CONFLICTS CASE NOTES

Cases on Preliminary Course Outline

1 Philsec Investment v. CA (1997)

Thus, the principal issue to be resolved in this case is whether Civil Case No. 16536 is
barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.

Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res judicata, a
judgment admitting the foreign decision is not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners
argue that the foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving
them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact."

Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of res
judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, 7 it was after the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under
the law. 8 It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding
for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.
This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary. 9 Rule 39, §50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive

upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive

evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary

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………..

Second. Nor is the trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under
the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the
grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not include forum non conveniens. 16 The
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination,
hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances" require the court's desistance. 17

In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed
to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the
defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the
latter's debt which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court
arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.

Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that
jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in
personam and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on
extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant
may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, "the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 18 It is not disputed
that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached
prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987. 19

2 Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs (1969)

The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo
loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for
smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs officials on the
high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the
seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..

It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal
Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction
against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ... 8 The principle of law that
sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the
seizure of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. 9

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Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart,10 an 1804 decision, that a state has the
right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending
to the high seas.

3 US v. Look Chaw (1910)

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the
parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the
court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of
an agreement under an international treaty.

4 People v. Wong Cheng (1922)

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime,
like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdiction waters. 

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a
foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle
and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants
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 did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country. . . .

such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

5 Bank of America v. CA (2003)

Second Issue. Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non-
conveniens?

No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient',

emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum
shopping,42 that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place
wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural
advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to
select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 43

Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine

depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. 44 In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals,45 this Court held that "xxx [a Philippine Court may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites
are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort
to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision."46 Evidently, all these requisites are present in the instant case.

Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of

Appeals,47 that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for
a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said
doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle

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of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.

6 Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC (2000)

The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the
case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the
case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen The Palace Hotel and MHICL are
foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.

The employment contract. — Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace
Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman,
where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of
the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. 36

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 37 The conditions
are unavailing in the case at bar.

Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the
incidents of the case — from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal
occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines.
Neither .are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr.
Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an intelligent decision be made as

to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil.
This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract was made).38

The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos
signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This
letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China.

No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC determine the facts
surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing,

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People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the
Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to
justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. — Even assuming that a

proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect
against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its
person was not acquired.

7 K.K. Shell v. CA (1990)

2. Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the courts will not find that
K.K. Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall back on the
argument that even if this were so, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a
valid ground to cause the dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention.

K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its right as maritime lienholder. It cites
Presidential Decree No. 1521, the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, which provides:

SEC. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; person entitled to such lien-Any

person furnishing repairs, supplies, to wage, use of dry dock or marine
railway, or other necessaries, to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic,
upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorized by
the owner, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be
enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that
credit was given to the vessel.

Private respondents on the other hand argue that even if P.D. No. 1521 is applicable,
K.K. Shell cannot rely on the maritime lien because the fuel was provided not
exclusively for the benefit of the MV Estella, but for the benefit of Crestamonte in
general. Under the law it must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel
itself. Now, this is a defense that calls precisely for a factual determination by the trial
court of who benefitted from the delivery of the fuel. Hence, again, the necessity for the
reception of evidence before the trial court.

In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact that the private
respondents have yet to file their answer in the proceedings below and trial on the
merits is still to be conducted, whether or not petitioners are indeed maritime lienholders
and as such may enforce the lien against the MV Estella are matters that still have to be
established.

Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the relationship of the parties is still to

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be established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who
is in the best position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the
suit.

8 Communications Materials and Design v. CA (1996)

Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or

non application, of the private international law rule of forum non
conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance
or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue
before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the
original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to
question plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue
of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the
facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience.4 7 Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the
court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 48

The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present
forum not being the "most convenient" as a ground for the suit's dismissal,
deserves scant consideration.

9 Raytheon International v. Rouzie (2008)

The instant petition lacks merit.

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and

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citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases

involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances 27 where
the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies
with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties
and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or
the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is filed. 29

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.32

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it
is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 34 Petitioner’s

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averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

10 Navida v. Dizon (2011)

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.59 Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other
than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action
and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately ₱2.7 million for each
of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed
in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute
a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately ₱2.7 million for each plaintiff
claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the
RTCs.

Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in
the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the
agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended
Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the
Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have
reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the
act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In
personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow
the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the

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plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. 66

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are
all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second,
the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within
the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence
from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other
members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering
the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to
assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support
the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that
the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant
companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying
these cases.67

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of all the defendant companies

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons." In this connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized
representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the proceedings before
the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings
below.

11 Hasegawa v. Kitamura (2007)

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject
matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be
assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed
by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in
Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language.

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Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the
parties46 following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private
International Law.47

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases

are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should
litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced?53

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction
does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.

In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction. In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the

sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law. 58 It is further determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, 60 the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to
adjudicate the claims.61

What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" 63 or the law of the
place where a contract is made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed."65 It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract 66 and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state
has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties.68 This rule takes into account several contacts and

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evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue
to be resolved.69

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a
dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. 70 They determine
which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law
rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact

that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. 72 Also, when the law of a
foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. 73

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the
latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other State or States. 74 The court’s power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign
law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns.75

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss
because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. 78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.79

12 Continental Micronesia v. Basso (2015)

The next question is whether the local forum is the convenient forum in light of the facts
of the case. CMI contends that a Philippine court is an inconvenient forum.

We disagree.

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Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case
may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are
met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision.46 All these requisites are present here.

Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical
presence in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch,
while Basso, before his death, was residing here.

Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were needed for
the parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.

The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident
subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the
surrounding circumstances of which can be ascertained without having to leave the
Philippines. The acts that allegedly led to loss of trust and confidence and Basso’s
eventual dismissal were committed in the Philippines. As to the law, we hold that
Philippine law is the proper law of the forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor
tribunals have the power to enforce their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of both parties.

…….

Our labor tribunals being the convenient fora, the next question is what law should apply
in resolving this case.

The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following

important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the
chosen legal system regulate the situation. 47 These questions are entirely different from
the question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer whether the courts of a state
where the case is initiated have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 48 As such, the power to
exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law.49

CMI insists that US law is the applicable choice-of-law under the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex loci contractus. It argues that the contract of employment
originated from and was returned to the US after Basso signed it, and hence, was
perfected there. CMI further claims that the references to US law in the employment
contract show the parties’ intention to apply US law and not ours.

We disagree.

13
In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 51 we emphasized that an essential
element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of
contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting fact or point of contact, such as the situs
of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing. Pursuant to Saudi Arabian Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points
of contact" or "connecting factors" in this case are the following:

(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;

(2) The seat of CMI;

(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;

(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties;

(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and

(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or

done.52

Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable
law. Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here from the time he was hired by CMI
until his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a
license to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso
was hired to work. The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A
purely consensual contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso
accepted the terms and conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of
performance relative to Basso’s contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged
prohibited acts of Basso that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.

Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem.
Thus, we hold that CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding
some references made to US laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly
stated in the contract. We explained in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation v. V. P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. 53 that the law selected may be implied
from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or
domicile of the parties.54 We cautioned, however, that while Philippine courts would do
well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the
parties to select the law applicable to their contract, the selection is subject to the
limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum. 55

14
Similarly, in Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation, 56 we ruled that
a foreign law, judgment or contract contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum shall not be applied.

13 United Airlines v. CA (2001)

Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private
respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as
the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the appellate court relied on
the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales which states:

250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.

A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall not be

eligible for denied board compensation if:

a. The passenger does not comply with the carrier’s contract of

carriage or tariff provisions regarding ticketing,
reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability for
transformation.

The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the
case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was
to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s
agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however,
such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by
the parties in Manila.

In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, 30 this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci
contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,
obligation and interpretation

14 Cadalin v. POEA Administrator (1994)

First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on

the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the
governing law.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

15
 A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract.
(G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal,
and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685;
Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to
apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes,"
one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will
not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it
(Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:

If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64
L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor.

………

NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than
those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the
belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code
and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).

16
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to
enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the parties. They
contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to
provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII

themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein.

The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire,
Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a
"system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to
enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance,
and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).

Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that
specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract
"as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law
does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of
Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of
Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]).
Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the
applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The
choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain
law because the services were rendered in that country.

15 Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople (1990)

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph
10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations
to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the
relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable
Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing

17
upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the
second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the
settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the
relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the
Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are
Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their
assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the
Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of
the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies
and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any
event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan
law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the
law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. 14

16 Bellis v. Bellis (1967)

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines,

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

18
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

19
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for
as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

17 Spouses Zalamea v. CA (1993)

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be
disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued
should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets
were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law.

20
18 Garcia v. Garcia-Recio (2001)

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document – a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

authentic one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as
a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 

……..

The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41

21
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.

19 Asiavest Merchant Bankers v. CA (2001)

Following unsuccessful attempts6 to secure payment from private respondent under the

judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. 7

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized

insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so
long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings
has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant
and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system
of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. 15

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section
50(b),16 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time
the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed
by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it
was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the
burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered.

……….

The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing

enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of
remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for
collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a

22
foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts
of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. 42 Ultimately, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the
defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum,43 i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.

In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as
other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a
question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded
and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present
evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of
summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must
stand.44

20 Asiavest Limited v. CA (1998)

The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint on December 3, 1987 against the
defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff
the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment dated December 28, 1984
and amended on April 13, 1987

Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 5 which was the
governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and respondent Court
of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by a court having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by the subsequent title. However, the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.

Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on
grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is on
the party challenging the foreign judgment — HERAS in this case.

23
At the pre-trial conference, HERAS admitted the existence of the Hong Kong judgment.
On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence to prove rendition, existence, and
authentication of the judgment by the proper officials. The judgment is thus presumed to
be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. 6 Consequently, the first ground relied upon by ASIAVEST has merit. The
presumption of validity accorded foreign judgment would be rendered meaningless were
the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity.

The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong
Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the
issue of whether summons was properly and validly served on HERAS. It is settled that
matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon
the defendant are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, 7 i.e., the law of Hong
Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was
presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid service of summons on
him.

There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific
law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in
personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In
view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come
into play. It will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the
Philippine law. 

In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam,
since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
Before we can apply the foregoing rules, we must determine first whether HERAS was a
resident of Hong Kong.

We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement of the
Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never challenged the
service of summons on him through a security guard in his Quezon City residence and
through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid service of
summons. What was in issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was
concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of
New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction
over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact,
ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.

Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him
was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on
him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid
and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that

24
the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no longer
so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be
made on him.

21 Wildvalley Shipping v. CA (2000)

The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to

the case at bar.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.24

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.

The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the
entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be
proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. 25

……

Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner
provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial32 of

the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in
evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.

The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No  1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued
by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.33 Only a photocopy of the said rules
was likewise presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public

documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. 34

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or
by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign

25
service officer, and with the seal of his office. 35 The latter requirement is not a mere
technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness
of a document in a foreign country.36

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de

Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon
attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in
the records of the case.

With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law
itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is
involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy
of the statute.37

At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before
the lower court.

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about

the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue.38

A review of the Complaint 39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the
fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela.

We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of
a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.

22 Gibbs v. Government (1933)

The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent
of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title
Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But
that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the
law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title,
citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.

The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the
entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that

26
he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of
his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact
that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the
community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but
because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is
extinguished upon her death.

In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court
said:

It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is
situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
(United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6
Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545;
Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate of
Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental principle is stated in the first
paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject
to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the
country in which it is situated.

It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:

In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective
rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract,
are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the
domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. (See
also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.];
Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs
at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.

It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community
property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the
Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of
the Civil Code provides:

All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article
1395 provides:

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted
to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the
language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which

27
levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra)
which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in
effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

23 Aznar v. Garcia (1963)

(check digest on sempio-dy book)

24 Bellis v. Bellis (repeat case)

25 Gibbs (repeat case)

26 AASJS v. Datumanong (2007)

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. 1 Petitioner
prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic
Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act
No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225
is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The
Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest.

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual
allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:

28
 xxxx

Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist -
- the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He
pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest.

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face,
it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it

is not a self-executing provision.` The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

27 Caballero v. COMELEC (2015)

Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4 were both

candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes
in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition 5 to deny due course to
or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false
representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in
Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian
citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes

29
on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. 6 He claimed that he
did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian
citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his
family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
California, and finally in Canada.
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he
was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a
couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a
registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.
He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations
from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the
requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for
public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be
elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for
their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior
to his election is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of

2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country,
can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. 21 The
law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. 22

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an
elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA
No. 9225

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,25 

we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of

domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. 29 Hence,
petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation
from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

30
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.

9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still
retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice,
and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 31chanrobleslaw

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove
that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished
Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he
made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that
he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year
immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that
petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if
such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12,
2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.

28 David v. Agbay (2015)

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by

naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that

31
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of

Republic Act No. 9225, 4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-
10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11,
2007.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite
his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
9225;

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is
qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship

32
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the
second group.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under
which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away
with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130

29 Tecson v. COMELEC (2004)

FPJ case – see ub consti 1 notebook 2 plus printed digest for conflict

30 Poe v. COMELEC (2016)

Grace Poe case – see ub consti 1 notebook 2 plus printed digest for conflict

31 Nuval v. Gurray (1928)

There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.

The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his
residence in the municipality of Luna.

Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time

33
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.

By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of
the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality,
Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th of
February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office

and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and
began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he
filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been
holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president
of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal
residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.

32 Velilla v. Posadas (1935)

. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his
legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same
motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the
Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately
confined, because his affliction became graver to us while he was absent than it was on
the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines
where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the
date of his death in Calcutta.

33 Ujano v. Republic (1966)

We find it to be a correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63]

which requires that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall
have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization."

34
The word "residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention

34 Caasi v. CA (1990)

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America,
not of Bolinao.

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back
of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside

permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A pp.
189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign

country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,

35
 unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'

Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as
a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country."

35 Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)

See ub consti 1 notes

36 Jimenez v. Republic (1960)

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the
strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his
wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during
the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.

The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about
of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law
specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to
give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to
be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would
36
not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This
the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-
incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a
witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The lone testimony of the husband
that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder
the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

37 Barnuevo v. Foster (1913)

Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be
upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or
have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that
the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant
does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a
foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established
by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate.

The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised

within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of
the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere
of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the
private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of
courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature
and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle.

38 Quita v. Dandan (1998)

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

37
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
petition

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce

between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo

But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.

Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.

The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.

When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of

Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.

39 Llorente v. CA (2000)*

38
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula
was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce.11

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula,
who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. . In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children

Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will

39
, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor

Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula’s petition

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit
the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38

there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by

New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity

40 Goitia v. Campos Rueda (1916)*

40
that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we
have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not
in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of
husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of
1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various
causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the
part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom;
personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband
toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband
to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the
only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.)
This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited
after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was
there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in
reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was
promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of
the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in
this jurisdiction.

41 Wong Wong Yiu v. Vivo (1965)

Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to
the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the
Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to
the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any
denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412,
Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas
before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our
country.

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced
in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage
contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which
it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this
contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China

41
42 Adong v. Cahong Seng Gee (1922)

Nothing new

43 Ching Huat v. Co Heong (1947)

The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not been proven.

SEC. 19. Marriages performed abroad. — All marriages performed outside of the

Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in these Islands.

In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43, 49), this Court held, after
quoting the aforesaid provision of the former Marriage Law:

. . . To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is

first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

44 People v. Mora Dumpo (1935)

Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and
practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is
alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the
two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of
the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and
minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days of prision correccional, with
costs. From this judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case
disclose that it has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having
presented any objection nor evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage
of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her
father had not given his consent thereto.

We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of
a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which no

42
judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case. In the
case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan
priest authorized to solemnize marriages

It appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by the accused with
Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be considered
as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information.

45 Lao v. Dee Tim (1924)

TAKE NOTE THAT THIS IS AN OLD CASE

FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY

It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in
the municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a
considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was
appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and
distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each
claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner
Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to
him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1)
and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore
entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she
and Yap Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in
accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting,
Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record,
we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the
following:

(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance
with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that
Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children born
of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the fact that
Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born of that
43
 wedlock; and that they had no reason to believe, until after the death of Yap
Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein.

(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June,
1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man, without
any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose Lao is
the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.

They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other
marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in
keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.

Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the
two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where two
women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same
man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be
entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate.

46 Yao Kee v. Gonzales (1988)

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom,
and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be

presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]

47 Republic v. Orbecido (2005)

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
44
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

48 Collector v. Fisher (1961)

(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½)
of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in

45
accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the
National Internal revenue Code;

In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law
that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed
to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during
their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed,
however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to
Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons
ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of the
decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that
English laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what
obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all properties
acquired during the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband.

It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory

There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article 124 1 of the new
Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the
marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article 1325 2 of the old Civil
Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.

It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are
foreigners who married in the Philippines.

the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of
the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except
for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any
evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court
is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in
presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law. 4

We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal
property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.

(Other issues are not clear to me)

63 Roehr v. Rodriguez (2003)

46
 As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. 23 Before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.—The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

1. (a)In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
2. (b)In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.

76 Shewaram v. PAL

The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the tickets stub in letters so
small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee
was aware of those conditions such that he had fairly and freely agreed to those
conditions.The liability of the appellant should be governed by the provisions of Article
1734 and 1735 of the NCC. It having been clearly found by the trial court that the
transistor radio and the camera of the appellee were lost as a result of the negligence of
the appellant as a common carrier, the liability of the appellant is clear- it must pay the
appellee the value of those articles.

79 Serra v. CA

A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares

the stipulations in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his
"adhesion" thereto. These types of contracts are as binding as ordinary contracts.
Because in reality, the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.
Although, the SC will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence to terms where facts and
circumstances will show that it is basically one-sided.

47
 The SC did not find the situation in the present case to be inequitable. Serra is a
highly educated man, who, at the time of the trial was already a CPA-Lawyer, and
when he entered into the contract, was already a CPA, holding a respectable position
with the Metropolitan Manila Commission. It is evident that a man of his stature should
have been more cautious in transactions he enters into, particularly where it concerns
valuable properties.

80 Sweet Lines v. Teves

Unlike the insurance contract, a common example of a contract of adhesion,

passengers of inter-island do not have the same chance to take into account the
conditions prior to the purchase. Their alleged adhesion is presumed only from
the fact that they purpose chased the tickets.

84 Vir-jen shipping v. NLRC

1. Accdg to the case of Vir-Jen: The form contracts approved by the National
Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign
shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody
the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code).lâwphî1.ñèt They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot
improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time

88 China Airlines v. Daniel Chiok (2003)

Article 1, Section 3 of the Warsaw Convention states:

“Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for

the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been
regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under
the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its
international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be

48
performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or
authority of the same High Contracting Party.”

In American Airlines v. Court of Appeals, we have noted that under a general pool
partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing airline is the principal in a contract of carriage,
while the endorsee-airline is the agent.

Likewise, as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner in British

Airways v. Court of Appeals was held liable, even when the breach of contract had
occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline.  The Decision followed our
ruling in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, in which we had held that the
obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact
that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.

In the instant case, following the jurisprudence cited above, PAL acted as the
carrying agent of CAL. In the same way that we ruled against British Airways and
Lufthansa in the aforementioned cases, we also rule that CAL cannot evade
liability to respondent, even though it may have been only a ticket issuer for the
Hong Kong-Manila sector.

91 Alitalia v. IAC

Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made liable for damages for:

a. The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing
it took place on board the aircraft or I the course of its operations of embarking or
disembarking;
b. The destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the
occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air; and
c. Delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods.

The convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude
or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by such default
on his part as is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct. The Convention does
49
not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or
as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be deemed a limit of liability
only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss
or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any
willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of
any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no
special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.

In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the
employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned

95 Santos v. Northwest (1992)

Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw

Convention.
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territ
ory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract

has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

WON Warsaw convention applies.

Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for
hire. Whether the transportation is “international” is determined by the contract of the
parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage
provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals
“within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,” the provisions of the Convention
automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its
passenger.

WON MNL or SFO was the destination.

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined

50
by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between
the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner’s ticket shows that his
ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left
open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to
transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be
considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

WON Northwest has domicile in the Philippines

Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is
allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the
principal place of business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was
made, and the place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term “domicile.”

96 Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA (1998)

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered

100 Time v. Reyes

The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public official might sue in the court of the locality
where he holds office, in order that the prosecution of the action should interfere as little
as possible with the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative
allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the place where the
offending article was printed and first published.

That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal case for libel against a non-resident
defendant does not make Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous of absurd, for such
inability to file a criminal case against a non-resident natural person equally exists in
crimes other than libel. It is a fundamental rule of international jurisdiction that no state
can by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state, can by its judgments

51
or decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the state.5
Not only this,

115 Minory Fujuki v. Marinay (2013)

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is

without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."

RULE 110

Prosecution of Offenses

Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the
course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or
territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its
departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where
the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international
law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

52