PEOPLE V.

CAMPUHAN

G.R. No. 129433     March 30, 2000

FACTS:

April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went
to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children.  There she met
Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Then she heard Crysthel
cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand. Horrified, she cursed "P - t -
ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He
pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase
the Campuhan who was apprehended.  They called the barangay officials who detained. 

Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact. Campuhan:
Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor.

RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death. Thus, subject to
automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD:

NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

Based on People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated.
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Crysthel made a categorical
statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped. Corazon narrated that Primo
had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim. The possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she
did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!. No medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between
the accused and the victim
 PEOPLE v. FRONDA
G.R. No. 130602.  March 15, 2000

Facts:

On October 8, 1998, around 12:00 high noon, Police Officer Cesary Harry Bedey, Desk Officer at
the Baguio City Police Office, was informed by a "concerned citizen" thru telephone that somebody was
engaged in selling marijuana at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City. The caller mentioned the names
of Michael Fronda, Antonino Flora, Jr. and Lauro Millamina, Jr., as the marijuana dealers.

There were actually two (2) houses at 341 A. Bonifacio Street. The first house was the residence
of the land lady, Lolita Flora, while the second house was a two-storey building leased to bedspacers.
There were 2 rooms at the first floor and also two rooms at the second floor. One room at the first floor
was occupied by Fronda, Flora and Millamina and beside it was another room occupied by one Gilbert
Mugot. At the second floor, Officer Corpuz occupied the room directly above that of the accused.To avoid
detection, Corpuz then went ahead of Bedey and a woman companion. Upon reaching the place, he
joined the drinking session held at the room of Gilbert Mugot.

Meanwhile, Bedey and his woman companion following Corpuz, proceeded to the house of the
landlady and inquired where the appellant and his co-accused resided. After Lolita Flora had pointed to
one of the rooms at the first floor, Bedey proceeded there and knocked at the door. Somebody from
inside then pulled the door open half-way and asked, "What do you want?". As soon as the door was
opened, Bedey stepped backwards, about 3 to 4 meters, and then asked if he could buy marijuana.
Someone answered, "there is," and a square package wrapped in newspaper about 1 to 2 inches thick, 8
½ inches in width and 11 inches long was then handed to Bedey. Bedey immediately opened the package
a little, smelled it and determined that the contents were marijuana. At the same time, he asked, "How
much?". When somebody answered "P1,000.00," Bedey immediately shouted "positive".

Upon hearing Bedey, officer June Corpuz immediately rushed towards him from the next room.
He and Bedey then advised/invited the occupants of the room to come out. Michael Fronda, Lauro
Millamina., Jr., and Antonino Flora, Jr. came out of the room.

The three were immediately brought to the police station and charged with selling marijuana.
Meanwhile, the brick of marijuana was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory where Alma Margarita
Villaseñor, Forensic Chemist, subjected it to physical, chemical and confirmatory tests. The package,
weighing 1.1 kilograms, was confirmed to be marijuana, a prohibited drug.

Issue: W/N the crime is considered as flagrante delicto.

Held:

To be caught flagrante delicto necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or

eyewitnesses. Such is a “direct evidence” of culpability, which is “that which proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption”, in contrast to circumstantial evidence, which is “the proof
of facts from which taken collectively the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a
necessary or probable consequence.”  Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker form of
evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct evidence of fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct; for in either case, the trier
of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Under the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following
concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty.
 LEJANO V. PEOPLE
GR NO. 176864 December 14, 2010

Facts:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police
arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a
mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or
NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its
informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P.Webb,
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police
officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August
10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. The
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G.Tolentino, tried only seven of
the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filartremained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as
its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the bodies of thevictims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former
laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde,
Estrellita’s husband.
 
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across theocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses aswell as documentary and object
evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for
truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. On January 4, 2000, after four years of
arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and
imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve
years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. The appellate court did not agree that
the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of
conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who
had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister. On April 20, 2010, as a
result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then
believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they
might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27,
2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been
turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused
Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground
that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial
of his right to due process.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that
he led the others in committing the crime.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not
yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence.

Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding
to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court
in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the
DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the
semen specimen at some future time.

Suspicious Details

Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this
information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling,"
allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued.
One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the
Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell
his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as
well assume the role of her informant.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two
immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus
positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from
airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to
the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also
with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts
the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold
together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.
 PEOPLE v. EFREN MATEO Y GARCIA
GR No. 147678-87 July 7, 2004
Facts:
Except for the variance in dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal Cases No. 9351 to No.
9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, uniformly read -
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by the MTC,
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:
"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian
of the complaining witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully... and feloniously and by means of force
and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent."[1]
The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape -
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as actual... damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape."[
Issues:
Ruling:
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court" in cases similarly involving the death... penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth.  No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same... occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).  The
practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"x x x                x x x                  x x x
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant.  Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would... accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual... matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review.  If only to ensure utmost... circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.  Where life...
and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an
accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone.  A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would... minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment.  If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain... from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court
for its final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme
Court -
Article VIII, Section 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
 "(5)     Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts."
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress.  The rule here announced additionally allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate... court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.