, 2010c). In addition, it is known that
WB lending decisions influence what other private banks and donor
organisations do, such that for each dollar that the World Bank lends,
it can be expected that many more will also flow to these projects
and initiatives (Rich, 1994). The rhetoric and actions of the World
Bank with regard to the environment are therefore crucial in
determining the prospects for sustainable development.
Fundamentally, the WB, as a multilateral institution, has been able to
borrow money on world markets and lend more cheaply than
Figure 3.6 The World Bank Institutions
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

G Established 1944
G 187 members
G Lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries
G Lending in 2010: US$44.2 billion for 164 new operations in 46 countries
The International Development Association (IDA)

G Established 1960
G 170 members
G Provides interest-free, long-term loans – called credits – and grants to governments of the
world’s 79 poorest countries (defined in 2011 as per capita incomes of <US$1,165)
G Lending in 2010: $14.5 billion for 190 new operations in 66 countries
The World Bank Group also includes the international Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment disputes (ICSID).
Source: compiled from World Bank (2010c).

commercial banks. It raises money by selling bonds and other

securities to individuals, corporations, pension funds and other banks
around the world. Its securities are considered to be amongst the
worlds safest, ensuring that it can borrow on very favourable terms
and is able to lend money at rates of interest below commercial
levels. Decisions on allocating funds take place on the basis of ‘one
dollar–one vote’, that is, according to the financial contribution of the
voting country to the bank. On this basis, approximately 45 per cent
of voting rights are held by the G8 countries, with developing
countries typically having less than 0.1 per cent of votes. In the early
decades, World Bank lending was principally to projects, that is,
investments in discrete, time-bound and often large-scale initiatives
such as within infrastructure and mining. From the early 1980s, an
increasing proportion of lending has been ‘programme lending’, for
packages of policy reform to address the failings in the macro-
economies of developing countries that were compromising what
could be achieved through traditional project lending. As seen in
Chapter 1, SAPs were considered by the World Bank and IMF as
key to the longer-term solution of the debt crisis. By the end of the
1990s, over 50 per cent of World Bank lending was to packages of
macro-economic and policy reform
Table 3.2 World Bank lending by theme,
(Potter et al., 2008).
2010
Figure 3.7 identifies the countries
Theme Percentage that receive World Bank financial
of total support. Table 3.2 shows the
lending
destinations of these monies in
Financial and private sector 30 terms of particular development
development themes, the patterns of which
Human development 14 are discussed further below.
Public sector governance 10 The World Bank also provides a
Rural development 9 number of ‘non-lending services’
Urban development 9
to developing countries. These
Social protection and risk 9
management
include technical and policy
Economic management 7 advice and research (both at a
Environment and natural 7 general level, as in the annual
resource management World Development Reports, and
Trade and integration 3 within countries to support
Social development, gender 2 environmental and poverty
and inclusion assessments, for example). It also
Rule of law <1
provides support for consultations
Source: adapted from World Bank (2010c). and impact evaluations.
Figure 3.7 Countries receiving financial support from the World Bank
Middle East and North Africa Europe and Central Asia
FY10 New Commitments FY10 New Commitments
IBRD | $3,523 million IBRD | $10,196 million
IDA | $214 million IDA | $620 million
Portfolio of Projects | $8.7 billion Portfolio of Projects | $24.4 billion
Russian
Federation
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Turkey Afganistan China
West Bank Lebanon Pakistan East Asia and Pacific
and Gaza FY10 New Commitments
Nepal
Arab Republic IBRD | $5,865 million
Saudi India IDA | $1,652 million
of Egypt
Arabia Bangladesh Portfolio of Projects | $28.4 billion
Mexico Vietnam Philippines
Senegal
Nigeria Thailand
Côte Ethiopia Sri Lanka
d’Ivoire Ghana Cameroon
Kenya
Demographic Tanzania
Peru Brazil Indonesia
Republic
Latin America and the Caribbean of Congo
FY10 New Commitments
IBRD | $13,667 million
IDA | $240 million South Asia
Portfolio of Projects | $32.1 billion FY10 New Commitments Australia
South IBRD | $6,689 million
Africa IDA | $4,645 million
Argentina Portfolio of Projects | $33.7 billion
Africa
FY10 New Commitments
IBRD | $4,258 million
IDA | $7,179 million
Portfolio of Projects | $35.3 billion
Countries eligible for IBRD funds only

Countries eligible for blend of IBRD and IDA funds
Countries eligible for IDA funds only
Inactive IDA-eligible countries
Countries not receiving World Bank funds
Offices with the Country Director present
Word Bank Regions
Source: adapted from World Bank (2010c).

The World Bank certainly has its opponents and as Nelson (2008:
552) suggests, has regularly been a ‘lightning rod for criticisms of
the international economic system and of development aid’. It has
been and remains a key target of environmental critics. A recent
independent evaluation, however, has suggested that World Bank
support for the environment has evolved from a preventative
approach of ‘do no harm’ to a more proactive ‘do good’ approach in
recent years (World Bank, 2008a). The following sections consider
the evidence for changes in the World Bank operations in relation
to the environment, in terms of its investment and policy lending and
in the way in which it works with other institutions towards
sustainable development.
Greener project lending

Early environmental activities of the World Bank were largely
concerned with assessing and mitigating the environmental impacts
of its lending. An Office of Environmental Affairs was created in
1973 for this purpose. However, it had minimal staff and it was not
until 1987 that a central Environment Division was established to
promote environmental activities (as well as oversee them). In 1992,
a ‘four-fold environmental agenda’ (Figure 3.8) for the World Bank
was announced reflecting the agreements reached at the Earth
Summit. The World Bank committed to supporting countries to
develop National Environmental Action Plans, to assisting the
integration of the interdependent concerns of poverty reduction,
economic growth and
Figure 3.8 The four-fold environmental environmental protection and to
agenda of the World Bank administer the new finances of the
1. Assisting member countries in setting
Global Environment Facility (all
priorities, building institutions and key outcomes of the Rio process as
implementing programmes for sound seen in Chapter 1). Commitments
environmental stewardship. were also made to improve
2. Ensuring that potential adverse Environmental Impact Assessment
environmental impacts from bank-financed
projects are addressed. (EIA) and ‘safeguard’ policies
3. Assisting member countries in building on (such as those referring to
the synergies among poverty reduction, indigenous peoples) within project
economic efficiency and environmental lending.
protection.
4. Addressing global environmental challenges The seriousness of the World
through participation in the Global Bank’s commitments to
Environment Facility (GEF).
environmental reforms was quickly
Source: World Bank (1994). tested in the early 1990s. The USA
(the WB’s largest contributor) threatened to withhold 25 per cent of

its 1992 contribution (approximately US$70 million) in relation to
bank involvement in the damming of the Narmada River in India. At
the time, this was the world’s largest hydroelectric and irrigation
complex, based on 30 major, 135 medium and 3,000 minor dams to
be built over 50 years. It was designed to generate an estimated 500
million megawatts of electricity, irrigate over two million hectares
and bring drinking water to thousands of villages. The scheme,
however, was mired in controversy from the outset: the dams would
displace 200,000 people, submerge 2,000 square kilmetres of fertile
land and 1,500 square kilometres of prime teak and sal forest, and
eliminate historic sites and rare wildlife. Fierce local and
international protests led to the WB taking the unprecedented step of
commissioning an independent review of its activities and subsequent
support was withdrawn. Whilst the Indian government continued
with the project, civil society challenges from within the country
persisted, including petitions of the Narmada People’s Movement to
the Supreme Court of India (Vidal, 1998).
Strengthening of EIA procedures continues to be key to processes to
reduce the negative environmental impacts of World Bank project
lending. Before projects are approved for lending, they are ‘screened’
for prospective environmental and social impacts and various levels
of investigation (including public consultations) are triggered before
the project can proceed. However, a recent review has suggested
continued problems of non-compliance with the Bank’s
environmental assessment policy (World Bank, 2008) and
weaknesses in those assessments that are undertaken (particularly
regarding public consultation and in determining indirect and
cumulative environmental impacts).
A further element of the World Bank’s environmental agenda has
been to provide funds for projects which specifically aim to
strengthen environment and natural resource management (termed
ENRM lending and identified in Table 3.2). Such projects include
direct investment in pollution prevention and treatment, the
conservation of biodiversity, integrated river management and
establishing national parks as well as funds for research, capacity
building, training and monitoring. Between 1990 and 2007,
approximately 15 per cent of all World Bank commitments (by
amount of lending) included ENRM components (World Bank,
2008a). Table 3.3 shows the regional destination of this lending.
East Asia is the largest recipient and 57 per cent of these
Table 3.3 ENRM lending by region, commitments are to China

1990–2007
specifically. India receives more
Region Percentage such funding than the whole of
of lending sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank,
East Asia and Pacific 33.3
2008: 23). The majority of ENRM
Latin America and Caribbean 19.4
commitments (95 per cent by value)
South Asia 14.8 are within IBRD/IDA projects.
Europe and Central Asia 14.1 However, they also include the
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.4 new finances for climate change
Middle East and North Africa 6.9 identified above and those to the
Global Environment Facility (GEF).
Source: adapted from World Bank (2008a).
The Global Environment Facility
was established in 1990 in
conjunction with UNEP and UNDP as a programme of new monies
to assist the least developed nations in the arenas of climate change,
biodiversity protection, international water management and ozone
depletion. Monies were to help meet the additional costs of
transforming a project with national benefits to produce global
benefits (or indeed ‘witholding development’ to protect the global
environment). Through GEF, the World Bank currently operates in
partnership with ten UN agencies, numerous NGOs and the private
sector to fund approximately 1,800 projects (the costs ranging from
US$2,000 to $50 million) in over 140 countries (Mee et al., 2008).
GEF is the main funding mechanism for delivering the goals of the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention
for Climate Change. GEF projects, by thematic area since its
inception, are shown in Figure 3.9. It has been praised by some as an
important tool for multilateral cooperation on environmental issues,
but is criticised by others for focusing on what could be considered
‘western’ environmental agendas (Werksman, 1995) and being too
closely aligned to World Bank decision-making and projects (Jordan
and Brown, 2007). Since 2008, GEF has been the principal channel
for international commitments to the WB’s Climate Investment Fund.
However, there is some concern that linking climate funds to GEF
(with its established priorities to maximise global environmental
benefits) may lead to smaller countries being unable to access these
finances in future (World Bank, 2008a: 22).
Programme lending and sustainable development

Structural adjustment programmes were the key mechanism used to
address the debt crisis from the late 1980s. However, concern
Figure 3.9 Distribution of GEF funding by focal area, 1991–2010
Biodiversity Climate
33% change
40%
Persistent Organic
Pollutants
3% Ozone
depletion
3% Multi-focal
area Land International
8% degradation waters
2% 11%
Note: Total disbursement $4.5 billion

Source: http://go.worldbank.org/JBZVXOC7O0, accessed 23 February 2012.
quickly mounted that SAPs were undermining the prospects of

sustainable development (Reed, 1996; FOE, 1999). Mohan et al.
(2000) suggested that SAPs were ‘environmentally blind’ in the first
ten years of implementation. The focus was generally on fiscal issues
(i.e. the balance of payments difficulties and governments spending
more than they had) and the environment was generally not high on
government or public agendas. Fundamentally, the core of neo-liberal
thinking encapsulated in SAPs was for decreasing state expenditure,
not increasing it through environmental protection. ‘In the effort to
rapidly trim budget deficits, governments are forced to make choices,
and inevitably, the environment loses’ (FOE, 1999: 4). Not only were
the budgets and staffing of environment departments regularly cut,
weakening the ability to enforce environmental laws, but
environmental legislation may have been relaxed in order to increase
foreign investment (FOE, 1999). Figure 3.10 illustrates some of the
environmental outcomes of these pressures.
It was also quickly evident that structural reform was widening
socioeconomic and gender disparities. The UNICEF publication of
1987 Adjustment with a Human Face was particularly important for
Figure 3.10 Pressures of adjustment on the environment
G In Cameroon, the IMF-recommended export tax cuts and devaluation of the currency in
1995 led to increased incentive to export timber. The number of logging enterprises rose
from 194 in 1994 to 351 in the following year. Exports of lumber grew by 50% between
1995 and 1997.
G Under SAP guidance since the mid-1980s, Guyana has implemented policies to increase
large-scale, foreign-owned mining ventures. There are now 32 foreign mining companies
active in the country with mining permits, covering 10% of the country.
G SAP in Tanzania resulted in rising costs of inputs for agriculture. Production increases were
pursued through increased land clearing at a rate of 400,000 hectares per year. Between
1980 and 1993, a quarter of the country’s forest area was lost (40% of which was to
cultivation).
G In Brazil, government spending on environmental programmes was cut by two-thirds in order
to meet the fiscal targets of the IMF.
G Benin, Guinea, Mali and the Central Africa Republic all established new mining codes to
promote exploration and development.
Source: compiled from Friends of the Earth (1999).
exposing the increased poverty and social polarisation (particularly

the worsening fate of women and children under five) occurring
under adjustment. It also revealed the pressure on natural resources
being created by people’s coping strategies under such conditions.
Through such evidence (and the wider resistance to neo-liberalism
and globalisation considered in Chapter 1), pressure mounted on the
World Bank and other financial institutions to modify the conditions
of their policy lending. Targeted funding, for example, became
available for various ‘Social Safety Nets’ aimed to reduce what were
considered short-term, negative impacts of adjustment on certain
groups (for an overview and critique of their impacts, see Potter
et al., 2008).
In 1999, SAPs were replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs). The intention is that PRSPs could overcome many of the
limitations of SAPs. For example, SAPs were characterised by very
prescriptive conditions on recipient governments, had tended to
embrace a ‘one size fits all countries’ approach (see Figure 1.11) and
public citizens or NGOs had been excluded from the processes
involved. PRSPs are developed by individual national governments
and through much more explicit and open participatory processes that
include representatives of the World Bank and IMF but also other
donors and civil society, as seen in Figure 3.11. PRSPs are required
to set out coherent plans for reform focused on poverty reduction and
to identify their financing needs in respect to their particular social,
economic and environmental contexts, that is, are tailored to the
Figure 3.11 The core principles of the specific conditions and needs of
PRSP approach
particular countries as defined by
Poverty reduction strategies should be: multiple stakeholders. The World
G Country driven, promoting national Bank also ‘encourages’
ownership of strategies through broad-based governments to consider
participation of civil society environmental factors in their
G Result-oriented and focused on outcomes
PRSPs, ‘because of the links
that will benefit the poor
between environment and poverty,
G Comprehensive in recognising the
multidimensional nature of poverty and because a poverty reduction
G Partnership-oriented, involving coordinated strategy must be environmentally
participation of development partners sustainable over the long term’
(governments, domestic stakeholders, and (World Bank, 2001a: 144).
external donors) and
G Based on a long-term perspective for An analysis of 40 countries
poverty reduction. implementing PRSPs to 2005
Source: IMF (2010). suggests that this approach has
made important progress in putting
poverty as a stronger focus within government, engaging civil society
to an unprecedented extent in policy activities and enhancing
coordination of donors at a country level (Driscoll and Evans, 2005).
However, there is also considerable variation across countries in the
extent to which the environment is integrated. In a review of 53
PRSPs, Bojo et al. (2004) looked at mainstreaming of the
environment in terms of: how environmental issues were explained;
any analysis of poverty–environment linkages; identification of
environmentally relevant actions; the extent to which participation
and consultation allow environmental concerns to be heard; and any
alignment with MDG7 (on sustainable development). Whilst some
PRSPs had very thorough engagements, in others it was only
marginal. The authors identified that environmental health issues
generally got more attention than natural resource management issues
and only a few took a longer-term perspective. Only 14 had any
explicit targets aligned to MDG7 and in most cases this was focused
on the water and sanitation target.
Strategic development and change within the World Bank

In 2001, the World Bank launched its first environment strategy,
Making Sustainable Commitments. The aim was to link environment
and development throughout all WB activities in future through three
core objectives, identified in Figure 3.12. Importantly, there was
recognition that change was required in the bank itself: to ‘accelerate
the shift from viewing the environment as a separate, freestanding
Figure 3.12 Strategic objectives for concern to considering it an integral

sustainable development at the World Bank
part of our development assistance’
G Improving the quality of life (focusing on (World Bank, 2001b: xxv).
three broad areas where environment,
quality of life and poverty reduction are The Bank is currently undertaking
strongly interlinked – in enhancing consultations on a new Environment
livelihoods, preventing and reducing Strategy. It recognises that the
environmental health risks and reducing
people’s vulnerability to hazards) external context has changed
G Improving the quality of growth and in considerably since the first strategy,
particular ensuring that short-term gains do in particular the impact of climate
not come at the expense of constrained change on development gains in its
opportunities for future development
client countries and the pace and
G Protecting the quality of the regional and
global commons in recognition that extent of urbanisation (World Bank,
solutions to sustainability need to go 2009c). In 2008, an Independent
beyond individual countries Evaluation Group assessment of
Source: World Bank, (2001b). World Bank support to the
environment (World Bank, 2008a)
had found that whilst support to
National Environmental Action Plans and general capacity building
for environmental stewardship had improved, this had not been
followed through in project lending. The review also identified
problems in the performance of ENRM projects within lower-income
countries and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, whilst
much analytical work had been done at a general and country level
regarding the linkages between poverty, livelihoods and environment,
the review found that much lending (particularly policy-based
lending) still gave insufficient attention to those linkages. The report
also identified that lending to issues of urban air quality, industrial
pollution control and urban health and environmental management
generally had been low and was a particular concern in the context of
rising urbanisation. More coordinated actions across sectors and in
given localities were also needed to build the positive linkages
between environmental protection, poverty reduction and
development more broadly.
Trade and the environment
At both a global and national level, trade has become an increasingly

important element in development. In recent decades, more of what
is produced is sold in external markets around the world confirming
the growing interconnectedness of the global economy. Between
1950 and 2000, for example, world merchandise trade (encompassing
manufactures, fuels, mining and agricultural products) increased

almost twenty-fold, whereas merchandise production increased only
six-fold (Dicken, 2011: 18). Similarly, trade now forms a larger
proportion of GDP in most countries than it did 50 years ago. The
contribution of developing countries to world merchandise exports
has also increased, as shown in Figure 3.13.
Evidently, trade has been responsible for a significant proportion of
economic growth in recent years and measures to promote further
trade expansion have been central to mainstream approaches to
development, as seen in previous chapters. However, just as with the
debates over globalisation as a whole, there remains substantial
uncertainty regarding the relationship between trade expansion,
economic growth and environmental impacts. There is concern that
large parts of the developing world are not experiencing the benefits
of wealth generated through trade; low-income developing countries
still accommodate only 1 per cent of world exports, as seen in Figure
3.13. Low-income countries also remain heavily dependent on a few
products despite some diversification: just five commodities (which
differ by country) account for over 70 per cent of total exports on
average from these countries (World Bank, 2010b).
The geography of global production and trade is complex (see
Dicken, 2011). Whilst there have been significant shifts in the last
few decades, including the rising share of world exports attributed to
Figure 3.13 The rising contribution of developing economies in world exports
40
Share of world exports (per cent)
30
20
10
0
1990 2000 2005 2008 1990 2000 2005 2008
Exports of goods Exports of services
Low-income economies
Middle-income economies (excluding China and India)
India
China
Source: World Bank (2010b).

Figure 3.14 The uneven and concentrated the developing world and the rapid
geographies of production, trade and foreign
investment
economic growth of countries such
as China and India, ‘the
G Approximately three-quarters of global geographies of production, trade
manufacturing and services production and and FDI remain highly uneven and
four-fifths of world agricultural production
are concentrated in just 15 countries. strongly concentrated’ (Dicken,
G Around one-fifth of world trade in goods, 2011: 25), as summarised in
services and agriculture is accounted for by Figure 3.14. Furthermore, there are
the leading two countries in each sector. ‘persistent peripheries’ within these
G More than 80 per cent of outward FDI stock
geographies embracing ‘most of the
originates from 15 countries (30 per cent
being accommodated by US and UK continent of Africa, parts of Asia
together). and parts of Latin America’ (p. 36).
G Half of all inward FDI is concentrated in five
countries (30 per cent in China and Hong Globally, the substantial growth in
Kong). trade has been outpaced by that of
Source: compiled from Dicken (2011).
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
As identified in Chapter 1, FDI
refers to investments made overseas
by one firm in another for the purposes of gaining a degree of control
over that firm’s operations. It also includes a firm setting up a branch
or subsidiary in another country. From the mid 1980s, the rate of
growth of FDI started to exceed and become ‘de-coupled’ from the
expansion of exports and trade. This is explained by the rapid growth
of transnational corporations and the amount of trade that occurs
between different parts of the same firm (although across national
boundaries). In 2009, there were an estimated 82,000 parent
company TNCs controlling around 810,000 foreign affiliates
(Dicken, 2011). These TNCs account for two-thirds of world exports
of goods and services and approximately one-third of world trade is
transactions between different parts of same firm. This dominance of
TNCs currently in world trade and the overall size of their assets
(that are often larger than many countries of the world, as seen in
Table 3.4) creates a number of concerns including their power to
influence public policy both within international trade negotiations at
the World Trade Organisation and domestically. TNCs are not
accountable to the public or any elected body, but only to a small
number of shareholders (Korten, 2001).
Reforming world trade became highly politicised in the 1990s as part
of the wider challenge to neo-liberalism. Unprecedented protests by a
wide range of development organisations, unions, NGOs and many
individuals in 1999, for example, (the ‘Battle for Seattle’) led to the
abandonment of the annual meeting in that city of the World Trade
Table 3.4 The state and corporate power Organisation (the international
Country or corporation Total GDP*
institution charged with setting the
or corporate rules and resolving disputes in the
sales** (millions arena of international trade).
of US$, 2008) Several international NGOs
Belgium 471,161 (INGOs) such as Oxfam have long-
Exxonmobil Corporation 459,479 standing and important campaigns
Sweden 406,072 concerning trade reform that focus
Wal-Mart stores 401,244 on exposing the ‘double standards’
Saudi Arabia 375,766 and ‘rigged rules’ of the
BP 365,700 international trading system that
Argentina 307,155 they suggest work in favour of the
Chevron Corporation 273,005 rich and prevent the potential for
Thailand 263,772 trade to reduce poverty. The nature
Ford Motor Company 146,277 of Oxfam’s concern is illustrated in
New Zealand 126,679 Figure 3.15 and is seen to include
IBM 103,630 the activities of governments,
Nestle 101,466 multinational business and the
Vietnam 97,180 World Bank as well as the WTO.
Electricite De France 94,044 There is also a recognition amongst
Deutsche Telekom 90,221 major international institutions that
Bangladesh 89,360 the challenge of ensuring positive
Sony Corporation 76,795 linkages between trade, economic
Rio Tinto Plc 58,065 growth and poverty alleviation are
Luxembourg 52,296 complex. For example, the UN
Sources: *World Bank (2010b); **UNCTAD (2011). Development Programme identifies
that whilst trade has been an
‘indispensable engine’ for economic
growth across the world throughout human history (UNDP, 2003:
xi), the experience of trade liberalisation in recent decades suggests
that ‘the expansion of trade guarantees neither immediate economic
growth nor long-term economic or human development’ (p. 1).
There are also different views on the impact of trade liberalisation on
the environment, summarised in Figure 3.16. Whilst the debate had
tended to be very polarised, evidence can be identified to support
both ends of the spectrum. The impact and outcomes of trade on the
environment will vary, among other things, according to the nature
of the product being exported and the effectiveness of domestic
environmental policy. However, the operation of international trade
rulings is also considered to be key. The majority of world trade
takes place according to a set of rules administered by the World
Trade Organisation.
Figure 3.15 The Oxfam ‘Making Trade Fair’ campaign
G Improving market access for poor countries and ending the cycle of subsidies, agricultural
over-production and export dumping by rich countries
G Ending the use of conditions attached to IMF–World Bank programmes which force poor
countries to open their markets regardless of the impact on poor people
G Creating a new international commodities institution to promote diversification and end
over-supply, in order to raise prices to levels consistent with a reasonable standard of living
for producers, and changing corporate practices so that companies pay fair prices
G Establishing new intellectual-property rules to ensure that poor countries are able to afford
new technologies and basic medicines, and that farmers are able to save, exchange and
sell seeds
G Prohibiting rules that force governments to liberalise or privatise basic services that are
vital for poverty reduction
G Enhancing the quality of private-sector investment and employment standards
G Democratising the WTO to give poor countries a stronger voice
G Changing national policies on health, education, and governance so that poor people can develop
their capabilities, realise their potential and participate in markets on more equitable terms
Source: Oxfam (2002).
Figure 3.16 Different views of the effect of trade liberalisation on the environment
Positive
G Trade liberalisation promotes economic growth. As societies become richer, they acquire
both the will and the resources to protect the environment.
G Trade liberalisation promotes the efficient allocation of resources (including environmental
resources), allowing the production of a given economic product with the least possible use
of resources.
G Trade liberalisation promotes the international transfer of environmentally-preferable technologies.
G Trade liberalisation promotes the convergence of environmental standards for products and
processes towards the higher levels of rich countries, and increases the markets for
environmentally-preferable products.
G Trade liberalisation promotes international co-operation in other areas, notably
environmental protection.
Negative
G Trade liberalisation amplifies environmental externalities through its promotion of economic growth.
G Trade often involves long-distance transport, which is one of the principal sources of
environmental externalities.
G Because of competitiveness pressures, trade liberalisation will result (at best) in political
drag on environmental policy making by governments, and (at worst) in an environmental
‘race to the bottom’ through competitive deregulation.
G Trade rules arising from trade liberalisation impede national governments in their attempts
at environmental protection, either because of possible trade effects (e.g. through
mandatory re-use of containers) or because of perceived discrimination (e.g. eco-labelling).
G Trade rules may inhibit the use of trade measures in multilateral environmental agreements.
G The production of some highly-traded goods (e.g. cotton, cigarettes, certain foods) is more
environmentally-destructive than the production for domestic consumption which it replaces.
G Opportunities to use land for trade result in subsistence farmers being displaced onto
environmentally-marginal land, where they may cause environmental damage.
Source: Ekins (2003).

The World Trade Organisation and sustainable development
The WTO was formed in 1995. It replaced the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was established in 1947 through
the same statesmanship which created the United Nations, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A set of international
trading rules was developed for the promotion of future economic
stability and development after the era of economic crisis, heavy
protectionism, mass unemployment and the Depression (which had
all formed part of the backdrop to the Second World War). These
principles of free trade and market liberalisation continue to underpin
WTO rulings.
Most countries of the world (153) are members of the WTO.
Decision-making is based largely on consensus, with each member
getting one vote (rather than being weighted according to economic
contribution, as within the World Bank). Member states agree to two
fundamental principles: of ‘national treatment’, under which
countries must treat external participants in their economies in the
same way as domestic firms; and of the ‘most favoured nation’,
which states that any concession granted by a member to any one
trading partner must be extended to all. WTO rulings are binding on
its members and the WTO has the power to impose sanctions on
governments through its dispute settlement system.
Although WTO rulings refer strictly to international trade policy (i.e.
what happens at borders), the agreements made by the organisation
have far-reaching implications for national policy-making and
prospects for economic development and environmental protection
within countries as well as internationally. For example, the WTO
agenda has increased in scope (from the original GATT activities
relating to manufactured goods) to include services (such as
telecommunications and banking) and intellectual property rights and
patents. It also now has authority in areas such as food safety that
were formerly the preserve of national governments. Developing
countries including BRIC and through groupings such as the G20
now have more influence at the WTO than before. As a result, the
political importance of the WTO agenda has mounted as has the
complexity of its negotiations (Reiterer, 2009). This is reflected,
for example, in the length of negotiations over the WTO work
programme (known as ‘rounds’). It took eight years to complete the
‘Uruguay Round’ (1986–94) and a further seven years to agree even
the shape of the latest round (agreed in Doha in 2001).
The Doha Round was to be a ‘Development Agenda’ (DDA). At the

launch, there was substantial optimism that trade rulings could and
should be made to better accommodate the development dimensions
of trade and give a stronger role to developing country members in
negotiations. Furthermore, there was explicit recognition within the
Doha Communique that upholding an open multilateral trading
system and promoting sustainable development could and must be
mutually supporting. In the early stages, there was indeed some
evidence of a stronger role for developing country members. At
Doha, for example, trade ministers from the developing world were
successful in modifying existing rules regarding trade in intellectual
property rights. These are now enabling lower costs of patented
medicines for treatments of HIV/AIDS, for example. At the Cancun
meeting in 2003, a group of 20 developing countries left in response
to the refusal of members from the EU, Japan and the US to cut
agricultural subsidies. There is some sense that issues of importance
to developing countries and their particular challenges have been
recognised within the negotiating topics for the DDA. These include
cuts being made to agricultural subsidies and in industrial tariffs on
textiles and leather products that have particular significance for
developing country exporters. ‘Special and differential treatment’ is
to be considered whereby developing countries would have smaller
cuts and be able to shield their agriculture and industry from full
cuts. However, these were only confirmed in 2004 and talks have
been substantially stalled since 2008.
Clearly, these arenas of trade have major implications for economic
development in exporting countries, but also for the environment.
Trade in environmental goods and services are also now part of the
Doha Round, opening the prospect that current tariffs on renewable
energy technologies will be subject to these rulings. As seen in
Chapter 2, India, Brazil and China are now world-leading
manufacturers of these technologies. The relationship between trade
rulings and Multilateral Environmental Agreements are also part of
the main negotiations of the WTO. Many environmental treaties
place some type of restriction on international trade and could be
considered strictly as violating the principles of the WTO. It was
seen, for example, in Box 3.1, that under the Basel Convention,
countries are obliged to prevent the import or export of hazardous
wastes if there is reason to believe that wastes will not be treated in
an environmentally sound manner on their destination. If a country
imposes a total ban on foreign waste but in so doing subjects foreign
companies to more stringent measures than may be applied to

domestic companies, this could contravene the WTO principle of
‘national treatment’.
Prior to the Doha Round, environmental concerns at the WTO were
discussed within the Committee on Trade and the Environment
(CTE). However, the CTE is not a policy-making body and its work
has focused largely on the negative impacts of environmental
measures on trade (i.e. environmental measures as distortions to free
trade), rather than how trade liberalisation may aggravate or cause
environmental degradation effects (Potter et al., 2008). For example,
it is possible within WTO agreements for countries to regulate trade
in certain products in order to protect human, animal or plant life or
health. Any such measure must be applied to domestic as well as
foreign firms (i.e. be non-discriminatory) and cannot be used as a
protectionist device (i.e. must be established through scientific
evidence as clearly for health or conservation ends and not for trade
protection). However, WTO rulings focus on the product not the
processes or methods of production. It is possible, therefore, that a
country may restrict the importation of a certain good if it will cause
environmental damage. What a country cannot do is stop the
importation of a good which has caused environmental damage
elsewhere during the course of its production: ‘the way the import is
produced, if it has no effect on the product as such, is not an
adequate reason to discriminate against it’ (Cairncross, 1995: 227). If
a country wishes to impose environmental and health standards on
productive activities and passes environmental legislation towards
that end, that country does not have a right under the WTO articles
to impose those standards on other countries. As a result, it could be
argued that such countries risk making their own production
uncompetitive in a world market where goods produced under less
environmentally friendly conditions can still be traded.
Concerns have emerged recently in relation to ‘eco’ and ‘carbon’
labelling (discussed further below). These measures are designed
explicitly to reveal to consumers the nature of the production
processes underpinning goods as a way of moving towards more
sustainable and lower-carbon futures. If discriminating against goods
and services on the basis of the processes and methods of production
(PPMs) is allowed under future WTO rulings (and possibly extended
to include labour standards and even human rights conditions), there
is concern that this could impact on the access of developing
countries (and their generally smaller business enterprises) to world

markets given their environmental standards, wage rates and working
conditions inevitably reflect also their level of development (Ekins,
2003).
There are also concerns that WTO rulings continue to assume that
trade takes place between countries when in fact the majority is
controlled by and takes place within TNCs. Whilst TNCs are not
members of the WTO and therefore have no direct power, they do
have very significant economic and technical resources and make a
large contribution to particular domestic economies such as the USA
and within the EU. This is suggested to guarantee that their concerns
will be listened to at a national level and carried forward to
negotiations within the WTO (Taylor, 2003). For example, the
International Chamber of Commerce is an international corporate
lobby group dominated by very large TNCs including General
Motors, Nestlé, Novartis and Bayer. It has permanent representation
at the WTO (New Internationalist, 2002). In contrast, many
developing countries are not able to afford the costs of maintaining
diplomatic missions at the WTO base in Geneva (Oxfam, 2002).
Evidently there are a number of critical challenges for the WTO in
future that will significantly shape patterns and processes of
development and impact on many of the world’s most pressing
environmental problems.
Business responses to sustainable development
As seen, many commentators are fearful of the prospects for

sustainable development through further trade liberalisation and have
particular concern for the dominance of large TNCs in world trade,
and their power and influence within international trade policy.
Fundamentally, TNCs are considered to put profit first and hold little
allegiance to any particular place, community or environment.
Beyond the arena of trade, TNCs have also increasingly moved into
sectors relating to natural resources, energy, telecommunications,
transport, water and sanitation that were formerly provided by the
public sector and that are vital for poverty reduction and the
prospects for sustainable development. Between 1990 and 2001, for
example in the context of neo-liberalism, 132 low- and middle-
income countries introduced private-sector participation in these
sectors (UNCHS, 2001). However, business and the private sector
are also understood to be central to meeting the global challenges of

sustainable development: in providing the innovations and products
for lower carbon growth, in shaping consumer tastes in future and in
providing directly the finances for conservation and development
projects, for example. Jonathon Porritt, a well-known
environmentalist and the Founder Director of Forum for the Future
that works with business as well as the public sector to promote
more sustainable futures, contrasts a suggested optimism and drive
amongst the most progressive business leaders with a current
procrastination of political leaders and confusion and indifference of
the public (Porritt, 2011). This section considers how business is
changing the ways in which it works and the sources of pressure
towards greater environmental and social accountability. Government
policy, consumer demand and business and industry’s own
perception of its environmental responsibility have combined in
recent years to move many companies to progress more sustainable
patterns and processes of development. However, concerns remain,
including issues of the power and accountability of private
corporations and whether these changes represent fundamental
changes in the way that business is being done, or just ‘greenwashing’.
As seen in Chapter 1, public distrust (especially in US and Europe)
of business and industry as a principal cause of many environmental
problems emerged through the 1970s. A key response by
governments was to introduce new environmental legislation, taxes
and regulatory agencies to enforce, monitor and penalise processes
and products that were environmentally harmful. This is the
‘command and control’ mechanism of environmental governance
identified in Figure 3.1. These remain a key way in which business
and industry are moved to more sustainable operations. However,
such regulatory controls require a well-resourced and powerful
regulatory infrastructure to ‘police’ enforcement. Attempts to impose
tighter regulations in one country can also encourage industry to
export its hazards elsewhere (as seen in Box 3.1). Furthermore, such
policy mechanisms can be considered to be economically inefficient,
to stifle competition and block innovation, and there may be little
incentive for a company to invest in reducing emissions or wastes
substantially below the level required by legislation. This is part of
the ‘ecological modernisation’ case considered in Chapter 1.
A principal response of business in these early years was to appoint
public relations specialists and to use the media to reshape public
opinion. Around 30 per cent of the advertising budgets of many large

companies in the oil, electricity and chemical industries became
directed towards environmental issues through the 1980s, for
example (Beder, 2002). Business also engaged in all kinds of
cooperative ventures, with schools, research institutes and government
assuring the public that business interests were the same as those of
the environment. In the run-up to the Earth Summit, for example,
‘Corporations lined up to present themselves as part of the solution,
rather than the problem’ (Ainger, 2002: 21). Some consider that
corporations were so successful in these activities that they were able
to cast doubt on the urgency of environmental problems (Beder,
2002) and even promote a public ‘backlash’ against the
environmental movement (Cairncross, 1995).
It is considered that a turning point in the relationship between
business and the environment became evident in the 1990s, as many
of the larger global corporations in particular started to internalise
environmental concerns as a central part of their corporate
governance (Redclift, 2005). The Business Council for Sustainable
Development, for example, was invited to compile recommendations
on industry and sustainable development at the Earth Summit. Ainger
(2002: 21) suggests that this confirmed that ‘Transnational companies
had made the evolutionary leap. They were no longer entities to be
managed by governments, but had mutated into “valued partners”
and “stakeholders” formulating global policy on their own terms.’ As
considered further in Chapter 6, many more businesses worldwide
became concerned with issues of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’
(CSR) and started reporting to their stakeholders (shareholders,
employees and customers) their social and environmental
performance as well as economic activities. In recent years, a number
of high-profile international companies have announced wide-ranging
plans that embrace commitments to reducing energy and resource use
throughout their production and distribution, to suppliers through
their commodity chains, to monitoring labour standards and to
addressing poverty and human rights impacts of their trade, for
example. In 2007, Marks and Spencer launched its £200 million
‘eco-plan’ termed ‘Plan A’. It set out 100 commitments to achieve in
five years. In 2010, these were extended to 180 specific goals across
seven themes in areas of climate change, waste, natural resources,
health and well-being, fair partnership, involving customers and
making Plan A ‘how business is conducted’. Figure 3.17 identifies
some of the key commitments.
Figure 3.17 Elements of Marks and Spencer’s ‘Plan A’ commitments
G Targets on energy and water efficiency by 2015 including:

– Reduction of store energy usage by 35% per square foot
– A 35% improvement in fuel efficiencies in deliveries to stores
– A 25% reduction in water usage within stores, offices and warehouses
G Move towards using 50% biodiesel in lorries
G Targets to reduce, simplify and re-use packaging including:
– Reduce home packaging by 30% by weight by 2015
– Help customers to recycle 20 million items of clothing each year by 2015
– Reduce the weight of non-glass packaging by 25% by 2012
G Convert produce and products to fish certified by Marine Stewardship Council, wood by
Forest Stewardship Council and key clothing range to 100% Fairtrade cotton
G Launch of M&S Supplier Exchange to support suppliers by sharing best practice,
stimulating innovation and helping to secure funds for investment
G Marks and Start programme of local and overseas work placements for disadvantaged
groups
G Enhanced training, campaigns and product labelling to support customers and employees
to make more healthy lifestyle choices
We’re doing this because it’s what you want us to do. It’s also the
right thing to do. We’re calling it Plan A because we believe it’s now
the only way to do business. There is no Plan B.
(http://plana.marksandspencer.com/about,
accessed 23 February 2012)
Whilst many applaud such commitments, others remain sceptical, for

example about whether such commitments constitute ‘greenwashing’,
whereby minor changes are made (and highly publicised) and the
environmentally conscious consumer is exploited for further
economic gain to the company. In addition, many environmental
NGOs remain very concerned as to the power of large corporations
to influence public thinking (and government policy) regarding the
changes required for sustainable development. It is well known that
corporations provide huge finances to various organisations, think-
tanks, lobbyists and political front groups which are opposed to
progressive climate policy and clean energy development for
example (i.e. which finance ‘climate sceptics/climate science denial’).
Greenpeace (2010) has recently completed an investigation of Koch
Industries, one of the largest private corporations in the world and
dominated by petroleum and chemical interests. It has annual sales of
over US$100 billion with operations in 60 countries. The Greenpeace
report identifies over 40 climate denial and opposition organisations

that received Koch foundation grants of over $24 million between
2005 and 2008. It also names 12 US senators who have received
more than $10,000 each for federal political campaigns since 2004.
The lack of a legally binding code on international corporate
behaviour is a long-standing concern particularly for INGOs. Friends
of the Earth International, for example, continue to campaign for a
legally binding treaty on TNCs that would ensure compliance with
minimum criteria of human rights, environmental and labour
standards, and place legal responsibility on the corporation for the
impacts of their business practices. Although the campaign gathered
momentum at the World Summit on Sustainable Development and
was supported by many developing countries as well as the EU, it
did not gain agreement. There are now, however, a number of not-
for-profit networks that work to support the development of
consistent and quality systems for reporting ‘CSR’ worldwide. The
Global Reporting Initiative is the most widely used and includes
reporting on human rights, the environment, anti-corruption, labour
and all aspects of ‘corporate citizenship’. It is supported by UNEP
and over 1,000 companies including many leading brands such as
Shell, GM and Microsoft, BMW and Coca-Cola report under the
framework (Blewitt, 2008). The World Bank and the IMF (i.e.
institutions beyond business) also produce sustainability reports
under GRI guidelines that are continuously reviewed by a wide range
of business, civil society organisations, labour and professional
institutions. Similarly, over 2,500 organisations from over 60
countries including major companies like Wal-Mart are now
reporting voluntarily on their greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change strategies through the Carbon Disclosure Project
(www.cdproject.net/, accessed 14 January 2012).
One of the most powerful tools for ensuring greater business
transparency and accountability is proving to be public access to
information that encourages and empowers civil society to join
‘governance processes’. In recent years, various forms of labelling
and certification have been developed through which industry
endorses more sustainable use of resources and consumers can make
more informed choices. West Germany was the first country to
launch a government-sponsored environmental labelling scheme in
1978. Their ‘Blue Angel’ endorsement now extends to over 11,500
products in 90 categories (www.blauer-engel.de, accessed 1 February
2010) through which customers are informed of the active
contribution of specific products to environmental and health

protection. Similarly, in 2007, the Carbon Reduction Label was
launched in the UK as a partnership between the Carbon Trust
(a not-for-profit company) and the government. To join the scheme,
companies have to declare the total greenhouse gas emissions for
their products at each stage in their lifecycle (including production,
transport and disposal). They also set commitments to reduce those
emissions further over two years. If reductions are not made, the
label is withdrawn. Similar schemes are being developed in Thailand,
Japan and South Korea.
Other labelling schemes may be backed by private sponsors (rather
than government) but typically involve similar coalitions of
stakeholders in business and civil society. The idea of labelling for
‘Fairtrade’, for example, originated in the Netherlands in the late
1980s. It was designed to inform and attract consumers through a
guaranteed label on coffee grown by small-scale farmers in Mexico
(and thereby support such farmers to engage in international
markets). Fairtrade Labelling International now coordinates Fairtrade
labelling schemes that have extended worldwide (and the products
involved expanded beyond coffee). Members include labelling
initiatives in 23 countries and networks representing producers in
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. FTLOI sets and
monitors the standards required of the producers and the companies
involved in the marketing and trade of FT products. It sets a
minimum price that buyers of FT products have to pay to the
Producer Organisations for their products that ensures a price that
covers the cost of sustainable production. A further sum (the ‘FT
Premium’) is paid by the buyer for investments in social and
environmental development projects
Figure 3.18 Fairtrade on the rise (decided upon democratically by
G Global sales of Fairtrade produce by value
producers and workers within the
increased 15 per cent in 2009 to an Producer Organisation). As such,
estimated total value of Euros 3.4 billion. the price paid by the consumer is
G An estimated 27,000 Fairtrade products are typically higher than for non-FT
now sold in over 70 countries.
produce. However, Figure 3.18
G The number of certified producer
organisations are also rising, from 508 in suggests that many consumers
2005, to 827 in 2009. worldwide are willing to pay
G Recent surveys suggest that consumer enhanced prices in the knowledge
awareness of Fairtrade products is as high that such goods are less
as 80 per cent in many countries.
environmentally damaging and can
Source: compiled from FTLOI (2010). enhance social development.
New technologies are also supporting consumers to be more aware of

the processes through which products are produced and enhance the
transparency of various stages in the complex commodity chains that
characterise many products (involving many stages not only in
production, but in manufacture, transportation and marketing).
Mobile phones are starting to be used to extract sustainability
information embedded in a product’s barcode and live web-based
camera feeds currently provide insight into activities on the ground
within Bangladeshi clothes factories supplying clothing to the
Asda supermarket chain (Goodman and Wright, 2011: 16). There
is also now much optimism concerning the potential of well-designed
and monitored labelling schemes to enable consumers to make
choices that support lower carbon emissions and in turn provide
incentives for businesses at various stages in the supply chain to
adopt more carbon-efficient practices. However, there are many
challenges in establishing the ‘green’ credentials of a product in
terms of quantifying carbon emissions through the production, use
and disposal of a product. These are enhanced when trying to
establish any suggested positive environmental and social benefits
of particular products. For example, there may be a lack of data on
carbon emissions at stages in the complex commodity chain,
particularly in low-income countries. Furthermore at the ‘ground
level’ of the supply chain, products (such as in forestry and
agriculture) may be extracted or produced under exploitative labour
conditions and in a context of a lack of political representation
that are very hard to ‘quantify’ and indeed to change. There is
also concern that extension of labelling schemes and moves
towards closer carbon accounting in future may be detrimental
to products from low-income countries:
exports from low-income countries typically depend on long-distance

transportation and are produced by relatively small firms and tiny
farms that will find it difficult to participate in complex carbon-
labelling schemes.
(World Bank, 2010a: 254)
Recently, the new practice of carbon ‘offsetting’ has become a way

that companies (and individual consumers) can demonstrate their
support for reducing carbon emissions and for projects that generate
environmental and social benefits, particularly within developing
countries. It is a practice that depends on the recent existence of a
market in carbon that is itself controversial. As seen in Box 2.6, an
‘official’, regulated and internationally governed market for carbon as

a traded commodity was established under the Kyoto Protocol in
1997. Box 3.2 described the ways in which carbon ‘offsetting’ is
enabled within this official market through what is termed the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). To date, carbon offsetting has
largely involved large energy-intensive industries within countries
subject to such international emissions reduction targets ‘offsetting’
their own (high) carbon emissions through payments to support
emissions reductions within other industries and countries. However,
there is also an emerging ‘voluntary’ market in carbon. In recent
years, hundreds of new companies (‘offset providers’) have been
established through which individuals and companies make voluntary
payments in relation to their own carbon emissions that are then
transferred to projects, activities and technologies located elsewhere
that in some way support the global reduction in carbon emissions.
Many offset projects also emphasise various added social and
development benefits in the host location as well as carbon
reduction. This voluntary offset market (although still only
approximately 1 per cent of the size of the regulated market) was
estimated in 2009 to be worth US$387 million (Hamilton et al.,
2010). Key companies in this field include Climate Care and the
Carbon Neutral Company.
However, the mechanisms of voluntary offsetting and the social
and environmental impacts of particular offset projects have been
strongly contested from the outset (see New Internationalist, 2006
www.carbontradewatch.org and www.corpwatch.org). For example,
a number of early projects were of dubious quality and impact
and there was confusion amongst consumers purchasing offsets.
There are ongoing debates regarding the calculations of carbon
‘saved’ and the price charged to the consumer to offset a particular
airline flight, for example. Many projects include reforestation
schemes, yet there are similar problems with calculating carbon
stored within particular species and the time taken for environmental
benefits to accrue. There are now new international standards
being developed within the industry, promoted and overseen by the
International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance. However, from
an environmental justice perspective, carbon trading and offsetting
are considered ‘false solutions’ (see Figure 1.14) and a new form of
colonialism whereby climate policies are used to impose projects
on the global South whilst northern consumers need not change
their lifestyle.
International debt and the environment
Issues of debt first came to international attention in the early 1980s.

In the favourable global economic climate of declining oil prices,
low interest rates and buoyant world trade of the mid 1970s, heavy
borrowing, largely from commercial banks, enabled the developing
countries to achieve relatively high growth rates whilst still being
able to service their debts. Through the late 1980s and 1990s,
however, many developing countries found it increasingly difficult to
service these debts in a global context of declining commodity
prices, rising costs of oil and interest rate rises. The prospect of
widespread defaulting on loans to commercial banks threatened the
stability of financial systems internationally, prompting the
involvement of the IMF and World Bank.
Whilst the burden of debt servicing for developing countries is now
much lower than it was previously, as seen in Table 3.5, debt
remains a significant part of the context in which sustainability has to
be pursued worldwide and measures for debt relief continue to be an
important policy mechanism for global economic growth. Most
recently, the challenges of debt have been seen in Greece and Ireland
which have had to accept emergency packages of finance and reform
from the IMF. This section reviews the key implications of debt for
sustainable development and identifies a number of actions towards
debt reduction that explicitly seek to link debt reduction to more
sustainable outcomes.
Fundamentally, debt presents
Table 3.5 Debt service as a percentage of problems for sustainable
exports development because monies
leaving the country through interest
Debt service/exports
payments are unavailable for
Region 1995 2000 2008 internal, productive investments in
East Asia and Pacific 12.7 11.4 3.9
the immediate term and ‘crowd out’
Europe and Central 10.6 18.2 18.6
possibilities of other areas of public
Asia spending such as education, health
Latin America and 25.4 38.0 14.0 and infrastructure that are essential
the Caribbean for future economic development
Middle East and 19.7 13.3 5.3 (Johansson, 2010). Through the
North Africa
1990s, government spending on
South Asia 25.6 14.6 8.4
servicing debts far exceeded that on
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.9 11.5 3.3
health for example, as seen in
Source: compiled from World Bank (2010b). Table 3.6. The level of government
austerity necessitated by debt servicing also has direct implications

for the environment, reducing a government’s capacity to deal with
environmental protection and rehabilitation and to invest in
environmental management. Furthermore, debts have to be serviced
through foreign exchange, so that they can only be met by increasing
exports, decreasing imports or further borrowing. Expanding exports
can have very direct impacts on the environment, particularly as the
principal exports for the majority of developing countries continue to
be raw materials and primary commodities. The need to increase
short-term productivity puts pressure on countries to overexploit their
natural resources. In the long term, this ‘resource mining’ raises the
costs of correcting the environmental destruction inflicted now and
reduces the potential for sustained development in the future of those
resources such as within agriculture and forestry. In an investigation
of debt and deforestation through the 1980s, George (1992)
established that (although the links were complex) those developing
countries that deforested the fastest through the decade were, in the
main, the largest debtors at that time.
Perhaps most starkly, debt raises the question of intergenerational
equity: debts have to be repaid by people today in relation to loans
taken on in the past by governments (and in some cases, dictators).
As seen in the following sections, NGOs have been very influential
in pressing for change in the way donor organisations operate and in
shaping innovative programmes for more sustainable debt relief.
Many continue to campaign on the moral questions of ‘odious debts’
Table 3.6 Government spending: health and debt servicing compared, selected low
human development countries
Public expenditure on health Total debt service (% of GDP)

(% of GDP)
Country 1990 2000 1990 2001
Cameroon 0.9 1.1 4.7 4.0

Pakistan 1.1 0.9 4.8 5.0
Kenya 2.4 1.8 9.3 4.1
Gambia 2.2 3.4 11.9 2.7
Nigeria 1.0 0.5 11.7 6.2
Mozambique 3.6 2.7 3.2 2.4
Sierra Leone – 2.6 3.3 12.8
Source: UNDP (2003a).

whereby the current generations are liable for the debts taken out by
corrupt regimes without any responsibility being taken by the
creditors that knowingly leant to those regimes (NEF, 2008).
The first substantial attempt to reduce the external debt of the
world’s poorest and most indebted countries was initiated in 1996 by
the World Bank, the IMF and a number of G8 countries. The aim of
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was to remove
US$100 billion of the debt of the lowest-income countries. It was the
first time that debts to the World Bank and the IMF were considered
for reduction. The key objective was to ensure that no poor country
faced an unmanageable debt burden and could achieve ‘debt
sustainability’, defined as total external debts (to all creditors) below
150 per cent of annual exports. Before qualifying for HIPC, countries
have to take part in IMF and WB economic reforms (initially to have
an SAP and more recently a PRSP, for example) and engage fully
with other ‘traditional’ debt relief mechanisms such as those
available through bilateral arrangements. By 2000, only five
countries had completed the qualification process and were eligible
for some debt relief. Substantially in response to widespread
campaigning by INGOs, particularly the Jubilee 2000 coalition, it
was agreed in 1999 to ‘enhance’ the HIPC initiative to provide
greater levels of relief, more quickly and to more countries.
Significantly, many bilateral creditors, including all G8 countries,
also agreed at this time to 100 per cent cancellation of bilateral debts
owed to them. The influence of civil society groups in prompting this
change was again important: in 1998, 70,000 people had formed a
human chain encircling the Birmingham summit of G8 leaders to
expose the unpayable and unjust nature of current debt levels.
Pushing for further cancellation of bilateral and multilateral debts
were also central to the Make Poverty History and ‘Live 8’
campaigns coalescing in particular around the 2005 meeting of the
G8 finance ministers in Gleneagles, Scotland.
At Gleneagles, a new programme that allows for full, 100 per cent
relief on eligible debts to the IMF and the WB was announced. To
qualify for the ‘Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative’ (MDRI), countries
must have completed the HIPC initiative process and meet the criteria
shown in Figure 3.19. By the end of 2010, 32 countries had qualified
and 25 of these are in Africa. Approximately US$72 billion of debt
has been relieved through HIPC to date and has been particularly
significant for improving the situation on the African continent.
However, there remain concerns including the transparency of the
Figure 3.19 Criteria for eligibility for the qualification process for these
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
schemes where judgements are
G Establish a further track record (i.e. since made entirely by the IMF and WB
receiving HIPC relief) of good performance with no participation of the debtor
under programmes supported by IMF/WB government or of civil society, for
loans
example. Furthermore, these
G Implement key reforms agreed at the HIPC
decision point mechanisms are closely linked to
G Have implemented a PRSP for at least one the performance and adoption of
year WB policies and prescriptions that
are strongly contested, as seen
above.
Debt relief for sustainable development

In the late 1980s, specific measures known as ‘debt for nature swaps’
(DNSs) were piloted as a way of recouping a proportion of debts and
assisting developing countries explicitly to conserve the environment.
Since the first projects in Ecuador and Bolivia, many countries have
worked with donors, environmental groups and banks in such
projects that support debt reduction and simultaneously generate
additional finances for conservation (and most recently, for health).
These projects take various forms, but fundamentally involve the
lending agency (that may be a commercial bank or donor
government) selling a portion of the debt at a discount to another
donor (often an NGO), who then offers the debtor country a reprieve
from that portion of debt in exchange for a commitment to a
particular environmental or health project in the country.
The first ever ‘debt for nature swap’ took place in 1987, when
Conservation International paid US$100,000 for US$650,000 of
Bolivian debt (owed to commercial banks) and forgave it in return
for the equivalent of US$250,000 in local currency as funds towards
the Beni Biosphere Reserve (Marray, 1991). The World Wide Fund
for Nature was also a pioneer of DNS and is currently working with
bilateral donor governments (especially the US, but also France,
Germany and the Netherlands) to swap ‘sovereign’ debt. A recent
project between the WWF and the government of France has
released US$20 million for biodiversity preservation in Madagascar.
Whilst early debt swaps were largely to establish conservation
reserves they are also being used in social sectors. In 2007, the Global
Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria launched its
‘Debt2Health’ project as a way of raising funds (beyond its traditional
private donations) and in recognition that those countries facing the

most severe problems in terms of health were also often those in most
debt. The Debt2Health project is a three party arrangement, shown in
Figure 3.20, in which creditors forgive portions of the loans owed to
them by debtor countries in exchange for guarantees that ‘freed up’
financial resources are put into the health funds. The Global Fund
then disburses those finances through their existing systems and
projects. Currently, the German government is involved in an
agreement with Indonesia worth Euro 50 million.
Whilst the impact of these projects on overall levels of indebtedness
may be relatively small, the local environmental benefits of the funds
acquired can be significant and be the basis for further economic
gains such as through eco-tourism initiatives. Critics, however, point
out that DNS do not change the fundamental pressures that create
and perpetuate environmental degradation. Conservation benefits are
long term whilst the pressure to clear forests, for example (as seen in
Box 3.3) are immediate and powerful. There is concern that NGOs,
multilateral banks or individual governments will not be able or
willing to fund such projects to a level equivalent to the earnings
which could accrue over the short term from the exploitation of those
resources.
Figure 3.20 The Debt2Health mechanism
Debt
cancellation
Creditor Beneficiary
Counterpart
payment(s)
Global
fund
Grants
Source: adapted from The Global Fund (no date).
Plate 3.1 Generating awareness of HIV/AIDS in Africa
a) Zambia
Source: David Nash, University of Brighton.
b) South Africa
Source: Bjorn-Omar Evju.
National action
Governments, as seen above, are important actors in influencing

cross-boundary environmental issues, in negotiating internationally to
establish multilateral agreements and trade outcomes, for example,
and in delivering on international aid commitments including for new
climate funds. They are also responsible for establishing the policy
and regulatory and institutional framework within a country and are
therefore important actors in the prospects for sustainable resource
management in wider arenas within their own boundaries.
Governments play a key role in many mechanisms for environmental
governance; in determining which uses are taxed and which are
subsidised, in restricting threats posed by individual or corporate
behaviour, and in allocating funds for conservation and development.
Governments also set mandates for many of the regional and local
agencies with responsibility for environmental protection. Through
many areas of policy-making, governments also influence the kinds
of choice that consumers have.
The WCED (1987) urged a key role for governments in finding
solutions to environmental degradation and in ensuring that the
various actors in development (including industry and consumers)
behaved in the interests of environmental conservation. The Dutch
National Environmental Policy Plan of 1989 is widely cited as the
first attempt to convert the principles of sustainable development
identified by Brundtland into concrete steps for action to change both
production and consumption (WRI, 1994). Most countries worldwide
now have a national report of some kind on their environment;
typically national conservation strategies (NCSs) or national
environmental action plans (NEAPs). The preparation of NEAPs
continues to be supported by the World Bank, as identified above.
The aim is to assist developing countries in moving beyond
environmental reporting and the setting of specific action plans for
the environment, towards integrating environmental considerations
into a nation’s overall economic and social development strategy.
However, it is recognised that the impact of NEAPs has been uneven
and many were being developed to comply with donor requirements
rather than stimulating local ownership (World Bank, 2001b). A
recent review suggests that many NEAPs have not been updated
since being prepared and there are continued concerns regarding a
lack of internal capacity to support these strategies (World Bank,
2008a).
At the Rio Earth Summit (and again 20 years later at the WSSD in
Johannesburg), governments committed to the preparation and
implementation of national Sustainable Development Strategies
intended as national reports on activities undertaken to meet the
objectives of Agenda 21. Over 100 countries are currently reporting
to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to this effect.
However, as Bass and Dalal-Clayton (2004) note, early strategies
tended to be all-encompassing ‘perfectionist master plans’, focusing
on environmental dimensions rather than integrating social and
economic concerns and were often remote from the realities of
resource use on the ground. ‘Strategy fever’ is also known to have
limited early reporting as developing countries in particular have
been required to produce many different strategies and monitoring
reports for different audiences (including to secure aid finances, as
considered above), serving to undermine rather than strengthen the
development of internal capacity and mechanisms for sustainable
development.
Many governments worldwide are now establishing national plans
for climate change and in energy, as seen in Figure 3.21. Many of
these national plans are shaped by regional and international targets
(such as the European Union commitments to the Kyoto Protocol)
but they are also being driven by domestic development benefits such
as of energy savings, reduced local air pollution and increased
employment in local industries. Not only is there a key role for
governments in establishing these targets, but also for providing
public monies to support the necessary developments to meet those
commitments, including through supporting research and providing
grants, loans and tax exemptions to private investors. However, there
are emerging concerns as to whether such support may constitute a
form of protectionism for domestic industry and business
development. For example, whilst China’s commitments on
renewable energy are considered to be amongst the most ambitious
globally (Flavin and Gardner, 2006), one of the largest unions in the
US, United Steelworkers has recently suggested that China’s clean
energy subsidies could contravene WTO rulings.
Government support for ‘green investment’ has also been adopted
within many countries as part of their response to the recent
economic crisis. Figure 3.22 shows the proportion of selected
countries’ overall ‘stimulus package’ (the public spending aimed to
secure the necessary financial recovery) that simultaneously seeks
to ensure lower carbon economic development in the future. In total
Figure 3.21 National plans on energy and climate change
Country Climate change Renewable Energy Transport

energy efficiency
European Union 20 percent emission reduction from 1990 to 2020 20 percent of 20 percent energy 10 percent transport
(30 percent if other countries commit to substantial primary energy savings from the fuel from biofuel by
reductions); 80 percent reduction from 1990 to 2050 mix by 2020 reference case 2020
by 2020
United States Emission reduction to 1990 levels by 2020; 25 percent of Increase fuel
80 percent reduction from 1990 to 2050 electricity by 2025 economy standard to
35 miles a gallon by
2016
China National Climate Change Plan and White Paper for 15 percent of 20 percent 35 miles a gallon fuel
Policies and Actions for Climate Change, a leading primary energy by reduction in energy economy standard
group on energy conservation and emission reduction 2020 intensity from already achieved; plan
established, chaired by the prime minister 2005 to 2010 to be the world leader
in electric vehicles;
and mass
construction of
subways underway
India National Action Plan on Climate Change: per capita 23 gigawatts of 10 gigawatts of Urban transport
emissions not to exceed those of developed countries, renewable capacity energy savings policy: increase
an advisory council on climate change created, by 2012 by 2012 investment in public
chaired by the prime minister transport
South Africa Long-term mitigation scenario: emissions peak in 4 percent of the 12 percent Plan to be the world
2020 to 2025, plateau for a decade, and then power mix by energy efficiency leader in electric
decline in absolute terms 2013 improvement vehicles; and expand
by 2015 bus rapid transit
Brazil National plan on climate change: reducing 10 percent of the 103 terawatt hours World leader in
deforestation 70 percent by 2018 power mix by 2030 of energy savings ethanol production
by 2030
Note: Some of the above goals represent formal commitments, while others are still under discussion.
Source: adapted from World Bank (2010a), World Development Report.
Figure 3.22 Green stimulus spending, selected countries, 2009
787.0
586.1 94.1
485.9 221.3
12.1
103.5 104.8
38.1 1.3 13.8
26.7 30.4 31.8 33.7
30.7
2.1 2.8 7.1
2.5
Australia United Canada France Republic Italy Germany Japan China United States
Kingdom of Korea
Size of total stimulus package ($ billions)

Size of green share of total package ($ billions)
Source: adapted from World Bank (2010a).
approximately US$436 billion for green investments have been

proposed as part of such fiscal stimuli worldwide (World Bank,
2010a) ranging from 1.3 per cent of the package in Italy to over 80
per cent in the Republic of Korea. The nature of the investments
proposed differs across countries. In the Republic of Korea, a large
part of the investment is for river restorations, expanding public
transportation and for energy conservation in villages and schools. It
is estimated that 960,000 jobs will be created. In the US, the majority
are climate-change related investments including the retro-fitting of
federal buildings towards greater energy efficiency and weather-
proofing of homes. In total an estimated 325,000 jobs a year will be
created. Clearly, the impact of these proposed investments on longer-
term shifts to a lower carbon (and more economically stable) future
remains unclear.
In addition to the use of subsidies to support moves towards more
sustainable developments, there are a host of ways in which
governments act to prevent environmentally detrimental activities,
particularly through the use of legislation and taxation. These have
been important (and remain widely used, as seen in Figure 3.1) in
controlling the impacts of industry and agriculture on the
environment through limiting particular pollutants and use of certain
environmentally harmful products. Most recently, they are measures
being used by governments towards promoting wider societal and
cultural change and more sustainable outcomes. For example, many
countries now seek to restrict vehicular use through a combination of
taxation (on fuel) and legislation to support environmental goals. In
France, legislation enables the authorities in Paris to restrict car use
in the city when pollution levels reach certain thresholds, allowing
only cars with even-numbered registration plates to be driven into the

city when pollution levels merit such action (and odd-numbered ones
on the next occasion). Spain has recently reduced the motorway
speed limit by 10 km per hour as a means to cut petrol consumption,
lower carbon emissions and achieve national commitments.
London has a system of ‘congestion charging’ where drivers of
private vehicles are charged to enter particular zones within the city.
A proportion of the monies raised through this scheme are then
invested to support programmes of public and environmental benefit
such as cycling schemes and public transport improvements. Similar
schemes using electronic toll cordons around city centres are now
used in cities worldwide including in Chile, India, Norway,
Singapore and Australia. Whilst there is some opposition to
government interventions via legislation in individual consumption
decisions, many countries including Rwanda, Ireland, Somalia,
China and France now have legislation that prevents supermarkets
from giving free plastic bags to shoppers because of the
environmental damage these cause (such as oil used in production,
time taken to biodegrade and impact on wildlife and environmental
aesthetics due to littering). There are also concerns as to whether
these mechanisms to promote behaviour change will lead to the kinds
of change in values and attitudes that are considered key to more
sustainable societies, as considered in Box 3.4.
An overarching role for governments that is understood as critical
across many aspects of sustainable development is in ensuring
political stability within national borders and the ability of citizens to
participate in political and decision-making processes. The notion of
‘good governance’ now informs many arenas of development
practice, including the conditions required of countries prior to
lending decisions of multi and bilateral donors. Figure 3.23
summarises the components of ‘good governance’ as identified by
the World Bank. These include characteristics of government as well
as other elements of the state such as the civil services, police and
courts. The thinking is that the outcomes in development depend not
only macro-economic stability and good policies, but also the
structures through which policies are developed and applied. Good
governance as forwarded by the WB seeks to support change
whereby governments are more responsive to the needs of the
poorest groups, take action to control corruption and ensure political
stability. It encompasses sound administration, responsiveness and
accountability of all public institutions to the needs of their
electorate, the access of citizens to decision-making and the
Box 3.4
Questioning the role of fiscal incentives for

sustainable change
Fiscal incentives are being widely used as a means for changing
environmental behaviour. In the UK, measures such as road pricing and
congestion charges have been successful in reducing car use into cities
including London and Durham. In the Republic of Ireland, the Plastic Bag
Environmental Levy has led to a 90 per cent reduction in use of plastic bags
since 2002. Evidently, these kinds of financial incentive have a role to play
in changing behaviour, but there is also a risk of over-reliance by
governments on such measures. A concern is that people may respond to the
immediate signal (financial penalty) without being swayed by the underlying
rationale (of unsustainable development and attitudes to pollution for
example). Moreover, if people remain uncommitted to the underlying ideas,
they will seek to avoid paying charges. This is confirmed by the industry
that has grown up around making number plates illegible to cameras as cars
enter the Congestion Zone in London and examples of illegal dumping of
rubbish to avoid landfill and rubbish taxes. Further research is needed into
whether and how programmes focused on changes in behaviour impact on
people’s attitudes and values. Are people just passively reacting to the
market incentive? Could the incentives be removed and behaviours remain
the same? Have values changed or have behaviours become habitualised? It
is argued that this fiscal approach to change focused on incremental, sector
by sector change, will not deliver the widespread changes in behaviour that
are needed for more sustainable development in that they are too limited in
extent, but also that they are inconsistent with what is known about
environmental challenges: that they are connected and interrelated. Andy
Dobson is a key proponent of a different approach to change, one through
‘ecological citizenship’ where behaviour is informed by deeper levels of
attitude change and systemic understanding of the problems with a particular
focus on justice. He suggests that behaviour driven by environmental
citizenship is more likely to be sustained, but also cautions that initiatives
may take longer to get going.
Source: compiled from Dobson (2009).
autonomy of associations of civil society including freedom of the

press and the presence of democratic politics. However, it is an
agenda that is widely debated and contested, among other things for
how such requirements within donor lending may undermine national
sovereignty and how they prioritise a western model of political
democracy (see Williams et al., 2009).
Figure 3.23 The World Bank dimensions of good governance
G Voice and accountability: the extent to which citizens within a country are able to participate
in selecting their government, freedom of expression and association, and free media
G Political stability and absence of violence: perceptions of the likelihood that government
will be destabilised by unconstitutional or violent means including terrorism
G Government effectiveness: the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the
quality of public services, the civil service and inpendendence of these from political
pressure
G Regulatory quality: the ability of government to develop and implement policies and
regulations that promote private sector development for example
G Rule of law: the extent to which all agencies have confidence in and abide by rules of
society including the quality of contract enforcement, the police and courts and the
likelihood of crime and violence
G Control of corruption: the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
ranging from ‘petty’ to larger forms of corruption and including the ‘capture’ of state and
government by elites/private interests
Source: compiled from Williams et al. (2009).
These few examples illustrate that the role of governments in

environmental action and sustainable development is both wide and
challenging. As seen in Chapter 1, a central element in neo-liberal
development thinking was to ‘roll back’ and reduce the role of
governments and the state within the economy and society. In recent
years and in response to the global economic crisis in particular,
there is evidence of a stronger role of governments in addressing the
crisis, in protecting the public good and in capturing the (‘win-win’)
gains for economy and environment in the future.
Non-governmental organisations and sustainable

development
NGOs are highly diverse organisations, engaged in various activities

and operating at a variety of levels.
The term non-governmental organisation encompasses all organisations

that are neither governmental nor for profit. What is left is a residual
category that includes a vast array of organisations, many of which
may have little in common. They can be large or small, secular or
religious, donors or recipients of grants. Some are designed only to
serve their own members; others serve those who need help. Some are
concerned only with local issues; others work at the national level, and
still others are regional or international in scope.
(WRI, 1992: 216)
Plate 3.2 Pressures for good governance
a) Botswana
Source: author.
b) Cape Town, South Africa

Source: author.
NGOs are one aspect of ‘civil society’ that has been receiving
substantial interest in the thinking and practice of sustainable
development in recent years (Edwards and Gaventa, 2001).
Commonly, civil society is identified as ‘an arena for association and
action that is distinct and independent from the state and the market,
a voluntary, self-regulating, “third sector” in which citizens come
together to advance their common interests’ (Potter et al., 2008: 317).
This broader arena of civil society also encompasses ‘social
movements’, the term generally used to refer to coalitions and
networks of actors (some of whom may be members of more
formalised NGOs), which have been seen in previous chapters and
sections to be important in mobilising action transnationally and
promoting change around a number of inter-related issues of
environmental and social justice, among other things around climate
change and debt. Some authors suggest a distinction between social
movements and NGOs on the basis that the former tend to work
outside existing structures and work to present a more radical
challenge to those than is the case with the latter (Ford, 1999).
Perhaps some of the best-known NGOs are international.
Organisations like Greenpeace, the World Development Movement,
Oxfam and the World Wide Fund for Nature are relatively long
established, have paid professionals and tackle issues of global
concern through lobbying, campaigning, direct action and the
implementation of aid projects. Typically, these INGOs work for
public benefit rather than for that of their members. At the other end
of the NGO spectrum are many more numerous, local, ‘grassroots’ or
‘community’ organisations. Particularly in the developing world,
groups of people come together for all kinds of reason to help
themselves collectively: by pooling labour, to assist in gaining credit
or to enable them to purchase goods in bulk, for example. People
may also form community groups in response to the failure of
government to provide services such as water or sewerage to low-
income housing developments or in response to the unacceptability
of what governments do, such as in reaction to political repression or
police brutality. Quantifying such groups is difficult as many are very
fluid in nature and often lack formal registration. In 2001, it was
estimated that there were over 200,000 grassroots or ‘community
benefit organisations’ in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Thomas
and Allen, 2001).
National-level NGOs have regularly been formed to coordinate the
activities of local organisations. In the Philippines, for example, there
are many umbrella groups which seek to service and support

grassroots membership (people’s) organisations in particular areas of
activity such as health or land reform. Other national NGOs have
their origins in grassroots community initiatives, which subsequently
spread to form national movements. The Green Belt Movement in
Kenya, for example, started in 1977 with a single tree nursery at a
primary school and now has mini green belts and community
nurseries throughout the country. Its founder (the long-time
campaigner for the environment, civil and women’s rights and
opponent of the government), the late Wangari Maathai, was
subsequently elected to parliament in the first democratic elections
in Kenya in 2002. In 2004, she received the Nobel Peace Prize
for this work.
However, there have been many changes in the nature and activities
of NGOs in recent years. These have blurred many of the former
distinctions of NGOs such as size, whether they are working for
members or for public benefit and as donors or recipients of aid. A
big change in the last 20 years has been the amount of official
development assistance that goes through NGOs rather than
governments, as considered above. About one-third of all ODA now
goes through NGOs, either provided by official donors for NGOs to
use directly or into donor projects and programmes that are then run
and managed by NGOs (Riddell, 2007). Further change has come as
many governments worldwide have contracted NGOs to deliver
services on their behalf. Many new NGOs have formed in response
to the increased availability of such funds, working in collaboration
with governments and donors as many governments’ capacity in
service delivery shrank with debt and under SAPs, for example. In
this way, the proliferation of NGOs can be considered in part the
outcome of the neo-liberalisation of governance through the 1990s,
that is, as community participation in many instances may be being
sought less for the political objectives of empowering the ‘voiceless’
and more for pragmatic reasons such as not relying on the state to
provide (Bebbington, 2004). Most recently, there are ideas that civil
society can provide public outcomes that governments cannot, such
as in the UK coalition government’s notion of the Big Society. In
developing countries, rising affluence and the growth of the middle
classes and the advent of more democratic regimes (seen starkly in
countries of North Africa in the past year) have all been factors in the
rising numbers and significance of NGOs. New ICT developments
such as the internet and mobile phones have also enabled new
alliances between NGOs and with individuals and the rapid

dissemination of information and mobilisation of support.
In short, many NGOs in developing countries are now both recipients
and donors of aid and are increasingly working together and with
other kinds of organisation including governments and international
institutions. Figure 3.24 identifies the multiple ways in which
different civil society organisations now work with the World Bank
to shape both aid agendas and the outcomes of particular projects.
This section considers how the pursuit of sustainable development
has been a key factor in the growth and importance of NGO activity
and these enhanced interactions and also identifies the continued
challenges and opportunities encompassed.
NGOs are not able to sign treaties, pass legislation or set targets for
emissions as governments are. Historically, however, they have been
a strong force in lobbying for such actions to be taken, in modifying
governmental activities and in contesting the operation of
international institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO.
Whereas NGOs have not been represented within formal negotiations
such as at the Earth Summit, they now have an official role in, for
example, many UN conferences and at meetings of the Development
Assistance Committee (that oversees aid from OECD countries).
Figure 3.24 Types of World Bank (WB) and civil society engagement
G Support to bring senior officers of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to annual meetings of
WB and to engage in policy development
G CSO participation in country-level discussions including development of Country Assistance
Strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
G CSO recourse to Inspection Panel – where people affected by WB projects can raise
concerns and request reviews
G Involvement in Bank-funded operational projects – in design, implementation and evaluation
G Civic Engagement and Social Accountability activities – funding of projects, meetings and
training activities for example that aim explicitly to further strengthen civil society
participation in development generally (i.e. beyond just WB projects). In particular towards
rising grassroots demand for better local accountability and governance
G Grant funding to CSOs – typically small grants to youth and faith groups and community-
based organisations
G Engagement with specific groups such as youth, persons with disabilities and labour unions
towards mainstreaming joint working into the future
G World Bank staff attending meetings of international civil society networks such as the
World Social Forum
G Collaboration around specific themes – such as water privatisation, extending urban supply
and sanitation to the poor and on odious debts.
Source: compiled from World Bank (2009a).

Plate 3.3 NGO–state collaboration in slum upgrading, Delhi, India
Source: Hamish Main, Staffordshire University.
In 1990, only 20 per cent of World Bank projects involved some

kind of collaboration with civil society organisations (CSOs). In
2009, this figure was over 80 per cent (World Bank, 2009a).
However, there are long-standing questions concerning the
collaboration between the World bank and CSOs: whether CSOs are
merely consulted at the initial stages of a project or engaged in
sustained partnerships, for example. Previous evidence suggested that
the participation of CSOs is often limited to the implementation
stages of projects and is therefore according to pre-identified agendas
of the World Bank, with little shared control over development
processes (Malena, 2000). However, the WB now in their evaluation
and reporting considers not only the stage and how CSOs are
engaging, but also whether there are institutional mechanisms in
place such as steering committees and consultative bodies to ensure
collaboration is more than a one-off engagement. Furthermore, there
is now greater CSO involvement in policy dialogue with the WB, as
seen in Figure 3.24.
NGOs are considered to have a number of characteristics that are
thought to make them particularly suited to effecting sustainable
development, including their size, their tradition of working closely

with local people and their environment, and their flexibility. As seen
in Chapter 1, ‘participatory development’ emerged as a discourse
within development thinking in the early 1980s. ‘Empowering’
community and grassroots organisations is now promoted by various
agencies as the route to an alternative development which may be
more sustainable, as well as more democratic and efficient, than
previous patterns and processes (Potter et al., 2008). In the following
chapters, illustrations will be given of the specific actions of NGOs
in rural and urban environments. The WCED recognised the key role
which NGOs could have in fostering sustainable development based
on their proven ability to secure popular participation in decision-
making and experience is suggesting that this can best be secured
through processes of planning and action which put people’s
priorities first rather than those defined by outside actors and
agencies (Chambers, 1983). Similarly, NGOs have traditionally
shown greater flexibility and adaptability than larger and more
bureaucratic government institutions and experience of sustainable
resource management suggests that a local body through which
people’s own values and needs can be discussed, planned for and
acted upon is essential. Empowering the poorest sectors of society to
become agents of their own development is a critical requirement of
sustainability and NGOs have often worked with some of the poorest
groups at the grassroots levels in areas of welfare and relief in
particular. Many have subsequently moved into actions to address the
underlying causes of deprivation and vulnerability, to promote self-
reliant development and to facilitate development on behalf of other
organisations (Korten, 1990) confirming the potential for NGOs to
foster more sustainable processes (as well as patterns) of
development.
A challenge for NGOs themselves may be to maintain their
accountability to local communities and ‘watchdog’ functions as
more official aid is now channelled through them and they are
increasingly required to operate in commercial markets in the
delivery of services. It may be that the ‘better organized or more
acceptable’ (Mohan, 2002: 48) capture resources, for example.
There is the prospect that the original missions of NGOs
and power to control their own agendas may become compromised.
In competing in the marketplace, smaller NGOs may be squeezed
out, and NGOs generally may be forced to become more
bureaucratic, leading to more finances being spent in those arenas
rather than on their beneficiaries. As donors increasingly work

through NGOs rather than governments, this may also dampen wider
processes of democratisation in those countries as the pressure for
governments to become more accountable and transparent is
decreased. Critically, it cannot be assumed that all interests are
served through ‘community development efforts’ (Potter et al.,
2008); societies are highly differentiated including by gender,
ethnicity and class, for example, which ensures that NGOs do not
offer a simple panacea for sustainable development.
Conclusion
Many of the actions taken at various levels to promote sustainable

development, as highlighted through this chapter, give cause for
optimism. It is evident that many institutions of development are
transforming what they do in operation, modifying the ways in which
they work with other organisations and changing their internal
structures. Furthermore, new institutions are being created at all
levels towards the elimination of poverty and the revitalisation of
economic growth, with greater weight given to environmental
concerns, not least through public pressure for more information,
transparency and accountability. It is also clear, however, that further
changes throughout the hierarchy of institutions are required. Indeed,
the capacity to generate sustainable development interventions at any
level very often depends on actions at other levels. For example,
community organisations require a national framework which allows
local democratic processes to develop and local voices and needs to
be articulated and acted upon. The effectiveness of international
institutions is constrained fundamentally by national governments
being willing to look beyond narrow national interests to the
collective objectives that cannot be accomplished individually and by
the strength of their commitments to develop rules of behaviour and
to ensure compliance where necessary within their borders. Whilst
significant partnerships have certainly developed in recent years,
there are substantial concerns, for example, as to how the
traditionally strong characteristics of NGOs in sustainable
development may be compromised through new relationships with
donors, governments and international institutions. There are also
concerns as to how genuine and sustained the commitments of
large business interests are to environmental and social responsibility.
The following Chapters 4 and 5 consider how these changes in the
operation and practices of core institutions in development have

shaped outcomes for people and environments within rural and urban
contexts of the developing world.
Summary
The notion of environmental governance is useful for understanding

the complex networks of organisations and mechanisms that now
influence environmental actions and outcomes.
‘State-centred’ international actions on the environment, trade,
climate financing and debt relief remain central to actions on
sustainable development but are becoming increasingly difficult to
negotiate.
New, innovative networks of aid donors and means for disbursing aid
have been developed in recent years. However there are challenges
of coordination and coherence and concerns as to how capacity
within developing countries could be undermined rather than
supported.
The World Bank has been a target for environmental critics, but
there have also been many changes within the organisation and in its
activities towards promoting more sustainable development.
Developing economies have a rising share of world exports and a
stronger role in world trade negotiations, but the geographies of
production and trade remain uneven and concentrated in particular
regions and countries. World trade increasingly takes place through
and within transnational corporations rather than countries.
Reforming world trade to better address poverty and the needs of
low-income countries remains a central campaign for international
NGOs, particularly as the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO
has stalled.
The business response to sustainable development is very wide-
ranging, responding to a combination of government legislation,
environmental taxes and subsidies, consumer demand and voluntary
codes developing within the business and industry sectors. Greater
public access to information can be a powerful tool for ensuring
business interests are more accountable to the environments and
people that their activities impact on.
The burden of debt servicing within developing countries has

declined, but debt and low national incomes remain a significant part
of the context in which sustainable development has to be pursued.
Adherence to programmes of economic adjustment remain part of the
conditions for low-income countries to access further finances.
Civil society organisations are now significant actors in sustainable
development: in influencing aid policy, as donors themselves and in
working jointly with other institutions to deliver development
interventions. This brings new challenges as well as opportunities.
G Identify the arguments for and against the World Bank now
being a greener institution.
G Why are the actions of TNCs so central to the prospects for
G Research in more depth one of the campaigns of an INGO such
as Oxfam on reforming world trade or the Jubilee Debt
Campaign on debt cancellation. What have been their successes
and failures?
G What do you think the significance of carbon-labelling schemes
could be in future for more sustainable development?
Further reading
Dicken, P. (2011) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World
Economy, sixth edition, Sage, London. A very good source for more detailed
insight into how the world economy works, the key organisations involved and
patterns of geographical integration, and includes how companies are responding
to issues of sustainable development.
Evans, J.P. (2012) Environmental Governance, Routledge, London. A clear
introduction to the field of environmental governance, the principles of and
approaches in practice. A good source for more detail regarding ideas of
ecological modernisation and of market mechanisms in particular.
George, S. (1002) The Debt Boomerang, Pluto Press, London. A classic study of
how debt is detrimental to both lenders and recipients.
Mohan, G., Brown, E., Milward, B. and Zack-Williams, A.B. (2000) Structural
Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts, Routledge, London. A useful source
to consider how the policies designed to address the problems of debt regularly
caused greater environmental and social hardship.
Development, third edition, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow. A good
overview text on issues in development that includes consideration of the major
institutions in development
Riddell, R.C. (2007) Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press,
Oxford. A readable and balanced assessment of the positive attributes and
failings of aid by an author with substantial direct experience in the aid industry.
Websites
www.worldbank.org Home page for the World Bank on which you can search
through ‘topics’ for details of work on the environment, sustainable development
and poverty reduction strategies, for example.
www.wto.org Home page of World Trade Organisation through which details of
the Doha Development Agenda can be found.
www.oecd.org/dac For statistics and reports on aid flows (including to the
environment) from countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
www.theglobalfund.org Home page for Global fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria with details of the Debt2Health swap initiative.
www.corpwatch.org An organisation committed to research and investigative
journalism that monitors and exposes environmental and human rights violations
by corporations.
www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk Site for the UK organisation campaigning for
debt cancellation – provides links to similar southern-based organisations.
www.tradejusticemovement.org.uk A coalition of NGOs campaigning to make
trade more fair for southern producers and countries.
www.globalreporting.org A not-for-profit network that supports the development of
consistent and quality reporting of corporate environmental and social
responsibility. Most widely used by large business and international financial
institutions.
4 Sustainable rural
livelihoods
Learning outcomes
G Understand the significance of rural development to the achievement of

the Millennium Development Goals
G Understand the range of objectives that agriculture is expected to
deliver for global sustainable development
G Appreciate the many interconnections between rural and urban areas,
but also the different challenges for sustainable development within
these contexts
G Be aware of the factors underlying the diversity and dynamism of rural
livelihoods
G Understand the key characteristics of the globalised agri-food system
G Appreciate the different but related challenges of sustainable
development of ‘industrial’ and ‘resource-poor’ agriculture
G Identify the principles of more sustainable rural development within
research and development practice
Key concepts
Urban bias; livelihoods; de-agrarianisation; agri-food system; Green and

Gene Revolutions; Farmer First; Participatory Learning and Action; social
capital; Community Based Natural Resource Management.
Introduction
In 2008, for the first time in human history, the world’s population
became predominantly urban based. However, there are significant
differences in the levels, patterns and processes of urbanisation
worldwide. Currently, of the 5.5 billion people in developing
countries, 3 billion live in rural areas (WB, 2008b) and it is projected
that developing regions as a whole will remain predominantly rural
190 • Sustainable rural livelihoods
until around 2020. Providing sustainable rural livelihoods for the

current and future populations remains central to meeting both
development and conservation needs within the developing world.
With over three-quarters of the world’s poor living in rural areas
(WB, 2008b), the MDG goal of halving extreme poverty and hunger
will not be met without reducing rural poverty. As seen in previous
chapters, livelihoods and well-being in rural areas are closely linked
to environmental resources and ecological systems, but a large share
of the world’s most impoverished people also live in some of the
most ‘fragile’ ecological zones in terms of slopes, soils and
constraints set by aridity. Furthermore, the impacts of processes of
globalisation and liberalisation have often hit the rural poor hardest
(Mullen, 2008) and there has been further marginalisation of small-
scale agriculture in recent decades (Vorley and Berdegue, 2001).
Rural people generally have weaker purchasing power and thereby
suffered more as currencies were devalued, for example. The
collapse of extension systems (i.e. support structures) as governments
had to cut their budgets, the removal of subsidised inputs to
agriculture and the worsening terms of trade for agricultural goods
all had adverse impacts on farmers in particular. Yet an estimated
2.5 billion people within developing regions depend (to varying
degrees) on agriculture within their overall livelihoods – as
smallholder producers and as wage labourers, migrant workers,
herders, fishers and artisans, for example (WB, 2008b). As Chambers
et al. (1989: xvii) state, ‘For adequate and decent livelihoods that are
sustainable, much depends on policies which affect agriculture’.
Worldwide, farming and food production is now part of a complex,
increasingly global agri-food system and there have been
unprecedented changes in how food is produced, distributed and
controlled in recent years that raise many issues of sustainability
discussed through this chapter. Whilst global food production has
grown faster than world population growth and to unprecedented
levels currently, 925 million people worldwide were undernourished
in 2010, defined as having a calorie intake below minimum dietary
requirements (FAO, 2010). Whilst the proportion of the world’s
population who are undernourished has fallen from 20 per cent in
1990 to 16 per cent currently, the MDG goal to halve the 1990 levels
by 2015 is unlikely to be achieved globally (UN-DESA, 2010).
The challenges of sustainable rural development also include how
agriculture is now expected to deliver a range of public as well as
private functions worldwide – the ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture
Sustainable rural livelihoods • 1 9 1
Figure 4.1 The multifunctionality of agriculture
Climate Multifunctionality refers to the

Food regulation regulation interconnectedness of agriculture's
security of biodiversity different roles and functions. It
recognises agriculture as a
multioutput activity producing not
Alleviation Management of only commodities (food, feed,

Agriculture
of poverty natural resources fibres, agro fuels, medicinal
products and ornamentals) but
also non-commodity outputs such
Generation of Enterprise as environmental services,
trade and Rural development landscape amenities and cultural
foreign exchange employment heritages.
Source: IAASTD (2009).
as shown in Figure 4.1. For example, over and above individual

subsistence and food security needs, primary commodity production
remains the principal source of exports and access to foreign
exchange for many developing countries. Yet opportunities for
agricultural expansion in many regions are limited by land and/or
water shortages, as seen in Chapter 2. The loss of the world's tropical
forest ecosystems (including through the expansion of agriculture) is
also a global challenge in terms of climate change and for the future
conservation of biodiversity (also considered in Chapter 2). In many
countries and different contexts, the role of farming in the future
management of natural resources and conservation is also being
widely debated. In the EU, for example, as public subsidies for
agricultural production are being scaled down, public concern is
being expressed for the conservation of valued landscapes (and
lifestyles). In short, there are a range of objectives that agriculture is
expected to deliver globally, but mounting concerns over the capacity
to meet these sustainably in the short and long term.
Rural and agricultural development back on agendas
Despite the evident significance of rural development in overall

considerations of sustainable development, rural areas of the
developing world have often been 'left out' of development theory
and practice. In the 1950s/60s, most development economists focused
on industrialisation as the engine of economic growth, as seen in
Chapter 1. The contribution of agriculture was as a source of food
and labour with an anticipated decline in the importance of
agriculture in national income and employment over time. Whist

rural-based strategies for development became more prominent
through the 1970/80s, built on ideas of ‘development from below’,
many development policies in fact fostered the interests of urban
consumers over farmers and the rural poor. In 1977 Michael Lipton
presented his now classic thesis on ‘urban bias’ in which he argued
that the major explanation of the persistence of poverty in developing
countries has been the ‘anti-rural’ development strategies followed.
In short, his suggestion was that the urban sector benefited
disproportionately from public spending in education and other
services and through cheap food policies and wider public subsidies.
Similarly, Robert Chambers’ well-cited work of 1983 details a range
of biases that have limited the understanding of the needs of rural
communities and environments and compromised rural projects in
practice. These include what he terms ‘tarmac bias’, referring to the
way in which bureaucrats, academics and journalists stick to major
roads and rarely venture into remote areas (thereby seeing those who
are less poor and better served by the factories, irrigation, health and
other services that follow main roads); ‘person bias’, resulting from
the tendency to speak only to influential community leaders, to more
‘progressive farmers’ and men rather than women; and ‘dry-season
bias’, which comes through visiting rural areas when travel is easiest
(despite the wet season being the most difficult time of year for
people whose livelihoods depend on cultivation).
More than 30 years since these
original works, it is suggested that
Figure 4.2 Declining investment in these biases continue to be relevant
agricultural development
(Jones and Corbridge, 2010;
G In the period 1976–78, 32 per cent of World Chambers, 2008; Thompson et al.,
Bank lending was to agriculture. Between 2007). Figure 4.2 confirms how
2000 and 2005, it was 6.5 per cent. agricultural development was not a
G In 1981, aid to the African agriculture
priority for the international financial
sector from all bilateral and multilateral
sources was $1,921 million. In 2001, institutions, for donors or for
it was $997 million. national governments through the
G The number of technical experts employed latter decades of the twentieth
by the World Bank in agriculture and rural century. Under the predominant
development fell from 40 in 1997 to 17
in 2006. neo-liberal approach to development,
G Public spending on agriculture is lowest whilst countries were expected to
in those countries where the share of enhance their exports of agricultural
agriculture in GDP is highest – comprising commodities, reforms of the
approximately 4 per cent of public spending.
agriculture sector per se did not
Sources: World Bank (2008a, 2008b). feature heavily and, as identified
Sustainable rural livelihoods • 193
above, served often to worsen the situation for small-scale producers

and the rural poor in particular. However, there are also signs of a new
interest in agricultural and rural development. In 2008, the World Bank
(after a 25 year gap) made agriculture the centre of its annual World
Development Report. It asserted that promoting agriculture was
imperative to achieving the Millennium Development Goals,
particularly in reducing poverty and hunger. It suggested that
agriculture was ‘uniquely powerful for that task’ (WB 2008b: 1)
through the ways that it contributes to development as an economic
activity, as a livelihood and as a provider of environmental services.
Similarly, donors including DFID and several African governments
have produced strategy papers and new plans committing to ‘pro-poor’,
Box 4.1
The World Bank’s three ‘rural worlds’

In 2008, the World Bank’s annual World Development Report was titled, ‘Agriculture
for Development’. It suggested that issues of agricultural development were imperative
for and the means to achieve the MDGs and to sustaining environmental services. It sets
out an agenda for how to ‘use agriculture to promote development’. Key to the report
was the suggestion that the way in which agriculture ‘works for development’ varies
across countries depending on how they rely on agriculture as a source of economic
growth and for poverty reduction. The report categorises countries and identifies three
‘rural worlds’ according to the share of agriculture in aggregate economic growth over
the past 15 years and the current share of total poverty in rural areas (using the $2 a day
per capita poverty indicator). On this basis, the three ‘types of country’ or distinct ‘rural
worlds’ were as follows:
Agriculture-based countries – where agriculture is a major source of growth accounting
for an average 32 per cent of GDP growth over the period (largely through significance
of agriculture in GDP) and most of the poor (70 per cent or more) are based in rural
areas. This group of countries has 417 million rural inhabitants, mainly in sub-Saharan
Africa. Eighty-two per cent of the population of SSA lives in such agriculture-based
countries.
Transforming countries – where agriculture is no longer a major source of economic
growth, contributing on average only 7 per cent to GDP growth, but poverty remains
overwhelmingly rural (82 per cent of all poor). This group (typified by China, India,
Indonesia, Morocco and Romania) has more than 2.2 billion rural inhabitants.
Regionally, 98 per cent of the rural population in South Asia, 96 per cent in East Asia
and the Pacific, and 92 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa are in such
transforming countries.
Urbanised countries – where agriculture contributes an average 5 per cent to

economic growth and poverty is mostly urban. However, agribusiness and the food
industry and services still account for as much as one-third of GDP and rural areas
have approximately 45 per cent of the poor. Included in this group of 255 million
rural inhabitants are most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and many
in Europe and Central Asia where 88 per cent of the rural populations are in
‘urbanised’ countries.
However, the model and the suggested policy measures that stem from it have been
criticised (see Woodhouse, 2009). There are concerns, for example, about the accuracy
and credibility of identifying large geographical regions within a single ‘agricultural
world’. Clearly, this over-simplifies the diversity that exists between particular countries.
Most importantly, it diverts attention away from the complexity of rural living, the many
known connections between agriculture and urban parts of the economy and the
significance of non-farm incomes in rural areas, for example. The WB categorisation of
agriculture-based countries suggests a rural economy comprising of smallholder farming
held back by low productivity and people being ‘pushed out’ of a failing agriculture. In
presenting three agricultural worlds, a linear model of economic growth is strongly
implied – where economic development occurs in a series of clearly defined steps and the
challenge is to find the technology and market incentives to push agriculture and rural
society from one stage to the next.
Figure 4.3 Agriculture-based, transforming and urbanised countries
80
Agriculture’s contribution to growth, 1990–2005, percentage
Agriculture-based Burundi
poverty data over time countries
Rwanda
60
Cameroon Malawi
Paraguay
Niger
INDIA
40 Nigeria (1965–94)
Bulgaria Lao PDR
Ghana
Azerbaijan
Kenya Ethiopia Nepal
Zambia Mali
Pakistan
Mozambique Uganda
20
Senegal Vietnam
Philippines Bolivia Indonesia Guatemala Bangladesh CHINA
Ukraine
Russia Morocco (1981–2001)
Venezuela Turkey
BRAZIL Dominican INDONESIA Sri Lanka
Chile Republic (1970–96)
0 (1970–96) Mexico Romania Tajikistan
Hungary South Africa
Colombia
Belarus Transforming countries
Urbanized countries
–20
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Rural poor/total poor, 2002
Note: Not all countries shown.

Source: compiled from World Bank (2008b).
agriculture-driven growth. However, there are some concerns as to

whether the policies emerging are significantly different to the
conventional ‘growth focused’ models for agricultural development.
These raise concerns for sustainable development, as identified in
Box 4.1 and considered further in the chapter.
The emphasis of this chapter is on the important shifts in research and
development practice that have occurred with greater understanding
of the requirements of sustainable rural development. It will be seen
that overcoming the biases identified by Lipton and Chambers remain
central to the prospects for sustainable rural development, in
particular, those of changing the power relations between groups
(within rural areas as well as between urban and rural) and fostering
research and practice that empowers marginal groups.
Rural–urban linkages: complex webs of connections

but persistent gaps
Importantly for sustainable rural development, there is now better

understanding of the linkages between rural and urban sectors that
shape both rural and urban landscapes and livelihoods (see Lynch,
2005 in this series; Tacoli, 2006). Separating people into ‘rural’ and
‘urban’ has become increasingly problematic as evidence mounts of
the widespread existence of ‘fluid, fragmented and multi-location
households’ (Lynch, 2005: 11) and of the reliance of many
households (wherever located) on both rural-based and urban-based
resources. Furthermore, there are sectoral interactions between rural
and urban: ‘historically rural’ sectors such as agriculture are
important in urban areas where an estimated 200 million urban
residents produce approximately 15 per cent of total world food
output (FAO cited in Jones and Corbridge, 2010) and urban sectors
such as manufacturing are increasingly established in rural areas. As
Rakodi (2002: 33) highlights, many households also live in ‘peri-
urban’ areas ‘outside the urban boundary but derive their livelihoods
from work within it, while people living inside the urban boundary
engage in activities such as farming, fishing, collecting wood or
trading which take them to the surrounding rural areas’.
There is also now greater understanding of the importance of
migration to the livelihoods of rural populations and as a key factor in
the dynamics of rural economies and settlement patterns (see Lynch,
2005). Indeed, in many developing countries, there are long histories
of migration such as within nomadic and semi-nomadic societies

where whole households (or particular members respectively) move
according to seasonal variations in resource/grazing conditions or in
response to seasonal labour demands in other rural and urban contexts
to return ‘home’ when work is complete. Other kinds of movement
include ‘step’ migration where movement is from a village to a small
town and subsequently to a larger city, and ‘chain’ migration where
wider family members in rural areas follow their predecessors once
they are established in an urban base. ‘Multilocation’ households are
also prevalent where some household members may live in towns and
others remain in rural areas.
Until quite recently, the role of migration in rural development has
been seen as people responding to hardship in rural areas, that is,
‘distress migration’ whereby people are ‘pushed’ from rural areas as a
response to natural calamity and other shocks. In times of drought
and food shortage, for example, household members may move away
to earn a wage outside rural areas and children may be sent to other
villages to be cared for until food availability improves (Devereux,
1999). However, there is now more understanding of the attractions
of migration as an opportunity to raise additional income, accumulate
wealth and gain skills and knowledge. Consideration of ‘accumulative’
migration strategies has helped focus on the positive outcomes of
migration including its role in stimulating rural development. In the
participatory poverty assessments undertaken within the World Bank
‘Voices of the Poor’ analysis (see Figure 2.13), both men and women
across all regions identified migration as a positive element in their
lives and as an opportunity for upward economic and social mobility.
This was most widely reported in Asia and Latin America and less so
in Africa. There has been much interest in particular in the economic
value of remittances of migrants back to their home area for individual
household incomes and for wider rural development. In south-eastern
Nigeria, it is estimated that the contribution of migrant associations
(formed to strengthen links between migrants and their ‘homes’) to the
construction of facilities such as schools, town halls and water points
has in some cases, outstripped public investment (Bah et al., 2006).
However, understanding the motivations for migration, its impacts
and the factors shaping it remains a very complex field, as
summarised by Rigg (2007: 126):
migration may be propelled by poverty, and encouraged by wealth; it
may reflect resource scarcities at the local level, or be an outcome of
prosperity; it may be embedded in economic transformations, or better
explained by social and cultural changes; it may narrow inequalities in

source communities, or widen them; it may tighten the bonds of
reciprocity between migrants and their natal households; or it may serve
to loosen or break these bonds; it may help to support agricultural
production; or it may be a means to break away from farming altogether.
Box 4.2 confirms that decisions regarding migration (and its

economic and social value and impacts) are often made at household
rather than individual level and are linked to wider processes of
economic, social and cultural change that develop over time.
Box 4.2
Rural–urban migration in Lampung, Indonesia

Longitudinal research undertaken in villages in Lampung Province on the Indonesian
island of Sumatra provides insights into the complexity of rural–urban linkages and their
integration with processes of wider economic, social and cultural change. In the early
1990s (an era of rapid economic expansion in Indonesia) opportunities expanded for
young women to work in garment and textile factories in Jakarta (located on the island of
Java). By 1994, most of the (unmarried) women between 15 and 20 had left the village
to work in Java. This was despite the influence of local cultural practices around family
honour and prestige, which placed limits on the geographical mobility of unmarried
women. As time passed, the evolution of a semi-formalised social network linking
village and city allowed village-based parents to feel reassured that their daughters were
‘supervised’ whilst in Jakarta, and therefore not breaking local cultural codes. This was
achieved largely through the establishment of a ‘home town association’ in Jakarta, run
by senior men originally from the Lampung village, who saw their role as one of
providing support for migrants in the city but who also played a role in factory
recruitment, partly by attempting to subvert any sense that the prestige of village families
was compromised by city migration. Initially, these young women were not expected to
remit money to their family home, rather the rural-based agricultural economy provided
support for them – women returning after days off spent in the village with rice and other
farm produce, for example, avoiding often higher expenditures on food during their
residence in the city. However, by the mid 1990s, the remitting of funds became more
established and was used principally to buy gold jewellery, kitchen utensils and furniture
that would help a woman ‘set up home’ on her return and on her (assumed) marriage,
that is, it was used to improve the marriage prospects of the young woman rather than
invested in any immediate needs of the rural-based household economy. However, in the
late 1990s, a combination of economic, political and environmental crises complicated
these remittance flows: support (in terms of food) was vital for factory workers facing
unemployment and short-term contracts, whilst factory wages were necessary for shoring
up agricultural incomes that were threatened by prolonged drought in Lampung.
Source: compiled from Silvey and Elmhirst (2003).
Migrancy is also just the most visible form of the many

interconnecting and multidirectional flows between rural and urban.
Very often, rural communities are closely tied to urban centres –
both within the country and internationally – as markets for
agricultural goods, sources of income, for schooling and access to
many services such as credit, telecommunications, farm equipment
and government services. Such linkages have intensified in recent
years as incomes from farming have decreased, as non-farm rural
activities have become increasingly important and through the
expansion of urban centres. However, whilst rural–urban linkages
exist between all rural and urban areas to some extent, the scale and
strength in specific places can be very different depending on the
particular economic, social and cultural transformations underway
(Tacoli, 2003: Rigg, 2007). In Chapter 5, greater consideration is
given to the environmental linkages that exist between rural and
urban in terms of the urban needs that are supplied by rural resources
and the impact of urban developments on rural areas.
Clearly, there are limitations to considering rural and urban
separately given the evidently complex web of connections across
space and sectors. However, there do remain important differences
between rural and urban contexts that need to be understood for the
development of effective approaches to sustainability. For example,
the priority issues for low-income groups can be quite different:
access to land, capital and labour to maintain productivity in rural
contexts or environmental health and the lack of social and human
capital to secure employment in an urban setting, for example.
Households in urban centres also generally depend on markets to a
greater extent than rural people so that security of cash incomes
becomes particularly important in understanding the nature and
impacts of urban poverty. The characteristics of governance can also
be very different: many people in rural contexts remain physically
distant and/or only very marginally associated with what are often
quite new structures of local government, whereas these formal
systems tend to be stronger even in smaller towns and urban centres.
There are also ways in which a continued divide between rural and
urban can be identified. Figure 4.4 for example confirms the wide
gap between rural and urban areas in terms of access to improved
sanitation facilities. Improvements in health and education in recent
years have also been faster in urban than rural areas (Jones and
Corbridge, 2010). The challenge of providing these services in rural
areas (that are clearly central to human well-being) are not unrelated
to the problems of physical access to basic infrastructures such as

roads, electricity and communications in rural areas. In turn, these
factors serve also to constrain many wider opportunities for development
such as through access to information, financial services, technical
advice and support and markets for goods. Box 4.3 highlights the
positive impacts that a more consistent supply of lighting provided
by solar power can have on economic opportunity and human health
for members of a weaver’s cooperative in India. Yet 1.4 billion
people worldwide don’t have access to electricity (IEA, 2009) and
many more experience limited availability and intermittent supplies.
There has been much optimism in recent years regarding the
potential of mobile telephones to overcome these development
constraints in rural areas. A number of opportunities of mobile
phones for rural development are identified in Figure 4.5. Research
to date has been largely focused on coverage and adoption rates
and the impacts on the functioning of regional and national
Figure 4.4 Disparities in urban and rural sanitation coverage
24 Rural areas
Sub-Saharan Africa 44 Urban areas
26
Southern Asia
57
45
Oceania 81
53
Eastern Asia 61
55
Latin America and the Caribbean 86
60
South-Eastern Asia 79
67
Western Asia 94
83
Northern Africa 94
83
CIS 93
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility,
2008 (percentage)
Source: UN-DESA (2010).

agricultural markets. There have been fewer studies on the impacts

on household economic opportunity and welfare. However, what is
becoming evident is that many of the potential development benefits
of mobile telephony depend on improvements to basic infrastructure
in rural areas – better information on market prices are of little use if
roads to markets are absent or inaccessible and if low literacy rates
constrain the use of information. Fundamentally, phones still require
electricity to charge them.
Box 4.3
Improving access to sustainable energy for

small businesses and low-income households
in India
SELCO India is a social enterprise that works with local communities,
commercial banks, micro-finance institutions and donors towards finding
energy solutions for under-served households and businesses in Karnataka,
India. Despite the presence of major banks in the region, many are unwilling
to finance solar energy projects and the majority of loans are unavailable to
poorer households which do not have the required down-payments or
sufficient assets to act as collateral and cannot afford the high interest rates.
Several communities in the region do not have access to electricity due to
their remote locations. Since 1995, SELCO has worked with banks and
donors to negotiate affordable finances and to provide and maintain solar
energy technologies as a sustainable alternative to often unreliable or absent
rural electricity supplies. Its aim is to enhance the living and working
conditions and earning capacity amongst poorer groups. It now serves over
100,000 customers.
One example is support to 102 members of a Handloom Weavers
Cooperative Society in a village in southeast Karnataka. The weaving of silk
sarees is a time-consuming occupation involving close concentration to
deliver high-quality products. However, frequent power cuts and
unavailability of light were leading to delayed deliveries and an economic
loss for members. SELCO worked with the Cooperative to understand their
cash flow and lighting requirements and negotiated on their behalf with
banks and donors to make the required down-payments on loans to purchase
solar lighting systems. Members of the cooperative now have consistent and
quality lighting, are able to expand production as well as better meet
deadlines whilst also meeting monthly payments to the bank.
Source: SELCO (no date).
Figure 4.5 The potential of mobile phones for rural development
As a communication tool:
Learn of job opportunities and market prices before travel
Improve coordination between small businesses
Ease and enhance communication between family members
Decrease costs of telephone calls
Receive/send/deposit money (‘m-banking’)
Foster good governance – e.g. through citizen-based monitoring (‘crowd sourcing’) of elections
abnormalities or to report post-election unrest
Provide advanced and quicker warning of weather and pest-related shocks and decrease
vulnerability
As new job opportunities:

Particularly in informal sector such as selling mobile phone credit, renting devices, selling,
repairing and charging handsets
As a development tool:
Provision of mobile-enabled services (‘Apps’) across sectors including agriculture, health and
education. Providing information and services that can:
G Monitor health outbreaks
G Extend reach of medical and agricultural workers – through providing hotlines for service
users
G Send health education messages
G Improve operation of markets and address supply chain inefficiencies
G Support diffusion of innovation
Securing a livelihood in rural areas
A key feature of rural areas across developing regions is their

economic, social and environmental diversity and it is important to
avoid over-simplification. Indeed, many rural development initiatives
have failed because they have not understood nor worked with this
complexity. In 2008, the World Bank classified countries according
to how they depend on agriculture as a source of economic growth
and for rural poverty reduction to identify three ‘rural worlds’
globally, as seen in Box 4.1. Figure 4.3 confirmed that not only
globally, but also within regions of the developing world, agricultural
production has a greater significance in some countries than others.
More importantly, within countries and in different rural settings,
agriculture can play a varied role in the rural economy and for
particular households. As Rigg (1997: 197) succinctly states,
‘there is more to rural life than agriculture’.
Since the late 1980s, the concept of rural ‘livelihoods’ has been
developed to better understand the many dimensions of securing a
living at a household level in rural areas and how these change over
time. A number of key concepts that have become central in
understanding rural change are identified in Figure 4.6. The
contribution of these ideas in shaping more sustainable approaches
to rural development is considered in more detail below. It is
now understood that livelihood diversity is very much the norm
among rural households, where a range of activities that may
include direct involvement in agricultural production are often
combined (such as highlighted in Figure 4.7) as a means for
accessing the products, labour and finance needed to securing
adequate stocks and flows of food and cash to construct livelihoods.
Dynamism (i.e. diversity over time) is a further fundamental
characteristic of rural livelihoods. Indeed, the capacity to move the
emphasis of any particular element within the livelihood system or to
introduce new components has been central often to survival itself
(Mortimore, 1998). Research into how poor households cope with
food insecurity in times of drought, for example, has highlighted
the varied adaptations to changing environmental and social
circumstances which households can and do make, such as
engaging in off-farm activities, including wild foods in their diet
and drawing on social relationships for temporary support,
such as loans of cattle.
Figure 4.6 Key concepts in understanding rural change
A livelihood comprises: the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access)
and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope
with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets,
and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which
contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels in the long
and short term.
(Chambers and Conway, 1992: 7–8)
Rural livelihood diversification: the process by which rural households construct an

increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order to survive and to improve
their standard of living.
(Ellis, 2000: 15)
De-agrarianisation: the long-term process of occupational adjustment, income-earning

reorientation, social identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from strictly
agricultural-based modes of livelihood.
(Bryceson, 2002: 726)
Figure 4.7 Sources of rural livelihood
G Home gardening – the exploitation of small, local micro-environments

G Common property resources – access to fuel, fodders, fauna, medicines, etc. through
fishing, hunting, gathering, grazing and mining
G Processing, hawking, vending and marketing
G Share-rearing of livestock – the lending of livestock for herding in exchange for rights to
some products, including offspring
G Transporting goods
G Mutual help – small loans from saving groups or borrowing from relatives and neighbours
G Contract outwork
G Casual labour or piecework
G Specialised occupations such as tailors, blacksmiths, carpenters, sex-workers
G Domestic service
G Child labour – domestic work at home in collecting fuel and fodder, herding, etc. and
working away in factories, shops or other people’s houses
G Craft work – basket making, carving, etc.
G Selling assets – labour, children
G Family splitting – putting children out to other families or family members
G Migration for seasonal work
G Remittances from family members employed away
G Food for work and public works relief projects
G Begging
G Theft
Source: compiled from Chambers (1997).
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the importance of

non-farm incomes within household livelihood portfolios. A key issue
is whether livelihood diversification operates as a ‘coping
mechanism’ that can enhance vulnerability over time or if
diversification is a source of security and sustainability of rural
livelihoods and a route out of poverty. The significance of non-farm
activities within the rural economy as a whole is also being assessed
to consider processes of ‘de-agrarianisation’ of the rural sector
(defined in Figure 4.6). Combined, these questions are informing
work such as on adaptation to climate change (Chapter 2) and how
agriculture can be made to ‘work better’ for economic development
(World Bank, 2008b). Again, the importance of understanding
differences between households and in particular rural contexts are
understood as key: rural development initiatives centred on promoting
non-farm activities could exacerbate rural inequality and poverty if
there are barriers to poorer households such as access to finance or
skills and educational constraints, or if there are simply insufficient
‘low-capital entry’ economic opportunities in particular areas.
Plate 4.1 Income opportunities in rural areas outside agriculture
a) Wage employment in brick-making, India

Source: author.
b) Desert tourism, Morocco

Source: Julie Bevis, University of Brighton.
Plate 4.1 . . . continued
c) Fishing, Malawi
Source: Huw Taylor, University of Brighton.
There is now evidence (despite some problems of data) of a large

rural non-farm economy across most countries in developing regions
and an increasing role for rural non-farm activities at a household
level (Davis et al., 2010). However, Table 4.1 confirms that there are
substantial differences across regions (and by gender) in the relative
importance (in terms of percentage of employment) of agriculture-
and non-agriculture-based activities. Engagement in direct-owned
agricultural production is more widespread in sub-Saharan Africa,
for example, than in South Asia and Latin America where larger
proportions of rural people secure a living through agriculture,
but as wage labour on farms owned by others. Similarly, women’s
employment in agriculture is highest in SSA and relatively low
in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, there are known
problems of statistical evidence on gender roles in agriculture
(Momsen, 2010); in many societies it may be culturally unacceptable
for a woman to say that she does agricultural work, for example
and indeed for the census taker to consider that she may have
an economic role. Detailed fieldwork often reveals much higher
levels of female participation in agriculture than identified in
censuses.
Table 4.1 Rural employment by sector of activity (percentage of adults)
Sector of activity Sub- South East Middle Europe Latin

Saharan Asia Asia East and America
Africa and the and Central and the
Pacific North Asia Caribbean
(excl. Africa
China)
Men
Agriculture, self-employed 56.6 33.1 46.8 24.6 8.5 38.4
Agriculture, wage earner 4.0 21.8 9.4 9.4 10.1 20.9
Non-agriculture, self-employed 6.9 11.8 11.5 8.8 7.4 9.2
Non-agriculture, wage earner 8.6 15.4 17.4 30.9 31.3 17.2
Non-active or not reported 21.7 14.6 14.4 26.0 27.5 13.4
Women
Agriculture, self-employed 53.5 12.7 38.4 38.6 6.9 22.8
Agriculture, wage earner 1.4 11.4 5.7 1.0 5.4 2.3
Non-agriculture, self-employed 6.8 2.9 11.3 2.8 1.6 11.7
Non-agriculture, wage earner 2.8 2.7 8.4 3.9 18.1 11.5
Non-active or not reported 32.7 64.3 35.5 53.3 46.9 51.2
Source: regional averages based on representative household surveys for 66 countries.
Research regarding the importance of non-farm activities for rural

economies as a whole and for individual households has also
confirmed that on-farm sources of income remain more important in
rural economies in African countries compared to other regions
(Davis et al., 2010). However, on-farm activities remain significant at
the individual household level, with more than 80 per cent of
households (in 13 of the 16 countries studied) participating in
agricultural production and/or wage employment in agriculture.
Wealthier households in rural areas generally have a higher level of
participation and share of income from non-farm activities, although
exceptions were found in Pakistan and Bangladesh where high levels
of landlessness among the poor forces people into agricultural and
non-agricultural wage employment.
The concept of ‘agro-ecosystems’ illustrated in Figure 4.8 captures
aspects of both the diversity and dynamism of rural livelihood
systems. The model confirms how farming is only one option for
securing basic needs for food and cash in rural areas, and that
farming itself may be based on a combination of livestock (including
fish) and/or cropping (including forestry) systems. Further diversity
stems from the limitless number of factors shaping individual
farming and livelihood systems, each farming system involving the

manipulation of basic ecological processes (such as the competition
between species or the predation by pests), via agricultural processes
of cultivation or pest control, and led by people’s aspirations,
priorities and goals (which may be set at the individual, community,
state or international levels).
Change in the agro-ecosystem may come via the full range of
environmental, economic, political and social factors across this
hierarchy. For example, a change in demand for a particular
handicraft item such as basketry (an economic factor) or a lack of
rainfall (an environmental factor) may operate at the local level to
prompt change in individual livelihoods. Box 4.3, for example,
illustrated how improved access to credit/finance enabled saree
makers to raise the quality of their production with economic and
Figure 4.8 The hierarchy of agro-ecosystems
World Economic Community
Nation
Region
Watershed
Village
Handicraft manufacture Household Processing, trading,

transporting
Livelihood
Fishing, hunting, gathering Non-farm employment
system
of common property resources
Farming
Off-farm employment
system
Remittances in agriculture
Livestock system Cropping system
Paddock Field
Herd Crop
Animal-environment Plant-environment
Source: adapted from Conway (1987).
social benefits for the household. Further up the hierarchy, a new

national government policy concerning recommended soil
conservation practices or a reduction in state capacity to finance local
extension services may serve to change local cropping patterns (as
may climate change).
Decisions within the (increasingly global) economic community,
such as regarding agricultural subsidies, now being debated at the
WTO impact on the profitability of cash-cropping decisions of
farmers at the local scale. The formation of a new regional trading
block between the governments of the US, Canada and Mexico (the
North American Free Trade Agreement signed in 1994) led to a 50
per cent reduction in the prices paid to Mexican farmers for their
corn, for example (Carlsen, 2004). As with any ‘system’, change in
any one element has implications for the functioning of the system as
a whole. The impact may be direct or indirect, large or small,
immediate or delayed. Understanding rural livelihood systems within
the agro-ecosystem framework, therefore, begins to illuminate the
extent and nature of the challenges for sustainable rural development.
An increasingly globalised agri-food system
Few people or environments now remain outside the workings of the

world economy and of the globalised agri-food system in particular.
Agriculture as an economic sector and as an activity has become
globalised; it is increasingly dependent on an ‘economy and set of
regulatory practices that are global in scope and organisation’ (Knox
and Marston, 1998: 337). In many places (although to varying
degrees), the ‘farm’, which had been the core of agricultural
production, is now just one part of an integrated, multilevel industrial
system encompassing production, processing, marketing and
distribution of food and fibre products (Redclift, 1987). Furthermore,
the vertical linkages through this system have become increasingly
integrated in recent years, particularly as a small number of major
agri-business firms (including seed companies, food processors and
supermarkets) have expanded their control over more and more
stages of the system and parts of the markets within. The modern
food system has been likened to an hourglass, as shown in
Figure 4.9, where at the bottom are the millions of farmers and farm
labourers (largely in developing regions) and at the top, the billions
of consumers worldwide. In the narrow stem between these are a
Figure 4.9 The modern food system as an hourglass
Billions of consumers
world-wide
Agricultural input suppliers,

food processors, marketing
and retailers number less
than 20.
Millions of farmers and

farm labourers
very small number of major MNCs (earning a profit through all the
transactions involved).
The globalisation of agriculture has had wide-ranging implications
for the relationship between people and between people and the
environment in rural areas of the developing world. For many
commentators, the overall impacts have been generally negative, as
summarised in Figure 4.10. A key concern is the degree (and
increasing concentration) of control that major agri-business
companies now have over decision-making throughout the agri-food
system. For example, the chemical pesticide industry increasingly
bought up biotechnology, plant breeding and seed interests across the
world through the 1990s. In 2000, 10 corporations supplied 33 per
cent of the global seed market compared to thousands of companies
20 years previously (Actionaid, 2003). Monsanto alone bought 60 per
cent of the Brazilian maize seed market in the two years 1997 to
1999. The production of many agricultural commodities now
involves entering into advanced contracts of some kind (including
Plate 4.2 Cash crops for export
a) Large-scale tea production, Indonesia

Source: author.
b) Tobacco production, Zimbabwe

Source: author.
Figure 4.10 The negative impacts of the with these MNCs) regarding the
integration of rural producers in the global
South into the global agri-food system
types of crop grown, price and
quality, for example, that introduces
G The options and capacity of governments in new risks for farmers and generally
the global South to influence national decreases their control over
agricultural development become
increasingly circumscribed. livelihood and natural resource
G National self-sufficiency in basic food stuffs management decisions. Whereas in
has been compromised as production the past, for example, farmers were
becomes focused on international demand dealing with several different (and
for non-traditional crops.
G Farmers are tied into unequal and
smaller) firms as well as with
dependent relationships with agri-business, public bodies such as government
often with negative social and controlled marketing boards to
environmental effects. purchase seeds and fertilisers or to
G Vulnerable groups, whether farmers or
workers, find their livelihoods under threat
sell produce, their exposure to
‘as they are sandwiched between market forces is now very different
downstream suppliers (providing for (Thompson et al., 2007). Such
example, patented genetic material, transactions are also now made in
chemical inputs and advice) and upstream
buyers (dictating size, appearance and the context of decreasing public
presentation of the product)’ (p.100). support for training, extension and
Source: compiled from Rigg (2007).
innovation (as well as for price
support for inputs and products)
that has occurred through liberalisation policies. Box 4.4 confirms the
very serious financial and emotional distress that farmers and their
families in India are experiencing as a result of the opening of Indian
agriculture to the global market in recent decades.
Different but related challenges for sustainable

agricultural development
In 1987, the WCED identified three distinct types of agriculture
worldwide, effectively categorised according to the degree of
incorporation into the globalising world economy. Firstly, ‘industrial’
agriculture was identified as largely confined to the more advanced
economies, but also as occurring in specialist enclaves of the
developing world. This type of agriculture was identified as highly
productive but dependent on heavy external inputs such as synthetic
fertilisers and chemical insecticides. Multinational corporations, as
identified above, had a lead role in this kind of agriculture and its
expansion, dominating the supply of the key inputs, but also through
establishing networks with agricultural research institutions, training
colleges, and government ministries and regulatory bodies.
Sustainability concerns raised at the time, such as the impacts of
Box 4.4
Farmer suicides in India

Since 1995, a quarter of a million Indian farmers have committed suicide. In
2009 alone, 17,638 farmers took their own lives – equivalent to one death
every 30 minutes. Furthermore, these are official statistics that may well be
an under-estimation and certainly do not account for the very large numbers
of surviving family members who have been affected by those deaths. There
are complex causes of suicide and factors explaining these deaths are varied
in different regions. However, indebtedness is a major cause and the
majority of suicides are farmers growing Genetically Modified (GM) cotton.
Since the mid 1990s, India has pursued policies of economic liberalisation
that have reduced the subsidies formerly available to farmers, and have
increased the presence of multinational corporations in agricultural markets
generally and in GM cotton production in particular. Many farmers are now
subject to increased costs and are experiencing reduced profits (and yields in
some cases). There is an increased vulnerability of smallholder farmers to
global market conditions (for the prices they receive) and to MNCs who
control the costs and availability of many inputs to production and the costs
of repayments on loans. Many farmers are trapped in a cycle of debt that
creates substantial emotional distress. The Centre for Human Rights and
Global Justice argues that this is a human rights crisis that has built up over
the last two decades and is a direct result of the policies of the Indian
government, which is legally obliged under UN human rights treaties to
address this crisis.
Source: compiled from Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice (2011).
monoculture production on genetic diversity and of chemical

fertilisers and pesticides on water quality, have mounted and widened
in recent years. For example, the global environmental impacts of
such ‘high external input’ systems now extend to the eutrophication
of freshwater systems and hypoxia in coastal marine ecologies as a
result of the application of inorganic fertilisers and pesticides. The
moral issue of the existence of food surpluses being created under
these systems of industrialised agriculture and the heavy state
subsidies that continue to support farmers in the EU and the US, for
example, are the basis of campaigns of international NGOs. Food
scares such as those surrounding the link between human variant
CJD and BSE in beef cattle and the health impacts of dioxins,
pesticides and antibiotics emerging in the food chain are now
powerful influences on consumer choice in the UK, the USA and

many countries in Europe. The growth of organic food sales in major
supermarkets and the rising popularity of local ‘farmers’ markets’ (as
well as the growth of Fairtrade products seen in Figure 3.18) suggest
that consumers are choosing to make purchases on the basis of what
they know of the production methods and commodity chains
involved, that is, rejecting the environmental and health impacts of
industrialised agriculture and making choices that explicitly enhance
the social and economic benefits to the producer.
The second category of world agriculture identified by the WCED
was ‘Green Revolution’ agriculture encompassing the activities of
approximately 2.5 billion people in 1987 in countries of the
developing world, but most widely in Asia. In areas of reliable
rainfall or irrigation technologies and close to markets and sources of
inputs, high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice in particular
(and the associated packages of fertilisers and pesticides required for
their production) had transformed pre-existing agricultural systems
through the 1960s and 1970s. In India, for example, these
technologies were central in establishing national self-sufficiency in
food grains by the late 1970s. At this time, there was substantial
optimism concerning the further incorporation of agriculture in
developing regions into the world economy and its ‘modernisation’
based on moving to these ‘high external input’ systems of
production, that is, modelling the general characteristics of industrial
agriculture.
However, the ‘euphoria’ of the early stages of the Green Revolution
(see Atkins and Bowler, 2001) faded through the 1970s as the
limitations of the ‘package’ beyond those ‘leading innovative
regions’ became clear. These included evidence of widening
socioeconomic polarisation and negative environmental impacts in
areas where such technologies were adopted (for further detail of the
uneven and often gendered impacts see Potter et al., 2008). There
was also a recognition that the crop types and water demands of the
technologies were generally unsuited for the environmental
conditions and livelihood priorities of many countries and farmers on
the African continent, for example. Furthermore, evidence mounted
from the agricultural research institutes that previous yield increases
under traditional plant breeding methods were slowing, and problems
such as chemical toxicity and changing soil carbon–nitrogen ratios
were necessitating further external inputs in order to maintain yields
(Pretty, 1995).
These kinds of pattern and evidence led to a call for a new ‘Doubly
Green Revolution’; one that is ‘even more productive than the first
Green Revolution and even more “Green” in terms of conserving
natural resources and the environment’ (Conway, 1997: 45).
However, in the last decade, the debate has shifted from a ‘Green’ to
a ‘Gene’ Revolution and the potential of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) to deliver further increases in global food
production (Atkins and Bowler, 2001). Proponents of the Gene
Revolution argue that biotechnology offers the means to feed an
expanding population from a restricted land base with fewer
environmental costs. GMOs are those where alien genetic material is
introduced artificially rather than through traditional breeding or
cross-breeding from one organism to another. Crop varieties are
being created to require less pesticide, to be herbicide tolerant, to fix
their own nitrogen, to yield in very challenging conditions and to be
drought resistant, all of which can, for example, reduce overall
energy requirements (Madeley, 2002). However, there are a range of
concerns regarding GMOs in agriculture and food systems,
summarised in Figure 4.11. Significantly, whereas it had been public
monies and charitable foundations that had funded the
experimentation and research centres of the Green Revolution,
commercial biotechnology companies have become the major
financers of agricultural research and development and are
increasingly the architects of this Gene Revolution. The further
corporate control over the food chain encompassed by these
developments and the implications for small farmers who become
tied into dependence on certified seeds and external inputs, for
example, are a particular concern for many civil society organisations
within the developing world (see Shiva, 2000).
Figure 4.12 shows the expansion of biotech crops globally since the
first commercial planting in 1996. In 2010, the area under biotech
crops exceeded 1 billion hectares, an expansion of 10 per cent over
the previous year (James, 2010). The principal countries and crops
are shown in Table 4.2. Over 90 per cent of farmers growing biotech
crops are now small-scale farmers in developing countries. However,
as Robinson (2004: 196) suggests, ‘the application of GM
“solutions” is regarded by many as the antithesis of a sustainable
option for further agricultural development’. Opposition to GM crops
is evident in the UK, for example, where public concerns continue to
prevent both the trialling and production of such crops. Certainly, the
characteristics of this externally and technology-led approach to
‘sustainable’ agricultural development are very different from those
Figure 4.11 The concerns over GMOs
Environmental concerns
1 Most agricultural crops have toxic ancestors and introduced genes could
switch back on ancestral genes making agricultural crops toxic.
2 Genes inserted into GMOs will spread to other non-target organisms with
unknown and unpredictable consequences.
3 We do not know enough about ecological interactions to be able to predict
accurately the long-term consequences of the introduction of genes into the
environment.
4 It is possible that development of herbicide-resistant plants could cause
changes in the patterns of herbicide use in agriculture in ways that will be
more environmentally damaging than existing systems.
5 It is difficult to predict what will turn into a plant or a weed. Once an organism
becomes a pest it can be difficult to eradicate.
6 A gene does not necessarily control a single trait. A gene may control several
different traits in a plant and the placement of genes is a very imprecise
science in many cases.
7 A gene which is safe in one country and one soil type may behave differently
under changed conditions. Therefore there are problems of scaling from field
trial to commercial release.
8 The majority of the new GM crops require high-quality soils, high investment in
machinery and increased use of chemicals. They do not solve the food needs
of the world’s poorest people.
9 GMOs encourage continuous cropping and thus discourage rotations,
polycultures and the conservation of biodiversity.
Socioeconomic concerns
1 Genetic engineering is leading to the patenting of life forms, genetic
information and indigenous knowledge of local ecology. Such commodification
or privatisation of nature and knowledge is morally wrong.
2 Corporations are concentrating research and development on the most
profitable elements of biotechnology rather than the applications that best
promote sustainable development.
3 The control of the global food economy by fewer large corporations is leading
to more genetic uniformity in rural landscapes.
4 Competition to gain markets and hence profits is resulting in companies
releasing GM crops without adequate consideration of the long-term impacts
on people or the ecosystem.
5 Without adequate labelling, consumers have no choice as to whether they eat
food derived from GMOs.
6 There is no conclusive evidence that GMOs are superior to conventional crops.
They may divert resources from exploring more appropriate, sustainable low-
technology alternatives to intensive agriculture.
7 Using GMOs to increase agricultural productivity in the North may lead
to reduced imports from the South. Farmers in the South may then turn to
more environmentally damaging alternatives with adverse effects on
biodiversity.
Source: compiled from Huckle and Martin (2001).

Figure 4.12 The global area of biotech crops
160
Total hectares
140 Industrial
Developing
120
Million hectares
100
80
60
40
20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: James (2010).
Table 4.2 Leading biotech growing countries and crops
Country Area Biotech crops

(million
hectares)
USA 66.8 Maize, soybean, cotton, canola, sugarbeet, alfalfa,

papaya, squash
Brazil 25.4 Soybean, maize, cotton
Argentina 22.9 Soybean, maize, cotton
India 9.4 Cotton
Canada 8.8 Canola, maize, soybean, sugarbeet
China 3.5 Cotton, papaya, poplar, tomato, sweet pepper
Paraguay 2.6 Soybean
Pakistan 2.4 Cotton
South Africa 2.2 Maize, soybean, cotton
Uruguay 1.1 Soybean, maize
Source: compiled from James (2010).
of participatory and community-based development considered

below. However, Box 4.5 confirms the difficulties in practice of
evaluating the sustainability impacts of GM technology.
The third type of agriculture, identified by the WCED in 1987 as
‘resource poor’, supported more than 2 billion people in the
developing world at the time, but was less well integrated into the
Box 4.5
The sustainability of genetically modified

cotton in South Africa
The Makhathini Flats area of KwaZulu Natal is one of the poorest in
South Africa. Agriculture is the primary source of income for smallholder
farmers cultivating plots typically of between 1 and 3 hectares and cotton
is the principal cash crop. However, cotton yields were relatively poor with
key constraints on production including drought, pest attacks, access to
irrigation and limited options in terms of input supply and marketing. In
1998–99, resource-poor farmers started adopting Bt cotton following large
commercial farmers. By 2004, most small-scale farmers in the area were
growing a Bt cotton variety. A study over six seasons found that yields for
Bt cotton were significantly higher and had resulted in increased income that
was being used in particular to invest in children’s education. However,
overall costs of production of Bt and non-Bt cotton were broadly similar: for
example, whilst pesticide and insecticide use declined (saving money and
labour costs), there were higher labour costs involved in harvesting the
greater yields.
Ongoing issues surrounding the contribution of GM cotton to agricultural

sustainability include:
G Whilst use of pesticides has declined (with health, economic and

environmental benefits), will Bt resistance to pests break down over a
longer time period?
G Will increased cotton yields under Bt varieties continue? Will this lead
to a dampening of market prices for cotton in future? Could this happen
with any yield/revenue-enhancing technology (therefore not being
GM-specific)?
G Bt seed is significantly more expensive than non-GM varieties and
risks of crop or market failure remain.
G Adoption of Bt cotton varieties has not addressed a key sustainability
issue of the ‘narrowness’ of the livelihood base of small-scale farmers in
Makhathini, that is, the heavy reliance on cotton production per se within
the household economy. This in combination with the vulnerability to
drought could be considered the greatest threat to sustainability in the
region. ‘This, however, was the case prior to Bt’s introduction and has
not been caused or exacerbated by that technology’ (Morse and Mannion,
2009: 243).
Source: compiled from Morse and Mannion (2009).
world economy and into the agri-food system in particular. It was in

these areas that the major challenges for sustainable rural
development were identified to lie; where poverty, economic and
ecological ‘marginality’ was concentrated and which had generally
been ‘forgotten’ through the ‘biases’ in development thinking and
policy identified above. As Pretty (1995: 31) suggested:
Farming systems in these areas are complex and diverse, agricultural

yields are low, and rural livelihoods are often dependent on wild
resources as well as agricultural produce. They are remote from
markets and infrastructure; they are located on fragile or problem soils;
and less likely to be visited by agricultural scientists and extension
workers or studied in research institutions.
The remaining sections of this chapter focus on the challenges of

sustainable rural development in these areas in more detail. However,
whilst these three categories of world agriculture remain important
for understanding how the challenges of sustainable agricultural
development are different globally, there are now growing concerns
as to whether agricultural policy and practice worldwide are able to
respond to the complex and diverse challenges of the twenty-first
century. In short, it is considered that the dominant approach to
world agriculture has been led by concerns for further growth and the
aggregate benefits of raising production whether in industrial or
small-scale agriculture. In so doing, the distributional aspects of who
benefits and who loses (central concerns in sustainable development)
are underestimated, and moreover, opportunities for alternative routes
out of poverty are being missed. In 2007, in a major review of the
workings of the global agri-food system and pathways for more
sustainable development, a typology of ‘Five Rural Worlds’ was
developed (Figure 4.13). In contrast to the WCED categorisation
(and that of the World Bank in Box 4.1), the typology centres on
rural peoples’ livelihoods and the differences between households.
Whilst this research confirms the continued concentration of poverty
and marginality within areas of ‘resource poor agriculture’, it also
makes clear:
that poverty is located unevenly across and within rural populations,

that policy in and for food and agriculture affects different groups in
different ways and that the actions of one rural group can improve or
impair the livelihoods of others.
(Thompson et al., 2007: 15)
It also confirms the importance of understanding agriculture as one

part of people’s livelihoods and in rural economies (as discussed
above) and of the need to consider the challenges and opportunities
for more sustainable rural development in particular environmental,
economic and social contexts:
Not all developing country farmers need to end up growing French

beans or carnations through out-grower schemes for the European
market, even if this is a good plan for some farmers in some places.
There are other opportunities that need to be sought out, and the
generalised models and universalised policy prescriptions do not help
in the search for these pathways to sustainability, particularly in a
period of rapid change and uncertainty.
(Thompson et al., 2007: 31)
Figure 4.13 Five ‘Rural Worlds’
Rural World 1 households and enterprises engaged in high-value, export-oriented agriculture,

make up a very small minority of rural households and firms in the developing world. In
addition to their land and other holdings, producers and firms have direct access to finance,
risk management instruments, information and infrastructure necessary to remain competitive
in their business operations. Most have an influential voice in national policies and institutions
affecting their enterprises and close ties to buyer-driven value chains associated with global
agriculture.
Rural World 2 accounts for a substantial number of rural households and agricultural firms in
the developing world. They are frequently part of the local elite but have little influence at the
national level. They have sizeable landholdings often devoted to both commercial and
subsistence agriculture. They previously had access to basic services, such as finance, but
with the advent of liberalisation and the consequent withdrawal of the state from a direct role
in agriculture, the availability of these services declined rapidly.
Rural World 3 households – fisherman, pastoralists, smallholders and associated micro-
enterprises – are survivalist. Food security is their main concern, and their small production
units are almost totally dedicated to home consumption. Their assets are poorly developed,
and they have very limited access to key services (e.g. credit) that would enable them to
increase returns to their assets.
Rural World 4 households are landless or near-landless, frequently headed by women, with
little access to productive resources other than their own labour. Sharecropping or working as
agricultural labourers for better-off households in their communities in Rural Worlds 1, 2 and 3
is perhaps the most secure livelihood option for many of them. For others, migrating to
economic centres on a daily, seasonal or even permanent basis is their best hope for survival.
But their low education levels are a major barrier to migrating out of poverty.
Rural World 5 households are chronically poor. Most have sold off or been stripped of their
asset holdings during periods of crisis. Remittances from relatives, community safety nets and
government transfers are vital to their sustenance. As a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
many more households are facing this precarious situation, particularly in Africa. Entrenched
gender inequalities exacerbate the problem. Social exclusion often typifies the relationship of
Rural World 5 to the larger community. Social protection programmes, including cash and in-
kind transfer schemes, will be critical for this group for some time.
Source: Thompson et al. (2007).

Towards sustainable rural development
The importance of the local context

Individuals ultimately make the land-use decisions upon which
sustainable agricultural development depends. They do so, however,
within the context of a variety of natural (environmental and
ecological) and structural (including the world economy) forces, as
identified in the hierarchy of agro-ecosystems above (Figure 4.8) and
in Box 4.4. Through these illustrations it is seen that whilst the range
of options in decision-making for particular people regarding natural
resource use may depend closely on factors of finance, access to
technology and political power, it can also be suggested that
behaviour is not fully determined, even amongst the poorest
farmers:
Political, social and economic forces do operate; but when they are
dissected, sooner or later we come to individual people who are acting,
feeling and perceiving . . . all are to some degree capable of changing
what they do . . . the sum of small actions makes great movements.
(Chambers, 1983: 191–2)
Whilst this ‘populist’ stance can be criticised for underestimating the

broader context of individual livelihoods, that is, the political,
economic and social structures and processes that underlie land use
decisions and practices leading to resource degradation (the focus of
political ecologists identified in Chapter 2), there is much evidence
from analyses of sustainable agricultural development that the local
level is a key arena for success. For example, ecology-based
alternatives to the ‘industrial’ agricultural model are now being
developed worldwide. Whilst various terms are used including ‘low
external input’, ‘organic’ and ‘biodynamic’ farming, they all centre
on integrating ecological processes and principles into the way that
food is produced, to prevent environmental harm in particular, but
also in ways that are tailored to the particular social, economic and
environmental priorities and circumstances at the local level. They
start with the understanding that spatial variability and complex
ecological dynamics are key properties of the agri-farming system
(Thompson et al., 2007). Whilst the technologies and specific
practices will be different in particular places, key elements include
the use of locally adapted resource-conserving technologies that
deliver multifunctional benefits (jointly providing food and other
goods for farmers and markets but also contributing to wider public
goods such as flood protection and habitat conservation); using the
knowledge and skills of farmers (improving self-reliance and
substituting human capital for costly external inputs); and making use
of people’s collective capacities to work together to solve common
agricultural and natural resource problems (Pretty, 2008).
The types of resource-conserving technology which are delivering
favourable changes to several components of the farming system
simultaneously are highlighted in Figure 4.14. Techniques such as
intercropping and agro-forestry demand a close understanding of the
specifics of local ecological and environmental conditions, substantial
Figure 4.14 Agricultural technologies with high potential sustainability
Intercropping The growing of two or more crops simultaneously on the same piece of
land. Benefits arise because crops exploit different resources, or
interact with one another. If one crop is a legume it may provide
nutrients for the other. The interactions may also serve to control pests
and weeds.
Rotations The growing of two or more crops in sequence on the same piece of
land. Benefits are similar to those arising from intercropping.
Agro-forestry A form of intercropping in which annual herbaceous crops are grown
interspersed with perennial trees or shrubs. The deeper-rooted trees can
often exploit water and nutrients not available to the herbs. The trees
may also provide shade and mulch, while the ground cover of herbs
reduces weeds and prevents erosion.
Sylvo-pasture Similar to agro-forestry, but combining trees with grassland and other
fodder species on which livestock graze. The mixture of browse, grass
and herbs often supports mixed livestock.
Green manuring The growing of legumes and other plants in order to fix nitrogen and
then incorporating them in the soil for the following crop. Commonly
used green manures are Sesbania and the fern Azolla, which contains
nitrogen-fixing, blue-green algae.
Conservation tillage Systems of minimum tillage or no-tillage, in which the seed is placed
directly in the soil with little or no preparatory cultivation. This reduces
the amount of soil disturbance and so lessens run-off and loss of
sediments and nutrients.
Biological control The use of natural enemies, parasites or predators, to control pests.
If the pest is exotic these enemies may be imported from the country
of origin of the pest; if indigenous, various techniques are used to
augment the numbers of the existing natural enemies.
Integrated pest The use of all appropriate techniques of controlling pests in an
management integrated manner that enhances rather than destroys natural controls.
If pesticides are part of the programme, they are used sparingly and
selectively, so as not to interfere with natural enemies.
Source: Conway (1997).

Plate 4.3 Harnessing scarce water resources for

agricultural production in Tunisia
a) Tabia and jessour irrigation

Source: author.
b) Water control in the El Guettar oasis

Source: author.
management skills and access to information, and often significant

levels of investment and cost adjustment. Coordinated actions at the
local level are necessary to ensure that the sustainable development
measures of one person or section of the community are not to be
compromised by the actions of others.
In 1988 Chambers put forward five interdependent prerequisites for
sustainable rural development on the basis of analysis of apparently
successful and sustainable projects in the developing world. These
principles, listed in Figure 4.15, have come to inform much rural
development research and practice in areas within and beyond
agriculture. The importance of the local context is confirmed, for
example, in prioritising local people’s issues and concerns but also
through the specifics of the values and commitments of staff.
However, the more detailed analysis in the following sections
indicates that the conditions for sustainability extend also beyond the
local level. They will include national systems of tenure which
promote security and encourage long-term investments, for example
and research and planning institutions that encourage and give value
to community voices at all levels. Furthermore, experience is
suggesting that the challenges of sustainable rural development often
lie in the relation between these levels of action: in how women, for
example, can be empowered to
address broader strategic needs that
Figure 4.15 Lessons for the achievement
of sustainable rural livelihoods tackle gender relations rather than
‘simply’ their practical, immediate
1 A learning-process approach needs as defined by existing gender
2 People’s priorities first roles (Pearson, 2001) or how local
3 Secure rights and gains
community based organisations can
4 Sustainability through self-help
work with donor organisations and
5 Staff calibre, commitment and continuity
state institutions (Bebbington,
Source: Chambers (1988). 2004).
Putting Farmers First

The basic model for agricultural development encompassed within
both the Gene and Green Revolutions encapsulates what has been
termed a ‘blueprint’ or ‘transfer of technology’ approach to planning:
in short, new technological packages are developed in research
stations and laboratories for transfer via extension systems to
farmers. Over the years, criticism of this approach was important in
generating the call for ‘another’ or ‘alternative’ development (as seen
in Chapter 1). These gave recognition, for example, to local practices

and knowledge and emphasised the questions of power and
participation that are central to achieving sustainability. The ‘Farmer
First’ movement aims to put farmers (broadly defined to include not
just sedentary, smallholder farmers, but also farm workers,
pastoralists, forest dwellers, fisherfolk and other small-scale
producers of food and feedstuffs) at the centre of agricultural
innovations and rural development through participatory research and
planning processes. In direct contrast to the blueprint approach,
Farmer First is based on a ‘learning-process approach’ where farmers
and scientists collaborate, where technologies evolve and are adapted
with experimentation and experience and where projects are
continuously modified rather than being held to a rigid set of aims
and procedures. The key features and contrasts between these
approaches are identified in Figure 4.16. Farmer First approaches
have had widespread implications (within and beyond agriculture and
rural development) for how research is undertaken, how projects are
designed and the value of particular kinds of ‘expertise’, for example
and have been the basis of many innovative and successful
developments. Most recently, there is understanding of the many
roles and relationships that farmers now have, that is, beyond those
with ‘outside professionals’ such as scientists and development
practitioners, as entrepreneurs involved in business, trading and
marketing or as organisers and advocates for others in the
community. As such, farmers are involved in many forms of
collaboration and networks of public, private and community-based
organisations. For those working ‘Beyond Farmer First’ (Scoones
and Thompson, 2009, 1994) the emphasis is now on innovation and
learning in this new and rapidly changing context.
However, putting the Farmer First approach into practice has proven
challenging. A key requirement, for example, is to understand and
value local priorities, yet as already discussed, understanding the
‘realities’ of resource-poor agriculture has generally not been the
focus of research and development. Figure 4.17 identifies a number
of core ways in which farmers’ and scientists’ priorities may differ.
Robert Chambers (1983, 1993, 2008) has been influential in detailing
the powerful forces which tend to perpetuate ‘first’ (‘scientist’ or
‘outsider’) priorities, those which start with ‘economies not people’,
with the ‘view from the office not the field’ and tend to lead to
centralised, standard prescriptions for change, rather than the
priorities of the ‘last’ (i.e. farmers) and the substantial ‘reversals’ that
are required in what he terms ‘normal’ research and development
Figure 4.16 Changing approaches to agricultural research and development
Transfer of Farming Systems Farmer First/ People-centred Innovation and Learning

Technology Research Farmer Participatory
Research
Era Long history, Starting in the From 1990s 2000s

central since 1970s and 1980s
1960s
Mental model of Supply through Learn through Collaborate in Innovation network centred on co-development;
activities pipeline survey research involving multi-stakeholder processes and messy
partnerships
Farmers as seen Progressive Objects of study Colleagues Partners, collaborators, entrepreneurs, innovators,
by scientists adopters, laggards and sources of info organised group setting the agenda, exerting
demand: ‘the boss’
Scientists as seen Not seen – only saw Used our land; Friendly consumers One of many sources of ideas and information
by farmers extension workers asked us questions of our time
Knowledge and Single discipline Inter-disciplinary Inter-disciplinary Extra/trans-disciplinary – holistic, multiple, culturally
disciplines driven (breeding) (plus economics) (more, plus farmer rooted knowledges
experts)
Farmers’ roles Learn, adopt, Provide information Diagnose, Empowered co-generators of knowledge and
conform for scientists experiment, test, innovation; negotiators
adapt
Scope Productivity Input–output Farm based Beyond the farm-gate – multi-functional agriculture,
relationships livelihood/food systems and value chains across
multiple scales, from local to global; long time
frames
continued . . .
Transfer of Farming Systems Farmer First/ People-centred Innovation and Learning

Technology Research Farmer Participatory
Research
Core elements Technology Modified packages Joint production Social networks of innovators; shared learning and
packages to overcome of knowledge change; politics of demand
constraints
Drivers Supply push from Scientists’ need Demand pull from Responsiveness to changing contexts – markets,
research to learn about farmers globalisation, climate change; organised farmers,
farmers’ conditions power and politics
and needs
Key changes sought Farmer behaviour Scientists’ Scientist–farmer Institutional, professional and personal change:
knowledge relationships opening space for innovation
Intended outcome Technology transfer Technology Co-evolved Capacities to innovate, learn and change
and uptake produced with technology with
better fit to better fit to
farming systems livelihood systems
Institutions and Technology transfer Ignored, black Acknowledged, but Central dimensions of change
politics as independent: boxed sometimes naïve
assumed away populism
Sustainability Undefined Important Explicit Championed – and multi-dimensional, normative and

political
Innovators Scientists Scientists adapt Farmers and Multiple actors – learning alliances
packages scientists together
Source: Scoones and Thompson (eds) 2009.

Figure 4.17 Where farmers’ priorities might diverge from those of scientists
Priorities
Scientists Resource-poor farmers
Crops – yield – flavour

– compatible with machine harvesting – local marketability
– single variety – multiple variety cropping
Cropping systems – mono-cropping – diverse cropping
– high external input – low external input
– high yield – yield less important
Management – maximise production – minimise risk
– maximise growth – livelihood security
Use of labour – minimise labour input – use all family labour
Constraints – meeting demands of scientific – meeting traditional
community obligations
– project cycles – maintaining good
– meeting demands of donors community relations
learning and practice. A simple illustration is that aid agency

bureaucracy can lead to pressure to produce a portfolio of projects
quickly and to spend budgets by deadlines, giving little time within
the project process to be open to changing conditions and experience
from practice or for projects to evolve. Too often, in the past,
‘outsiders’ have assumed that they knew what poor people wanted
when, in practice, the priorities of farmers and of different groups
within the local community would vary quite widely.
Reversals in ‘learning’ are also required, whereby the value of
indigenous knowledge, skills and technologies is recognised in
combination with ‘conventional’ science, as discussed in Box 4.6.
As identified recently within the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA, 2005: 24):
Traditional knowledge or practitioners’ knowledge held by local

resource managers can often be of considerable value in resource
management, but it is too rarely incorporated into decision-making
processes and indeed is often inappropriately dismissed.
The importance of using the knowledge and skills of farmers for

more sustainable alternatives to conventional models of agriculture
development are also a characteristic of the agro-ecology-based
alternatives considered above and are a central element in defining
the ‘Doubly Green Revolution’:
Whilst the first Green Revolution took as its starting point the
biological challenge inherent in producing new high-yielding food
crops and then looked to determine how the benefits could reach the
poor, this new revolution has to reverse the chain of logic, starting
with the socio-economic demands of poor households and then seeking
to identify appropriate research priorities. Success will not be achieved
either by applying modern science and technology, on the one hand, or
by implementing economic and social reform on the other, but through
a combination of these that is innovative and imaginative.
(Conway, 1997: 42)
Since the 1990s, many methods rooted in the philosophy of ‘Farmer

First’ have been developed to explore local issues and realities and to
give greater voice to a wider set of local interests. These include a
greater reliance on qualitative techniques (interviews rather than
surveys, for example) but also oral and visual methods rather than
written accounts. ‘Participatory Learning and Action’ (PLA) is now
Box 4.6
The value of indigenous technologies
Rural people’s knowledge and scientific knowledge are complementary in their

strengths and weaknesses. Combined they may achieve what neither would
alone.
(Chambers, 1983: 75)
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was tremendous optimism for the role of western
science in raising agricultural production throughout the world, encapsulated in the
research and extension activities associated with the ‘green revolution’. The locus of
research was the experimental station and the challenge was to transfer the new
technology to the farmers’ fields. When it subsequently became clear that farmers were
unable to gain yields on their own farms comparable to those achieved at experimental
stations, the ‘blame’ was passed between ‘ignorant farmers’ and ‘poor extension
services’.
It is now appreciated more widely that rarely do farmers fail, through ignorance, to effect
land-use decisions which will raise productivity or conserve resources. Rather their
behaviour is, more regularly, rational in the light of their political-economic, social and
environmental circumstances. It is now thought that research conducted at experimental
stations has limitations for solving the ‘real-life’ problems of the farmer (particularly the
resource-poor farmer). Scientists have an important role to play in conducting research
about a problem, for example how potatoes grow. But for solving a problem, such as
how to grow potatoes, it is thought that farmers in fact have a lot to teach scientists
(Chambers et al., 1989). The problem for research and extension activities, therefore,
becomes not how to transfer technology from research station to farmer but how to close
the gap between the two so that insights from both can be shared and built upon.
However, as more has become known regarding the ways in which farmers learn and
experiment, often in very contrasting ways to modern science, it has also become clear
that there are differences amongst rural people in terms of their knowledge and power.
‘The issue is not just “whose knowledge counts?”, but “who knows who has access to
what knowledge?”and “who can generate new knowledge, and how?”‘ (Chambers, 1993:
xv). Not only, therefore, are there substantial and continued challenges in instilling
changes in attitudes, behaviour and methods in the work of institutions and extension
agents, but new insights are required into how those who are variously excluded at the
local level can be:
strengthened in their own observations, experiments and analysis to generate
and enhance their own knowledge; how they can better seek, demand, draw
down, own and use information; how they can share and spread knowledge
among themselves; and how they can influence formal agricultural research
priorities.
(Chambers, 1993: xv)
the umbrella term used to refer to the tools and ways of working that
have done much to move understanding forward of the knowledge,
values and priorities within local communities and the ‘complex,
diverse and risk-prone environments of resource-poor people’
(Scoones and Thompson, 1994: 4). PLA is centred on trying to see
the world from the point of view of those directly affected by
development (Mohan, 2008). PLA is most commonly used in natural
resource management and in agriculture, but also in programmes
addressing empowerment, equity and rights issues (Chambers, 2008).
Through the types of research tool and approach identified in
Figure 4.18, more appropriate research priorities and more inclusive
approaches to development interventions are being realised. Box 4.7
shows how PLA approaches are being used to support local capacity
to adapt to future climate changes in the Andes.
However, there are also continued challenges for sustainable rural
development despite the substantial progress made through these
alternative approaches. There is concern, for example, that the
‘frenzied levels of global interest in participatory methodologies’
(Guijt and Shah, 1998: 4) through the 1990s led to the production
of so many handbooks, guides and courses that a ‘manual and
Figure 4.18 The major components of participatory learning and action
Participatory
learning
and action
Methods/ Behaviours and Process of analysis

tools attitudes and sharing
• mapping • enabling and • disaggregate

• timeline listening behaviour groups/separate
• matrix ranking • positive bias stakeholders,
• Venn diagram towards women, and bring them
• well-being ranking vulnerable groups together
• transect walk and bottom-up • document
• time-use diagrams agendas • cross-check
• historical matrix • open and intelligent information
questions (triangulation) from
• good observations multiple dialogues
of others’ behaviour and tools
• decide priority
problems and plans
of action
Source: adapted from Neefjes (2000).
Box 4.7
Supporting adaptations to climate change in

the Andes
Successful farming in the Andes region is already a substantial challenge,
requiring for example, complex soil and water management and a diversity
of crops, varieties and planting schemes adapted to altitude, daily
temperature extremes and seasonal weather variations. Climate change is
expected to aggravate substantially what is already a precarious situation;
melting of the Andean glaciers is predicted within 15 years, droughts,
flooding, wind and cyclones are expected to become more common and
stream flows will decrease, for example. In 2005, a project was started in
two highland locations in Bolivia and Ecuador amongst the poorest regions
of the Andes, combining the work of two national NGOs, the Ecuadorian
Network for Community-based Natural Resource Management (MACRENA)
and the Bolivian Programme for Integrated Development of Potosi
(PRODINPO), and an international NGO, World Neighbours. The project
adopted a participatory approach involving communities in locally led
learning and practical activities, based on the farming experience, local
knowledge and technologies already in use and starting in small simple ways
then diversifying over time. The aim is to enhance knowledge of climate
change and improve resilience and opportunities for coping with its impacts.
Initial activities centred on understanding local knowledge on climate and
priorities for the future. Water management was found to be key –
communities were already suffering from both droughts and floods at
different times of year – and was central to learning how to cope with
climate change. Practical activities were designed (including visits to
particularly innovative farmers, site testing of alternative types of irrigation,
composting and water harvesting, for example) towards building knowledge
and evaluating options. Over time, support and facilitation was increasingly
to collective rather than individual activities; where participants worked
together to design and install soil and water conservation efforts on different
farms, to reforest a vulnerable hillside, plant windbreaks or to establish their
own savings and loan funds to help finance local purchase of fencing
materials, micro-irrigation and water harvesting technologies, for example. In
northern Ecuador, four communities living on the Ilalo Volcano which had
initially been involved in very local priorities of soil conservation and water
harvesting for home consumption and garden cultivation subsequently came
together through group work parties and cross-visits to develop a more
ambitious, watershed level agenda identifying water sources, vulnerable
areas and conflict zones. A management plan was developed, that was turned
into a project proposal that was later funded by the municipality.
Despite the evident success of the project in helping farmers to start

addressing climate change, the project acknowledges some obstacles:
Development practitioners need to be strong facilitators with

flexible programmes and funding to support open-ended learning-
action, which goes against the grain of standard (pre-planned
projects and technology transfer). Donor and development agencies
must hand over more trust and responsibility to communities to
design and implement their own agendas. Local people and
outsiders need to be free to learn from each other and to learn as
they go along.
(IIED, 2009: 60)
Source: compiled from IIED (2009).
method-oriented mania’ has emerged that could lead to the same

standardised approaches and solutions that they aimed to challenge.
There are similar concerns that participation and empowerment have
become such widely pronounced policy goals (and are often a
condition for funding of research and development projects) that
many are now engaging with participatory methods ‘despite a
superficial understanding of the underlying empowerment principles
that were at the root of much pioneering work’ (ibid.: 5). Clearly,
ongoing critical reflection on complex questions of power in
participatory research and development are required (Cooke and
Kothari, 2001).
Secure rights and gains

Ensuring that individual land users and communities have secure
rights to resources and the benefits from investments is a further
characteristic of more sustainable rural development processes,
identified in Figure 4.15. In short, farmers who sense their rights are
insecure are deterred from taking a long-term view and from
investing their labour and other assets further. When people are sure,
for example, that they have the rights to the products from trees that
they plant, invest in and manage, they plant many more than they do
when there are restrictions on the use or harvesting of such resources
(Chambers, 2008). Because of the centrality of agricultural
production in rural livelihoods, issues of land ownership and tenure
are central to the question of security of rights to resources and
benefits. As well as being the foundation for economic opportunity,
land is also regularly a major correlate of social prestige and political
power in rural societies of the developing world. Yet substantial
inequality in the distribution of landholdings is a widespread,
entrenched and often worsening feature of many developing
countries despite decades of land reform programmes (see Potter et
al., 2008; Jacobs, 2010). Furthermore, many people (particularly in
Asia) are engaged in agricultural production under systems of tenure
including share-cropping arrangements, which deliver the major
benefits to the landlord rather than the tenant. The limited autonomy
of farmers under many forms of contract farming is also a concern,
when not only does the contractor control many of the on-farm
operations, but farmers can ultimately be evicted from lands if leases
are contravened (Watts, 1994).
Through the late twentieth century, pressure for land reform in
countries including South Africa, India, Bolivia and Brazil has
increasingly come from grassroots movements. As considered in

previous chapters, what may start as locally based protest around
specific issues are increasingly finding commonality and support as
part of transnational environmental justice movements and are
influencing many areas of national policy and the decisions of
international organisations. The shared concerns of these movements
include exposing the social and environmental outcomes that occur
when people lose their rights to land and to jobs and are mobilising
to find more just and thereby sustainable processes. Brazil has one of
the most unequal distributions of landholding in the world. In a
country with a population of approximately 190 million people, just
35,000 families control half of all farmland and 3 per cent of the
population owns two-thirds of all arable land (Zobel, 2009). Box 4.8
considers the work of one of the largest social movements in Latin
America, the Movimento do Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST), and its
role in pressuring for new land reform legislation in Brazil. It also
confirms how the movement has supported wider access to land
through occupations and the formation of co-operatives and through
providing such things as education and legal advice.
Box 4.8
Pressures for land reform in Brazil

The Brazilian landless workers movement, the Movimento do Trabalhadores Sem Terra
(MST) was formed in 1984. This was one year before the end of the country’s military
dictatorship and the return of civilian rule. It began as a coalition of individual squatter
groups primarily located in southern Brazil. Its guiding slogan remains ‘land for those
who work it’ and the movement centres on challenging existing land tenure regimes that
allow land to be taken from the poor, for and by the wealthy. This includes taking direct
action to support squatter groups and substantial lobbying of political parties to introduce
legislation and meet the commitments of the constitution. MST activities have widened
to include the concerns of both rural and urban poor. It is considered to be one of the
largest and most well-organised grassroots social movements globally.
MST has over 2 million members, has occupied thousands of hectares of idle farmland
and won land titles on behalf of more than 350,000 families. Families come together in
brigades and coordinators are elected from each state to form a governing body. When
land and title have been secured, members have also established cooperative farms,
organised systems for health care and education, built schools, clinics and even a
university (the Florestan Fernandes National University in the state of Sao Paulo). A
dairy cooperative formed by 550 MST families in the southern state of Santa Catarina is
now the biggest milk producer in the region. However, the movement has suffered
substantial opposition within the Brazilian media, from wealthy landowners and their
supporters in Government and business. As many as 1,500 people have been killed in
land conflicts. Two separate massacres of landless squatters in 1996 brought international
and national attention to the plight of the rural poor in Brazil.
In 1998, President Cardoso announced a new programme of agrarian reform aimed at
reducing the social tensions around land and enhancing access to land by the poor. This
is widely recognised to have been as a result of rising populist pressure, in particular
from the MST. It was a ‘market-led’ policy (with World Bank finance) that was designed
to reduce state involvement in the implementation of land reform and to stimulate the
market in land. In other words, the thinking was that separating land reform from state
involvement and allowing price to determine how land is allocated would serve to
improve the transparency of the process and in turn decrease support for the MST. Loans
were made available to people who had previously worked in agriculture and had
incomes of below US$15,000 to help them purchase land. People had to form
associations with other interested buyers to purchase land from existing farmers.
However, from the outset the programme generated significant dissent from MST.
Targets for land transfers were low and were not achieved. Land prices also rose steeply
through the period of the programme as activities of agri-business expanded. Not only
did this give problems of land supply for the programme, but the costs of re-payments on
loans also rose, creating problems of indebtedness. An estimated one-third of families’
loans were in default in 2007. Progress on land reform faded further through the decade
of President Luiz da Silva. This was despite optimism for his term given his working-
class background and previous founding involvement in the Workers’ Party. In 2005, the
MST organised the biggest march in Brazilian history to push for implementation of the
promises of the constitution that land left unproductive for two years is subject to
agrarian reform.
Source: compiled from Zobel (2009); Wolford (2008); Sauer (2009).
For Middleton et al. (1993: 124), land reform is one of two

‘inseparable starting points in any fight for sustainable agriculture’,
the other being the rights of women. As identified above, there are
problems of data due to women’s work in agriculture often being
unpaid, undervalued and often not recorded; however it is estimated
that 80 per cent of food in sub-Saharan Africa is produced by women
(ibid.) and there may be twice as many women as men currently
working in agriculture-related activity in developing countries
(Momsen, 2010). Yet women own less than 2 per cent of the world’s
total agricultural area and women have often been excluded from
programmes of land reform (Jacobs, 2010). Clearly, these patterns
illustrate that questions of security of rights and gains for sustainable
rural development include not only ‘ownership’ of resources
(as encompassed in formal land laws, for example), but rights to

control the products of labour that are defined by gender relations. In
many parts of the developing world, women receive rights to land
through their husbands on marriage, but may have few rights to
decide what is cultivated or marketed or how any profits made are
spent. Furthermore, there is often a gender bias in terms of access to
training (such as technical assistance from extension workers) and
access to inputs (including water and credit), that ensures that many
agricultural development interventions have very different impacts on
women and men (Momsen, 2010).
The role of women in conservation

It has been long and widely argued that women are key to
sustainable development: ‘the achievement of sustainable
development is inextricably bound up with the establishment of
women’s equality’ (WRI, 1994: 43). Early research and development
work had focused on women’s role in the domestic sphere and on
bringing women into development through programmes addressing
‘women’s areas’ such as family planning and nutrition (understood as
the ‘Women in Development’ school of thought, WID). Through
this, however, a better understanding of women’s additional roles in
agricultural production and wider productive activities, such as
fuelwood and water collection and management, developed. By the
1980s, understanding rose of women’s ‘substantial interest’ in
environmental resources and of the many ways in which women
were taking action on environmental management challenges.
Ecofeminists took the notion of women’s interest in environment
further to suggest that women have a natural affinity with nature
aligned to their child-bearing qualities that men do not have. Authors
such as Vandana Shiva (1989), for example, have contrasted what
they consider women’s essential features of caring and empathy with
the controlling, manipulative position of men, to argue that women
may be the key to new and more sustainable ways of living and
social relations, if these ‘feminine principles’ could be sufficiently
recovered.
Through the 1990s, many ‘Women Environment and Development’
projects sought to work with women in this role as ‘privileged
environmental managers’ (Braidotti et al., 1994) and to ‘harness’
their knowledge of local environments and their existing initiatives
within diverse conservation projects. Whilst there are many
Plate 4.4 Women in environmental management
a) Fuelwood collection, Zimbabwe

Source: author.
b) Organising the community:

a Lampungese wedding
Source: Becky Elmhirst, University
of Brighton.
c) Water management, Malawi

Source: Huw Taylor, University of
Brighton.
successful examples across soil and water conservation, in forestry

and irrigation projects, there have also been problems (see Momsen,
2010 in this series). For example, the suggested synergy between
women and the environment whereby they are the main ‘users’ and
‘managers’ of natural resources is now seen by many as reflecting
accepted gender roles and a lack of alternative opportunities for
women rather than any chosen or inherent empathy with conservation
and natural resources. In other words it is through the gendered
division of labour (whereby women take primary responsibility for
collecting and managing the energy and water needs of the
household) that women’s immediate ‘practical gender’ needs
(Pearson, 2001) regularly centre on accessing environmental
resources. This in turn explains how environmental degradation will
often impact most heavily on women, as seen in Figure 2.18.
Accepted gender roles also structure how women tend to take greater
responsibility for maintaining communal services such as schools,
health posts (and community woodlots and wells) and generally often
provide the ‘glue’ between the elements and activities of the
community (such as organising weddings). The outcome of many
WED project interventions was that conservation became the ‘fourth

burden’ on women to add to their gendered responsibilities in
production, in the reproduction of the household and in community
management, particularly through the way that they assumed that
women had the spare time to undertake these projects.
Work within the ‘gender and development’ (GAD) school of
thought now considers that it is not sufficient to work only
with women or to assume that women’s relationships with the
environment are undifferentiated. Gender divisions of labour are not
uniform or static, nor are gender relations. Furthermore, women are
not an undifferentiated or homogeneous group. Relations between
men and women may vary in such things as class or other social
divisions, and are continually ‘struggled over’ (see Momsen, 2010).
Box 4.9 illustrates the importance of working for women’s needs in
resource management and the kinds of resistance met, but also the
importance of changing relations between women and men and
between local villagers (men and women) and wider political
structures for the sustained development of key resources in
the livelihoods of the poor.
Box 4.9
Building women’s rights in sustainable water

management
The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) was formed in 1972 as a small
membership organisation for poor women working in the informal sector. It is now a
trade union with over 1.2 million members across India. It is both an organisation and a
movement in that it aims to empower poor, illiterate and vulnerable women through
ensuring full employment and working towards income, food and social security. An
estimated 200,000 of its members are poor, self-employed women working in the
informal sector in the rural districts of Gujarat state.
In Gujarat rainfall is low and erratic and the majority of villages have no reliable source
of fresh water – many relying on mobile water tankers that may or may not arrive.
Women typically spend up to six hours a day collecting water. Agricultural productivity
and pastoral production are compromised by drought and increasing salinity and there is
substantial ‘distress migration’ of people during the summer months.
As a trade union, SEWA’s work is mandated by the members themselves. It has a
national executive formed of representatives of ‘local associations’ from the
districts. At the village level women are organised into unions and cooperatives, often
according to the different occupations that they are involved in.
In 1986, the State Water Board in Gujarat was aware of the failings of centralised
management of local water resources in the districts. It approached SEWA, knowing
their expertise in grassroots development, to look into involving local communities in
building, operating and managing a water supply system. On the basis of its previous
experiences, SEWA understood that it would be easier to recruit members into water
development activities if these could be linked to economic improvement. SEWA
mobilised women around eight economic activities ranging from embroidery to anti-
desertification measures. By 2000, nearly 200 groups have been formed under the
‘Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas Programme’ – a joint initiative
of the Indian government and UNICEF.
Historically, water infrastructure such as bore holes and dams was regarded as male
territory. Many women were therefore often reluctant to come forward into this area and
men were widely critical of women entering this public domain. Despite this, many of
the water user committees established in Gujarat (pani samities) were all women or at
least equal in number to male members.
SEWA has initiated many different types of activity amongst the water committees in
various districts. These include visits to other functioning cooperatives to see how
democratic frameworks operate and meetings with water engineers to understand water
supply systems. Much of their work has involved assisting women to understand and
negotiate their way through the maze that is India’s system of governance of water
resources. There are seven bodies solely at the national level, for example, that have
some authority and responsibility over water. This gets more complex as it moves to
district and sub-district and then to local panchayat levels.
In order to take steps to restore traditional sources of water, women had to learn about
the roles of different agencies, decide which to approach and how. SEWA assisted in
bringing engineers from the Minor Irrigation Departments together with the villages to
plan, design, source and pay for materials.
The continual training, support for women to deal with the technical, institutional (and
social and cultural demands) of water related activities has been fundamental to SEWA’s
success in securing the sustained participation of villagers. It has also been of paramount
importance for institutionalising grassroots governance in the water sector whereby new
institutions dominated by women have been created with strong links to existing
governing institutions at wider levels. A shift in attitudes towards women has also been
identified: they have earned respect within their families and their communities for their
knowledge and abilities and mainstream institutions are now willing to accept illiterate
women on their training programmes, for example. There have also been cases of
districts abandoning contracts with private sector companies in favour of local
organisations.
Source: compiled from WRI (2003); www.sewa.org
Assuring and securing rights to resources for women and confronting

fundamental gender inequalities are continued challenges for
sustainable development. Women may not necessarily be the source
of solutions to environmental problems: groups of women as well
as men may act in environmentally damaging ways and women’s
apparent ‘closeness’ to nature may stem more from their lack of
opportunities outside the household and the social relations in
society than their biological makeup. Sustainable development,
therefore, depends on removing women’s subordination and
oppression as well as their poverty, not simply ‘grafting on women
as a group’ or ‘lumping’ women’s varied interests together
(Middleton et al., 1993).
The capacity of local institutions

When people have secure rights to resources and gains from
investments, it has been found that they also have a perceived self-
interest in project development and implementation, and this is a
further characteristic of more successful sustainable rural
developments, as identified in Figure 4.15. Experience suggests that
when people participate for the reason that they have seen success
achieved and have become enthusiastic about achieving it for
themselves, projects tend to be more relevant, to spread more quickly
and to encourage further innovation and development. This was seen
in Box 4.7 where visits to particularly innovative farmers in
surrounding areas were important in inspiring other individuals to
undertake soil conservation and water harvesting measures.
Furthermore, as Pretty and Ward (2001: 209) suggest, ‘for as long as
people have managed natural resources, they have engaged in forms
of collective action’. Such collaboration is evidenced in a huge
variety of local associations that exist in rural areas across
developing regions, such as work teams, burial societies and savings
groups as well as in the long-standing ‘traditional’ social norms,
rules and values that shape resource management and guide the
association between individuals. Together these comprise important
‘institutions of governance’ that are the focus of much interest
towards fostering more sustainable patterns and processes of
development. In short, the importance of strong local institutions in
sustainable futures is now understood in terms of their potential to
foster more sustainable development innovations but also in that it
can be the breakdown of such institutions that is part of the
explanation for environmental degradation.
It was seen in Chapter 3 that non-governmental organisations in

general and as one component of civil society have become more
prominent in development thinking and action, especially as desires
for democracy and justice have mounted within certain countries.
NGOs are considered to have a number of characteristics that make
them particularly suited for working towards sustainable
development, including their tradition of working at the local scale,
with people in specific environmental contexts, and for how they
tend to be less bureaucratic than other (particularly governmental)
organisations. It is also considered that NGOs tend to attract staff
who themselves have the kind of qualities and values suited to
working for and in more sustainable ways. As Chambers (1988: 13)
suggested, staff of NGOs have historically been recruited for their
‘sensitivity, insight and competence’ and where the ‘reversals of
normal values are often most at home’. However, it has also been
seen that NGOs are now working in new ways and in new
partnerships (including with organisations that they may have
historically challenged) such that their capacity to continue to work
according to these values and in these ways may be compromised.
Box 4.10 illustrates three projects in India that are all seeking to
improve farmers’ access to information for more secure rural
livelihoods, based on new networks and partnerships between
community-based organisations, national NGOs, state authorities and
national and global private sector organisations.
The rise of civil society is also based on the importance now being
given to ‘social capital’ in explaining and fostering development.
Whilst a difficult concept to define (see Figure 4.19), many
international organisations and donors ‘found community’ particularly
in relation to natural resource management in the late 1990s (Agrawal
and Gibson, 1999). In essence the thinking is that the assets on which
people draw for their livelihood include ‘social’ resources such as
through memberships of groups, access to networks and through
‘informal’ relationships of trust and exchange, for example. Social
capital enables mutually beneficial collective actions (such as those
required to manage ‘common property’ resources such as grazing or
water courses). Social capital can also be enhanced by networks that
improve people’s ability to work together or to access wider existing
institutions and resources, hence its potential for new approaches to
conservation and development. In 2001, Pretty and Ward estimated
that over 400,000 new community-based groups and networks
worldwide may have been formed since the 1990s towards building
social capital in natural resource sectors and largely in the developing
Box 4.10
Public–private collaborations for enhancing

information and communication for rural development
in India
The organisations and programmes:

1. The Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative (IFFCO) is a national organisation of rural
co-operatives working in partnership with a private-sector Indian mobile phone
company to deliver a farmers’ information service known as IFFCO Kisan Sanchar
Limited (IKSL). The service requires farmers to purchase a SIM card through which
they receive free voice-mails containing agricultural information (including on
weather, market prices, fertiliser availability, electricity timings and government
schemes) and have access to a helpline (costing 1 Rupee per minute).
2. Reuters is an established multinational private company providing information
services globally. ‘Reuters Market Light’ (RML) is an India-based business providing
mobile-enabled information to farmers. Farmers purchase a subscription (on a 3-, 6-
or 12-month basis) to receive daily agricultural information (as in (1) above) through
text messages.
3. MS Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF) is an NGO that is piloting mobile-
information services for fishermen in partnership with Tata Teleservices (an Indian
mobile phone operator) and Qualcomm (a global technology company). The
programme ‘Fisher friend’ provides free mobile handsets to fishermen (which they
must share on a rotating basis with others in the community) and access to the project
information service that includes weather, market prices, the optimal fishing zone and
details of government schemes.
Impacts of the mobile communication and information:

1. Saving crop loss and improving yields: Mr Jagdish, Khanvaas village, Rajasthan.
Service: IKSL
Saving crop loss: this farmer acted on timely weather information received through IKSL
to protect a harvested crop (Gwar – used as livestock fodder) that was lying on ground
exposed to the elements. He estimates that he would have lost 50 per cent of this crop if
not for this advanced information, worth Rs 5–6,000.
Increased revenue: the farmer made use of information provided by IKSL concerning
planting techniques and diseases to make changes in farming practice. In his description,
he shifted from ‘guess-based’ actions to following modern scientific cultivation
practices, resulting in his estimation of a 25 per cent increase in annual earnings of
Rs 25,000.
2. Optimising supply to increase revenue: Arphal village, Maharashtra.

Service: RML
The farmers in this village had been involved in horticultural cultivation for two years.
Flowers are a highly perishable commodity and farmers monitor production and
harvesting closely to minimise waste. The farmers received information from RML about
a predicted increase in market demand for their crop. They applied a particular fast
growth tonic to increase production and capitalised on the information through higher
sales. The farmers reported that the amount of daily supply taken to market typically was
less than 1,000 sticks a day. They have now adjusted the quantity they bring to market as
a result of RML market demand information offering the potential for further increased
revenues on high demand days.
3. Getting a higher catch: Mr K. Prabhakaran, Veeramptattinam village.
Service: Fisher friend
This fisherman had stayed on land to manage family commitments and was advised by
colleagues at sea that they were having a poor fishing day. He told them about the
optimal fishing zone information he accessed on his mobile phone and they quickly
changed their location and benefited from a higher catch. One of the beneficiaries hauled
Rs 30,000 on that day, between six and ten times the typical daily revenue reported by
other fishermen with launch boats.
Source: compiled from Vodafone (2009).
Figure 4.19 The essence of social capital world. Examples of programmes

The social assets comprising social capital
established in specific countries are
include the norms, values and attitudes that shown in Figure 4.20. These groups
predispose people to cooperate; relations of may be formed as new associations
trust, reciprocity and obligations; and common between different actors (such as
rules and sanctions mutually agreed or handed
down. These are connected and structured in between the state and community
networks and groups. groups in joint forestry
Source: Pretty (2008).
management), to build on existing
community groups (for example,
women’s associations becoming more formalised in the context of
micro-finance projects) or through identifying and strengthening
existing informal institutions (such as enhancing traditional
community organisations operating to manage common property
resources like grazing lands). Clearly, the existence of new
institutions does not ensure sustainable resource management
although there has been much success in terms of farmers organised
within groups performing better than those who are outside particular
resource-based project initiatives (Pretty and Ward, 2001).
Figure 4.20 Social capital formation in natural resource management, selected

countries
Watershed and catchment groups

G India: programmes of state governments and NGOs in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil
Nadu, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh
G Brazil: 275,000 farmers in three southern states adopted zero-tillage and conservation
farming as part of watershed groups
G Kenya: Ministry of Agriculture catchment approach to soil and water conservation
G Honduras/Guatemala: NGO programmes for soil and water conservation and sustainable
agriculture
G Burkina Faso/Niger: water harvesting programmes
Irrigation water users’ groups

G Sri Lanka: Gal Oya and Mahaweli authority programmes
G Nepal: water users’ groups as part of government programmes
G India: participatory irrigation management in Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Orissa
G Philippines: National Irrigation Administration turned over 12 million hectares to local
management groups
G Pakistan: water users’ associations in Punjab and Sindh Microfinance institutions
G Bangladesh: Grameen Bank nationwide
G Pakistan: Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in Northern Areas
G Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, China, Philippines, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Papua New
Guinea, Indonesia and Malaysia have a wide variety of bank and NGO programmes
Joint and participatory forest management

G India: joint forest management and forest protection committees in all states
G Nepal: forest users’ groups
Integrated pest management

G Indonesia: 1 million graduates trained in rice and vegetable IPM programme
G Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, Philippines, India: a further 8,000 trained
Farmers’ groups for research and experimentation

G Kenya: organic farming groups
G Columbia: farmer research committees
Source: compiled from Pretty and Ward (2001).
There has been close interest in the potential of so-called

‘Community Based Natural Resource Management’ (CBNRM)
initiatives for more sustainable rural development. CBNRM
encompasses a breadth of policies and programmes in practice, but
typically involves one of three kinds of experience: some kind of
joint or collaborative management involving local communities in the
management of (typically) previously defined ‘state’ resources; those
that look to decentralise authority to (usually newly created)

local/community institutions; and those that work to strengthen the
traditional, local institutions and controls that are already in place
(Elliott, 2002). CBNRM initiatives are being undertaken for various
reasons and can encompass quite divergent ideas about conservation:
At one extreme fall existing conservation projects (e.g. conventional

protected areas) that belatedly make minor efforts to draw in local
people . . . at the other extreme lie initiatives aimed specifically at the
development of particular (often ‘sustainable’) uses of natural
resources by local people who are given full tenure over those
resources . . . The first is based on the idea that conservation has to do
with concern for ‘wild’ species and their associations (ecosystems and
habitats) . . . the second is based on the idea of conservation as the
sustainable management of renewable resources.
(Adams and Hulme, 2001: 14)
Whilst high levels of donor support continue to go to CBNRM

initiatives, there remain challenges, for example financial
sustainability once donor funds end. Many traditional institutions in
resource management also continue to be eroded through such things
as processes of resource scarcity, social changes associated with
migration and a decline in the authority of traditional leadership.
Perhaps most fundamentally, many CBNRM initiatives (as in wider
forms of participatory development considered above) have assumed
distinct ‘communities’ exist, whereas they are in fact highly diverse
and dynamic, contain many different interests and environmental
priorities within them and have very varied abilities or power to
negotiate and make change.
Conclusion
For some time, the debates about both the environment and
development have been dominated by the interests and values of the
rich rather than the poor, men rather than women, and the urban
rather than the rural. The challenges of reversing these priorities have
been seen within this chapter to be wide and substantial, yet integral
to the prospects of sustainable rural development. Whilst individual
farmers ultimately make many of the land-use and resource-
management decisions in rural areas, ensuring that these are
sustainable depends evidently on many broader factors. Enhanced
integration into the global agri-food system has brought new risks for
farmers as they engage in new kinds of relationship with

substantially different kinds of organisation and wider economic
markets, for example. The capacity of national governments to shape
national agricultural policy and to support local farmers is also more
constrained. The chapter has shown the benefits for environment and
development that have been achieved through research and
development initiatives that start with the local context, the priorities
and knowledge of small-scale rural farmers, strengthen their rights
over resources and networks of association, for example, and that
evolve with learning and through participatory processes. But there
are substantial remaining challenges including that ‘community
participation’ is itself ‘conflictual’ (Mohan, 2002: 51) in that it
challenges existing structures of power ranging from the legal
authority of state institutions to accepted norms of behaviour such as
gender roles and relations within the household. There is also the
danger that focusing on grassroots civil society can divert attention
away from the many processes affecting individual lives that cannot
be tackled at the local level. However, the long-term benefits of
providing secure rural livelihoods for the rural poor will also fall to
wider communities including in urban centres.
Summary
Despite rising urbanisation, rural areas worldwide are expected to

provide a range of functions central to sustainable development.
Rural development has been substantially ‘left out’ of development
thinking and practice in the past. Recognition of the complex global
challenges of sustainable development in the twenty-first century has
led to a resurgence of interest in agriculture in particular.
Agriculture has become increasingly globalised. A key sustainability
concern is the degree of control that major agri-business companies
now have through many stages of the global agri-food system.
The components of rural livelihoods are diverse and change over
time. Non-farm economic activities in rural areas are growing but
agriculture remains important for the majority of rural households.
A ‘Gene Revolution’ for world agriculture is offered as a route to
further increases in global food production, but there are many
sustainability concerns and much opposition to the further use of
GMOs.
Putting Farmers First has become a powerful narrative in rural

development and has done much to guide more sustainable rural
development interventions in practice. The chapter details what this
means for research, for planning processes and for projects on the
ground and the continued challenges revealed through these
experiences.
Women often have a close relationship with environmental resources,
but their ‘interest’ in environmental conservation can be theorised in
different ways. Successful sustainable development initiatives centre
on building women’s rights in resource issues but also on changing
gender relations within the household and with wider authorities.
There are many initiatives in natural resource sectors that look to
strengthen the networks and associations of people within
communities and with wider institutions including NGOs, the state
and the private sector. Lessons are emerging regarding the challenges
of community participation in practice and the contexts in which
local institutions can thrive or break down.
G Identify the principal differences between the ‘Green’ and ‘Gene’

Revolutions in world agriculture.
G Do women hold the key to sustainable rural development?
G How and why is agriculture only one aspect of rural livelihoods?
G What challenges for sustainable development are presented by
the dominance of multinational companies within the global agri-
food system?
Further reading
Conroy, C. and Litvinoff, C. (1988) The Greening of Aid: Sustainable Livelihoods in

Practice, Earthscan, London. A key publication that drew together the early
principles emerging of more sustainable development interventions in practice.
Lynch, K. (2005) Rural–Urban Interactions in the Developing World, Routledge,
Abingdon. A clear introduction to how development processes and patterns in
rural and urban contexts are inter-linked.
Rigg, J. (2007) An Everyday Geography of the Global South, Routledge, Abingdon.
An excellent book that prioritises the everyday experiences and strategies of
individuals and households and draws on a very wide number of case studies
within countries of the developing world.
Scoones, I. and Thompson, J. (eds) (2009) Farmer First Revisited: Innovation for
Agricultural Research and Development, Practical Action Publishing, Rugby.
A critical reflection on the achievements and limitations of the original ‘Farmer
First’ approaches to rural development.
Unwin, T. (ed.) (2009) ICT4D: Information and Communication Technology for
Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. A good source for
understanding the ways in which new information and communication
technologies are bringing challenges and opportunities in development.
Websites
http://www.steps-centre.org A research organisation (Social Technological, and
Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) located at the Institute of
Development Studies at the University of Sussex that has a long-standing
reputation for leading new ideas in rural development thinking and practice.
www.mstbrazil.org English language website of a network of individuals and
organisations working to support the Brazilian Landless Workers movement
(MST).
www.iied.org Website of the International Institute for Environment and
Development, which has done a lot of work in the past on participatory learning
and action and produces a host of news, briefings and research reports related to
natural resources and sustainable development.
www.sewa.org For details of the activities of the Self Employed Women’s
Association – a trade union that works to support poorer self-employed women
throughout India.
5 Sustainable urban
livelihoods
Learning outcomes
G Realise that levels of urbanisation are rising but there are key
differences between regions and within countries
G Be aware of the strong links between urbanisation and socio-economic
development, but also that rising economic prosperity is a key factor
shaping the environmental burden of cities
G Understand the factors underpinning the rising informality of urbanisation
in the developing world
G Identify the key features of the urban environmental challenge at a
number of spatial scales
G Understand how and why taking decisions as close as possible to urban
citizens is understood as key to more sustainable urban developments
Key concepts
Urbanisation; green and brown urban environmental agendas; urban

informality; slums; decentralisation; good governance
Introduction
In 1800 only 3 per cent of the total world population lived in towns
and cities. In 2010, this figure was 50.6 per cent (UNHSP, 2010).
Figure 5.1 confirms the trend worldwide for the increased
concentration of people in cities rather than rural areas. Whilst such
urbanisation occurred in Europe, North America and Latin America
through the mid twentieth century, the trend is now increasingly
being seen in developing regions and particularly within Asia and
Africa. Whilst Latin America is the most urbanised region in the
developing world, Asia has the largest number of people living in
cities (over 1.5 billion people) and it is in Africa that some of the
250 • Sustainable urban livelihoods
Figure 5.1 Proportion of urban population by region, 1950–2030
100
Percentage of urban population
80
60
40
20
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Oceania

North America Europe World
Source: UNHSP (2006).
fastest annual rates of urban growth are found (exceeding 4.5 per cent
in some countries). Currently, there are more people living in cities of
the developing world than in cities in more developed regions and it
is predicted that 80 per cent of the world’s urban dwellers will live in
cities of the developing world by 2030 (UNHSP, 2010).
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development
suggested that the urban challenge lay ‘firmly in the developing
countries’ (WCED, 1987: 237), due in the main to the unprecedented
growth rates being observed and the challenge of meeting the
immediate needs of an expanding urban poor. In that year the World
Bank had estimated that approximately one-quarter of the developing
world’s absolute poor were living in urban areas (World Bank,
1990). By 2000, it was increasingly recognised that whilst
urbanisation (and globalisation) are powerful forces of economic
growth, innovation and creativity, they are also drivers of exclusion
and environmental degradation. At the time of the Millennium
Declaration for example, an estimated one-third of all city dwellers
were living in slums. Improving the lives of slum dwellers was
recognised as a major development challenge (rather than an
unfortunate consequence of urbanisation). Addressing global poverty
is at the core of the Millennium Development Goals, as seen in
previous chapters, and achieving the goals is understood to be
heavily dependent on how well cities perform:
Sustainable urban livelihoods • 251
The link between urbanisation and socio-economic development

cannot be disputed. Cities make countries rich. Countries that are
highly urbanised have higher incomes, more stable economies,
stronger institutions and are better able to withstand the volatility of
the global economy than those with less urbanised populations. The
experiences of developed and developing countries also indicate that
urbanisation levels are closely related to levels of income and
performance on human development indicators.
(UNHSP, 2006: 48)
There are substantial challenges for all cities in managing the

environmental implications of economic growth, in meeting the
needs of their residents and in protecting the environmental resources
on which they depend in the future in ways that are beneficial both
socially and economically for residents. City-based production
currently accounts for the majority of resource consumption and
waste generation worldwide, for example. As identified in Chapter 2,
cities consume more than two-thirds of global energy and produce
over 70 per cent of carbon emissions (World Bank, 2010a). Intra-city
inequality is also rising globally (UNHSP, 2010). The globalising
world economy also ensures that the nature and direction of urban
change in any city or country is also now more inter-linked and
integrated. Furthermore, with rising affluence, the environmental
burden of cities tends to fall increasingly at the global scale (and on
the future generations) confirmed, for example, in the higher per
capita emissions of carbon dioxide and levels of waste generation
from cities of the more developed world (McGranahan and
Satterthwaite, 2002).
The focus of this chapter, however, is the cities in the developing
world and the particular sustainability challenges therein that to a
large extent are not key concerns in wealthier cities. Box 5.1
describes and contrasts what have been termed the ‘Green’ and
‘Brown’ agendas for the most affluent and more impoverished cities
respectively. The level of affluence is not the only factor affecting
the environmental burden of cities, as will become clear through this
chapter. The differences identified in the box should also not detract
from the common, global challenges of sustainable urban
development. So too, the multiple deprivations of urban poverty
illustrated in this chapter should not deflect from the fundamental
pattern that affluence creates more pollution than poverty. In
addition, whilst the Brown Agenda is the priority for low-income
countries but a substantially ‘old’ issue for the more developed
Box 5.1
Green and Brown environmental agendas

The term ‘Green environmental agenda’, as shown in Figure 5.2, encompasses issues
such as the depletion of water and forest resources. These concerns are most relevant to
cities of the more developed world, to future generations and natural ecological systems.
In contrast, the Brown agenda encompasses issues of access to basic water supplies,
sanitation and housing; the ‘pollution’ of urban poverty that is most relevant to poor
urban residents of today and to human health.
Figure 5.2 The Green and Brown urban environmental agendas
Features of problems The Brown Agenda The Green Agenda

on the agenda
Principal impact Human health Ecosystem health

Timing Immediate Delayed
Scale Local Regional and global
Worst affected Current generation Future generations
Aspects emphasised in relation to
Water Inadequate access and Overuse; need to protect

poor quality water sources
Air High human exposure to Acid precipitation and
hazardous pollutants greenhouse gas emissions
Solid waste Inadequate provision for Excessive generation
collection and removal
Land Inadequate access for Loss of natural habitats and
low-income groups for agricultural land to urban
housing development
Human wastes Inadequate provision for Loss of nutrients in sewage
safely removing faecal and damage to water bodies
material (and water) from from its release of sewage
living environment into waterways
Source: adapted/compiled from McGranahan and Satterthwaite (2002).
Whilst affluent cities can be considered to have performed better in terms of meeting the
needs of their current populations, historically these have been met by displacing the
environmental burdens over space (elsewhere) and time (delayed). For example, sewers
have been put in to take human waste out of the city and goods whose production may
have been resource intensive or damaging have been imported. The burden of dealing
with the levels of waste generated or high levels of fossil fuel combustion will fall on the
next generations through their contribution to global warming, for example. In wealthier
cities, the key challenges for action lie in reducing excessive consumption of natural
resources and the burden of wastes on the global environment (WRI, 1996).
In contrast, the environmental burdens of low-income cities are generally falling now and
within the city. In addition, it is the most impoverished groups who suffer ill-health,
vulnerable and shortened lives. The spatial shift in environmental burdens with urban
economic development is modelled in Figure 5.3. As identified by McGranahan et al.
(2001: 10):
As we move into the twenty-first century . . . the importance of the ‘brown’
agenda is undiminished . . . economic change is outpacing urban environmental
management and the achievement of social justice. Moreover, there is a serious
danger that as new ‘green’ concerns are added to the environmental agenda, the
‘brown’ concerns will be neglected or misrepresented.
Figure 5.3 A stylised environmental transition
Local scale and immediate Urban–regional scale Global scale and delayed
(e.g. inadequate and unsafe (e.g. air and water (e.g. aggregate water and
water and sanitation) pollution) waste generation and
carbon emissions)
Severity of environmental
problems
Increasing urban affluence

Source: adapted from McGranahan et al. (2001).
countries, the local and immediate problems in the developing world

are bound up with ‘new economic, social and ecological processes
many of which are global in scale’ (McGranahan et al., 2001: 6) and
will require actions beyond that scale, as seen in subsequent sections.
Evidently cities are central to attempts at meeting the goals of
sustainable development in the sense that this is where the majority
of the world’s population is located, with all the associated physical
demands (such as for food and shelter) and the impacts involved in
meeting the political, social and cultural requirements of urban living
and the adoption of urban values. However, cities also provide

opportunities for more sustainable development. Figure 5.4
summarises the key environmental advantages that cities can provide
at a number of scales. The large numbers and concentration of
people and activities are evident opportunities for economies of scale
(lower unit costs) in providing services such as piped water, roads,
electricity, and can reduce the costs of providing emergency services,
for example. The risks from natural disasters can also be reduced
more cheaply and effectively in urban centres through measures such
as drainage to reduce the risk of flooding and improved buildings to
better withstand flooding when it does occur. Opportunities in urban
centres also include the potential to reduce fossil fuel consumption
through the increased provision and use of public transport rather
than private motor vehicles and the enhanced scope for recycling and
reuse presented where large numbers of people live in close
proximity. The concentration of people in cities can also facilitate
their involvement in local district- and city-level politics and
partnerships; and in the same way, it is easier for authorities to
collect charges and taxes for public services and to fund
environmental management. But close investigation is needed to
consider where these opportunities fall – to governments, private
enterprises or particular groups, for example – and who is excluded
or unable to access such benefits.
Figure 5.4 The environmental advantages of urbanisation
For urban and peri-urban environmental living conditions:

G Lower costs per capita of providing treated water, sewer systems, waste collection, clean
fuels and many other environmental services.
G More possibilities for local governments to fund or manage other forms of infrastructure
and services that reduce environmental health risks (e.g. enforce pollution control and
occupational health and safety).
For regional environmental burdens:

G High population densities, reducing per capita demand for occupied land.
G A concentration of major polluters, facilitating pollution control.
For global environmental burdens:

G Compact urban settlement patterns, reducing transport distances, increasing opportunities
for more energy-efficient public transport, and thereby reducing carbon emissions.
G Economies of scale and agglomeration, making electrical co-generation possible and
facilitating the use of waste process heat from industry or power plants for local
(neighbourhood) water and space heating, again reducing carbon emissions.
Source: McGranahan et al. (2004).

This chapter investigates the key features of these processes and

patterns of urban development in the developing world to illustrate
more fully the nature of the urban environmental agenda. As
discussed in the previous chapter, there are many processes of
change currently that make rigid distinctions of urban and rural
problematic. Just as large numbers of rural people now engage in
non-agricultural activities and indeed may commute seasonally or
daily to urban areas, large sections of the population of ‘urban’ areas
also work in agricultural enterprises or in industries that serve rural
demand. Cities also have significant environmental linkages with
rural areas – through the resources they draw on (such as in
agriculture and in energy supply) and the pollution they generate
(influencing air and water qualities in surrounding areas, for
example). As seen in Chapter 4, these sectoral and spatial linkages as
well as the substantial flows of goods, income, capital, information
and people between rural and urban areas are central to
understanding the challenges and opportunities of sustainable
development. In short, increased urbanisation and urban expansion
bring many changes in land use, household composition, and access
to infrastructure, services and employment and pressures on natural
resources both within urban and rural contexts and also in peri-urban
areas. However, in continuity with the arguments made in the
previous chapter, there are differences between these contexts that
continue to be important in understanding the demands and prospects
of sustainable development.
Key patterns and processes of urban change

in the developing world
Whilst the general trend, as seen in Figure 5.1, is for increasing

levels of urbanisation across the developing world, the figure also
confirms significant differences between regions and countries in the
patterns of change. For example, the populations of Africa and Asia
remain predominantly rural. But projections suggest that these
regions will reach the ‘tipping point’ whereby over 50 per cent of
their populations are living in towns and cities by 2030 and 2023
respectively. Whilst Africa as a continent currently has relatively
small numbers of people residing in urban centres, it experienced the
highest levels of urban growth in the world between 2005 and 2010
with average annual growth rates in excess of 3.3 per cent (UNHSP,
2010). However, it is in Asia that the largest numbers of people
currently reside in urban areas and where the greatest future

expansion in terms of additional urban residents is projected to occur.
There is also substantial diversity within regions and within
countries. Whilst high rates of urban growth continue to characterise
urban change in developing regions generally, ‘not all cities
contribute equally to this rapid growth, and neither is it
unprecedented or out of control’ (UNHSP, 2010: 15). Current levels
of urbanisation are twice as high in North Africa as they are in East
Africa, for example (52 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). Cities
such as Mumbai in India and Shanghai in China are currently (and
have been for several decades) amongst the largest cities in the
world. Whilst their total populations are large (20.1 million in the
case of Mumbai and 15.8 million in Shanghai in 2010), their annual
rates of growth are relatively modest (1.96 per cent and 1.7 per cent
respectively). As a contrast, several cities in China such as Shenzhen
and Shangqiu grew annually in the 1990s by over 17 per cent from
much smaller population bases (UNHSP, 2010). Whilst the
projections that most of the world’s demographic growth in the next
30 years will be concentrated in urban areas (rather than spread more
evenly in urban and rural areas as in the past) is unprecedented, on a
global scale, the pace of urbanisation is declining. Urbanisation
expanded at an average annual rate of over 3 per cent through the
1950s, but has slowed to an expected 1.9 per cent between 2010 and
2015 (UNHSP, 2010).
Some caution is needed when considering all such rates and
projections of urban change. Fundamentally, what constitutes an
‘urban’ area is defined differently in each country, which affects
comparability across regions and countries. In Uganda, for example,
a settlement of over 2,000 people is classified as urban, whilst in
Nigeria it is 20,000 (UNHSP, 2010). In China, those settlements with
more than 3,000 residents are considered ‘urban’ but only those
with more than 60,000 people are identified as ‘cities’. As seen
above, the rates of increase identified for Africa are generally
expansions over a small base and growth is occurring more widely
across many smaller and intermediate urban centres than is the case
in Latin America, for example. Some of the fastest increases in
Africa were after independence that heralded the removal of colonial
restrictions on the rights of local African people to live and work in
cities. Projections are also based on the historic association between
economic growth and urbanisation, yet many countries (particularly
in Africa) are not experiencing steady economic growth.
Furthermore, some cities are expanding through contemporary

influxes of refugees that may constitute temporary growth.
Certainly, the growth rates predicted for some of the largest cities in
the developing world in the 1970s did not materialise in subsequent
decades. For example, in 1980 it was predicted that Mexico City
would have 31 million people by 2000, yet in fact it only reached
18 million (Satterthwaite, 2008a). Clearly, the processes
underpinning urban change will be specific to particular places
and times. For example, the ‘early’ transition to urban living that
occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean generally (relative to
other developing regions) as seen in Figure 5.1 has been explained
in terms of the very unequal agrarian structure (leading to little
capacity to retain a rural population) and government policies
favouring import substitution that created significant urban based
industrial employment (UNHSP, 2010). However, in the case of
the mismatch between predicted and actual growth for Mexico
City, economic growth slowed through the 1980s and 1990s, so
fewer people moved to larger cities, but decentralisation policies
(considered in more detail and more widely below) also made more
resources available to smaller cities and therefore encouraged
the growth of smaller centres.
In short, new kinds of urban system are developing worldwide,
which include networks of very dynamic, although smaller cities as
well as urban configurations that have not been seen before
(Figure 5.5). Some of the key processes of urban change in the
developing world are also without historical precedent. For example,
in nineteenth-century Europe, people migrated to the towns and cities
in search of employment and economic advancement. The industrial
activities located in those areas depended on this process of
migration to raise output and generate wealth. Urbanisation,
industrialisation and ‘modernisation’ (the adoption of urban values)
were processes which occurred simultaneously in the cities of Europe
and were mutually reinforcing. This has often not been the case in
the developing world. Table 5.1 highlights the cases of a number of
Latin American countries in the 1960s (a period of relatively rapid
industrial development), where it is seen that employment growth
lagged substantially behind that in manufacturing output. Such
‘jobless growth’ continued to be a feature of urban change in the
developing world into the 1990s and is seen currently in the
decoupling of urbanisation from economic growth and poverty
reduction, most evidently on the African continent.
Figure 5.5 Novel urban configurations
Mega-regions: economic units that result from the growth, convergence and spatial spread of
geographically linked metropolitan areas. They are polycentric urban clusters surrounded by
low-density hinterlands and they grow considerably faster than the overall country population.
Recent research suggests that the world’s 40 largest mega-regions are home to fewer than
18 per cent of the world’s population but account for 66 per cent of global economic activity
and 85 per cent of technological and scientific innovation. Examples include:
In China, the Hong Kong–Shenzen–Guangzhou mega-region that encompasses a
population of approximately 120 million people
In Brazil, the mega-region that stretches from Sao Paulo to Rio de Janeiro that is
home to 43 million people
Urban corridors: where a number of city centres of various sizes are connected along
transport routes in a linear development often linking a number of mega-cities and their
hinterlands and often related to specific economic objectives. Examples include:
In India, the industrial corridor developing between Mumbai and Delhi stretching over
1,500 km
In Malaysia, the manufacturing and service industry corridor encompassing Kuala
Lumpur, the Klang Valley conurbation and through to the port city of Klang
In West Africa, the greater Ibadan–Lagos–Accra urban corridor spanning over 600 km
across four countries
Urban corridors are changing the way that cities and towns function, creating new forms of
interdependence amongst cities and leading regional economic growth. They can also lead to
unbalanced regional development as they strengthen ties to existing economic centres rather
than diffuse development.
City regions: City regions have grown enormously in recent decades as major cities extend
beyond their formal boundaries to engulf and absorb intermediate city centres, smaller towns,
semi-urban areas and their rural hinterlands. Some of these city regions are now bigger in
surface area and population than whole countries. Examples include:
The Bangkok region in Thailand that is expected to expand another 200 km from its
current centre by 2020 and to grow far beyond its current population of 17 million
In Brazil, Metropolitan Sao Paulo currently spreads over 8,000 square kilometres and
has a population of 16.4 million
South Africa’s Cape Town city-region draws daily commuters from over 100 km
Source: compiled from UNHSP (2010).
Whilst Africa as a whole has some of the highest urban growth rates
in the world, such urbanisation is suggested to have occurred despite
poor economic growth, inequitable distribution of resources and
rising urban poverty (UNHSP, 2010). These factors are exacerbated
by high levels of unskilled labour and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, for
example, all of which are both a cause of persistent poverty and
further impede efforts to reduce poverty and enhance the
sustainability of many cities in Africa. However, whilst many
commentators are quick to suggest the ‘exceptional’ case of Africa,
Table 5.1 Industrialisation and employment in selected Latin American countries,

1963–9
Country Manufacturing annual Manufacturing employment

output growth (%) growth (%)
Brazil 6.5 1.1

Colombia 5.9 2.8
Costa Rica 8.9 2.8
Dominican Republic 1.7 –3.3
Ecuador 11.4 6.0
Panama 12.9 7.4
many countries on the continent have had high levels of economic

growth in recent years (fuelled particularly by the mining,
commodities and construction sectors as well as in services). It
should also be understood that even in Asia’s most successful and
rapidly industrialising countries such as China and India, there are
persistent problems of mounting inequalities with national GDP rates
rising more quickly than poverty rates are falling, for example.
The rising ‘informality’ of urbanisation

Securing employment is critical to individual urban livelihoods and
for patterns of urban development that are more sustainable. In 1997,
Todaro suggested that one of the most ‘obvious failures’ of the
development process over the past few decades had been ‘the failure
of modern urban industries to generate a significant number of
employment opportunities’ (p. 247). Few of the urban poor can
afford to be unemployed for any length of time. Many, in fact, will
be under-employed; either they are working less than they would
like or are doing so at such low rates of production that their labour
could be withdrawn with very little impact on overall output.
Opportunities for formal sector employment also declined under
structural adjustment programmes as jobs in the public sector were
cut under government austerity measures and as industries were
denationalised, for example. Whilst developed and developing
countries alike are currently experiencing an employment crisis
as a result of the recent global economic downturn, the impact
in developing countries may be particularly severe, where
unemployment is endemic and in most countries, the working
age population is growing much faster than gainful employment
opportunities (UNHSP, 2010). All such factors have led to a growing
‘informalisation’ of the urban economy in many developing countries

and particularly in Asia and Africa.
In response to a lack of employment opportunities within the
‘formal’ sector, many urban residents in the developing world look to
a wide variety of both legitimate and illegitimate income
opportunities available within the ‘informal’ economy. This term is
commonly used to refer to small-scale, unregulated, semi-legal
economic activities which often rely on local, internal resources,
family labour and traditional technology. The host of activities
encompassed within this sector is illustrated in Figure 5.6. Whilst
Figure 5.6 Informal sector activities
Small-scale production
Primary Secondary Tertiary

Market gardening Food processing Printing and network
Urban farming Home-production of hot food Office equipment
Construction Garments Computing and software
Crafts
Jewellery and trinkets
Shoes and leather products
Household goods
Electrical and mechanical items
Specialised production (e.g.
festivals, alcohol)
Distributive trades
Processed food trading (nuts, snacks) Clothes, shoes and leather goods
Unprocessed produce (fruit and vegetables) Jewellery and cosmetics
Commercial food trading (Chiclet, Coca-Cola) Newspapers
Suitcase trading (imported items) Household items
Hot food and drinks Music and electrical items
Tertiary services Specialised services
Laundry Tourist guides

Domestic Car park attendants
Shoe cleaning and repair Car, home rentals
Hardware repair Residential lodgings
Motor vehicle servicing Secretarial, clerical
Taxi-driving and transport Legal and medical
Maintenance and gardening Beauty services/hairdressing
Odd jobs (e.g. car cleaning) Distribution/storage
Bottle and waste collecting Begging
Protection
Source: compiled from Potter and Lloyd-Evans (1998); Drakakis-Smith (2000).

Figure 5.7 Opportunities and challenges of informal sector employment
Advantages Limitations
More buoyant and elastic in generating jobs Low productivity of sector and its lack of
for an increasing urban labour force than bargaining power means incomes generally
the formal sector. lower than in formal sector.
Small scale of operations and low levels Nature of employment means that earnings
of capital required lowers costs of creating tend to be more intermittent and erratic,
employment. making access to formal credit mechanisms
by households difficult.
Produces jobs that require fewer skills Irregular and often illegal nature of many
and less training than the formal sector. activities makes operators in the informal
sector vulnerable to official and non-official
harassment and persecution.
Lack of regulation and control and ease Unregulated nature of informal sector makes it
of entry makes informal sector well suited difficult for people to obtain access to services
to absorption of migrants and other and supports necessary for increasing earnings
newcomers to the urban labour market. and moving out of poverty.
Provides a safety net in times of economic Informal nature makes it difficult to protect
crisis for those made redundant. those who are engaged in them, whether as
paid workers or as unpaid family members,
against child labour abuses or against hazards
in the workplace, for example.
Informal sector jobs don’t produce government
revenues to support welfare policies, social
safety net programmes.
Source: compiled from UNCHS (2001).
there are some problems with quality data, it is estimated that the
sector provides employment, goods and services for as much as
60 per cent of the urban population. Recent research suggests that
informal sector activities contribute between 80 and 90 per cent of
all new job opportunities in Latin America and over 90 per cent in
Africa (UNHSP, 2010). In New Delhi, approximately one-third
of investment in housing has been from informal sector revenues
generated by slum dwellers. Certainly, ‘the extent and impact of
poverty on urban populations, as well as on urban and national
economies would be much greater were it not for the informal
sector’ (UNCHS, 2001: 212). The linkages between the informal
and formal sectors of the economy and the contribution of the
informal sector to national GDP are now better recognised (UNHSP,
2006). However, there are a number of challenges of employment
within the informal sector, as shown in Figure 5.7.
Poverty is a common reality for many urban residents of the
developing world. This is despite the generally positive relationship
Plate 5.1 Urban informal income opportunites
a) Door-to-door welding, Harare, Zimbabwe

Source: author.
b) Garment production, Kairouan, Tunisia

Source: author.
c) Food trading/transport, Kolkata, India

Source: author.
between urbanisation and socio-economic development noted above,

that is, that worldwide, countries with higher levels of urbanisation
have higher levels of human development and the proportion of
people in poverty is lower in urban centres than in rural areas. The
absolute numbers of people living at or below poverty levels are
currently higher in urban areas than in rural. By 2035, it is predicted
that cities will become the predominant sites of poverty in terms of
proportion as well as numbers. Furthermore, income inequalities are
often more entrenched and apparent in cities than in the countryside
and the cost of living in urban centres is also higher. Generally,
urban dwellers have to purchase many items which can be accessed
freely or more cheaply in rural areas, such as water, fuel and building
materials. Estimates suggest that poorer urban households may spend
between 5 and 10 per cent of their income on water (WRI, 1996) for
example and may pay 30 per cent higher costs for food than their
rural counterparts (UNCHS, 2001). The doubling of global food
prices for many basic foods between 2007 and 2009 is understood to
have impacted particularly strongly on the urban poor who spend
upwards of 70 per cent of this income on food (UNHSP, 2010).
Many goods and services are more commercialised in urban centres
and urban residents are more reliant on cash income to secure these,
which also brings a certain vulnerability to price rises and any drop
in income. An understanding of urban poverty has become even
more important in recent years as many basic services and housing,
for example, are often no longer provided by the public sector but
have to be accessed in the marketplace where people’s ability to pay
is critical. In recent years, there has been mounting evidence that the
privatisation of public utilities including water and electricity
(considered further below) has led to increased costs for consumers
to levels where poor families cannot afford sufficient quantities to
secure their most basic needs.
In continuity with the discussions of poverty in Chapters 2 and 4, the
extent of urban poverty is unlikely to be captured by indicators based
on income alone. Thinking only in terms of income can hide other
aspects of deprivation such as poor-quality housing or people’s
capacity to challenge detrimental changes in their local environments.
Figure 5.8 displays the multiple aspects of urban poverty and some
of the wider factors underpinning these dimensions. Through this
chapter, some detail of how these aspects of poverty impact on the
prospects for sustainable development will be highlighted: the
inadequacy of basic services and their links to good health and
education, for example, and the significance of representative,
democratic and accountable local authorities for ensuring people’s
rights to organise and for their protection against eviction will be
seen. As Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004: 12) state:
of the multiple deprivations that most of the urban poor face, many of
these deprivations have little or no direct link to income levels, while
many relate much more to political systems and bureaucratic structures
that are unwilling or unable to act effectively to address these
deprivations.
Because of their poverty, many residents of cities in the developing

world live in locations and settlements which are hazardous and
detrimental to their own well-being. As noted in Chapter 2, as
poverty becomes more concentrated into certain locations, often
those of high ecological vulnerability, the urban poor may degrade
these environments further in the course of securing their basic
Figure 5.8 The deprivations associated with urban poverty
Incompetent or Homes built on illegal

ineffective and often dangerous
government limiting sites; better quality
No No credit available
land supplies housing and serviced
organisation to low-income groups
(e.g. lots too expensive
providing survival to support land purchase
income if income inappropriate and house building
source is lost or fails; no land-use or improvement
insurance for assets (lost controls) Households
to disaster) or to cover living in illegal
health-care costs settlements where
Debt utilities or service
repayments providers refuse
reducing to operate
available
Poor quality and
income Limited or no often insecure,
Service
Dangerous safety net hazardous and providers
jobs undertaken unaccountable and/or
because of higher overcrowded uninfluenced by
incomes – high risks democratic
of injury, illness or
housing
pressures
premature death
Income lost to Inefficiency or

illness and injury Inadequate and Lack of infrastructure incapacity of utilities
(and treatment or service providers,
often unstable income and services increasing gap between
costs)
causing very large what is provided and
what low-income
health burden households can afford
URBAN
Economy producing
little opportunity POVERTY
for better incomes Poorer groups’
Incompetent,
voicelessness and ineffective or anti-poor
High prices paid for powerlessness within police force
Health risks from many necessities political systems
malnutrition and use of
cheaper (poor quality) and bureaucratic
foods, fuels and water Inadequate
structures
protection of
poorer groups’ High level of
Inadequate violence and other
rights through the crimes
High/rising prices unstable or risky
for necessities (food, operation of
water, rent, transport, asset base
toilets, school fees…)
the law (including
protection from Absence of ‘rule of law’
Short-term and support for poor
survival limiting asset
discrimination)
realising their civil and
builidng (e.g. capacity political rights and
to save, children taken Discrimination faced entitlements
out of school to earn/ by particular groups
collect water) Asset base constantly with regard to access to
eroded as it copes with No collateral for
income, housing, credit
illnesses, injuries and accessing credit to
and services on the basis
other stresses/shocks; allow house or plot
of gener, age, nationality,
limits of community purchase, or to pay
class/caste and
reciprocity regularisation costs
ethnic group
or connection charges
Source: Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004).
needs. Fundamentally, the poor are unable to afford the locations that
are more desirable in terms of the inherent or acquired characteristics
of the land. Wherever the urban poor are concentrated in cities of the
developing world, it is commonly at high densities in areas of low
rent. Poor groups do not live here in ignorance of the dangers; they
choose such sites because they meet more immediate and pressing
needs. These places are often the only ones where they can build
their own houses or rent accommodation. The sites remain cheap
because they are dangerous (Hardoy et al., 2001).
Regularly such locations are close to hazardous installations, such as

chemical factories, and suffer continuous air and water pollution as
well as the prospect of sudden fire or explosion. But critically for the
urban poor, these locations may be close to jobs. As Gupta (1998)
revealed, it was the high concentration of low-income people around
the Union Carbide Factory in Bhopal which caused so many to be
killed or permanently injured (over 3,000 dead and approximately
100,000 seriously injured). In Caracas, the capital city of Venezuela,
the occurrence of slope failures has been increasing in recent
decades. The maps of where these slope failures occur and those of
the areas of low-income housing are almost entirely the same (Potter
et al., 2008). Caracas grew rapidly in the second half of the twentieth
century with the development of the oil industry and much of the
expanded population were housed in self-built barrios, the majority
of which are located on the steep slopes of the narrow east–west
valley in which the city is located. Furthermore, whereas earthquakes
were the trigger for past landslides, it is now heavy rains that
regularly present a hazard to the vulnerable populations of the
barrios. In 1999, many of those who died in catastrophic floods
were low-income households living on unstable hill-slopes
(Hardoy et al., 2001).
One of the most visible patterns of urban poverty in the developing
world is the prevalence of ‘slums’, whereby large concentrations of
low-income housing are seen on the fringes of many cities. Since
2000, there has been an international target to significantly improve
the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers within MDG7. This has
become known as the ‘Cities without Slums’ target. However at the
time of the launch of the MDGs, there was no operational definition
of ‘slums’ or assessment of the number of slum dwellers globally.
Many planners, city authorities (and slum dwellers themselves) had
preferred less derogatory terms such as ‘unplanned neighbourhood’,
‘squatter’ or ‘informal’ settlement and different countries defined the
physical and social attributes of these settlements differently. In 2003,
the UN-HABITAT developed a provisional definition of a slum as a
settlement in an urban area in which more than half of the inhabitants
live in inadequate housing and lack basic services. To operationalise
the definition, measurable indicators were needed at the household
level. The definition of slums now used in UN monitoring is shown in
Figure 5.9. The 2003 research found close to 1 billion slum dwellers
in the developing world (approximately one-third of the total urban
population) suggesting that the Millennium target was extremely
Figure 5.9 UN-HABITAT slum indicators
A slum household consists of one or a group of individuals living under the same roof in an
urban area lacking one or more of the five amenities:
1. Durable housing (a permanent structure providing protection from extreme climatic conditions)
2. Sufficient living area (no more than three people sharing a room)
3. Access to improved water (water that is sufficient, affordable and can be obtained without
extreme effort)
4. Access to improved sanitation facilities (a private toilet, or a public one shared with a
reasonable number of people)
5. Secure tenure (de facto or de jure secure tenure status and protection against forced
eviction)
NB: since information on secure tenure is not widely available, UN statistics use only the first
four indicators to define slum households and then to estimate the proportion of urban
population living in slums.
Source: UNHSP (2010).
modest. Indeed the MDG slum target has been achieved: 227 million
people were moved out of slum conditions between 2000 and 2010,
over half of whom were in China and India alone, confirming the low
target that was set. Table 5.2 confirms that whilst substantial progress
has been made across many regions (and particularly in Asia and
North Africa), absolute numbers of people living in slum conditions
continues to rise. Sixty-one million new slum dwellers were added to
the global urban population in the decade from 2000, for example.
Box 5.2 highlights the approach taken in Morocco towards cities
without slums, or ‘Villes sans bidonvilles’ as it is known locally.
Whilst not all of the world’s urban poor live in slums (nor are all
slum dwellers income poor), the MDG target on slums has helped
put the physical dimensions of urban poverty to the fore, that is,
the deprivations of water, sanitation, shelter and overcrowding
associated with urban poverty. The visible manifestation of housing
that lacks basic services, space and security can take many forms.
‘Stereotypical’ forms of slums include the shanty towns often
cramped together on the edges of cities but also dilapidated
houses within city centres (typically one-story units that are visibly
‘temporary’ constructions and are often officially unauthorised).
Less obvious forms of slum housing are the ‘legal’ dwellings that
may look permanent from the outside, such as multi-storey public
housing, tenements and dormitories, but where living conditions
are seriously compromised through overcrowding, decay and poor
upkeep. These are found on the urban periphery and within city
centres. Figure 5.10 summarises a range of low-income options for
Table 5.2 Urban population living in slums, 1990–2010
Major region or area Urban slum population (thousands)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
North Africa 19,731 18,417 14,729 10,708 11,836

Sub-Saharan Africa 102,588 123,210 144,683 169,515 199,540
Latin America and 105,740 111,246 115,192 110,105 110,763
the Caribbean
Eastern Asia 159,754 177,063 192,265 195,463 189,621
Southern Asia 180,449 190,276 194,009 192,041 190,748
South-Eastern Asia 69,029 76,079 81,942 84,013 88,912
Western Asia 19,068 21,402 23,481 33,388 35,713
Oceania 379 421 462 505 556
Major region or area Proportion of urban population living in slums (%)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
North Africa 34.4 28.3 20.3 13.4 13.3

Sub-Saharan Africa 70.0 67.6 65.0 63.0 61.7
Latin America and 33.7 31.5 29.2 25.5 23.5
the Caribbean
Eastern Asia 43.7 40.6 37.4 33.0 28.2
Southern Asia 57.2 51.6 45.8 40.0 35.0
South-Eastern Asia 49.5 44.8 39.6 34.2 31.0
Western Asia 22.5 21.6 20.6 25.8 24.6
Oceania 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1
Source: adapted from UNHSP (2010).
Box 5.2
Addressing the challenges of slum development in

Morocco
In 2003, an assessment of housing conditions in urban Morocco established that
approximately 5 million people and one-third of the total urban population were living in
sub-standard housing, many of whom were urban slum dwellers. This was despite a
decade of slum upgrading projects through the 1990s in recognition that informal
housing developments were fast outpacing formal provision. In 2004, the government of
Morocco initiated a comprehensive reform programme, to address issues of supply and
demand for housing, to enhance the role of the private sector in housing provision, to
improve the regulatory and institutional environment of the housing sector and to
increase the affordability of low-income housing. A central part of the strategy was
towards slum rehabilitation and clearance, known as the ‘Villes sans bidonvilles’
programme. Backed by a World Bank loan of US$150 million, the programme aimed to
provide decent and affordable accommodation for 212,000 households across urban
Morocco by 2010.
The programme was led by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning and included
finance from World Bank, government and private sources. It was organised as a
partnership between all stakeholders: developers, slum dwellers, municipal authorities
and NGOs. The programme has involved:
G On-site upgrading of slum areas through the provision of roads, drainage and water
supply, public lighting and electricity networks
G The provision of serviced plots on urban land on which households will build new
dwellings
G The resettlement of slum households to newly built apartment buildings.
Whilst the first option is identified as the most beneficial and least disruptive for people,
in practice the major part of the programme has involved the resettling of households
away from poorer areas (typically areas of the more central Medinas) to newly built
neighbourhoods on the edges of cities.
In the decade to 2010, the proportion of the urban population of Morocco living in slums
declined from 24.2 per cent to 13 per cent (UNHSP, 2010). An estimated 2.4 million
people have been moved out of slum conditions. Factors underpinning this success are
considered to include the strong political leadership and pro-poor stance under the
constitutional monarchy of King Mohammed VI; a centralised role of the Ministry of
Housing that was also able to coordinate the large number of public authorities, private
banks, NGOs and community groups involved; and sustained budgetary resources for the
programme (UNHSP, 2010). However, the World Bank’s Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis of the programme of slum upgrading (World Bank, 2006) highlighted a number
of issues including:
G A lack of knowledge within the programme of the preferences and diverse needs
of slum-dwellers themselves that was a contributing factor in local resistance and
limited participant engagement
G Insufficient participation of slum dwellers in the design and implementation of
the housing programme
G Lack of affordability of apartments for the lowest income groups and the need for
a more flexible approach to the housing design and supply
G A need for housing improvements to be integrated with programmes to enhance
access to community and municipal services and employment opportunities if
poverty alleviation goals are to be achieved.
Whilst many families appreciated their new-found legitimacy and ownership, the
apartments do not provide sufficient space for extended families (important for the care
of the elderly for example); they tended to be located at some distance from employment;
and led to a decline in the potential for informal commercial activities. In some cases,
economic and social hardship for those re-housed had increased (World Bank, 2006).
The government of Morocco has recently introduced legislation towards requiring greater
public participation in all planning decisions and launched a national strategy of human
development towards better integrated poverty solutions. In short, there is an
acknowledgement that ‘top-down’ approaches to slum improvements can only go so far
(UNHSP, 2006).
housing. The environmental impacts of living in such conditions are

considered further in the sections below. Security of tenure and
ownership is a key concern for both environmental improvements
and for achieving poverty goals, yet it is currently difficult to
monitor, as identified in Figure 5.9. In the 1960s and 1970s, for
example, many city authorities had policies of slum or squatter
clearance, where inhabitants had no defence in the law against
eviction (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). Every year, it is estimated
that several million people are evicted from their homes as a result of
public works or government redevelopment programmes (UNCHS,
1996: xxviii). In cities including Mumbai, Jakarta and Rio de Janiero,
despite the political commitments to (and international recognition
of) pro-poor urban policies, thousands of people continue to be
forcibly evicted from their homes ‘all in the name of becoming a
“world class city”’ (ibid.: 165). Furthermore, because many
settlements are illegal, they lack basic or emergency public services.
Residents may also be ineligible for loans to improve their housing
or employment conditions (their illegal shelter or land site being
unacceptable as collateral), or indeed, for government subsidies such
as in education (for which an authorised address may be required to
register children).
In addition to the millions of people for whom accommodation is
very insecure or temporary, there are also those who have no home at
all and instead live on the streets. Again, official statistics are often
not collected or can be misleading. Joshi et al. (2011) cite the
National Census of Bangladesh in 1997 reporting only 32,081
homeless people nationally; a year later a study by the Asian
Development Bank found 155,000 homeless people in Dhaka city
alone. However, it is understood that both the homeless and the wider
urban poor are a very diverse and heterogeneous group, which further
confirms the complex challenges for sustainable urban development.
Figure 5.10 The different kinds of rental and ‘owner occupation’ housing for
low-income groups in cities of the developing world
Type Characteristics
Rented room in subdivided inner-city Usually very overcrowded and in poor

tenement building state of repair
Rented room in custom-built tenement Usually host many more families than
building built for. Often poorly maintained
Rented room, bed or bed hours in Tend to be poorly maintained with a lack
boarding house, cheap hotel or of facilities
pension
Rented room or bed in illegal Share problems associated with
settlement illegality. Extra problems of insecurity of
tenure
Rented land plot on which a shack Highly insecure tenure; owner may
is built require them to move at short notice
Rented room in house or flat in Quality may be relatively good. May be
lower- or middle-income area located far from jobs
of the city
Employer-housing for low-paid workers Quality often poor. Regularly rules
against families living there
Public housing unit Many small in relation to numbers living
there. Inadequate maintenance
Renting space to sleep at work Usually total lack of facilities for
washing/cooking. Lack of security
Renting a space to sleep in public Total lack of security/facilities. Payments
buildings to protection gangs or local officials
Building a house or shack in Insecure tenure. Lack of public services.
squatter settlement Dangerous locations etc.
Building a house or shack in an Sites are purchased and have degree of
illegal subdivision security. Some infrastructure. Often
expensive
Building a house or shack on a Affordable plots on legal subdivisions
legal land subdivision on the city often far from jobs
periphery
Invading empty houses or Occupation illegal. Usually no services
apartments or public buildings
Building a house or shack in Often far from jobs. Restrictions on
government site and service employment activities from home.
or core housing scheme Eligibility criteria
Building a shack or house in Often government’s response to disaster
a temporary camp situation. Infrastructure and services
inadequate
Source: extracted from UNCHS (1996), but based originally on Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989).
Plate 5.2 Low-income housing
a) Informal housing, Hanoi

Source: Huw Taylor, University of Brighton.
b) Public housing, Harare

Source: author.
c) Tenement blocks, Kolkata

Source: author.
The urban environmental challenge
The level of economic development and affluence is evidently a very

important factor shaping the nature of environmental problems facing
particular cities. As seen in Box 5.1, as cities get wealthier, industrial
and energy-related pollution become more problematic, as does the
inability to deal with wastes. These environmental burdens can be
considered dispersed and delayed and will impact hardest in the
future and for global communities. Clearly, there are many reasons,
as discussed in Chapter 2, to consider these issues as immediate and
profound challenges for the global community. However, these
environmental burdens remain quite different to the immediate, local
environmental health concerns characterising low-income slums. The
nature of environmental problems in particular cities will also be
influenced by the rate and scale of urbanisation itself and the degree
of concentration of such growth. Fast-growing cities may provide
particular challenges for planning and management but serious
environmental problems can also occur in declining industrial centres
and stagnant smaller towns, for example (UNCHS, 1996).
The geographical location of cities is a further factor shaping the
nature of the environmental challenge: cities in cold climates
consume greater levels of fossil fuels for domestic heating, for
example. Mexico City is a widely cited case where altitude and
topology (the city being surrounded on three sides by mountains)
combine to present particular challenges for the dispersal of
atmospheric pollutants, especially from industry and the motor car.
Location is also a major determinant of the type and frequency of
natural hazards that a city may experience. Eight of the ten most
populous cities in the world are located on earthquake faults, for
example, and are also at risk from a number of ‘natural’ disasters, as
seen in Table 5.3. Coastal areas (where some of the highest rates of
urban growth are currently occurring) are clearly more at risk from
many of the impacts of climate change including sea level rise,
tropical cyclones and flooding that are distinct from the
environmental problems of cities further inland.
However, it is important to move beyond such broad patterns to
understand the nature of the environmental burden of cities and how
cities are responding to these. Wealth differences occur within cities
(not just between them) and it is suggested that more competent,
Table 5.3 Disaster risk in populous cities
City Population Earthquake Volcano Storms Tornado Flood Storm

(million) surge
in 2005
Tokyo 35.2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mexico City 19.4 ✓ ✓ ✓
New York 18.7 ✓ ✓ ✓
São Paulo 18.3 ✓ ✓
Mumbai 18.2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Delhi 15.0 ✓ ✓ ✓
Shanghai 14.5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Kolkata 14.3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: adapted from UNHSP 2009.

accountable city governments can lessen environmental burdens

across all levels of economic development (McGranahan and
Satterthwaite, 2002). It is important not to underestimate the
significance of these economic and political dimensions to
sustainable urban development. In Figure 5.8 it was seen that many
of the dimensions of poverty in urban areas relate to factors beyond
income to include aspects of people’s participation and voice within
political systems and the protection of their rights in law, for
example, and there are many external influences that shape local
environmental concerns and the prospects for sustainable urban
change in future. Indeed, Hardoy et al. (2001: 382) suggest that:
it can even be misleading to refer to many of the most pressing

environmental problems as “environmental” since they arise not from
some particular shortage of an environmental resource (e.g. land or
fresh water) but from economic or political factors that prevent poorer
groups from obtaining them and from organising to defend them.
The following sections consider how these varied factors interact in

specific locations at a range of scales towards further understanding
the challenges of sustainable urban development in developing
regions and how opportunities are being taken towards more
sustainable patterns and processes.
The household and community level

In poor neighbourhoods of cities in the developing world, many of
the most threatening environmental problems are found close to
home. Regularly, poorer households use their homes as centres for
income generation, homes also functioning as workshops, as stores
for goods for sale, as shops or as bars or cafés. The environmental
risks are often greater for women and children because of the longer
hours spent at home and in the immediate vicinity. Women, for
example, may combine, in the same space and time, piece-work for
income with domestic duties such as child care. The environmental
problems related to such activities in the home are diverse, but
include the hazards to health associated with poor ventilation,
inadequate light, the use of toxic or flammable chemicals and the
lack of protective clothing. A high proportion of disablement and
serious injury in cities of the developing world is caused by
household accidents and these are strongly aligned to poor-quality,
overcrowded conditions. Many low-income urban dwellings are
constructed of flammable materials such as wood and cardboard and

accidental fires are more common where families live in one room
and where it is difficult to provide protection from open fires or
kerosene heaters (UNHSP, 1996).
Indoor air pollution is also aggravated by the burning of low-quality
fuels such as charcoal for domestic heating and lighting. The major
impacts are on respiratory health, whereby irritant fumes cause
respiratory tract inflammation, repeated exposure leading to the onset
of chronic obstructive lung disease. Urban indoor pollution is
estimated to be responsible for 3 million deaths every year (UNHSP,
2010). Young children are particularly vulnerable; they may be
strapped to their mothers’ backs during the course of daily indoor
activities including cooking and suffer more as their smaller lungs
are less able to cope with pollutants. In combination with
malnutrition, smoke inhalation may further retard infant growth and
raise susceptibility of children to other infections. It is suggested that
acute respiratory infection may now be a bigger killer than diarrhoea
amongst children (McGranahan and Murray, 2003).
One of the most critical determinants of human health (wherever
people live) is access to adequate supplies of clean water. In 1980,
the WHO estimated that 80 per cent of all sickness and disease
worldwide was related to inadequate water (in terms of quantity and
quality, and of solid and liquid wastes). Since then, where
environmental improvements have been made in the quality of
available water and in the disposal of excreta, illness and the burden
of disease have been dramatically reduced and the impact on
mortality has been even greater (World Bank, 1992). However, as
many as 140 million urban residents currently have no ready access
to safe water. Halving the proportion of people without access to safe
water (by 2015 over 1990 levels) is a target within MDG7. On
current trends, it is anticipated that this target will be met with 86 per
cent of the population in developing regions having access to safe
water supplies. However, the progress that has been made has largely
been in rural areas (UN-DESA, 2010); drinking water coverage in
urban areas (94 per cent in 2008) has remained almost unchanged
since 1990. Table 5.4 illustrates the persistent challenge of extending
improved urban drinking water and sanitation facilities in selected
countries.
There are, however, acknowledged problems of data quality in such
reporting. Many countries simply do not have data on who has ‘safe’
Table 5.4 Proportion of urban population with improved water sources and
sanitation facilities, selected countries, 2008
Country % of urban population % of urban population with

with access to improved access to improved
drinking water sanitation facilities
Angola 60 86
Argentina 98 91
Bangladesh 85 55
Brazil 99 87
Chad 67 23
Gambia 96 68
India 96 54
Indonesia 89 67
Mexico 96 90
Nigeria 75 36
Peru 90 81
Uganda 91 38
Source: compiled from UN Statistics Division www.unstats.un.org.
water (or sanitation that is ‘adequate’) in terms of how these

significantly reduce health risks. There are also problems of outdated
data that cannot account for the expansion of informal settlements or
how existing facilities may fall into disrepair. There is a further
tendency towards the overestimation of levels and ‘adequacy’ at the
national level that often do not match with research within cities that
reveals substantial local difficulties (see Satterthwaite, 2008b). Many
governments, for example, classify adequate water provision as a tap
within 100 metres of the house but in practice it is not uncommon
for as many as five hundred people to share access to a single public
standpipe (UNCHS, 2001). In many cases, the situation may be much
worse, as seen in Table 5.5a. There are further questions concerning
the length of time water is supplied each day when considering the
adequacy of provision to ensure sufficient quantities of water at the
household level or to secure the health benefits within a community
(Table 5.5b). When access to water is restricted in these ways, for
many low-income residents the option is either to draw water from
surface sources (often, in effect, open sewers) or to purchase water
(of unknown quality) from vendors. The costs of such water may be
anything from four to one hundred times higher than the cost of
water from a piped supply (WRI, 1996: 20). The inequities of this
situation whereby poorer groups use less but have to pay more for
Plate 5.3 Delivering basic urban needs
a) Water in Jakarta, Indonesia

Source: author.
b) Fuel in Kairouan, Tunisia

Source: author.
Table 5.5 Questioning environmental water was illustrated in Figure 2.6.

improvement
In short, this further limits the
(a) the adequacy of service amount of water used at the
household level and is another
City Numbers sharing public
standpipe
important determinant of
environmental health and individual
Dakar, Senegal 1,513 well-being.
Noukchott, Mauritania 2,500
Luanda, Angola 600–1,000 Whilst access to basic services like
water and sanitation have a key role
(b) the consistency of household supply in poverty reduction and the
(survey of 50 cities in Asia and Pacific in the
mid-1990s officially stated as having 24-hour improvement of living conditions
access to piped home supply) within slums that are mandated
under the MDGs, inequality
City Reported supply
(hours per day) evidently persists. Furthermore,
there are concerns that a key policy
Chennai 4 response, of the widespread
Karachi 4 privatisation of basic utilities
Mumbai 5
including water, sanitation and
Bandung 6
electricity in cities of the
Kathmandu 6
developing world, has put
Faisalabad 7
affordable access further from the
Source: Compiled from UNCHS (2001). most vulnerable groups in society.
Whilst proponents of such
economic liberalisation argue that the poor will benefit from properly
financed utilities (and be saved reliance on water vendors, for
example), this has been challenged by broad-based coalitions as seen
in Box 5.3. In short, there is mounting evidence that privatisation
leads to higher tariffs for basic services and fails to reach the poorest
communities and those who have no access. Whilst the private
sector can ‘pick off’ the most lucrative contracts and customers,
the most ‘hard to reach’ people are left to public authorities whose
capacities have been reduced by, for example, structural adjustment
reform and the current global economic crisis. However, privatisation
of basic service provision continues. Figure 5.11 identifies a
number of concerns if the human right of all people to water is
to be secured.
The inadequacy of urban water supplies serves substantially to
explain the endemic nature of many debilitating and preventable
diseases in cities of the developing world. Vulnerability to infection
amongst low-income households is also enhanced by the inadequacies
of urban facilities for the hygienic disposal of excreta or household
Box 5.3
The Cochabamba water wars, Bolivia

Cochabamba is a city in Bolivia with a population of over half a million, many of whom
live typically on less than US$100 per month. In 2000, it was proposed (substantially
promoted by the World Bank) to sell control of its public water system to a multinational
consortium of private companies (Aguas del Tunari) with the prospect of water supply
rates rising to US$20 per month. A new organisation, Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua
(Coordinators in Defence of the Water), formed and a four-day strike shut down the city.
When the government failed to respond, a public protest was called and a coalition of
peasant unions, student groups and working-class unions as well as segments of the
national security forces joined in the public protest against the privatisation. Riot police
clashed with protestors and this resulted in more than 175 injured civilians as the public
call for the cancellation of the contract rose. The support of a peasants’ union that was
fighting a parallel struggle against the privatisation of water provision in rural areas was
gained. It organised road blocks extending into six of Bolivia’s nine regions beyond the
city. City residents stormed the local city hall where talks were being held, resulting in
the arrest of 15 leaders of the Coordinadora. Subsequent demonstrations led to the release
of the protest leaders, a reported cancellation of the contract and then denial on the part
of the government and ultimately a declaration of a state of emergency, the suspension of
rights to strike and legitimisation of the use of the army to prevent civilian unrest.
Rather than quell the discontent, the state of emergency fuelled further protests in
Cochabamba and widespread discontent throughout the country to include university
students, rural teachers and miners’ unions, for example. Eventually, Aguas del Tunari
itself withdrew from the deal and as it became clear that the privatisation of water
provision in Cochabamba would not occur, Coordinadora called off the strikes. Whilst
the immediate cause of the unrest has been removed, many residents of Cochabamba and
more widely remain concerned about the growing pressures to privatise public resources
in the country.
Source: compiled from UNCHS (2001).
garbage. Water and sanitation are intimately linked, not least where
inadequate sanitation facilities lead to contamination of water and the
spread of diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea that commonly occur
in the cramped conditions of urban centres. However, it is a link that
has also been overlooked. For people living in poverty, their need for
drinking water and sufficient food, for example, may take precedence
over concerns regarding poor sanitation. There is also a wider
reluctance to ‘talk about toilets’ (Black, 2008) that extends to urban
planners and across societies. The ‘illegal’ nature of slum settlements
is also a factor that has limited government investments in sanitation
and international donors have been steered towards the more overtly
Figure 5.11 The key lessons of the recent privatisation of basic services
G By its very nature, privatisation is increasingly forcing public authorities (both central and
local) to become more profit-oriented in the provision of essential services. Among
developing nations, where a significant proportion of the population lives in poverty, many
segments of society are in no position to guarantee sufficient or adequate rates of return
to the shareholders of private companies now providing basic services. Therefore, unless
the rates charged by those utilities are subsidised in some way, already underprivileged
people will likely be forced to forgo basic services altogether.
G Private corporate entities place strong emphasis on profit generation and cost recovery, which
often has the effect of fragmenting service scope and delivery. If no potential or actual user
can pay the full price for the new services, the project may become financially unsustainable.
G Private operators are accountable to investors rather than to the communities they serve.
Of particular concern are the growing incidences of unethical practices by private suppliers
and other institutions that aggressively push for increased privatisation. The need to
strengthen participatory monitoring mechanisms could not be more acute, since
privatisation is extremely difficult to reverse once effected.
Source: compiled from UNHSP (2010).
pressing poverty concerns and ‘gaps’ in provision in rural areas in

comparison to urban areas.
The MDG target to halve the proportion of people globally without
access to improved sanitation facilities is not expected to be met (UN-
DESA, 2010). In 2008, 48 per cent of the population in developing
regions (an estimated 2.6 billion people in both urban and rural
contexts) continued to lack access to an improved sanitation facility.
In urban centres, such access has only increased by 5 per cent over
1990 levels where an estimated 790 million people remain without
improved sanitation. As with drinking water provision, the largest
improvements in sanitation have been made in rural areas, although
the gap between rural and urban coverage in some regions remains
large, as was seen in Figure 4.4. The persistent challenge of improving
urban sanitation for particular countries was shown in Table 5.4.
Whilst flushing toilets and underground systems of sewers are the
most common means of disposal of human excreta in most cities of
the developed world, they are rare in cities in developing regions and
where they are present, they serve only a small proportion of
residents. For households with no provision for individual or shared
sanitation within their homes, ‘open defecation’ (OD) within ditches,
streams, parks or other open spaces or into some container which is
then thrown away (‘wrap and throw’) are often the only options.
Provision of public or community toilets remains limited or of poor
design and maintenance. Use may also involve a fee which people
cannot afford. Examples of more sustainable sanitation provision are
Figure 5.12 Proportion of population by sanitation practices 1980 and 2008 (percentage)
100 4 4 3
7 8 6
1 6 7
14 17 5 17
10
89
6 2 85 14 21
8 80
75 27 22 5 80
32 14 32
36 9 72
69 14
Percentage of population
69
44 16 38 18 45 47
22 18 13
6 56 55 53
50 10 20
12 52
46 9
66 10 43
2 41
20
7 36 16
31
25 28
25
0
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Southern Sub-Saharan South-Eastern Eastern Northern Western Latin America and Oceania Developing
Asia Africa Asia Asia Africa Asia the Caribbean regions
Improved facilities Shared facilities Unimproved facilities Open defecation
Note: Data for Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania are not sufficient to provide regionally representative estimates of the proportion of the population who use
shared sanitation facilities.
Source: UN-DESA (2010).
discussed below. Figure 5.12 identifies the progress that has been
made at a regional scale towards enhancing access to improved
sanitation. Whilst improvements in the extent of open defecation (the
greatest threat to human health) are seen in all regions, the largest
relative declines are in those regions where it was already practiced
least (such as North Africa). In contrast, progress has been more
limited in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia
where OD rates continue to be highest.
However, as with the data on drinking water, there are some
problems with definitions and official reporting. There are also
concerns as to how ‘access’ to sanitation is occurring in practice.
Official statistics, for example, assume use of a facility that
physically exists, yet research reveals many social, religious and
cultural factors (as well as physical and economic) that shape access
to particular sanitation facilities. There are particular problems for
women and young girls, for example, in finding secluded spaces for
open defecation. Research has also shown that many people may not
use public or community facilities because they do not have the time
to accompany their children and young girls to them or they are too
far from their homes to use after dark (UNCHS, 2001). Adult women
may feel too ashamed to use a public latrine in front of men during
daylight hours and run the risk of rape when using such facilities
after dark (Huggler, 2004). In particular cultures, there may be
taboos regarding putting excreta underground where it will
contaminate the dead, or layering one person’s excreta on another
(Black, 2008). Practical reasons for not using a facility may be
because it is extremely foul smelling or is not constructed or
maintained in a way that ensures personal dignity and social codes
can be upheld. In short, all such poor sanitation contributes not only
to individual poverty and ill-health, but also dangers for the wider
community including direct exposure to faeces near homes and the
contamination of drinking water. The cramped conditions of many
informal settlements also aggravate the rapid transmission of disease
between individuals, such as cholera, diarrhoea and tuberculosis.
The city and the wider region

Cities also present a number of environmental problems associated
with the demands they place on ecosystems, resources and sinks of
the surrounding region. Cities themselves involve the dramatic
conversion of land use. Although on a global scale only around 1 per
cent of the total land surface is under urban use (assessments vary
according to and including the definition of ‘urban’ used), urban
developments worldwide are encroaching on some of the last-
remaining and most-valued reserves of natural vegetation, including
mangrove swamps, protected wetlands, prime agricultural lands and
forests. The expansion of built-up areas with city growth also
involves transformation of the land surface, valley reshaping and the
filling of swamps, for example, and the extraction and movement of
rocks and other materials. In eastern Kolkata 4,000 hectares of inland
lagoons have been filled to provide homes for middle-class families
at the expense of the tenant families who formerly made a livelihood
based on aquaculture in the region (WRI, 1996). In China, there were
an estimated 80,000 ‘mass incidents’ in rural areas in 2007 as local
people protested against land and property seizures, corruption and
pollution that was occurring as a result of urban expansion and rapid
construction of housing and industry to serve urban interests
(Buckley, 2010). The various solid, liquid and air-borne wastes
generated within cities are also regularly transferred to the
surrounding regions, with detrimental impacts on water bodies and
land sites when liquid and solid wastes are disposed of without
adequate treatment. Furthermore, demand from city-based activities
for the products from forests, farmlands and watersheds located
outside city boundaries present substantial challenges for sustainable
urban development. Simply providing water for industrial and

domestic uses is a problem for many cities. Mexico City, for
example, depends on the Mexico Valley aquifer for 80 per cent of its
water supply, and this has become so depleted that the city itself has
sunk 10 metres since the 1930s as a result of excessive withdrawal of
groundwater sources (UNHSP, 2010).
Although ‘urban primacy’ (i.e. the concentration of urbanisation in a
few key cities within a country) may be less marked currently than in
former times, there is still a tendency for industrial developments to
be concentrated in a small number of urban centres. Regularly such
developments are not subject to effective planning or pollution
control. It was seen in Chapter 3 that the lack of stringent pollution
control legislation generally in the developing world has been an
important factor in attracting industrial production facilities (often
transnational enterprises) to cities in these regions. Furthermore,
Box 5.4
The environmental impacts of Maquila developments

on the Mexico–United States border
In the mid 1960s, the government of Mexico initiated a programme to promote
industrialisation in the previously underdeveloped northern border region through creating
EPZs incorporating 13 towns (Gwynne, 2008). Mexican and foreign factories were enabled
to import machinery and inputs without paying tariffs on the condition that goods were re-
exported. US companies were able to take advantage of cheap Mexican labour as well as
US tariff regulations. The expansion of export-only assembly factories (‘maquiladoras’)
substantially altered the distribution of population and urban development in Mexico. For
example, the population of the 36 municipalities that adjoin the United States increased
from 0.28 million in 1930 to 4 million by 1990 (UNCHS, 1996: 50).
By 1996, there were over 2,000 industrial plants employing more than 600,000 people.
However, the expansion of employment has often been at substantial cost to the local
environment: ‘the fact is that Mexican border towns have become garbage dumps for
millions of barrels of benzene solvents, pesticides, raw sewage and battery acid spewed
out by foreign-owned maquiladoras’ (Johnston-Hernandez, 1993: 10). The health impacts
of such inadequate disposal of toxic wastes and chemical sludge are profound in urban
developments where large proportions of the population depend on open water courses
for their drinking water, for example. In the eastern border town of Matamoros, the rate
of anencephaly (babies born without brains) was four times the national average, with
tissues taken from the mothers of such babies showing the presence of pesticides, several
of which have been banned in the United States (Johnston-Hernandez, 1993).
many countries have established export processing zones (EPZs)

where manufacturing activities, often using transnational capital, are
by definition encouraged and concentrated. In response to factors
including the need to raise foreign exchange earnings to service debts
and to open up their economies and attract foreign investment, EPZs
have been a popular policy for governments of developing countries.
TNCs are attracted to such zones by the tax exemptions and
incentives offered and the typically low labour costs (Gwynne,
2008). Box 5.4 identifies a number of environmental challenges of
industrial developments at the Mexican border with the United States
(one of the largest concentrations of EPZs in the world).
Problems of air pollution have long been associated with cities,
although there is currently much diversity worldwide in the relative
importance of particular pollutants. In the developing world, sulphur
dioxide and the concentration of suspended particulates are the major
causes of urban air pollution resulting largely from industrial
production and the burning of coal, oil and biomass fuels. In most
cities of the more developed regions, tighter environmental
regulations, measures to promote more efficient fuel use and the
greater use of the least polluting fuels have reduced pollution from
these ‘traditional sources’. However, city-wide environmental
problems also stem from activities other than industrial production.
Congested roads and poorly maintained vehicles, for example, are a
growing source of ‘photochemical’ (particularly lead and carbon
monoxide) pollution as motor vehicle use per capita rises. Whilst it is
difficult to ascertain the precise health impact of air pollutants, it is
considered that air pollution is now eroding many of the previously
gained health improvements in cities, particularly in Asia and Latin
America (McGranahan and Murray, 2003). As many as half a million
people died within Asia and the Pacific region in 2000 as a result of
air pollution (UNEP, 2007). However, there are also examples of
cities in the developing world leading international practice towards
more sustainable transport that are proving key to health
improvements for urban residents, ensuring efficiency of movement
through the city that is essential to economic development and for
lowering carbon emissions. One of the most heavily used yet lowest-
cost (for the city authorities to provide and for passengers) public
transport systems in the world is in Curitiba in Brazil. Here, over
2 million passengers daily use the Bus Rapid Transit system and
no-one lives or works more than 400 metres from a bus stop
(Simpson and Tuxworth, 2010).
In order to support both people and productive activities, cities depend

substantially on inputs of raw materials and goods of various natures
from the surrounding region. Whilst wealthy (powerful) cities have
long had the capacity to draw resources from far beyond their
immediate region, this capacity has greatly increased in recent
decades, particularly as the relative cost of transportation has declined.
Increasingly, food, fuel and material goods are drawn into cities from
all over the nation and indeed the world (Potter et al., 2008). As
already suggested, the larger and more prosperous cities tend to make
greater demands, as consumption per head rises. Work on ‘ecological
footprinting’ of cities (discussed further in Chapter 6) confirms that
the environmental impact of more wealthy cities extends further into
more distant surrounds than with lower-income cities, where the
burden falls more locally. However, cities have many further indirect
impacts on surrounding regions, through the commercialisation of
land and agricultural markets for example. As discussed in Chapter 4,
whilst such processes can be the basis for new economic opportunities
(including through migration to urban centres), they are also often
associated with environmental decline in rural areas through impacts
on crops grown, the availability of labour at key points in the
agricultural calendar, the economic viability of particular productive
activities and even the expulsion of peasant farmers from their lands.
Clearly these types of process illustrate some of the limitations of the
dualist distinction of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’. This is confirmed, for
example, in the case of urban demand for fuelwood and charcoal
resources, where the supply necessarily comes from forested
surrounding areas and, in many instances, pre-empts their use by
rural residents; sources once available to rural inhabitants become
unavailable to them as urban demand rises. This occurs through
either deforestation per se or the commercialisation of fuelwood,
which makes wood a commodity to be paid for rather than a resource
to be collected from communal lands. Such regional environmental
effects may be felt at considerable distance from the centre of
demand (the city). For example, research has shown that fuelwood
for the urban population of Bangalore comes typically from over 150
km away and from over 700 km in the case of Delhi (Hardoy et al.,
2001). However, the consequences of such pressures for local people
and local environments will also depend on the institutional context
in these rural areas:
urban charcoal demands are more likely to lead to deforestation if the

producers are seeking out uncontrolled forests and have no intention of
returning, than if the producers are local residents harvesting wood

from private or communal lands, having negotiated an agreement with
the owners.
(McGranahan et al., 2004: 5)
Urban demand for charcoal and fuelwood can also serve to

incentivise tree planting and environmental improvement.
Water is a resource with a strong regional dimension. Most cities
rely on freshwater resources largely from within and around the
urban centre as, unlike other resources, water cannot be imported
easily from great distances. However, in most parts of the world, the
spatial range of urban water withdrawals is expanding (McGranahan
et al., 2004). Research in Africa suggests that whilst many major
cities in the 1970s were using groundwater supplies as their primary
sources, by the 1990s, their principal sources were more likely to be
rivers more than 25 kilometres away (ibid.). Johannesburg in South
Africa draws its water supply from 600 km away in neighbouring
Lesotho (UNCHS, 2001). The construction of dams, canals and
varied water diversion systems (including for hydroelectric power)
regularly involves the loss of agricultural land and the displacement
of people. The management of such ‘cross-boundary’ water resources
presents substantial political and economic challenges, as identified
in Chapter 2. It can also have major impacts on ecosystems and their
functioning. Extraction of groundwater to serve Jakarta’s water
needs, for example, has led to saltwater intrusions extending 15 km
inland (Hardoy et al., 2001).
The regional dimension of water is also illustrated in the
environmental problems associated with the inadequate provision for
the safe disposal and dispersal of industrial and domestic waste
within cities. The city of Lima, Peru discharges 18,000 litres of
untreated wastewater into the Pacific Ocean every second (UNHSP,
2006: 13) with global implications. Whilst the quantity of water
moving into and out of urban areas is approximately the same, water
is often returned to sources at far lower qualities than when supplied.
As a consequence, water conditions downstream of urban centres
tend to be more degraded than those upstream. As Hardoy et al.
(2001: 109) suggest, many rivers running through cities in low- and
middle-income countries are ‘literally large open sewers’. They cite
the case of the Yamuna River in India that is the source of drinking
water for 57 million people including the population of Delhi. Yet
1,700 million litres of untreated sewage flow into that river each
day from the city (as well as the industrial waste from 20 large,
25 medium and approximately 93,000 small-scale industries). The

result is that the 500-kilometre section of the river below Delhi is
virtually devoid of oxygen (eutrophicated) with serious implications
for the contamination of domestic water sources, the undermining of
agricultural production and the decline of fishing stocks.
In summary, the urban environmental challenge in the developing
world is substantial in terms of extent and scope. Industrial
developments and rising consumption in urban centres have been
seen to be important factors in the degradation of urban
environments, but it is also evident that for many low-income
households, poverty and a lack of development closely define their
core environmental challenges of daily living and working (i.e. the
nature of the Brown Agenda). However, it has also been seen that
some urban environmental problems diminish as cities become more
productive and economically advanced, confirming that there are also
opportunities that cities offer for more sustained development. In part
as a result of the density of urban living, cities are places where a
great variety of local initiatives and actions develop, often outside the
formal or monetarised sectors, such as within citizens’ groups,
residents’ associations and youth clubs, which are increasingly
recognised to be essential for ‘healthy’ cities worldwide and a key
resource for sustainable urban development actions.
Towards more sustainable urban development
It is evident from the sections above that reconciling the immediate

and future needs of urban residents, managing environmental
degradation and maintaining the economic advantages of urban
development are substantial challenges for sustainable development
in practice. In continuity with the progress shown towards
sustainable rural development, sustainable urban development
requires taking account of a complex set of natural, social and
economic relationships, difficult political and economic trade-offs
and a wide range of actors (Bartone et al., 1994). One of the most
valuable resources available for sustainable urban development is
now considered to be the capacity of citizens’ groups to ‘identify
local problems and their causes, to organise and manage community-
based initiatives and to monitor the effectiveness of external agencies
working in their locality’ (UNHSP, 1996: 427). However, the
realisation of this capacity depends substantially on what happens at
the city authority level, particularly in terms of the establishment of
an effective system through which local people (including business

interests) can participate in decision-making. In turn, city authorities
remain responsible (despite increasing privatisation) for many
functions which are critical to improving urban environments but are
widely constrained in the developing world in part through the
inadequate transfer of national finances to this level. There are also
many issues, such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or
promoting more sustainable international trade practices and other
essential elements of sustainable urban development, that require
actions on behalf of institutions beyond the city level.
The following sections focus on two arenas that are considered key
to meeting the sustainability challenges of urban centres and for the
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In an era of
rapid urban change and the diversity of cities and towns across
developing regions, it is understood that taking decisions as close to
urban citizens as possible is key (UNHSP, 2006, 2010). This
suggests an important role for city authorities to devolve political,
administrative and budgetary resources and functions to the local
level but also to ensure participatory and transparent decision-making
that improves the responsiveness of local policies and projects to
citizens’ priorities and needs. These form part of the challenges of
‘good governance’ discussed in Chapter 3. A second arena is the role
of community groups and local innovation where new forms of
governance that promote effective partnerships between local
stakeholders, NGOs, private business, government and donors, for
example, are needed if basic services and environmental
improvements are to be provided for, by and with communities.
The effectiveness of city authorities

Lessons drawn from 40 years’ experience of national or international
agencies demonstrate that most local problems need local institutions.
Outside agencies, whether national ministries or international agencies,
often misunderstand the nature of the problem and the range of options
from which to choose the most appropriate solutions. They also fail to
appreciate local resources and capacities.
(Hardoy et al., 2001: 384–5)
City authorities worldwide are responsible for a range of urban

management tasks including regulating building and land use,
providing systems of water supply, sanitation and garbage collection,
controlling pollution, managing traffic, delivering emergency
services, and providing health care and education. They may not be
directly responsible for all these tasks (the increased privatisation of
service provision has been referred to above), but national and city
authorities are responsible for providing the framework within which
private as well as community-based developers operate, including the
political context in which markets and local democracy work.
Issues of the capacity and responsiveness of local and sectoral
institutions are an important determinant of the quality of the
environment in a city. It was seen in Figure 5.8 that many aspects of
urban poverty are linked to the limited capacity of local government
agencies and departments to meet their responsibilities. Yet many city
governments in the developing world are seriously constrained in
terms of the finances and professional and technical competencies
necessary to provide the investments, services and pollution control
central to healthy urban environments. In many developing countries,
city authorities depend on central governments for financial assistance
to a much greater degree than in more developed countries.
Furthermore, as identified in Chapter 1, governments themselves were
often highly centralised, and often with authoritarian regimes, in
many developing regions until quite recently. These governments
often sought to consolidate their power through the establishment of
(and the concentration of financial resources within) national urban
development corporations and national housing authorities, for
example. The result was often the construction of large, expensive
infrastructural developments in urban centres, but inadequate financial
resources at the local authority level to operate and maintain them.
However there have been major transformations in city governance
across developing regions in the last two decades, including through
processes of ‘decentralisation’ whereby power and responsibilities are
increasingly being devolved from national to local governments. This
includes decentralisation of administrative authority in decision-
making and responsibilities, of political representation and of financial
control over local budgets: ‘Decentralisation exists in its most
advanced form when elected local governments are empowered and
capable of setting development priorities, making major development
and expenditure decisions, and determining and collecting local
revenue’ (UNHSP, 2006: 170). These processes of decentralisation are
complex and contested, particularly as overall government budgets
have been cut (often under the pressure of debt servicing and the
requirements of structural adjustment programmes) and are being
restricted further by the current economic recession. A legacy of past
failures of central government to transfer management responsibilities

to local authorities has also been a lack of trained personnel at the
local level. This is considered to be part of the relatively slow pace
of decentralisation in many African countries (UNHSP, 2006).
Decentralisation and wider ‘good governance’ also includes
developing new partnerships for environmental management, which
can be an intensely political task for example ‘as different interests
compete for the most advantageous locations, for the ownership or use
of resources and waste sinks, and for publicly provided infrastructure
and services’ (Satterthwaite, 2008a: 264). It also includes
understanding the needs, knowledge and capacities of the urban poor.
Decentralisaton policies are considered most advanced in Latin
America. For example, the rise of democratic governments in many
countries in the region in the late 1980s/early 1990s was also
associated with progressive policies that have strengthened local
government and enhanced the inclusion of grassroots movements and
community organisations in planning decisions. Box 4.8 highlighted
the role that the social movement Movimento do Trabalhadores Sem
Terra has had in Brazil in influencing land and housing policy to better
meet the needs of the poorest sectors of rural and urban society. Brazil
was one of the first countries to introduce ‘participatory budgeting’
that allows community-led city councils to decide on health, education
and other policies and how municipal budgets should be spent. It was
the first country (in 1988) to include the ‘right to the city’ as part of
its constitution towards challenging exclusionary urban developments
that undermine human rights at the city level (UNHSP, 2010).
Participatory budgeting is a flexible mechanism where each city may
adopt different criteria for the selection of community representatives
(who are generally from low-income districts) and for allocating
budgets. It has resulted in the more active participation of civil society
as well as more and better services to low-income groups (UNHSP,
2006), that is, supporting processes of more inclusive, poverty-focused
and sustainable urban development.
Evidently, there is a key challenge for city authorities in finding new
ways of working with other organisations at the local level. It was
seen in the analysis of the nature of the environmental agenda at the
household level, for example, that the extent of the problems and
the shortfall in delivering environmental improvements are likely to
remain beyond the capacity of local authorities alone to address.
New partnerships are therefore essential to overcome this ‘backlog’
but may require significant changes amongst all involved institutions.
The fact that capital is limited demands a more profound knowledge of the
nature of environmental problems and their causes to allow limited
resources to be used to best effect . . . potential solutions will need to be
discussed locally and influenced by local citizens’ own needs and priorities.
(Hardoy et al., 2001: 398)
The analysis of the nature of the Brown Agenda above also highlighted
how the environmental concerns of the poor are intricately linked in
the same space and time to economic and social goals. However, the
traditional sectoral policies of urban authorities (and this applies in
more developed economies as well) may be ill-equipped to balance
such concerns. As Hardoy et al. (2001: 400) suggest:
Most environmental problems are multidimensional, interconnected,

interactive and dynamic which makes appropriate actions difficult for
conventional government structures. The architects, planners and
engineers who work for departments of housing or public works know
very little about the environmental health problems faced by those they
are meant to serve.
In continuity with the analysis presented in Chapter 4 in relation to

sustainable rural development, it is understood that there has often
been a mismatch between ‘conventional professionally led urban
development strategies and the realities of urban development as
experienced by the poor’ (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2004: 270). A
key response has been the development of interventions that have
sought to support strategies that emerge from people’s own activities,
to better meet the needs of the urban poor and through establishing
new relationships between professionals/the state and local residents
that ‘enable both parties to contribute to new solutions in urban
development’ (ibid.: 271). However, there are substantial challenges
in understanding the very diversity of the urban poor and the
multiple economic, social and political factors that shape their
experiences in particular locations as considered above in terms of
sanitation needs and responses (see Joshi et al., 2011). The following
section considers some of the principles for more sustainable urban
developments that support community and local innovation.
Utilising the potential of community organisations

and local innovation
There are plenty of examples of communities in urban centres of the
developing world over the last decades taking action to improve their
living conditions. Indeed, the total investment by individuals and

groups in their homes and neighbourhoods has often greatly
exceeded that made by city authorities (UNHSP, 2006). ‘Often
through no choice of their own, low-income households are de facto
managers of the local environment’ (WRI, 1996: 134). But it is only
relatively recently that international institutions, aid agencies and
national governments have recognised such initiatives as valuable. As
identified above, in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, many national
governments (with international backing) engaged in policies of
squatter settlement destruction and removal. During this period, self-
help housing, for example, was viewed with ‘alarm and pessimism’
(Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 1998: 144) and was seen as part of the
problem of underdevelopment (thus necessitating clearance) rather
than a reflection of poverty or even part of a solution. Just as with
local rural development initiatives which are showing signs of
sustainability, understanding is now emerging not only of the value
of local initiatives per se, but of the preconditions which enable
successful urban environmental management based on community
organisations to be generated more widely.
In the late 1980s, five core lessons
for successful sustainable urban
Figure 5.13 Common characteristics of development (Figure 5.13) were
sustainable urban development
suggested on the basis of the work
1 Housing is also a people’s problem of NGOs and community
2 The need for building communities organisations across 20 human
3 The need for organising the community settlement projects. They
4 The importance of outsiders encapsulate often very wide-ranging
5 The importance of external funding changes in development (and
Source: Conroy and Litvinoff (1988).
research). In short, a principal
prerequisite for sustainable urban
development was to recognise that
housing was not only a problem for central government, local
authorities or the private sector but also a concern for communities
themselves and ‘given a chance, poor communities hold the key
to the solution of their own problems’ (Conroy and Litvinoff,
1988: 252).
In many cases, experience suggests that the nature of that ‘chance’
can be quite simple. For example, in a low-income district of Cali
(Colombia’s second largest city), an NGO, the Carvajal Foundation,
assisted residents by building a warehouse in the middle of the
‘squatter settlement’ to provide space for manufacturers to sell
construction materials directly to residents at wholesale prices (WRI,

1996). Until that time, a major factor in the inability of residents to
build and improve houses had been the cost of construction materials
which they had had to buy from retailers at some distance from the
settlement. Once people had access to the construction materials,
they were given further support such as in design and construction.
Critically, the foundation played an important part in convincing the
city authorities to approve the building plans and to set up a small
office in the neighbourhood: ‘Having preapproved building plans and
easily obtainable permits was a valuable incentive for residents to
build legal, affordable structures’ (WRI, 1996: 138).
The experience in Cali confirms that securing support from
government authorities was important in giving a sense of security in
a community (essential for encouraging innovation) where the legal
right to occupy land was still lacking. Experience of more sustainable
housing projects also confirmed that a more holistic view of human
settlements was required that was broader than the physical structure
and included the critical issue of social organisation (‘building the
community’ in Figure 5.13). Enabling communities to be stronger
and better organised was essential for solving the immediate
problems and for long-term benefits in the future. Just as with
sustainable rural developments, community development in an urban
context is something ‘more than participation’: it requires working
with the poorest and most excluded groups, understanding and
addressing their priorities in urban environmental management, as
well as bringing together ‘different voices’ in the community.
One of the largest slum upgrading programmes in the developing
world has been in been in Thailand where in 1992 the government,
through its Urban Community Development Office (UCDO),
supported community organisations with loans, small grants and
technical support to form networks to negotiate collectively with city
authorities. This has now been extended to involve the private sector,
whereby UCDO has been merged with a Rural Development Fund to
form a parastatal organisation. This organisation facilitates dialogue
among communities in low-income settlements, and between these
communities, the private sector, NGOs and the municipality. The
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Pakistan is widely cited as a successful
and more sustainable example of planned, networked provision of
sanitation for the urban poor (Box 5.5). It involves new partnerships
between community groups, NGOs and public authorities. However,
in both these cases, government recognition of informal settlements
and tenure security on behalf of residents were essential in providing

the enabling environment in which local residents could plan and
invest and for developing the necessary partnerships with government
authorities. Whilst formal research and monitoring of tenure security
remains limited, it is suggested that between 30 and 50 per cent of
urban residents in the developing world may lack any kind of legal
document to confirm such security, that is, for the majority of urban
inhabitants, their occupation of land and/or housing is ‘either illegal,
quasi-legal, tolerated or legitimized by customary or traditional laws,
which can either be recognised or simply ignored by the authorities’
(UNHSP, 2006: 95). This confirms the many challenges for
sustainable urban development in future to provide solutions for the
significant number of urban poor who continue to face the threat of
eviction or indeed live on the streets (Joshi et al., 2011).
Box 5.5
The Orangi Pilot Project of low-cost sanitation in

Pakistan
Orangi is a low-income settlement dating back to 1965 in Pakistan that now has over a
million inhabitants. Most residents built their own houses without official help and there
was no public provision for sanitation as the settlement developed. Whilst more affluent
households constructed toilets connected to soakpits and some households close to creeks
constructed sewerage lines emptying directly into these, public provision was absent and
local enthusiasm to get local government agencies involved was low. However, most of
the settlements within Orangi have been accepted by the government and land titles have
been granted. In 1980, a local organisation was set up led by Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan,
who was convinced that if local residents were fully involved, appropriate (and cheaper)
sanitation systems could be developed. The OPP set up meetings in ‘lanes’ of adjacent
houses, explained the benefits of improved sanitation, encouraged the organisation and
election of local leaders and provided technical and planning assistance. Through the
support of the OPP, local people in Orangi have built, financed and maintain a network
of good-quality pour-flush toilets and a lane system of sewers that serve over 90,000
households (UNHSP, 2006). The costs per household were approximately one-fifth of
what local utilities would have charged. The model has now been extended to most
of Karachi’s informal settlements. Significantly, as more local groups approached OPP
and the scope of sewer construction grew, new arrangements were able to be made with
government authorities. City authorities are now responsible for financing, managing and
maintaining the main trunk sewers and waste treatment plants, and low-income urban
residents do similarly in relation to the latrines, lane sewers and secondary sewers.
Experience of more successful sustainable urban development has

also confirmed the importance of ‘outsiders’ for enabling
communities to improve their own environments. Often it has been
external NGOs which have been central in acting as support,
advisory or action groups for community initiatives (or in securing
these functions from other agencies on the community’s behalf).
Box 5.6 highlights the role of a regional NGO in India, the Society
for the Promotion of Area Resources Centre (SPARC) and the ways
in which it is working with other institutions including the World
Bank, the municipal authorities and local community groups to foster
improvements in sanitation and also in the wider living conditions
of poorer groups. These examples confirm again that it is the
relationship between community and local authorities that is critical
for capturing the potential of community organisations and local
innovation, and NGOs have often acted as a ‘go-between’ for
residents and public authorities. A further characteristic is for NGOs
to support and facilitate rather than take on what community
organisations can do on their own, that is, working with rather than
replacing existing institutions. In continuity with the experience in
rural development, important factors in sustainability have often been
the quality of the relationships between community groups and
NGOs (as seen in Box 5.6). Interventions that are based on the
Box 5.6
The work of the Society for the Promotion of Area

Resources Centre (SPARC) in Mumbai
If Indian cities are to grow in a healthy or sustainable way, we must learn how
to partner and engage with informality and the urban poor. The Alliance of
SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan is currently
working with 750,000 households across India.
(www.sparcindia.org)
Community toilets
In 2001, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai began a programme of slum
sanitation improvement with support from the World Bank under its Mumbai Sewage
Disposal Project. In contrast to previous practice whereby the city organised the
construction of public toilets, paid contractors to build them and municipal departments
maintained them, the programme sought to involve communities in the processes of
design, construction, management and maintenance. The municipal authority successfully
persuaded the World Bank to agree to change the funding and tendering arrangements to
enable more community management and NGO involvement. On the basis of their
previous successes in other cities, SPARC was contracted to provide toilets in 14 wards
of Mumbai. Two hundred and eleven toilet blocks were developed in the first phase of
the programme, benefitting over 200,000 people.
Local people were involved in the design and construction of the toilets, supported by
engineers and architects from SPARC. There were significant differences in the design of
the toilet blocks over conventional government models: they were bright and well
ventilated, were better constructed allowing easier cleaning and maintenance, had large
water storage tanks enabling water for bathing as well; each block had separate entrances
for women and men giving women more privacy and saving time in queuing, and a block
for children was included. Toilet blocks also included a room where a caretaker lived
that meant that lower wages needed to be paid for maintenance. The cost of the toilet
blocks was 5 per cent less than the municipal corporation’s costing. SPARC is now
working on the second phase of the project to build a further 150 toilet blocks. Through
the success of the project, a Zero Open Defecation campaign is also being promoted
across the country and a National Task Force for Sanitation was created in 2005.
Relocation and rehabilitation of railway dwellers

Since 2009, municipalities engaging in urban infrastructure projects in India have to
make appropriate arrangements for the resettlement of households. SPARC (in
association with other NGOs) is regularly appointed to work in a mediating and support
role with the municipalities and the affected households towards more sustainable
outcomes. There were many past examples of people being forcibly evicted by the
police, then moved to areas at great distances from jobs and families and with
insufficient infrastructure. In the late 1990s, the railway network in Mumbai was widely
considered to be under severe need of repair and extension. However, informal
settlement had encroached as close as five feet from the tracks in many locations and an
estimated 24,000 families needed to be relocated if such improvements were to be made.
To support affected families to engage in the planning and execution of the projects, the
city authority sought the participation of SPARC and the National Slum Dwellers’
Federation as well as a local community-based organisation, a women’s saving
cooperative comprising slum and pavement dwellers. The key role for SPARC was in
initiating dialogue with families, assisting with moves, supporting the formation of
societies of affected families, providing assistance with paperwork and helping to secure
legal title to new housing. The government provided the land and the Railways provided
the infrastructure. However, the communities demolished their own homes and were
responsible for the new builds. To date, over 20,000 families have been successfully
moved, voluntarily, to accommodation with secure tenure and simple amenities based on
this community-led strategy. Using SPARC’s experience across other housing projects,
the costs of rebuilding are kept low by using family labour and community-based
contractors and seeking out low-cost construction technologies. SPARC also supports
people to access government subsidies and housing loans and lobbies the government,
regulatory authorities and private financers for better housing policy and support.
Several factors underpin the success of the programme. The Mumbai Metropolitan
Regional Development Authority in charge of the railway project was willing to give up
some of the powers normally held by government agencies in such resettlement projects,
giving responsibility to the NGOs for determining eligibility, obtaining information on
the community and allocating housing, for example. While all these functions had
previously offered opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking, the long-standing
relationships between the community and the NGOs involved in the programme ensured
levels of trust and good lines of communication. Households agreed the criteria for
allocating accommodation in the new settlements and families formed lending
cooperatives to assist families who had lost income as a result of the move. It is evident
that the mutual trust and flexibility on the part of both community and government
agencies were very much part of enabling poor people to act collectively for their own
benefit and that of wider urban society.
Sources: Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004); World Bank (2003a), www.sparcindia.org.
priorities defined by the urban poor themselves and where external

agencies are engaged in a process of continuous support (rather than
adopting a more piecemeal, project approach), lessons are learnt from
the success of one initiative to build and stimulate further projects.
As Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004: 282) summarise, local NGOs
recognise from the outset that poverty reduction requires more than
an official recognition of the poor’s needs:
it has to include strengthening an accountable people’s movement that

is able to renegotiate the relationship between the urban poor and the
state (and its political and bureaucratic apparatus at district, city and
higher levels), and also between the urban poor and other stakeholders.
Conclusion
Whilst the Green Agenda has tended to dominate western

environmental thinking and the actions of international institutions of
development such as the World Bank and the United Nations, there
is now a better understanding that it is the immediate adverse effects
on survival for the urban poor of such basic processes as cooking,
washing and working which ensure that the environmental challenges
at the household level are of no less global proportions than global
warming itself. Sustainable urban management in developing
countries, as illustrated through this chapter, evidently requires
interdependent actions across all levels of the hierarchy. If the
actions of community groups are to be replicated widely to deliver
environmental improvements on this scale, decentralised and

democratic city and national governance is essential for enabling
local groups to organise and for valuing their ‘voice’. External
assistance is required at all levels: in building capacity and
competence amongst local authority planners and in fostering
consensus and leadership within communities. All actions depend
on innovative partnerships built on different approaches to
understanding as well as new kinds of intervention.
In continuity with the lessons being learnt regarding progressing more
sustainable rural development, urban development in the future must
focus on the welfare needs of the poorest sectors of the towns and
cities of the developing world. The urban environments of the poor
are extremely hazardous to human health and the people themselves
represent a substantial resource for the improvement of these
environments. Enabling poor communities to take control of their
own development can be a starting point for achieving levels of urban
development and environmental change which are unlikely to be met
by international and/or government finances. However, often this also
involves safeguarding the needs of specific groups within poor
communities against more powerful economic interest groups and
addressing the continued challenges of insecurity of tenure for many
households. Whilst the focus of this chapter has been the constraints
on and conditions for sustainable urban development, the prospects
for more sustainable urban development have also been seen to be
tied closely to those of securing sustainable rural livelihoods.
It is also evident that the Brown environmental Agenda encompasses
immediate and challenging issues that are explicitly linked to
development concerns and the achievement of the MDGs. They are
simultaneously about generating an income to live on day by day and
the reality of resource degradation and danger. Unemployment is
closely related to poverty and in turn to hazardous and deteriorating
living and working conditions. The challenge of sustainable
development includes a shift away from narrow sectoral programmes
in urban development towards approaches which can both address
and build upon these interdependent concerns.
Lessons are also being learnt (within the developed as much as the
developing world) that a well-functioning urban system and an
‘inclusive city’ also depends on social stability, equity, integration
and justice (UNHSP, 2010). Sustainable urban development requires
new policies which reduce poverty and other forms of deprivation,
but which are also socially and spatially inclusive. These are further
factors lying behind the essential requirement for stronger local

governance to ensure that context-specific and locally defined needs
are addressed, that city authorities are more accountable to all
citizens within their jurisdiction and that civil society is inspired to
engage in participatory developments.
Summary
The rising concentration of the world’s population in urban centres

presents opportunities as well as challenges for sustainable
development. Questions of urban sustainability are different from
those in rural areas, but not unrelated.
There are many positive associations between rising urbanisation,
the levels of human development and opportunities in sustainable
development at a global scale.
The patterns and drivers of contemporary urbanisation in any
particular country and point in time are complex and are often quite
different to those that occurred in the past.
Slums are the most visibly obvious manifestation of the multiple
deprivations of urban poverty.
The urban environmental challenges for many low-income residents
are at the immediate household and community scales.
Processes of decentralisation of authority and decision-making from
the state to city level and of privatisation of many basic services
within cities of the developing world are two key features of
contemporary urban development with key implications for
sustainability.
The capacity, accountability and transparency of local authorities is a
key factor in the prospects for sustainable development, but this also
demands working in new ways with NGOs and citizen groups as
well as the private sector.
G Debate the advantages and disadvantages of the privatisation of

water service provision in cities.
G Review the challenges of changing urban sanitation practices. To

what extent are the barriers to change economic, social or political?
G Compile the evidence behind the suggestion that the challenges
of the Brown Agenda are ‘close to home’ for the majority of
residents in cities of the developing world.
G What are the environmental impacts of cities on surrounding
rural regions? Think widely to include impacts on livelihood
systems and relations between and within households in rural
areas using your understanding from the previous chapter.
Further reading
Environment and Urbanization. An international journal that prioritises policy-
relevant papers written in an accessible style.
Jones, G.A. (2010) ‘The continuing debate about urban bias: the thesis, its critics, its
influence and its implications for poverty-reduction strategies’, Progress in
Development Studies, 10,1 pp. 1–8. A good paper for understanding the
continued relevance of the concept and outcomes of ‘urban bias’.
Hardoy, J. et al. (2001) Environmental Problems in an Urbanising World, Earthscan,
London. A landmark text in detailing the environmental problems of urbanisation
at a range of scales.
UNHSP (United Nations Human Settlements Programme) (2010) State of the World’s
Cities 2010/11, Bridging the Urban Divide, Earthscan, London. The latest annual
report of the UN body whose mission is to promote sustainable development. This
report examines the drivers underpinning urban poverty and deprivation, the
characteristics of the ‘urban divide’ and ways in which local authorities and
national governments are working towards more sustainable urban development.
Websites
http://www.iied.org/human-settlements/home A good site for investigating recent
research and policy activities relating to human settlements. This group (part of
the International Institute for Environment and Development) is committed to
supporting NGOs and academics in the fields of poverty reduction, urban
governance and more sustainable patterns of urban development.
www.unchs.org The website for UN-HABITAT, the UN Human Settlement
Programme that has a remit to promote sustainable development.
www.sparcindia.org For further details of the work of the Society for the
Promotion of Area Resources Centre (SPARC) that works in collaboration with
other NGOs through many cities of India in the field of pro-poor and sustainable
urban development.
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ Gateway to understand more about the United
Nation’s work on and progress towards the MDGs.
6 Sustainable development
in the developing world:
an assessment
Learning outcomes
G Understand the role of indicators in moving towards more sustainable

processes and patterns of development
G Be familiar with a number of ways of assessing sustainable development
G Be aware of the strengths and limitations of indicators of and for
G Reflect on the common but differentiated challenges of sustainable
development into the future
Key concepts
Environmental assessment; ecological footprint analysis; green GDP

accounting; decoupling.
Introduction
It has been seen through the preceding chapters of this book that
the notion of sustainable development encompasses a wide range
of concerns. These include the capacity of the planet to absorb
the changes brought about by human activities and the substantially
compromised development opportunities for many people in the
world, particularly in the developing countries. From the
investigation of the varied definitions and use of the term in
Chapter 1, it was clear that there are different ‘interests’ in
sustainable development and contested views of what should occur
(the priorities for action and the nature of envisioned change) in
future. As a result, the practice of sustainable development has to be
understood as an inherently political and conflictual endeavour where
Sustainable development in the developing world: an assessment • 303
those with more power are often best able to influence outcomes in
their favour (Peet and Watts, 2004; O’Riordan, 2000).
The preceding chapters of this book have confirmed that the idea of
sustainable development has been a strong influence in shaping many
changes in environmental management and development worldwide:
in terms of the way individuals act, businesses operate and
communities organise themselves, for example, but also in directing
the nature of state activities, in prompting the formation of new
international institutions, and in fostering new ways in which all such
organisations relate to each other in the search for patterns and
processes of change which are more sustainable. One of the aims of
the book was to highlight this ‘institutional learning’ and through
considering the outcomes for people and environments in practice, to
identify the continued challenges for further moves towards
sustainable development. However, as more institutions of
development declare an interest in ‘sustainable development’ as a
policy goal and as further issues (such as global security) are
articulated in terms of sustainable development, the requirement for
continued critical questioning of the political nature of sustainable
development becomes stronger. The experiences of more sustainable
processes and outcomes (as in Chapters 4 and 5) confirm that
sustainability rests on inclusivity and reconciling different needs and
interests at the local level. Furthermore, it has been seen that new
opportunities for sustainable development have emerged when
previously dominant interests are challenged: as NGOs, for example,
engage in international fora on environment and development and as
rural development professionals work in more participatory ways that
value local knowledges and priorities. Without continued critical
reflection therefore, opportunities for more sustainable development
are likely to be missed or compromised.
This chapter identifies the contribution of the expanding field of
sustainable development indicators and appraisal towards assessing
progress made. The final section reflects on evidence that has
emerged through the substantive chapters of the book for a ‘common
future’ for sustainable development.
Assessing progress towards sustainable development
In 1987, the WCED urged the development of new ways to measure

and assess progress towards sustainable development. However, just
304 • Sustainable development in the developing world: an assessment
as arriving at common definitions of sustainable development was

seen in Chapter 1 as a substantial and ongoing challenge, this is
demonstrated also in terms of the development of the means for
assessment and measures of sustainable development. This field of
assessment, appraisal and indicators within sustainable development
is complex, with some key challenges as identified in Figure 6.1. For
some authors, trying to ‘tie down and measure’ sustainability could
be considered a ‘futile exercise in measuring the immeasurable’ (Bell
and Morse, 2008: xvii) if sustainable development is understood not
as a single thing, but a complex term open to a variety of
interpretations and depending upon the various perceptions of the
stakeholders in the specific problem context. Furthermore, the
holistic nature of sustainable development (the many interdependent
dimensions) and the importance of temporal scale (intergenerational
issues) present substantial challenges for assessments and indicators
which fundamentally seek to break down a complex system into its
component parts. There are also concerns as to how to assess aspects
of the process of moving towards more sustainable development,
such as of participation or governance that have been seen through
the text as central to sustainable development. Others acknowledge
the problems involved, but accept that these have to:
somehow be reconciled with the reality that everyone has a role to

play in achieving sustainability – whether it is in policy development
or consumption decisions. To make the right decisions we all need
credible, accessible and timely information. Hence the advent of the
indicator.
(Chambers et al., 2000: 15)
Similarly, in publishing its strategy for sustainable development, the

UK government stated that:
Sustainable development is about ensuring a better quality of life for

everyone, now and for generations to come. It means a more inclusive
society in which the benefits of increased economic prosperity are
widely shared, with less pollution and less wasteful use of natural
resources. To know whether we are meeting that goal, we need to be
able to measure what is happening and monitor progress.
(DETR, 1999: 3 emphasis added)
Whilst a key driver of the development of assessment processes and

indicators of sustainable development has certainly been to provide
such information for decision-making and monitoring, there are also
Figure 6.1 Key challenges in assessing sustainable development
G Is sustainable development seen as a process or an end state? Is the assessment of the

‘journey’ or the ‘destination’?
G Is the intention an assessment of sustainable development or for sustainable
development?
G How can the more ‘qualitative’ aspects of sustainable development such as well-being or
quality of life be measured? How can values such as justice or equity be measured?
G If sustainable development is broken down into a series of component measures within the
environmental, social and economic spheres, for example, how can the synergies and
trade-offs between them be captured?
G What is the appropriate time-scale over which to assess sustainable development?
G If there are many different ‘interests’ in and framings of sustainable development, who will
decide what the outcomes should be and criteria within any assessment?
G If sustainable development is contextual and place specific, what purpose can indicators
beyond the local level play?
G How important is the process of developing indicators itself (rather than the data
generated) for contributing to sustainable development?
debates as to the purpose and use of assessment. For example, one

view is that ‘in general, people value what they measure’ (World
Bank, 2003b: 15). Another is that we should ‘seek to measure what
we value’ (Blewitt, 2008: 175). For others, it is the processes of
close reflection and dialogue that can occur as community groups,
businesses and organisations, for example, engage in the
development of indicators that enables the crystallisation and
development of the very values that are required for sustainable
development in the future (ESDinds Project, 2010).
In recent years in the context of what Talberth (2008) has termed
the ‘converging crises of the C21’ of the realities of climate change,
resource depletion and economic vulnerabilities, there has been
substantial reflection as to whether the global community has the
‘right’ means and measures for assessing sustainability objectives.
He suggests a consensus amongst governments, scientists and civil
society on the need for a transition to an economic system where:
progress is measured by improvements in well-being rather than by

expansion of the scale and scope of market economic activity. We
need to measure economic progress by how little we can consume and
achieve a high quality of life rather than how fast we can add to the
mountains of throwaway artefacts bursting the seams of landfills. We
need to measure progress by how quickly we can build a renewable
energy platform, meet basic human needs, discourage wasteful
consumption, and invest in rather than deplete natural and cultural

capital . . . we need an economic system that is firmly ensconced
within Earth’s ecological limits . . . and is diverse, adaptable and
resilient.
(p. 21)
The following sections consider progress towards meeting these

challenges of measurement and assessment.
The use of indicators in sustainable development

The challenge of developing indicators of sustainable development
has been taken up by a range of actors in civic, academic and
development communities, at a variety of scales and for a number of
purposes. In Chapter 3 it was seen how many businesses worldwide
now report not just their economic performance in a particular year,
but also in relation to additional social and environmental goals set
for the company. There are many ways of conducting this so-called
‘triple bottom line accounting’ and as seen in Chapter 3 there are
now networks such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that are
supporting the development of consistent and quality systems for
sustainability reporting globally. The GRI produce guidelines on the
contents, quality and scope for sustainability reporting for
organisations working across various sectors with the aim of
promoting a more standardised approach and for sharing good
practice. The development of quality sustainability indicators and
reporting is recognised as an important means for both
communicating the business commitment to sustainable development
and for comparing organisational performance (Blewitt, 2008). The
Millennium Development Goals can also be considered a set of
indicators of sustainable development; the common, interdependent
goals for development that are underpinned by specific, quantifiable
and directly measurable targets relating to each goal. These are used
to both direct and evaluate aid projects, for example.
Identifying indicators to predict and monitor the impacts of
development interventions has also been a long-standing legal
requirement in many countries. For example, the National
Environmental Policy Act in the US has required developers since
1969 to consider the environmental implications of projects prior to
their approval. Many multilateral and bilateral donor organisations
now have some form of environmental assessment requirement, as
seen in the case of the World Bank in Chapter 3, that includes
identifying measurable indicators for evaluation. The field of

‘Strategic Environmental Assessment’ (SEA) has also developed in
recent years towards assessing the impacts of development policies
and programmes (rather than discrete projects). Furthermore, it is
anticipated that these processes of assessment can (and should)
contribute to sustainable development. In 2001, the European
Community issued its directive on SEA within which one of the key
aims is to ‘promote sustainable development (Article 1). Evaluation
of this field of environmental assessment and its contribution to
sustainability is beyond the scope of this text (but see Gibson, 2005;
Bond and Morrison-Saunders, 2011). However, much has been learnt
concerning both how to measure and account for environmental and
social impacts and what can be considered quality and effective
processes of assessment. This includes the importance of public and
stakeholder participation early and throughout the process. The public
right of access to information is central to sustainable development
and the basis of the Aarhus Convention signed by members of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) of 1998:
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of
present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to
his or her health and well-being, each party shall guarantee the rights
of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention.
(Article 1)
Many governments, departments and local authorities are also

developing and using indicators to monitor their commitments
and achievements towards sustainable development. As seen in
Chapter 3, since the Earth Summit in 1992, many countries have
developed national and local strategies and action plans as part
of their commitment to Agenda 21 processes. The first sustainable
development strategy for the UK was published in 1994
(Department of Environment, 1994). The revised strategy in 1999,
entitled ‘Quality of life counts’, identified a number of priorities for
sustainable development, 15 ‘headline indicators’ and over 150
measures of more specific issues and areas for action. Developing a
national set of indicators was considered important not only for
assessing the outcomes of policy initiatives (and thereby accounting
to their constituents) but also for educating people about what
sustainable development means and raising awareness of the further
actions that would be required. The multiple functions that these
Figure 6.2 The intentions of the national indicators were considered to

core set of indicators
perform are shown in Figure 6.2.
G To describe whether we are achieving In 2005, a further revised strategy
sustainable development overall
G To highlight key national-scale policy
for the UK, ‘Securing the future’
initiatives relevant to sustainable was published. This took into
development and to monitor whether we are account feedback from the
meeting key targets and commitments in Sustainable Development
those areas
Commission (the UN body that
G To educate the public about what
sustainable development means oversees national strategies) that
G To raise public and business awareness of had identified over 20 key points on
which the UK government was
particular actions which they need to take in
order to achieve more sustainable urged to take more decisive action.
development
Development of the new strategy
G To report progress to international audiences
G To make transparent the trade-offs and
also included responses to a written
synergies between sustainable development consultation report, themed
objectives workshops organised by NGOs
Source: DETR (1999: 16).
with an interest in sustainable
development, a number of regional
dialogue events and local
community consultations run by trained facilitators. In turn a new
indicator set was established on which the UK government reports
annually. As seen in Figure 6.3 a number of measures, including
those for individual well-being, were under development at the time.
These have been reported since 2007 and confirm how sustainability
indicators can change as what is valued (and considered important to
measure) shifts, for example.
Figure 6.3 UK government strategy indicators
Indicator Measure
1. Greenhouse gas emissions Kyoto target and CO2 emissions

2. CO2 emissions by end user Industry, domestic, transport (excluding international
aviation), other
3. Aviation and shipping Greenhouse gases from UK-based international aviation and
emissions shipping fuel bunkers
4. Renewable electricity Renewable electricity generated as a percentage of total
electricity
5. Electricity generation Electricity generated, CO2, NOx and SO2 emissions by
electricity generators and GDP
6. Household energy use Domestic CO2 emissions and household final consumption
expenditure
continued . . .
Indicator Measure
7. Road transport CO2, NOx, PM10 emissions and GDP

8. Private vehicles CO2 emissions and car/km and household final
consumption expenditure
9. Road freight CO2 emissions and tonne/km, tonnes and GDP
10. Manufacturing sector CO2, NOx, SO2, PM10 emissions and GVA
11. Service sector CO2, NOx emissions and GVA
12. Public sector CO2, NOx emissions and GVA
13. Resource use Domestic material consumption and GDP
14. Energy supply UK primary energy supply and gross inland energy
consumption
15. Water resource use Total abstractions from non-tidal surface and ground water
sources and GDP
16. Domestic water consumption Domestic water consumption per head
17. Water stress (to be developed to monitor the impacts of water
shortages)
18. Waste Arising by (a) sector, (b) method of disposal
19. Household waste (a) arising, (b) recycled or composted
20. Bird population Bird population indices: (a) farmland birds, (b) woodland
birds, (c) birds of coasts and estuaries, (d) wintering
wetland birds
21. Biodiversity conservation (a) priority species status, (b) priority habitat status
22. Agriculture sector Fertiliser input, farmland bird population, ammonia and
methane emissions and output
23. Farming and environmental (to be developed to monitor progress in new stewardship
stewardship schemes)
24. Land use Area used for agriculture, woodland, water or river, urban
(contextual indicator)
25. Land recycling (a) new dwellings built on previously developed land or
through conversions, (b) all new development on previously
developed land
26. Dwelling density Average density of new housing
27. Fish stocks Fish stocks around the UK within sustainable limits
28. Ecological impacts of air Area of UK habitat sensitive to acidification and
pollution eutrophication with critical load exceedences
29. Emissions of air pollutants SO2, NOx, NH3 and PM10 emissions and GDP
30. River quality Rivers of good (a) biological, (b) chemical quality
31. Flooding (to be developed to monitor sustainable approaches to
ongoing flood management)
32. Economic output Gross domestic product
33. Productivity UK output per worker
34. Investment (a) total investment, (b) social investment relative to GDP
35. Demography Population of working age (contextual indicator)
continued . . .
Indicator Measure
36. Household and dwellings Households, single person households and dwelling stock
(contextual indicator)
37. Active community Informal and formal, volunteering at least once a month
participation
38. Crime Crime survey and recorded crime for (a) vehicles,
(b) domestic burglary, (c) violence
39. Fear of crime (a) car theft, (b) burglary, (c) physical attack
40. Employment People of working age in employment
41. Workless household Population living in workless households (a) children,
(b) working age
42. Economically inactive People of working age who are economically inactive
43. Childhood poverty Children in relative low-income households a) before
housing costs, b) after housing costs
44. Young adults 16–19-year-olds not in employment, education or training
45. Pensioner poverty Pensioners in relative low-income households a) before
housing costs, b) after housing costs
46. Pension provision Working-age people contributing to a non-state pension in at
least three years out of the last four
47. Education 19-years-olds with level 2 qualifications and above
48. Sustainable development (to be developed to monitor the impact of formal learning
education on knowledge and awareness of sustainable development)
49. Health inequality Infant mortality (by socio-economic group)
50. Healthy life expectancy Healthy life expectancy (a) men, (b) women
51. Mortality rates Death rates from (a) circulatory disease and (b) cancer,
below 75 years and for areas with the worst health and
deprivation indicators, and (c) suicides
52. Smoking Prevalence of smoking (a) all adults, (b) routine and manual
socio-economic groups
53. Childhood obesity Prevalence of obesity in 2–10-year-olds
54. Diet People consuming five or more portions of fruit and
vegetables per day and in low-income households
55. Mobility (a) number of trips per person by mode, (b) distance
travelled per person per year by broad trip purpose
56. Getting to school How children get to school
57. Accesibility Access to key services
58. Road accidents Number of adults and children killed or seriously injured
59. Social justice (social measures to be developed)
60. Environmental equality (environmental measures to be developed)
61. Air quality and health (a) annual levels of particles and ozone, (b) days when air
pollution is moderate or higher
62. Housing conditions (a) social sector homes below the decent homes standard,
(b) vulnerable households in the private sector in homes
below the decent homes standard
continued . . .
Indicator Measure
63. Households living in fuel (a) pensioners, (b) households with children, (c) disabled/
poverty long-term sick
64. Homelessness (a) rough sleepers, (b) households in temporary
accommodation (i) total, (ii) households with children
65. Local environment quality (to be developed using information from the Local
Environmental Quality Survey of England)
66. Satisfaction in local area Households satisfied with the quality of the places in which
they live (a) overall, (b) in deprived areas, (c) non-decent
homes
67. UK international assistance Net Official Development Assistance (a) per cent of Gross
National Income (comparison with selected countries), (b)
per capita (comparison with selected countries)
68. Well-being (well-being measures to be developed)
The Bellagio STAMP (SusTainability Assessment and Measurement

Principles) are a set of guidelines that have been established by
international experts in the field of sustainability indicators and
evaluation. They are intended for use by any group involved in
assessing sustainable development: governments, international
corporations or community organisations, for example. The
guidelines refer to the assessment process as a whole, from
establishing the vision of sustainable development through to
ensuring that the continued capacity for assessing progress exists.
Widespread participation and continuous adaptation are central to the
processes, as seen in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4 The Bellagio STAMP: SusTainability Assessment and Measurement Principles
1. Guiding vision
Assessing progress towards sustainable development is guided by the goal to deliver well-
being within the capacity of the biosphere to sustain it for future generations.
2. Essential considerations
Sustainability Assessments consider:
G The underlying social, economic and environmental system as a whole and the interactions
among its components
G The adequacy of governance mechanisms
G Dynamics of current trends and drivers of change and their interactions
continued . . .
G Risks, uncertainties and activities that can have an impact across boundaries
G Implications for decision-making, including trade-offs and synergies
3. Adequate scope
Sustainability Assessments adopt:
G Appropriate time horizon to capture both short- and long-term effects of current policy
decisions and human activities
G Appropriate geographical scope ranging from local to global
4. Framework and indicators

Sustainability Assessments are based on:
G A conceptual framework that identifies the domains that core indicators have to cover
G The most recent and reliable data, projections and models to infer trends and build scenarios
G Standardised measurement methods, whenever possible in the interest of comparability
G Comparison of indicator values with targets and benchmarks, where possible
5. Transparency
The assessment of progress towards sustainable development:
G Ensures the data, indicators and results of the assessment are accessible to the public
G Explains the choices, assumptions and uncertainties determining the results of the assessment
G Discloses data sources and methods
G Discloses all sources of funding and potential conflicts of interest
6. Effective communication
In the interest of effective communication, to attract the broadest possible audience and to
minimise the risk of misuse, Sustainability Assessments:
G Use clear and plain language
G Present information in a fair and objective way, which helps to build trust
G Use innovative visual tools and graphics to aid interpretation and tell a story
G Make data available in as much detail as reliable and practical
7. Broad participation
To strengthen their legitimacy and relevance, sustainability assessments should:
G Find appropriate ways to reflect the views of the public, while providing active leadership
G Engage early on with users of the assessment so that it best fits their needs
8. Continuity and capacity

Assessment of progress towards sustainable development requires:
G Repeated measurement
G Responsiveness to change
G Investment to develop and maintain adequate capacity
G Continuous learning and improvement
The development of indicators in practice

One of the best known practical methods for exploring the human
impacts on environment (and how far society at various scales may
be away from sustainability targets) has been the ‘ecological
footprint’ (EF). It was originally developed in the early 1990s and is
a complex and rapidly expanding methodology. In short, the
ecological footprinting is a quantitative assessment of all the
biophysical resources needed to support the consumption of
particular groups of people, a country or city, for example, in terms
of the raw materials and energy used to extract, produce and
transport manufactured goods and for their disposal. It is typically
expressed in terms of hectares of biologically productive area (of
world average productivity) that are required to support that activity.
EF is clearly related to the notion of carrying capacity, but rather
than asking ‘how many people can the earth support?’, ecological
footprint analysis asks ‘how much land do people require to support
themselves?’ (Chambers et al., 2000: 59).
Most commonly footprint analysis has been calculated and expressed
for countries, regions and cities, but can also be applied to products
where the ‘Environmental Rucksack’ is the total amount of energy
and raw materials required to extract, transport and manufacture a
particular good. All such analyses rest on the fundamental premise
that it is possible to estimate with reasonable accuracy the resources
consumed and waste generated and in turn whether these can be
converted to an equivalent biologically productive area necessary to
support those functions (Wackernagel, 1998). The precise methods
and calculations used will depend on the level of detail required, the
data available and the purpose of the assessment. The Global
Footprint Network was founded in 2003 to develop, coordinate and
standardise the accounting methods used. It has over 50 partner
organisations from public, business and civil society sectors.
Ecological footprinting is not without its critics, but is generally
accepted as ‘a great step forward’ (Levett, 1998: 67) particularly for
capturing ecological and spatial/distributional aspects of
sustainability (it is less good on economic aspects) and in assisting
the visualisation of human impacts on the earth. Its ‘simplicity’ is
proving to be valuable in assisting public understanding and in
presenting a starting point for debate towards better planning.
Carbon footprinting is an expanding (and complex) field that can be
considered a form of EF. As seen in previous chapters, the challenge
of moving towards lower carbon futures has prompted new ways of

assessing humanity’s ‘carbon footprint’ on the Earth’s atmosphere.
These include assessing and monitoring the tons of carbon emitted
by whole countries (as in reporting under the Kyoto Protocol), the
manufacture and transport of particular products (the basis of carbon-
labelling schemes) and the carbon intensity of economic output
(emissions per unit of GDP). A different method of carbon
footprinting involves quantifying the area of the Earth’s surface
needed to sequester those emissions. However, all such indicators are
complex to measure in practice, particularly when taking account of
the emissions that are associated with the energy and materials used
within traded goods. There are substantial difficulties also in
measuring carbon sequestration under different land uses and forestry
types, for example, that continue to challenge international
agreements on responses to climate change (as well as particular
initiatives such as REDD+ seen in Box 3.3). Like EF more widely,
carbon footprinting is proving a useful communication tool and way
to monitor progress as well as to advance and assess such policy
measures.
Assessment of ecological footprints is also a central part of the
Happy Planet Index reported for countries worldwide since 2006 by
the New Economics Foundation. This index takes the conventional
approach to EF of quantifying the amount of resources used further
to consider the ‘efficiency’ with which such ecological inputs are
then converted into human development outcomes in terms of life
expectancy and life satisfaction. The Index uses existing data on life
expectancy as collected by the UNDP within its annual Human
Development Reports and on life satisfaction largely from existing
surveys undertaken by the pollsters Gallup in their World Poll
(which now extends to 112 countries). Life satisfaction is multiplied
by average life expectancy and divided by the ecological footprint
(using data from the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report) to
produce the HPI. In 2009, Costa Rica came top of the HPI league, as
seen in Table 6.1. It was followed by nine countries also in Latin
America. The highest ranking western nation was the Netherlands
(ranked forty-third). The index highlights that it is possible to live
long happy lives with a much smaller ecological footprint than found
in the highest-consuming nations. This is confirmed in the case of
Costa Rica, which has a footprint less than a quarter the size of the
USA but very similar life expectancy and life satisfaction. A key
finding was that in general, countries classified by the UN as
Table 6.1 The Happy Planet Index (selected countries)
HPI ranking Country Life Life Ecological HPI

expectancy satisfaction footprint
(years) (global hectares)
1 Costa Rica 78.5 8.5 2.3 76.1

2 Dominican Republic 71.5 7.6 1.5 71.8
9 Brazil 71.7 7.6 2.4 61.0
16 Indonesia 69.7 5.7 0.9 58.9
20 China 72.5 6.7 2.1 57.1
23 Mexico 75.6 7.7 3.4 55.6
35 India 63.7 5.5 0.9 53.0
43 Netherlands 79.2 7.7 4.4 50.6
51 Germany 79.1 7.2 4.2 48.1
74 UK 79.0 7.4 5.3 43.3
114 USA 77.9 7.9 9.4 30.7
118 South Africa 50.8 5.0 2.1 29.7
Source: compiled from NEF (2009a).
‘medium human development’ fared better than those in ‘low’ or

‘high’ development categories, suggesting that human well-being
does not depend on high levels of resource consumption.
In recent years, there has also been mounting interest in the
development of measures that adjust conventional indicators of
economic development to better reflect the elements that matter for
sustainable development. These are collectively termed ‘green GDP’
accounting. As seen in Chapter 2, there has been long-standing
dissatisfaction within development studies regarding Gross Domestic
Product (and Gross National Product) for measuring development,
poverty and human well-being. There are also concerns for the way
GDP fails to account for the environmental costs associated with
development, as highlighted in Figure 6.5. Some kind of green
accounting programme is now in place in over 50 countries and are
planned for a further 20 (Talberth, 2008). The focus is on ‘adjusting’
GDP to account for the costs of resource depletion and damage
and/or ‘augmenting’ it such as through adding the economic value of
higher education and voluntary work. All aim to provide a better
measure of sustainable economic welfare rather than economic
activity per se.
The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) is one of the most established
examples of an adjusted or green GDP measure. The GPI
Figure 6.5 The failings of Gross Domestic Product as a measure of progress
It is beyond dispute that GDP fails as a true measure of societal welfare. While it measures
the economic value of consumption, GDP says nothing about overall quality of life . . . GDP
gives no indication of sustainability because it fails to account for depletion of either human
or natural capital. It is oblivious to the extinction of local economic systems and knowledge to
disappearing forests, wetlands, or farmland; to the depletion of oil, minerals, or groundwater;
to the deaths displacements, and destruction caused by war and natural disasters. And it
fails to register costs of pollution and the non-market benefits associated with volunteer work,
parenting, and ecosystem services provided by nature. GDP is also flawed because it counts
war spending as improving welfare even though theoretically, at best, all such spending really
does is keep existing welfare from deteriorating.
(Talberth, 2008: 19)
GDP is . . . merely a gross tally of products and services bought and sold, with no distinctions
between transactions that add to well-being, and those that diminish it. GDP, rather than
leading us down the right path, points us in a completely random direction. It is no measure
of progress. It increases with polluting activities and then again with their clean-up.
(www.foe.co.uk/community/tools/isew/annex1.html, accessed 13/7/10)
differentiates between economic activity that diminishes natural and

social capital and activity that enhances these capitals. It uses the
same personal consumption data as GDP but makes deductions for
income inequality, crime and environmental degradation and loss of
leisure, for example. It adds factors relating to the value of public
infrastructure and of housework and parenting, volunteer work and
higher education. The indicators of environmental decline used in the
GPI include the costs of air, water and noise pollution, loss of
wetlands, farmlands and primary forest, depletion of non-renewable
energy resources, carbon dioxide emissions damage and the costs of
ozone depletion. A key problem of such measures is the difficulty of
putting a monetary value on elements such as voluntary activity and
wetland loss. By definition, voluntary activity is not paid for and
wetland resources (and the ecosystem services they provide such as
supporting wildlife or recreation) are not currently part of any formal
market system. However, the GPI and related measures have been an
important part of thinking through not only how to measure a
country’s progress in more meaningful terms (i.e. to reflect what is
now valued, including ecological health and life satisfaction) but also
for questioning more broadly the model of economic development
that underpins these outcomes (Box 6.1).
The recent global economic crisis has also added urgency to this
endeavour. A number of international organisations are now taking
on the challenge of how to assess progress towards visions of future
Box 6.1
Questioning the routes to sustainable

development: what indicators can reveal
There is no doubt that higher incomes are central to an improved quality of
life. However, there is mounting evidence that increases in ‘conventional
economic growth’, that is, GDP, does not couple well with actual human
well-being. For example, the Happy Planet Index has shown that some of the
poorest countries of the world (in sub-Saharan Africa) as defined by low
GDP also had the lowest HPI scores. However, ‘middle’ income countries
scored well on the HPI and there was evidence that further increases in GDP
per capita are associated with lower scores. Table 6.1 showed that the US
scored only marginally better than South Africa despite a GDP per capita
that is almost seven times as large. Furthermore, calculations of the Genuine
Progress Indicator for the US reveal that it was at its highest in 1975 when
GDP per capita for the country was approximately half of what it is today
(Redefining Progress, 2006). This suggests that the costs of economic growth
have significantly outweighed the benefits since that time.
These findings confirm that there are levels of GDP/income above which
well-being stops increasing and becomes subject to ‘diminishing returns’,
that is, the efficiency of achieving well-being decreases dramatically and
many countries are now in a period of ‘uneconomic growth’. The data from
both the HPI and the GPI suggests that in many western societies, GDP
could be lowered and fewer resources consumed with little negative impact
on well-being. This ‘de-coupling’ of well-being from further economic
growth as conventionally measured not only questions if the global
community has the right measures but whether further increases in GDP per
capita in particular areas of the world are actually desirable (Jackson, 2009).
development that are built around sustainability and well-being. For

example, there are ongoing projects hosted by the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Measuring the
Progress of Society and by the European Commission on GDP and
Beyond. The ‘Stiglitz Report’ has received widespread international
attention. In 2008, the French president (Nicolas Sarkozy) appointed
Joseph Stiglitz as chair and Amartya Sen as advisor (both Nobel
prize winners in economic sciences and professors at Columbia and
Harvard Universities respectively) to a commission to assess the
strengths and feasibility of the varied alternatives to GDP available
and to identify the additional information needed to produce more
relevant indicators of social progress. President Sarkozy was
concerned as to the existing state of statistical information about the

economy and society but also how the economic crisis at the time
had taken so many governments by surprise. The commission
reported failings in both existing measurements of progress and how
governments (and other market participants) interpreted them:
We are now living one of the worst financial, economic and social
crises in post-war history . . . it is perhaps going too far to hope that
had we had a better measurement system, one that would have
signalled problems ahead, so governments might have taken early
measures to avoid or at least to mitigate the present turmoil. But,
perhaps had there been more awareness of the limitations of standard
metrics, like GDP, there would have been less euphoria over economic
performance in the years prior to the crisis; metrics which incorporated
assessments of sustainability (e.g. increasing indebtedness) would have
provided a more cautious view of economic performance.
(Stiglitz et al., 2009: 8–9)
These reviews are now informing much country-specific work. The

UK government, for example, has committed to work to develop a
set of indicators that could be used across all government policies,
programmes and projects that improve understanding of the
relationship between specific interventions and the well-being of
individuals, communities and the environment. Across many
different policy areas (i.e. not solely economic development), it is
recognised that more informed public policy (that can also turn out to
be more cost effective) depends on valuing the outcomes that matter
to individuals in terms of how their lives, their communities and the
environment change as a result of policy (NEF, 2009b). This
includes measuring the more subjective dimensions of change that
can be hard to quantify. Developing measures to assess ‘happiness’ is
now part of the work of the UK Government Office for National
Statistics for example (Thomas and Evans, 2010). It also rests on
looking closely at how different indicators are linked to each other to
provide a more holistic view of change that is central to sustainable
development. That integrated view is also key to understanding and
balancing the tradeoffs that are inevitably required in policy-making;
better evidence and understanding of linkages enables the choices
being made within development interventions to be made explicit and
transparent to the constituencies involved that are also key to more
sustainable policy and practice.
For many organisations involved in working towards more
sustainable development, particularly civil society organisations
(including environmental groups, faith-based groups, charities and

social enterprises), their work is explicitly what is termed ‘value-
driven’, that is, it is precisely the achievement of the more
‘intangible’ outcomes such as empowerment, social cohesion or
respect for the environment that underpins their activities. As
identified in Chapter 1, there are now diverse initiatives that consider
that it is a fundamental change of values (in ‘hearts and minds’)
that is the central to the challenge of sustainable development. The
Earth Charter, for example, was the outcome of global consultation
processes and is a vision of sustainable development built on values.
It is endorsed by hundreds of organisations including international
NGOs, national governments, international conservation and
humanitarian organisations and national environmental networks.
The shared values and principles of the Earth Charter that these
organisations are committed to further through their work are shown
in Figure 6.6. Research into developing values-based indicators that
support such organisations to examine, measure and monitor values
within their work is expanding (see ESDinds Project, 2010; Dahl, 2012).
The strengths and weaknesses of indicators

The work on developing indicators of sustainability raises the issue
of sustainable development as a goal or a process of change and
whether the practice or endeavour of developing indicators is itself
an assessment of sustainable development or for sustainable
development. The MDGs and the UK government indicators, for
example, essentially seek to define a vision or condition of
sustainability in terms of a set of economic, social and environmental
criteria. They highlight what is being valued/sought and set out how
it will be measured through a series of indicators of sustainable
development. A strength of such sustainability indicators were seen
to include the flexibility to add and refine indicators, particularly as
new data sources become available, as new ways of measuring some
of the more subjective outcomes are developed and also as what is
being valued by society evolves. Critics continue to point to the
essentially reductionist nature of the endeavour, questioning how the
components of sustainable development in practice can be assessed
by a series of measures of inputs and outputs, how the complex
interlinkages and possible tradeoffs between indicators can be
captured and question the very idea of sustainable development as an
end point rather than a process of change. Evidently, great care is
needed when understanding and interpreting any particular set of
Figure 6.6 The shared ethical framework of the Earth Charter Initiative
The interdependent principles for a sustainable way of life:

I. Respect and care for the community of life
1. Respect Earth and life in all its diversity
2. Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion and love
3. Build democratic societies that are just, participatory, sustainable and peaceful
4. Secure Earth’s bounty and beauty for the present and future generations
II. Ecological integrity
5. Protect and restore the integrity of the Earth’s ecological systems, with special
concern for biological diversity and the natural processes that sustain life
6. Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection and, when knowledge is
limited, apply a precautionary approach
7. Adopt patterns of production, consumption and reproduction that safeguard Earth’s
regenerative capacities, human rights and community well-being
8. Advance the study of ecological sustainability and promote the open exchange and
wide application of the knowledge acquired
III. Social and economic justice
9. Eradicate poverty as an ethical, social and environmental imperative
10. Ensure that economic activities and institutions at all levels promote human
development in an equitable and sustainable manner
11. Affirm gender equality and equity as prerequisites to sustainable development and
ensure universal access to education, healthcare and economic opportunity
12. Uphold the right of all, without discrimination, to a natural and social environmental
supportive of human dignity, bodily health and spiritual well-being, with special
attention to the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities
IV. Democracy, nonviolence and peace
13. Strengthen democratic institutions at all levels, and provide transparency and
accountability in governance, inclusive participation in decision-making and access to
justice
14. Integrate into formal education and life-long learning the knowledge, values and skills
needed for a sustainable way of life
15. Treat all living beings with respect and consideration
16. Promote a culture of tolerance, non-violence and peace
indices of achievements as measured. Of particular importance are

the processes through which they are identified, how different
interests and stakeholders are involved and the debate and dialogue
that underpins their use and continued development, as identified in
the Bellagio principles (Figure 6.4).
Simple headline indicators of sustainable development as in the UK
strategy (and of ‘un’sustainable development as in ecological
footprinting) can also be an important way to consider complex
issues in a reasonably integrated or holistic way. They are also useful
in considering overall trajectories through annual assessments over

time and for showing ‘how far away’ from sustainable development
particular places or groups are at a specific point in time. Where the
process of developing indicators includes broad participation and
consultation, this not only informs but also educates stakeholders. In
this way, it is less important that the indicators are ‘ideal’, but the
process of their development is important for encouraging ownership
and debate, that is, the role of developing indicators is for sustainable
development.
There is also evidence that the substantial work of independent think
tanks (such as the New Economics Foundation) and NGOs (such as
Friends of the Earth and Redefining Progress) in developing and
communicating alternative measures of ‘progress’ are now
influencing governments. As seen, indicators such as the HPI and
GPI seek to measure the components of change that work to
undermine or support the outcomes and activities that matter to
people, including ecological decline and life satisfaction. The
evidence that these measures have provided concerning, for example,
how what is valued in society has become increasingly decoupled
from economic growth, is proving important for governments to
rethink not only how they measure the outcomes of policy but also
how ‘development’ to date has been achieved.
Fundamentally, as has been highlighted throughout the text,
sustainability is a complex and contested notion with various
interpretations and differentiated interests in the nature of future
change. Any particular set of indicators or measurements of
achievement therefore need to be understood and interpreted in this
context. However, it has also been seen in a range of arenas
(particularly within Chapter 3) that access to information, greater
transparency and accountability, for example, have been powerful
forces for change. It has also been seen how a lack of democracy,
together with social conflict and environmental injustice, all threaten
resources and jeopardise intragenerational well-being. The continued
development of indicators, particularly in the social spheres of
sustainability and towards capturing these less tangible (including
values-based) dimensions, will be an important part of further action
towards sustainability. Additional work is also needed (as identified
in Chapter 4) in enhancing participatory methods for monitoring and
evaluating all kinds of policy and projects, that is, assessing change
through processes that include people being affected by impacts or
affecting those outcomes. Only in this way will it be understood
whether projects are making a difference that matters to the people

who are living with those changes.
A common future?
Almost 25 years ago, in presenting the report of the World

Commission on Environment and Development, the Chair, Gro
Harlem Brundtland, stated that ‘we live in an era in the history of
nations when there is a greater need than ever for co-ordinated
political action and responsibility’ (WCED, 1987: x). The challenges
of sustainable development were identified as ‘cutting across the
divides of national sovereignty, of limited strategies for economic
gain, and of separated disciplines of science’ (p. x). The call was ‘for
a common endeavour and for new norms of behaviour at all levels
and in the interests of all’ (p. xiv).
These same pleas are currently being voiced as the global community
attempts to respond to the unfolding economic crisis. Coordinated
political action and responsibility is currently being negotiated by
finance ministers within the Euro zone to determine the economic
future of whole countries such as Greece, and avoiding a return to
protectionism is considered key to the economic future of the
European Union as a region. The ‘Occupy movement’, a coalition of
campaigners whose actions have created attention in many cities
across the world, has highlighted the extremes and injustices of
global capitalism and the new norms of behaviour that are required
particularly within the global banking and finance industries but also
within governments to ensure these institutions operate in the
interests of all. Evidently, the challenges of reconciling different
interests and ensuring inclusivity even as common futures are
acknowledged continues to prove a difficult and ever more urgent
challenge. However, it is also suggested that:
We are now at an exciting stage in the awkward but vital, transition to
sustainability. In international government, in national strategies, in
business, in community action and in individual behaviour and
outlook, we are beginning to witness a dawning realisation that global
humanity has to shift if future generations are to survive with any
meaningful sense of prosperity and well-being.
(O’Riordan, 2009: 307)
Whilst the emphasis within this text was has been on the particular
environment and development challenges and progress in the
developing world, the interdependence of different regions of the

world has been demonstrated repeatedly: where change in any one
element of the world’s atmospheric system has implications for the
functioning of the system as a whole (and all organisms living within
it); where a substantially globalised economic system operates
through geographical differences (of both the physical and human
environments); and where individual human rights are now
understood to connect to global security and to the global challenge
of sustainable development.
Throughout the text, the detail of the patterns and processes of
development (and the outcomes of policies and projects towards
sustainable development) has shown substantial evidence
of the global nature of the challenges of sustainable development.
Climate warming presents the archetypal global environmental
problem and challenges the social sciences as well as the earth
sciences, international relations and all countries to find lower-
carbon processes and patterns of production and consumption.
Worldwide there are also local problems of natural resources
decline, pollution and degradation of the varied services that
ecosystems provide and that are essential to human well-being,
as revealed within the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. The
expansion of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, the
outcomes of core summits on environment and development and
the international commitments to the Millennium Development
Goals have been provided as evidence that the common nature
of the global challenge of sustainable development has been
recognised at the highest political level.
The economic recession that started in the US within the financial
sector in 2008 but quickly moved to affect the productive sectors in
countries across the world has confirmed the common experience of
the volatile and unstable nature of economic development globally.
It has also led to deep questioning of how future growth can be
secured. Evidence of the considerable interest in the ‘win-win’
opportunities of stimulating new patterns of economic growth that
could also lay the basis for lower-carbon growth trajectories in the
future was seen in Chapter 3. This was evident in the ‘merging’ of
climate and development agendas within reports of key institutions
in development, in country and regional commitments regarding
the use of renewable energy technologies and in government support
for ‘green investments’ as part of their overall stimulus spending
towards assisting economic recovery.
Concerns for the justice encompassed in moving towards sustainable

development, for how environmental degradation (and environmental
improvements and the impacts of environmental policy decisions) are
distributed across society (and spatially) have also been seen to be
understood as challenges within more economically advanced
countries as well as within developing regions. The environmental
justice movement in the US centres on urban injustices of pollution,
hazardous waste and environmental dangers that are spatially
concentrated in poor and minority neighbourhoods.
‘Environmentalism of the poor’ extends the focus to the many
thousands of local ecological distribution conflicts and injustices,
urban and rural, that impact on the livelihoods of the poorest groups
within countries, that are often a key cause of poverty and further
social conflict and that are explained in terms of the growing
requirements for natural resources and consumption goods by more
wealthy groups and countries. The common, shared concern globally
about the injustices of patterns and processes of development and
understanding of the interlinked challenges in environment, economy
and societies is encapsulated in the rising prominence of social
movements, seen throughout the text. Whereas in the past,
international non-governmental organisations, for example, operated
to connect groups of people in one place (who had the finances) to
those elsewhere in need (i.e. linkages based on ‘sympathy’ for
others), increasingly people and places of the globe are being linked
in empathy and solidarity. It has been seen that transnational social
movements currently connect many individuals and varied networks
and associations of different groups and organisations across
countries and at the same time, through what are understood as inter-
related and shared struggles and resistances in the spheres of
environment, economy and social justice.
The chapters of the book have also presented evidence of difference
and disputed understandings of the future challenges in sustainable
development. It continues to be widely argued that the sustainable
development agenda at the international level is not commonly
shared, but rather, dominated by a more narrow and particularly
‘northern’ interest. There is a persistent concern that it continues to
be issues of ‘Global Environmental Change’ (such as the
implications of climate warming and biodiversity conservation on
future generations) rather than international distributive issues of
poverty that impact on current generations (and are much harder to
tackle, are less amenable to ‘mitigation’ and technological solutions,
for example) that dominate policy and action. The failure to find
an international consensus on the shape of the Climate Convention
after 2012 and the end of the current Kyoto Protocol was seen in
Chapter 2 to encapsulate the different and disputed understandings
of the climate challenge. Indeed, a key part of the dispute and
contestation at the Copenhagen meeting in 2010 concerned how to
take forward into the future the existing mechanism for recognising
‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities in action on climate
change, that is, the legally binding targets for emissions reductions
that to date referred only to Annex 1 countries. However, it also
exposed how ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ understandings of the future
challenges of action on climate change are also differentiated; the US
adopting a very different stance on future targets to the European
Union, for example, and as also seen between the BRIC economies
and the Small Island states.
Evidence was also provided of research and practice that puts
difference and inclusivity central to the future challenge of climate
warming for sustainable development. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, for example, is working with the
understanding that different ‘emission scenarios’ or ‘pathways of
development’ (i.e. what happens in practice in economic, political
and social terms) will be key in terms of influencing the scale and
distribution of global and regional impacts of climate warming
(Parry, 2004). Hence, it is understood that mitigation efforts will not
prevent climate change from occurring and closer attention is needed
to the challenges of adaptation. This includes understanding how
development opportunities are being compromised through climate
change, finding ways to integrate climate change adaptation
throughout development strategies and policies and ensuring that
future donor support (including as comes through the international
carbon market) is focused on developing adaptation capacity in
developing regions.
Disputed understandings of the notion of ‘common futures’ in the
global challenges of sustainable development were also identified in
Chapter 3 in the arena of trade. Whilst proponents of free trade (and
neo-liberal development ideas generally) emphasise the global
benefits that will flow from enhanced trade and economic activity,
the campaigns of NGOs such as Oxfam are centred around how the
international trade rules currently don’t constitute a ‘level playing
field’. Their argument is that multilateral trade arrangements do not
constitute a common starting point, nor do they present equal
opportunities for development in the near future. The importance of a

multilateral trade regime that is better aligned with the objectives of
human development is also recognised by institutions including the
UN Development Programme. In their report, ‘Making Global Trade
Work for People’ the UNDP urged that the multilateral trade regimes
needed to reflect the differences between developing countries and
industrialised countries more effectively; to give policy space for the
coexistence of diverse development strategies and to permit
asymmetric rules that favour the weakest members where required.
Developing countries needed to have greater flexibility in developing
their agricultural policies to achieve food security and to protect the
most vulnerable. In the arena of the environment, flexibility needs to
be ensured so that developing countries are enabled to design
appropriate solutions according to their own development and
environment priorities and without fear of trade sanctions. However,
as seen in the text, despite commitments of members of the World
Trade Organisation in 2001 to a ‘Development Round’ of
negotiations, putting an agenda into practice has been substantially
stalled in recent years.
Perhaps most explicitly, the text has consistently revealed quite
different environmental concerns that challenge less developed
regions of the world in comparison to more industrialised countries.
As Redclift (1992: 26) identified a decade ago:
In urbanised, industrial societies, relatively few people’s livelihoods

are threatened by conservation measures. The ‘quality of life’
considerations which play such a large part in dictating the political
priorities of developed countries surface precisely because of the
success of industrial capitalism in delivering relatively high standards
of living for the majority (but by no means all) of the population. In
the South, on the other hand, struggles over the environment are
usually about basic needs, cultural identity and strategies of survival.
Evidently, some things have changed since Redclift’s observation.

Through the text it has been seen that high rates of economic growth
in countries within the Global South such as in China and India have
also been very successful in moving large numbers of people out of
extreme poverty and out of slum living and working conditions, for
example. Many ‘middle income’ countries (as seen in the reporting
of the Happy Planet Index above) have also been able to deliver
improvements in well-being at much lower levels and rates of
economic growth (and with lower resource demands). However,
there are many more examples throughout the book of income

levels remaining a key factor in shaping access to natural resources
and to basic environmental improvements, in influencing the
security of livelihoods and tenure in both rural and urban contexts
and in explaining the opportunity that people have to live healthy
lives that (as Sen (2000) suggests) they themselves have reason
to value.
However, it has also been seen throughout the chapters, that more
sustainable development processes are being built through addressing
those diverse aspects of poverty that are not necessarily closely
linked to income, but rather, are focused on the barriers to inclusion
and development that come through a lack of access to information
or a lack of voice and democracy. Furthermore, key to many of the
interventions towards more sustainable processes and patterns of
development as seen and to recognising diversity of interests and
promoting inclusivity has been the importance of ‘empowering the
poor’, ‘finding community’ and taking action closest to the people
and environments involved. For example, the World Bank now
requires widespread consultation of civil society groups within
the process of preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
that shape further lending to and eligibility of countries for
programmes of debt relief. PRSPs have been argued to reflect an
acknowledgement on behalf of the World Bank that there can be
no single prescription for macro-economic adjustment for recipient
countries, but that policies need to be tailored to the specific
conditions and needs of particular countries as defined by multiple
stakeholders. PRSPs (in contrast to earlier Structural Adjustment
Programmes) aim to provide national ownership of the process
based on broad-based participation throughout and over the longer
term of civil society in partnership with government, other country-
stakeholders and donors. Bilateral and private aid organisations are
also now working through multiple channels including NGOs rather
than largely through governments as in the past, towards more
flexible but also targeted financial support to countries and
communities.
Participation and inclusivity of multiple voices, knowledges and
capacities have also been identified as the cornerstones of the
‘Farmer First’ approach in research and development that has had
widespread impact on more sustainable rural development outcomes.
The ‘decentralisation’ of authority in terms of finances and decision-
making from national departments to city authorities has also been
seen, in Chapter 5, to be central to progress towards more sustainable

urban developments particularly for the way in which it raises
accountability to local populations. Substantial evidence has been
presented through the text of various institutions in development
‘finding’ community to the benefit of local peoples and
environments. The role of ‘southern-based’ NGOs in particular such
as SEWA in Chapter 4 and SPARC in Chapter 5 have been
recognised to bring substantial expertise and capacity in terms of
working at the local level across a variety of sectors in sustainable
development and to have provided momentum for further change.
However, all such steps towards ‘working with community’, whilst
not depending necessarily on large transfers of financial resources,
have been seen to rest on very significant shifts in political power.
Working to transfer and/or create power and control at a local level
and within communities depends on many interrelated actions across
the hierarchy of levels of action towards sustainable development
considered through the text. They require difficult political decisions
and often profound (and unsettling) changes. This applies as much to
consumers in the global North, professionals in development research
and amongst government leaders in international and national
negotiations, as it does to city planners, NGO staff, and to men and
women in the communities of the developing world themselves.
Whilst community participation has become a pervasive alternative
discourse in sustainable development, it does not offer an
unproblematic panacea for sustainable development. As Cooke and
Kothari (2001) have strongly articulated, the complexities of power
and power relations can still be misunderstood and misused in
interventions within this agenda; an enthusiasm for participatory
methods in research can drive out others with advantages not
delivered by those tools and there may well be decision-making
processes that are not participatory that are equally valid in practice.
Unjust or ‘tyrannical’ uses of power (to use their term) can
characterise participatory development processes and practices as
much as within those agendas they have sought to contest.
The achievements made towards sustainable development as detailed
in this text have involved substantial reassessment on behalf of
individuals, governments, civil society, private business and industry
and international institutions of the constraints and opportunities of
development and the environment, of the criteria for success in the
use and protection of the resources of the world and of notions of
human progress and well-being. As Reid (1995: 235) has stated:
Sustainable development confronts, not just society, but each of us at

the heart of his or her purpose. It invites us to give practical support to
the values of social equity, human worth and ecological health; it
questions our readiness to involve ourselves in the struggle for change.
There can be no ‘blueprints’ for sustainable development: sustainable

development actions depend on embracing complexity and working
to reconcile different interests in environment and development. It is
not possible to predict what the likely needs of future generations
will be, the nature of technological progress that will be made or the
precise outcomes of global warming. Flexible and creative solutions
are required as the nature of the ‘problem’ evolves and as policies,
programmes and projects proceed. However, these are not
justifications for inaction today. The obligation of the current
generation is both to use and to protect the resources of the world in
ways that meet human development opportunities more equitably
today, but which do not preclude options for such actions tomorrow.
Summary
The field of indictors of and for sustainable development is

expanding rapidly. The tools for assessing sustainable development
targets and outcomes are now substantial but there continue to be
challenges for capturing the process of change and the more
qualitative dimensions of sustainability.
The economic vulnerability of countries globally, as demonstrated
by the recent economic crisis, has prompted questioning of both
the measures for assessing development progress and the means for
achieving this. It is the focus of a number of international reviews
of indicators for sustainable development.
Ecological footprinting is a well-established method for exploring
human impacts on environmental resources. It forms the basis of
carbon footprinting and also measures that quantify the efficiency
with which ecological resources are converted into human
development outcomes.
Green GDP accounting seeks to adjust and/or augment conventional
GDP accounts to better measure sustainable economic welfare.
Values-based outcomes such as respect for ecological integrity and social
justice are ‘harder to measure’ but central to the mission and activities of
many organisations working towards sustainable development.
G What are the benefits of moves to ‘tie down and measure’

G Research in more depth how methods of ecological footprinting
are being improved. Find out your own ecological footprint
using the method established by the World Wildlife Fund;
http://footprint.wwf.org.uk/
G What are the challenges of trying to measure human happiness?
G What are your own core values? How do they relate to the
natural environment? How do they relate to future generations?
G Think about the communities in which you are involved. What
evidence is there for commitment to common goals for the future?
Further reading
Bell, S. and Morse, S. (2008) Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the

Immeasurable?, second edition, Earthscan, London. An established text that
looks at the theory and practice behind the development of sustainability
indicators. The second edition looks at some very advanced and complex
practical approaches to sustainability analysis.
Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet,
Earthscan, London. This text is a very readable consideration of how to reconcile
economic growth, human well-being and ecological health now and into the
future. A good source to understand more about how human well-being has
become decoupled from economic growth, the continued dependence of
economic growth on energy and resources/materials and the challenges of
changing consumption patterns.
New Economics Foundation (2009) The (Un) Happy Planet Index: Why Good Lives
Don’t Have to Cost the Earth, NEF, London. For further information on the
methods underpinning the Index and explanation of the global patterns found.
Wilkinson, R. and Picket, K. (2009) The Spirit Level – Why More Equal Societies
Almost Always Do Better, Penguin, London. This book draws together the
mounting evidence globally of the benefits of equality and how it is inequality
rather than how wealthy a society is that explains so many patterns and problems
of development.
Websites
www.neweconomics.org New Economics Foundation is an independent think tank
that seeks innovative solutions and challenges mainstream ideas on environment,
economy and society. It works across all sectors including government, academia
and civil society, produces some very useful reviews of research and provides
guidance for those institutions looking to promote more sustainable development.
www.globalreporting.org Website for the Global Reporting Initiative and the
research and policy advice that they provide for organisations looking to improve
the quality and scope of their sustainability reporting.
http://sd.defra.gov.uk For full details on how the UK government is developing
policy and action and providing support towards more sustainable development.
www.earthcharterinaction.org For details of the origin of the Earth Charter
Initiative and how it is supporting people, organisations and communities to now
take action on the initiative in arenas of education, business, the media, religion
and in law-making for example.
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Index
Page numbers in italics denote a table/figure.

Aarhus Convention (1998) 129, 307 Andes: supporting adaptations to climate
acid rain 43, 100, 122 change in 230–1
Adams, W.M. 24, 25, 43, 47–8, 245 anti-colonial movements 29
Adaptation Fund 138 anti-globalisation movement 38, 110
adaptive capacity 107 Argentina 29
Adger, W.M. 111 Asia: urbanisation 249, 255–6
Afghanistan 75 Asian crisis 38
Africa 72; city water resources 287; infant Asian Tigers 32
mortality 85, 87; life expectancy 87; assessment (of sustainable development)
percentage share of ODA budget 134; 303–22; key challenges 304, 305;
poverty in 86; urbanisation 249–50, 255, purpose and use of 305; use of
256, 257–9 indicators see indicators
Agenda 21 9, 10, 48, 307 Attenborough, Richard 77
agri-food system 208–19, 208, 245–6; Auty, R. 75
negative impacts 209, 211
agriculture 190–5; challenges for Bamako Convention (1991) 131
sustainable development of 211–19; Bangladesh: impact of cyclones and
decline in investment 192; Farmer flooding on women 100; and saltwater
First movement 223–32, 226–7, 327; intrusions of groundwater 100
farmer suicides in India 212; and barrios 266
gender 205; Gene Revolution 214, 223; Basel Action Network (BAN) 62
globalisation of 208–11; GM crops Basel Convention 62, 64, 129, 130, 130–2,
214–16, 215, 216, 217; Green 156
Revolution 213–16, 223, 225, 228; Bass, S. 173
industrial 211–12; multifunctionality Bellagio STAMP (SusTainability
of 190–1, 191; resource poor 216, Assessment and Measurement
218–19, 224; and rural areas 201–2, Principles) 311, 311–12, 320
205; technologies with high potential Bhopal tragedy 266
sustainability 221, 221, 223; and urban Big Society 181
sector 195; water use 60, 72, 73; biofuels 71; risks and opportunities 67,
women’s work in 234; and World Bank 68–9, 71
192–4; World Bank’s categorisation Biological Diversity Convention 9, 22,
of ‘rural worlds’ 193–4 129, 146
agro-ecosystems 206–7, 207 biomass 66
aid 133–7; challenges of 135, 137; biotech crops 214, 216
definition 133; and environment 138–40; Biswas, A.K. and M.R. 40
impact of on recipient nations 134–5; Blue Angel endorsement 162–3
see also ODA Bojo, J. 149
Ainger, K. 160 Bolivia 169, 231; Cochabamba water wars
air pollution 61, 122, 276, 285 280
352 • Index
BP disaster (Gulf of Mexico) (2010) 67 energy and climate change 174;

Brazil 28, 29, 32–3, 69, 148; Bus Rapid population 78; and renewable energy
Transit system 285; and debt crisis 32–3; sources 70, 173; urbanisation 256, 283
national plans on energy and climate Christian Aid 75, 81
change 174; participatory budgeting CITES (Convention on International Trade
291; pressures for land reform in 233–4; in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and renewable energy sources 70 and Flora) 128
Bretton Woods conference (1944) 26, 141 cities 81; carbon/carbon dioxide emissions
Brown Environmental Agenda 251–3, 292, 81, 251; disaster risk 274, 274; dispersal
299 of industrial and domestic waste 287–8;
Brundtland Report 322 ecological footprinting of 286; energy
Buckles, D. 65, 76–7 consumption 81, 251; environmental
Bus Rapid Transit system (Brazil) 285 advantages of 254, 254; environmental
business: and Corporate Social challenges 273–88; environmental
Responsibility 160; lack of legally impact of on surrounding regions 283–8;
binding code on 162; response to evictions 270; Green and Brown
sustainable development 158–65 environmental agendas 251–3; homeless
Business Council for Sustainable people 270; housing for low-income
Development 160 groups 271; land use 283; pollution 283,
284, 285; water sources 287; see also
Cali (Colombia) 243–4 urban areas
Cameroon 148 city authorities 289–92
Canada 130; tar sands in 66–7 city regions 258
cap and trade 123–4, 130, 132–3 civil society 180, 181, 241
capital: forms of for sustainable Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 182–3
development 23 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Caracas (Venezuela) 266 132–3, 138, 165
carbon: accounting 164; credits 132; Climate Care 165
footprinting 313–14; labelling 157; climate change 9, 22, 54, 101–7, 150;
market 109, 164–5; ‘offsetting’ 132–3, adaptation 107, 111, 114, 114; and
164–5; trading 164–5 developing countries 107, 111, 112; and
carbon dioxide emissions: cities 81, 251; development 101, 103; development of
and climate warming 104; and fossil international framework on 102–3;
fuels 65; and GDP 69, 69; share of economics of 109–10; impacts of 105–7,
global 112, 113 106; and migration 81–2; national plans
Carbon Disclosure Project 162 for 173, 174; political responses and
Carbon Neutral Company 165 challenges 107–10; supporting
Carbon Reduction Label 163 adaptations to in the Andes 230–1
Carbon Trust 163 Climate Convention 325
Cardoso, President 234 Climate Justice Action Network 110
Carvajal Foundation 243–4 climate justice movement 96, 108–9,
Chambers, Robert 192, 223, 224, 241, 304 110–14
Chernobyl accident (1986) 46 climate warming 103–7, 323, 325; and
children: impact of urban indoor pollution carbon dioxide emissions 104; evidence
on 276; major causes of death 87, 88; for 104; and greenhouse gases 64, 104;
mortality 87, 87; and poverty 87; human impact on 58; impact of on
vulnerability to effects of climate children 87–8; impact of 105–7, 106;
warming 87–8 sources of uncertainty over 104–5, 105;
China 58, 96, 132–3, 173; energy water-related impacts 72
consumption 65; national plans on Cochabamba water wars (Bolivia) 280
Index • 353
colonialism 28, 29 democratic deficit 130

command and control approach 122, 123, dependency theory: and development
159 28–31, 30
common futures 322–9 Deutscher, E. 134
communism: collapse of 33 developing countries 25; and agriculture
communities: environmental risks and 190; and climate change 111, 112;
urban 275–83; steps towards working contribution of economies of to world
with 328 exports 151, 151; and debts 166–71;
Community Based Natural Resource economic crisis in 34; impact of climate
Management (CBNRM) 244–5 change on 107; and rural areas 189–90;
community organisations: utilising unemployment 259; and urbanisation
potential of 292–8 249–50; and WTO 158
Conference of Parties (COP) 102 development 24–5; in 1980s 31–3; centrality
congestion charging 176, 177 of resources in 59–77; changing
Congo 75 perceptions of 25–39; and climate
conservation: and development 45–8; role change 101, 103; and conservation
of women in 235–40 45–8; and dependency theory 28–31, 30;
Conservation International 169 disadvantages of 37; and economic
Convention of Biological Diversity see growth 26, 31, 32, 32; and environment
Biological Diversity Convention 40–8; and environmentalism 54;
Convention on the Conservation of modernisation thesis and economic
Migratory Species of Wild Animals 26–8; as multidimensional concept 31;
(CMS) 128 and neo-liberalism 34–8, 39;
Convention on International Trade in participatory 32, 184; post-
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and developmentism 37–8; relationship with
Flora (CITES) 128 population 77; resource curse in 75–7;
Cooke, B. 328 rethinking of in twenty-first century
Copenhagen Accord (2009) 102–3, 138, 139 38–9; rural and agricultural 191–5; and
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) trade 153; and urbanisation 251, 263
160, 162 Development Assistance Committee 182
Costa Rica 314 ‘development from below’ 31
critical natural capital 22, 23 development reversals 32
digital divide 36, 37, 62
Dalal-Clayton, B. 173 disasters see natural disasters
DDT: banning of 45 Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan
de-agrarianisation 202, 203 (1989) 172
debt 32–3, 166–71; attempts to reduce 168;
debt service as percentage of exports e-waste 61–4, 63
166, 166; and deforestation 167; and the Earth Charter 21, 319, 320
environment 166–71; and Heavily Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro) (1992) 9,
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 22, 47, 48, 100, 102, 127, 160, 173
initiative 168; and intergenerational Earth Systems Science 22
equity 167–8; and Multilateral Debt East Asian miracle 32
Relief Initiative (MDRI) 168–9, 169; eco labelling 157
negative impacts of 166–7 ecofeminists 235
debt for nature swaps (DNSs) 169–70 ecological economists 22
Debt2Health project 169–70, 170 ecological footprinting 82, 286, 313–15
decentralisation 290–1, 327–8 ecological modernisation 49–50, 50, 159
deforestation 286–7; and debt 167; and economic crisis, global 32–3, 39, 54, 57,
REDD+ 139–40, 314 71, 322
354 • Index
economic growth: and development 26, 31, First National People of Color
32, 32; and environment 46–7, 48; Environmental Leadership Summit
slowing of in 1980s 32, 32; and (1991) 51, 52
sustainable development 47 Five ‘Rural Worlds’ typology 218, 219
ecosystems 97–9, 98, 101 Flexibility Mechanisms 132
Ecuador 231 flooding 72; impact of climate change on
education: inequality in access to 83–4, 83 106, 107; in Pakistan 73
emissions trading 132–3 food prices: rise in 68
employment: urban areas 205–6, 206, 259 Ford Foundation 134
energy: and the challenges of low-carbon foreign direct investment (FDI) 36, 36, 152
development 65–71; growth in demand Forum for the Future 159
of 65; inequality of access to sources of fossil fuels 65; burning of and carbon
66, 66; national plans for 173, 174; dioxide emissions 104
world supply 60 fragile lands 94
energy consumption 60, 65; cities 81, 251 France 175–6
energy policies 70 Frank, Andre Gunder 28–9, 30
environment 100–14; and aid 138–40; Friends of the Earth 321
changing perceptions of 39–54; and Friends of the Earth International 162
development 40–8; and economic fuelwood: urban demand for 286–7
growth 46-7, 48; and international debt
166–71; and poverty 94–100; and trade G8 meeting (Gleneagles) (2005) 135, 168
150–4 GDP (gross domestic product) 90, 91, 315,
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 317; carbon intensity 69, 69; failings of
144, 145 as measure of progress 315, 316
environmental justice 50–3, 96, 324 gender: and agriculture 205; division of
Environmental Justice and Climate Change labour 237, 238; and experience of
Initiative 110 environmental change 100; inequalities
environmental limits 59–65 84, 92, 93; see also women
Environmental Rucksack 313 Gender Inequality Index (GII) 92, 93
environmental taxes 22 Gene Revolution 214, 223
environmentalism of the poor 50–1, 53, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
324 (GATT) 26, 155
equity 24; growth with 31; genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
intergenerational 167–8; 214, 215 see also GM crops
intragenerational 47, 84 Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) 315–16,
Escobar, A. 37 317, 321
European Commission 317 George, S. 167
European Union 322; national plans on Gibbs, Lois 51
energy and climate change 174 Gibson, R.B. 24
exclusion 11, 15; measuring of in human Giddens, A. 108
development 92 Glennie, J. 39
export processing zones (EPZs) 284, 285 Global Environment Facility (GEF) 144,
146, 147
Fairtrade 163, 213 Global Footprint Network 313
Fairtrade Labelling International 163 Global Fund 169–70
Farmer First movement 223–32, 226–7, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 162, 306
327 global warming see climate warming
farmer suicides (India) 212 globalisation 33, 38, 57, 190, 250; and
farmers’ markets 213 agriculture 208–11; and expansion of
farming see agriculture 191 information communication technologies
Index • 355
36; and foreign direct investment (FDI) human rights 232–5

36, 36; impact of on poor 11; see also Hurricane Katrina 72
anti-globalisation movement hybrid governance strategies 122
GM (genetically modified) crops 214–16,
215, 216, 217 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 26, 33,
GNP (gross national product) 28, 89 34, 35, 121, 138, 141, 162, 168
Gould, W.T.S. 78 import substitution industrialisation (ISI)
governance 121–2; forms of environmental 29–30
123–6; notion of good 176–7, 178 India 58, 74; building women’s rights in
governments 121, 290; role of in sustainable water management 238–9;
sustainable development 172–8 farmer suicides in 212; food production
Green Belt Movement (Kenya) 181 213; improving access to sustainable
green economy 11 energy for small businesses and low-
Green Environmental Agenda 251–3 income households 200; national plans
green GDP accounting 315–16 on energy and climate change 174;
green investment: government support for population 78; poverty in 86; public-
173, 175, 175 private collaborations 242; and Self-
Green Revolution agriculture 213–16, 223, Employed Women’s Association
225, 228 (SEWA) 238–9, 328; Society for the
greenhouse gas emissions: and climate Promotion of Area Resources Centre
warming 64, 104; and Kyoto Protocol (SPARC) (Mumbai) 296–8, 328;
101, 102, 109, 139 tensions with Pakistan over Indus
Greenpeace 161–2, 180 Water Treaty 72, 73; wind power
greenwashing 161 industry 70
gross domestic product see GDP Indian Farmers Fertilisers Cooperative
gross national product see GNP (IFFCO) 242
Guiyu town (China): and e-waste 64 indicators: Bellagio STAMP
Gupta 266 (SusTainability Assessment and
Guyana 148 Measurement Principles) 311, 311–12,
320; development of in practice 313–19;
Handloom Weavers Cooperative Society 200 and ecological footprinting 313–15;
happiness 91; developing measures to Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)
assess 318 315–16, 317, 321; Happy Planet Index
Happy Planet Index (HPI) 314–15, 315, 314–15, 315, 321; intentions of national
317, 321 core set of 308; and Stiglitz Report
Hardoy, J.C. 289, 292 317–18; strengths and weaknesses of
hazardous waste: controlling trade in 319–22; UK governments’ 308–11; use
130–2, 156 of in sustainable development 306–12
health: impact of inadequate water supplies indigenous technologies 228–9
and sanitation on 276, 279–80; impact Indonesia 170; and biofuel production 68
of urban air pollution on 276, 285 Indus Water Treaty (1960) 72, 73
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) industrialisation 43
initiative 168 inequalities 11, 58, 82–100; and
homeless people 270 educational access 83–4, 83; gender 84;
Hong Kong 31 measuring of in human development 92,
housing: and low-income groups in cities 92; social and health impacts 82;
271; self-help 243; see also slums tackling of 82; and water access 73–4;
Hulme, D. 245 wealth 87; worsening of 28
Human Development Index (HDI) 89–90, infant mortality 85
91, 92 informal economy 260–1, 260, 261
356 • Index
information communication technologies Live 8 campaign 168

22; globalisation and expansion of 36 livelihood, rural 201–8; and agro-
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate ecosystems 206–8,207; diversification of
Change see IPCC 202, 203, 206–7; and dynamism 202,
International Bank for Reconstruction and 206; non-farm incomes 203–6; sources
Development (IBRD) 141, 141 of 203
International Carbon Reduction and Offset Lloyd-Jones, T. 195
Alliance 165 local institutions 240–5
International Chamber of Commerce 158 London: congestion charging 176, 177
International Development Association Love Canal (New York State) 51
(IDA) 141, 141 low-carbon development: energy and
International Energy Agency 66 challenges of 65–71
International Monetary Fund see IMF
international NGOs (INGOs) 153, 324 Maathai, Wangari 181
International Union for the Conservation of Madagascar 169
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Make Poverty History campaign 168
45 malaria 87
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate market environmentalism 48–9
Change) 58, 104, 105, 106, 107, 325; Marks and Spencer: ‘Plan A’ 160, 161
report (2001) 104–7 Martinez-Alier, J. 40, 51
Ireland: Plastic Bag Environmental Levy Marx, Karl 29
177 MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment)
Israel 74 22, 53, 54, 96–7, 98, 99, 101, 116,
127–30, 128–9, 225, 323
Jacobs, M. 19 mega-regions 258
Japan 31, 38 Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation 134
Johannesburg Declaration 11, 15 Mexico 32–3
Jubilee 2000 coalition 168 Mexico City 257, 274, 284
Mexico-United States border:
Kenya 181 environmental impact of Maquila
Koch Industries 161–2 developments on 284
Korea 175 Middleton, N. 234
Kothari, U. 328 migration/migrants 81, 195–8; chain 196;
Kyoto Protocol 101, 102, 109, 121, 127, and climate change 81–2; displaced
129, 132, 138, 139, 165, 325 persons 81; distress 196; Lampung
(Indonesia) 197; motivations for 196–7;
labelling 157, 162–3, 164 and remittances 81, 196; step 196
Lampung (Indonesia): rural-urban Millennium Declaration 85, 86
migration 197 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
land reform 232–4 10–11, 12–14, 53, 58, 72, 85–9, 250,
land transfers 74 281, 306, 319, 323
land use: in cities 283 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment see
landfills 61 MEA
Latin America 29, 32–3; decentralisation Mitlin, D. 264, 298
policies 291; industrialisation and mobile phones 164, 199–200, 201
employment in 257, 259; urbanisation Mohan, G. 147
249, 257 Momsen, J. 84
life expectancy 87 Monsanto 209
Lima (Peru) 287 Monterrey Consensus 137, 137
Lipton, Michael 191–2 Montreal Protocol 129
Index • 357
Morales, Evo 111 ODA (official development assistance)

Morocco: slums in 268–70 133–4; and climate change mitigation
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 138; and NGOs 181; percentage share of
People (MOSOP) 76 Africa’s 134; as proportion of Gross
Movimento do Trabalhadores Sem Terra National Income (GNP) 135, 136;
(MST) 235–6, 291 sources of 134
Moyo, Dambisa 135 Ogoni people 76
MS Swaminathan Research Foundation oil 67; dependence on 66; extraction of in
(MSSRF) 242 Niger delta 76; peak 60, 61
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) oil economies 75
168–9, 169 Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) (Pakistan)
Multilateral Environmental Agreements 294–5
(MEAs) 45, 122, 156 organic produce 49, 213
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Narmada People’s Movement 145 Development (OECD) 317
national action 172–8 O’Riordan, T. 41, 322
national environmental action plans Our Common Future 8–9
(NEAPs) 172 Oxfam 153, 180, 325; ‘Making Trade Fair’
National Environmental Policy Act (US) campaign 153, 154
306 ozone layer 46
natural disasters 254; risk of in cities 274,
274 Pakistan 75; Orangi Pilot Project (OPP)
Nelson, P.J. 144 294–5; water concerns 72, 73
neo-classical economics 27 participatory budgeting 291
neo-liberalism 39, 48, 158, 181; challenges participatory development 32, 184
to 152; and development 34–8 Participatory Learning and Action (PLA)
New Economics Foundation 314, 321 225, 229, 230
Newly Industrialising Countries 31 participatory poverty assessments 89, 90,
NGOs (non-governmental 196
organisations)178–85, 241, 296, 321, payments for environmental services 125
328; challenges 184–5; characteristics of Peak Oil 59, 61
for effecting sustainable development Peake, S. 110
183–4, 241; collaboration between People’s World Conference on Climate
World Bank and CSOs 182–3; features Change and Mother Earth’s Rights
of 178; formation of national-level (Bolivia) (2010) 110–11
180–1; and overseas development pesticides 209, 212
assistance 181; reasons for growth in Philippines: and NGOs 180–1
181–2; and urban sustainable Picket, K. 82
development 296–8; variety of 180; and Plane Stupid! 110
World Bank 182–3 political ecology 53, 99
Niger delta 76 pollution 40, 42, 122; air 61, 122, 276,
Nigeria 62, 95, 196, 256 285; cities 283, 284, 285; control 45;
9/11 (2001) 75 impact of on children 88
North American Free Trade Agreement pollution charges 124
(NAFTA) 67, 208 ‘pollution of poverty’ 43, 44
not-for-profit networks 162 population 77–81, 79–80; distribution of
nuclear waste 100 world 79; drivers and characteristics of
change 78, 80; increase in 77;
Obsinbanj, O. 62 relationship with development 77
Occupy movement 322 Porritt, Jonathon 159
358 • Index
post-development 37–8 Rostow, W. 27

poverty/poor 11, 15, 26, 47, 54, 58, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 69
84–100, 116, 148, 324, 327; defining rural areas 189–248, 255; and agriculture
89–90; and the environment 94–100; 201–2, 205; and agro-ecosystems 206–7,
environmentalism of the 50–1, 53, 324; 207; and development 191–5; divide
impact of globalisation on 11; influence between urban areas and 198–9, 199;
of ecosystem services on 97–9; lack of employment by sector of activity 205–6,
voice in environmental decision-making 206; Five ‘Rural Worlds’ typology 218,
96; and MDGs 85–9, 250; 219; key concepts in understanding
multidimensional nature of 89, 94, 99; change 202, 202; linkages with urban
number of people living in 85–6, 86; sectors 195–201, 255; migration from
and pollution 43, 44; rural areas 190; 195–6; non-farm activities 203, 205,
and slums 266–70, 268; urban 251, 261, 206; potential of mobile phones for
263–70, 265, 290, 299; and ‘urban bias’ development 199–200, 201; poverty
191–2 190; securing a livelihood in 201–8
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers rural development, sustainable 220–45;
(PRSPs) 148–9, 149, 327 capacity of local institutions 240–5;
Pretty, J. 218, 240 challenges 229, 232; and Community
privatisation: of basic services 279, 281 Based Natural Resource Management
Probo Koala (ship) 131–2 (CBNRM) 244–5; Farmer First
movement 223–32; importance of local
‘Quality of life counts’ strategy (1999) 307 context 220–3; land reform 232–4; and
Participatory Learning and Action
Rakodi, C. 195 (PLA) 225, 229, 230; prerequisites for
Ramsar Convention 128 223; role of women in conservation
recycling: and e-waste 62, 64 235–60; securing rights and gains
Redclift, M. 326 232–5; and social capital 241–3, 243,
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from 244; value of indigenous technologies
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 228–9
139–40, 314 Rusnak, G. 65, 76–7
Redefining Progress 321
refugees 81 sanitation 72, 276–7, 279–82; disparities in
regulatory mechanisms 45 urban and rural 198, 199
Reid, D. 46, 328–9 SAPS (structural adjustment programmes)
remittances 81, 196 34–5, 35, 138, 142, 146–7, 148
renewable energy sources 65–71, 323 Saro-Wiwa, Ken 76
resource conflicts 75–7 Satterthwaite, D. 84, 264, 298
resource curse 75–7 ‘Securing the future’ strategy (2005) 308
resource poor agriculture 216, 218–19, 224 SELCO India 200
resources: centrality of in development Self-Employed Women’s Association
59–77; challenges of low-carbon (SEWA) 238–9, 328
development 65–71; questioning self-help housing 243
environmental ‘limits’ 59–65; water Sen, Amartya 89, 317
‘scarcity’ 71–4 shanty towns 267
Reuters Market Light (RML) 242 Shiva, Vandana 235
Rigg, J. 202 Simon, D. 34
Rio+20 summit (2012) (Brazil) 11 Singapore 31
Rio Summit see Earth Summit sink limits 64
Rising Tide 110 slums 250, 266–70, 268, 280, 294
Robinson, G.M. 214 Smith, Adam 34
Index • 359
Smith, J. 110 trade 150–4, 325–6; concentration of 152;

social capital 241–3, 243, 244 contribution of developing countries to
social movements 180, 324 world exports 151, 151; and
Society for the Promotion of Area development 153; dominance of TNCs
Resources Centre (SPARC) (Mumbai) 152, 153, 158; effect of liberalisation on
296–8, 328 the environment 153, 154; and
solid waste disposal 22 multilateral trade arrangements 325–6;
South Africa: and GM crops 217; national Oxfam’s ‘Making Trade Fair’ campaign
plans on energy and climate change 174 153, 154; see also WTO
South Korea 31 Trafigura 131–2
Spain 176 transnational corporations see TNCs
Stern, Nicholas 109–10 transport: energy demand and greenhouse
Stern Review (The Economics of Climate gas emissions 71; making more
Change) 109–10 sustainable 285
Stiglitz Report 317–18 Truman, President 26
Stockholm conference (1972) 43, 45, 77, 100 tsunamis 72
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Tunisia 95
307
structural adjustment programmes see SAPs Uganda 256
subsidies 125–6, 175, 212 UN Conference on the Human
Sudan 75 Environment (1972) see Stockholm
sustainable development: assessing conference
progress towards 303–22; challenges UN Convention on the Law of the Seas
127; as common sense? 19–350; concept (UNCLOS) 128
of 16–19; definitions 8–9, 16, 18, 19; UN Convention to Combat Desertification
disciplinary development of 22–5; (UNCCD) 129
frameworks and depictions of 20–1, 20; UN Development Programme (UNDP) 89,
global challenges of 57–119; 90, 116, 146, 153, 326; Human
interpretations of 18, 19; objective of Development Reports 314; ‘Making
21; principles 15, 16; shared essentials Global Trade Work for People’ 326
of concept of 24, 25 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 45,
Sustainable Development Commission 308 146, 162
Sweden 43 UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC) 9, 102, 127, 129, 146
Taiwan 31, 38 UN Population Division 78
Talbreth 305 underdevelopment 26, 28, 29, 30
Tanzania 148 undernourishment 190, 259
tar sands (Canada) 66–7 unemployment 259, 299
‘tarmac bias’ 192 UNICEF: Adjustment with a Human Face
taxation 124, 175 (1987) 147–8
technocentric philosophy 41, 49 United Kingdom: government strategy
technologies: value of indigenous 228–9 indicators 308–11
terrorism: natural resource wealth as urban areas 249–301; and employment
source of 75 205–6, 206, 259; environmental
Thailand 38; slum upgrading programme challenges 273–88; environmental risks
294 at household and community level
Thatcher, Margaret 34 275–83; inadequacy of water supplies
TNCs (transnational corporations)158 160, 276–9; inadequate access to sanitation
162, 285 facilities 280–3, 282; indoor pollution
Todaro, M.P. 259 276; key patterns and processes of urban
360 • Index
change in developing world 255–73; wealth inequalities 87

linkages with rural sectors 195–201, well-being 90; components of 97; linkages
255; novel urban configurations 258; between ecosystem services and 97, 98
poverty 251, 261, 263–70, 265, 290, West Germany 162
299; slums 250, 266–70, 268, 280, 294; White, H. 90
waste disposal 281–3; see also cities Wilkinson, R. 82
‘urban bias’ 191–2 Willis, K. 38
urban corridors 258 wind technology 70, 71
urban development, sustainable 288–98, women: and agricultural work 234;
299–300; and city authorities 289–92; building of rights in sustainable water
common characteristics of 293; utilising management (India) 238–9; and
potential of community organisations discrimination 84; impact of cyclones
and local innovation 292–8 and flooding on in Bangladesh 100;
urbanisation 78, 81, 150, 189, 249–50, impact of environmental degradation on
250, 255; and development 251, 263; as 100, 237; and land rights 235; role of in
driver of exclusion and environmental conservation 235–40; and sanitation
degradation 250; environmental facilities 282–3
advantages of 254, 254; regional/country ‘Women Environment and Development’
diversity 255–9; rising ‘informality’ of projects 235
259–72 World Bank 26, 33, 34, 35, 89, 138, 139,
141–50, 162, 327; and agriculture
Vienna Convention 128 192–3, 193–4; and Civil Society
Villes sans bidonvilles programme Organisations (CSOs) 182–3; Climate
(Morocco) 269 Investment Fund 146; countries
voluntary regulation 126 receiving aid from 142, 143; dimensions
for good governance 178; engagement
‘war on terror’ 75 with civil society 182, 182; ENRM
Waraich, O. 73 lending 145–6, 146; four-fold
Ward, H. 240 environmental agenda of 144, 144; and
waste 61; controlling the trade in hazardous Global Environment Facility 146, 147;
130–2, 156; dispersal of industrial and greener project lending 144–6;
domestic 287–8; e-waste 61–4, 63 institutions of 141; lending by theme
waste disposal 281 142, 142; opposition to 144; origins 141;
waste water 72 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
water: access to clean and safe urban 72, 148–9; programme lending and
276–7, 277, 279; city sources 287; sustainable development 146–9;
global withdrawal by sector 60; qualifications for loans from 141; raising
inadequacy of urban supplies of 276–80; of money 142; and reducing of debts
inequalities in access 73–4, 279; 168, 169; strategic development and
‘perverse principle’ in accessing clean change within the 149–50, 150; World
74, 74; pollution of 122; regional Development Report 192
dimension of 287; withdrawals 60, 71 World Commission on Environment and
water management: building women’s Development see WCED
rights in sustainable 238–9 World Conservation Strategy (WCS) 45–6
water ‘scarcity’ 71–4 World Development Movement 180
water wars 71, 72 World Heritage Convention 128
WCED (World Commission on World Summit on Sustainable
Environment and Development) 8–9, 19, Development (WSSD) (Johannesburg)
82, 84, 96, 172, 184, 211, 250; report (2002) 9–10, 11
(1987) 46–7 World Wide Fund For Nature 169, 180
Index • 361
WTO (World Trade Organisation)152–3, WTO protests (1999) (Seattle) 38,

155–8, 326; Committee on Trade and 152–3
the Environment (CTE) 157; complexity
of negotiations 155; and developing Yumuna River (India) 287
countries 158; Doha Round 155–6;
principles 155

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An Introduction to

This fourth edition has been comprehensively rewritten and updated to

Jennifer A. Elliott is Principal Lecturer in Geography at the University of

The Perspectives on Development series will provide an invaluable, up to date

Published: Water Resources and Development

ISBN: 978-0-415-59072-3 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman and Franklin Gothic by

1.1a Promoting the messages of sustainable development:

3.3 NGO–state collaboration in slum upgrading, Delhi,

1.1 The structure of Agenda 21 10

2.2a World energy supply by source, 1980–2009 60

3.2 Percentage share of Africa’s ODA budget 134

4.10 The negative impacts of the integration of rural

6.4 The Bellagio STAMP: SusTainability Assessment

1.1 Economic growth rates in the world economy, 1971–2000

1.1 Forms of capital for sustainable development 23

4.6 The value of indigenous technologies 228

I would like to thank my colleagues and friends for continuing to be

This book is concerned with the continued challenges and

now responsible for a significant proportion of world exports and

Urbanisation is also occurring most rapidly in developing regions,

traced in Chapter 1 within an analysis of thinking and practice in

to address the integrated challenges of sustainable development. The

be identified on the basis of reflections on the substantive chapters

At the end of this chapter you should be able to:

G Understand why sustainable development is a contested concept

Sustainable development; development theory; globalisation; neo-liberalism;

In 1984, the United Nations (UN) established an independent group

24 languages (Finger, 1994) and its definition of the term continues

Figure 1.1 The structure of Agenda 21

Section 1: Social and Economic Dimensions

Section 2: Conservation and Management of Resources for Development

Section 3: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups

Section 4: Means of Implementation

Source: N. Robinson (1993).

in which more stakeholder groups were brought into formal

which they link explicitly to the environment. However, at the

Millennium Development Goal Target Selected environmental links*

Millennium Development Goal Target Selected environmental links*

Source: compiled from www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ and *UNEP (2007).

Figure 1.3 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development: the challenges

concerns for environmental degradation, poverty and exclusion

Figure 1.4 The UK Government’s Principles of Sustainable Development

I. Living within Environmental Limits

Living within Environmental Limits Ensuring a Strong,

Source: Compiled from DEFRA (2005)

perspectives and considers changing ideas about how development

The concept of sustainable development

Literally, sustainable development refers to maintaining development

Plate 1.1 Promoting the messages of sustainable development

a. Sign on entry to Kang, Botswana

b. Fresher’s Fair, University of Brighton, England

different disciplines have influenced and contributed to the

Definitions of sustainable development

Interpretations of sustainable development

‘It is indistinguishable from the total development of society.’

‘Sustainable development appears to be an over-used, misunderstood phrase.’

As suggested in the quotations in Figure 1.5, the attractiveness of the

Sustainable development as ‘common sense’?