PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

By: PASAJOL, Joan G.

Case No.

Case Title: Eulogio vs Bell GR No. 186322 July 8, 2015

Doctrine:
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of
the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the
value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of
those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155
and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting
it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at
the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the
statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners
needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the
increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

By: PASCASIO, Alfred Robinson

Case No.

Case Title: PNB vs Venancio GR No. 212483 October 5, 2016

Doctrine
I.) A spouse’s consent is indispensable for the disposition and encumbrance of conjugal
properties. The real estate mortgage over conjugal property is void if the non-contracting
spouse did not give consent. Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one
spouse must be consented to by the other; otherwise it is void. (See Article 124 of the Family
Code)

II.) The mortgage may have been declared void, but the principal obligation is not affected (it
remains valid). The mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the
principal contract of loan. Though the mortgage is void, it can still be considered as an
instrument evidencing indebtedness.
III.) If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (See Article 121 of
the Family Code) if the conjugal properties are not sufficient to answer for the loan, then the
creditor can recover the remaining unpaid balance from the separate properties of either
spouse.

By: PATRON, Christine Marie

Case No.

Case Title: Virginia Ocampo vs. Deogracia Ocampo GR No. 198908 August 3, 2015

Doctrine:
In a void marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides that "When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work
or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to
operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.

By: PICARDAL, Donn Ferdinand E.

Case No.

Case Title: Republic of the Philippines vs. Serenogon GR No. 199194 February 15, 2016

Doctrine:
To comply with the requirement under Article 41, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort.

By: PISEC, Erol Stephen B.

Case No.

Case Title: Castillo vs. De Leon Castillo GR No. 189607 April 18, 2016

Doctrine:
Marriage is governed by law in effect at the time of its celebration. - The validity of a
marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. In this case, both marriages were contracted before the Family Code
took effect, i.e. the Civil Code governs both marriages. Under the Civil Code, one distinct
difference between void marriages and voidable marriages is the requirement of a judicial
decree to establish invalidity - in a void marriage, no judicial decree is needed; while in a
voidable marriage, a judicial decree is mandatory. That there was no judicial declaration that
the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial
as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Thus, the second marriage is valid.

By: RAMOS, Karissa Marie, R.

Case No.

Case Title: Kho vs. Republic GR No. 187462 June 1, 2016

Doctrine :
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.
PROPERTY

By: REYES, Ma. Celina Noreen D.

Case No.

Case Title: Victoria vs. Pidlaoan GR No. 196470

Doctrine:
Mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484
of the Civil Code provides that co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided
thing or right belongs to different persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately
identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in good faith,
the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying indemnity; or
(b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. The law does not force the parties into a
co-ownership. A builder is in good faith if he builds on a land believing himself to be its
owner and is unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition.

By: SAPITULA, Ralph Errold

Case No.

Case Title: Department of Education vs. Casibang GR No. 192268

Doctrine:
Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is
to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice.

Elements: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice,
of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
By: TALORONG, Hayde

Case No. GR No. 198774

Case Title: Alolino vs. Flores April 4, 2016

Doctrines:
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW - An easement of light and view can only be acquired
through prescription or by virtue of a voluntary title.

EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE - Every building is subject to the easement which

prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance. A barrio road is designated
for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon.
Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed
house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The occupation and use of private
individuals of public places devoted to public use constitute public and private nuisances and
nuisance per se. This is so because the interests of the few do not outweigh the greater
interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general welfare.

By: UBANA. Ysabel B.

Case No.

Case Title: Quesada vs Bonanza Restaurant GR No. 207500

Doctrines
(1) Construction of concrete structures on the property without the registered
owner's permission does not forestall the sale of the property

There is no logical connection between the construction of concrete structures on the

property by the lessee and the registered owner's inability to sell it. The argument is a non
sequitur. In this case, the lease contract itself specifically recognized the lessee's right to
construct on the property and the registered owner's approval is only relevant with respect to
the lessee's right to the turnover of materials used upon the sale of the property. Other than
that, the contract does not oblige the lessee to secure the owner's consent prior to
constructing improvements. Article 1657 of the Civil Code enumerates the statutory
obligations of a lessee among which is to use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family,
devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be
inferred from the nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place. The
registered owner failed to show how any of the lessee's constructions go against the
permissible use of the property based on its nature.

(2) A summary proceeding for unlawful detainer contemplates a situation

where the defendant-lessee’s possession, while initially lawful, had legally
expired
 Under the Article 1673 of the Civil Code, a lessor may judicially eject the lessee for
any of the following causes: x x x (4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or
service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the
requirement in No. 2 of article 1657, as regards the use thereof. x x x In this case, the
registered owner failed to show that the lessee had dedicated the property to a use that is
contrary to its commercial nature and that caused its deterioration. On the contrary, the
lessee maintained the property and made improvements on it.

By: VALENCIANO, Aylwyn Maria S.

Case No.

Case Title: Daclison vs. Baytion GR No. 219811

Doctrines:

(1) ACCRETION - Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human
intervention. General rule is that the deposits must not be artificial and man-made.

NCC, Art. 457. The following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be
considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers

In this case, respondent failed to prove the attendance of the 2nd element. The contested
filled-up portion between the riprap constructed by the government and the property owned
by respondent Baytion is not an accretion that would form part of the latter’s property.

(2) NCC, Art. 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the thing that
has been mentioned.” This means that the supposed improvement must be made,
constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an
improvement contemplated 'by law.

The Court further ruled that the disputed property cannot also be considered an
improvement or accession.

By: YCONG, Cherrey Joy

Case No.

Case Title: Sps. Espinoza vs. Sps. Mayandoc GR No. 211170

Doctrine
In proving bad faith.— The settled rule is bad faith should be established by clear and
convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a known duty through some motive,
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. For anyone who claims that someone
is in bad faith, the former has the duty to prove such.

By: YRAOLA, Marison Mayumi

Case No.

Case Title: National Housing Authority vs. Manila Seedling Bank Foundation GR No. 183543

Doctrine

A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Since
respondent had no right to act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to it,
and since it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment of nine additional hectares of
petitioner's property rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to the excess. While respondent
may have been allowed by then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda to lease the
excess to various establishments, such authority did not come from petitioner, who is the
owner. As provided in the law, respondent shall be made to account for the fruits it received
from the time it took possession until the time it surrendered the excess to petitioner.
Respondent has admitted that it leased out the excess to various establishments and earned
profits therefrom. Having done so, it is bound to pay the corresponding amounts to
petitioner.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION

By: ALVAREZ, Dan Mar Z.

Case No.

Case Title: Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church vs Rigor 89 SCRA 493

Doctrine:
TESTATOR'S INTENT IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. — In testamentary succession cases,
as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of
the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the
determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat estor et eirt lex).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the
plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention
was different from that literally expressed.

CAPACITY TO INHERIT. — In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee

must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when
it is proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
WHERE BEQUEST IS INOPERATIVE. — If the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in
which the right of accretion exists (Art. 956, New Civil Code). The Civil Code recognizes that
a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession.
The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property covered by
the said legacy.

WHERE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL PROPERTIES. — Legal succession takes
place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator (Art. 960(2), New
Civil Code).

By ANCHORIZ, Andrei Dominic D.

Case No. 2

Case Title: Bagunu vs. Piedad GR No. 140975 December 8, 2000

Doctrine: ||
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent
and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as
that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into
the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person
to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of
representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral
line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the
Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives
to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative
within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of
the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

By: ANONUEVO, Ma. Criselda A.

Case No. 3

Case Title: Pascual vs Pascual- Bautista GR No. 84240 March 25, 1992
Doctrine:

Under Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. When the law is
clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. And even granting that exceptions may
be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication.

By: BELTRAN, Jose Miguel Banzon

Case No.

Case Title: Manuel vs. Hon. Ferrer GR No. 117246 August 21, 1995

Doctrine:
Iron Curtain. The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court. It states
that when legitimate persons have half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right
to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in
the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot
succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father;
and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general
intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in
relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.

By: BETITA, Maureen

Case No.

Case Title: Tison vs CA GR No. 121027 July 31, 1997

Doctrine:
SUCCESSION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY – The issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. The presumption continues to operate unless and until it is
rebutted by a proper party. Unless and until it is rebutted, the presumption may stand in lieu
of evidence. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its
truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.|||

By: BUCOY, Isagani Jr. B.

Case No.

Case Title: Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA GR No. 116775 January 22, 1998

Doctrine:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place. The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by
Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-
sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, defendants and
intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives
of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the
lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION; A NEPHEW IS A COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY

INHERIT IF NO DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT, OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE DECEDENT.
— Petitioners misappreciated the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As
already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore
Justa's nephews. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no
descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a
half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's
heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of
the survivors."

By: CABILDO, Josephine Ivane V.

Case No.

Case Title: Gonzales vs. CA GR No. 117740 October 30, 1998

Doctrine:
SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL RELATIVES; WHEN PRECLUDED FROM INHERITING
FROM THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — With the finding that private respondents are
the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate
of their brother. The applicable provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. As to petitioners' claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad
actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court
ruled that the evidence presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth
belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to
great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine
the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are
entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de
Mesa.

By: CABRERA, Errol D.

Case No.

Case Title: Nazareno vs. CA GR No. 138842 October 18, 2000

Doctrine:
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though
Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and
distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding
the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and NOT the
estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully
disposed.

By: CRUZ, Lean Richard T.

Case No.

Case Title: Sanchez vs. CA GR No. 108947 September 29, 1997

Doctrine:
Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that “[e]very act which is intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.” For a
partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the
following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there
were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4)
the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We
therefore affirm the validity of the parties’ compromise agreement/partition in this case.
By: DE ELLO, Philip Edwin S.

Case No.

Case Title: Heirs of Conti vs CA GR No. 118464 December 21, 1998

Doctrine:
A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action
originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud. [12 Phil. 109 (pp.
113-114; 1908)]

By: DE GUINTO, Charlene L.

Case No. 11

Case Title: Alejandrino vs CA GR No. 114151 September 17, 1998

Doctrine:
RIGHTS OF HEIRS; TO USE AND ENJOY THE UNDIVIDED ESTATE BEFORE
PARTITION. — Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Eaco-
owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made,
the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together
with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition
to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the right of an heir over the property of the
decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.

TO SELL THE PRO INDIVISO SHARE OF THE INHERITED PROPERTY BEFORE

PARTITION; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of
inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by
Article 1088. In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro
indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned
in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property
could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article
493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

PARTITION; WAYS IT COULD BE EFFECTED. — Under the law, partition of the estate of
a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court
in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the
testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.

COULD NOT BE EFFECTED IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTION. —

The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title.
As there is no pending administration proceeding, the property of the
Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial
settlement of estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered
before the trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property
sold to private respondent.

CAN BE EVIDENCED BY THE OVERT ACT OF A CO-OWNER. — It appears that when a

co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an
end to indivision among (his) co heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced
by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the
form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co-ownership by
selling her share to private respondent.

By: DELA CRUZ, Paul Arwin A.

Case No.

Case Title: Lopez vs CA GR No. 127827 March 5, 2003

Doctrine:
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each
a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other.

By: DIATO, Jea Mari D.

Case No.

Case Title: Bravo- Guerrero vs. CA GR No. 152658 July 29, 2005

Doctrine:
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for valuable
consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value
replaces the property taken from the estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand,
must be included in the computation of legitimes.

By: FRANCISCO, Migmar Bernped S.

Case No.
Case Title: Bascara vs. Sheriff Rolando Javier GR No. 188069 June 17, 2015

Doctrine

In this case, while it is undisputed that petitioner was in possession of the subject property, it
cannot be said that his right to possess the same is by virtue of being a co-owner,
agricultural tenant or usufructuary; nor is the claim to his right of possession analogous to
the foregoing situations. What is clear is that he allegedly acquired the property from Pardo
by reason of a donation mortis causa. He is, therefore, a transferee or successor-in-interest
who merely stepped into the shoes of his aunt. He cannot assert that his right of possession
is adverse to that of Pardo as he has no independent right of possession. Consequently,
under legal contemplation, he cannot be considered as a "third party who is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor." The trial court had the ministerial duty to
issue, as it did issue, the possessory writ in favor of respondent Pangilinan. As it appeared,
there was no reason for it to order the recall of the writ already issued.\

By: GONZALES, Jo-Anne P.

Case No.

Case Title: Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo J. Hacbang v. Atty. Basilio H. Alo, G.R. No.
191031, October 5, 2015

Doctrine:
Article 777 of the NCC provides that the inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent’s
death without a moment’s interruption. Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed with
specific properties do not require court adjudication to identify which particular properties
become theirs; the testator had already identified these. From the very moment of testator’s
death, title over these properties vests on the heir, legatee, and devisee.

By: LATINA, Christian Michael E.

Case No.

Case Title: Testate Estate of Potenciano vs. Potenciano GR No. 226271 November 9, 2016

Doctrine:
Surviving spouse generally cannot be a compulsory heir by way of right of representation.
While the surviving spouse cannot claim to be a compulsory heir of his or her parent-in-law,
such rule is not applicable to Irma P.E. Potenciano because she is not succeeding the
decedent by right of representation, but as one of the heirs of the compulsory heirs of the
decedent. |||

By: MENDOZA, Lauren Antonette M.

Case No.

Case Title: Heirs of the Late Ecarma vs. CA GR No. 193374 June 8, 2016

Doctrine: Article 495 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in
accordance with Article 498 of the same Code, i.e. sale of the property and distribution of the
proceeds. Therefore,' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject properties which are
co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners representing the share of the deceased,
they cannot preclude the other owners likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses,
from exercising all incidences of their full ownership.

By: MILLERA, Rommel M.

Case No.

Case Title: Heirs of Leandro Natividad and Juliana Natividad vs. Natividad GR No. 198434
February 29, 2016

Doctrine:
By operation of law, the heirs succeed not only to the rights of the decedent but also to his
obligations.

By: PAGBILAO, Raymond Eigel R.

Case No.

Case Title: Alejandra Arado Heirs: Jesusa Arado, etc. vs. Anacleto Alcoran and Elenette
Sunjaco G.R. No. 163362 July 8, 2015

Doctrine:
Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such
children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child (Iron Curtain Rule in intestate
succession.) The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent (citing Diaz vs. IAC; 182
SCRA 427)