Ideology

TEUN A. VAN DIJK

Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

Introduction

Ideology is a complex phenomenon that requires a multidisciplinary approach. As

systems of belief, ideologies are a form of social cognition and hence need to be
studied in (social) psychological terms. As developed and used by social groups,
they need to be accounted for in a sociological and politicological framework. And
acquired, (re)produced, and communicated by situated text and talk, they need a
discourse-analytical and communicational approach. Such a multidisciplinary theory
goes beyond traditional philosophical views of ideology as a form of false conscious-
ness. This entry summarizes such a multidisciplinary theory of ideology, with special
attention to the relations between ideology and communication (for detail of the
theory summarized here, see Van Dijk, 1998).
Another fundamental difference from most classical approaches is that ideologies are
not necessarily negative. They are not only developed and used to sustain and legitimate
social and political power abuse, as is the case for racism, but can also be shared and
used by social groups to resist such domination and in order to propagate egalitarian
attitudes and practices, as is the case for feminism. In both cases, ideologies are belief
systems shared by groups in order to promote their interests and to guide their social
and political practices.

Ideology as social cognition

Whatever else ideologies may be or do, they are first of all a kind of belief, that is,
they are mental representations, as is also the case for forms of social cognition such as
knowledge, opinions, attitudes, norms, and values. But unlike personal opinions they
are essentially shared by social collectivities. They are a form of shared or “widespread”
ideas (Fraser & Gaskell, 1990). There are no such things as personal ideologies, in the
same way as there are no personal languages. Even when the original “ideas” that give
rise to an ideology have been developed by one or a few individuals, these ideas only
constitute an ideology as defined here when groups of people acquire, share, propagate,
and use them to promote their collective interests and to guide their social practices.
Yet, as is the case for languages, ideologies may be learned and used by individu-
als as group members in their everyday practices—thus bridging the well-known gap
between social structure and individual agency. This also guarantees that ideologies can
be (slowly) changed and adapted to new social and political situations.

The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, First Edition. Edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc011
2 ID E O L O G Y

As socially shared systems of ideas, ideologies are part of a very complex network of
neurologically based mental representations stored in the (so-called “semantic”) long-
term memory. As is the case for the socioculturally shared knowledge of communities,
they are slowly acquired and relatively stable in order to serve as a fundamental cogni-
tive basis for the everyday social conduct and discourse of group members. One does
not become a racist or feminist overnight, nor an antiracist or an antifeminist for that
matter.
Although, since the 1980s, there have been a large number of studies on various
forms of social cognition in social psychology (for an introduction and review see, e.g.,
Augoustinos, Walker, & Donoghue, 2006; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), sociocognitive studies
of ideology have been rare.

Ideologies as polarized self-schemas of a group

Although at present the detailed cognitive organization (as well as the neurological
basis) of ideologies is still unknown, ideologically based discourse and other social prac-
tices provide some indirect insight into these underlying mental structures.
In order to serve the interests of a social group, ideologies must represent the very
“definition” of the group, so that group members can identify themselves as group mem-
bers in the first place. Thus, ideologies typically represent who we are, what we do,
why we do it, how we (should or should not) do it, and what we do it for, that is, our
social identity, actions, goals, norms and values, resources, and interests. In that respect,
ideologies are the collective, basic mental self-schema of a group consisting of infor-
mation organized by these schematic categories. Often this self-schema is positively
biased—although some (dominated) groups in a specific sociopolitical environment
may have a negative self-schema (for details, see Van Dijk, 1998)
Secondly, most group ideologies are developed and used in relation to other social
groups, for example whether to compete with, dominate, resist, or otherwise inter-
act with other groups and their members. This is only possible when group members
not only have an ideological self-schema, but also need to form a schematic repre-
sentation of relevant other groups, as is the case for racists with regard to ethnically
different immigrants or minorities, and feminists with regard to sexist men. This other-
representation is usually negatively biased. In other words, ideologies tend to be polar-
ized between Us and Them, between ingroups and outgroups (for intergroup relations,
see Tajfel, 1982).
Unlike socially shared knowledge of communities, group ideologies are at least partly
evaluative, as is shown in their positive ingroup and negative outgroup bias, and as
defined by the norms and values of a group and its surrounding society and culture.
Thus, a positive socioculturally shared value such as freedom may be construed in dif-
ferent ideologies in order to serve particular group interests, as is the case with the
freedom of the market, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and academic
freedom, on the one hand, and freedom from oppression, discrimination, or pollution,
on the other.
As socially shared mental self-schemas, ideologies must be quite general and abstract,
because they need to be relevant for many different people, circumstances, experiences,
 ID E O L O G Y 3

and social practices and in many different situations during a relatively long period, so
as to be able to maintain the identity and serve the interest of a group. In that sense
they represent general principles and guidelines rather than detailed instructions or
opinions on specific issues.

Ideologies and social attitudes

In order to be able to serve as guidelines for everyday practices of group members,
ideologies are assumed to found and organize more specific, socially shared represen-
tations, traditionally known as attitudes. Thus, group members may have stereotypes,
prejudices, or other generic attitudes on government intervention in the market, on
immigration, abortion, homosexual marriage, the death penalty, or minority quotas,
among many other issues.
Although also the detailed structure of such attitudes has hardly been studied, despite
a long tradition of attitude research in social psychology (see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,
1993), their ideological basis and manifestations in discourse and social practices sug-
gest that they also tend to be polarized, for example between pro-choice and pro-life
views of abortion, as well as the positive representation of the views and conduct of
the ingroup, and a negative one of the outgroup. Whereas ideologies may define the
general coherence of various attitudes of a group, attitudes themselves are more spe-
cific and tend to influence our discourse and other social practices as group members
more directly. This also means that we usually acquire specific attitudes first, and only
later acquire a more fundamental ideological framework for them. Thus, women may
develop a critical attitude toward sexual harassment, and only later acquire a more gen-
eral feminist ideology in order to resist other forms of male domination.

Ideological mental models

For ideologies to develop as the basis of shared experiences, and to act as guidelines of
the daily practices of group members, they obviously need to be related to the opin-
ions and activities of individual group members. To thus relate social structure and
individual agency, we use the fundamental cognitive notion of mental models. Mod-
els are defined as embodied, subjective mental representations of personal experiences,
actions, and situations, and are represented in the episodic (autobiographical) memory
part of long-term memory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1993). In order
to represent social situations and their environment or personal experiences, to plan
and execute specific actions, and to understand or coordinate with other ingroup or
outgroup members, people form such subjective mental models on an ongoing basis.
These models, on the one hand, are construed by instantiations or applications of
socially shared knowledge in the community (e.g., on immigration); on the other hand
they may be influenced by the socially shared attitudes and ideologies of the ingroup.
But as personal mental models they are not merely instantiations of socially shared
beliefs, but also may be influenced by earlier or current personal experiences, that is,
old models, which may even be at variance with shared experiences of a group.
4 ID E O L O G Y

Thus, the mental models construed by group members (as group members) are the
ways in which ideologies are “lived” in the everyday experience of group members, and
explain why and how ideologies may show considerable personal variation, uses, and
manifestations. Based on socially shared attitudes, mental models thus feature person-
ally variable opinions on specific events. These mental models of personal experiences
are also the source of possible changes in ideology, for instance as new circumstances
may lead to different personal experiences shared by an increasing number of group
members—as we know from the historical development of racism, pacifism, or femi-
nism.
Models are subjective mental representations of specific events and situations and
share a fundamental cognitive schema defining all human experiences, organized by
such basic categories as setting (time, place), participants (and their identities, roles,
and relationships), ongoing events, actions, or situations, and goals. Such mental models
serve not only to represent past actions but also to control ongoing conduct and to plan
future actions of group members.
We can see that the combined social and personal influences on the mental models
of everyday experiences and practices define these mental models as the ideal inter-
face between social structure and individual agency. Thus, ideologically based mental
models allow people to understand and act as group members and in the interests of a
group. This also means that they serve as the basis for discourse and communication as
ideological practices of groups and their members.

Ideological discourse and communication

Ideologies are not innate but learned. As briefly indicated above, they are gradually
acquired by people as members of social groups, mediated by personal experiences
(subjective mental models) instantiated by, or generalized as, socially shared attitudes
about relevant social or political issues. For such social attitudes and their underlying
ideologies to be acquired and shared in a group in the first place, they usually need
to be expressed, formulated, or otherwise communicated among group members or
defended or legitimated outside of the group. That is, ideologies are typically produced
and reproduced by talk or text by ideological discourse, such as party programs, parlia-
mentary debates, news reports and editorials, textbooks, bibles, pamphlets, or scientific
articles, as well as everyday conversations among or with people as group members (Van
Dijk, 1998, 2008b).

Ideological discourse structures

Ideological discourse is not shaped arbitrarily. In order to function as a persuasive
expression and reproduction of group attitudes and ideologies, some discourse struc-
tures are more typical or efficient than others. Thus, one of the most typical and general
properties of ideological discourse is its polarized nature, reflecting the underlying
polarized structure of social attitudes and ideologies, that is, a polarization between
 ID E O L O G Y 5

(positive) Us and (negative) Them. Indeed, these very pronouns are the prototypical
grammatical markers of underlying ideologies.
This polarization may affect all variable structures at all levels of discourse and its
communicative contexts, such as

• who has the floor in a debate or conversation

• who has active or passive access to public discourse
• overall discourse topics
• descriptions of people and their actions and properties
• lexical items (words)
• metaphors
• implications and presuppositions
• arguments
• narrative structures
• rhetorical operations (“figures”), such as hyperboles and euphemisms
• images and photos

and so on.
This discursive polarization is typically characterized by enhancing the positive prop-
erties of Us, the ingroup, and the negative properties of Them, the outgroup. At the
same time, the negative properties of the ingroup and the positive ones of the outgroup
are typically de-emphasized, toned down, mitigated, or simply ignored or hidden. We
thus obtain an ideological square (Van Dijk, 1998) that may be applied at all levels of
the discourse: positive topics about Us (how tolerant, modern, advanced, peaceful, or
intelligent We are), negative topics about Them (how intolerant, backward, aggressive,
etc. They are), and avoid negative topics about Us (e.g., our racism or our international
aggression, or their contribution to our economy and welfare). The same goes for the
words or metaphors we use, or what information is explicit or remains implicit, fore-
grounded or backgrounded, among many other discourse structures. Even the syntax
of active or passive sentences may thus be used to emphasize our good properties or to
hide or background the bad properties of people talked about.
Polarized ideological discourse is not only based on the polarized ideological mental
models of the speakers, but is also persuasively designed to help form or confirm sim-
ilar ideological models among the recipients of discourse and communication. It is in
this way that ideologies are slowly learned and reproduced by public ingroup discourse
of many types (from news in the media or school textbooks to everyday conversa-
tions). And once such ideological models of specific events are created by the recipients,
repeated communication may lead to the formation of socially shared ideological atti-
tudes and, finally, to general, underlying ideologies. We thus analyze and explain how
ideologies are formed and reproduced, and at the same time how they are used—and
thus at the same time reproduced—in social practices such as discourse and commu-
nication. And when the social or political attitudes thus communicated are in the best
interests of a dominant group and against the best interests of a dominated group and/or
the public at large, we are specifically dealing with the form of persuasion we call manip-
ulation (Van Dijk, 2005).
6 ID E O L O G Y

Context models
The expression and reproduction (or the challenge) of ideologies by discourse is not
only controlled by the underlying mental models of events and situations we write or
talk about. We also have mental models of the very communicative situation we partici-
pate in, such as a teacher talking in a classroom to her students, a politician addressing
other members of parliament, or a journalist writing a news report. Since these mod-
els define the context of discourse, we call them context models. They make sure that
discourse is appropriate in a given communicative situation—for example what can or
cannot be said in a parliamentary debate and how it should (or should not) be said (Van
Dijk, 2008a).
In a theory of ideology and its reproduction by discourse, we need to study not only
the structures of ideological text or talk, but also, especially, the mental context models
representing the definition of the communicative situation by the participants. Indeed,
the expression of ideologies is crucially dependent on context. Feminists will not always
speak as feminists, depending on the situation, to whom they are speaking, and what
the goal of the discourse is. Similarly, racists or male chauvinists may sometimes hide
their prejudices if, in their current discourse, it would be against their interests. On
the other hand, among group members, or in conflict discourse, ideological discourse
may be very explicit in order to teach, propagate, defend, or legitimate the ideology
or the practices of a group. Hence, a detailed analysis of the communicative situation is
necessary in order to be able to describe and explain the presence or absence and nature
of ideological discourse structures.

Ideology is not the same as discourse

Since ideologies are usually expressed and reproduced by text or talk, there is a tendency
to confuse or collapse the notion of ideology with that of discourse. In our view, such
a conceptual identification is misguided, if only because ideologies are cognitive struc-
tures and discourses, as defined here (as concrete instances of text or talk) are linguistic
structures, on the one hand, and a form of social action or communication on the other.
Ideologies can be expressed by discourse, but are not the same as discourse. Ideologies
can also be expressed by other social practices, as we know from seeing sexual harass-
ment or racial discrimination being used as expressions of sexist or racist ideologies. In
other words, it makes sense to distinguish ideologies as forms of social cognition from
the ways they are being expressed and used in discourse or other social practices.
The confusion between discourse and ideology is even more common in the concept
of discourse used by Foucault (1971), that is, they are seen not as concrete instances of
text or talk, but as systems or orders of discourse (as in genres of political discourse or,
even more abstractly, in terms of the discourse of modernity). This more abstract, more
philosophical notion of discourse is often also referred to by the capitalized term, Dis-
course (see, e.g., Gee, 2010). In that case it (vaguely) refers to systems and ideas as well
as sets of (concrete) discourses—and hence such a notion is closer to the notion of ide-
ology as defined here. But even for this (macro) concept of Discourse, it makes sense to
distinguish between systems of ideas, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ways these
 ID E O L O G Y 7

are expressed in, for example, systems of philosophical, political, or media discourses
during a given historical period. We also suggest a distinction be made between the
general notion of a “system of ideas” (including philosophical systems) and an ideol-
ogy. Thus, Marx developed a system of ideas, as did many philosophers, but (fragments
of) that system only became a (Marxist) ideology when it was acquired, spread, and
used by members of a collectivity. Kant also designed a system of ideas, but it would be
strange to talk of an ideology of Kantism. In other words, the history and the theory
of ideology (and of discourse for that matter) have shown a great deal of theoretical
confusion that we can clear up with more explicit analytical categories and distinctions
today, for example from contemporary discourse studies and cognitive science.

Ideology and society

The relevance of an analysis of context as part of ideological discourse analysis already

establishes a link between ideologies and the social situation, that is, with the identity
and goals of groups and group members and their ongoing practices. Thus, whereas
the social nature of ideologies is defined by belief systems shared by social groups, and
used by group members, we have also seen that the expression, acquisition, and repro-
duction of ideologies take place in specific social communicative situations. Hence, the
communicative theory of ideology presented here triangulates a sociopolitical, cogni-
tive, and discursive component (for the concept of ideology, especially as part of social
and political theory, see, among a vast number of books, Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979;
Thompson, 1984).
The social component of a theory of ideology deals not only with communicative
situations and interactions or social practices at the micro-level of the social order, but
also with complex, higher-level societal structure and organization. We have already
defined ideologies as a type of belief shared by social groups and their cognitive and
discourse structures as polarized between Us and Them, between ingroups and out-
groups, and involving the shared representation of social identities, goals, norms and
discourse values, resources, and interests. Such polarization often needs to be based on
a societal analysis in terms of power, power abuse, domination, and resistance, includ-
ing which groups have access to public discourse, such as that of politics, the media,
or education—a major power resource. It is in such a broader framework that the fun-
damental functions of ideologies are described and explained, for instance in terms of
the promotion of group cohesion, the coordination of collective action, maintaining or
resisting power, defending or challenging resources or other interests, and so on.
At the same time, a societal analysis of ideology needs to be more explicit about the
nature of different ideological groups, their position, interests, organization, and collec-
tive action. A racist political party, a feminist action group, a pacifist network, a labor
union, and a professional organization are all ideological groups, but they have very
different properties. Some groups have explicit “ideologues” teaching group ideology to
newcomers (as is the case for the catechism of a church), or journalists spreading ideolo-
gies through the media of a group, whereas other ideological groups have more informal
ways of communicating and reproducing their ideology. Some ideological groups may
8 ID E O L O G Y

be organized with “card-carrying” official members, elections, leaders, and so on, as is

the case for political parties, whereas other ideological groups only informally exist as
people sharing specific ideological ideas (as is the case for progressive and conserva-
tive ideologies—or rather meta-ideologies, because they may dominate many different
ideologies). Patriarchy may thus be a powerful dominant ideology, but is often not orga-
nized as such, for example by explicit male chauvinist clubs, media, or memberships,
but, rather, is present and shared in many or most social groups and organizations dom-
inated by men.
It is also within such a broad sociopolitical framework that we need to describe
and explain the changes of ideologies, for instance as a result of the many forms of
interaction (including discourse and communication) between ideological groups,
or the actions (or lack of action) of the state. A characteristic example has been the
positive influence of ecological ideologies on many existing consumerist or industrial
ideologies—as may be concluded from the analysis of the “ecologically conscious”
advertising of polluting oil companies, or the influence of feminism on traditional
chauvinist ideologies and practices. Obviously, ideologies may develop as a function
of economic and sociocultural conditions—even when the general Marxian thesis of
the influence of the economic base on the (ideological) superstructure is too vague
and not generally true. Pacifism may be hard to defend when the country is invaded.
Racism and xenophobia typically tend to grow when immigration drastically increases,
especially in economically hard times, as is the case in Europe today. Socialism
developed as a reaction to capitalism, and antiracism is by definition a reaction to
racism and its discriminatory practices (for more recent studies of political ideologies,
see, e.g., Freeden, 1996).
Of course, these are all very general, societal macroprocesses that need detailed
microanalysis of the precise mechanisms involved, such as the discourse and commu-
nication practices of an ideological group, how such discourses are understood and
how they form persuasive mental models and changing attitudes among members of
other ideological groups, and how these changing attitudes are in turn collectively
reproduced in other groups by various kinds of public discourse (political debate,
policies, news, propaganda, advertising, teaching, and so on).
In other words, even a macrosociological approach to the development, changes, and
influences of ideologies in terms of groups, group relations, power, institutions, laws,
and so on, often requires detailed discourse and communication analysis. Ideologies
may partly develop as a result of the social and political circumstances of a group (e.g.,
as a reaction to oppression and discrimination, or as legitimation of power abuse), yet
for the mental models of personal experiences (including emotions and opinions about
such personal experiences) to become shared in a group, so that others know what I
know and feel, people need to talk, write, and communicate. Hence, at all levels of the
theory of ideology, we always need

1 a macrosociological component of social or political situations, conditions, or group

relations (of power, competition, etc.), on the one hand, and a microsociological
component of everyday interaction or social practices, especially talk and text, on
the other;
 ID E O L O G Y 9

2 a sociocognitive component of mental models of specific, personal, situated experi-

ences, on the one hand, and generic, sociocultural attitudes, ideologies, norms, and
values, on the other; and
3 a detailed analysis of the many ideologically influenced structures of text and talk as
forms of discursive interaction in specific situations and social practices, on the one
hand, and a general analysis of access to discourse, specific genres, and the over-
all communication institutions and processes in society—including, for instance,
an analysis of media practices, control, and power, on the other. These ideological
communicative practices are themselves instances of the microsociological compo-
nent with its macrosociological consequences, making the theory a complete system
of ideological reproduction in society.

In other words, each of the components of theoretical triangulation between society,

cognition, and discourse/communication has a micro and a macro level of analysis.

An example: Racism

By way of example, let us finally be more specific about racism as an ideology and how it
is discursively reproduced in society (for detail, see Van Dijk, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b)
Racism is a social system of domination, in which “white” (European, etc.) groups
dominate “non-white” (non-European) groups. This overall system is implemented and
daily reproduced at the micro level in and by specific forms of racist practice and inter-
action, leading to discrimination. This system of domination or inequality and its dis-
criminatory practices are based on and legitimated by an underlying, socially shared
system of racist ideology, in which (white) ingroups are represented positively and (non-
white) outgroups are represented negatively.
This overall ideology is derived from and then again applied in the formation or con-
firmation of racist attitudes, for example about immigration, elections, busing, quotas,
intelligence, the labor market, and so on. These attitudes in turn are derived (bottom
up) from and again applied (top down) in the formation of, personally variable, racist
mental models of specific group members about specific “racial” or “ethnic” events in
specific situations. These various levels of racist mental representation are all involved
in the production of racist practices, for example exclusion, marginalization, and prob-
lematization of many different kinds.
One of these ideological racist practices, discourse or communication, has a double
function. On the one hand text and talk may be discriminatory practices like all others
(and exclude, problematize, and marginalize immigrants or minority members), and
thus reproduce the overall system of racist domination as explained above. On the other
hand, discourse is crucial in the development, and especially the reproduction, of the
underlying racist attitudes and ideologies that sociocognitively “ground” the system of
domination, and provide its rationale and legitimation. This is especially the case for
the role of public discourses, such as the discourses of politics and the bureaucracy, the
mass media and education.
10 ID E O L O G Y

However, only specific social groups, the symbolic elites, control and have preferen-
tial access to such public discourses, making them primarily responsible for the discur-
sive reproduction of racism, whether or not they are influenced by non-elite members
of the dominant group (influence that itself is discursively managed and controlled). At
the same macro level of the analysis of racism, we further need to examine the role of
(racist or antiracist) political parties, legislation, the courts, racist and antiracist orga-
nizations, and so on. Much of this analysis is again based on the public discourses (and
their cognitive and social consequences) of these groups and institutions.
In other words, a complex system of domination such as racism and its underlying
ideology needs to be studied in terms of the social, cognitive, and discursive analysis of
its development, reproduction, and change. Detailed, and systematic discourse analysis
can be used to study the empirical data at all levels and in each component.

SEE ALSO: Argumentation, Political; Cognition, Political; Collective Memory; Dis-

course Analysis; Feminist Theory; Groupthink; Language, Political; Manipulation;
Persuasion, Political; Polarization, Political; Political Discourse; Political Psychology;
Stereotypes; Values

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Teun A. van Dijk was professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam
until 2004 and at Pompeu Fabra University until 2014. After earlier research on literary
theory, text grammar, discourse pragmatics, and the psychology of text processing, his
work since the 1980s has mainly been within the framework of critical discourse studies,
with special attention to the study of racism and discourse, news discourse, ideology,
context, and knowledge. His most recent publication is Discourse and Knowledge: A
Sociocognitive Approach (2014). Since 2014 he has lived and worked in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. For a list of his publications, consult his website: http://www.discourses.org.