Transmission Line

Reliability and Security

i
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 Transmission Line
Reliability and
Security

Anthony J. Pansini, EE, PE

THE FAIRMONT PRESS, INC. MARCEL DEKKER, INC.

Lilburn, Georgia New York and Basel

iii
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pansini, Anthony J.
Transmission line reliability and security/Anthony J. Pansini.
p. cm.
ISBN 0-88173-471-3 (print) -- ISBN 0-88173-472-1 (electronic)
1. Electric power transmission. 2. Electric power systems--Secu-
rity measures. 3. Electric circuits--Reliability. I. Title.

TK3091.P3132 2004
621.319--dc22
2004043334

Transmission line reliability and security/Anthony J. Pansini.

©2004 by The Fairmont Press, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this
publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or
any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.

Fairmont Press, Inc.

700 Indian Trail, Lilburn, GA 30047
tel: 770-925-9388; fax: 770-381-9865
http://www.fairmontpress.com

Distributed by Marcel Dekker, Inc.

270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
tel: 212-696-9000; fax: 212-685-4540
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Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

0-88173-471-3 (The Fairmont Press, Inc.)

0-8247-5671-1 (Marcel Dekker, Inc.)
While every effort is made to provide dependable information, the publisher, authors,
and editors cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions.

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To the three women in my life…

My mother, My wife, My daughter

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 Contents
Preface .......................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1 Circuit Arrangements ..................................... 1

2 Electrical Criteria ............................................. 9
3 Mechanical Criteria ....................................... 19
4 Substation Criteria ........................................ 37
5 DC Transmission ........................................... 47
6 Operations Criteria ....................................... 53
7 Economics ....................................................... 57

Appendix A Insulation: Porcelain vs. Polymer .............. 59

B The Grid System:
Tying Maps to Computers .......................... 79
C U.S. and Metric Relationships .................... 95
D National Transmission Grid Study
Transmission Planning and the
Need for New Capacity .............................................. 97
Transmission Siting and Permitting ........................ 157
Advanced Transmission Technologies .................... 248

Index .......................................................................................... 331

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 Preface
In 1992, Congress passed legislation essentially permit-
ting electric (and other) utilities to be unregulated, resulting
in transmission displacing local generation as the main sup-
ply to local communities and creating problems of service
reliability. In 2001, events associated with 9-11 created prob-
lems of security. Although solutions to both can be coordi-
nated, focus must be directed on security. Attention will be
given to prevention, damage limitation and rapid restoration
Criteria for arriving at solutions are: Electrically, circuits
must be so arranged that the shutting down of one or two
does not cascade into an area blackout. Mechanically, new
circuits should have a low profile so as not to attract undue
attention; fences, surrounding the structures should be pro-
vided to thwart saboteurs from their intentions; circuits
should be designed so that any damage or destruction is lim-
ited; and procedures updated for rapid restoration of facili-
ties when several simultaneous points of damage or
destruction are involved. For new and existing lines, struc-
tures should be surrounded by barbed wire topped fences
and the installation of battery operated sensors that would
radio back to the system operator an alarm of intrusion and
its location.
The criteria may also limit the voltage class of the trans-
mission line to 138 kV because of code clearance require-
ments of distances between conductor and ground and,
between conductors, take up space available on the tallest
wood structure. This also happens to be the limit for ‘solid’
type insulation (no gas or oil accessories) underground
cables that may be installed in sections or branches of the
circuit, and it is also the approximate limit for working from
insulated bucket vehicles.
ix
 Meeting the criteria mentioned above, the usual eco-
nomic considerations may have to be strained to new limits,
and in some instances ignored. Some attempt should be
made to separate charges to anti-terrorist protection activi-
ties from those associated with the improvement of service
reliability; the former may perhaps be charged to the federal
government, while the latter may not.
Deregulation resulted in the utility being restructured
into three separate and independent enterprises: generation,
transmission and distribution (although almost all three be-
came parts of the original utility as a holding company).
Allegedly, this mode of operation would result in competi-
tion between the several owners of these new operating
units, allowing any single consumer the opportunity to
choose his or her supplier, taking advantage of less expen-
sive sources of energy—with the quality of service equal to
or better than that of the replaced utility.
This discussion of the transmission systems would not
be complete without some explanation of the effect on and
by these three units on each other.
Increasing demands for electric service required the
timely construction and installation of new generating facili-
ties. For environmental and economic reasons, sites for such
new installations were/are becoming extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to find somewhere within the franchise area
(not to mention load centers) of each of the several indepen-
dent companies.
The situation was/is mitigated by allowing new con-
struction to be postponed by the introduction of so-called
cogeneration or merchant generation. Here, larger industrial
and commercial consumers are encouraged to install their
own generating facilities with excess generation during their
cycles of operation to be sold to the local utility by connect-
ing to their transmission or distribution systems (a reversal
x
of policy in some instances). In some states, this consumer
generation is not only mandated, but its unit cost is also set
at that of the least efficient unit of the utility’s generation
sources.
Later, a smaller version, known as distributed genera-
tion, was developed to be connected to the distribution sys-
tem at strategic points. These mainly consisted of small
units, generally driven by small gas turbines, but also in-
cluding a few fuel cell experimental applications; these may
be both utility or consumer owned. These units, and the
cogeneration units are not usually competitive with utility
owned units that have the advantage of economy of scale.
Some cogeneration and distributed generation units
may impact negatively on the safety of operations. Although
standards for the selection, installation and maintenance of
equipment to connect and disconnect these units from the
system to which they supply electric energy are furnished
the consumer by the utility, these standards are not always
followed, particularly those relating to maintenance. This
constitutes a hazard to persons who may be working on the
system; believing it is de-energized, they may be the victims
of an improper, unannounced connection energizing the sys-
tem to which they are connected. Similarly, should a fault
develop on the utility system to which they are connected
and the equipment fail to disconnect their generation from
the system, overloads and fires and explosions may occur.
Further, while they are under the supervision of the system
operator, they tend to dilute his attention to other events
occurring on the electric system to which they may be con-
nected.
Transmission systems, restructured into separate entities
for privately owned and operated utilities, have assumed a
more important and sensitive position in the supply chain of
electricity to the ultimate consumer. Their role has essen-
xi
tially been reversed, from providing backup and peak power
to local generator based systems. They now will become the
primary source of supply, with local generators (if any) as
backup and peak power sources for the new transmission
systems.
In this respect, the restructured transmission systems
essentially follow those of some publicly owned power sys-
tems, such as TVA, Hoover Dam, Grand Coulee, and oth-
ers—systems designed and operated to supply large
amounts of available power to load centers at relatively long
distances from the power sources.
In both instances, the associated transmission lines are
located generally away from populated centers in sparsely
inhabited areas, in the “boondocks,” for economic and envi-
ronmental reasons. Often, the structures support two cir-
cuits, and occasionally more. They are very vulnerable, not
only to vandalism and the vagaries of man and nature, but
especially to the saboteur, as they are extremely exposed.
No attempt is made in this dissertation to describe the
detailed planning, design, and normal operation and main-
tenance of transmission facilities. Many excellent works exist
sufficient to fill the needs of such endeavors. Here, the dis-
cussion is based primarily on the effect of deregulation on
the reliability of the newly deregulated systems, and consid-
eration of what may be done to maintain or improve the
reliability of the now deregulated transmission systems.
Some phenomena occurring in electric theory are included,
in non- or semi-technical terms, for the benefit of non-tech-
nical people and to refresh the memories of engineers.
It is obvious that reliability and security go hand in hand.
But whereas reliability encompasses contingencies resulting
from flaws in design and human errors, security tends to ne-
gate damage and destruction of property and injury or death
to humans deliberately caused by other humans.
xii
 While steps are taken to provide security for generating
stations, the transmission lines, which are the delivery sys-
tems for their product, under the deregulated system, pro-
vide literally thousands of miles of opportunity for saboteurs
to deny that product from being delivered to consumers, all
with relative ease and safety.
Electric service has become a necessity not only in the
lives of individuals, but also in the operation of public ser-
vices; e.g., water supply, sewage disposal, communications,
transportation, health activities, etc. Already military sur-
veillance and protection has been extended to nuclear power
installations, and probably may be extended to large power
generating facilities. As the main source of supply to large
areas of the country, should not transmission facilities re-
ceive attention, possibly by some sort of paramilitary agen-
cies? And/or, should not another look be taken at the
methods of supply of electric energy, in view of events of
September 11, 2001?

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Circuit Arrangements 1

Chapter 1

Circuit Arrangements

The choice of the type of electric circuits in the transmis-

sion system as the primary source of supply is of great im-
portance as it plays a great part in achieving high levels of
reliability, including security, of electric service to the con-
sumers.
Under deregulation of electric utilities, transmission sys-
tems, as the link between generation in the chain of supply
between generation and consumers, will assume great im-
portance. They will supplant local generation as the primary
supply to consumers. As important as the transmission lines
that will supply loads of diverse characteristics and sensitiv-
ity, the type of circuit selected is important. These will have
an influence on the economics as well as the design, con-
struction, operation and maintenance of projected facilities.
A simplified diagram illustrating the changes brought
about by deregulation, and useful as a comparison with
present regulated operations, is shown in Figure 1-1. Note
the introduction of new “super” transmission lines attached
to relatively large generation sources. The changed function
of transmission is apparent, namely, a reversal of functions,
from backup and peak supply to local generation to the pri-
mary source of supply, with local generation (if any) as
backup and peak supply to the new transmission systems.
The elimination of some or all of the local generation units
with the completion of the new transmission sources of supply,
especially their demolition, in order to reduce their capitalization to
1
2 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 1-1. Simplified schematic diagram of transition from regulated

to deregulated supply systems.
Circuit Arrangements 3

achieve competitive rates with other suppliers, should be unneces-

sary. The capitalization of such units can be reduced to one dollar
for accounting, tax, and other legal purposes. If this violates some
existing practices, steps should be taken to make them acceptable,
at least for the duration of the security measures against terrorism
in existence. Considering the vulnerability of transmission sys-
tems, located in sparsely populated areas for economic and envi-
ronmental reasons (as new generation is planned to be) prudence
dictates that these local generator units be retained during the pe-
riod national security is challenged. Some billing adjustments to
the consumer, similar to present fuel adjustments, during the pe-
riod of their operation, can be considered.

The types of circuits that may be contemplated for the

proposed transmission system, and their importance on reli-
ability, are shown in Figures 1-2 for radial systems and 1-3
for loop systems. In Figure 1-2a, a fault on any part of this
type circuit affects all of the consumers it serves, cutting off
their supply.
In Figure 1-2b, service reliability may be slightly im-
proved with the installation of sectionalizing switches, as
shown. Here, a fault will de-energize the entire circuit until
the sectionalizing switch between the fault and the station
can be opened, possibly by automation; the circuit breaker at
the station will reclose (if programmed to do so) and service
restored to those consumers from the point of fault back to
the station. The process is repeated after the fault is cleared;
the entire circuit is de-energized by the station circuit
breaker until the open sectionalizing switch is closed, then
the station circuit breaker is closed, restoring service to the
entire circuit.
In Figure 1-2c, the circuit arrangement is essentially the
same as that of Figure 1-2b. The switches in that circuit are
replaced with the much more expensive circuit breakers and
 4
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 1-2. Radial type circuits showing several methods of sectionalizing.
 Circuit Arrangements
Figure 1-3. Loop type circuit showing methods of sectionalizing. One circuit breaker
scheme as shown in Figure 1-2 also applies.

5
6 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

associated relaying. Since all the switching necessary to iso-

late the section on which the fault is located is done by cir-
cuit breakers, the intervals when the entire circuit is
de-energized are shorter, and full restoration of service on
the entire circuit is considerably shortened.
In Figure 1-2d, a less expensive arrangement, with fewer
circuit breakers, is essentially the same as that in Figure 1-2c,
except that the circuit breakers on both sides of the section
on which the fault is located must be open before the isolat-
ing switches may be opened and also when closed.
In Figure 1-3, the circuit consists essentially of two of the
kind shown in Figure 1-2c, connected together through a
circuit breaker to form a continuous loop, capable of being
sectionalized automatically between branches, de-energizing
that section on which the fault is located. Faults on a branch
or consumer are isolated by the operation of the circuit
breaker connecting it to the main line. The arrangement in
Figure 1-2d may replace the one described, with all the extra
switching associated with that arrangement.
While this closed loop arrangement appears to be the
best reliable one, there is danger that the fault may be so
located that the fault current flowing in one branch may not
be high enough to operate the isolating circuit breaker on
that branch of the loop. By operating the loop in two sec-
tions, an open loop, total fault current will flow to the fault
located between the open (loop) circuit breaker and the sta-
tion, assuring the operation of the circuit breaker nearest the
fault between the fault and the station. Meanwhile, the open
circuit breaker, sensing one side is now de-energized, will
close automatically, restoring the open loop and service to all
the consumers on the circuit, except those connected to the
isolated section on which the fault is located.
While the circuit arrangements described above are “ba-
sic” arrangements, combination of some of them may pro-
Circuit Arrangements 7

vide satisfactory and economic solutions to individual prob-

lems.
In Figure 1-3, two generators are shown connected to-
gether through a circuit breaker that would operate normally
open. Should it be found desirable to operate with it closed,
precautions should be taken to synchronize the two genera-
tors before closing the circuit breakers.
If in Figure 1-3, the two generators represent two sepa-
rate generating stations distanced apart, then the loop repre-
sents a tie between the two generators. Should a fault now
develop, fault current would flow from each of the genera-
tors in proportion to the distance each is from the fault. This
could result in slowing down the unit supplying most of the
fault and load current, and a relative speeding of the unit
farthest from the fault. The result would be a continuing
rocking motion between the two generators, accelerating, so
that ultimately one would have its circuit breaker open from
overload, and subsequently the other would also have its
circuit breaker open, resulting in this part of the system to
shut down. The same effect would take place with a number
of generators similarly distanced and connected together.
The result would be that each generator would have its cir-
cuit breaker open, “cascading” one after the other, until the
entire system is shot down (blackout). To obviate this occur-
rence, it is imperative that the circuit breakers nearest the
fault open as fast as possible, clearing the fault from the cir-
cuit and stopping the rocking motion described above from
continuing. This activity is often referred to as the “stability”
of the system.
Protective relays play an important part in the operation
of a transmission system. They initiate the opening or clos-
ing of the breaker that may take a fraction of a second to
complete. The relay itself may take even less time to func-
tion, making the length of the circuit from the relay to the
8 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

mechanism operating the breaker a factor to be considered.

Where the coordination of operation of several breakers is
involved, the relaying circuitry may be complex, and hence
prone to malfunctioning. In this case, redundant relaying
should be considered. Where the breakers involved are dis-
tant from each other, communication between relays associ-
ated with them is necessary, and this may be accomplished
by pilot wire, leased telephone wire, wireless, and, of recent
usage, fiber optic conductors may be considered. Present-
day electronic relays are much faster than the older electro-
magnetic type and retrofitting of such older relays is
recommended.
In planning the circuitry of transmission systems, the
associated relaying required to accomplish the desired re-
sults must always be taken into account. Sometimes it may
be the determining factor in the circuitry chosen.

The principle of the sectionalized open loop circuit is

applicable to transmission lines, the moveable open point
allows transfers of loads in both normal and emergency situ-
ations, limits service interruptions only to the section on
which the fault occurs; the only time the loop is closed is
momentary during switching times. The loop may originate
and end at the same station, or may constitute an open tie
between two stations. The opening in the circuit prevents
disturbances (e.g., overloads, stability) from being communi-
cated to other stations. Accomplishing this at stations by
means of buses is detailed in Chapter 4, Substations.
Electrical Criteria 9

Chapter 2

Electrical Criteria

Alternating current circuits, when energized, create elec-

tromagnetic and electrostatic fields about the conductors.
These alternating (moving) fields in turn create alternating
voltages within the conductors that do not coincide with the
voltage supplied to the circuit. The net result is the current
and voltage waves do not act in unison but become dis-
placed with each other as shown in Figures 2-1a and 2-1b.
The voltage generated in the conductor because of the elec-
tromagnetic field is 90 degrees behind relative to that of the
main load current (Figure 2-1a), while that caused by the
electrostatic field is 90 degrees ahead of that of the load
current (Figure 2-1b). These fields do not exist separately in
the conductor, but act together to displace the current and
voltage waves in the circuit from each other; that is, they
tend to impede the flow of current relative to the voltage.
The resulting effect is that the power delivered now is less
than the power supplied, and this ratio is known as the
power factor of the circuit.
The effect of the voltage created by the electromagnetic
field is called inductive reactance while that created by the
electrostatic field is called capacitive reactance. The two reac-
tances tend to balance each other; the net effect is generally
termed the reactance of the circuit.
The actions described above also appear when two (or
more) such energized conductors are adjacent to each other

9
10 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 2-1a. Effect of inductance on voltage and current in a conductor

(not to scale).

(Figure 2-2), further affecting the relationship between the

current and voltage waves within the conductors. The effect
of this relationship is referred to as the mutual reactance of
the circuits.
The amount of these several reactances of a circuit de-
pend on the length of the circuit as well as on the length of
the adjacency of nearby conductors, and the values of the
currents in these conductors. In the case of transmission
lines, these quantities may be very significant, restricting
severely the capacity of the line. There are ways of overcom-
ing these restrictions.
The usual transmission circuit consists of three ener-
Electrical Criteria 11

Figure 2-1b. Effect of capacitance on voltage and current in a conductor

(not to scale).

Figure 2-2. Effect of the magnetic field about a conductor on an adja-

cent conductor.
12 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

gized conductors and a neutral or ground wire (Figure 2-3).

Each conductor carries approximately one-third of the
power flowing in the circuit (exactly one-third when evenly
balanced). Each conductor is known as a phase; the circuit,
therefore, is a three-phase circuit. Each phase is electrically
120 degrees apart from each other. The “disturbing” reac-
tances associated with the position of each phase are also
displaced 120 degrees from each other. Now, if each phase
conductor can be relocated in its position relative to the
other two for one-third of the circuit length, for the entire
circuit, they will tend to cancel each other. The one-third
length need not be all in one section of the line, but may
consist of several transpositions totaling approximately one
third. This is done with three phase length lines.
For shorter lines or branch lines of only one or two
phases, this may not prove practical. Here banks of inductive

Figure 2-3.
Electrical Criteria 13

reactors and/or capacitive reactors are installed on such

lines (Figure 2-4a), to counter the reactance of the line, help-
ing the line to achieve a 100 percent power factor, or as close
to this as practical. As the load varies, the transmission line
may vary daily, weekly, monthly, etc.; the units of the reac-
tors are equipped with circuit breakers that can control the
amounts of corrective inductive or capacitive reactance re-
quired to achieve the goal (Figures 2-4b and 2-4c).
Combinations of both methods may be employed where
it may be the solution in some instances.
One other distinguishing feature of alternating current
circuits is known as the “skin effect.” The density of the
current flowing in a conductor, particularly at the higher

Figure 2-4a. Simplified cable circuit (above) shows how power deliv-
ered to load is affected by a shunt reactor. In the absence of shunt
reactors, this power decreases to zero at some critical length.
14 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 2-4b. Current-limiting reactors: (A) Westinghouse, (B) General

Electric.

Figure 2-4c. Capacitor installation on poles.

Electrical Criteria 15

operating voltages, tends to be greater toward the surface of

the conductor and reducing as it nears the center of the con-
ductor. This results in the use of hollow type conductors
descried in the next chapter.

LIGHTNING PROTECTION

Strictly speaking, this is not an electric circuit consider-

ation, but does affect its operation.
Generally, the object of such protection is to prevent the
atmosphere surrounding the transmission lines from becom-
ing highly charged allowing a relatively low resistance path
to form for the discharge of the electric charges forming on
a cloud when the voltage generated there reaches a critical
point. This is achieved in two ways: the use of an overhead
ground or shield wire, and of lightning arresters.
As the name implies, the shield wire is placed over the
conductors at a height to form a 30-degree angle (from expe-
rience and tests); however, it must not be inordinately high
as its effect diminishes the higher away from the conductors
(Figures 2-5a and 2-5b). In that case, two (or more) such
wires need to be installed. These wires are solidly grounded
at each structure where they are supported. This connection
includes all other points of ground on the structure, includ-
ing the ground of the circuit or circuits themselves.
The lighting arrester (Figures 2-6a and 2-6b) is installed
on the structure supporting the top conductor of a circuit in
such a manner as to have one end (or a short conductor from
the arrester) within a determined space. When the voltage
created by the charged atmosphere and the circuit voltage
become great enough, a discharge across the air gap occurs,
creating an arc that is made to enter a tube where the pres-
sure of the confined air tends to blow out the arc, restoring
16 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 2-5. Showing 30° angle for lightning protection on

overhead wires.
Electrical Criteria 17

Figure 2-6. 69 kV Lighting arrester.

the arrester to its protective position. It is highly important

that the capacity of the arrester be large enough not to have
the tube fail, causing the arc to be diverted across the insu-
lators (that may be wet and/or dirty) to the structure, where
the arc may damage both the insulators and the structure
seeking a path to ground. The flashover of the insulators
constitutes a fault on the line and may trip the circuit breaker
back at the source station. Although only one arrester may
be installed on the topmost conductor, there are occasions
where arresters on all conductors may be desirable. Usually
arresters are installed in addition to the existence of the
ground or shield wire.
18 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

To insure a good ground, copper rods are driven into

the ground at the foot of the supporting structures and are
interconnected with other grounds. Sometimes, a grid or
mesh of bare copper wires is buried at the foot of the struc-
tures and connected to other grounds; this is referred to as a
“counterpoise” (Figure 2-7, see also Figure 3-7c). Additional
grounding may be obtained by connecting these counter-
poises with a buried bare wire. All of these increase the area
for the current flowing to ground to be dissipated harmlessly
into the ground.
The importance of good grounds is emphasized, not
only for lighting purposes, but also for proper operation of
protective relays, and especially for safety reasons.

SINGLE
PARALLEL-CONTINUOUS

DOUBLE
PARALLEL-CONTINUOUS

RADIAL

CONTINUOUS

AND RADIAL

Figure 2-7. Arrangements of counterpoises.

Mechanical Criteria 19

Chapter 3

Mechanical Criteria

There are obviously many items in this category from

rights-of-way to, but not including, the substation; substa-
tions will be the subject of Chapter 4.
The right of way over which a transmission line is lo-
cated depends largely on the type of line and the nature of
the terrain. In general, it should be wide enough so that
adjacent trees or other structures, in falling, do not encumber
the space under the conductors; conversely, should the con-
ductors fall, they do not encounter trees or other structures
at which they may cause fire (Figure 3-1). The area of the
right of way should be kept clear of vegetation that would

Figure 3-1. Tree removal and topping along right-of-way.

19
20 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

not only impede the transportation of maintenance and re-

pair crews, but also constitute a fire hazard.
Access roads to the rights of way should be unobtrusive
and located at strategic locations to ease the work of crews
maintaining the right of way as well as the transmission
lines. If gates are involved, they should be locked with keys
or coded strips available only to restricted personnel. Where
they are in areas subject to vandalism, fences may be erected
for a few hundred or thousand feet on either side of the
access point, with rolls of barbed wire at the top and bottom
of the fence (Figure 3-2). In extreme cases, the entrance may
be electrified. In any case, ample notices should be posted to
keep out people who have no business there.
Where helicopters are used to patrol the lines or for
carrying men and material for repairs, landing pads should
be provided, possibly near the access locations. In areas dif-
ficult to access, either extra conductors may be installed or
caches of material shored in a weather-proof fashion.
All of these precautions, and others, may not discourage
the saboteur from attempting to damage or destroy the over-
head line, but would make his task more difficult and per-
haps limit the extent of the sabotage.

STRUCTURES—TOWERS

Towers are generally fabricated of galvanized steel

members, mostly of angle iron but including other shapes,
bolted or riveted together, and in some cases welded to-
gether. Their height may vary from some 50 feet to 150 feet,
depending on the voltage of the transmission line (Figure 3-
3) and the minimum standards of distances of the lowest
conductor at the lowest point of sag to the ground and clear-
ances between conductors, in accordance with the National
Mechanical Criteria 21

Figure 3-2. Barbed wire fence.

Electric Safety Code. The framework nature of the structure

minimizes the effect of wind and generally provides a means
of access for the worker, although steps are sometimes pro-
vided. The tower footings are attached to sister members
imbedded in concrete pilings for short, light towers and in
concrete foundations for the larger, heavier duty towers.
Multiple bolts or rivets are used, again depending on the
forces they must sustain. There are several types of towers,
each designed for its purpose.
22 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 3-3. Comparison of power-carrying capabilities and operating

voltages.

Suspension or Tangent
Suspension or tangent type are towers in which the in-
sulators to which the conductors are attached are free to
swing (Figure 3-4). The spans on either side of the insulator
string approximately even so that the structure carries only
the weight of the conductors, ice coated, and the force of the
wind against them.

Angle or Corner
Angle or corner type towers (Figure 3-5), as the descrip-
tion implies, are designed to hold the spans of conductors on
either side that are at an angle with each other. They are
usually also of dead end design. These towers are of great
strength, and may also be guyed to take care of the forces
due to the uneven balance of conductors attached to the
crossarm on the tower.
 Mechanical Criteria
Figure 3-4. Tangent or suspen- Figure 3-5. Angle or corner tower.
sion tower constructions.

23
24 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Dead-end
Dead-end type towers (Figure 3-6) also carry the weight
of the span of conductor, but the spans may be unequal in
length and the spans on either side are dead-ended, each
mounted through the insulators directly to the crossarm at-
tached to the tower. The strength of this type is greater than
that of the suspension tower, designed purposely to with-
stand failure if all the conductors on one side break and no
longer balance the ice-laden, wind-driven conductors on the

Figure 3-6. Dead-end tower.

Mechanical Criteria 25

other side. The towers are so designed to limit the damage,

should the conductors and intervening suspension towers
fail.
The great advantage of the tower (as compared to wood
pole structures) is that it permits long spans of construction
minimizing the number of such structures. The great disad-
vantage lies in the extent of damage caused by the failure of
as little as one conductor or as great as the failure of a tower.
Repairs are of usually long duration. In most instances, tem-
porary wood pole lines are constructed around the failed
portion to return the line to service as quickly as possible.
Wind blowing against ice-laden conductors, attached to
the tower at a height, creates a moment arm that strains the
tower legs, footings and connecting bolts or rivets. More-
over, the swaying conductors tend to weaken the mechanical
strength of the conductors at the points of attachment. In
some instances, the wind blowing at the conductor may
cause near horizontal ice formations on a side of the conduc-
tor that, acting as an airplane wing, cause the conductor to
rise and fall with the gusts of wind, causing the conductor to
“dance,” creating further strains on the tower structure.
Needless to say, the metal tower structures must be elec-
trically grounded to take care of any flashover to the struc-
ture that may occur, leading the flashover current to ground
safely.
Barbed wire strands are sometimes installed at the
lower part of the tower to keep intruders from mounting the
structure. In addition to this, since 9-11, it may be prudent to
build a barbed wire top and bottom fence (see Figure 3-2),
but with no gates (access by bucket vehicle) around the base
of every tower. A coordinated attempt to blow up one or
more towers on a major transmission line or on several
transmission lines, can seriously disrupt the functioning of
industrial plants (also defense plants) as well as the lives of
26 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

populations in large areas of the country from long periods

without electric service.

WOOD POLE STRUCTURES

Wood structures made of poles and timbers are gener-

ally confined to lower voltage transmission lines for eco-
nomic reasons, but are also easier and quicker to repair. The
wood members are generally of native timber (e.g., western
cedar in the western regions, long leaf yellow pine in the
South and East), chemically treated to resist rot and insects.
Maximum pole lengths are in the nature of 70 feet, which
limits the space available on them for carrying conductors
and observing code clearances. Their strength also limits the
loads (forces) they can sustain with acceptable margins of
safety. Hence, span lengths are generally limited to about 500
feet, some one-quarter those of steel tower lines. Poles em-
ployed in the structures, as well as those employed singly on
some transmission lines, are usually buried directly in the
earth for their support. The same design considerations (ice,
wind, lightning, code clearances, etc.) apply as for tower
lines, although wood provides some extra insulation value.
In general, the same rules apply to wood pole struc-
tures, clearances, grounds, dead-ends, lightning arresters,
etc. As wood is an insulator, wires connecting the overhead
ground wire and other items on the pole are run down the
side of the pole and connected to ground rods and/or coun-
terpoises. Barbed wire fences should surround each pole
structure, similar to those around towers.
Various configurations of steel towers and wood pole
line structures are shown in Figures 3-7a, 3-7b, and 3-7c.
Spans on wood pole lines are much shorter, generally not
exceeding 500 feet, with the sag in the conductor spans usu-
Mechanical Criteria 27

Figure 3-7a. Typical configurations of steel-tower lines.

Figure 3-7b. Typical configurations of wood-pole lines.

ally so small that the danger of them contacting each other

in the wind, or of “dancing” is not present. Failure of con-
ductors or poles from ice and wind is more rapidly repaired,
than for towers (mentioned above) because maintenance
work, even at mid-span, both while energized or de-ener-
gized, can be done from insulated bucket vehicles (perhaps
 28
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 3-7c. Typical transmission structure and counterpoise configurations.
Mechanical Criteria 29

the greatest advantage), Figure 3-8). However, the greater

number of structures (compared to towers) means that much
more exposure to accidents and sabotage. And the same
general protective fences and barbed wire installations ap-
ply.
Where the exposure to damage and destruction for both
towers and wood pole structures may be unacceptable, re-
course may be had to rerouting the portions of the overhead
lines in peril, or placing them underground (Figure 3-9).

INSULATORS

Line insulators are the medium between energized con-

ductors and their non-energized supports, points of attach-
ment to the structure. They come in two popular shapes,
discs and posts. Both consist of units that are capable of
being added in strings for discs and in columns or posts to
achieve the desired amount of insulation. They are made of
porcelain and polymers (plastics), Figure 3-10. Other insula-
tors may be found as supports for buses, on disconnecting
switches, and as bushings on circuit breakers, transformers,
and other devices. All are subject to accumulations of dirt
(and salt in seaside areas), and are subject to cleansing dur-
ing rain storms. All, however, are also subject to accumula-
tion of ice and snow that tends to shorten the insulating path
of the insulator and aid in the flashover of the insulator from
nearby lightning strokes and switching surges.
The effects of such flashovers are more visible on the
porcelain insulators than on the plastic ones and the cleans-
ing effect of rain on the plastic insulators is not as effective
as on the porcelain ones. The problem of external pollution
and moisture has been recognized, and special vulcanized
rubber coatings or the use of special rubber shields to in-
30 Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 3-8. Insulated bucket vehicle.
Mechanical Criteria 31

Figure 3-9. Underground construction.

32 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 3-10a. Disc insulator with arcing

rings or horns to keep flash away from in-
sulators. (From Overhead Systems Refer-
ence Book).

Figure 3-10b. Typical post-type porcelain in-

sulator. (Courtesy Ohio Brass Co.)

crease the surface creeping distance, the shortest distance

measured along the surface of the insulator, have been de-
veloped. In other cases additional insulators have been
added to the string. Caution should be taken in live wire (hot
stick) work on the plastic ones; if in doubt, de-energize the
work area. Safety should always be the first consideration.
Mechanical Criteria 33

Insulators to which conductors are attached are special

targets for vandals and saboteurs as they can be shot at from
a distance, often undetected. Damage or destruction of sev-
eral discs in a chain, or post supports can cause flashover to
ground that may cause circuit breakers to trip, de-energizing
the circuit. Those on wood pole structures are perhaps more
vulnerable than those on metallic towers, but the insulating
factor of wood does tend to make flashovers more difficult,
less frequent.

LIGHTNING ARRESTERS

Lightning arresters are installed at strategic locations on

the transmission lines, usually some three or four spans
apart. Their ground wires are connected to the overhead
ground wire and to the steel structure on tower lines and to
copper wires alongside the wooden structures to grounds in
the earth or counterpoises where they exist.

CONDUCTORS

Conductors on transmission lines are usually made of

copper or aluminum, and each circuit will consist of three
conductors depending on the load to be carried and the al-
lowable drop in voltage or electrical pressure. The conduc-
tors may be stranded alone for lower voltage transmission
lines and stranded hollow core wires for the higher voltage
lines (Figure 3-11). They may be filled with strands of inert
material to hold the metallic strands in place along the outer
part of the circle to take advantage of the “skin effect” of
alternating current. For long spans, the core of the conductor
may contain a steel wire or cable for mechanical strength
34 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

A Hollow copper conductor with an I-beam core. a, I beam

twisted spirally in a lay opposite to lay of individual wires
b.

B Type HH conductor using curved segments a laid in spiral

configuration. Individual segments slide back and forth
slightly when conductor is wound on reel.

C Aluminum conductor steel reinforced commonly called acsr.

a, steel strands making up the core; b, current-carrying
aluminum strands.

D One form of copperweld conductor. a, round steel core over

which thin copper cylinder b in welded.

and may also contain some filler material to keep the steel
wires centered in the conductor. The conductors are attached
to the insulators holding them by means of “shoes” that are
placed on the top and bottom of the conductor to spread the
pressure applied in holding them there, this to avoid hot
spots if a narrow clamp were used and the pressure applied
at only a very narrow place on the conductor. Care should
also be taken not to break any of the strands of the conductor
as this not only may reduce the current capacity of the con-
ductor, but also create a hot spot in the conductor that may
cause its ultimate failure.
Mechanical Criteria 35

Where the structures (towers or wood poles) are able to

carry additional loads, the capacity of the line may be
doubled by installing a second conductor alongside the
original one by means of hardware designed for such pur-
poses (Figure 3-12).
Overhead ground wires may be of steel, copper, or cop-
per clad steel, and wire connecting them and other metallic
details are usually made of copper.

CABLE

Branch circuits (from the main transmission line) that

supply large consumers as well as communities are more
exposed to the would-be saboteur. They are more easily ac-
cessible because of the usually lower structures and, while
still in less populated areas, closer to traveled roads. They
are of usually lesser voltage than the main transmission line,
generally at 138 kV or lower. This makes them candidates for
underground cables, particularly as cables of these ratings
are now available with “solid” type insulation requiring no
oil or gas accessories. Although obviously more expensive
and faults are more difficult to find and repair, they offer the
best defense against sabotage.
The obvious economic advantage of overhead construc-
tion for transmission, and especially of tower lines, will con-
tinue, but may give way to wood pole lines during the
period of possible terrorist acts of sabotage, and to under-
ground cables in particular instances.
36 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 3-12. Double conductor line.

Substation Criteria 37

Chapter 4

Substation Criteria

Transmission substations are key points in transmission

systems, especially in contingencies, as this is where are lo-
cated circuit breakers and the relaying that controls them,
transformers that (usually) reduce voltages to lower level
branch circuits, metering to record operations, and possibly
also banks of reactors and capacitors where they are needed
for power factor correction. Also located here are accessories
for all this equipment. Substations may also serve as head-
quarters for maintenance and restoration activities in event
of emergencies.
Incoming and outgoing circuits are connected to buses
through circuit breakers (Figure 4-1). The buses are so ar-
ranged that circuits may be sectionalized here to isolate a
fault on any circuit, bus, transformer and the buses them-
selves. Some are done automatically with circuit breakers;
others by means of isolating switches that must be de-ener-
gized before and after operating them—with temporary out-
ages occurring in the process. Breakers here may also act as
the open point in loop circuits, aiding in the sectionalizing of
the circuit to isolate a faulted section (refer to Chapter 1).
Note the flexibility of such operations increases with the
addition of circuit breakers and the arrangement of buses. If
several circuits converge into a station, the bus arrangement
is such that loads between circuits may be redistributed or
circuits energized that may not be faulted.
37
38 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 4-1. Incoming and outgoing feeder circuit breaker arrangements

(Courtesy Westinghouse Electric Co.)
Substation Criteria 39

Where branch circuits are involved, the main circuit

may supply transformers to lower voltage to the required
level (Figure 4-2). Here again, the output of the transformers
is connected to buses for similar flexibility as those described
above. For service reliability, three circuits are recommended

Figure 4-2. Fundamental schemes of supply at higher than generated

voltage.
40 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

for the branch supply, two from one main source and the
third from a separate source, if available, left open if it is de-
sired to operate as an open loop circuit. Refer to Chapter 1.
Reliability of both incoming and outgoing circuits is
provided by the bus arrangement. From least to some high
degree, they all depend on the use of and arrangement of
circuit breakers. Each additional circuit breaker provides
greater flexibility of operation with a greater degree of reli-
ability, including the ability to sectionalize both incoming
and outgoing open-loop circuits at that point. The greater
the number of circuit breakers, the greater the cost. Figure, 4-
2 shows the application of these arrangements when the,
incoming circuit voltage is to be raised to a higher outgoing
voltage circuit. Note the application of reactors to limit the
supply, of fault current to generators where transformers do
not intervene in the circuitry. Figure 4-3 shows a modifica-

Figure 4-3. Distribution substation with high-voltage double bus and

low-voltage auxiliary bus and individual transformation in each pri-
mary feeder resulting in relatively low interrupting duty on feeder
breakers.
Substation Criteria 41

tion of the ring bus of Figure 4-1g where individual trans-

formers are associated with each outgoing circuit, lessening
the strain on their circuit breakers. Combinations of all of
these bus arrangements often produce satisfactory reliability
results at considerably reduced cost.
The bus arrangement in Figure 4-4 is designed so that
each incoming circuit supplies a fixed number of outgoing
circuits, each independent of the other. Here, a fault on one
outgoing circuit does not interrupt service on the others, and
likewise, a fault on one of the incoming circuits interrupts
service on only the outgoing circuits it supplies. Nowhere
are the incoming circuits connected together in a grid, nor
are the outgoing circuits connected in a grid. Here, interrup-
tion of supply from any one circuit will not communicate to
another on both the incoming and outgoing sides; there will
be no possible overloading of one circuit from attempting to
pick up the load supplied by the interrupted circuit, and
hence, no cascading into total blackout. Obviously, there will
be interruption of service to a given area, the load of which
may or may not be picked up by other circuits at the com-
mand of the system operator, depending on the available
spare capacity of the non-interrupted circuits that may be
variable depending on the time of day. While, reliability is
thus affected, it limits the operations of the saboteur—the
price in reliability paid for a higher degree of security.
Buses should be physically separated a sufficient dis-
tance so that failure of one, with possible attendant explo-
sion and fire, does not communicate to the other buses or to
any other vital equipment. Similarly, circuit breakers and
transformers should follow the same separation principle,
achieved with steel reinforced explosion and fire proof bar-
riers between them (that may also act as sound barriers Fig-
ure 4-5), and sump pits dug beneath each of these units
sufficient to contain the oil in that unit even if aflame.
42 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Incoming transmission lines

▼ ▼ ▼

High
voltage
ring
▼

bus
• • •

Low
voltage
▼

ring
bus
▼
• • • • • • • • • • • •
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
Same
Distribution loop circuits

▼
• • • • • • • • • • • •

•
Switches
normally
open

Section- • ▼
alizing
switches
▼

Emergency ties

Figure 4-4. Substation bus arrangement.

Substation Criteria 43

Figure 4-5. Substation power transformer with barriers.

It was previously recommended that outgoing circuits

from the substation be underground cable. If, for some rea-
son this should not be possible or practical, it is suggested
that at least a significant distance for the first part be under-
ground to confuse saboteurs.
Lightning protection should follow the same principles
as for overhead lines, described above. The area of such
substations will be quite large and its perimeters should be
contained by barbed wire fencing, and in extreme cases, elec-
trified, all as mentioned previously . Consideration should
be given to erecting a wire mesh over the substation, or parts
of it, to prevent sabotage from the air; this would also serve
as lightning protection.
Possible underground construction of such substations
should be given consideration, as well as the transmission
lines themselves, or at least portions of them in high sabo-
tage areas. The economics of such construction are so stag-
gering that other means of power delivery will no doubt be
chosen.
All equipment in the substation should be connected
through air switches for safety reasons (Figure 4-6). Whether
44 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 4-6. Air-break switches mounted on a substation rack.

Substation Criteria 45

for routine maintenance or in emergencies, the worker must

be able to see an opening in the circuit on both sides of the
equipment on which he, or she, may be working.
Substation buses are convenient places on which to in-
stall fault locating devices. These may hasten the location
and elimination of faults. One suggested device is shown in
Figure 4-7 (page 46). Although many are not 100 percent ac-
curate; they are sufficient to give an approximate location,
which together with other field indications, can speed the
process of restoration.
Portable substations, Figure 4-8, should be kept on hand
to replace temporarily units that may be so damaged that
they may not be repaired in the field.

Figure 4-8. Portable transformer.

 46
a
•

•
EC ➔

EA ➔
➔
b

EB
•

•
•

EB ➔
EA

➔
c

•
➔ EC
•

•
•

Transmission Line Reliability and Security

EC ➔ EA ➔ EC ➔ EA ➔
➔ ➔ ➔ ➔
•

Re 50°
➔ ➔ R Rej 60°
➔
Zm Zm

Im =
➔
➔

Ix Im =
➔

Ir Zm
➔

Ir Ix
➔

➔
Ir + Ix I r + Ix
•

(a) (b) (c)

Positive sequence Negative sequence Zero sequence

Figure 4-7. Circuit for sequence fault locator.

Direct Current Transmission 47

Chapter 5

Direct Current Transmission

There are relatively few direct current transmission lines

in operation, mainly because of the high cost of transforming
alternating current into direct current at one end of the line
and then back again to alternating current at the other end, in
a process that allows this to happen when current is flowing
in either direction. However, it has so many other advan-
tages, compared to alternating current, that it becomes af-
fordable in certain instances.
One of its chief advantages is that one conductor may
take the place of three in a-c conductors in a circuit. The re-
turn path for such a d-c circuit can be the ground, aided by
the grounds associated with the lightning protection of the
line, namely, the overhead ground wire and the underground
counterpoises, some of which may involve a continuous path
between structures (Figure 5-1). Crossing bodies of water,
particularly sea water, the sea provides the return conductor.
Other important advantages stem from the fact that d-c
circuits do not have alternating magnetic and electrostatic
fields about them, hence no problems with inductive and ca-
pacitive reactances with their effects on voltage and power
losses that may seriously reduce the active power transmis-
sion capability, requiring the use of corrective reactors. For
the same voltage rating as a comparative a-c circuit, the d-c
circuit requires only some 70 percent of the insulation (Figure
5-2) or, expressed differently, the same insulation as the a-c
circuit can accommodate a voltage some 30 percent higher
47
48 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 5-1. DC transmission used over very long distances. The two
AC buses may be hundreds of miles apart and do not have to be syn-
chronized, or in phase, to permit power to flow between systems.

Figure 5-2. AC vs. DC power transmission. In AC, the peak voltage

must be used in calculating the insulation required from conductor to
grounded supporting structure. This value is higher than the effective
value of the DC system shown at the bottom. The DC system utilizes
the maximum voltage to ground to transmit power.
Direct Current Transmission 49

with an increase of the capability of the d-c circuit to deliver

some 30 percent more power.
In connecting two d-c circuits of the same voltage rating,
there is no need for synchronization; in similar a-c situations,
where the a-c circuits are of different frequencies (e.g. 50 and
60 cycle), conversion to d-c makes their connection feasible.
All of this makes the control of d-c circuits simpler than their
a-c counterparts.
Care, however, should be taken in energizing and de-
energizing d-c circuits, as the rise and collapse of their associ-
ated magnetic fields may induce unwanted voltages in the
conductor itself and in surrounding conductors. An auto-
matic placing of temporary grounds on the switches during
this part of their operation is usually provided to insure the
safety of the workers. Care should also be taken not to have
the d-c circuit in close proximity to an energized a-c circuit,
as the a-c voltages induced in the d-c circuit may have some
influence on the d-c “wave” and the existence of the a-c volt-
age will produce circulating currents that will only serve to
heat the conductor and reduce the circuit capability; a-c fil-
ters are available that drain these unwanted circulating cur-
rents to ground.
A simplified schematic diagram of a typical d-c trans-
mission line is shown in Figure 5-3. The a-c to d-c voltage rec-
tifiers are usually thyrite units that are capable of rectifying
a-c to d-c and, as inverters, converting the d-c back to a-c. The
losses involved in their operation are relatively low and their
maintenance (by replacing of worn out units) is also rela-
tively low. Figure 5-4 shows a typical waveform that is an
example of change from maximum positive a-c voltage to d-
c voltages. Some idea of the size of the banks of thyrite recti-
fier-inverters for a 345 kV circuit is shown in Figure 5-5.
Clearly, what is needed is a d-c transformer that approxi-
mates the simplicity and efficiency of the a-c transformer.
 50
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 5-3. Simplified schematic diagram of a high voltage DC transmission line.
Direct Current Transmission 51

Figure 5-4. Six-phase rectification with twelve half circles.

52 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 5-5. Stack of thyrite rectifiers for 345 kV DC transmission line.

Operations Criteria 53

Chapter 6

Operations Criteria
ELECTRICAL

The transmission system should be such that the de-

energization of one or more circuits should not result in cas-
cading to a system blackout. This can be accomplished by
not connecting them in a network or mesh, but having each
circuit consist of an open loop configuration with
sectionalizing facilities at each consumer branch, or substa-
tion, Figure 6-1. Moreover, each substation should have three
sources, each independent of the others and acting as a
sectionalizing point, see Figure 4-4. In this manner, the sabo-
teur who may succeed in causing a failure simultaneously
on one or more circuits will not achieve an area blackout, but
only a few sections of circuits on which the faults may have
been placed. The normal open in the circuit now transferred
to the de-energized sections containing the faults. Emer-
gency ties to adjacent circuits may be provided for those
extremely rare cases where two or more sections of the cir-
cuit may be faulted (Figure 6-2). Relaying for such an ar-
rangement may be difficult and perhaps not reliable, in
which case an electronic scenario may be designed for such
special cases.
This arrangement contains a relatively large number of
expensive circuit breakers. Where short time interruptions of
service can be tolerated while manual switching of discon-
nects takes place, the circuits may be modified, as shown in
Chapter 1.
53
54 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

This arrangement may not result in the economy asso-

ciated with the network or mesh arrangement, but this may
be a small price to pay for the greater reliability against mass
blackouts.
In almost all arrangements of circuits, in times of emer-
gency when one or more circuits are called upon to pick up
some of the load of adjacent circuits, prudence would dictate
that, under normal conditions, circuits be not operated at or
near full load, but some comfortable margin be left to accom-
modate picking up the additional load of an adjacent circuit
in trouble.

MECHANICAL

Daily helicopter patrols, weather permitting, should be

made with bolometers scanning the circuits for the existence
of hot spots that may ultimately cause failure. A monthly
ground patrol to check for conditions not seen by air may be
desirable. These may include any visible attempts at forced
entry, damage to fences and gates, and the changing of bat-
teries in the sensing devices. Insulated bucket vehicles (Fig-
ure 6-3) should be employed with their crews trained in live
line (hot stick) maintenance (Figure 6-4). Other normal main-
tenance, such as brush and vegetation clearing, checking of
lightning arresters, warning signs for dirt on insulators, etc.,
should be carried out.
Operations Criteria 55

A G

B H

C
F

Sectionalizing of circuits not shown. Each station ring bus same as F.

Open circuit breakers acting as sectionalizing points.

Figure 6-1.. Open loop supply of transmission system (no grid or mesh)
This page intentionally left blank
Economics 57

Chapter 7

Economics

Evaluating the proposals included in the previous chap-

ters is difficult in view of the different practices now em-
ployed by the several utilities. Some general remarks
concern the rather obvious features; for example, the replace-
ment of a mesh with open loop circuits. Specific features,
such as the sectionalizing of circuits at each tap for consum-
ers or branch lines with the arrangement of circuit breakers
(and protective relaying). Obviously, there are areas where
some interruptions can be tolerated for short or longer peri-
ods of time, as in some residential areas, while interruptions
of any magnitude should be avoided in highly sensitive ar-
eas, such as water and sewage works, hospitals, communica-
tion centers, military installations, etc. In between these
extremes are areas where short interruptions may be toler-
ated, as in public offices and schools, comparatively small
industrial and commercial enterprises.
Knowing the time and cost for restoration of service, a
comparison can be made of typical cases shown, with more
expensive circuit breakers eliminated, or branch under-
ground cables replaced with overhead lines, etc. And the
dollars invested per number of consumers affected can then
be compared to loss of revenue for the utility AND losses to
the businesses involved. From these data, priority lists may
be developed to act as guides in paring back features from
circuits or parts of circuits to reduce investment costs. These
indices may also be used in determining schedules for resto-
ration in major contingencies.
57
58 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

In the final analysis, all of these factors should be tem-

pered by local experiences to determine the final choice of
circuit design, operation and maintenance.

MISCELLANEOUS
A few thoughts on research that should be expedited,
perhaps by one new “Manhattan Project.”
1. Conductors of zero resistance (or even negative values)
under load. Work on this has been very successful, but
much remains for it to be practical and economically
competitive.
2. Development of a DC transformer that can rival its AC
present counterpart.
3. Development of a means to store electricity directly,
probably a DC solution.
4. A direct means of generating electricity. Present steam
turbo-generators are about 30% efficient (from the fuel
to the end product) and nuclear units are even much
less.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To Messrs. Kenneth Smalling and William Underwood

for their review and comments on the material presented. To
Ken Smalling for securing some of the data needed in the
development of this work.
To my patient wife for putting up with my endeavors.
To the members of The Fairmont Press for their encour-
agement and their substantial help in the preparation of this
work. Any errors, however, must be laid at my doorstep.
Appendices 59

Appendix A

Insulation:
Porcelain Vs. Polymer

For many years, porcelain for insulation purposes on

lines and equipment has exercised a virtual monopoly. It was
perhaps inevitable that plastics, successful as insulation for
conductors since the early 1950’s, should supplant porcelain
as insulation for other applications in the electric power
field.
The positive properties of porcelain are chiefly its high
insulation value and its great strength under compression.
Its negative features are its weight (low strength to weight
ratio) and its tendency to fragmentation under stress. Much
of the strength of a porcelain insulator is consumed in sup-
porting its own weight. Figure A-1a&b.
In contrast, the so-called polymer not only has equally
high insulation value, but acceptable strength under both
compression and tension. It also has better water and sleet
shedding properties, hence handles contamination more ef-
fectively, and is less prone to damage or destruction from
vandalism. It is very much lighter in weight than porcelain
(better strength to weight ratio), therefore more easily
handled. Figure A-2, Table A-1.
Economically, costs of porcelain and polymer materials
are very competitive, but the handling factors very much
favor the polymer.

59
60 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure A-1 a. Ball and socket

type suspension insulator.

Figure A-1 b. Pin-type insulator.

 Appendices
Table A-1. Polymer insulation weight advantage
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
Product Type Voltage Porcelain Polymer Percent Weight
(kV) Weight (lbs) Weight (lbs) Reduction
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
Insulator Distribution 15 9.5 2.4 74.7
Arrester Distribution 15 6.0 3.8 36.7
Post Insulator Transmission 69 82.5 27.2 67.0
Suspension Transmission 138 119.0 8.0 93.2
Intermediate
Arrester Substation 69 124.0 28.0 77.4
Station Arrester Substation 138 280.0 98.9 64.7
———————————————————————————————————————————————————

61
62 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Polymer insulation is generally associated with a me-

chanically stronger insulation, such as high strength fiber-
glass. The fiberglass insulation serves as an internal structure
around which the polymer insulation is attached, usually in
the form (and function) of petticoats (sometimes also re-
ferred to as bands, water shedders; but for comparison pur-
poses, however, here only the term petticoat will be used).
The insulation value of the Polymer petticoats is equal to or
greater than that of the fiberglass to which it is attached.
The internal fiberglass structure may take the form of a
rod (or shaft), a tube, cylinder, or other shape. It has a high
comparable compression strength as a solid and its tensile
strength, equally high, is further improved by stranding and
aligning around a fiber center. The polymer petticoats are
installed around the fiberglass insulation and sealed to pre-
vent moisture or contamination from entering between the
petticoats and fiberglass; Figure A-3. The metal fittings at
either end are crimped directly to the fiberglass, developing
a high percentage of the inherent strength of the fiberglass.
It should be noted that fiberglass with an elastometric (plas-
tic) covering has been used for insulation purposes since the
early 1920’s.
The polymer petticoats serve the same function as the
petticoats associated with porcelain insulators, that of pro-
viding a greater path for electric leakage between the ener-
gized conductors (terminals, buses, etc.) and the supporting
structures. In inclement weather, this involves the shedding
of rain water or sleet as readily as possible to maintain as
much as possible the electric resistance between the ener-
gized element and the supporting structure, so that the leak-
age of electrical current between these two points be kept as
low as possible to prevent flashover and possible damage or
destruction of the insulator. Tables A-2a&b.
Appendices 63

Figure A-2. A variety of typical Polymer insulator shapes. (Courtesy

Hubbell Power Systems)
64 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure A-3. Polymer insulator showing fiberglass

rod insulation and sealing (Courtesy Hubbell
Power Systems).

Table A-2a. Polymer improvement over porcelain (Courtesy

Hubbell Power Systems)
————————————————————————————————
Watts Loss Reduction*
(watts per insulator string)
————————————————————————————————
Voltage Relative Humidity
kV 30% 50% 70% 90% 100%
————————————————————————————————
69 0.6- 0.8 0.9 1.0 4.0
138 1.0 2.4 4.5 7.2 8.0
230 1.0 2.5 5.7 14.0 29.0
345 2.5 4.2 8.5 15.0 30.0
500 2.8 7.8 11.5 33.0 56.0
————————————————————————————————
*Power loss measurements under dynamic humidity condi-
tions on I-strings.
 Appendices
Table A-2b. Polymer Distribution Arrester Leakage Distance Advantage (Courtesy
Hubbell Power Systems)
——————————————————————————————————————————————
Standard Standard Special Special Standard Standard
MCOV Porcelain Porcelain Porcelain Porcelain Polymer Polymer
Leakage Height Leakage Height Leakage Height
Distance (in) (inches) Distance (in) (inches) Distance (in) (inches)
——————————————————————————————————————————————
8.4 9.0 9.4 18.3 15.9 15.4 5.5
15.3 18.3 15.9 22.0 20.0 26.0 8.5
22.0 22.0 20.0 29.0 28.9 52.0 17.2
——————————————————————————————————————————————

65
66 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

When the insulator becomes wet, and especially in a

contaminated environment, leakage currents begin to flow
on the surface; if the current becomes high enough, an ex-
ternal flashover takes place. The rate at which the insulation
dries is critical. The relationship between the outer petticoat
diameter and the core is known as the form factor. The
leakage current generates heat (I2R) on the surface of the in-
sulator (eddy currents). In addi-
tion to the effects of the leakage
current, the rate at which the petti-
coat insulation will dry depends
on a number of factors. Starting
with its contamination before be-
coming wet, the temperature and
humidity of the atmosphere and
wind velocity following the cessa-
tion of the inclement weather. In
areas where extreme contamina-
tion may occur (such as some in-
dustrial areas or proximity to
ocean salt spray), the polymer pet-
ticoats may be alternated in differ-
ent sizes, Figure A-4, to obtain
greater distance between the outer
edges of the petticoats across
which flashover might occur.
When dry, the leakage current (ap-
proximately) ceases and the line
voltage is supported across dry
petticoats, preventing flashover of

Figure A-4. Polymer insulator arrangement areas of high contamina-

tion where flashover between petticoat edges is possible (Courtesy
Hubbe) Power Systems)
 Appendices
Table A-3. Comparison of Contamination Performance of Polymer versus Porcelain Housed
Intermediate Class Arresters (Courtesy Hubbell Power Systems)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
Partial 5 Hr. Slurry Test
Wetting Maximum Current After
Test Slurry Number
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
MCOV Housing Housing Max. Max. 5 10 15 20
(kV) Material Leakage Current Disc.
Distance (in) (mA crest) Temps. (°C)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
57 Polymer 81 <1 <38 35 42 44 44
66 Porcelain 54 68 >163 — — — —
84 Polymer 109 <1 <38 50 52 60 60
98 Porcelain 122.4 18 <82 143 160 175 185
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
Tested using the 5-hour uniform slurry test procedure. This test consists of applying a uniform coating of standard
400 ohm-cm slurry to the test arrester. Within 30 seconds, MCOV is applied for 15 minutes, during which time the
surface leakage currents cause the surface to dry. Slurry applications are repeated for a total of 20 test cycles. After
the 20th test cycle, MCOV is applied to the arrester for 30 to 60 minutes to demonstrate thermal stability Surface
leakage currents were measured at the end of the 5th, 10th, 15th and 20th test cycles.

67
68 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

the insulator. It is obviously impractical to design and

manufacture comparable porcelain insulators as thin as
polymers and having the same form factor. Table A-3.
In addition, in porcelain insulators, the active insulating
segment is usually small and, when subjected to lightning or
surge voltage stresses, may be punctured. In subsequent
similar circumstances, it may breakdown completely, not
only causing flashover between the energized element and
the supporting structure, but may explode causing porcelain
fragmentation in the process; the one-piece fiberglass insula-
tor will not experience puncture.
The polymer suitable for high voltage application con-
sists of these materials:
1. Ethylene Propylene Monomer (EPM)
2. Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM)
3. Silicone Rubber (SR)
Both EPM and EPDM, jointly referred to as EP, are
known for their inherent resistance to tracking and corro-
sion, and for their physical properties, SR offers good con-
tamination performance and resistance to Ultra Violet (UV)
sun rays. The result of combining these is a product that
achieves the water repellent feature (hydrophobic) of sili-
cone and the electromechanical advantages of EP rubber.
Different polymer materials may be combined to pro-
duce a polymer with special properties; for example, a sili-
cone EPDM is highly resistant to industrial type pollution
and ocean salt.
The advantageous strength to weight ratio of polymer
as compared to porcelain makes possible lighter structures
and overall costs as well as permitting more compact de-
signs, resulting in narrower right-of-way requirements and
smaller station layouts. The reduction in handling, shipping,
packaging, storage, preparation and assembly, all with less
Appendices 69

breakage, are obvious—these, in addition to the superior

electromechanical performance.
Fiberglass insulation with its polymer petticoats is sup-
planting porcelain in bushings associated with transformers,
voltage regulators, capacitors, switchgear, circuit breakers,
bus supports, instrument transformers, lightning or surge
arresters, and other applications. The metallic rod or conduc-
tor inside the bushing body may be inserted in a fiberglass
tube and sealed to prevent moisture or contamination enter-
ing between the conductor and the fiberglass tube around
which the polymer petticoats are attached. More often, the
fiberglass insulation is molded around the conductor, and
the polymer petticoats attached in a similar fashion as in
insulators. Figure A-5.
Lightning or surge arrester elements are enclosed in an
insulated casing. Under severe operating conditions, or as a
result of multiple operations, the pressure generated within
the casing may rise to the point where pressure relief ratings
are exceeded. The arrester then may fail, with or without
external flashover, Figure A-6, exploding and violently ex-
pelling fragments of the casing as well as the internal com-
ponents, causing possible injury to personnel and damage to
surrounding structures. The action represents a race between
pressures building up within the casing and an arcing or
flashover outside the casing. The ‘length’ of the casing of the
arrester limits its ability to vent safely. The use of polymer
insulation for the casing permits puncturing to occur, with-
out the fragmentation that may accompany breakdown and
failure of porcelain.
Summarizing, the advantages of polymers over porce-
lain include:

• Polymer insulation offers benefits in shedding rain wa-

ter or sleet, particularly in contaminated environments.
70 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure A-5. Typical porcelain bushings that may be replaced with

polymers.

(a) Typical oil-filled bushing for 69 kV transformer.

Appendices 71

Figure A-5(b). Sidewall-

mounted bushing.

Figure A-5(c).
72 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure A-5(d). Bushing applications that may be

replaced with polymers.

Figure A-5(e).
Appendices 73

Figure A-5f. More porcelain insulation that may be

replaced with polymers.

• Polymer products weigh significantly less than their

porcelain counterparts, particularly line insulators, re-
sulting in cost savings in structures, construction and
installation costs. Table A-4.

• Polymer insulators and surge arresters are resistant to

damage resulting from installation and to damage from
vandalism. The lack of flying fragments when a poly-
mer insulator is shot deprives the vandal from his satis-
faction with a spectacular event and should discourage
insulators as convenient targets.
 74
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure A-6. Polymer and porcelain cased arresters.
 Appendices
Figure A-6 (cont’d). Polymer and porcelain cased arresters.

75
76 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Polymer arresters allow for multiple operations (such as

may result from station circuit reclosings), without vio-
lently failing. Figure A-6.

• Polymer insulators permit increased conductor (and

static wire) line tensions, resulting in lower construction
designs by permitting longer spans, fewer towers or
lower tower heights.

• Polymer one-piece insulators, lacking the flexibility of

porcelain strings and the firm attachment of the conduc-
tor it support are said to produce a tendency to dampen
galloping lines.

Although polymer insulation has become increasingly

utilized over the past several decades, there are literally
millions of porcelain insulated installations in this country
alone; economics does not permit their wholesale replace-
ment. Advantage is taken of maintenance and reconstruction
of such facilities to make the change to polymers.
Much of the data and illustrations are courtesy of
Hubbell Power systems, and is herewith duly acknowledged
with thanks.
Appendices 77

Table A-4. Example—10 Miles, 345 kV, 250 Strings of Insu-

lators
————————————————————————————————
Porcelain - 4500 bells, 52-3, 13.5 lbs. ea., total 60,760 lbs.
750 crates at 3.1 cu. ft. = 2,325 cu. ft.
Insulator cost = $51.760 ($11.60/bell)
Polymers - 250 units, 14.4 lbs. ea., total 3 600 lbs.
5 crates at 75 cu. ft. = 375 cu. ft.
Insulator cost = $51.750
Savings
———————
1. Storage space at receiving point (3 mos.)
porcelain - 580 sq. ft.; polymer - 100 sq. ft . ................ 480 sq. ft. $ 60.00
2. Off-load, re-load at receiving point; porcelain -
10 man-hrs.; polymer - 2 man-hrs. ............................... 8 man-hrs. $120.00
3. Breakage - off-loading, storage; re-load-
porcelain - 1 percent; polymer - 0 ................................... 1 percent $517.50
4. Truck - receiving point to tower sites (5 miles);
porcelain- 1.00/cwt.; polymer .50/cwt .............................. $589.50 $589.50
5. Off load at tower site porcelain -
5 man-hrs.; polymer - 1 man-hr . ................................. 4 man-hrs. $60.00
6. Unpack at tower site; porcelain -
50 crates/hour, 25 man-hrs.; polymer -
50 insulators/hour, 5 man-hrs . .................................. 20 man-hrs. $300.00
7. Breakage - off-loading through string assembly
& cleaning porcelain - 1 percent: polymer - 0 .............. 1 percent $517.50
8. Assemble strings, attach blocks porcelain -
40 man-hrs.; polymer - 8 man-hrs . ........................... 32 man-hrs. $480.00
9. Clean insulators; porcelain-10 min./string;
polymer - 3 min./string ................................................ 29 man-hrs. $435.00
10. Lift string into place (2 men); porcelain -
5 min./string; polymer - 2 min./string ..................... 25 man-hrs. $375.00
11. Install & connect to tower (2 men); porcelain -
5 min./string polymer - 2 min./string ...................... 25 man-hrs. $375.00
12. Breakage - lifting & installation;
porcelain - 0.5 percent; polymer - 0 ............................. 0.5 percent $258.75
13. Cleanup packaging materials at jobsite;
porcelain - 6 man-hrs.; polymer - 1.5 man-hrs . ..... 4.5 man-hrs. $67.50

(Courtesy Hubbell Power Systems)

This page intentionally left blank
Appendices 79

Appendix B

The Grid
Coordinate System:
Tying Maps to Computers*

INTRODUCTION

The grid coordinate system is the key that ties together

two important tools, maps and computers. Maps are a neces-
sity for the better operation of many enterprises, especially
of utility systems. Their effectiveness can be increased many-
fold by adding to their information data contained in other
files. Much of the latter data are now organized and stored
in computer-oriented files-on punched cards and on mag-
netic tapes, drums, disks, and cells. Generally, these data can
be retrieved almost instantly by CRTs (cathode ray tubes) or
printouts. The link that makes the correlation of data con-
tained on the maps and in the files practical is the grid co-
ordinate system.
Essentially, the grid coordinate system divides any par-
ticular area served into any number of small areas in a grid
pattern. By superimposing on a map a system of grid lines,
and assigning numbers to each of the vertical and horizontal
spacings, it is possible to define any of the small areas by
two simple numbers. These numbers are not selected at ran-

*Reprinted (with modifications) from Consulting Engineer,® January 1975, vol. 44, no. 1, pp.
5 1-55.© by Technical Publishing, a company of the Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, 1975.
All rights reserved.

79
80 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

dom, but have some meaning. Like any graph, these two
coordinates represent measurements from a reference point;
in this respect they are similar to navigation’s latitude and
longitude measurements.
Further subdivision of the basic grid areas into a series
of smaller grids is possible, each having a decimal relation
with the previous one (i.e., by dividing each horizontal and
vertical space into tenths, each resultant area will be one-
hundredth of the area considered). By using more detailed
maps of smaller scale, it is possible to define smaller and
smaller areas simply by carrying out the coordinate numbers
to further decimals. For practical purposes, each of these
grid areas should measure perhaps not more than 25 ft by 25
ft (preferably less, say 10 ft by 10 ft) and should be identified
by a numeral of some 6 to 12 digits.
For example, by dividing by 10, an area of 1,000,000 ft
by 1,000,000 ft (equivalent to some 190 miles square) can be
divided into 10 smaller areas of 100,000 ft by 100,000 ft each,
identified by two digits, one horizontal and one vertical.
This smaller area can again be subdivided into 10 smaller
areas of 10,000 ft by 10,000 ft each, identified by two more
digits, or a total of four with reference to the basic 1,000,000-
ft square area. Breaking down further into 1000- by 1000-ft
squares and repeating the process allows these new grids to
be identified by two more digits, or a total of six. Again
dividing by 10 into units of 100 ft by 100 ft, and adding two
more digits, produces a total of eight digits to identify this
grid size. One more division produces grids of 10 ft by 10 ft
and two more digits in the identifying number-for a total of
10 digits, not an excessive number to be handled for the grid
size under consideration; see Figure B-1.
This process may be carried further where applications
requiring smaller areas are desirable; however, each further
breakdown not only reduces the accuracy of the measure-
Appendices 81

Figure B-1. Development of grid coordinate system.

82 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ments, but also adds to the number of digits, which soon

becomes unmanageable. Experience indicates that a “com-
fortable” system should contain 10 digits or fewer for nor-
mal usages.
While the decimal relation has been mentioned, other
relations can be used, such as sixths, eighths, etc., or combi-
nations, such as eighths and tenths, and others.

Standard References
To give these numerals some actual physical or geo-
graphical significance, they may be tied in with existing local
maps. U.S. Geological Survey maps, coast and geodetic sur-
vey maps, state plane coordinate systems, standard metro-
politan statistical areas, or latitude and longitude bearings.
They may also be tied in with maps independent of all of
these.
While reference to state and federal government sys-
tems lends some geographical significance, it produces iden-
tifying grid numbers with several additional digits. It is not
necessary for any grid coordinate system to have this refer-
ence to a government system, but if it is desired, it is a rela-
tively simple procedure to develop a computerized look-up
program that can translate such coordinates.
Basic grid coordinate maps may be developed from the
conversion of existing maps to a usable scale, if such maps
are reasonably accurate and complete, both as to their geog-
raphy and content. They may also be developed from exact
land surveys, from aerial surveys, or from combinations of
all of these.
Excellent maps are also available for most of the coun-
try. U.S. Geological Survey maps show latitude and longi-
tude lines every few miles; they also show numerous
triangulation stations with the latitude and longitude for
each station determined to an extreme degree of accuracy.
Appendices 83

Further, detail maps are available for practically every city

and township, showing streets, houses, and lots. Despite the
fine degree of accuracy of these maps, minor inaccuracies
and discrepancies are bound to occur.

Earth’s Curvature
Errors occur in mapping the earth’s curved surface on a
flat map; see Figure B-2. For example, in the case of the
approximate 190-mi square mentioned previously, in the
continental United States, the error introduced by this curva-
ture, measuring from the center (95 mi in the longitudinal, or
north-south direction) would probably not exceed 2 percent,
a tolerable error. These errors need not be of great import,
except in establishing match lines between maps. No gaps or

Figure B-2. Error introduced in grid coordinate system by earth curva-

ture
84 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

overlaps should appear between adjacent maps, or between

property or lot lines within a map. Tolerances of a few per-
cent ordinarily are acceptable.

GRID COORDINATE MAPS

A grid coordinate map system should meet the follow-

ing requirements:

1. It should include a simple and easily understood system

of numerals for locating the data under consideration
(numerals only; the x and y coordinates).

2. The grid areas should be small enough to be consistent

with the purposes for which they are to be used (25 ft or
less).

3. The number of digits in the grid number should be held

to a practical number so as not to become cumbersome
and unwieldy (normally not more than about 10).

4. It should be designed to allow for expansion so that it

will not have to be radically revised if unforeseeable
expansion should occur.

5. It must provide reasonable accuracy (tolerances of a few

percent), and it may or may not be tied in with some
government or other established coordinate system.

6. Map sizes should be manageable (say, 24- or 36-in.

square).

7. Maps of different scales should be included in the sys-

Appendices 85

tem to accommodate different kinds of data (for circuit

data, say 1000 or 500 ft; for details of facilities, say, 100
ft for overhead and 50 or 25 ft for underground).

8. A key map must show the entire grid area.

9. Optional is a grid atlas showing street locations with

grid overlay.

In attempting to design a grid coordinate system for a

very large area, it may be difficult to meet these require-
ments. In such instances it may be desirable and practical to
divide the entire area into two or more convenient districts,
establishing a separate grid coordinate system in each dis-
trict and tying the separate systems together with match
lines at the borders. A prefix letter or number may be used
to identify districts, though this may not prove necessary in
actual operation.
The size of individual maps should be large enough to
encompass an area suitable for the purpose but small
enough not to be unwieldy; sizes 24- or 26-in. square have
proven practical. Maps of different scales are used for differ-
ent purposes; for example, a 50- or 100-ft scale is used for
dense or crowded areas; 300- or 500-ft for less dense or rural
areas; and 500- or 1000-ft or even larger for district or overall
area viewing. The series of scales used should be such that
the larger-scale maps fit into those of smaller scale com-
pletely and evenly. Match lines of each sheet should fall on
corresponding match lines of adjacent sheets.
The grid pattern applicable to each of the several scale
maps may be printed directly on each map as light back-
ground lines, perhaps even in a different color, or printed on
the back of the maps when they are reproduced. Alternately,
a grid overlay can be applied to each map to be used when
86 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

it is necessary to determine a grid coordinate for an item on

the map. The actual grid number need not be printed on
every item on every map unless desired. Such numbers as-
signed to key locations on each map normally suffice; the
others may be determined from the grid background or
overlay. To maintain their permanence and to minimize dis-
tortion from expansion and contraction because of changing
humidity and temperature, the maps should be printed on a
material such as Mylar, a translucent polyesterbase plastic
film; this is especially true of the base maps from which
others of different scales and purposes are derived.
As much as practical, the data on the maps should be
uncluttered and as legible as possible. It may be desirable in
some instances to provide two or more maps (of the same
scale) for several purposes; marks for coordinating these
several maps, should it be necessary, may be included on
each of the maps.
Maps may be further uncluttered by deliberately remov-
ing as much of the information on them as appears desirable
and practical and consigning such information to files
readily accessible by computer. In many instances, this infor-
mation already is included or duplicated in such files, but
may need to be labeled with the appropriate grid coordinate
number. The use of CRTs and printouts makes this informa-
tion available at will.

Application of Grid Coordinate Numbers

The grid coordinate number may be applied to each
item of information contained in the computer-operated files
by location. This may be done in several ways: manually, by
machine, or a combination of the two.
The manual method is to superimpose or overlay the
grid pattern on existing maps and manually assign numbers
to each item to be processed. As mentioned previously, the
Appendices 87

grid pattern may be transferred to the master or original

maps, and reproduced (or microfilmed) on the maps for the
user; here numbers can be assigned directly from the map.
The machine method of grid number assignment em-
ploys an electronic scanning device called a digitizer. This
machine includes a drafting table for map display and a
cursor or pointer. The postal address and other fixed data are
inserted on a punch card. For a particular map, the grid
numbers of the map are set on the digitizer console. The
digitizer assigns the x and y coordinates when the cursor is
placed on a selected point and activated. These data are fed
to a keypunch, which produces a punched card. In this
method of producing the grid coordinate numbers, the digi-
tizer enables additional refinement to be achieved, produc-
ing additional decimal numbers for the x and y coordinates.
Hence, the ultimate grid area that can be measured can be
one-tenth or one-hundredth, etc., of the basic unit area (1 by
1 ft, or 0.1 ft by 0.1 ft, for a 10- by 10-ft base area).
When numbers are assigned manually from maps, this
degree of accuracy is not possible, nor is it necessary if the
principal purpose of the grid coordinate system is to identify
an item rather than a precise point. While the actual accuracy
of such additional digits can be questioned, they provide a
method of further subdividing a map for closer location of
an item, but more important, they make possible a system of
automatic mapping using the computer.
The grid coordinate number corresponding to the loca-
tion of an item in question is added to its record and now
becomes its computer address. In assigning these numbers to
existing files, the digitizer generally can properly identify
the location from a suitable map. As a practical matter, how-
ever, there will be some locations or descriptions that cannot
be identified using the digitizer, and these may require
manual processing and actual checking in the field; fortu-
88 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

nately these usually constitute only a small percentage of the

total records.
In the maintenance of such files, the grid coordinate
numbers associated with changes in, or with the introduc-
tion of new items into, the records can be assigned manually
by the originator of the record.

COORDINATE DATA HANDLING

As implied earlier, the grid coordinate system provides

an easy and simple but, more important, a very rapid means
of obtaining data from files through the use of the computer.
In some respects, it assigns addresses to data in the same
way as the ZIP code system in use by the postal service. The
manner in which the grid number may be used is illustrated
in the following examples; for convenience they refer to elec-
tric utility systems, although obviously they apply equally
well to other endeavors employing maps and records.
Data contained on maps and records generally apply to
the consumers served and the facilities installed to serve
them. While maps depict (by area) the geographic and func-
tional (electrical) interrelationship between these several
components, the records supply a continuing history (by
location) of each component item (consumers and facilities).
In the case of consumers, such data may include, in
addition to the grid coordinate number, the name and post
office address. Also a history of electric consumption (and
demand where applicable), billing, and other pertinent data
over a continuing period, usually 18 or 24 months. There
may also be data on the consumer’s major appliances; also
the data and work order number of original connection and
subsequent changes. The grid coordinate number of the
transformer from which the consumer is supplied is in-
Appendices 89

cluded, as well as that for the pole or underground facility

from which the service to the consumer is taken. Sometimes
interruption data may be included. Other data may include
telephone number, tax district, access details, hazards (in-
cluding animals), dates of connection or reconnection, insur-
ance claims, easements, meter data, meter reading route, test
data, credit rating, and other pertinent information. Only a
small portion of these data are shown on maps, usually in
the form of symbols or code letters and numerals. In the case
of facilities, such data may include, in addition to the grid
coordinate number, location information, size and kind of
facility (e.g., pole, wire, transformer, etc.), date installed or
changed, repairs or replacements made (including reason
therefor, usually coded), original cost, work order numbers,
crew or personnel doing work, construction standard refer-
ence, accident reports, insurance claims, operating record,
test data, tax district, and other pertinent information. Simi-
larly, only a small portion of these data are shown on maps,
usually in the form of symbols or code letters and numerals.
Data from other sources also may be filed by grid num-
ber for correlation with consumer and facility information
for a variety of purposes. Such data may include govern-
ment census data; police records of crime, accidents, and
vandalism; fire and health records; pollution measurements;
public planning; construction and rehabilitation plans; zon-
ing restrictions; rights-of-way and easement locations; legal
data; plat and survey data; tax district; and much other in-
formation that may affect or be useful in carrying out utility
operations.
Obviously, all these data, whether pertaining to the con-
sumer or to the utility’s facilities, are not necessarily con-
tained on one map or in one record only; indeed, there may
be several maps and records involved, each containing cer-
tain amounts of specialized or functionally related data. All,
90 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

however, may be correlated through the grid coordinate sys-

tem.

Data Retrieval
Data contained in the files may be retrieved by means of
the computer and may be presented visually by means of
CRTs for one-time instant use, or by printouts and automatic
plotting for repeated use over an indefinite time period. Data
presented may be the exact original data as contained in one
or more files, or extracted data obtained as a result of corre-
lating data residing in one or more files, or a combination of
both; such extracted data may or may not be retained in
separate files for future use.
These data may be retrieved for an individual consumer
or an individual item of plant facilities, or may be other data
for a particular area, small or large. The various specific
purposes determine what data are to be retrieved and how
they are to be presented. They also determine the programs
and equipment required. Data thus retrieved then are used
with data contained on the map to help in forming the de-
cisions required. The decisions may include new data that
can be reentered in the files as updating material, that can be
plotted or printed for exhibit purposes, or that can be reen-
tered on maps for updating or expanding the material
thereon; all of these may be done by means of the computer.
The grid coordinate number is applied to utility facili-
ties for ease of location and positive identification in the
field. In the case of electric utilities, these may include ser-
vices, meters, poles, towers, manholes, pull boxes, trans-
formers, transformer enclosures, switches, disconnects,
fuses, lightning arresters, capacitors, regulators, boosters,
streetlights, air pollution analyzers, and other equipment
and apparatus; also the location of laterals on transmission
and distribution circuits.
Appendices 91

OTHER APPLICATIONS

Similarly, for gas utilities, the applications of grid coor-

dinate numbers may include mains, services, meters, regula-
tors, valves, sumps, test pits, and other equipment; also the
location of boosters, laterals, and nodes on the gas systems.
For water systems, they may include mains, services, meters,
valves, dams, weirs, pumps, irrigation channels, and other
facilities. For telephone and telegraph communication sys-
tems, including CATV circuits, they may include mains, ser-
vices, terminals, repeaters, microwave reflectors, and other
items including poles, manholes, and special items.
Grid coordinate numbers also may find application in
many other lines of endeavor: highway systems, railway
systems, oil fields, social surveys (police, health, income,
population distribution, etc.), market surveys (banks and
industries), municipal planning and land use studies, non-
classical archeology, geophysical studies, and others where
such means of location identification may prove practical.
The use of grid coordinates facilitates positive identifica-
tion in the field; the numbers are posted systematically on
facilities, such as streetlight or traffic standards, poles, and
structures, and at corners or other prominent locations.
An atlas, consisting of a grid overlay on a geographical
map, aids the field forces in locating consumers and plant
facilities and provides a common basis for communication
between office and field operating personnel.
The grid pattern permits the classical manipulation of
data by individual grid sections or areas comprising several
grid sections. In addition to the sample presentation of such
data by means of CRT displays and typed printouts, data
may be presented in the form of plotting in various graphical
forms, in patterns indicating the distribution of data, the
density of particular data, the accumulation of data within
92 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

fixed boundaries, the determination of area boundaries for

predetermined data content (the analysis of data within a
given polygon), the calculation of lengths and distances be-
tween grid locations, and the mapping of facilities in accept-
able detail-and all of these operations may be performed
automatically by means of the computer.
Further, summaries and analyses employing the grid
coordinate system may be more readily made and are sus-
ceptible to combination and consolidation, resulting in per-
haps fewer and more comprehensive reports (eliminating
the duplication of much needless data and the presentation
of more complete and meaningful conclusions in one place).
In all of the foregoing discussion, the point must be
made that all of the handling of data using the grid system
may also be accomplished without the use of the grid sys-
tem. It is apparent, however, that this latter method will in
the vast majority of cases employ more effort in terms of
work hours and will be more time-consuming, so as to ren-
der many applications impractical, even though their desir-
ability may be great; in short, the grid coordinate system
enhances the economics of data handling.

ECONOMICS

It is not to be denied that the introduction of the grid

coordinate system will impose additional cost to the maps
and records function. It is also evident that these costs will
be offset by the decreased personnel requirements in the
processing of data derived from the maps and records, espe-
cially when the computer may be made to take up a large
part of this burden. Moreover, more refinement and a wider
scope in processing of data are attainable.
The cost of implementing a grid coordinate system can
Appendices 93

be evaluated fairly accurately. Many factors will influence

the final determination; these include the area of the system
involved, the number of consumers and facilities, the condi-
tion of the basic and auxiliary maps and records, the number
and scope of the applications desired, the extent of automa-
tion, and many other factors. A very approximate estimate
may average perhaps about one day’s revenue per con-
sumer. Practical considerations associated with implementa-
tion may well dictate a period of several years, perhaps 5
years or even more, over which the expenditure will have to
be made to accomplish the desired goals.
The offsetting savings from the introduction of a grid
coordinate system, including those derived from the addi-
tional worth of the wider utilization, are difficult to pinpoint.
It should be observed that while it is probable that a single
application will not justify the adoption of the grid coordi-
nate system, except in some unusual or special set of circum-
stances, it is also probable that the multiplicity of practical
applications indicated will justify the relatively modest ex-
penditure necessary for the conversion of present maps and
records to the grid coordinate system.
The personnel requirements necessary to implement a
grid coordinate system over a reasonable (short-term) period
of time must be viewed together with the overall probable
lessened longer-term in-house requirements. Since such a
conversion is a one-time operation, it recommends itself
admirably to the classical use of contractors having the spe-
cial skills and experience. Further, such outside services are
not apt to be diverted by crisis incidents prevalent in many
enterprises.
One final observation. With the national consensus ap-
parently pointing to an ultimate metric system for the
United States to conform with world standards, the adoption
of a grid coordinate system provides an excellent opportu-
94 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

nity for its introduction with a minimum of conversion ef-

fort.
With the advent of the computer, it was inevitable that
the grid coordinate system should be developed to provide
a simple means of addressing the computer. The grid num-
ber provides the link between the map and the vast amount
of data managed by the computer. This happy marriage of
two powerful tools results not only in better operations but
in improved economy as well. It is a must in the moderniza-
tion of operations in many enterprises and especially in util-
ity systems.
Appendices 95

Appendix C

US and Metric Relationships

————————————————————————————————
U.S. To Metric Metric To U.S.
————————————————————————————————
Length
1 inch = 25.4 mm 1 millimetre = 0.03937 inch
1 inch = 2.54 cm 1 centimetre = 0.3937 inch
1 inch = 0.0254 m 1 metre = 39.37 inch
1 foot = 0.3048 m 1 metre = 3.2808 feet
1 yard = 0.9144 m 1 metre = 1.094 yard
1 mile = 1.609 km 1 kilometre = 0.6214 mile

Surface
1 inch2 = 645.2 mm2 1 millimetre2 = 0.00155 inch2
1 inch2 = 6.452 cm2 1 centimetre2 = 0.155 inch2
1 foot2 = 0.0929 m2 1 metre2 = 10.764 foot2
1 yard2 = 0.8361 m2 1 metre2 = 1.196 yard2
1 acre = 0.4047 hectare 1 hectare = 2.471 acres
1 mile2 = 258.99 hectare 1 hectare = 0.00386 mi2
1 mile2 = 2.59 km2 1 kilometre2 = 0.3861 mile2

Volume
1 inch3 = 16.39 cm3 1 centimetre3 = 0.061 inch3
1 foot3 = 0.0283 m3 1 metre3 = 35.314 foot3
1 yard3 = 0.7645 m3 1 metre3 = 1.308 yard3
1 foot3 = 28.32 litres 1 litre = 0.0353 foot3
1 inch3 = 0.0164 litre 1 litre = 61.023 inch3
1 quart = 0.9463 litre 1 litre = 1.0567 quarts
1 gallon = 3.7854 litres 1 litre = 0.2642 gallons
1 gallon = 0.0038 m3 1 metre3 = 264.17 gallons

Weight
1 ounce = 28.35 grams 1 gram = 0.0353 ounce
1 pound = 0.4536 kg 1 kilogram = 2.2046 lb*
1 net ton = 0.9072 T (metric) 1 Ton (metric) = 1.1023 net tons**
*Avoirdupois
**1 ton = 2000 lb

Compound units
1 lb/ft = 1.4882 kg/m 1 kilogram/metre = 0.6720 lb/ft
1 lb/in2 = 0.0703 kg/m2 1 kg/cm2 =14.223 lb/in2

93
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Appendices 97

Appendix D

Transmission Planning and

The Need for New Capacity
(National Transmission Grid Study)

Eric Hirst
Consulting in Electric-Industry Restructuring
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Brendan Kirby
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Introduction
Transmission Planning Practices
Traditional Utilities
Current Planning Environment
Review of Recent Plans
Review of RTO Transmission Planning
Proposed Planning Process
Key Transmission Planning Issues
Planning Criteria: Reliability and Commerce
Economies of Scale
Congestion Costs
Generation and Load Alternatives
New Technologies
Merchant Transmission
Projections of New Generation and Load Growth
Recommendations
Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
97
98 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. electricity industry is in the midst of a transi-

tion from a structure dominated by vertically integrated
utilities regulated primarily at the state level to one domi-
nated by competitive markets. In part, because of the com-
plexities of this transition, planning and construction of new
transmission facilities are lagging behind the need for such
grid expansion.
Between 1979 and 1989, transmission capacity increased
slightly faster than did summer peak demand (Hirst and
Kirby 2001). However, during the subsequent decade, utili-
ties added transmission capacity at a much lower rate than
loads grew. The trends established during this second de-
cade are expected to persist through the next decade. Ac-
cording to one analysis, maintaining transmission adequacy
at its current level might require an investment of about $56
billion during the present decade, roughly half that needed
for new generation during the same period (Hirst and Kirby
2001).
Expanding transmission capacity requires good plan-
ning (as well as appropriate market rules and regulatory
oversight). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC 1999) emphasized the importance of transmission
planning in the creation of competitive wholesale markets.
FERC wrote that each regional transmission organization
(RTO) “must be responsible for planning, and for directing
or arranging, necessary transmission expansions, additions,
and upgrades that will enable it to provide efficient, reliable,
and nondiscriminatory transmission service and coordinate
such efforts with appropriate state authorities.” FERC in-
cluded transmission planning as one of the eight minimum
functions of an RTO:
Appendices 99

[T]he RTO must have ultimate responsibility for both

transmission planning and expansion within its region
that will enable it to provide efficient, reliable and non-
discriminatory service…. The rationale for this require-
ment is that a single entity must coordinate these actions
to ensure a least cost outcome that maintains or im-
proves existing reliability levels. In the absence of a
single entity performing these functions, there is a dan-
ger that separate transmission investments will work at
cross-purposes and possibly even hurt reliability.

This shift from planning conducted by individual utili-

ties for their system to meet the needs of their customers, to
planning conducted by RTOs to meet the needs of regional
electricity markets, raises important issues (Table 1). These
issues include the criteria for planning (reliability, econom-
ics, etc.); environmental considerations (effects of transmis-
sion expansion on the location and types of emissions from
power plants, accommodation of remotely located renew-
able resources, as well as the direct siting and environmental
effects of transmission); economic development (providing
greater access to cheaper power may encourage local and
regional economic growth); the role of congestion costs in
deciding which projects to build; the consideration of gen-
eration, load, and transmission-pricing alternatives to new
transmission projects; the economic and land-use benefits of
building larger facilities ahead of immediate need; the role of
new solid-state technologies that permit operation of trans-
mission systems closer to their thermal limits; the role of
merchant transmission projects; and the growing difficulty
in obtaining data on new generation and load growth caused
by the separation of generation and retail service from trans-
mission. Finally, collaborative transmission-planning pro-
cesses, which include various stakeholders early in the
100 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Table 1. Key transmission-planning issues

—————————————————————————————
Topic Issues
—————————————————————————————
Reliability vs To what extent should RTOs plan solely to
commerce meet reliability requirements, leaving deci-
sions on grid expansion for commercial
purposes (e.g., to reduce congestion costs) in
the hands of market participants?

Congestion costs Are congestion costs (e.g., short-term nodal or

zonal congestion prices and long-term firm
transmission rights) a suitable basis for decid-
ing on transmission investments?

Alternatives to What role should RTOs play in assessing and

transmission motivating suitably located generation and
load alternatives to new transmission? Should
RTOs provide information only or should
they also help pay for such alternatives?

Economies Should RTOs or private investors overbuild

of scale transmission facilities in anticipation of future
need to reduce the dollar and land costs per
GW-mile of new transmission facilities? How
should these economies be balanced against
the possibly greater financial risks of larger
transmission facilities?

Advanced What are the prospects for widespread use of

technologies new technologies (e.g., superconductivity,
solid-state electronics, and faster systems to
collect and analyze data) to improve system
control, thereby permitting operation of
existing grids closer to their limits?
(Continued)
Appendices 101

Table 1. Key transmission-planning issues (Continued)

—————————————————————————————
Planning data Who will provide the data needed for trans-
mission planning, particularly on the loca-
tions, timing, and types of new and retiring
generating units and the loads and load
shapes of retail customers?

Economic effects How should transmission’s impact on re-

gional power prices and the resulting impact
on the regional economy be factored into
transmission planning?

Environmental How should the effects of transmission

and other availability on the generation mix and the
societal effects resulting shift in emissions be included in
transmission planning? How should re-
motely located generators (e.g., coal and
wind) be accommodated in transmission
planning? Should transmission be built to
increase fuel diversity for generation and to
discipline generator market power? How
should potential siting problems be incorpo-
rated into the planning process?

Centralized vs
To what extent can private investors, rather
decentralized
than RTO planners, decide on and pay for
transmission
new transmission facilities? Can they, in spite
planning and
of networkexternality effects, capture enough
expansionof the benefits of such transmission projects
to justify their investment? How can new
technologies advance private investment?
—————————————————————————————
102 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

process (e.g., as problems are being identified rather than

when solutions have already been selected), should be con-
sidered as RTOs plan for future regional electricity needs.
Part of the complexity associated with transmission
planning stems from transmission’s central position in elec-
tric-system operations and wholesale power markets. Be-
cause of its centrality, transmission serves many commercial
and reliability purposes. American Transmission Company
(2001) identified several objectives for transmission planning
and expansion: improve transfer (import and export) capa-
bility from different directions, accommodate load growth
without delay, accommodate generation development with-
out delay, provide flexibility to transmission customers to
modify their transactions as market conditions change, re-
duce service denials and interruptions due to transmission
constraints (equivalent to reducing congestion costs), cut
losses, and improve reliability. Southern Company Services
(1995) mentions many of the same objectives and also in-
cludes provision of sufficient margin to permit transmission
elements to be taken out of service temporarily for mainte-
nance.
The American Transmission Company (2001) plan notes
some of the many issues it will have to consider as it plans
for transmission expansion, including public involvement in
the planning process, minimizing environmental and land-
use impacts, timely licensing and construction of good
projects, and balancing the robustness of the transmission
system with the need to keep transmission rates reasonable.
The foregoing comments on the purposes and complexi-
ties of transmission planning emphasize the fact that such
planning is only one element of a broader process that ulti-
mately leads to the construction of needed bulk-power facili-
ties (Figure 1). To assess various transmission and
nontransmission (generation, load, and pricing) alternatives,
Appendices 103

Figure 1.Transmission-planning models, and their inputs and outputs.

transmission models require large amounts of data and pro-

jections related to loads, generation, and transmission. Trans-
mission planners use detailed electrical-engineering
computer models to assess these alternatives (Figure 2).
Model results, combined with information on project costs,
environmental effects, siting, and regulatory requirements,
lead to financial and regulatory assessments of different
projects. Ideally, these plans lead to the construction of
needed projects, cost recovery (including a return on invest-
ment) for transmission owners, and transmission rates that
appropriately charge users for the services they receive.
Figure 2 expands on the transmission-planning portion
of Figure 1. This second figure shows how load-flow, dy-
namic, and short-circuit models are used to determine
whether the bulk-power system can meet all the applicable
operating and planning reliability standards. The arrow to
the right of the box labeled Planning Models indicates that
these models are run over and over to test the ability of the
104 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 2. The relationship between transmission planning and its in-

puts (data and projections) and results.

bulk-power system to operate within specified ranges for all

first- and some multiple-contingency conditions. The funda-
mental characteristic that makes transmission planning and
investment so difficult is lack of control of the grid and the
inability to control the flow through individual transmission
elements (e.g., lines and transformers). (Devices such as
phase shifters and direct current (DC) links allow control,
but are much more expensive than traditional transmission
facilities.) Each transmission element is part of a network
that is a common resource available to all. Because electricity
flows according to the laws of physics and not in response to
human controls, what happens in one part of the grid can
affect users throughout the grid. Because of these large exter-
nalities, transmission must be centrally managed and regu-
lated. Other characteristics that complicate transmission
planning include:
Appendices 105

• Large Geographic Scope—Conditions on one part of an

alternating current (AC) network affect flows through-
out the network. Consequently, transfers between any
two points on the network can be restricted by con-
straints elsewhere in the network. Similarly, upgrades to
any part of the network affect transfer capabilities
throughout the network.

• Diversity of Interests—Each transmission enhancement

affects many market participants. Generators will either
expand their market opportunities (if they are low-cost
producers) or reduce their market opportunities. Loads
have similar, but opposite, interests.

• Transmission vs Generation—The split and differences

between competitive generation and regulated trans-
mission affect transmission planning. The competitive
generation business encourages faster planning, shorter
deployment times, and less sharing of commercially
sensitive information. The regulated transmission busi-
ness environment produces slower planning and longer
deployment times (to accommodate an inclusive public
process) and the wide sharing of information. In addi-
tion, transmission and generation are both complements
and substitutes. As a consequence, poor transmission
planning and inefficient transmission expansion could
undercut competitive wholesale markets and increase
electricity costs.

• Long Life—Transmission is a long-lived (30 to 50 years),

immobile investment with very low operating costs. The
need for new transmission shows up in real-time con-
gestion prices. It is difficult to accurately forecast the
need for a specific transmission investment for several
106 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

decades. The generation and demand-side alternatives

are often shorter lived and have higher operating costs
that can be eliminated if the investment is no longer
needed.

• Regulatory Decision Process—Because the regulator

(and the regulated entity) are spending ratepayer dol-
lars, public processes are used to produce good deci-
sions. All opinions and options are welcome and
considered, which can lead to a time-consuming and
costly process.

• Regulatory Uncertainly—Investors are unlikely to

spend their money until it is clear that they will recoup
their investment and earn a reasonable return on that
investment.

• Environmental Impacts—Some people oppose new

transmission lines (and, to a lesser extent, substations)
on aesthetic grounds or because they might lower prop-
erty values. Others are concerned about the health ef-
fects of electromagnetic fields. Although little scientific
evidence supports this concern about transmission lines,
public perceptions and fears may lead to opposition to
construction of new transmission lines (National Insti-
tute of Environmental Health Sciences, 1999).

The remainder of this issue paper is organized as fol-

lows: The next section summarizes planning processes as
practiced by vertically integrated utilities and today’s inde-
pendent system operators (ISOs). This section also summa-
rizes the planning processes proposed by RTOs. Subsequent
sections outline the characteristics of an ideal transmission
plan and planning process; a benchmark against which cur-
Appendices 107

rent and future plans might be assessed; and several key

planning issues and the complications that arise because of
the increasing competitiveness and transitional state of the
U.S. electricity industry. A later section recommends certain
actions for DOE, FERC, and others on improved planning
processes; while the final section summarizes the key find-
ings from this issue paper.

TRANSMISSION PLANNING PRACTICES

Traditional Utilities
Historically, transmission planning was much simpler
than it is today and than it is likely to be in the future. Until
the mid-1990s, the U.S. electricity industry featured verti-
cally integrated utilities. As a consequence, transmission
planning was closely coupled to generation planning. Utili-
ties, because they owned generation and transmission, could
optimize investments across both kinds of assets. With re-
spect to operations, utilities routinely scheduled generation
day-ahead and redispatched generating units in real time to
prevent congestion from occurring. The costs of such sched-
uling and redispatch were spread across all customers and
reflected in retail rates.1
In addition, utilities had good data and forecasting tools
to estimate current and future loads and generating capacity.
Because each utility was the sole provider of retail electricity
services, it had considerable information on current and
likely future load levels and shapes. Because each utility was

1Although transmission planning focused primarily on generation and loads

within a single control area, the tight power pools and regional reliability coun-
cils reviewed utility plans to ensure that projects proposed in one service area
would not adversely affect other utility service areas.
108 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

the primary investor in new generation, it had considerable

information on the timing, types, and locations of new gen-
eration and corresponding information on the retirement of
existing units.
Finally, the amount of wholesale electricity commerce
was much less than it is today and it was much simpler. It
was simpler in the sense that most transactions involved
neighboring utilities, either to take advantage of short-term
economies of operation or for long-term purchases of firm
power.

Current Planning Environment

In today’s electricity industry, generation and transmis-
sion are increasingly separated, either through functional
unbundling of these activities or through corporate separa-
tion. This deintegration, combined with the competitive na-
ture of electricity generation, makes it much harder for
transmission planners to coordinate their activities with
those of generation owners. In particular, the owners of gen-
eration are reluctant to reveal their plans for new construc-
tion and retirement of existing units any sooner than they
have to.
In some regions, today’s system operators are indepen-
dent of load-serving entities. Therefore, the system operators
have little information on the details of retail loads, such as
the types of end-use equipment in place and trends and
patterns in electricity use. It is now the load-serving entities
that have such information, and for competitive reasons,
they may be reluctant to share such information and projec-
tions with the system operator.
This deintegration of generation and transmission
means that congestion management is no longer an internal
matter. Of necessity, congestion management involves a sys-
tem operator, transmission owners (if different from the sys-
Appendices 109

tem operator), power producers, and load-serving entities.

The separation of generation from transmission can lead
to investment decisions in both sectors that are suboptimal
from a broad societal perspective. For example, more than
8000 MW of new generating capacity plan to interconnect to
the Palo Verde substation in Arizona (Emerson and Smith,
2001). But the existing transmission system can handle no
more than 3360 MW of new generation. Even with the three
new 500-kV lines proposed for this area, the maximum ex-
port capability will be only 6750 MW because of stability
limits, well below the 8000 MW planned. To make the prob-
lem even worse, most of these new generators will obtain
natural gas from the same pipeline. Thus, the outage of this
pipeline could become the single largest contingency in Ari-
zona, increasing greatly the amount of contingency reserves
that must be maintained.
Finally, the amount and complexity of wholesale elec-
tricity commerce is much greater than it was a few years ago.
Transactions today can span several control areas, and own-
ership of the power may change hands several times be-
tween the point of injection (the generator that produces the
power) and the point of withdrawal (the load that consumes
the power). This complexity makes it difficult for system
operators to know the details of transmission flows and even
more difficult to project what these flows might be like in
future years.

Review of Recent Plans

Independent System Operators (ISOs) and utilities are
developing transmission-planning processes to accommo-
date the needs of a rapidly evolving and increasingly frag-
mented electricity industry. This section briefly reviews
several plans recently issued by ISOs and other regional
entities.
110 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) (2001)

plan discusses historical and projected generation and load
by region within ERCOT, including a range of projections.
These projections form the basis for an identification of exist-
ing and likely future transmission constraints within the
Interconnection and of an assessment of the need for addi-
tional transmission. The ERCOT report includes a discussion
of existing transmission capacity and expansion possibilities
for each of the three ERCOT subregions.
Overall, the ERCOT plan identifies six major transmis-
sion constraints (generally thermal limits, but sometimes sta-
bility limits). The plan also identifies several projects
intended to mitigate these constraints. These projects include
several 345-kV lines (both new lines and additional circuits
on existing towers), a static compensator (to provide dy-
namic reactive-power support), and capacitors (to provide
static reactive-power support). In addition, the transmission
owners proposed several projects, which ERCOT recom-
mended for construction.
One indication of the success of the ERCOT transmis-
sion-planning process is the number of transmission projects
recently completed or under construction. ERCOT has sev-
eral transmission advantages over other regions, including
regulation by a single entity (the Texas PUC), a state govern-
ment that supports additional transmission, and a regulatory
system that gives transmission owners a reasonable assur-
ance that their capital investments will be recovered. Of the
seven projects considered critical during the past few years,
one was completed in 2000, five are on schedule to be com-
pleted by the end of 2002, and one is undergoing further
evaluation (Texas Public Utility Commission 2001).
The goals of the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
(MAPP) (2000) plan are to ensure that the transmission sys-
tem can “reliably serve the load indigenous to the MAPP
Appendices 111

region,… provide sufficient transfer capability to reliably

accommodate firm transfers of power among areas within
MAPP and between MAPP and adjacent reliability regions,
and provide an indication of transmission costs for enhanc-
ing transfer capability and relative costs for alternative loca-
tions of new generation.” The MAPP process is bottom up,
with plans developed by individual transmission owners,
then integrated for each of the five subregions, and then
integrated again at the MAPP level. In addition, considerable
analysis is done for the MAPP region as a whole, primarily
to analyze projects that span more than one subregion. The
MAPP review ensures that projects proposed in one subre-
gion will not adversely affect the electrical system in other
subregions. Although MAPP planning still relies heavily on
the individual utilities, the regional planning process is be-
ginning to significantly influence the individual expansion
plans.
The MAPP plan uses information on transmission ser-
vice requests that were refused along with data on transmis-
sion curtailments to help in the analysis of “desired market
use of the regional and inter-regional transmission system.”
These data “provided strong evidence to indicate that trans-
mission constraints to the east of MAPP significantly ham-
pered electrical sales” (Mazur, 1999).
The ISO New England (2001) plan breaks new analytical
ground. This plan explicitly analyzed the potential benefits
of new transmission from reductions in congestion through
what the ISO calls its Projected Congestion Cost Assessment,
“which, through modeling, determined the economic costs
associated with transfer limits between regions and sepa-
rately analyzed the New England system on a bus by bus
basis for transmission constraints.” As the report notes, “Sig-
nificant transmission congestion will exist from an economic
viewpoint, primarily between ME/NH [Maine and New
112 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Hampshire] and Boston, SEMA-RI [Southeast Massachu-

setts] and both Boston and SWCT [Southwest Connecticut].
Estimates of New England congestion range between ap-
proximately $200-$600 million per year during the study
period, depending on the assumptions utilized.”
The New England analysis also considered the effects of
market power on congestion costs, which could have enor-
mous effects on the benefits associated with new transmis-
sion facilities. Because analysis of strategic market behavior
is difficult, the New England analysis used a simple ap-
proach: it increased the bid prices for all generators by 10 or
25% above their marginal operating costs.2 This approach
may underestimate the benefits of transmission in reducing
the ability of generators to exercise market power.
Figure 3 is a summary of some of the congestion-analy-
sis results developed by ISO New England. The graph shows
how sensitive these estimates are to different assumptions.
And this is just a subset of the cases ISO NE examined; the
5- year congestion costs for the full set of cases ranged from
about $500 million to more than $3 billion. Because this was
just an initial assessment, it includes no estimates of the costs
to build the transmission needed to relieve congestion in the
region.
ISO New England divided the region into 13 subareas
based primarily on transmission characteristics and con-
straints: “The subareas have been defined solely based on
transmission interfaces that are relevant to both reliability
and congestion concerns.” These subareas do not necessarily
conform to political or utility boundaries.

2The traditional assumption in production-costing models that generators bid

their marginal costs is almost surely incorrect. On the other hand, appropriately
simulating bidder behavior, with and without new transmission that expands the
scope of regional markets and reduces congestion, is very difficult.
Appendices 113

Figure 3. Congestion costs in New England under different assump-

tions about fuel prices, Hydro Quebec imports, and exports from Con-
necticut, as well as the bidding behavior of generators.

National Grid USA (2000) owns some of the transmis-

sion assets in New England. Its report is less a detailed plan
for New England and more an overview of likely transmis-
sion needs in the future. The report examined the period
2001 through 2005 in terms of demand projections, genera-
tion, the relationship of generation to demand, transmission-
system topology (major zones and interfaces), transmission
performance (system power flows), capability (transfer lim-
its and congestion costs), and transmission-system opportu-
nities.
The chapter on opportunities is especially interesting
because it shows where within New England new genera-
tor interconnections “would alleviate or exacerbate conges-
tion on the transmission system.” As Figure 4 shows,
locating generators in Boston or southwest Connecticut
would relieve congestion, whereas locating generators in
114 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Maine, northern Vermont or New Hampshire, Rhode Is-

land, or southeastern Massachusetts would worsen conges-
tion. Information like that shown in Figure 4 should help
guide market decisions on new generation and load-man-
agement programs, as well as possible merchant-transmis-
sion projects. Provision of information on the current and
expected future state of the transmission system and the
costs of using that system could reduce what North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) (2001) sees as
“inefficient transmission expansion [caused by the] uncoor-
dinated siting of generation and the development of trans-
mission projects.”
The initial assessment conducted by American Trans-
mission Company (2001) divided its region into five subar-
eas. Like ISO New England, ATC defined these zones on the

Figure 4. National Grid USA’s assessment of the best and worst loca-
tions within New England to locate new generating units.
Appendices 115

basis of transmission “system topology, load characteristics,

load density and existing generation.” ATC plans to revise
the boundaries of these zones if and when bulk-power flows
and conditions change. Its initial plan presents several pro-
posals for transmission additions within each zone for 2002,
2003, 2004, and between 2005 and 2010, based on loadflow
simulations conducted for 2002, 2005, and 2010.
The Western Governors’ Association (2001) issued a
conceptual plan for the Western Systems Coordinating
Council. The plan is conceptual in that it looked at broad
regional needs and not at local transmission needs. The re-
port noted important limitations in current transmission
plans and the associated planning processes:

The current transmission planning process is frag-

mented, based on utilities’ individual forecasts of needs
and specific interconnection requests from new genera-
tion.

At best, coordination occurs on a subregional basis. The

current planing process is reactive, rather than forward
looking. There is a wide gap between evolving mer-
chant needs on the resource side (regional) and existing
grid plans (local or sub-regional) on the transmission
side. Planning assumptions are based primarily on local
traditional resources and give little consideration to re-
mote and nonconventional resources.

This western analysis considered two generation sce-

narios to the year 2010. One involves gas-fired generation
built close to load centers and the other includes coal, wind,
geothermal, and other generation located in remote areas. In
the first scenario, little new transmission is needed between
2004 and 2010. In the second case, transmission investments
116 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

of $8 to $12 billion are needed to support 23 GW of new

remotely located generation.3
Because the Bonneville Power Administration has built
no major transmission facilities since 1987, it has a substan-
tial backlog that it is now addressing (VanZandt, 2001). Ex-
perts from eight electric utilities in the Pacific Northwest
reviewed the first nine projects that BPA proposed, at a total
cost of $615 million (Infrastructure Technical Review Com-
mittee, 2001). This largely qualitative review examined, for
each of the nine projects, the limiting outages to be ad-
dressed by the project, the expected local and regional ben-
efits from the project, various risks associated with the
project, a project description, and alternative transmission
projects that could address the limiting outages. The review
also includes an appendix on risk and uncertainty that out-
lines the kinds of risks facing new transmission projects,
including adequacy requirements, congestion relief, changes
in electric-industry structure, and over- vs under-building.
Some recent plans are more limited in scope than the
ones discussed above. Often, the plans do not fully integrate
planning for reliability with planning for commerce. Because
some entities have received so many generator- interconnec-
tion requests, their plans are dominated by the specific
projects required to connect these new generators to the grid.
Correspondingly, the plans do not anticipate possible prob-
lems that might occur in the future as a consequence of load

3This works out to a transmission investment of more than $400 per new kW of
remote generation, a very high cost. If new coal and wind generation costs about
$1000/kW, the supporting transmission would add 40% to the initial cost. By
comparison, the new transmission planned for the Pennsylvania-New Jersy-
Maryland Interconnection (PMJ, 2001b) region ($720 million to connect 27,500
MW of new generation) is expected to cost only $26 per new kW of generation.
Part of this cost difference occurs because the distances between generation and
load centers are much greater in the west than in the mid-Atlantic region.
Appendices 117

growth; generator retirements; other new generators being

built within the control area; or additional bulk-power trans-
actions into, out of, or through the control area. In particular,
these plans generally do not provide sufficient guidance to
market participants on desirable locations for new genera-
tion, load-reduction programs, or merchant transmission.
These plans are more reactive than proactive, in part because
transmission planners do not have enough time to develop
plans that look out several years and offer guidance on
where to locate new generators. Instead, the planners are
often overwhelmed with requests for new generation inter-
connections. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA,
2001) wrote:

BPA has received requests for transmission integration

studies for more than 13,000 megawatts of new generat-
ing capacity at sites around the Northwest. More are
pouring through the door. In just the last two weeks,
BPA has received eight formal requests for studies on
integrating new combustion turbines totaling 3,850 MW.
… The Transmission Business Line is informing devel-
opers that it will take at least nine to 12 months to com-
plete the required studies.4

As of March 2001, PJM had received more than 250 gen-

erator-interconnection requests, organized into seven
queues. The first five queues include 40 GW of new genera-
tion to be completed between 2001 and 2004, enough to add
more than two-thirds to PJM’s current generating capacity

4The Tennessee Valley Authority faces a similar situation. It has received appli-
cations from independent power producers for 90,000 MW of new generation,
more than three times the amount of existing generation (Whitehead, 2001). TVA
would need an extra 50 system planners to clear the backlog of interconnection
studies associated with all these new generators.
118 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

(Figure 5). Similarly, ISO New England had, as of Spring

2001, a queue with 40 GW of new generation, far more than
the region’s peak demand of 23 GW.
Perhaps because of the many interconnection requests
PJM has received, its plan, although massive in length and
detail, appears to lack any overall purpose. The plan in-
cludes two baseline assessments, the first of which analyzes
compliance with regional reliability standards from 2001
through 2006 assuming no new generating units are built.
The second baseline plan examines, in a similar fashion, the
years 2002 through 2007 assuming all new generation in
Queue A5 is built. Separately, PJM presents all the intercon-
nection studies associated with the new projects in Queues
A, B, and C. In August 2000, the PJM Board approved the
Queue A construction projects, with an estimated cost of
$300 million; in June 2001, the Board approved the projects
in Queues B and C, estimated to cost an additional $420
million.
This review of recent transmission plans shows tremen-
dous variation. No single plan encompasses all the elements
of a good transmission plan, as discussed in the section on
Proposed Planning Process. Several factors explain the lack
of key elements in many plans: (1) the dramatic changes in
the U.S. electricity industry raise new issues for transmission
planning, (2) the data and analytical tools to address these
new issues have not yet been developed, (3) the ISOs are
new entities that are still expanding their staffs, (4) the au-

5PJM sorts generator interconnection requests into queues depending on when

the request was formally made. The August 2001 PJM plan includes Queues A,
B, and C, with a total of 27,500 MW of new generation. Although the use of
queues may be fair to generators, its application is controversial because it may
increase overall electricity costs. For example, some merchant generation
projects, although far down in the queue, might help solve transmission prob-
lems and, from a societal perspective, should be expedited.
Appendices 119

Figure 5. Planned generating capacity in the PJM area.

thority and responsibilities of the ISOs and other regional

entities are not yet clear, and (5) the planning staffs are very
busy responding to generator-interconnection requests.
NERC (2001) recently noted that “these complex and rapidly
evolving requirements are overwhelming the transmission
planning process such that there is not enough time to de-
velop optimal transmission plans.”

Review of RTO Transmission Planning

The RTO filings of October 2000, required by FERC’s
Order 2000, pay little attention to Function 7 on transmission
planning and expansion. The need to resolve other RTO is-
sues—such as governance, regional scope and membership,
and transmission-cost allocation and revenue require-
ments—dominated the prefiling deliberations. Perhaps be-
cause of these factors, FERC (1999) gave the RTOs three
years after becoming operational to meet the requirements of
Function 7.
The GridFlorida (2000) Planning Protocol calls for an
“open and inclusive process” conducted by the RTO and
120 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

supported by a Transmission Planning Committee that will

provide “advice and input regarding the planning process”
to the RTO. The protocol deals with regional planning; local
planning; generation interconnection; data bases; standards
for planning, design, and construction; transmission con-
struction; and the role of reliability organizations and the
Florida Public Service Commission in the planning process.
Although the GridFlorida proposal says much about the
planning process, it contains few details on the substance of
what a transmission plan should contain. While the protocol
mentions “market solutions” it does not define the term and
does not explain how they are to be identified, assessed, and
implemented if found to be cost effective. Similarly, the pro-
tocol mentions “alternative solutions” but does not indicate
what these alternatives might be, how they are to be com-
pared with transmission solutions, and how they will be
implemented.
The RTO West plan (Avista Corp. et al., 2000) “antici-
pates that RTO West’s approach [to transmission planning]
will evolve over time.” The initial plan anticipates trans-
mission expansion for two purposes: (1) “for reliability of
service to load” and (2) “to relieve congestion.” As noted
elsewhere in this paper, distinguishing between reliability
and commercial needs for new transmission is very diffi-
cult and perhaps a distraction. With respect to relief of
congestion, RTO West anticipates a “market-driven expan-
sion mechanism,” which, in principle at least, should re-
duce the need for RTO West to develop its own plan in
this area.
Attachment P (Description of RTO West Planning and
Expansion) focuses on decision-making authority: who de-
cides what facilities are to be built and who pays for these
investments. The Attachment commits RTO West to de-
velop:
Appendices 121

(1) criteria to be applied by RTO West in determining

the level of transfer capability that should be main-
tained from existing facilities, (2) transmission adequacy
standards, (3) further definition of the market-driven
mechanism [for transmission expansion], (4) the [new-
transmission-cost] allocation procedure, including objec-
tive criteria, (5) interconnection standards, and (6) the
details of the relationship/participation of RTO West
with appropriate interconnection-wide and regional re-
liability organizations.

The Alliance RTO (American Electric Power Service

Corp. et al. 2000) proposal is included in its Attachment H:
Planning Protocol. The RTO is responsible for “coordinat-
ing” the planning rather than for doing the planning itself.
(Some might question whether a “coordinated” plan is truly
an integrated, regional plan or merely a collection of plans
prepared by individual transmission owners.) The RTO’s
Reliability Planning Committee will be “the vehicle through
which coordinated reliability planning activities will be con-
ducted.” RTO staff and representatives from each transmis-
sion owner and local distribution utility will be members of
this committee, but not other market participants. This com-
mittee will be responsible for the planning models and data,
reviewing and approving planning studies, determining the
need for system expansion to meet reliability needs and
transmission-service requests, participating in NERC and
regional reliability processes, and coordinating transmission
planning and expansion with other RTOs. The committee
will produce a 10-year plan every year. The RTO’s Planning
Advisory Committee “will provide a forum for stakeholders
and interested parties to have input in the planning pro-
cess.” With respect to transmission projects intended to re-
122 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

duce congestion, the Alliance RTO “will encourage market-

driven operating and investment actions….”
The proposal from the New England Transmission
Owners et al. (2001) builds on the experience with ISO New
England. It envisions a binary RTO with a nonprofit ISO and
a for-profit independent transmission company (ITC). The
proposed three-phase planning process “combines the
knowledge and objectivity of ISO-NE [ISO New England]
with the strengths of an investor-owned business focused on
transmission….” The process consists of the following steps:

• The ISO will lead a needs assessment, which will inte-

grate data and projections on regional loads, generation
(existing, planned retirements, and potential additions),
transmission, and inter-control area transactions to fore-
cast the region’s needs for additional transmission. The
needs assessment will be consistent with regional reli-
ability planning standards, address congestion costs,
and consider transmission-system performance.

• The ITC will develop a Regional Transmission Facilities

Outlook, which will identify transmission alternatives
that may be needed based on a range of plausible sce-
narios.

• Finally, the ISO will assess the ITC’s Outlook and ap-
prove a regional plan. This assessment will consider
other alternatives proposed by the ISO and stakehold-
ers. The ISO review will provide “a check that the Out-
look is not biased in favor of transmission solutions at
the expense of generation or other market-based solu-
tions.” “The decision to proceed with [transmission
projects] will be made by the market [participants] for
market based proposals (including merchant transmis-
Appendices 123

sion) and by the ITC for regulated transmission propos-

als.”

This review of some RTO filings suggests that much

work remains to be done by the RTOs to develop compre-
hensive and meaningful transmission-planning processes.
Unfortunately, progress has been slow during the past sev-
eral months. One RTO posted a progress report on its
website in August 2001 that its “… planning and expansion
principles are still under discussion….” Deciding on a spe-
cific transmission-planning approach is difficult in some re-
gions because the participants cannot agree on whether
transmission investments should be driven by the market
participants or by reliability requirements. In the former
case, generator owners, large customers, and private inves-
tors might pay for new facilities built as merchant projects,
while in the latter case the transmission owners (and ulti-
mately, all retail customers), in response to RTO plans,
would pay for such projects through a centralized process.

Proposed Planning Process

As noted above, transmission planning today is much
more complicated, and perversely, much more uncertain,
than it was several years ago. Based on our review of several
recent transmission plans, we offer a suggested RTO trans-
mission-planning process (Figure 6), the results of which
should include broad consensus on new transmission and
nonwires projects that are needed and that get built in a
timely and cost-effective fashion.
Several of the activities summarized below are covered
in greater detail in the following section. Our proposed pro-
cess begins with a clear identification of the purpose of the
transmission plan (Step 1), followed by a comprehensive
assessment of the current regional situation, encompassing
124 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Figure 6. Outline of proposed RTO planning process.

both operations and markets (Step 2). This situation analysis

provides a firm basis for discussing future conditions, prob-
lems, and potential solutions. Steps 3 and 4 involve projec-
tions of likely conditions several years into the future and an
identification of transmission problems that might occur
under these postulated future conditions. Steps 5 and 6 as-
sess various transmission and nontransmission alternatives
that might solve the problems identified in Step 4. Finally,
Step 7 summarizes the results of the analyses conducted in
the prior steps and recommends specific projects to address
the transmission problems discussed in Step 4.

Step 1. What is the purpose of this transmission plan?6 Who

developed it? In response to what requirements? How
were various interest groups (e.g., generators, transmis-
sion owners, load-serving entities, distribution utilities,

6These purposes could include maintenance of reliability, promotion of competi-

tive electricity markets, support for development of new generation, promotion
of economic growth, creation of new jobs, and so on.
Appendices 125

retail customers, and state regulators) represented in the

development and review of this plan? How does the
plan reflect the market design in that region (e.g., the
number and types of markets for energy, installed ca-
pacity, ancillary services, and congestion)? How were
the practical limitations of siting and project financing
addressed in the plan (e.g., did the planning process
consider nontechnical as well as technical issues, who
will pay for transmission projects)? To what extent is the
plan intended to motivate market solutions to transmis-
sion problems?

Step 2. Describe the current situation, covering bulk-power

operations (both generation and transmission), whole-
sale markets, and transmission pricing. What problems
(e.g., reliability, congestion, losses, generator market
power), if any, occur that are caused by limitations in
the transmission system? What transmission projects are
under construction or planned for completion within
the next few years to address these problems? What are
the estimated costs and benefits of these projects, indi-
vidually and in aggregate? What entities are expected to
benefit and to pay for these projects? Explain the com-
puter models used to analyze transmission conditions
and the limitations of these models (analytical approxi-
mations).

Step 3. Describe the bulk-power system as it is expected to

exist in the future (e.g., five and ten years). What are the
levels, patterns, and locations of loads? Describe the
region’s fleet of generating units, including locations,
capacity, and operating costs (or bid prices). What are
the likely effects of new generation facilities on intercon-
nection requests, the overall transmission system, and
126 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

the costs of new transmission construction? What trans-

mission-pricing methods might be used to recover the
costs of capital, losses, and congestion? Describe the
transmission flows within the region as well as the
flows that occur into, out of, and through the region.
Given the many uncertainties that affect future fuel
prices, loads, generation, transmission and its pricing,
and market rules, create various scenarios or sensitivi-
ties that can be used subsequently to analyze potential
problems and transmission improvements (Steps 4 and
5).7

Step 4. What transmission problems, both reliability and

commercial, are likely to exist given the future condi-
tions (scenarios) developed in Step 3?8 What other prob-
lems might exist for which transmission could be
applied (e.g., generator market power caused by a re-
stricted geographical scope of wholesale markets, lim-
ited fuel diversity caused by insufficient transmission
facilities to remote locations with fuel, such as coal and
wind)?

Step 5. What transmission facilities might be added to the

current system to address the problems identified in
Step 4? What effects would these facilities have on com-
pliance with reliability standards, commercial transac-
tions, losses, and overall regional electricity costs
(generation plus transmission)? Can recent technologi-
cal advances in transmission equipment and software be
applied? Do they capture potential economies of scale

7The results of Steps 2 and 3 should be sufficiently detailed that other parties can
assess for themselves market solutions to solve these problems (e.g., those dis-
cussed in Step 6).
Appendices 127

associated with building (ahead of need) larger lines

than currently needed? Do these proposals address the
potential for generators to exercise market power in
wholesale electricity markets?9 What are the likely capi-
tal costs of these transmission additions? How do the
costs and benefits of individual projects, as well as
groups of projects, compare with each other? Can any of
these transmission projects be built on a merchant (i.e.,
for profit and unregulated) basis? What kinds of risk
assessment were conducted in developing recommenda-
tions on these new transmission projects?10 How were
these risks addressed in the plan, including the risks of
over- vs underbuilding transmission?11 Should certain
transmission facilities be built to guide current and fu-
ture decisions on the locations of new generating units
and the locations and types of demand-management
programs; that is, should transmission planning be pro-
active rather than reactive?

8These problems could appear as real-time congestion, denial of requests for

service, or curtailment of approved transactions. They could also include opera-
tional difficulties caused by aging and obsolete equipment that should be re-
placed to reduce forced and maintenance outages or increase functionality.
9It may be very difficult analytically to estimate the kinds of strategic bidding

behavior that might occur. Such behavior will be a strong function of the RTO
operating and market rules as well as the physical infrastructure (amounts and
locations of generation, transmission, and load).
10Uncertainties are much greater than in the past. Today, they include load shape

and levels, generator locations (new construction and retirements), market opera-
tions, market prices for energy and ancillary services, transmission pricing (in-
cluding locational pricing for losses and congestion), patterns and levels of
commercial transactions, weather, fuel price volatility, and new generation and
transmission technologies.
11For example, consider the risks associated with cost recovery for a new trans-

mission line needed to connect a new generator to the grid. This risk could be
eliminated by requiring the generation owner to pay the capital costs up front
rather than through rates over a 20-year cost-recovery period.
128 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Step 6. What nontransmission alternatives (including suit-

ably located generation and price-responsive load pro-
grams as well as alternative transmission-pricing
schemes12) might be deployed to address the problems
identified in Step 4? These alternatives could also in-
clude changes in system-operations, such as remedial-
action schemes. To what extent can these generation,
demand-side, and pricing alternatives address the prob-
lems for which the transmission facilities suggested in
Step 5 were proposed? What are the expected costs to
the transmission system of these nontransmission alter-
natives (which may not reflect the total costs of these
generators and/or demand-management programs)?
Based on the differences in characteristics and the differ-
ences in costs and benefits, recommend either transmis-
sion or nontransmission solutions to the problems
identified in Step 4. Where no solutions are offered, in-
dicate why. (Presumably, the expected status quo should
continue if the costs of solving a problem exceed the
benefits of doing so.)

Step 7. Based on the foregoing analyses, recommend trans-

mission pricing, generation-location decisions, demand-
management programs, and construction of new
transmission facilities. If market participants do not pro-
pose the solutions analyzed in Steps 5 and 6, recom-
mend those transmission facilities (from Step 6) that
should be built under traditional regulation. Summarize
the benefits and costs of these proposed projects, both
singly and in aggregate. Can the projects ultimately be
approved and built in a timely fashion? Can they be fi-

12Such pricing schemes should encompass access charges as well as charges for
congestion and losses.
Appendices 129

nanced? Will these projects be undertaken by market

participants acting in their own interest, or must the
RTO require their construction and ensure that custom-
ers at large pay for them?

Table 2, based on this 7-step process, identifies key in-

gredients of a successful transmission planning process
and plan.

Table 2.
Checklist of important characteristics of a transmission plan
————————————————————————————————
• Public involvement throughout planning process

• Broad range of alternatives considered, including suitably located

generation and demand-management programs, new transmission
technologies, and various transmission-pricing methods

• Effects of transmission on generator market power

• Effects of transmission on compliance with reliability standards,

both planning and operating

• Effects of transmission on congestion costs

• Comprehensive risk assessment of transmission plan(s)

• Proactive, rather than reactive, transmission plan (consideration of

needs for increased throughput and locational guidance for new
resources, not just responses to generator-interconnection requests)

• Development of a practical and robust, rather than a theoretically

optimized, transmission plan

• Support for projects built through competitive-market mechanisms

• Timely completion of the plan

————————————————————————————————
130 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

KEY TRANSMISSION PLANNING ISSUES

Planning Criteria: Reliability and Commerce

Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities planned their
transmission systems to: (1) meet North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) and regional-reliability-council
reliability requirements and (2) ensure that the outputs from
the utility’s generation could be transported to the utility’s
customers. (Utilities sometimes built transmission lines for
economic reasons; for example, to provide access to cheaper
power in a neighboring system or to export surplus power.)
Today, transmission systems are called on to do much more.
They must serve dynamic and rapidly expanding markets in
which the flows of power into, out of, and through a particu-
lar region vary substantially over time. As a consequence,
transmission planners may need to look beyond the NERC
Planning Standards in assessing alternative transmission
projects and also consider enabling competition to occur
over large geographic regions (NERC 1997). A market-fo-
cused approach might seek to reduce the number of times
transmission-service requests are denied and generation
must be redispatched to avoid congestion. Where congestion
(locational) pricing is used, this goal is met by reducing con-
gestion costs (discussed below). Congestion pricing might
reduce the distinction between reliability and commerce by
explicitly pricing reliability.
Many industry experts believe that the distinction be-
tween reliability and commerce in transmission planning is
increasingly irrelevant. Reliability problems (e.g., a line that
would become overloaded during a contingency) are also
commercial problems that affect different market partici-
pants differently (e.g., flows are reduced on the line in ques-
tion, which means that the output from cheap generators
must be reduced and the output from expensive generators
Appendices 131

must be increased). Conversely, certain commercially desir-

able flows may be restricted because of reliability problems
that would otherwise occur. Equally important, these people
believe that transmission serves a vital enabling function,
permitting the purchase and sale of energy and capacity
across large regions and, in the process, reducing problems
associated with generator market power.
Some experts believe that the distinction between reli-
ability and commerce is important. Not all reliability prob-
lems have commercial implications, they noted. Some local
problems (e.g., low voltages close to load centers) are related
more to reliability than to commerce. The solution to such
reliability problems might be the addition of capacitors to
serve local loads regardless of whether the generation source
is near or far. The distinction may be important in determin-
ing who pays for the project, with reliability projects paid for
by all grid users but commercial projects paid for only by
those transmission customers who benefit from the project.
Of course, deciding who does and does not benefit from a
project can be difficult and contentious. The Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) (2001a)
baseline plan focuses on reliability: “Transmission con-
straints on market dispatch are economic constraints. Eco-
nomic constraints are not considered violations of reliability
criteria as long as the system can be adjusted to remain
within reliability limits on a pre-contingency basis.”

Economies of Scale
It is generally cheaper per megawatt of capacity to build
larger transmission lines (Table 3). For example, the cost per
MW-mile of a 500-kV transmission line is about half that of
a 230-kV line. Higher-voltage lines also require less land per
MW-mile than do lower-voltage lines (right side of Table 3).
A 500-kV line requires less than half the land per MW-mile
132 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

of a 230-kV line.
Both of these factors argue for overbuilding lines rather
than trying to size lines to exactly match current and short-
term forecast needs. (Overbuilding includes the use of larger
conductors, construction of larger towers that can carry more
than one set of circuits, and the use of higher-voltage lines.)
Overbuilding a line now will (1) reduce long-term costs by
avoiding the much higher costs of building two smaller lines
and (2) reduce the delays and opposition associated with
transmission-line siting by eliminating these costs for the
now unneeded second line.

Table 3. Typical costs, thermal capacities, and corridor widths of trans-

mission lines
————————————————————————————————
Capital costa Capacity Cost
Voltage (kV) (thousand $/mile) (MW) (million $/GW-mile) Widthb (feet)
————————————————————————————————
230 480 350 1.37 100
345 900 900 1.00 125
500 1200 2000 0.60 175
765 1800 4000 0.45 200
————————————————————————————————
aThese estimates are from Seppa (1999) and include the costs of land, towers, poles, and
conductors. We increased these estimates by 20% to account for the costs of substations and
related equipment.
bThese estimates are from Pasternack (2001).

On the other hand, the lumpiness of transmission in-

vestments (e.g., one can build a 345-kV line or a 500- kV line
but not a 410-kV line) can complicate decisions on what to
build and when. Also, a large transmission line may impose
more of a reliability burden on the system than do several
smaller lines. Indeed, if a new, large line becomes the largest
Appendices 133

single contingency, contingency-reserve requirements might

increase in the region. And, opposition might be greater to a
500-kV line than to a 345-kV line because the former line has
taller towers and requires more land.

Congestion Costs
Decisions on whether to build new transmission are
complicated by uncertainties over the future costs of conges-
tion. (To some extent, the prices of firm transmission rights
show how the market values certain transmission paths.)
These uncertainties relate to load growth, the price respon-
siveness of load, fuel costs and therefore electricity prices,
additions and retirements of generating capacity and the
locations of those generators, the exercise of market power
by some generators, and transmission pricing. The ISO New
England (2001) analysis, summarized in Figure 3, shows this
complexity very well. Analysis conducted for the New York
ISO showed that the large number of proposed generating
projects in or near New York City and Long Island “would
reduce the level of congestion observed on the…bulk power
system, with the biggest congestion decreases occurring in
New York City and on Long Island” (Sanford,
Banunarayanan, and Wirgau, 2001).
We developed a simple hypothetical example to explore
these issues and their complexities and interactions. This
example involves two regions, A and B, separated by 200
miles. Region A contains 31 GW of generating capacity and
no load. Region B contains 32 GW of generating capacity and
50 GW of load. Both regions contain a wide range of gener-
ating capacity, with running costs (or bids) that vary from
zero to almost $160/MWh. The load in Region B ranges from
20 to 50 GW, with a load factor of 63%.
We calculated the cost of congestion as the difference be-
tween (1) the cost of generation (including generators in
134 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

both regions) to serve the load in Region B when transmis-

sion capacity between the two regions is limited, and (2) the
cost of generation when transmission capacity between the
two regions is infinite. The generation costs in both cases are
calculated for every hour of the year.
Figure 7 shows the cost of congestion as a function of
the transmission capacity connecting the two regions. With
21 GW of transmission capacity (the baseline in this ex-
ample), electricity consumers in Region B pay $87 million a
year because of congestion. As the amount of transmission
capacity increases, the cost of congestion declines because
the number of hours that congestion occurs and the price
differences between A and B decline. However, as shown in
Figure 7, this decline is highly nonlinear, with each incre-
ment of transmission capacity providing less and less eco-
nomic benefit. Expanding transmission capacity from 20 to
21 GW lowers the cost of congestion $99 million/year, ex-
panding capacity from 21 to 22 GW saves $44 million, and

Figure 7. The annual cost of congestion as a function of transmission

capability between hypothetical regions A and B.
Appendices 135

expanding capacity from 22 to 23 GW cuts costs by only $29

million.
The relationship between the benefits of adding trans-
mission capacity between A and B to reduce congestion costs
and the costs of doing so are highly nonlinear because of (1)
nonlinearities in congestion costs, (2) economies of scale in
transmission investments, and (3) the lumpiness of transmis-
sion investments. For this example, if the goal is to increase
capacity by 0.5 GW, it makes sense to build either two 230-
kV lines or one 345-KV line, but not a 500-kV line. On the
other hand, it is most cost effective to use 500-kV lines when
expanding capacity by 1 GW or more. Indeed, the benefit/
cost ratio for 230-kV lines increases in going from an addi-
tion of 0.5 to 1.0 GW, but then declines as more capacity is
added. On the other hand, the benefit/cost ratio is more than
2 for the addition of a 500-kV line to expand capacity by 1.5
or 2.0 GW.
What happens to these costs and benefits if additional
generating capacity is built in Region B, close to the load
center? Adding 0.5 GW of capacity with a running cost of
$30/MWh reduces congestion costs by TXCongestion $19
million/year. Adding 2 GW of such capacity reduces conges-
tion costs by $59 million/year. If the new generating capac-
ity added to Region B had a running cost of $57/MWh, its
congestion-reduction benefits would be only $14 and $35
million/year for 0.5- and 2-GW additions, respectively.
These benefits are about two-thirds of those that would oc-
cur with new capacity at $30/MWh. Clearly, building new
generation in Region B would undermine the economics of
adding transmission capacity between regions A and B.
The congestion-reduction benefits of each additional
MW of generating capacity are less than the benefits of ear-
lier additions. This effect is especially pronounced as the bid
prices of the new units increase. For the more expensive of
136 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

the two units there is no benefit from adding more than 1.5
GW of generating capacity in Region B because other gen-
erators are less expensive. Once again, the results are highly
nonlinear.
If loads grow at 2% a year, the annual cost of congestion
(assuming no additions to either generating or transmission
capacity) increases from $87 million in the initial year to
$125, $162, and $250 million in the second, third, and fourth
years. Such increases in load make transmission investments
substantially more cost-effective. If loads respond to prices,
such that loads are higher at low prices and lower at high
prices, congestion costs would be reduced. In this example,
as the price elasticity of demand increases from 0 to 0.02,
0.04, and 0.08, congestion costs are reduced from $87 million
to $48, $25, and $7 million a year. For the ranges in load
growth and price elasticity considered here, congestion costs
vary from $7 to $250 million a year when the amount of
transmission capacity between the two regions is 21 GW.
Making decisions on how much money to invest in equip-
ment with lifetimes of several decades is difficult in the face
of such uncertainties about future load growth; customer
response to dynamic pricing; and the amounts, locations,
and running costs of new generating units.
The discussion so far has focused on the benefits of re-
ducing congestion. But not all market participants benefit
when additional transmission is built to relieve congestion.
In particular, loads on the low-cost side of the constraint and
generators on the high-cost side of the constraint lose money
when congestion is reduced. For example, a generator in
Region B with a bid price of $42/MWh would earn $6.9/kW-
year when the transmission capacity between regions A and
B is 20 GW. Expanding transmission capacity to 21 or 22 GW
would reduce that generator’s earnings to $4.6 and $3.7/kW-
year, reductions of 33% and 46%, respectively. Such large
Appendices 137

prospective losses would likely engender substantial opposi-

tion to efforts to reduce congestion. (If Region A had loads
that enjoyed the benefits of Region A’s low-cost generation,
those loads would also oppose efforts to reduce congestion.)
Finally, investors considering additional generation in
Region B may worry that future construction of a new trans-
mission line between A and B would undercut the value of
their new generation.

Generation and Load Alternatives

The Department of Energy Task Force on Electric Sys-
tem Reliability (1998) recommended that RTOs “ensure that
customers have access to alternatives to transmission invest-
ment including distributed generation and demand-side
management to address reliability concerns and that the
marketplace and the [RTO’s] standards and processes enable
rational choices between these alternatives.”
Transmission planners can encourage nontransmission
alternatives in two ways. The simplest method is to provide
transmission customers with information on current and
likely future congestion costs. Such information—coupled
with locational pricing for congestion and losses—on the
costs and benefits of locating loads and generation in differ-
ent places could motivate developers of new generation to
pick locations where energy costs are high, thereby reducing
congestion costs. Similarly, such information could motivate
loadserving entities to offer load-reduction programs to their
customers in those areas where energy prices are high be-
cause of congestion. For example, the National Grid USA
(2000) transmission plan included a map of New England
(Figure 4) showing areas where new generation would
worsen congestion and areas where new generation would
reduce congestion. An alternative approach to the provision
of information only is to pay for nontransmission alterna-
138 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

tives. With this approach, the RTO would first prepare a

transmission plan. This plan would likely include one or
more major transmission projects (new lines and/or substa-
tions). Next, the RTO would issue a request for proposals for
alternatives and then review the proposals to see if they
were less expensive than the original transmission project
and provided the same or better reliability and commercial
benefits that the transmission project would. Ultimately, the
least-cost solution to the identified transmission problem
would be acquired by the RTO and recovered through trans-
mission rates.
Appropriately comparing transmission to load or gen-
eration, however, is difficult because they differ in construc-
tion leadtimes, project lifetimes, availability, capital and
operating costs, market type, and technical applicability:

• Lifetimes—Transmission investments are long-lived (30

to 50 years). Generators typically have shorter lifetimes,
and load-management projects may have much shorter
lifetimes (e.g., if a building is extensively remodeled, the
load-management systems may be removed and re-
placed with alternative systems for lighting, heating,
cooling, and ventilation). The longer lifetimes of trans-
mission projects enhance confidence in their ability to
provide the needed service for many years; however
they reduce flexibility to respond to changed circum-
stances in the future.

• Availability—Transmission equipment typically has

very high availability factors, much higher than those
for either generation or load.

• Capital and operating costs—Although the capital costs

of transmission can be high, operating costs are very
Appendices 139

low. The operating costs for generators are high and

depend strongly on uncertain future fuel prices. The
trade-off here is between high sunk costs (once the
transmission project is completed) against uncertain op-
erating costs for generation and load management.

• Type of market—The returns on transmission invest-

ments are regulated, today primarily at the state level
and in the future primarily by FERC. The profitability of
generation investments, on the other hand, is deter-
mined largely by competitive markets. Comparing costs
(e.g., economic lifetimes and rates of return) between
regulated and competitive markets is difficult.

• Technical applicability—Nonwires resources cannot al-

ways solve the problems at which the transmission in-
vestment is aimed (e.g., transient stability or the need to
replace aging or obsolete transmission equipment).
Also, connection of the resource to the grid may impose
new costs on the system (e.g., if system-protection
schemes must be upgraded).

The difference in lifetimes between the transmission

project and its alternatives raises the issue of whether the
alternatives should be assessed against the cost of deferring
the transmission project for several years or against the full
cost of displacing (eliminating the need for) the transmission
project. If the transmission project will likely be needed in
any case, although at a later date, the deferral approach
makes sense.
Although the concept of encouraging competition be-
tween transmission investments and generation and load
alternatives is appealing, implementation can be difficult.
The Tri-Valley project, proposed by Pacific Gas & Electric in
140 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

northern California, illustrates these difficulties. The project

involves the construction of new 230-kV transmission lines,
construction of new 230/21-kV substations, and upgrading
of a substation to 230-kV service. The California ISO issued
a request for “cost effective and reliable alternatives… from
generation and/or load alternatives to the proposed PG&E
transmission project” (Winter and Fluckiger, 2000). Alterna-
tives were required to be available between the hours of 8
am and 1 am for up to 500 hours between April 1 and Oc-
tober 31 each year from 2001 through 2005. The ISO sought
call options on about 175 MW. The request was issued in
January 2000 with responses due in late March. The ISO
received four proposals, all of which it subsequently re-
jected.
The ISO rejected all four bids because they failed one or
more of the evaluation criteria, which involved satisfaction
of the ISO’s reliability criteria, commencement date, operat-
ing characteristics, ability to provide the proposed services,
cost, safety, impacts on markets (in particular, effects on gen-
erator market power), and environmental implications. The
key reason the bids were rejected is they were substantially
more expensive than the transmission project. Also, the
transmission project was expected to provide more capacity
to the system than the generation and load-management
projects.
A year later, when faced with a similar situation, the ISO
decided against issuing a competitive solicitation. In this
case, the ISO approved construction of the San Diego Gas &
Electric Valley-Rainbow transmission project (Detmers,
Perez, and Greenleaf 2001). In part because of the electricity
crisis California faced, the ISO decided that this project
should be considered part of a “broad strategy by the state
of California to put into place a robust transmission system
to support reliable service to consumers.” The benefits of this
Appendices 141

500- kV transmission project would not be realized by gen-

eration or load-management alternatives. The proposed
transmission line would permit generation from other parts
of California, Arizona, and New Mexico to be moved to the
San Diego area. The project would also permit new genera-
tors being located near San Diego to reach distant markets.
Finally, the project would provide local reliability benefits
that otherwise would have to be purchased through reliabil-
ity-must-run contracts. These reliability benefits would occur
because the transmission project “integrates San Diego with
the rest of the Western Interconnection, providing significant
access to a wide variety of resources rather than being lim-
ited to the local area resources and the common concerns
that they share, such as adequacy of gas supply.”
The limited analysis conducted to date seems to argue
against widespread use of suitably located generation and
load management as alternatives to some new transmission
projects. However, these analyses were conducted primarily
by transmission engineers who are more comfortable with
transmission and understand transmission better than they
do its alternatives. Also, the continued opposition to con-
struction of new transmission facilities requires the electric-
ity industry to look long and hard at possibly viable
alternatives.

New Technologies
Superconductivity, power electronics, information sys-
tems, and other new technologies could revolutionize trans-
mission and make it easier to expand the system through
merchant, rather than regulated, projects. According to
Howe (2001), “Recent advances in materials science offer the
prospect of another industry paradigm: one based on robust
facilities-based competition in network services, without the
environmental and land-use impacts of traditional ‘big iron’
142 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

solutions.” Some of these advances include:

• Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage—High-

speed magnetic-energy-storage devices that are strategi-
cally located in a transmission grid to damp out
disturbances. These systems include a cryogenically
cooled storage magnet, advanced line-monitoring
equipment to detect voltage deviations, and inverters
that can rapidly (within a second) inject the appropriate
combination of real and reactive power to counteract
voltage problems. By correcting for potential stability
problems, these systems permit the operation of trans-
mission lines at capacities much closer to their thermal
limits than would otherwise be possible.

• High-Temperature Superconducting Cable—Can carry

five times as much power as copper wires with the same
dimensions. Although initially applicable to under-
ground distribution systems in dense urban areas, even-
tually this technology may be used for medium- and
high-voltage underground transmission lines. The use
of these cables would greatly reduce the land required
for transmission lines in urban areas and lessen aes-
thetic impacts and public opposition.

• Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices—A

variety of power-electronic devices used to improve
control and stability of the transmission grid. These sys-
tems respond quickly and precisely. They can control
the flow of real and reactive power directly or they can
inject or absorb real and reactive power into the grid.
These characteristics provide both steady-state and dy-
namic benefits. Direct power-flow control makes the
devices useful for eliminating loop flows. The very fast
Appendices 143

response makes the devices useful for improving system

stability. Both characteristics permit the system to be
operated closer to its thermal limits. FACTS devices in-
clude static var compensators, which provide a dynamic
source of reactive power; thyristor-controlled series ca-
pacitors, which provide variable transmission-line com-
pensation (effectively “shortening” the line length and
reducing stability problems); synchronous static com-
pensators, which provide a dynamic source of reactive
power; and universal power-flow controllers, which
control both real- and reactive-power flows.

• High-voltage DC (HVDC) systems—HVDC lines have

several advantages over AC transmission lines, includ-
ing no limits on line length, which is useful for moving
large amounts of power over long distances; reduced
right-of-way because of their more compact design; pre-
cise control of power flows, eliminating loop flows; and
fast control of real- and reactivepower to enhance sys-
tem stability. The primary drawback of HVDC is the
high cost of the converter stations (which convert power
from AC to DC or vice versa) at each end of the line.

• HVDC Light—This new approach to HVDC uses inte-

grated-gate bipolar transistor-based valves (instead of
thyristor-based valves) in the converter stations. These
new valves permit economical construction of lower-
voltage lines, which greatly increases the range of appli-
cability for DC lines; involves much more factory
construction instead of on-site construction, which low-
ers capital costs; and provides better control of voltages
and power flows. HVDC light lines have recently been
built in Australia and Denmark, and others have been
proposed for the United States.
144 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Real-time ratings of transmission lines—Represent an-

other use of advanced information technologies to ex-
pand the capability of existing systems (Seppa, 1999).
Such systems measure the tension in transmission lines,
ambient temperature and wind speed, or cable sag in
real time; the results of these measurements are
telemetered to the control center, which then adjusts the
line rating according to actual temperatures and wind
speeds.

In spite of their wonderful attributes and recent declines

in their costs, these technologies are generally too expensive
to warrant their widespread use today. (To date, they have
been deployed in a few locations, primarily by utilities to
improve the performance of their systems.) However, as the
technologies are improved and demonstrated, their costs
will likely continue to drop enough that they become cost
effective. When that day arrives, transmission planning will
be simpler, primarily because market participants (rather
than regulators or system operators) will be able to decide
whether to invest in these systems and will be able to retain
their benefits (because some of these technologies use de-
vices that permit direct control of power flows).

Merchant Transmission
The kinds of new technologies discussed above make it
possible for unregulated, for-profit entities to build what are
called merchant transmission projects. Under such circum-
stances, the need for centralized transmission planning is
greatly reduced. Three such merchant projects have been
proposed in the United States:

• TransEnergie US proposes to build a 330-MW, 26-mile

submarine cable under Long Island Sound to connect
Appendices 145

Connecticut and Long Island. FERC approved the

project in June 2000, after which TransEnergie held an
open-season subscription for the DC line’s capacity.

• The Neptune Regional Transmission System, announced

in May 2001, is a set of DC projects to link the northeast-
ern U.S. with eastern Canada. All four phases involve
submarine cables. The total project calls for 3600 MW of
transfer capability from Canada to the U.S. FERC ap-
proved the project in July 2001.

• The TransAmerica Grid, proposed by Black & Veatch

and Siemens AG, calls for construction of large mine-
mouth coal plants in Wyoming and DC lines to connect
this new generation with Chicago and Los Angeles.
These transmission lines, about 1000 miles each, would
cost $4.5 billion and would greatly expand the transfer
capability between the eastern and western interconnec-
tions. All three of these projects are DC. As noted by
Liles (2001):

“…the benefit of DC lies in the ability of the project’s

operator to control the flow of power on the line. What
you put in is what you get out, net of resistive losses.
Loop flow is not an issue. Contrast that with the existing
AC network, in which power flows freely throughout
the system according to the impedances of the lines….
Physically firm transmission capacity can be bought and
sold on a DC line. For DC lines, the contract path is the
actual path over which the power flows.”

Such merchant projects are feasible only if the owner

can obtain clear property rights to the transmission invest-
ment. According to Rotger and Felder (2001), such property
146 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

rights require the use of “bid-based, security- constrained

locational pricing for transmission services” as well as finan-
cial transmission rights. The PJM and New York ISOs have
such systems in place.
Rotger and Felder (2001) propose a regulatory backstop
in case competitive markets do not construct enough trans-
mission to maintain reliability. Their vision of a backstop,
however, is quite limited. It calls for the RTO to assess the
need for new transmission to meet reliability requirements
only, with no consideration of economic projects that might
reduce costs to market participants. The RTO, having iden-
tified transmission projects needed for reliability, would then
issue a request for proposals for such projects (Figure 8).
Although attractive in concept, no merchant transmis-
sion projects have yet been built in the United States. It is
also unclear whether such projects are viable only where
direct control is possible (e.g., with DC lines and other new
technologies such as FACTS systems) or whether such

Need for Transmission No Continue Needs

▲

Investment? Monitoring

Yes
▼ Enough Response
Have Viable Market-Base No Issue RFP that Meet RFP
▲

Projects Been Proposed? Requirements

Yes
▼ Yes No
Continue Needs ▲
Monitoring
▼

Award Contract for Transmission Owner

Least-Cost Technically Builds Project Under
Feasible Project FERC Jurisdiction

Figure 8. Proposed RTO backstop process to be used when competitive

markets do not produce enough transmission expansion to meet reli-
ability requirements.
Appendices 147

projects are feasible for AC systems. If merchant projects are

limited to those where control is possible, it is unclear
whether such projects will play a major role in expanding
North American transmission systems or will play more of a
niche role.

Projections of New Generation and Load Growth

The deintegration of the traditional utility, which en-
compassed generation, transmission, distribution, and cus-
tomer service in one entity, raises two important
informational issues for transmission planning. First, from
what sources will transmission planners obtain reliable in-
formation on the locations, types, capacities, and in-service
dates of new generation? Second, what entity will be respon-
sible for developing projections of future load growth?
Historically, utilities reported their plans for new gen-
eration to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and
NERC. Increasingly, however, new generation is being con-
structed by independent power producers. Although EIA
collects data from such entities, long lags can occur between
the time a company announces a new power plant and the
time it shows up in the EIA system. The Electric Power Sup-
ply Association also collects data on power-plant construc-
tion plans. Because the Association does not provide details
on the status of the project, it is hard to determine the prob-
ability that a project will get built and produce power. The
probability of unit completion increases as the project moves
from initial announcement to applications for siting and on
to environmental permits, construction, and completion.
Analogous issues concern projections of future load
growth. System operators (ISOs and, in the future, RTOs)
monitor and record data on power flows down to the level
of distribution substations. But, because of their focus on
bulk-power flows and wholesale electricity markets, system
148 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

operators are unlikely to have data on end-use demand by

customer class. The competitive load-serving entities may
have such information but are unlikely to want to make such
information publicly available. The electricity industry needs
to develop a system to collect relevant data on customer
electricity-using equipment, load shapes, and load levels and
to provide this information to transmission planners (as well
as to other entities responsible for maintaining a healthy
bulk-power system).

Recommendations
As the electricity industry continues its long and com-
plicated transition to a fully competitive state, the require-
ments for transmission planning are changing and
expanding. This paper outlined a proposed planning process
that RTOs might adopt in a restructured electricity industry.
However, most of the details for this process are not yet
developed. Similarly, FERC’s requirement in Order 2000 that
“the RTO must have ultimate responsibility for both trans-
mission planning and expansion within its region” is largely
undefined. These gaps lead to several recommendations for
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), FERC, and RTOs to
consider:

• Provide technical assistance to ISOs, RTOs, regional re-

liability councils, federal power agencies, and other or-
ganizations to develop and demonstrate improved
transmission-planning methods. Such methods would
feature active public involvement throughout the plan-
ning process, comprehensive consideration of nonwires
solutions to transmission problems, analysis of the ben-
efits and costs of different solutions under a wide range
of possible futures, and a focus on practical solutions
that can be readily implemented. DOE could work with
Appendices 149

the planning staffs at various electricity-industry organi-

zations to develop improved planning processes, ana-
lytical tools, and plans. DOE could then widely
disseminate the results of these case studies (i.e.,
through publications, conferences, and workshops) so
that others in the electricity industry can learn from
these experiences.

• Assist FERC in the development of planning standards

that FERC would then use in its review and approval of
RTO transmission plans. This activity would add detail
to the FERC Order 2000 requirement that RTOs be re-
sponsible for planning (Function 7). Based on the case
studies described above, DOE could work with FERC
staff to define what public involvement is required,
what data RTOs must make available to market partici-
pants on the current and likely future states of the trans-
mission system, what FERC means by “least cost” in its
requirement that RTOs be responsible for transmission
planning and expansion, and the extent to which plan-
ning should be proactive (i.e., guide future investments
in new generation and demand-management pro-
grams), rather than only react to generator-interconnec-
tion requests and load growth. These standards should
focus on performance (what is to be accomplished) and
not be prescriptive, to permit flexibility within and
among RTOs.

• The RTOs, acting under FERC requirements, could en-

sure that transmission planning and expansion fully
comply with NERC and regional planning standards.
Such compliance would ensure that transmission sys-
tems are adequate and meet reliability and commercial
needs.
150 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• The RTOs should identify the transmission-informa-

tion needs of market participants (including genera-
tion developers, load-serving entities, transmission
owners, and others) to guide their investment and op-
erating decisions so they are consistent with current
and likely future transmission conditions and costs.
The information needs of interested stakeholders will
vary considerably. Some participants will only want
maps showing “good” and “bad” locations for new
generation from the perspective of the transmission
system, while other participants will want detailed
load-flow studies that show voltages and flows
throughout the system, under various on- and off-
peak conditions. Periodically, such information should
be made available to market participants.

• Study the potential role of merchant transmission.

DOE, again working with RTOs and other market par-
ticipants, could conduct a study to determine the ex-
tent to which merchant (nonregulated) transmission
projects can meet future transmission needs. Among
other topics, this study should examine the possibility
of extending merchant transmission to AC projects,
rather than the DC projects that are the focus of
today’s merchant transmission facilities. Another criti-
cal issue concerns the meaning of the RTO role as a
“backstop” to market solutions. Under what condi-
tions should the RTO build (or pay for) a project that
is needed to solve transmission problems that market
participants have not, acting on their own, chosen to
solve? This study should also address the danger that
merchant transmission will “cherry pick” the most
profitable transmission projects, leaving the regulated
entity (more accurately, transmission customers in gen-
Appendices 151

eral) to pay for the less cost-effective transmission

projects that, nevertheless are required for reliability or
to connect customers to the system.

Conclusions
Maintaining a healthy transmission system is vital for
both reliability and commerce. Because electricity is essential
to our modern society, public policy should ensure suitable
expansion of the nation’s transmission grids. Unfortunately,
the historical record shows a clear and long-term decline in
U.S. transmission adequacy (Hirst and Kirby 2001). Specifi-
cally, the amounts of new transmission added during the
past two decades have consistently lagged growth in peak
demand. To make matters worse, projections for the next five
and ten years show continued declines in adequacy, al-
though some of the projected need for new transmission
may be met by the construction of generating units close to
load centers.
To further compound the problem, transmission plan-
ning is not keeping pace with the need for such planning.
Because transmission owners and ISOs are receiving so
many requests for generator interconnections, they are un-
able to devote the staff resources needed to develop proac-
tive transmission plans. That is, they are focused primarily
on preparing the system-impact and facility studies required
for these new interconnections. Thus, some transmission
plans are little more than compilations of individual genera-
tor-interconnection studies.
Because transmission planners have insufficient time
and resources, little information is being provided
proactively to energy markets on the costs and locations of
congestion. Such information could help potential investors
in new generation decide where to locate new units. Such
information could also help loadserving entities decide what
152 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

kinds of dynamic pricing and load-reduction programs to

offer customers in different locations. More broadly, such
information could reduce the need for centralized planning
and construction of new transmission facilities.
Because generation and load can serve, in some in-
stances, as viable alternatives to new transmission, transmis-
sion plans need to explicitly consider such nontransmission
alternatives. Whether the transmission system (i.e., transmis-
sion users in general) should pay for these generation and
load projects is unclear and hotly contested. At a minimum,
transmission planners should provide information (again
based on analysis of past and likely future congestion costs)
on suitable locations for new generation and load manage-
ment. In a similar fashion, alternative methods for pricing
transmission services (including charges for access, conges-
tion, and losses) would affect transmission uses. These
changes in transmission flows would, in turn, affect the need
for new facilities. Thus, transmission planning should in-
clude assessments of alternative pricing methods to improve
efficiency in transmission utilization.
Transmission planning may be too narrowly focused on
NERC and regional reliability-planning standards. That is,
transmission planning may pay insufficient attention to the
benefits new transmission investments might offer competi-
tive energy markets, in particular, broader geographic scope
of these markets (which would encourage greater diversity
in the fuels used to generate electricity) and a reduction in
the opportunities for individual generators to exercise mar-
ket power. Although some plans consider congestion (either
congestion costs or curtailments and denial of service), such
considerations are more implicit than explicit. As shown
here, congestion costs (both in real time and in forward
markets) can provide valuable information on where and
what to build.
Appendices 153

Advanced technologies offer the hope of better informa-

tion on and control of transmission flows and voltages. Such
improved information and control would permit the system
to be operated closer to its thermal limits, thereby expanding
transmission capability without increasing its footprint.
Thus, new technologies may reduce fights about transmis-
sion siting. In addition, these technologies, because they
permit control of power flows over individual elements (e.g.,
DC lines), may make it attractive for private investors to
build individual facilities (merchant transmission). Unfortu-
nately, these advanced technologies are still too expensive
for widespread application, although some are economic in
niche applications.
The separation of generation from transmission and of
retail service from transmission poses difficult information
problems for transmission planning. Specifically, transmis-
sion planners need detailed information on the timing, mag-
nitudes, and locations of new generating units; the
developers of these facilities are unwilling to share competi-
tive information until required to do so (e.g., for environ-
mental permits and for transmission- interconnection
studies). Planners also need detailed information on the lo-
cations and magnitudes of future loads. In a retail-competi-
tion world, it is not clear what entities will have the
information necessary to produce reliable projections of re-
tail load and whether those entities will be willing to share
these projections with transmission planners.
Finally, the economies of scale in transmission invest-
ment argue for overbuilding, rather than underbuilding,
transmission. It is substantially cheaper per GW-mile to con-
struct a higher-voltage line than a lower-voltage line. The
higher-voltage line also requires less land per GW-mile,
which should reduce opposition from local landowners and
residents. Also, building a larger line now eliminates the
154 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

need to build another line in several years. This situation can

eliminate the need for another potentially bruising and ex-
pensive fight over the need for and location of another trans-
mission line. Also, the availability of suitable land on which
to build transmission lines can only go down in the future,
as population grows and the economy expands. On the other
hand, overbuilding can increase financial risks for the trans-
mission owners.

Acknowledgments
We thank John Adams, Kenneth Donohoo, Philip Fe-
dora, Trudy Harper, Michael Henderson, Steven Herling,
Douglas Larson, George Loehr, Paul McCoy, Mark MacLeod,
Stephen Metague, David Meyer, Wayman Robinett, Jose
Rotger, Richard Sedano, Alison Silverstein, Brian Silverstein,
Dorothea Stockstill, Perry Stowe, and James Whitehead for
their very helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

References
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Compliance Filing, Docket Nos. ER99-3144-003 et al., submitted to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Columbus, OH, Sep-
tember 15.
American Transmission Company. 2001. Initial Ten Year Transmission Sys-
tem Assessment, Waukesha, WI, June 1.
Avista Corp. et al. 2000. Supplemental Compliance Filing and Request for
Declaratory Order Pursuant to Order 2000, Docket No. RT01-35-000,
submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Spokane,
WA, October 16.
Bonneville Power Administration. 2001. “Transmission Integration Re-
quests Pour In,” Journal, DOE/BP- 3365, Portland, OR, March.
Detmers, J., A. Perez, and S. Greenleaf. 2001. “Valley-Rainbow Transmis-
sion Project,” Memorandum to California Independent System
Operator Board of Governors, Folsom, CA, page 3, March 23.
Emerson, A. and J.D. Smith. 2001. Revised Biennial Transmission Assess-
ment 2000–2009, Arizona Corporation Commission, Phoenix, AZ,
July.
Appendices 155

ERCOT. 2001. Report on Existing and Potential Electric System Constraints

and Needs within ERCOT, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Tay-
lor, TX, October 1.
GridFlorida, LLC. 2000. Attachment N, Planning Protocol, Supplemental
Compliance Filing, Docket No. RT01-67-000, submitted to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, December 15 (as revised on May
29, 2001).
Hirst, E. and B. Kirby. 2001. Transmission Planning for a Restructuring U.S.
Electricity Industry, Edison Electric Institute, Washington, DC, June.
Howe, J.B. 2001. “End the Gridlock: Why Transmission is Ripe for New
Technology,” Public Utilities Fortnightly 139(2), 38-43, page 40, Janu-
ary 15.
Infrastructure Technical Review Committee. 2001. Upgrading the Capacity
and Reliability of the BPA Transmission System, August 30.
ISO New England. 2001. 2001 Regional Transmission Expansion Plan
(RTEP01), Holyoke, MA, October 19.
Liles, J. 2001. “Merchant Transmission: Building a Grid that Wall Street
Can Understand,” Public Utilities Fortnightly 139(17), 24-36, Septem-
ber 15.
Mazur, R.W. 1999. “MAPP Regional Transmission Planning,” Manitoba
Hydro, Winnipeg, Manitoba, November.
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool. 2000. MAPP Regional Plan 2000 through
2009,Minneapolis, MN, December 29.
National Grid USA. 2000. National Grid USA Five Year Statement for the
years 2001 to 2005, Westborough, MA, December.
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 1999. Health Effects
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NC, June.
New England Transmission Owners et al. 2001. Joint Petition for Declara-
tory Order to Form the New England Regional Transmission Organiza-
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Regulatory Commission, Holyoke, MA, January 16.
North American Electric Reliability Council. 2001. Transmission Expan-
sion: Issues and Recommendations, Transmission Adequacy Task
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NJ, September 17.
North American Electric Reliability Council. 1997. NERC Planning Stan-
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156 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Pasternack, B. 2001. Personal communications, Transmission Planning

Department, American Electric Power, Columbus, OH, March.
PJM Interconnection. 2001a. Final Draft, 2000 Baseline RTEP Report For the
2002-2007 Period, Norristown, PA, March 1.
PJM Interconnection. 2001b. PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan
(RTEP), Version 2.1.00, Norristown, PA, August.
Rotger, J. and F. Felder. 2001. Connecting Customers: A Case for Merchant
Transmission with a Regulatory Backstop in a Restructured Electric
Power System, TransEnergie U.S. Ltd.
Sanford, M., V. Banunarayanan, and K. Wirgau. 2001. Implications of Ca-
pacity Additions in New York on Transmission System Adequacy, GE
Power Systems Energy Consulting, prepared for New York Inde-
pendent System Operator, Schenectady, NY, March 2.
Seppa, T. 1999. “Improving Asset Utilization of Transmission Lines by
Real Time Rating,” presented at T&D Committee Meeting, IEEE/
PES Summer Power Meeting, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, July 22.
Southern Company Services. 1995. Guidelines for Planning Transmission
Facility Improvements for the Operating Companies of the Southern Elec-
tric System, Birmingham, AL, March 14.
Texas Public Utility Commission. 2001. 2000 Annual Update on Activities
in the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Market, Project No. 19616, Austin,
TX, March.
U.S. Department of Energy Task Force on Electric System Reliability.
1998. Maintaining Reliability in a Competitive U.S. Electricity Industry,
Washington, DC, page 126, September 29.
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 1999. Regional Transmission
Organizations, Order No. 2000, Docket No. RM99-2-000, Washing-
ton, DC, December 20.
VanZandt, V. 2001. “Transmission Assessment,” Transmission Operations
and Planning, Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, OR,
March 23.
Western Governors’ Association. 2001. Conceptual Plans for Electricity
Transmission in the West, Denver, CO, August.
Whitehead, J.T. 2001. Personal communication, Transmission Planning
Department, Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, TN, Oct. 17.
Winter, T.M. and K. Fluckiger. 2000. “Policy Issues Regarding Alterna-
tives to Transmission and Recommendations on Tri-Valley RFP,”
Memorandum to California Independent System Operator Board of
Governors, Folsom, CA, page 4, April 18.
Appendices 157

Transmission Siting and

Permitting
(National Transmission Grid Study)

David H. Meyer
Consultant, Electricity Policy and Regulation
Alexandria, Virginia
Richard Sedano
Regulatory Assistance Project
Montpelier, Vermont

Introduction
Assessment of Current Siting Regime
Description of the Transmission Siting Process
Due Process in Transmission Siting.
Key Difficulties in the Current Transmission Siting Process
Two Instructive Transmission Siting Cases
Successes in Siting Transmission
Critical Elements of Success and Characteristics that Lead to
Conflict
Business Uncertainties and the Current Siting Process
The Regional Perspective
Some Generic Considerations Regarding the Regional Approach
Alternative Designs for Regional Siting Institutions
Defining “Regional Transmission Facilities”
Objective Criteria
Functional Tests
Economic Test
Improving the Existing State-Based Siting Process
Accountability
Improvements to Siting Processes
Improving Agency and Industry Practices
Effective Presentation of Alternatives
Advantages of Open Planning
Deterministic and Probabilistic Planning
157
158 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Impact of Rate Design on Decision Making

Encouraging Innovation
Effects of Cost Minimization
Need for Complete Applications
Transmission Company Perceptions of the Siting Process
Federal Actions to Improve the Siting Process
Summary and Conclusions
Problem Areas in the Existing Siting Regime
Options for Improving the Transmission Siting Process
Acknowledgments
References

INTRODUCTION
In order to construct new transmission facilities or to
significantly upgrade existing facilities in the U.S. electricity
system, developers typically need approval from several
state and federal agencies. This process has, in recent years,
become protracted and difficult. The difficulty is hardly sur-
prising given that transmission facilities are highly visible
structures that may span long distances and must somehow
fit into physical surroundings that are already in use for
other purposes. Incorporating these facilities into the land-
scape and taking fair account of the wide range of legitimate
interests affected by them is challenging.
Nevertheless, many observers and participants in the
electricity sector now regard transmission siting and permit-
ting procedures as a major reason why the development of
new transmission facilities is not keeping up with the need.
Critics say that the siting and permitting process has become
unnecessarily cumbersome, delay prone, and subject to
breakdown. Some observers argue that current state-based
regime for managing siting and permitting is not well
adapted to the review of proposed large-scale multistate
transmission projects that are or may soon be needed to
Appendices 159

serve regional bulk power markets, perhaps with little ben-

efit to local electricity consumers. Other officials familiar
with state processes agree that regulatory processes can and
should be improved, while noting that there is also potential
to improve the siting and planning practices of transmission
owners or other applicants for proposed new facilities.
Given the vital importance of the transmission network,
it is essential to the national interest that transmission siting
and permitting procedures work for society in practical
terms. That is, these procedures must lead to timely deci-
sions by appropriate agencies about whether proposed facili-
ties would serve the public interest, and to timely approval
of routes or sites for facilities that are deemed necessary. This
paper examines current siting and permitting practices and
ways to improve them. Specifically, the paper:
• Examines existing government and industry practices
related to siting and permitting,
• Identifies key or frequent problems with these practices,
• Identifies policy options that should be considered to
resolve these problems, and
• Discusses objectively some of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the options, so they can be considered by
federal and state policy makers, corporate officials, and
the public.
The policy options discussed fall into three categories:
• Creating new regional institutions to facilitate transmis-
sion siting and permitting, either for all new transmis-
sion facilities or for large or critically important
facilities;
• Improving the current state-based governance regime;
160 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Making siting-related practices by industry and govern-

ment agencies more effective, regardless of governance
structure.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections:
• An assessment of the existing state-based siting regime.
• A discussion of transmission siting from a regional per-
spective, the reasoning that has led to increased interest
in establishing regional institutions for siting new trans-
mission facilities, and the options for designing these
institutions.
• Issues related to defining “regional transmission facili-
ties.” Some such definition would be useful for deter-
mining which new facilities would be subject to the
jurisdiction of regional siting institutions.
• Options for improving the existing state-based siting
regime.
• Options that could be pursued under any governance
structure to improve siting-related practices by govern-
ment agencies and industry.
• Summary and conclusions.

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITING REGIME

The North American electricity grid is a monumental

feat of imagination, planning, and engineering. The grid
links generators to cities; cities are linked together and with
rural areas; and many electricity suppliers are made acces-
sible to users. Networking delivers a very high standard of
reliability at reasonable cost, and the U.S. economy depends
heavily upon this high level of reliability. Some government
Appendices 161

authority approved construction of most of the power lines

that make up the grid.
Siting transmission lines is understandably difficult, in-
volving complex engineering, social, and land use consider-
ations. As aggregate electricity usage in an area grows,
reliability tends to degrade unless the transmission network
is strengthened. There are often many ways to meet a need for
grid enhancement, and choosing a good solution is likely to
involve tradeoffs among many factors, including cost. Arriv-
ing at good solutions often requires long lead times and the
development and implementation of a flexible long-term plan
for optimizing the transmission grid and related facilities.
Utilities, whether publicly or privately owned, involve a
mixture of public and private interests. One of their roles is
to bring forward proposals to meet transmission grid needs
and implement these proposals if they are approved by gov-
ernment agencies. Consumers rely on government agencies
to select the transmission proposals that are most likely to
have value well in excess of their cost over the working life
of the investment. Because the future is uncertain and reli-
ance on forecasts is unavoidable, the selection process will
not always result in the best decisions. However, the goal is
that the system used for siting electric transmission lines will
produce timely, high-quality decisions in most cases.
Siting electric transmission lines is currently a state re-
sponsibility.1 Each state may address transmission siting in
its laws, and most have done so. In a few states, utilities are
required only to give notice of intent to build a transmission
line; after a specified period, if no challenges are raised, the
utility may proceed with acquisition of right of way (if
needed) and construction. In most states, however, the utility

1
With the exception of the federal power marketing administrations and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, which have their own siting authorities.
162 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

must demonstrate to a siting authority that the proposed

facility is needed, and the siting authority must confirm that
construction of the facility will serve the public interest.
Most power lines are proposed in states that have for-
mal siting authorities. Some transmission proposals are
withdrawn after supporting evidence is assessed during the
siting process. A few proposals make it all the way to a
decision by the siting authority and are then rejected. Rejec-
tions represent failures of analysis and communication
somewhere in the planning and siting processes, and they
are costly to all parties, including the public. The objective of
the subsections below is to examine the existing siting pro-
cess and analyze some of its successes and failures.

Description of the Transmission Siting Process

A utility typically files a siting proposal when it feels
that there is justifiable need for additional transmission ca-
pacity and that the proposed solution is robust. In most
states, the proposal goes to a siting authority, most often the
regulatory utility commission. A significant number of states
have a separate siting authority that may include officials
from other affected state agencies.
Usually, the process is a “contested case,” which means
that the decision will be based on evidence presented by the
applicant and other parties. Parties (“intervenors”) may in-
tervene in the case either by right (e.g., the state public ad-
vocate) or by permission if they demonstrate to the siting
authority that a distinct interest is at stake that is not other-
wise sufficiently represented. The utility decides when the
process starts and controls most of the relevant information.
Sometimes, intervenors fill gaps in the information provided
by the utility.
In some states, a specific amount of time is allotted for
reviewing a transmission siting proposal. The time limit may
Appendices 163

be reached or even exceeded in complex cases or cases that

involve much procedural maneuvering; this may trigger a
rejection of the proposal by the siting authority on proce-
dural grounds. Other states have no specific time limit. Still
other states, in order to reduce utility incentives to hold back
details about a proposal, allow a time limit to be activated
only after a finding by the siting authority that the applica-
tion is complete. In some states, the process focuses on the
proposal under consideration rather than on how best to
address a grid need.
In these cases, a rejection may not be accompanied by
guidance about how to address better the need that the origi-
nal proposal was intended to meet. The prospective lack of
such guidance and the desire to avoid rejection may moti-
vate some parties to work during the case to improve the
project after filing, based on evidence and arguments during
discovery and hearings.2
Electricity consumers pay for transmission facilities
through their electricity bills.3 Consumers depend on regula-
tors to allow the incorporation into electricity rates only the
costs related to transmission facilities required to serve their
area’s long-term needs. Transmission costs represent ap-
proximately 10% of the nation’s total electric bill.4 An envi-
ronmental assessment is often required for a transmission
proposal. Environmental issues of interest include:
• Concern about opening new areas to development—for
example, roads may be needed for access to maintain
lines, and development may follow roads;
2
An iterative process has its merits but exposes intervenors to the risk of having
to evaluate an essentially new proposal in the midst of the process. The siting
authority must “manage the clock” to ensure that everyone is treated fairly.
3
Merchant transmission costs find their way into retail prices though by a differ-
ent path than regulated transmission rates.
4
DOE. 2002. National Transmission Grid Study. U.S. Department of Energy.
164 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Potential disruption of habitat by reducing the size of

continuous undeveloped spaces;
• Potential impacts on endangered species; and
• Visible impacts that may create aesthetic concerns, espe-
cially in scenic areas.

In most states, the utility must apply for and obtain a

“certificate of public need” (the name of this document var-
ies from state to state) for a transmission facility. This certifi-
cate is extremely important; it indicates that the designated
government authorities have reviewed the proposed project,
evaluated the tradeoffs involved, and concluded that, over-
all, the project is in the public interest even though some
legitimate private or public interests may be adversely af-
fected. The formal criteria for determining “need”5 vary.
Some commonly used criteria are
• Someone is willing to invest in the project (in other
words, the project is perceived to have significant mar-
ketable value).
• The project is needed to maintain the reliability of the
bulk power supply system.6
• The project is needed for regional electricity commerce.7

5
There is no practice or mechanism for determining regional or interstate need.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) performs this function in a way
that some expect will become typical for Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs)—providing unbiased and competent information to clarify and focus the
work of individual utilities on addressing validated needs.
6
Demonstrating this particular need requires competence in either deterministic
or probabilistic transmission planning models as explained briefly in Section 6.
Using just one approach leaves the applicant vulnerable to challenge.
7
For some states, serving regional commerce is a vital purpose of the grid. For
others, it is secondary to maintaining reliability.
Appendices 165

• The project is needed to interconnect an approved gen-

erator to the grid.8

In many states, decision makers must consider alterna-

tives to the primary proposal. Some states have specific in-
structions concerning alternatives that the utility must
present. Siting authorities are typically interested in route
and non-transmission alternatives when these are relevant.9

———————————————————————————

Substitutability of
Transmission and Nontransmission Resources

There are many substitutable ways to meet customer needs for

delivery of energy. Here are two examples:

1. Consider a community that has experienced significant customer

demand growth and has been relying on generation located outside
the area but delivered to customers by wires that are beginning to
reach capacity limits. In this case, the capacity of the lines could be
increased, or generation could be added within the community to
reduce the need for imports. Alternatively, customers could reduce
their demand on the grid, either by using energy more efficiently or
by making their own electricity. Deploying several approaches may
avoid overreliance on any one. Examples of these alternative ap-
proaches are being deployed now in New York City for the explicit
purpose of improving electricity system reliability.

8
One commenter at the public workshops organized for the National Transmis-
sion Grid Study (NTGS) by the U.S. Department of Energy suggested that inad-
equate attention is being given to transmission needs associated with bringing
some new generation on line. If this is true, a need buildup may be accumulating
that could result in belated justification for new power lines in some areas.
9
Texas requires submittal of alternative route options as well as analysis of the
usefulness of demand-side management and distributed generation in lieu of
new lines.
166 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

2. Consider a market in which a transmission constraint leads to en-

ergy clearing prices that differ by two cents between the two sides
of the bottleneck in many hours. Possible solutions include adding
transfer capacity to allow the low-cost resources on one side of the
constraint to flow freely to the other side. Or it might be possible
to add lower-cost resources in the region where energy prices are
higher. A third alternative would be to reduce demand in the region
where power is more expensive if a reduction would mean avoid-
ing use of the most expensive generation resources. An example of
adding resources in the region where power is more expensive
appears to be unfolding in Pennsylvania where differences between
eastern and western prices are moderating because natural-gas-
fired generation has been added in the east.

In both examples, structural improvements, such as more functional

markets and better pricing regimes, are contributing to the resolution of
problems that might once have been solved by transmission facilities
alone. These alternatives should be considered during an investment
planning cycle prior to and again during permitting so that the public
can see and appreciate the decision-making process.
———————————————————————————

The cost to prepare a transmission proposal and support

it through the siting process is significant and can vary de-
pending on the complexity of the project and degree of pub-
lic concern.10 Regulated companies expect that federal and
state supervised rates will recover the cost of the project plus
a reasonable return. Merchant transmission companies rely

10
In September 1995, the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) voted to allow
Florida Power to recover $23 million in costs spent on a proposed 500-kV line
that was never built. The line was approved by the PSC in 1984 for reliability.
However, continued local opposition led to protracted and costly litigation.
Florida Power eventually developed an alternative plan involving more intensive
monitoring of the status of key transmission lines in the area, interruption of
service to a limited number of customers in emergency situations if necessary,
and reactivation of a 115-kV line that had earlier been retired from service. (Elec-
tric Utility Week, 1995.)
Appendices 167

on a business plan that forecasts sufficient revenues from the

sale of transmission services to cover their costs and provide
an acceptable return on invested capital. Their charges are
also eventually reflected in retail electric prices.
A crucial and volatile factor in the transmission siting
process is the public trust. It is extremely important that the
managers of the process and other major parties act in spe-
cific cases so as to gain and keep the public’s confidence that
the siting process will generally lead to sound outcomes that
serve the many public interests at issue.

Due Process in Transmission Siting

Due process is an important element in the American
judicial system, including the transmission siting process. By
means of due process rules, the regulatory agency that man-
ages the process balances the interests of many parties, in-
cluding potential intervenors who need a sufficient
opportunity to review and critique the particulars of a pro-
posed transmission project, the utility that is charged with
providing reliable service at just and reasonable rates, and
consumers.
The first element of due process is notice. Parties who
may be affected by a project have a legal right to hear
about it sufficiently in advance to make a reasoned re-
sponse if they choose. When a project affects many com-
munities, notice must be provided so that all communities
are informed.11
A complete filing is also a necessary element of due
process. Potential intervenors need full information about
the project, presented in non-technical terms. Information
provided by utilities may be incomplete. Regardless of the

11
This concern is spoofed in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, by Douglas
Adams, in which notice to demolish the Earth was posted at Alpha Centauri.
168 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

history or regulatory time limits on the case, filing of in-

complete applications or withholding of relevant informa-
tion puts the proposed project at risk, and may create
mistrust, conflict, delay, and/or result in outright rejection
of the proposal. Another key element of due process is the
determination of which parties are allowed to participate.
The state is usually represented, and any relevant point of
view not adequately represented by others is generally al-
lowed. Those designated as “parties” to the case receive all
information submitted to the siting authority by any other
party and have the opportunity to ask and be asked dis-
covery questions and to put on and cross-examine wit-
nesses. Typically, parties pay their own costs. Low-budget
participation is possible, but expert advice is expensive,
which limits the participation of some intervenors.12
“Discovery” is the process of insuring that all relevant
facts are available to all parties before hearings. Because
utilities possess most of the information relevant to transmis-
sion proposals, they usually have a greater discovery bur-
den—that is, they must distribute to others all relevant
information. In some cases, however, other parties present
competing alternatives and thus become subject to major
discovery burdens.
Conflicts may result if some information essential to
understanding the need for or the design of a project is de-
clared to be confidential to protect allegedly proprietary
details. A simple solution is an agreement that allows all
parties to see the information but requires that they use it
only for the purpose of the case. Even with such an agree-
ment, disputes may persist since the information may be

12
Some of the most tenacious non-government intervenors have wealthy benefac-
tors or pro bono advocates. In rare cases, states provide funding, usually as-
sessed from the applicant, for intervenors.
Appendices 169

important to enable the public to understand the need for

the project, and there is no practical way to include the
public in a protective agreement. In addition, there may be
lingering disagreement on how proprietary the information
is in the first place. In many jurisdictions, applicants face
no formal penalty if they withhold information as a strat-
egy to divert attention or delay review of the proposal;
however, an applicant who withholds information risks
losing the trust and goodwill of regulators and the public.
Siting authorities usually allow public comment, and
many are required by law to do so. Some states require that
comments be solicited in person in each affected county. For
a long transmission line, many counties could be affected.
Public comments are not usually used as evidence because
statements are not cross-examined; however, these com-
ments may influence the atmosphere in which the decision
makers deliberate.
Technical hearings are the forum through which the sit-
ing authority collects evidence. These hearings are some-
times held before staff or hearing examiners or directly
before the siting authority. Parties to these hearings can pro-
duce witnesses, and all parties can cross-examine all wit-
nesses.
It is important that all parties understand in advance the
standards for approval of a transmission proposal. These
standards should be provided by the siting authority with
citations of appropriate statutes, regulations, and precedents.
Sometimes an issue emerges for which there is no precedent,
and parties may want to know at an early stage in the case
how the authority will evaluate this issue. After the siting
authority issues its findings and orders, there is usually an
opportunity to appeal. State courts vary in their ability to
process such appeals quickly.
170 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Key Difficulties in the

Current Transmission Siting Process
Why don’t utility proposals for new transmission facili-
ties get routinely approved within a “reasonable” time pe-
riod? In fact, most smaller projects or upgrades of existing
facilities are approved, often in less than a year. Notice and
hearing requirements take up the bulk of the time in such
cases. However, some proposals do not go smoothly, as dis-
cussed in the rest of this subsection.
Significant difficulties arise when a proposal is per-
ceived by key parties to be inconsistent with important pub-
lic interests. These interests may include costs as well as
impacts on electric rates, the environment, property rights,
protected federal land, or other sensitive land. Often, critical
disagreements are about how certain tradeoffs should be
evaluated and resolved. Sometimes, a conflict is the result of
a party’s conscious decision to be uncompromising for rea-
sons of principle or strategy. Disputes may arise about
whether certain questions have been sufficiently answered
or whether parties will have access to certain information
and on what terms.13
Major delays occur if the siting authority finds that an
applicant failed to examine and present relevant alternatives,
a task that entails significant effort. If more than one state is
involved, the states may disagree over the proposed distri-
bution of the societal benefits and costs associated with the
line.
A bias is introduced in the weighing of alternatives if
different approval venues, processes, or compensation meth-

13
There are many examples. In Illinois, a transmission project was approved only
after the utility produced information requested by the commission staff; the staff
had recommended that the project be denied because the information offered at
the outset was inadequate. Illinois Commerce Commission Docket 92-0121 (P.R.
Buxton, Personal communication).
Appendices 171

ods are used for different options. For example, if the siting
authority is not the regulatory commission, the authority
may not have sufficient experience in demand-side measures
to determine whether they may be superior to a power line
as a means of meeting a system need. Introducing competi-
tion to the wholesale generation market has added another
dimension of difficulty. Investments in generation, transmis-
sion, and demand-side measures come in regulated and
competitive forms and pass through different channels for
approval, so there is no single standard for comparing them,
and there may be no formal opportunity for a side-by-side
evaluation.

Two Instructive Transmission Siting Cases

American Electric Power’s 765-kV project between
West Virginia and Virginia
The painfully long, complex, controversial, and costly
review of an American Electric Power (AEP) transmission
project in West Virginia and Virginia is often cited as a de-
finitive example of a dysfunctional transmission siting pro-
cess. The major parties are the applicant, two states, and
three federal land management agencies. After ten years of
review, this project is still at least a year from final approval.
AEP first proposed the 765-kV project in 1991 to Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, the U.S. Forest Service, the National
Park Service, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As ini-
tially proposed, the project’s primary purpose was to main-
tain reliability in southern West Virginia and southwestern
Virginia, and a secondary purpose was to reduce the risks of
a cascading outage that could affect many states in the east-
ern United States. The project would have involved con-
struction of a new line about 113 miles long from an AEP
substation in Wyoming County, West Virginia, to an AEP
substation near Cloverdale, Virginia. Possible impacts on
172 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

populated areas made the project controversial in both

states, and both states held very extensive local hearings. In
addition, the Forest Service issued a draft environmental
impact statement in 1996 in which it recommended that the
line not be constructed as proposed because it would cross
sensitive areas of the Jefferson National Forest, the Appala-
chian Trail, and the New River.
In October 1997, AEP proposed an alternative route to
the regulatory commissions in the two states. This route was
about 17 miles longer than the earlier route, and the most
important change was that it would go south from the Wyo-
ming area of West Virginia before turning east, enabling the
line to cross the New River in a less sensitive area. Several
other changes were made to put the line behind ridges and
to cross rivers and important natural areas at locations with
lesser impacts. In June 1998, the West Virginia Public Service
Commission approved its 32-mile portion of the line.
In September 1998, however, AEP agreed to a request
from the staff of the Virginia Corporation Commission that
the utility conduct a detailed study of an alternative route
that would follow much the same path as before in West
Virginia but would terminate in Virginia at an AEP substa-
tion near Jacksons Ferry. The Virginia Commission also en-
gaged a consulting firm to prepare an independent
evaluation of the route to Jacksons Ferry. After completing
its review, AEP agreed that the Jacksons Ferry route was
acceptable although it would not allow as much margin for
future load growth as the route to Cloverdale.
In May 2001, the Virginia Corporation Commission ap-
proved the Jacksons Ferry route, chiefly because it would
have fewer adverse environmental and social impacts than
the route to Cloverdale. The West Virginia Public Service
Commission must now review the route ending at Jacksons
Ferry, even though the West Virginia portion of the route
Appendices 173

remains essentially unchanged from that which the commis-

sion approved in June 1998. In addition, the new route
would cross about 11 miles of national forest in an area not
studied in the Forest Service’s 1996 draft environmental
impact statement, so the Forest Service must do a supple-
mentary analysis and decide whether to grant a permit for
construction of the line.
The siting process for this project might have been accel-
erated if there had been:

• Greater coordination and cooperation among the five

reviewing agencies (West Virginia, Virginia, and the
three federal agencies). A significant source of delay in
the earlier stages of the process was that each state com-
mission tended to favor a route that would reduce ad-
verse environmental and social impacts within its own
state without regard for the possibility of adverse im-
pacts in the other state.

• Presentation by AEP of a wider range of alternatives at

an early stage in the process.

• Better communication between the Forest Service and

the applicant. The Forest Service and the applicant
could have focused earlier on the acceptability of sev-
eral alternative routes across national forest lands.

• More emphasis on the “regional picture” through in-

volvement of a regional siting institution. Because a
major purpose of the line is to reduce the risk of a cas-
cading multistate outage, this project has regional sig-
nificance. The regulatory process, however, has
involved only two states, and their proceedings have fo-
cused primarily on intrastate concerns.
174 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

The Cross Sound Connector

Another project, the Cross Sound Connector, illustrates
the problems of focusing on a single route and also shows
some additional difficulties typical of interstate projects.
TransEnergie US, Ltd proposed the project in the summer of
2000. It would connect the Long Island Power Authority’s
Shoreham substation with a United Illuminating substation
in New Haven, Connecticut, by means of a buried 26-mile
undersea cable. The project has two principal purposes: to
improve reliability on Long Island and in Connecticut, and
to enable Long Island to import generation from New En-
gland. The project obtained required approval from New
York officials but was rejected in April 2001 by the Connecti-
cut Siting Council, less than a year after it was proposed.
Two reasons were cited for the rejection. The primary
reason was risk to valuable shellfish beds in Long Island
Sound near the Connecticut end of the project. A secondary
concern was that the allocation of benefits from the project
between New York and Connecticut was not equitable in
comparison to the burdens involved. In August 2001,
TransEnergie reproposed the project with a new route that
would avoid the shellfish beds at some additional cost. Be-
cause the first proposal was rejected without prejudice, the
revised proposal was filed as a new application in Connecti-
cut, and went through the full review process. The Connecti-
cut Siting council approved the project on January 3, 2002.
However, some critics of the project announced their inten-
tion to challenge the Council’s decision in court.
This case highlights that before filing a formal proposal,
an applicant should probe thoroughly for sensitive issues
that may be raised by its proposal and the likely impacts of
alternative routes. The case also demonstrates the need for
states involved in the review of interstate projects to coordi-
nate their reviews and agree on findings regarding the allo-
Appendices 175

cation of costs and benefits. (These topics are discussed be-

low in the Regional Perspective section.)

Successes in Siting Transmission

Most transmission siting proposals eventually receive
certificates of need. With sustained effort, utilities, state
regulators, public advocates, communities, and intervenors
usually find answers to problems. A successful review pro-
cess for a large interstate transmission project is described
below.

A recent four-state transmission siting success story

In September 1998, New Century Energies (a company
formed by the merger of Southwestern Public Service and
Public Service of Colorado and subsequently merged into
Xcel Energy) affirmed its intent to build a 300-mile, 345-kV
line that would connect a Southwestern substation near
Amarillo, Texas, with a substation near Lamar, Colorado,
that is partially owned by Public Service of Colorado. From
Amarillo, the line would cross the Oklahoma panhandle,
continue north to Holcomb station near Garden City, Kansas,
and then west to Lamar. The terminus at Lamar was to be a
210-MW high voltage DC interchange facility that would
permit asynchronous flows between the eastern and western
U.S. grids. The purposes of the project were to improve re-
liability and stabilize power flows in the region and to facili-
tate electricity trade. To address potential market power
concerns associated with the company merger, Texas regula-
tors required New Century Energies to pursue this project.
In July 2001, Xcel Energy obtained the consent from the last
of the four states when the Colorado Public Utilities Com-
mission approved the project.
The interest of Texas regulators in this project only
partly explains the project’s success. Other reasons were the
176 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

applicant’s proactive anticipation of and responsiveness to

landowner and community concerns, and the awareness by
Kansas regulatory officials of the regional implications of the
project and the potentially reciprocal responsibilities of a
state faced with a project of principal benefit to neighboring
states.

Critical Elements of Success and

Conditions that May Lead to Conflict
A review of many siting proposals reveals some indica-
tors of probable success as well as conditions that increase
the risk of conflict.

Success indicators
• Link to a generation project—A transmission project
that interconnects a needed generation project to the
grid is less likely than other types of projects to encoun-
ter heavy opposition. The transmission component may
be seen as incidental to the generation project.

• Early planning—If interested parties are informed

ahead of time that a power line may be needed and will
probably be proposed, the project has a greater likeli-
hood of success. In some cases the proposal that is ulti-
mately put before siting authorities differs from that
which had initially been presented to the public for re-
view, indicating that the public review was of value.

• Open planning—A planning process is considered

“open” or “transparent” when it solicits the views of
interested parties regarding ways to address a specific
transmission need. Parties other than utilities are more
likely to feel that such a process has respected their in-
terests; it also gives the utility the opportunity to make
Appendices 177

changes to a plan before committing to it as a formal

proposal.

• Regional planning—The major benefits from interstate

transmission projects are often unevenly distributed.
When out-of-state benefits can be recognized in a state’s
siting process, effective presentation of these benefits is
an important indicator of success. Special arrangements
may be needed to ensure that a project will provide net
benefits to all affected states.

• Demonstrable need—A project appears more compel-

ling as its value to consumers is more evident. The need
to maintain reliability is widely accepted although dem-
onstrating that a specific project is needed to strengthen
the system can be difficult. The need to interconnect a
permitted generator to the grid is usually obvious. In
some states, there is debate about the “need” for projects
that primarily facilitate electricity trade.

• Economic benefits—If regional energy transfers are

clearly in the public interest, a proposed project that
enables such transfers will likely be received positively.
In some jurisdictions, applying this rationale to power
lines is relatively new and results from the increasing
importance of wholesale electricity trade. There is de-
bate about whether a proposed transmission line that
primarily facilitates electricity trade and reduces elec-
tricity costs for some consumers is “needed” (see Re-
gional Perspective section for further discussion). In
some jurisdictions, “need” is interpreted narrowly as
referring only to reliability.

• Alternatives, presented objectively—Presenting a broad

178 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

range of relevant alternatives is important. Some states

require that alternatives accompany the primary siting
proposal, and intervenors and public advocates may
develop them if the utility does not. Regardless of Trans-
mission Siting and Permitting E-11 E-12 National Trans-
mission Grid Study regulatory requirements, an
objective presentation of alternatives advances the cred-
ibility of the applicant and the primary proposal.

• Open lands—If there are few objections to the transmis-

sion line route on the basis of natural resource concerns,
the odds of a project’s success improve, particularly as
open land area shrinks in many states with the growth
of cities. (Restrictions on the use of much government
land limits its value for transmission siting.)

Characteristics of transmission siting proposals/processes

that may lead to conflict
• Disregard for directives in law or siting authority pro-
nouncements—Probably the worst thing that a trans-
mission project applicant can do is disregard clear
instructions from the siting authority or statute. Al-
though this may seem unlikely, it happens more often
than might be expected.

• Differing assumptions about land use—State officials

may view proposed land use tradeoffs in ways that dif-
fer from utility expectations. An open utility transmis-
sion planning process can reveal potential
misunderstandings of this kind before they disrupt or
derail a mature proposal.

• Potential for disagreements with federal land manag-

ers—Difficulties sometimes arise when the interests of
Appendices 179

one or more federal land management agencies are af-

fected by a proposal. Land managers may not regard
accommodating transmission line proposals as a high
priority. Different federal land managers within a region
may not coordinate well with the state siting process or
with each other, even within a single federal depart-
ment. Federal land managers sometimes decide not to
commit resources to participate in the planning of a
transmission project (or ignore the process, which has
the same result), choosing to participate only after the
process is well under way, compromises have been
made by others, and the range of options under consid-
eration has been narrowed. Some projects affect the in-
terests of several federal agencies, and some parties cite
insufficient coordination among them in reviewing such
projects as a problem. (Note: There are also cases in
which these managers have cooperated well with each
other and with state siting officials.)

Business Uncertainties and the Current Siting Process

The business aspects of the current transmission siting
process merit attention. The ongoing restructuring of the
U.S. electricity industry poses many uncertainties for the
transmission component of the industry. Some companies do
not know whether they will remain in the transmission busi-
ness, and those that intend to stay in the business are unsure
what rules will determine the profitability of new transmis-
sion investments. There is also uncertainty about how mar-
ket participants will gain access to transmission facilities,
and receive allocations of scarce transmission capacity. The
outcomes of these federal legislative and regulatory debates
will create winners and losers, and the debates are a con-
suming preoccupation for participants at all levels of the
electric industry.
180 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Some parties believe that many meritorious transmis-

sion projects never make it out of the utility board room and
into the permitting process. It is unclear whether this is be-
cause of uncertainty about whether revenues will cover the
cost of the facility, skewed incentives resulting from un-
sound transmission pricing, fear of the siting process, faulty
project development, concern for predatory effects on profits
from other utility investments (i.e., generation), other rea-
sons such as local politics, or some combination of influ-
ences. The cost of the siting process weighed against the
odds of success is understandably important. It is equally
important, however, to remember that, in every part of the
United States, there is an entity obliged to deliver electricity
reliably and at a just and reasonable rate. This obligation
does not account for business risk though first principles of
regulation call for utilities to be treated fairly by being given
the opportunity to collect adequate revenues for their ser-
vice. These entities must continue to try to build the facilities
they believe are needed.

THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the 1970s, electricity providers have increasingly

used the nation’s transmission networks for electricity trade
as well as for the traditional purpose of ensuring the reliabil-
ity of bulk power supplies. During the past decade, electric-
ity trade has increased very sharply, to the point that
congestion is now frequent in many locations and economi-
cally desirable trades must often be foregone to avoid load-
ing the transmission lines beyond prudent limits. 14 In

14
New tools for managing the grid may enable operators to maintain reliability
standards while reserving less transmission capacity for contingency flows. This
will relieve constraints in some areas at some times.
Appendices 181

addition, as the aggregate economic value of the trade en-

abled by the grids increases, the trade function becomes in-
creasingly important, and the two functions of maintaining
reliability and enabling trade tend to converge. From the
perspectives of transmission planning and operations, the
overall goal is now to facilitate trade while maintaining re-
liability.
Although many states do not now take electricity trade
into account when issuing permits for new transmission
capacity, this may change. In general, all levels of govern-
ment (federal, state, and local) have long since adopted the
policy premise that additional commerce enhances produc-
tivity and serves the public interest, assuming that the prices
for the goods and services involved accurately reflect real
costs. Attention to the externalities or dislocations that could
result from trade often leads to requirements for mitigation,
and in some cases to outright rejection of proposed additions
to an area’s infrastructure. Further, if insufficient attention is
given to adverse side effects of increased trade, the probabil-
ity of misallocated or excessive investment goes up mark-
edly. For example, excessive transmission investment could
be underutilized because of electrical stability concerns, or
excessive investment in local generation could cause genera-
tion to be “locked into” a region. A thoughtful assessment of
alternatives, as discussed in the section “Improving Agency
and Industry Practices,” on page E-31, helps to ensure the
broad vision necessary to consider all aspects of additional
electricity commerce in transmission planning and siting
processes.
In any case, given that the policy of favoring increased
trade has won broad acceptance, it seems likely that states
will increasingly acknowledge the contribution of electricity
commerce to the need for new transmission capacity. Given
the long-term and forward-looking nature of transmission
182 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

planning, planners should take into account likely future

trade requirements even if some jurisdictions in their area do
not now recognize trade as contributing to need. Some ana-
lysts note that the reliability benefits of transmission addi-
tions are typically distributed very broadly, and the costs of
such additions are usually recovered from all consumers
across a wide area; by contrast, the economic benefits of
increased commerce may be distributed much less evenly.
This means that different methods of cost allocation and
recovery may be appropriate, to the extent that a project is
needed to support electricity commerce.
Finally, it is apparent that, in general, the public will
benefit if the geographic markets across which bulk power
trade occurs and reliability is managed are large. This is
because large markets tend to be more diversified than small
markets, and greater diversity translates into both lower
market-clearing prices and lower-cost provision of reliability.
(See Issue Papers Transmission Planning and the Need for New
Capacity by E. Hirst and B. Kirby and Alternative Business
Models for Transmission Investment and Operation by S. Oren,
G. Gross, and F. Alvarado for additional analysis.)
The importance of thinking about bulk power markets
in terms of large multistate regions is widely recognized
(Fox-Penner, 2001; Bailey and Eaton, 2001; Costello, 2001;
O’Donnell, 2000; Stavros, 2000). However, efficient regional
markets will not evolve through market transactions alone.
Sustained, conscious efforts are needed to develop regional
institutions that will support the functioning of such mar-
kets. In its Order No. 2000, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) stressed the benefits of large markets; in
that and subsequent orders, FERC has emphasized the im-
portance of forming large Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions (RTOs). RTOs may be for-profit Independent
Transmission Companies (ITCs, also called TRANSCOs),
Appendices 183

nonprofit operators of transmission facilities owned by oth-

ers (Independent System Operators, or ISOs), or some hy-
brid of the two. (For extended analysis of RTOs, see Issue
Paper Alternative Business Models for Transmission Investment
and Operation by S. Oren, G. Gross, and F. Alvarado.) In
Order No. 2000, FERC sees large RTOs as essential mecha-
nisms for achieving several transmission objectives that are
very important to the public interest, including:

• Provision of nondiscriminatory transmission service to

all buyers and sellers in the market area,

• Economically efficient provision of ancillary services,

• Economically efficient assurance of reliability, and

• Regional transmission planning.

Many observers now believe that transmission grids can

be planned, built, maintained, and operated most efficiently
from a regional perspective. In addition, many are also con-
cerned that the existing state-based regime for siting and
permitting new transmission projects may not be well suited
to assessing proposals of regional importance. Some of the
issues raised are

• The societal costs and benefits of a regionally important

transmission project are seldom distributed evenly
across the area affected. Benefits tend to be distributed
broadly in the form of lower electricity prices, higher
reliability, and larger sales volumes for lower-cost elec-
tricity producers. By contrast, many costs are distrib-
uted narrowly along the route of the proposed line
where aesthetic vistas, real estate values, and land use
184 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

patterns are likely to be negatively affected. In addition,

the consumers who pay for the line through their elec-
tric bills may or may not be the same group of consum-
ers who benefit from increased reliability and access to
lower-cost generation.

———————————————————————————
A Case of a Failure to Communicate
The siting proceedings described below for a generation and trans-
mission project that had regional impact demonstrate how communica-
tion can go wrong among two states and a federal regulator, and how
ignoring a project’s regional dimensions in the early stages can cause
difficulties later.
In 1989, FERC granted the city of Jackson, Ohio, a license to con-
struct a hydro generation project on the Ohio River. AMP-Ohio, a whole-
sale power provider to 77 Ohio municipal utilities, joined the project as
a co-developer and helped finance the project. A decision was made to
site the project at Belleville, West Virginia, to take advantage of a West
Virginia law that exempted municipal hydro projects from state tax.
However, because the economic benefits of the Jackson project would go
mostly to retail consumers served by AMP-Ohio’s utility customers, con-
troversy arose in West Virginia where it appeared that citizens would
suffer environmental impacts but few economic benefits. Accordingly,
the West Virginia Senate passed a bill in 1994 removing the tax exemp-
tion for the project and threatening its economic viability. Although the
governor of West Virginia vetoed the bill, saying that it was unfair to
treat out-of-state municipalities differently from those of West Virginia,
an agreement was reached before the veto that the project sponsors
would make payments to West Virginia in lieu of taxes and that the
transmission line linking the hydro plant to the grid would be located
entirely wholly in Ohio even though that would approximately double
its length.
In 1996, Ohio regulators approved the transmission line, but Ohio
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) chair Craig Glazer filed a “concurring
opinion” strongly criticizing the review process and its outcome. Glazer
complained that Ohio was not consulted “in a meaningful way” when
AMP-Ohio negotiated its deal with the governor of West Virginia: “It is
indeed disingenuous for AMP-Ohio to reach an agreement with the West
Appendices 185

Virginia governor to site the line in Ohio and only then come to Ohio and
argue that any routes in West Virginia are not feasible and should not be
looked at in the siting process” (Electric Utility Week, 1996). Glazer ar-
gued that analyses showed “far more environmentally benign and cost-
effective routes through West Virginia for this line.” He criticized FERC,
which had approved the proposed hydro facility, saying that Ohio staff
had attempted to establish a joint siting and information sharing process
that “fell on deaf ears at the FERC staff level.” He continued, “Given
FERC’s utter lack of interest in such a cooperative effort, [Ohio’s] staff
did not pursue more formal requests” for cooperation. He added, “This
is a case study on how applicants, neighboring states, and an intervening
federal agency should not act” (ibid.).
Although there was a good faith effort to resolve the benefit alloca-
tion issue between Ohio and West Virginia in this case, the transmission
line was not considered at that time by AMP-Ohio, so the company was
vulnerable later to the assertion that it had struck an unscrupulous bar-
gain with the governor of West Virginia. PUC Chairperson Glazer noted
that some of these difficulties might have been foreseen at the time of the
original hydro licensing decision and could have been resolved in ad-
vance. Perhaps due in part to this case, Ohio recently adopted a stream-
lined, time-limited siting process that explicitly provides for cooperation
with other states and agencies on siting matters.
———————————————————————————

• At least one state is legally prohibited from considering

out-of-state benefits associated with projects under re-
view (Mississippi State Code 77-3-14). This constraint
could lead to rejection of regionally beneficial projects if
the intrastate benefits do not appear to exceed the intr-
astate costs.

• Even if a state is not legally prohibited from taking out-

of-state benefits into account, it may still not give these
benefits full weight when assessing a project.

• Existing siting processes vary significantly from state to

state. Approval may be required from federal agencies
186 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

charged with the management of public lands; this is

particularly frequent in the West. Permits for crossing
the lands of Native American tribes may also be needed.
Thus, the review process for a major interstate project is
almost certain to be complex. Institutional mechanisms
are needed to improve communication and coordination
among the various agencies that must approve a project
and to help develop common procedures and require-
ments to serve the needs of as many reviewing agencies
as possible.

The concerns noted above regarding the adequacy of the

existing state-based process for reviewing major interstate
transmission proposals have led some observers to conclude
that strong regional authorities are needed to organize re-
views and decide about siting and permitting of projects that
would have regional impacts. For example, see DOE (1998),
Recommendation #25: “Explore formation of regional regu-
latory authorities (RRAs) to provide an institutional focus on
interstate transmission enhancement needs, the avoidance of
increased regulatory burdens and the replacement of mul-
tiple siting and other authorities with single regional siting
authorities that are not subject to any state veto.” Note: This
recommendation was not supported unanimously.
The principal counterargument expressed by organiza-
tions representing state and local government agencies is
that as yet there is no compelling evidence that such far-
reaching changes are needed. In September, 2001, nine state
and local governmental organizations delivered a joint letter
to Senator Jeff Bingaman, chairman of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, objecting to Bingaman’s draft
legislation that would give the FERC a backstop role and
eminent domain authority with respect to siting new trans-
mission facilities. The nine organizations were the National
Appendices 187

Governors Association (NGA), the National Conference of

State Legislatures, the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, the Council of State Governments,
the National Association of Counties, the National Associa-
tion of Towns and Townships, the National Association of
State Energy Officials, the National Association of State Util-
ity Consumer Advocates, and the Association of State En-
ergy Research and Technology Transfer Institutions (Electric
Utility Week, 2001).
An examination of recent or current major transmission
projects does not yield conclusive answers about whether
strong new regional siting institutions are needed (as op-
posed to improvements to the existing state-based regime).
At a minimum, however, the record confirms that new
mechanisms and practices are needed to foster greater coor-
dination, cooperation, and timeliness among states, federal
agencies, and tribes that must review proposed major inter-
state transmission projects. Pertinent issues and policy op-
tions are discussed in the sections below.

Some Generic Considerations

Regarding the Regional Approach
Before discussing various possible formats for the de-
sign of regional siting institutions, it will be helpful to ad-
dress several background topics that pertain generically to
the regional approach.

Relationship between generation siting and transmission siting

Generation and transmission siting are inextricably re-
lated. The placement of new generation in relation to load
centers and transmission bottlenecks can increase or de-
crease the need for new transmission facilities. Regional or
state planning and siting officials must take these effects into
account.
188 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

In some areas of the country where natural gas is readily

available at low cost (e.g., the Gulf Coast), generation pro-
viders have filed applications for transmission interconnec-
tions for new generation well in excess of projected load
growth in the surrounding area.15 This generation would
serve more distant markets, and additional transmission ca-
pacity would probably be needed to enable the generators to
reach those markets. However, some parties assert that natu-
ral gas pipelines may be generally cheaper and less environ-
mentally intrusive than electric transmission lines, and most
analysts agree that new generation capacity should be built
as close as practicable to the load centers it serves.
Accordingly, when a new “long line” transmission facil-
ity is proposed, opponents may argue that the facility is not
needed because new generation could be built near the load
center. This would probably raise an evidentiary question
(i.e., one requiring formal examination) that would have to
be addressed before the question of the need for the trans-
mission facility could be resolved. Further, load centers tend
to be heavily urbanized areas; they may have air quality
problems; and they may lack the water supplies needed for
new generation. Without a thorough assessment of these is-
sues, decision-makers would find it difficult to answer the
question of the feasibility in economic and other terms of
building a sufficient quantity of new generation near the
load center. The need to consider other alternatives to new
transmission capacity (e.g. distributed generation)16 would
broaden the analytic requirements of the process even fur-
ther.

15
See, for example, comments presented by a Southern Company representative
at DOE’s workshop in Atlanta, September 26, 2001.
16
A further difficulty is that it takes time, once a need is identified, to combine the
many possible resources into a sound mitigating strategy.
Appendices 189

This complex of issues (the merits of local generation

and other local alternatives versus distant generation plus
transmission) has two significant implications:

(1) It increases the prospects for disagreement between or

among states concerning the need for new transmission
capacity and suggests that states should be cautious
about approving new generation capacity without in-
quiring whether such capacity may lead to transmission
congestion and the need for new transmission capacity
in neighboring states. The availability of new technolo-
gies for distributed generation and other technological
substitutes for new transmission will add fuel to this
debate. At a minimum, generation and transmission sit-
ing decisions increasingly require extensive communica-
tion and coordination among states across a region.

(2) It increases the need for open regional transmission

planning processes that will indicate to all affected par-
ties where and when new transmission capacity will be
needed, taking into account the siting of generation and
the economic cost and feasibility of alternatives to con-
ventional transmission facilities.

Promoting common processes among

reviewing agencies within a region
A regional institution could foster the development of
common processes that all reviewing agencies in the re-
gion—states, Native American tribes, and federal agencies—
could use to review transmission projects. The regional body
could facilitate development of common application require-
ments and timelines, joint interagency hearings, agreements
on the types of alternatives to be considered, and a single
record of decision for the project (see Conceptual Plans for
190 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Electricity Transmission in the West, 2001). These actions could

be accomplished with comparatively little infringement on
the authority of the reviewing agencies.

Improving coordination of the overall process in a region

Shortly after an application for siting of an interstate or
regionally significant transmission project has been filed
with one or more reviewing agencies, it would be beneficial
to have a joint meeting involving the applicant and all af-
fected reviewing agencies, including federal agencies and
Native American tribes, to identify possible points of diffi-
culty or disagreement and begin exploring possible solu-
tions. Although this meeting could be coordinated
informally under the existing state-based review regime, a
centralized regional organization could give the effort fo-
cused and pragmatic leadership without infringing on the
authority of the reviewing agencies.
Two current and controversial transmission siting
cases involving Minnesota and Wisconsin17 provide sup-
port for the view that the siting process for interstate
projects could be aided significantly if a cooperative re-
gional body were available to assist in coordinating the
process, and if regional transmission plans were available
to guide state agencies in considering questions related to
the need for new transmission facilities. In both of these
cases, the applicants contended that the lines were needed
primarily to maintain reliability in Wisconsin. The need is-
sue became a matter of debate in both cases, and resolu-

17
These are the 38-mile line from Chisago, Minnesota, to Apple River, Wisconsin,
and the roughly 230-mile line from Duluth, Minnesota, to Wausau, Wisconsin.
The latter has been approved by the state siting authorities, but is the subject of
an appeal in Minnesota. The former was withdrawn and is being redesigned
based on the results of a mediation process.
Appendices 191

tion of it might have gone more smoothly had a well-de-

veloped regional plan been available. As of this writing,
neither case is resolved.

Providing federal backstop authority

Some designs for regional institutions would give au-
thority for siting decisions to a board composed of represen-
tatives from the affected states (and perhaps federal and
tribal agencies as well). This raises the possibility of internal
disagreement; that is, the regional body might be unable to
reach a timely decision on whether a proposed transmission
project is needed or on the acceptability of a route for the
line. To deal with such cases, after a specified time period or
under specified conditions,18 a federal entity could be em-
powered to rule on the acceptability of the project at the
request of the applicant.19

———————————————————————————
Regional Transmission Planning and
Development of Cooperative Regional Institutions
Due to the geography of the western U.S., with its comparatively
long distances between cities and some of the natural resources used
in generating electricity, the western states have gained extensive expe-
rience with planning and siting interstate transmission projects. Re-
cently they have begun to develop an institutional framework under
the auspices of the Western Governors’ Association to aid them in
dealing with shared issues related to such projects. Much of this work
is being done through a body named the Committee for Regional Elec-
tric Power Cooperation (CREPC). CREPC was created in 1984 jointly

18
One possible condition would be the case of a regional transmission project
proposed in a state that declines to consider regional costs and benefits.
19
There are also proposals that would allow applicants to invoke federal backstop
authority if a regional entity did not exist and if a state siting agency was not able
to make a timely decision about a proposed transmission project.
192 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

by the Western Interstate Energy Board, which acts as the energy arm
of the Western Governors’ Association, and the Western Conference of
Public Service Commissions. CREPC has representation from the regu-
latory commissions, energy agencies, and facility siting agencies in the
11 states and two Canadian provinces in the Western Interconnection.
Through CREPC, the western states have begun negotiations to de-
velop a common interstate transmission siting protocol, and are aiming
at June 2002 as a target date for a publishable draft.
One of the roadblocks to the formation of comparable institutions
in the Eastern Interconnection is the lack of a clear and urgent agenda.
That is, without either well-developed regional transmission plans or a
collection of actual regional-scale transmission proposals, it is not obvi-
ous which states and federal land management agencies need to be talk-
ing with each other about what issues. Rather than wait for RTOs to be
established and for transmission plans to be developed by them under
FERC’s direction, an interim approach could be considered. DOE and the
FERC could jointly identify key transmission bottlenecks, and FERC
could task administrative law judges to work with appropriate parties in
each bottleneck area to prepare interim transmission plans. By putting
the emphasis on the power of persuasion, such a process would be non-
threatening, which would help to elicit constructive responses from
stakeholders. The resulting plans would probably flag some important
issues affecting groups of states, and thus help to spur the formation of
cooperative regional institutions.
———————————————————————————

The prospect that jurisdiction over a project might pass

to a backstop agency after the case proceeds for a certain
amount of time could motivate a voting majority of a stale-
mated regional body to reject the proposal as incomplete
before the backstop provision tolls, perhaps in the hope that
it would be resubmitted in a form that would win broader
support. Further, an agency subject to backstop provisions
might be more insistent on the range and detail of alterna-
tives addressed in the initial application, to increase the odds
of finding an alternative to which it could say “yes” within
the time limit and/or give itself more grounds upon which
Appendices 193

to declare an application incomplete if necessary.20 In the

end, backstop provisions—linked to time limits keyed to a
finding that the application meets a specified standard of
completeness—would likely lead to the filing of more com-
plete applications and would impose some discipline on re-
viewing agencies to act within predictable time periods.

———————————————————————————
Why Not Just Centralize Transmission Siting Under FERC?
There are obvious challenges in coordinating and harmonizing the
views of affected states, local governments, tribal bodies, and federal
agencies about proposed transmission facilities. Many observers and
industry participants have asked whether it would not be better to enact
federal legislation making FERC responsible for transmission siting de-
cisions—particularly because FERC already exercises this function with
respect to the siting of natural gas pipelines. Here are some important
considerations:

1. Except for areas served by TVA or the federal power marketing

administrations, transmission siting is presently a matter of state
responsibility. Pre-empting the states and centralizing transmission
siting under a federal agency would be a major change, and it is
unlikely to win broad acceptance as an appropriate solution to
today’s siting challenges until less radical measures have been tried
and found insufficient.

2. Despite the overarching importance of maintaining the adequacy

and reliability of the grid, “all transmission siting is local.” Fitting
a proposed facility into a landscape where the affected land areas
are already used for a wide variety of legitimate purposes will

20
Note that in the case of AEP’s controversial Wyoming-Cloverdale proposal, the
West Virginia Public Service Commission (which must rule upon an application
within 400 days or else it is automatically approved) at one point rejected AEP’s
application as incomplete and advised AEP not to resubmit its proposal until
after the Forest Service had completed its draft environmental impact statement.
Resubmitting the proposal would restart the 400-day clock, and the PSC appar-
ently wanted the clock to start after the Forest Service had issued its impact state-
ment.
194 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

never be easy. Doing this job well will always require an immense
amount of information from local, state, and regional sources, as
well as consultation and negotiation with and among many of these
parties. Transferring transmission siting responsibility to a single
federal agency could mean over-centralization, resulting in delays,
hasty, or poor decisions, or all three.

3. The existing process for siting natural gas pipelines is not necessar-
ily a model to be emulated. Critics emphasize that some pipeline
siting cases have also dragged on for years, and assert that the
process is not sufficiently predictable. They also complain that most
events in the process take place in Washington, D.C., and argue that
this imposes a substantial burden on many participants, and effec-
tively precludes participation by others.

4. Improved coordination of federal agency reviews of transmission

proposals would continue to be a major concern, even if siting re-
sponsibility were centralized at FERC. However, this problem can
be addressed without centralization.

5. As indicated in many places in this report, the FERC already faces

a long agenda of important and urgent matters related to establish-
ing and maintaining effective competition in the nation’s bulk
power markets. Many of these matters, in practical terms, can only
be addressed by FERC—there is no other credible candidate. In the
case of transmission siting, however, the states still want to do the
job.
———————————————————————————

A stronger but much more controversial formulation of

the backstop concept that has been proposed by some in the
electric industry would be to empower the applicant to ap-
peal to the backstop agency when a reviewing agency acts
within the allotted time but rejects the application. This ver-
sion would be much resisted by the reviewing agencies be-
cause it makes the state process appear less important to the
ultimate decision on the application. It is also unclear how
this structure would actually change the nature of the review
process. It might make it more difficult for a reviewer to say
Appendices 195

“no” to an applicant, knowing that the applicant could turn

to the backstop agency for a second opinion, or it might
tempt a reviewer to reject a controversial project anticipating
that the backstop agency may be more willing to take any
political heat associated with approving the project. A perni-
cious effect on the behavior of applicants could be the emer-
gence, at least in some cases, of “forum shopping.” That is,
some applicants could become less responsive to the con-
cerns of the reviewing agencies and less willing to spend
money to address their concerns, knowing that if they got a
rejection they could turn to the backstop agency.
Over time, the criteria and standards used by the back-
stop agency would tend to become definitive for all review-
ing agencies, perhaps making the role and powers of the
backstop agency more important than the drafters of the
backstop provisions had realized or intended.

Responsiveness to local concerns

A frequent criticism of the regional approach, especially
if it is combined with federal backstop authority, is that a
regional or federal body will not be sufficiently responsive to
local concerns. To address this issue, a regional or federal
body could be required to hold extensive local public hear-
ings and weigh the concerns expressed at these hearings
against regional and national ones. Historically, many re-
gional federal entities (e.g., the Bonneville Power Adminis-
tration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, regional offices of
the Environmental Protection Agency) have proven to be
very responsive to local concerns (sometimes to the conster-
nation of officials in Washington, D.C.).

Should regional bodies be empowered to

provide advisory opinions only?
Giving regional entities the power to counsel but not
196 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

decide would have the advantage of enabling a panel of

experts to provide an objective assessment of a proposed
project from a regional perspective without infringing
upon the reviewing agencies’ powers of decision. The re-
viewing agencies would be under some pressure to explain
decisions not compatible with a regional body’s advisory
opinion. The disadvantage of this approach is that it fur-
ther complicates rather than simplifies the institutional
landscape for transmission siting. Many parties are
strongly opposed to adding new layers to siting proce-
dures or electricity regulation.

Risk of jurisdictional confusion

If a regional siting body were established, states in the
area would still likely retain jurisdiction for some new trans-
mission projects, depending on the definition of “regionally
significant” used to identify the projects over which the new
body would have jurisdiction. If the definition relied on clear
empirical criteria (e.g., “all transmission projects of 230 kV or
higher”), the jurisdictional boundaries would probably be
clear, but there would still be some practical difficulties with
the empirical approach. (See the section “Defining ‘Regional
Transmission Facilities,’” on page E-25, for further discus-
sion.)

Risk of “forum shopping”

An applicant might deliberately design a project to fall
into one jurisdictional category rather than the other, e.g., so
that the body that the applicant perceived to be most favor-
ably disposed would review the project. This might in some
way disserve the public interest. As long as both reviewing
bodies are reasonably well conceived and well run (and
these are not trivial requirements), the public interest should
be adequately served.
Appendices 197

NEPA reviews
If a regional body with siting authority included some
representatives of federal agencies, this raises the question of
what level of federal involvement would trigger the require-
ment for an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). If a decision by the regional body would sup-
plant the need for an independent review of the project by
one or more federal agencies, it seems likely that the regional
body would have to conduct an environmental assessment.
Depending on the results of the assessment, an impact state-
ment might be required. In general, major new transmission
projects usually have significant environmental impacts; in
such cases, if federal decisions are required, full environmen-
tal impact statements must be prepared.

Alternative Designs for Regional Siting Institutions

There are at least five basic designs that might be con-
sidered for regional siting institutions, and many possible
hybrids among the basic models. The discussion below fo-
cuses on the principal distinctions among the five basic
models and is not intended to be exhaustive.

Cooperative agreements
A cooperative agreement would establish a regional
entity for the mutual convenience of participating states,
tribes, or federal agencies; the participating agencies would
not cede any existing authority or responsibility to the re-
gional institution. The regional institution’s functions would
be limited to activities such as fostering common siting pro-
cesses and requirements and improving coordination among
members to streamline review of regionally significant trans-
mission facilities. Members would probably find it useful to
agree on a category of facilities that would fall under the
198 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

entity’s purview, and they would have to agree on how to

staff and fund the institution. The parties could begin by
establishing a cooperative agreement that would apply only
to one specific major case and then decide on the basis of
that experience whether to continue to proceed case by case
or to establish a standing agreement.

Interstate compacts
An interstate compact is an agreement among or be-
tween states to establish an institution that has the power to
act for all of them in a specific area. Establishing an interstate
compact is a complex process, especially if more than a few
states are involved. The legislature of each participating state
and the U.S. Congress must approve the compact’s founding
agreement.
For a compact on transmission siting, many states might
have to enact legislation to authorize their public utility com-
missions (PUCs) to cede specific authority to the regional
body or to share authority or provide guidance to the com-
mission concerning the circumstances under which it should
defer to the regional body. The founding agreement would
have to define the class of transmission facilities that would
be subject to the commission’s jurisdiction and establish how
the commission would be staffed and funded.
Agreements for compacts typically specify that the gov-
ernors of the participating states will appoint the compact’s
commissioners. Voting representation on a compact commis-
sion tends to be controversial because of differences in the
sizes of states and how to set each state’s share (e.g., based
on population or contribution to gross domestic product) as
well as the likelihood that some states would probably be
more affected by the commission’s activities than others.
Smaller states tend to prefer one-state, one-vote structures so
as not to be overruled by larger states.
Appendices 199

Interstate compacts have been established for many

purposes, and some have been much more successful than
others. They ultimately depend on cooperation and goodwill
among the member states. If states are strongly at odds on an
issue, a compact commission may find it difficult to solve the
problem. Conceivably, a provision for federal backstop au-
thority could be included in the founding agreement to deal
with potential stalemates.
Another possible problem with the compact model in
the current context is that federal agencies are not subject to
interstate compacts. Cooperative agreements could be de-
vised between a compact commission and appropriate fed-
eral agencies, but the arrangement would be comparatively
informal. Another question is whether the founding agree-
ment could be fashioned to facilitate participation by Native
American tribes.

Independent regional entities

The independent regional entity model offers consider-
able flexibility (regional authorities have been established
through federal legislation to address a wide range of prob-
lems).21 Affected agencies (state, tribal, or federal) would
have to agree on a conceptual design for a regional authority
that would accomplish their common purposes, and then
appropriate federal legislation would have to be crafted and
enacted to serve those purposes. This approach requires the
support of most of the affected states, but it is significantly
less formal than the process for establishing an interstate
compact.
Presumably, a board of commissioners would head a
regional authority, and the enabling statute would set the
21
This model probably comes closest to accommodating the intent of the Task
Force on Electric System Reliability to the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board in
its Recommendation #25. (See DOE 1998).
200 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

criteria for appointment to the board. One approach would

be to use the siting boards that currently exist in some states
as a model, with commissioners from relevant state and fed-
eral agencies or tribal institutions nominated by governors,
tribal authorities, or the President.22 Thus, this model accom-
modates federal participation more readily than an interstate
compact. The designers of the new entity would have to
decide how best to balance federal and state interests, par-
ticularly with respect to voting powers and whether there
would be federal backstop authority.
As with the other models, designers would have to
define the class of transmission facilities subject to the new
entity’s jurisdiction and establish a funding mechanism. If
the new entity were to have final siting authority on behalf
of federal agencies, the enabling legislation would have to
amend the enabling laws for those agencies. Similarly, state
legislatures would have to make appropriate changes to
their respective siting laws. A sunset provision could be in-
cluded to ensure future review of the need for and effective-
ness of the new entity.

Joint federal-state boards

Although there are precedents in the telecommunica-
tions sector for the establishment of joint regulatory boards,
this model has not been used in electricity regulation despite
periodic expressions of interest by the National Association
of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC) and various states.
Further, the relevance of this structure to transmission siting,
at least under existing law, is at best uncertain.
Section 209(a) of the Federal Power Act authorizes FERC
22
A critical design element would the process for removal of commissioners from
the regional board. Serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority is quite
different from serving for a distinct term, for example. Another significant matter
to address is how such an organization would be staffed.
Appendices 201

to refer an electricity matter under its jurisdiction to a joint

state board composed of nominees selected by the respective
state utility commissions or by the state’s governor if there is
no state commission. A joint board is to have the same
power, duties, and liabilities as a commissioner at FERC who
has been directed by FERC to hold hearings. Thus, a joint
board for an electricity matter, assuming unanimity among
its members, would be equivalent to a sixth commissioner at
FERC with respect to FERC decisions on the matter.23
However, under current law, FERC has no jurisdiction
over transmission siting, so it would have no basis upon
which to call for the establishment of a joint board to address
transmission siting issues.

Regional FERC offices

FERC could be directed through federal legislation to

25
The full text of Section 209(a) reads:
[FERC] may refer any matter arising in the administration of this Part to a
board to be composed of a member or members, as determined by the
Commission, from the State or each of the States affected or to be affected by
such matter. Any such board shall be vested with the same power and be
subject to the same duties and liabilities as in the case of a member of the
Commission when designated by the Commission to hold any hearings. The
action of such board shall have such force and effect and its proceedings
shall be conducted in such manner as the Commission shall by regulations
prescribe. The board shall be appointed by the Commission from persons
nominated by the State commission of each state affected, or by the Gover-
nor of such State if there is no State commission. Each State affected shall be
entitled to the same number of representatives on the board unless the nomi-
nating power of such state waives such right. The Commission shall have
discretion to reject the nominee from any State, but shall thereupon invite a
new nomination from that state. The members of a board shall receive such
allowances for expenses as the Commission shall provide. The Commission
may, when in its discretion sufficient reason exists therefore, revoke any
reference to such a board.
202 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

establish offices in each RTO’s area; each office could be

made responsible for transmission siting and rate regulation
within the region. Such legislation could limit FERC’s re-
gional activities to matters such as hearings before adminis-
trative law judges and staff reviews of siting applications
and could reserve final decision authority to the commission.
The legislation could also direct FERC regarding the creation
of regional joint state boards on transmission siting, the
weight to be given to decisions by such boards, and how
FERC’s siting decisions should take into account the views
and expertise of other federal agencies and Native American
tribes.

DEFINING “REGIONAL TRANSMISSION FACILITIES”

If regional transmission siting entities were established,

the category of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of these
bodies would probably need to be defined. The subsections
below address possible criteria for this definition and the
institutional context in which they might be applied.

Objective Criteria
One way to define the transmission facilities that would
fall under the jurisdiction of a regional siting body is to use
objective indices, such line voltage or length or whether the
line would cross state boundaries. Although these criteria
may sound reasonable, they may not always yield the ex-
pected results. For example, in some sparsely populated ar-
eas, lines that serve transmission functions may be
comparatively low voltage; conversely, in some densely
populated areas, distribution lines may be designed for eco-
nomic reasons to operate at high voltages. Another example
is that a facility may be used in part for transmission and in
Appendices 203

part for distribution purposes. One way to deal with prob-

lems of this kind is to create a definition based on objective
criteria with a mechanism that would allow an affected party
to petition for a waiver, based on demonstrating that the
criteria should not be applied in a specific case.24

Functional Tests
An alternative for defining the jurisdiction of a regional
body is to apply functional tests that gauge whether a facil-
ity would be used primarily or wholly for transmission and
define the degree of its expected contribution to the reliabil-
ity of the regional grid. A significant objection to this ap-
proach is its lack of transparency—applying it could require
hearing and evaluating evidence before a decision could be
made about whether a proposed facility is regionally signifi-
cant.

Economic Test
An economic test could be devised to estimate the prob-
able economic benefits that a line would provide for con-
sumers over a given period through either improved access
to lower-cost generation or mitigation of potential market
power. This estimate could be compared to an agreed-upon
threshold for determining regionally significant projects.
This approach might also require gathering and evaluating
evidence.
In short, there are no easy, straightforward criteria.
However, determining the criteria would be more impor-
tant in some institutional contexts than others. For ex-

24
Many states currently use objective criteria (such as voltage and line length) to
determine whether transmission distribution projects need state approval.
Projects that do not meet the defined threshold in these states still have to meet
local zoning, safety, and other requirements, but they do not have to go through
the full state siting review process.
204 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ample, if the institution’s principal function is to facilitate

cooperation among the reviewing agencies in the region, if
the agencies retain their existing authority, and if no fed-
eral backstop mechanism is established, then no jurisdic-
tional changes would result from the designation of a
project as a “regional project.” A “regional project” would
be channeled through the regional cooperative process, but
no other changes would ensue. As a result, the criteria for
determining a regional project would be less important
(and less likely to be the focus of litigation) than if desig-
nation as “regional” would mean that a project might un-
der certain conditions be shifted onto a federal
jurisdictional track. As long as jurisdiction would not be
affected, the most important choice the reviewing agencies
would have to make could be whether they wanted to
channel all transmission projects through the regional
body, or only a subset of projects deemed to have regional
significance.
By contrast, if the regional institution was given the
power to decide siting questions, the scope of its jurisdiction
would be much more important, and the founding parties
would probably wish to define criteria for jurisdiction very
carefully. Similarly, if a federal backstop mechanism were
created by federal legislation, the legislation would probably
have to address jurisdiction. One approach would be to side-
step the criteria altogether and specify that under certain
conditions (e.g., failure of a reviewing agency to act within
a specified period, or rejection by a reviewing agency of an
RTO-approved transmission project), the applicant could
petition the backstop agency to take the case. Another alter-
native would be for the legislation to direct the backstop
agency to conduct a rulemaking procedure to establish ap-
propriate criteria for identifying transmission projects of re-
gional or national importance.
Appendices 205

IMPROVING THE EXISTING

STATE-BASED SITING PROCESS

Regardless of how the debate evolves over whether re-

gional or federal authorities should be responsible for certain
aspects of transmission siting, states will continue to be re-
sponsible for siting a large proportion of the nation’s new
transmission facilities. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider
how the state-based siting process could be improved.
Transmission proposals fall typically into one or more of
three categories:
• Those needed to connect a new generator to the grid,
• Those needed to meet reliability standards, and
• Those needed to enable increased electricity trade.
Some projects are very small in geographic scope; others
extend for hundreds or even thousands of miles.25
Although there is debate about the scope of possible
federal or regional responsibilities for transmission siting,
state authorities will continue to review dozens of transmis-
sion or transmission-related proposals each year, and re-
sponsibility for siting generation is likely to remain with the
states. Similarly, most legislative proposals that would shift
some jurisdiction for transmission siting away from states
(e.g., transfer a “backstop” authority to FERC) nonetheless
leave states with the primary authority for this function.
State-based transmission siting processes vary considerably
across the U.S., and, for the most part, worthy projects are
approved, and deficient projects are discouraged, improved,

25
A recent proposal (not yet filed at a siting authority) would build approximately
2,000 miles of transmission lines to connect new coal generation in Wyoming
with load centers in Chicago and Los Angeles.
206 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

or rejected. Most transmission projects are intrastate and

small in scale.
Even successful siting cases may have shortcomings,
and some cases illustrate recurrent criticisms of state-based
transmission siting that warrant attention. Some observers
believe that the cases that could have been handled better
represent exceptions to a basically sound system. Others see
these cases as symptomatic of a need for fundamental
changes.

Accountability
Any system of regulation must have and retain public
confidence. Generally, regulators earn public confidence by
being fair, competent, and consistent over time. In the
United States, the general practice is to assign responsibility
for regulation to the level of government that can most effec-
tively serve and protect the interests of the citizens affected.
This practice allows local conditions and differences to be
reflected in regulatory decisions, and non-local consider-
ations can be taken into account when appropriate.

Improvements to Siting Processes

State laws governing transmission siting are the product
of serious debate among elected officials. Likewise, state sit-
ing decisions are the products of a careful weighing of evi-
dence in light of public policy expressed in statutes.
Although state siting laws and processes have been consci-
entiously developed, improvements may be needed to main-
tain a reliable and adequate electricity grid. Some possible
changes are discussed below.

“One-stop” siting process

Some states place the authority for considering trans-
mission siting proposals in a single agency, which may be
Appendices 207

the state regulatory utility commission or a siting board

made up of decision makers from several government de-
partments. This structure makes accountability for siting
decisions clear, and it enables applicants to become famil-
iar with a single process. If local authorities have a role in
the approval process, it is important that the state be able
to impose on all local reviewers a common, statewide per-
spective regarding the regulated utility system.26
Interstate projects would be eligible for one-stop treat-
ment only if the affected states combined their efforts into
a regional siting process. This principle has many support-
ers, but the procedural requirements would be very de-
manding; the authors are aware of no successful attempt
at a voluntary, one-stop, multi-state siting process.27 The
dilemma for states is often thought to be whether the state
siting authority should focus exclusively on protecting the
state’s interests or should take an expansive view and con-
sider regional interests. This is a false choice. The long-
term interests of most consumers are best served by
addressing regional grid needs while accounting for state
interests at the same time.28

26
For example, recent legislation passed in Colorado modified the standing of
local authorities in transmission siting matters. The PUC can now pre-empt
the decision of local authorities if there is a compelling state interest.
27
Ohio has a statute that explicitly authorizes its transmission siting authority
to cooperate with other states, but this process has yet to be tested. The west-
ern states have begun negotiations concerning a common interstate siting pro-
tocol for the west, which could result in something like a regional one-stop
process.
28
There are many examples of state siting orders that make a special effort to
acknowledge the importance of regional concerns. There are also examples
that do the opposite.
208 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

———————————————————————————
Three Views of State-Based Siting
Three organizations with distinctly different perspectives about
U.S. electricity policy are the Western Governors’ Association, the Edison
Electric Institute, and the Electricity Consumers Alliance. Although
many parties have views about how to change the transmission siting
process, the views of these organizations illustrate that there is a broad
range of opinions.
The Western Governors’ Association (WGA) is a policy forum serv-
ing 18 western states, including Alaska and Hawaii. The organization
has a long-standing interest in transmission siting and energy policy. The
WGA position is:

• Transmission expansion should support three key priorities: en-

hance reliability, reduce consumers’ costs, and promote fuel source
diversity.

• Need should be established using regional criteria.

• Siting should remain the responsibility of the states.

• The states should collaborate in the review of interstate transmis-

sion projects, and federal land management agencies should join
this collaboration.

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is a trade association that represents

the interests of investor-owned electric utilities. The EEI position is:

• States should have a limited amount of time to review any trans-

mission project.

• If a state rejects a project or does not rule within the allotted time,
FERC should be authorized to take the case as it stands and rule
upon it within a specific time period.

• Other EEI recommendations concerning federal land management

agencies focus on enhancing coordination and attention to dead-
lines in agency reviews of siting proposals.
Appendices 209

The Electric Consumers Alliance (ECA) addresses electricity policy is-

sues nationally and in key states on behalf of small consumers and their
local organizations. The ECA position is:

• Determination of need for new transmission should be made by a

regional transmission organization.

• Federal, state, and local reviews should take no more than 12 to 18

months.

• Reviews by more than one agency within a single state should be

combined. Similarly, reviews by more than one federal agency
should be combined.

• If federal or state reviews are not complete after the allotted time,
FERC should take and rule on the case.

• The rights of individuals must be respected in the siting process.

Sources: The Western Governors’ Association published its views in Conceptual Plans for
Electricity Transmission in the West, 2001). The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is a trade
association for investor-owned electric utilities. EEI’s views were conveyed to the authors
in a personal conversation with Rich Loughery and Henry Bartholomew. The Electric
Consumers Alliance (ECA) represents hundreds of rural, senior, low-income, small-busi-
ness, minority and other consumer organizations. ECA conveyed its views at a DOE public
hearing on September 28, 2001.
———————————————————————————

States will also need to address the allocation of costs

for a regionally justified transmission project. An RTO or a
tightly operated ISO29 will administer this matter once the
project is built but typically does not have an active role at
the project review stage. If there is a problem with the allo-
cation of costs and benefits among states and their consum-
ers, these money matters should be negotiated under

29
A tightly operated pool is one that controls and dispatches all the generators to
reduce overall costs, and internalizes numerous cost allocation decisions in its
rate structure.
210 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

pressure from regulators (as they often are in natural gas

open-season proceedings).30 Siting authorities can send sig-
nals to developers and allow reasonable time for proposals
to be adjusted to address such concerns. Authorities can also
encourage project planners to address this subject with
stakeholders and the public before an application is filed.
Ex parte rules control how information flows to and
from the regulatory body; they are intended ensure a fair
process free of abuses by parties who have ready access to
decision makers. The evidentiary basis for an order should
be clear from the record. However, ex parte rules can hinder
the management of siting dockets and negotiations with the
applicant or other reviewing agencies by shielding the siting
authority from valuable insights more likely to emerge in
conversation than in cross-examination. Beyond speaking
through their orders, regulators can find ways to communi-
cate constructive information in a fair way, using methods
such as workshops, special masters and other alternative
dispute resolution methods, written questions to the parties,
status orders, etc.

Maximum time limits

Most transmission siting proposals are small in scale
and are reviewed and acted on by the relevant state author-
ity within a year. Larger projects attract more attention from
intervenors, are more complex, and may take longer. In some
protracted cases, the siting authority may, because of reluc-
tance to reject a project that appears to have merit but needs
modification before it can be approved, allow the applicant
time to correct deficiencies that emerge during the proceed-
ing.

30
The April 2001 Connecticut Siting Council decision to reject the Cross Sound
Cable project included a warning, presumably directed at successor proposals
regarding the allocation of costs as compared to the expected benefits.
Appendices 211

In general, however, siting authorities should strive to

maintain schedules and avoid delays. Among other things,
this means not allowing opponents of a project to hold up
the process. Opponents must have a fair opportunity to
gather information and present a case but should not be al-
lowed to take control of the calendar. The project proponent
can help prevent this kind of delay by presenting a credible
array of alternatives so that opposing parties cannot obstruct
proceedings by calling for inquiries into reasonable alterna-
tives that have not been addressed in the proposal.31
As an alternative to allowing the siting review calendar
to be based on judgment calls, some states impose a time
limit on the process. However, if a time limit is to have a
positive effect, the time allowed must be sufficient for a re-
view that will meet public expectations for thoroughness
and fairness. A very tight time limit can too frequently put
the authority in the difficult position of nearing the deadline
with inadequate evidence to find in favor of a project. A
system that frequently results in rejections on procedural
grounds or approvals by default is not a good system.
A recurrent complaint from prospective applicants is
that siting processes without time limits are too unpredict-
able. For example, unpredictable time frames can negatively
affect project financing; an applicant may be reluctant to
spend the money to develop a proposal and support it
through the approval process unless it is reasonably certain
that it will be able to obtain financing for the construction
phase of the project. However, potential financial backers
may be unwilling or unable to address the financial details
of a project if they do not know when construction might

31
Of course, if there is a superior alternative, the process must accommodate it.
Proponents of transmission projects should do their best to ensure that there are
no superior alternatives and expect the review process to ratify that view.
212 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

begin or be completed, and a project tied up in a protracted

review is more likely to be adversely affected by ongoing
changes in bulk power markets. Reasonable time limits on
transmission siting processes would help dispel the uncer-
tainty that appears to hamper many business decisions in
the transmission sector.32

Clarify approval criteria

Fortunately, many transmission proposals that come
before siting authorities address unambiguous needs to im-
prove reliability or to respond to growth. The difficult cases
are ones in which the facts do not line up well with the
approval criteria, or the criteria themselves are inadequate
for the specific situation. States should examine the approval
criteria in their siting statutes in light of the significant
changes occurring in bulk power markets (see “The Regional
Perspective,” on page E-13). In addition, when a case ex-
poses a weakness in the statute, this should be addressed by
the state legislature as soon as possible.33

Cost recovery rules and grid investment needs

Utility costs cannot be recovered from consumers with-
out rate proceedings. Many utilities’ rates are frozen or
capped for long periods as part of a regulatory agreement, as
imposed by a legislature in electric restructuring laws, or for
punitive reasons. Without performance incentives or the
opportunity to recover extraordinary costs, a utility may
decide to avoid major investments even when they are

32
A complete proposal, based on standards established by statute and rule, is key
to making a time limit work. Until a proposal is complete, the “clock” should not
start.
33
Legislators are sometimes reluctant to “open up” a statute for fear that others
will take the opportunity to press for other changes. This concern must be bal-
anced against the need to update an important process.
Appendices 213

needed. When considering rate freezes and caps, regulators

and legislators should consider the horizon of prospective
utility investments and consider whether a cap will stifle
important projects.34

Federal incentives for state changes

In some instances, state siting processes based on an
accumulation of law and precedent may no longer be ad-
equate to address the challenges associated with the current
restructuring of the U.S. electricity industry.35
Given the arcane nature of transmission siting and the
potentially difficult political challenge of updating the siting
process, the federal government may be able to facilitate
needed change by means of incentives.
Federal sponsorship of workshops and development of
model legislation are worthwhile approaches; another initia-
tive that has significant support would put the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission in a backstop role to state
siting authorities. This approach, which would require
changes in federal law, would give FERC siting jurisdiction
over proposed “regional transmission facilities” (See section
on “Defining ‘Regional Transmission Facilities,’” above) if

34
Utilizing traditional regulatory tools like Construction Work in Progress ac-
counts or simply booking and deferring costs for future regulatory treatment can
provide utilities with assurance that they will recover the costs of needed trans-
mission investment incurred during a rate cap, including a reasonable return on
investment after the end of the rate cap. However, if the cap is part of a perfor-
mance ratemaking plan, and the utility has accepted the risk that such costs may
be needed during the period of the plan, then asset depreciation would start
normally, and the utility could include the depreciated costs in the consideration
of post-plan rates. In this latter case, utilities would still have incentives to pur-
sue cost-effective transmission investments because efficiency improvements in-
ure, at least in part, to the utility’s profits in performance based ratemaking.
35
This subject requires extensive analysis and lends itself to the “best practices”
project discussed below in “Federal Assistance.”
214 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

affected states fail to act within a specified period.36 Many

observers expect that if FERC had this role, most states
would intensify and coordinate their efforts and complete
reviews in time to avoid an unwanted change of venue to
the backstop authority.
An approach that some observers find less aggressive
would be for federal law to support or assist the formation
of cooperative regional bodies composed of officials from
affected states; these regional bodies could be convened to
coordinate the review of regionally significant transmission
proposals. (This idea is explored in the section “The Regional
Perspective,” above.) These regional institutions could be
aided by findings of need from the soon-to-be-formed RTOs.
The question of what authority states should retain in future
siting processes is currently stalemated between advocates
of state authority and proponents of federal authority.

IMPROVING AGENCY AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES

Not all barriers to siting of new transmission lines are

related to the state-based review process. Some delays and
rejections result from omissions or other types of problems
with transmission proposals or with the practices of trans-
mission owners.
The subsections below address changes in practice by
prospective transmission siting applicants that could im-
prove the quality of regulatory outcomes. This section also

36
FERC backstop authority could also be exercised if state siting authorities ad-
dressing a regionally important multistate project disagree on whether the
project should be permitted. This is different from a trigger based on a time
deadline because in this case the states would have executed their responsibili-
ties. FERC could determine whether some compromise or blending of interests
among the affected states would be possible.
Appendices 215

turns attention to the federal government, addressing sit-

ing on federal lands, siting by federal utilities, and other
actions the federal government can take to improve siting
results.
The subjects in this section are linked by improving
methods, utilizing existing methods better, more effectively
deploying new methods, and communicating among all af-
fected parties more effectively. A positive outcome would
be one in which the transmission owners’ interest and the
public interest are better aligned than they appear to be
today.

Effective Presentation of Alternatives

Transmission siting proposals are complex, especially
for large-scale projects designed to improve reliability or
enable increased energy transfers over wide regions. To aid
decision makers in making a sound choice about whether to
permit a project (and to prevent critics from derailing a
project by shifting attention to other options), a proposal
should include a detailed presentation of the alternatives
considered.37

Alternatives enhance credibility and public confidence

A proposal that presents and compares alternatives
shows that the proponent is focused on meeting a system
need in the best way, not on getting a particular project built.
Addressing alternatives shows the applicant’s confidence
that the proposal represents the best approach to meeting a
system need. This approach can be aided by undertaking an
open planning process once a need has been recognized but
before a solution is selected; the public should be engaged in

37
This is not usually a concern for transmission that will interconnect a generator
with the grid.
216 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

this process to assist the transmission company in combining

its own and public interest priorities in the decision pro-
cess.38 This process improvement should not be used, how-
ever, as a way to shift the responsibility to develop
alternatives to intervenors. Many permitting agencies al-
ready require that proposals include alternatives. Agencies
that do not should consider adding this requirement as an
investment to speed the overall process.

Range of alternatives must be broad

Even when an applicant presents alternatives, the range
addressed may be too narrow. Efforts to define a generic list
of alternatives that should be addressed are difficult because
of the inherent variety of grid needs and circumstances. In-
stead of mechanically addressing a list of required alterna-
tives, an applicant will likely fare better by determining
what alternative routes or alternatives to transmission are
likely to be considered relevant by the regulators and poten-
tial intervenors and addressing these options in detail. (The
applicant will readily learn about these alternatives during a
transparent planning process.)
If important alternatives are not evaluated in the pro-
posal, they are likely to be introduced by public advocates or
other intervenors who may assert that the alternatives repre-
sent a better approach than the proposed project.39 It is also
worth adding that a transmission line serves no other pur-

38
Southwestern Public Service, then a subsidiary of New Century Energies, con-
ducted such an open process in building a transmission line in Kansas. As a
result the Kansas Corporation Commission approved the segment of the project
in its state despite the lack of direct and immediate benefit to Kansas. (Personal
communications with Mark Doljac, Kansas Corporation Commission.)
39
An example is a transmission project in New Mexico that was rejected after
local generation and efficiency alternatives were proposed by the state Attorney
General and other intervenors.
Appendices 217

pose than to conduct power, but other options such as in-

creasing energy efficiency, managing load, and constructing
local generation, may have distinct, positive externalities in
the community while also contributing to reliability. Fran-
chised wires companies are usually concerned with the gen-
eral economic well-being of their service areas, so they have
reason to consider a broad range of potentially beneficial
local investments.

Advantages of Open Planning

A frustration that is sometimes expressed in the midst
of a transmission siting dispute goes something like this:
“If only the applicant had spoken with us before going
public with the proposal. Now both sides are digging in
for a fight.” Costly proposals to build new lines sometimes
seem to come out of the blue because needs are not articu-
lated ahead of time, if ever; once a transmission corridor is
proposed, land owners and other interested parties may
feel as if set upon by a powerful force. It does not have to
be this way. Although some parties will oppose power line
proposals regardless of the circumstances, others may be
moved to oppose a project not so much because of its con-
tent but because of perceptions that the proponent is be-
having in an arrogant or paternalistic fashion or making a
unilateral decision. Despite the costs of regular reports to
the public about the state of the transmission grid and its
expected needs, it is in the interest of both the public and
the applicant or RTO to make these reports. System needs
can be tracked as they evolve from technical indications
into demonstrable problems. Discussions about how to ad-
dress growing concerns can be particularly productive if
they involve affected parties and all relevant information is
available to anyone who cares to look for it. Early identifi-
cation of potential problem areas also allows small-scale
218 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

responses like distributed resources the best opportunity to

contribute efficiently to a solution.40

Deterministic and Probabilistic Planning

Deterministic analysis identifies possible events (e.g.,
failure of a large generator) and studies their effects on reli-
ability. The analyst assesses the likelihood of these events
based on professional judgment. Probabilistic analysis uses a
rigorous statistical method to assess the likelihood of an
event and its effects. Probabilistic analysis allows for rela-
tively easy numerical comparisons of alternatives, but these
comparisons may seem more precise than they actually are
because the results are highly dependent on the quality of
forecasts of future equipment performance. Deterministic
approaches are more traditional and less costly. Both meth-
ods are valuable. Regulators should encourage the use of
both so decision makers can have the most complete infor-
mation possible.

Impact of Rate Design on Decision Making

As its participants know well, there are many ways to
regulate the electric utility industry. The rules and rate de-
signs in force at any given time affect the decisions and be-
havior of the players. Some examples follow showing the
effects of rate design on the assessment of new transmission
proposals:

• If the cost of a new transmission project is “rolled in” to

average regional transmission rates, the new transmis-

40
A related topic is that the grid in which investments are made today will not
be the same grid in just a few years. Loads will change, new generation will be
built, and some units may be retired. One merit of a transparent process is that
it helps focus on the investments that are most likely to make sense for a wide
variety of futures.
Appendices 219

sion will be far easier to justify than if the same costs are
assigned only to the group of consumers in the region
whose changes in electricity usage have caused the in-
vestment to be necessary.41

• If the costs of an alternative are treated as rolled in while

the costs of competing alternatives are charged incre-
mentally to those whose energy use has caused the need
for the new transmission, the utility will tend to select
the alternative whose costs are rolled in even if it is
more expensive and less effective at meeting grid needs.

These are not hypothetical examples. The first case is

typical in the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), where
the cost of “pool transmission facilities” is borne by all con-
sumers in New England. Although these facilities are not
intended as local interconnection service and are in principle
necessary for reliability, their need is often the result of de-
mand growth in a distinct part of the whole region. None-
theless, everyone pays. The second case is typical in most
regions. Distributed resources such as energy efficiency and
local generation are the best answers to some grid problems.

41
A corollary to this idea is drawn from experience with highways. If new road-
ways are built to address congestion without addressing lower-cost ways to re-
duce traffic, and if the source of the demand for the new roadways does not pay
the cost for the new construction, the new road can generate more traffic. That
is, more traffic than expected will use the new roadway because it is available,
and congestion will increase more rapidly than highway planners would have
predicted based on prior patterns. Similarly if a new remedial connection to the
grid is built and the costs are assigned to society rather than to the connection’s
direct beneficiaries, the connection can result in increased demand (either from
inefficient generation siting or even greater volumes of long distance energy
trading) and therefore increased congestion. Some would call this an implicit
subsidy. The result of this scenario is increased congestion, much more rapidly
than would be expected based on prior patterns.
220 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Yet the system-wide financial support available for transmis-

sion to assist the grid is not available for these competing
alternatives. Basic economics suggests that when the cause
of an investment can be clearly be assigned to a specific
group of customers, those customers should pay for it.
Implementation of this rule by regulators is complex in prac-
tice though congestion transmission pricing is a very posi-
tive step in this direction. Ignoring this rule will adversely
affect the nature and efficiency of future utility invest-
ments.42

Encouraging Innovation
One way that the transmission siting process can be
improved is for regulators to reward applicants for bringing
forward innovative ways to address transmission grid
needs. There is evidence of this already, as DC proposals,
undersea projects, and flexible AC transmission system
(FACTS) devices begin to appear on grid expansion plans.
Industry and DOE should continue their attention to the
pace and direction of transmission- related research and
development, and the industry should continue to educate
regulators about the merits of new approaches and devices
that can enhance the grid.

Effects of Cost Minimization

Some parties are critical of existing regulation because
returns on equity investment are thought to be inadequate
compared with the risks of the enterprise and the value
added by transmission facilities. In this view, transmission
costs are roughly 10 percent of retail electric rates; a modest

42
This idea can be extended to the retail regime as well. The State of Connecticut
directs system benefit funds to support demand-response programs in desig-
nated transmission- and distribution-constrained areas. (Also, see Moskovitz,
2001.)
Appendices 221

increase over this figure should be acceptable to consumers

if the result is greater incentive to propose needed projects.
Allowing higher proposal costs would also tend to widen
the range of economically competitive alternatives.
At the same time, applicants sometimes resist adding
features to their projects that would increase costs but bring
the proposals in line with public policy concerns. Examples
of such features include:

• Selective undergrounding,

• More attractive tower designs and wire placements,

• Longer routes around sensitive areas,43

• Zigzag corridors as an alternative to long, straight

wooded corridors, and

• Sharing of more financial benefits with affected land-

owners.44

Some might suggest that these elements “gold plate” a

project. Others see these features as real costs necessary to
win support and fit a needed project into surroundings that
are not blank slates but lands protected by legitimate prop-
erty rights and valued by society. A transparent planning
process that focuses more broadly on addressing future
needs will aid applicants in identifying beneficial improve-
ments to budding projects.

43
See description of Cross Sound Connector project in the section “Two Instruc-
tive Transmission Siting Cases,” on page E-8.
44
Utilities express concern that premature identification of a route may result in
increased easement costs. In contrast, rumors of a prospective transmission
project may adversely affect land values and burden landowners with uncer-
tainty. We suggest putting all the facts on the table and relying on the siting
authority (and courts if necessary) to rule expeditiously on the project and its
route and to set fair and reasonable easement costs.
222 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Need for Complete Applications

Transmission siting is a difficult process at best. When a
proposal is incomplete, the process becomes still more diffi-
cult. The reasons for incomplete applications range from a
lack of familiarity with the rules and expectations of the sit-
ing authority to intentional omission of significant informa-
tion. In any case, the burden is on the applicant to know and
abide by the spirit of the rules. This is not just an issue of fair
play; trust is a fragile commodity in a process where the
threat of eminent domain always looms, even though it is
rarely mentioned and even more rarely used. When appli-
cants do not abide by the rules of the process, they may lose
the trust of the public and the siting agency. Once trust has
been compromised, it is difficult for a review process to
reach an outcome that will be in the public interest and be so
recognized by most parties.

Transmission Company Perceptions of the Siting Process

In some jurisdictions, there is anecdotal evidence that at
least some transmission system problems are not being ad-
dressed because utility executives are concerned about the
hostile reception they expect that proposals would receive
from the state siting process.45 Utilities holding this view
assume they would lose in the court of public opinion and
waste financial and human resources in the attempt. It is
difficult to evaluate these anecdotes for several reasons. A
utility speaking freely and acknowledging reluctance would
risk a regulatory ruling that it had been imprudent for fail-
ing to pursue construction of needed facilities. Further, the
root cause of the reluctance may relate to factors other than
the siting process. The existence of these stories, however, is

45
Other possible factors include uncertainties regarding cost recovery in a state or
how costs would be allocated among states and companies for interstate projects.
Local politics may also be a factor.
Appendices 223

clear indication of a problem. One objective of reform of the

siting process should be to ensure that the process is per-
ceived as welcoming good proposals and offering a fair test
to all projects. A process in which utilities with an obligation
to deliver are so intimidated that worthwhile projects remain
under wraps does not serve the public interest.

———————————————————————————
Solving Existing Aesthetic Problems in
Combination with New Transmission Projects
In some cases, a new transmission project can provide the means to
resolving a community’s existing aesthetic problem. Consider the case of
an aging industrial waterfront area that has the potential to be trans-
formed into a civic and tourist center, but its best views are marred by
an accumulation of high voltage lines left over from its industrial past.
Some communities are working with their utilities on such projects by
finding ways to remove some or all of these lines in conjunction with
upgrading other transmission lines nearby. This somewhat radical ap-
proach—removing still-functional facilities from service for aesthetic rea-
sons—can produce a more efficient transmission system, while
strengthening public support for an otherwise intrusive project.
One example is in Minnesota. As part of the controversial Chisago-
Apple River proposal, a mediation process revealed the existence of an
opportunity to clean up the visual effect of accumulated power lines in
the city of Taylor Falls, MN. Power lines would be removed, and one 161
kV line would cross the river in its place. The concept would also place
the new line underground for some distance near the waterfront. Execu-
tion of this idea is still pending; Xcel and Dairyland Cooperative have
not yet filed the new proposal with siting authorities in Minnesota and
Wisconsin.
Another example is in Vermont, where the Vermont Electric Power
Company and the City of Burlington are working together in advance of
a major VELCO transmission siting proposal to see if lines on the re-
developed waterfront of Vermont’s largest city can be removed as part of
the project. Advance planning ensures that regardless of the decision, all
sides will know that great effort was made by VELCO to find positive
collateral benefits.
———————————————————————————
224 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Federal Actions to Improve the Siting Process

There are several ways, described in the subsections
below, that the federal government could promote improved
transmission siting performance in the United States, inde-
pendent of how jurisdiction is apportioned between state
and federal regulators.

Improving federal land management agency reviews

Probably the second-most-often-heard category of com-
plaints about the transmission siting process (after concerns
about the state process) relates to federal land management
agency reviews of proposals. Almost 29 percent of the total
land area of the United States is owned by the federal gov-
ernment and managed by the Departments of Defense, Ag-
riculture, Interior, and other agencies (Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 2000; see box below for additional details).
In addition, other non-federal land areas such as airsheds,
wetlands, navigable waterways, and coastal zones are sub-
ject to federal oversight by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Corps of Engineers and other agencies.
These complaints fall into four general categories:
• There is often inconsistency within an agency in the
ways local or regional land managers review transmis-
sion projects.
• When two (or more) federal agencies are involved, there
is frequently inadequate communication and coordina-
tion between them.
• Review of transmission proposals does not appear to be
important in comparison to the primary mission of the
agency.
• Federal agencies frequently wait to conduct their re-
views until state reviews are completed and a final route
Appendices 225

has been selected. This introduces the risk that a federal

agency may require a route change, leading to another
(time- and cost-consuming) iteration in the state process.

(See box on Alturas case (next page), which illustrates

some of these problems.) It should be noted that research for
this paper also found reports of good cooperation between
states and federal agencies.

———————————————————————————
Distribution of Federal Lands in the United States
Although almost 29 percent of the land area of the United States is fed-
erally owned, the distribution of this land is very uneven. Nearly 38
percent of all federal land is in Alaska where almost 68 percent of the
state is federally owned. Another 54 percent of all federal land is concen-
trated in the 11 states of the contiguous U.S. that are located wholly or
partially west of the Continental Divide. Additional details about these
11 states are presented in the following table:

Total Area
State (Acres, in 000’s) % Federal Land
———————————————————————————
Arizona 72,688 45.6
California 100,207 44.9
Colorado 66,486 36.4
Idaho 52,933 62.5
Montana 93,271 28.0
New Mexico 77,766 34.2
Nevada 70,264 83.1
Oregon 61,599 52.6
Utah 52,697 64.5
Washington 42.694 28.5
Wyoming 62,343 49.9
———————————————————————————
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2000 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, December,
2000),Table No. 381 (1997 data).
———————————————————————————
226 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

———————————————————————————
The Alturas 345 kV Intertie Project
This project demonstrates some reasons why potential developers
of transmission facilities regard gaining permits from affected federal
agencies as one of the most difficult and frustrating aspects of transmis-
sion siting.
The Alturas line is 163 miles long and runs between Reno, Nevada,
and Alturas, California. About 20 miles of the line is in Nevada and the
balance is in northern California. The line was needed primarily to sup-
port reliability in the fast-growing area around Reno, and to enable the
applicant, Sierra Pacific, to gain access to low-cost hydro from the Pacific
Northwest for the benefit of retail customers in both Nevada and Cali-
fornia.
The project was proposed to the Nevada Public Service Commis-
sion early in 1993 and the Commission approved it in November 1993.
Sierra Pacific then turned to the other affected agencies: the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and several federal agencies [the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Forest Service, the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS)]. BLM became as the lead federal agency for the purposes
of preparing an environmental impact statement because it had the most
affected acreage. The Forest Service had two affected areas, three line
miles in the Modoc National Forest in California, and eight line miles in
the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada. The California Public
Utilities Commission became the lead agency for state environmental
purposes.
In the spring of 1994 BLM and CPUC jointly hired a consulting firm
to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) for the state and an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the federal agencies. The appli-
cant paid the cost of this work. The draft statements were issued for
comment in March 1995. In the fall of 1995, the applicant believed that
the comments received could be satisfactorily addressed through several
kinds of mitigating measures. BLM issued the final EIS in November
1995, and approved its portion of the project in February 1996. The
CPUC approved its portion of the line in January of 1996. However, in
February 1996 the manager of the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest
issued a “no action” decision, and argued that the EIS had been flawed
because it had not addressed a sufficiently wide range of alternatives,
including the alternative of skirting the Humboldt-Toiyabe National
Appendices 227

Forest entirely.
The applicant appealed this decision, first to the regional forest
manager and then to the deputy chief of the Forest Service. The appeal
process took several months, and the results of the appeal were inconclu-
sive. In June 1996 the deputy chief ordered the “no action” decision
withdrawn, but he also directed the Humboldt-Toiyabe manager to ob-
tain whatever information was needed to make a new decision. This led
to several months of dialogue between the applicant and the Humboldt-
Toiyabe manager, and the filing by the applicant of several hundred
pages of additional information. The manager of the Modoc National
Forest, who had not issued a final decision on the portion of the route
that would cross the Modoc area, joined this dialogue.
However, the applicant found that the continuing uncertainty over
the acceptability of the Humboldt-Toiyabe route segment was making it
difficult to gain required permits from local governments in Nevada that
would be needed for the construction phase of the project. These prob-
lems led the applicant to examine the option of an alternative route on
private land around the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, even though
this had several disadvantages. It would put the line into more devel-
oped areas, and make it more visible to local residents. This alternative
route was about the same length as the initial route, but it was more
costly because it would need more expensive towers in several locations,
the right of way was more expensive, and additional legal costs would
be involved. At length Sierra Pacific decided to pursue the private-land
route and withdrew its application to cross the Humboldt-Toiyabe area
in February 1997. Due to these route changes, the applicant had to go
through some local-level processes a second time in Nevada.
In April 1997, the manager of the Modoc National Forest issued a
decision on the EIS, also denying the applicant’s request for a permit.
Sierra Pacific appealed this decision to the chief of the Forest Service in
May 1997, and this led eventually to the issuance of a permit in October
1997. However, several other parties to the proceeding appealed this
latter action. After review, the decision to issue the permit was upheld in
January 1998.
Construction of the project was begun in February 1998 and com-
pleted in December 1998. The applicant estimates that the difficulties
with the Forest Service delayed the project by at least two years and led
to additional costs of well over $20 million.
———————————————————————————
228 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Addressing these concerns about federal agency reviews

must start with a recognition that a change in priorities is
required: applicants deserve a timely, consistent, and sub-
stantive response from the federal government. For the same
reason that a “one-stop” siting process makes sense at the
state and local level, federal agencies should find a way to
participate cooperatively and constructively in the overall
siting process. This may require additional effort and re-
sources from both the applicant and the agencies to consider
alternative routes and solutions earlier in the process.
One option is to centralize individual agency responses
to transmission proposals.46 Special staff groups could be
created in the headquarters of appropriate federal agencies
to work jointly on reviewing transmission proposals, par-
ticularly if efforts to improve coordination among federal
agencies and to train and inform regional managers about
the importance of the transmission grid do not achieve the
desired results.
Another option is to designate a lead agency for cases
where two or more federal agencies are affected, and give
that agency jurisdiction over all federal matters affected by
the transmission proposal. It would be difficult to gain broad
support for this approach because it would require some
federal agencies at times give jurisdiction to another federal
agency regarding land use within their domains. It is worth
noting that this approach is not used in siting natural gas
pipelines, even though siting such lines is wholly under fed-
eral jurisdiction.
A less radical version of this option would be to make
the FERC the lead agency for coordinating all federal re-
views of proposed transmission facilities, while specifying

46
See comments to the DOE by the Electricity Consumers Alliance, discussed in
the section “Improving the Existing State-Based Siting Process” on page E-45.
Appendices 229

that other affected federal agencies would participate in the

reviews as cooperating agencies, and would retain their ex-
isting authorities. Charging one agency with overall coordi-
nation of the process, especially one already experienced
with environmental and other types of analysis of electricity
projects, would help to bring greater consistency and pre-
dictability to the federal review process. Further, given
FERC’s other responsibilities in the electricity area, it would
have stronger reasons than most other agencies to press for
good coordination, and eventually it would also have re-
gional transmission plans at its disposal to use in confirming
whether a proposed transmission line is needed. Presum-
ably, establishing this approach would require federal legis-
lation because of FERC’s status as an independent
regulatory agency.
Other measures that do not interfere with agencies’ ju-
risdiction could be considered, such as memoranda of un-
derstanding and other commitments to complete project
reviews in a timely way. A standard form or protocol could
be developed to ensure that cooperative understandings are
in place without compromising any agency’s authority.

Innovative siting practices

Not surprisingly, most applicants prefer to use siting
practices that have worked before. They believe this ap-
proach improves their chances of success, and that new ap-
proaches are risky. One reason for their caution is that
mounting a transmission siting effort can be expensive, par-
ticularly if it is unsuccessful.47 Despite this bias, innovative
approaches that invest in early and more open planning and

47
See the section “Description of the Transmission Siting Process,” on page E-3,
for details on a transmission project that Florida Power abandoned after more
than a decade of effort and expenditures of $23 million.
230 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

consider a more comprehensive range of alternatives may

produce better outcomes. DOE should consider funding
demonstration programs in this area.

Increasing transmission capacity of existing facilities

It is increasingly well understood that for some types of
transmission system needs, adding generation resources in
the load center can increase transfer capacity. In addition,
new technologies such as static var compensators can give
operators more control over grid flows and lead to a reduc-
tion in the amount of capacity that must be reserved for “N-
1” contingencies. 48 DOE could focus resources on
demonstrating technological options that are available but
not in common practice, such as FACTS, high-voltage direct
current (HVDC), and high-temperature superconductivity
(HTS), which would increase the transfer capacity of existing
facilities.49

Identifying “best practices” for reviewing agencies

DOE could work with appropriate state-based organiza-
tions50 to identify “best practices” for consideration by trans-
mission siting authorities. The topics to be addressed could
include:

• Open planning;

48
An N-1 Contingency refers to the practice of assuring that the transmission
system can withstand the change in power flows resulting from the sudden loss
of any element on the system.
49
FACTS devices are sophisticated solid-state electronic switches that allow op-
erators to control flow on certain power lines. HVDC lines do not operate syn-
chronously with the AC grid but can move large amounts of power over great
distances with almost no losses. HTS can also move large amounts of power with
almost no losses; this technology is under development. See Issue Paper Ad-
vanced Transmission Technologies by J. Hauer, T. Overbye, J. Dagle, and S.
Widergren.
Appendices 231

• Treatment of alternatives;

• Criteria for project approval, including determination of

need;

• Maximum time limits;

• Strategic use of undergrounding;

• Innovative easement agreements;

• Use of mitigating measures;

• Estimating probable cost/benefit implications for af-

fected jurisdictions; and

• Development of model rules and decision criteria.

The Tennessee Valley Authority and the federal power

marketing administrations with active transmission siting
responsibilities could also participate in this project and
adopt the resulting practices.

Guidelines for applicants

The federal government has a great capacity to provide
leadership as can be seen in many energy-related areas. For
example, the Federal Energy Management Program of DOE
is working to make federal buildings energy efficient, not
only as good management practices for those buildings, but
also to set an example. Regarding transmission siting, DOE
could work with state agencies51 and industry organiza-

50
Participation by organizations such as the National Governors’ Association, the
Western Governors’ Association, and the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners would be important to the success of such a project.
51See previous footnote.
232 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

tions52 to develop guidelines that would aid applicants in

securing timely approval for proposed new transmission or
grid-related projects. This project to develop guidelines
would consider much the same subject matter as the preced-
ing one focused on “best practices” but from the applicant’s
perspective. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the federal
power marketing administrations with active transmission
siting responsibilities could also contribute to the success of
this project.

Innovative regulatory methods

Investor-owned utilities’ high-voltage transmission systems
are under FERC’s rate-making jurisdiction.53 Many utilities
believe that rate-making incentives to build new transmis-
sion facilities are not adequate and have proposed increasing
the return on investment allowed in transmission rates.
There is also concern that transmission pricing should better
reflect system economics and power flows. Addressing these
proposals in detail is outside the scope of this paper,54 but
some comments about alternative approaches are relevant in
the context of improving siting processes.
Utilities’ incentives are clearly driven by the regulations
that define their revenue stream. Volumetric transmission
rates promote increased volume on the grid, and utilities
respond in a logical way by increasing throughput on their

52Organizations such as the Edison Electric Institute, the American Public Power
Association, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, and the Electric
Power Supply Association could provide valuable assistance in the design and
implementation of such a project.
53This is true everywhere in the contiguous United States except Texas.
54See the Issue Paper Alternative Business0 Models for Transmission Investment

and Operation by S. Oren, G. Gross, and F. Alvardo addresses the return on

equity issue. Generally, performance-based rate making for transmission service
offers the prospect of improving utility incentives by bringing them into better
alignment with the public interest.
Appendices 233

systems. In some cases, congestion or reliability problems

ensue, leading to calls for additional capacity. An alternative
approach would be to compensate utilities fairly (at what-
ever rate of return on equity regulators choose) for the use of
their facilities regardless of throughput. Each utility would
have its transmission rates set to recover its costs plus the
return and would be subject to periodic rate adjustments to
true up any divergence between expected revenue and ac-
tual results. Performance incentives for reliability and ser-
vice could be incorporated into the system.
Under this regulatory alternative, a transmission-own-
ing utility has no undue bias toward growth in assets. In-
vestments that may promote more efficient use of existing
facilities and avoid the need for new facilities may be more
vigorously pursued, which may align corporate incentives
more closely with the public interest. FERC could actively
invite utilities to experiment with this form of regulation for
a defined period of time. DOE could work with FERC to
develop the plan.
Another area where FERC activities could be very help-
ful to transmission siting is in RTO development. An RTO
can become an unbiased source of accurate, publicly tested
regional planning information that can help siting authori-
ties evaluate and validate the need for a variety of grid-re-
lated investments. An RTO can also provide insight about
the appropriate allocation of the costs of interstate projects
and about how transmission services should be priced in
order to provide accurate economic signals for grid-related
investments.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Siting electric transmission lines is currently a state re-

234 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

sponsibility.55 Each state has the option to address transmis-

sion siting in its own laws, and most have done so. In most
states, applicants must demonstrate that proposed facilities
are needed, and a state siting authority must confirm that
construction of the facilities would serve the public interest.
If a facility would cross state lines, approval is needed from
each state affected. Additional approvals are required from
federal agencies if the line would cross federally owned or
controlled lands, and consent from Native American tribes is
needed to cross tribal lands. The public process for review-
ing and approving the siting of proposed transmission facili-
ties is unavoidably difficult and complex because it entails
fitting long-lived and highly visible structures into physical
surroundings where land is already in use for other pur-
poses. This is especially true for transmission projects that
are large in geographic scale because they tend to require
approvals from many affected jurisdictions.
During the past decade, most small-scale, intrastate
transmission proposals have been approved without major
delay or controversy. Delay and controversy have been more
common in larger, interstate projects; however, approval has
been obtained eventually in most cases if the applicant has
been persistent and presented alternative proposals. Some
parties believe that this record is misleading, and suggest
that some or even many applicants have refrained from pro-
posing large-scale, multistate transmission projects. It is dif-
ficult to verify the extent of such withholding, but there has
been a striking disparity during the past decade between the
level of new investment in generation and the level of new
investment in transmission. This disparity suggests that
some major transmission projects may indeed have been

55With the exception of the federal power marketing administrations and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, which have their own siting authorities.
Appendices 235

withheld and may not be just the result of excess capacity

built in prior decades (though siting authorities should
guard against the prospect of accelerated construction pro-
ducing a new generation of stranded utility costs).
There are several possible reasons for withholding of
proposals:

• Regional-scale transmission planning has lagged behind

the development of regional-scale bulk power markets.
It may be that the economic feasibility of some
multistate projects is only now becoming apparent. The
penalties to companies or investors who misjudge the
economics of such projects can be severe.

• The transmission sector of the industry is in the midst of

a fundamental reorganization. Many companies have
not known whether they will remain in the transmission
business or what the rules will be that will determine
the rate of return on new transmission investments. It is
reasonable to assume that some companies will not
present new proposals until these uncertainties are re-
solved.

• The present state-based transmission siting process is

difficult at best, particularly for large-scale projects.

Given these considerations, it is understandable that

there is disagreement between those who think that the ex-
isting siting regime is basically sound but needs improve-
ment, and those who believe that fundamental reforms are
needed.

Problem Areas in the Existing Regime

Approval of a proposed transmission project is the cul-
236 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

mination of a long and complex process that can go awry for

many reasons. In addition, the transition to regional bulk
power markets may raise significant new difficulties related
to transmission siting. Some of the principal problem areas
are:

Need for regional-scale transmission planning

Although some regional plans have been developed,
many areas of the nation do not have regional plans, and
some of the plans that have been prepared are very incom-
plete (see the Issue Paper Transmission Planning and the Need
for New Capacity by E. Hirst and B. Kirby). There is an urgent
need for regional transmission plans that after public review
will confirm to prospective applicants and reviewing agen-
cies that specific regional transmission needs have been
identified and ranked according to priority. Regional trans-
mission planning is one of several critical functions that re-
gional transmission organizations (RTOs) would perform, as
envisioned by FERC.

Possible need for interim transmission plans

Rather than wait for RTOs to be formed and regional
transmission plans to be developed by them, as an interim
measure it might be useful for DOE and FERC to identify
key bottlenecks and for the FERC to task administrative law
judges to work with appropriate parties in the bottleneck
areas to develop interim transmission plans. A possible ben-
efit of such plans is that they would probably flag some
important issues affecting groups of states, and thus help to
spur the formation of cooperative regional institutions.

Need for transparent planning and systematic consideration of alter-

natives by applicants
To win approval, a transmission proposal should be
Appendices 237

developed through a process open to participation by all

interested parties and with systematic attention to a broad
range of alternatives.

Need for coordination, consistency, and timeliness

of federal agency reviews
Applicants and other parties cite four kinds of problems
with federal agency reviews of transmission siting propos-
als:

1. Local or regional officials within an agency are some-

times inconsistent in their reviews of transmission
projects.

2. If two or more federal agencies are reviewing a project,

communication and coordination between/among them
are sometimes inadequate.

3. Review of transmission proposals is sometimes given

little priority in comparison to the primary mission of
the agency.

4. Federal agencies sometimes wait to conduct their re-

views until state reviews are completed and a final route
has been proposed. This introduces the risk that a fed-
eral agency may require a route change, leading to an-
other time- and cost-consuming iteration in the
state-level process.

Need for coordination and development of a common review process

All state agencies with review responsibilities, relevant
federal agencies, and tribal authorities within a region
should use a common review process and coordinate re-
views of transmission siting proposals. Inadequate coordina-
238 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

tion and cooperation among reviewing agencies (and the

applicant) can significantly hinder the siting process and
may lead to rejection of a project by one or more agencies.56

Need to regulate the time allowed for reviews

Many corporate parties to the transmission siting pro-
cess assert that the unpredictable timing of typical state-
based siting processes contributes significantly to the
uncertainty hindering key business decisions in the trans-
mission sector today. Many parties favor state and/or fed-
eral legislation setting fixed time limits (e.g., 12–18 months)
for reviews. Projects not acted upon within the time period
would be approved by default. The success of this approach
would depend to a significant extent on the filing of a com-
plete application at the outset, and affected agencies would
probably enforce “completeness” very strictly.

Potential disagreement between states over definition of “need”

One state’s definition of “need” for new transmission
capacity may include transmission to enable additional elec-
tricity commerce; a neighboring state may limit “need” to
transmission needed to maintain reliability.

Potential disagreement between states over

whether a particular facility is needed
Even if two states have identical definitions of need,
they may still not agree that a proposed facility is the best
alternative for meeting a specific requirement.

56Examples include AEP’s 765-kV line in Virginia and West Virginia, and the
Cross Sound Connector project between Long Island, New York, and Connecti-
cut, both of which are described above in the section “Assessment of Current
Siting Regime.”
Appendices 239

Potential disagreement between states

over distribution of costs and benefits
An interstate project may fail to win all required ap-
provals unless the affected states come to agreement about
the distribution of the facility’s costs and benefits. A key el-
ement of disagreement may be the time horizon over which
benefits and costs are assessed.

Need for regional institutions to facilitate

the siting process for interstate projects
The western states have had extensive experience with
siting interstate transmission projects, and an institutional
framework is evolving under the auspices of the Western
Governors’ Association57 to aid the states in dealing with
such projects. In the eastern U.S., however, interstate projects
have been less frequent, and, for the most part, comparable
institutional frameworks remain to be developed.

Options for Improving the Transmission Siting Process

The recent debate over whether to make a federal
agency, most likely FERC, responsible to some degree for
siting major new transmission facilities has been healthy and
useful though sometimes acrimonious. It has put all parties
on notice that this process must work—it must lead to a
timely determination by appropriate government agencies
regarding whether proposed facilities are needed and to the
approval of routes or sites for needed facilities. The debate

57The Western Interstate Energy Board, which is the energy arm of the Western
Governors’ Association, and the Western Conference of Public Service Commis-
sions acted jointly in 1984 to create the Committee on Regional Electric Power
Cooperation (CREPC). CREPC has representation from the regulatory commis-
sions, energy agencies, and facility-siting agencies in the 11 states and two Cana-
dian provinces in the Western Interconnection. Through CREPC, the western
states have begun negotiations to establish a common interstate transmission-
siting protocol.
240 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

has also provided impetus for a searching examination of

options for improving the process. Many of these options are
listed below.

Options for individual states

1. Promote or require an open, transparent transmission
planning process.

2. Require project applications to address a broad range of

alternatives.

3. Review and if appropriate clarify or update criteria for

approval; consider whether the requirements of com-
merce should be recognized explicitly in determining
“need” for transmission capacity.

4. If necessary, modify state law to enable siting authorities

to take account of out-of-state benefits when assessing
the merits of a transmission siting proposal.

5. Adopt a “one-stop” siting process. Local and county

governments could use zoning to direct utility facilities
to preferred locations, but they would lose the ability to
reject a project. State reviews would be consolidated in
the siting authority.

6. Set a maximum time limit (e.g., 12 or 18 months) for

reviews by state or local agencies.

7. State clearly what materials must be included in an

application, and refuse to initiate a review until an ap-
plication is complete.

8. Promote use by applicants of both deterministic and

probabilistic planning methods.
Appendices 241

9. Promote more consistent use of “rolled-in”” and “cost

causation” approaches to recovering the cost of new
grid-related investments, to minimize either favoring or
disadvantaging particular technological alternatives.

10. Promote innovative approaches to meeting transmission

grid needs.

11. Emphasize to prospective applicants that undue mini-

mization of transmission project costs can be self-defeat-
ing.

Regional options
All of the state-level options listed above have regional
significance; that is, if they were considered and applied by
all states in a given region, the result would probably be
greater regional consistency and efficacy in siting policies
and practices. The options below focus on development of
regional institutions that could, among other objectives, pro-
mote such consistency and efficacy. States, federal land man-
agement agencies, and Native American tribes should
consider the following options:

1. Support and participate in open, transparent regional

transmission planning.

2. Promote the development of cooperative regional trans-

mission siting institutions that would have two key
missions:
(a) Develop elements of a common siting process, us-
able by most and if possible all reviewing agencies;
and
(b) Maintain parallel processes among reviewing agen-
cies, utilizing consistent information, identifying in-
242 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

formation gaps or possible points of disagreement

early, and ensuring that these are addressed by a
scheduled calendar date.

3. Agree that if an agency fails to complete its review by a

scheduled calendar date, the application is approved by
default.

4. Consider whether a regional organization with decision-

making powers should be established to address some
energy regulatory matters on a regional basis (i.e., over-
sight of system planning, siting and permitting, rate
regulation, or other matters).

Federal options
Most of the options listed above could be aided through
specific federal actions, including:

1. Establish broad federal support for open, transparent

regional-scale planning to address generation require-
ments, generation siting considerations, transmission
requirements, and related issues.

2. As an interim measure while waiting for RTOs to be

formed and regional transmission plans to be prepared
by them, DOE and FERC could act jointly to identify
key transmission bottlenecks, and FERC could task ad-
ministrative law judges to work with appropriate par-
ties in each bottleneck area to prepare an interim
transmission plan by a specific date.

3. Improve the process for the review of transmission sit-

ing proposals by federal land management agencies.
Several sub-options could be implemented by a Presi-
dential executive order:
Appendices 243

(a) Direct federal land managers and other relevant

agencies to support and participate in common and
coordinated state or regional processes for timely
review of proposals for new transmission facilities
requiring federal approval.
(b) Require all federal reviews to be completed within
18 months after the filing of a complete application.
Applications not acted upon within 18 months
would be approved by default.
(c) Establish training programs on the national signifi-
cance of the transmission grids and related issues,
and make these programs mandatory for federal of-
ficials authorized to approve or reject transmission
siting proposals.
(d) Create special staff groups in the headquarters of
appropriate federal agencies to work jointly to pre-
pare consolidated, multi-agency reviews of proposed
transmission projects.
(e) Direct that if two or more agencies have jurisdiction
over a proposed transmission project, the Office of
Management and Budget shall designate one of
them as the lead agency, responsible for coordinating
the preparation of a timely joint review of the pro-
posal. (Note: An alternative to this arrangement
would be to enact federal legislation making FERC
responsible for coordination of all federal reviews of
transmission projects, as described below.)

4. Seek federal legislation that would:

(a) Direct the Secretary (DOE) or FERC to initiate a
rulemaking to establish criteria for the identification
of transmission bottlenecks (or projects to ease such
bottlenecks) of national or regional importance.
244 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

(b) Affirm that for projects designated to be of national

or regional importance, an applicant would have the
right to petition FERC to assume a backstop role in
the event that a state or tribal reviewing agency does
not act to approve or deny the project within 18
months after the filing of a complete application. (A
stronger but more controversial and less predictable
formulation would be to empower applicants to pe-
tition FERC when a state, tribal, or federal reviewing
agency acts in the allotted time but rejects the appli-
cation. “Forum shopping” could become a signifi-
cant problem if applicants could always turn to
FERC for a second opinion. If this version were
adopted, items c and d below would have to be
modified for consistency.)

(c) Empower FERC to decline a petition for cause, and

limit FERC’s role to serving as a backstop for the
agency that has not acted, without affecting the ac-
tions or responsibilities of other reviewing agencies.

(d) Direct that FERC shall be the lead agency for coordi-
nating all reviews of proposed transmission facilities
by federal agencies, that other affected federal agen-
cies shall participate as cooperating agencies, and
that the cooperating agencies will retain their exist-
ing authorities with respect to the issuance of per-
mits for lines crossing lands under their jurisdiction.

5. Undertake a DOE project, jointly with NGA, WGA,

NARUC, and other appropriate state-based organiza-
tions to articulate a set of “best practices” related to
transmission siting for consideration by all states.
Appendices 245

6. Undertake a DOE project, jointly with appropriate state

agency organizations and industry trade associations, to
articulate a set of guidelines for applicants, designed to
increase the likelihood of approval of proposed new
transmission or grid-related projects.

7. Undertake a DOE demonstration program to support

applicants in taking innovative approaches to transmis-
sion siting proposals (e.g., treatment of alternatives, use
of innovative or little-used technologies, imaginative
use of mitigating measures, etc.).

8. Undertake a DOE demonstration program to support

the use of new or under-used methods and technologies
for increasing the transmission capacity of existing fa-
cilities.

9. Support FERC efforts to improve the incentives of trans-

mission-owning companies and other potential devel-
opers of new transmission capacity or other grid-related
projects through performance-based regulation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Joe Eto at the Lawrence Berkeley National

Laboratory for his cheerful confidence and support and the
writers of the other papers in this series for their insights. We
are grateful for the support of Department of Energy staff,
particularly the expertise of Paul Carrier and Jimmy
Glotfelty in bringing a large and complex enterprise to-
gether. We thank the many individuals who provided in-
valuable background information, commentary, and
suggestions, including the speakers at the three public hear-
246 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ings the DOE convened for this project.

Particular thanks go to the following individuals who
took time to talk with or write to us about how transmission
siting really works in the United States: Henry Bartholomew,
Martin Bettman, James Boone, Jeffrey Butler, Roy Buxton,
Daniel Cearfoss, Jr., Mark Cooper, Clark Cotton, John
Cowger, Mark Doljac, Mel Eckhoff, Steve Ferguson, Alan
Fiksdal, Webster Gray, Brent Hare, Cheryl Harrington, Doug
Hartley, Rich Hoffman, Fred Hoover, John Hynes, Blaine
Keener, Ron Klinefelter, Klaus Lambeck, Doug Larson, Rick
Loughery, Mark MacLeod, Earl Melton, Martha Morton,
John Owens, Sandi Patti, Gary Porter, Prasad Potturi, Lee
Rampey, Raj Rana, Gene Reeves, Tom Ring, Jose Rotger,
Wayne Shirley, Alison Silverstein, Julie Simon, Udaivir
Sirohi, Karen Skinner, Jeff Steir, Don Stursma, Massoud
Tahamtani, Bob Timmer, John Underhill, Steve Walton,
Randy Watts, Carl Weinberg, Thomas Welch, Jim Wexler,
Connie White, and Kim Wissman.

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Conceptual Plans for Electricity Transmission in the West, Report to the West-
ern Governors Association, August 2001, p. 13.
U.S. Department of Commerce. 2000. Statistical Abstract of the United
States. December 2000.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1998. Maintaining Reliability in a Competitive
U.S. Electricity Industry, Final Report of the Task Force on Electric Sys-
tem Reliability to the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Washington,
DC.
248 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Advanced Transmission
Technologies
(National Transmission Grid Study)

John Hauer
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Richland, Washington
Tom Overbye
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois
Jeff Dagle
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Steve Widergren
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Introduction
Background
Power System Components and Reciprocal Impacts
Transfer Capacity
Complexity of the National Transmission Grid
Technologies to Increase Transfer Capacity
Institutional Issues that Affect Technology Deployment
New Demands on the Transmission Grid
Information Gaps in Grid Management
Challenges and Opportunities in Network Control
The Evolving Infrastructure for Transmission Management
Performance Challenges to a New Generation
of Transmission Technology
Technology Challenge #1: Broader Coordination of
Grid Management
Technology Challenge #2: Knowing the Limits of Safe Operation
Technology Challenge #3: Extending the Controllability of
Network Flow

248
Appendices 249

Technology Challenge #4: Dealing with Operational Uncertainty

Technology Challenge #5: A Grid that Heals Itself
Technology Challenge #6: More Power in Less Space
Technology Challenge #7: Assessing New Technologies using
Life-Cycle Analysis
Technology Challenge #8: The Intelligent Energy System 5
Technology Challenge #9: Physical and Cyber Security of
the Transmission Grid
Meeting the Technology Challenges
Institutional Issues
Effective Utilization of Federal Resources
Effective Utilization of Academic Resources
Advanced Technology-Related Recommendations
References
Appendix A—List of New Technology Equipment to Reinforce the
Grid

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the use of advanced technologies

to enhance performance of the national transmission grid
(NTG). We address present and developing technologies that
have great potential for improving specific aspects of NTG
performance, strategic impediments to the practical use of
these technologies, and ways to overcome these impedi-
ments in the near term.
Research and development (R&D) infrastructure serving
power transmission is as badly stressed as the grid itself, for
many of the same reasons. The needs are immediate, and the
immediate alternatives are few. Timely and strategically ef-
fective technology reinforcements to the NTG need direct,
proactive federal involvement to catalyze planning and ex-
ecution. Longer-term adjustments to the R&D infrastructure
may also be needed, in part energy policy can evolve as the
NTG evolves.
250 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Technology and a coordinated national effort are only

two of the elements necessary for timely resolution of the
problems facing the national energy system. Sustainable
solutions require careful balancing between generation and
transmission, profit and risk, the roles of public and pri-
vate institutions, and market forces and the public interest.
There is a vast body of information and opinion on these
issues. A recent white paper by EPRI (formerly known as
the Electric Power Research Institute) clearly lays out the
broad issues and a comprehensive inventory of technology
options for enhancing the grid, including detailed assess-
ments of their direct costs and benefits. Titled “The West-
ern States Power Crisis: Imperatives and Opportunities,”
(EPRI 2001), this document notes that “…the present
power crisis—most evident in the Western states but po-
tentially a national problem—requires a fundamental reas-
sessment of the critical interactive role of technology and
policy in both infrastructure and markets” (EPRI 2001).
Similar assessments of needs and solutions, many of which
arrive at similar conclusions, are found in a series of stud-
ies extending back to 1980 (DOE 1980). A widely shared
view concerning the urgency of technology solutions is
provided in Scherer 1999.
The strategic need is not just for new technology in the
laboratory but for an infusion of improved, cost-effective
technology to work in the power system. The chief impedi-
ments to infusion are institutional and can be resolved by a
proactive national consensus regarding institutional roles.
Until this consensus is achieved, the lack of cohesion be-
tween technology and policy may be disruptive for contin-
ued development of the NTG and the infrastructures that it
serves.
This issue paper discusses the use of new technologies
to enhance the performance of the NTG, as follows:
Appendices 251

• Background on power system operation in general and

the specifics of the NTG.

• The new demands being placed on the NTG and out-

lines the technology needed to address these demands.

• The impact of existing institutional frameworks on the

application of new technology to the transmission grid.

• The strategic challenges that can be addressed through

accelerated use of selected new technologies.

• The institutional issues associated with moving new

technology from the research laboratory to deployment
in the grid.

• A summary of some of the options discussed in the

paper.

• Appendix A is an extensive (though not exhaustive) list

of new technologies that could be applied to the NTG.

BACKGROUND

The transition to open electrical energy markets is

stressing the NTG beyond its design capabilities. Less con-
spicuously, this transition is also stressing the management
infrastructure by which transmission facilities are planned,
developed, and operated. Stresses on this infrastructure are
a major strategic impediment to the focused development
and timely deployment of technical solutions to shortfalls in
national grid capacity. The subsections below give some
transmission system background that is necessary to under-
stand these technological issues.
252 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Power System Components and Reciprocal Impacts

The power system has three components: generation,
load, and transmission. Electric power is produced by gen-
erators, consumed by loads, and transmitted from genera-
tors to loads by the transmission system. Typically, the
“transmission system” (or “the grid”) refers to the high-volt-
age, networked system of transmission lines and transform-
ers. The lower-voltage, radial lines and transformers that
actually serve load are referred to as the “distribution sys-
tem.” The voltage difference between the transmission sys-
tem and the distribution system varies from utility to utility;
100 kV is a typical value. This paper focuses only on ad-
vanced technologies for the transmission system.
It is important to understand reciprocal impacts among
the transmission system, load, and generation. Because the
transmission system’s job is to move electric power from
generation to load, any technologies that change or redistrib-
ute generation and/or load will have a direct impact on the
transmission system. This can be illustrated using a simple
two-bus, two-generator example shown in one-line form in
Figure 1. The solid lines represent the buses, the circles rep-
resent the generators, and the large arrow represents the
aggregate load at bus 2. Three transmission lines join the
generator at bus 1 to the load and generation at bus 2. Super-
imposed on the transmission lines are arrows whose sizes
are proportional to the flow of power on the lines. The pie
charts for each line indicate the relation between the loading
on each line and its rated capacity. The upper and middle
transmission lines have a rating of 150 MVA, and the lower
line has a rating of 200 MVA. In addition, we assume that the
bus 1 generation is more economical than the generation at
bus 2, and the entire load is being supplied remotely from
the bus 1 generator. With a bus 2 load of 420 MW, the power
distributes among the three lines based on their impedances
Appendices 253

(which are not identical), so the upper line is loaded at 67

percent, the middle at 89 percent, and the lower at 100 per-
cent. Note: there are 13 MW of transmission line losses in
this case.

Transfer Capacity
A natural question to ask is: what is the transfer capacity
of the transmission system described in Figure 1? That is,
how much power can be transferred from bus 1 to bus 2?
The answer is far from straightforward. At first glance, the
transfer capacity appears to be 420 MW because this amount
of power causes the first line to reach its limit. However, this
answer is based on the assumption that all lines are in ser-
vice. As defined by the North American Electric Reliability
Council (NERC), transfer capacity includes consideration of
reliability. A typical reliability criterion is that a system be
able to withstand the unexpected outage of any single sys-
tem element; this is known as the first contingency total

Figure 1: Two-Bus Example with No Local Generation

254 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

transfer capability (FCTTC). Based on this criterion, Figure 2

shows the limiting case with an assumed contingency on the
lower line, which results in a transfer capability of only 252
MW. Which number is correct?
The answer depends on system operational philosophy
and on the availability of high-speed system controls. If the
operational philosophy requires that no load be involun-
tarily lost following any individual contingency, and if there
are no mechanisms to quickly increase the generation at bus
2, voluntarily decrease the load at bus 2, or redistribute the
flow between the remaining upper two lines, then the limit
would be 252 MW. With these limitations, the only way to
increase the transfer capacity would be to construct new
lines.
However, if we relax one or more of these conditions,
the transfer capacity could be increased without construction
of new lines. For example, one approach would be to pro-
vide at least some of the bus 2 load with incentives so that,

Figure 2: Two-Bus Example with Limiting Contingency

Appendices 255

following the contingency, some customers on bus 2 would

voluntarily curtail their loads. Incentives might involve
price-feedback mechanisms or agreements to allow the sys-
tem operator to curtail load through some type of direct-
control load management or interruptible demand. Another
approach would be to have a mechanism for quickly com-
mitting some local bus 2 generation. Availability of local
generation reduces the net loading on the transmission sys-
tem and can increase its capacity. A third approach would be
to use advanced power electronics controls such as flexible
AC transmission system (FACTS) devices to balance the load
between the upper two lines.
The unifying themes of these alternative approaches are
knowledge about the real-time operation of the system,
availability of effective controls, and an information infra-
structure that permits effective use of the controls. To under-
stand these themes, it is important to understand the
complexity of the actual national transmission grid.

Complexity of the National Transmission Grid

The term “national transmission grid” is something of a
misnomer. The North American transmission grid actually
consists of four large grids, each primarily a synchronous
alternating current (AC) system. Together, these four grids
span parts of three sovereign countries (U.S., Canada, and
Mexico). By far the largest grid is the Eastern Interconnec-
tion, which supplies power to most of the U.S. east of the
Rocky Mountains as well as to all the Canadian provinces
except British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec. The Western
Interconnection supplies most of the U.S. west of the
Rockies, as well as British Columbia, Alberta, and a portion
of Baja, California. The remaining two grids are the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which covers most of
Texas, and the province of Quebec. In contrast to the two-bus
256 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

example presented above, the Eastern and the Western Inter-

connections contain tens of thousands of high-voltage buses
and many thousands of individual generators and loads.
Because the individual grids are asynchronous with one
another, no power can be transferred among them except in
small amounts through a few back-to-back direct current
(DC) links. Several major DC transmission lines are also
used within the individual grids for long-distance power
transfer.
At any given time the loading on the grid depends on
where power is being generated and consumed. Load is
controlled by millions of individual customers, so it varies
continuously. Because electricity cannot be readily stored,
generation must also vary continuously to track load
changes. In addition, the impedances of the many thousands
of individual transmission lines and transformers dictate
grid loading. With several notable exceptions, there is no
way to directly control this flow—electrons flow as dictated
by the laws of physics. Because electricity propagates
through the network very rapidly, power can be transferred
almost instantaneously (within seconds) from one end of the
grid to the other. In general, this interconnectivity makes
grid operations robust and reliable. However, it also has a
detrimental effect if the grid fails; failures in one location can
quickly affect the entire system in complex and dramatic
ways, and large-scale blackouts may result.
The grid’s ability to transfer power is restricted by ther-
mal flow limits on individual transmission lines and trans-
formers; minimum and maximum limits on acceptable
bus-voltage magnitudes; and region-wide transient, oscilla-
tory, and voltage-stability limitations. Given NERC’s reliabil-
ity requirements, these limits must be considered not only
for current and actual system operating point but also for a
large number of statistically likely contingent conditions as
Appendices 257

well. The complexity of maximizing the power transfer capa-

bility of the grid while avoiding stressing it to the point of
collapse cannot be overstated.

Technologies to Increase Transfer Capacity

The goal of this issue paper is to examine technologies
that can be used to increase the grid’s power-transfer capa-
bility. This increase can be achieved by a combination of
direct technical reinforcements to the grid itself along with
indirect information and control reinforcements that im-
prove grid management practices and infrastructure.
Direct reinforcement of the grid includes new construc-
tion and broad use of improved hardware technology. Strate-
gic decisions regarding these two types of improvements are
a function of grid management—planning, development, and
operation. Grid management involves recognizing transmis-
sion needs, assessing options for meeting those needs, and
balancing new transmission assets and new operating meth-
ods. Timely development and deployment of requisite tech-
nology are essential to reinforcing the grid. Requisite
technology may not mean new technology. There is a massive
backlog of prototype technology that can, given means and
incentives, be adapted to power system applications.
Indirect grid reinforcement includes improving grid
management by means of technology. Historically, the trans-
mission system was operated with very little real-time infor-
mation about its state. During the past few decades,
advances in computer and communication technology in
general and SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion) and EMS (energy management system) technology in
particular have greatly improved data capabilities. Signifi-
cant real-time data are now available in almost every control
center, and many centers can conduct advanced on-line grid
analysis. Despite these improvements, more can and should
258 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

be done. In the control center, additional data need to be

collected, better algorithms need to be developed for deter-
mining system operational limits, and better visualization
methods are needed to present this information to operators.
Beyond the control center, additional system information
needs to be presented to all market participants so that they
can make better-informed decisions about generation, load,
and transmission system investments.

Institutional Issues that Affect Technology Deployment In

order to effectively discuss the role of advanced transmission
technologies, we have to consider how their deployment is
either hindered or encouraged by institutional issues. Ulti-
mately, the bottom line is economics —technologies that are
viewed as cost effective will be used, and those that are con-
sidered too costly will not. The issue of cost is not simple;
public policy must address how costs and benefits should be
allocated. For example, it is difficult to beat the economics of
traditional overhead transmission lines for bulk power trans-
fer. The lines are cheap to build and entail relatively few
ongoing expenses. But the siting of new transmission lines is
not so simple; right of way may be difficult to obtain, and
new lines may face significant public opposition for a variety
of reasons from aesthetic to environmental (for a detailed
discussion, see Issue Paper Transmission Siting and Permitting
by D. Mayer and R. Sedano.) Advanced technologies can
reinforce the grid, minimizing the need for new overhead
lines, but usually at higher cost than would be paid to build
overhead lines. The challenge is to provide incentives that
will encourage the desired transmission investments.
Unfortunately, in recent years the uncertainties associ-
ated with electricity industry restructuring have hampered
progress in transmission reinforcement. The boundaries be-
tween responsibilities for operation and planning were once
Appendices 259

clearly delineated, but these responsibilities are now shifting

to restructured or entirely new transmission organizations.
This process is far from complete and has greatly weakened
the essential dialogue between technology developers and
users. Development of new technology must be closely
linked to its actual deployment for operational use. Together,
these activities should reflect, serve, and keep pace with the
evolving infrastructure needs of transmission organizations.
The current uncertainty discourages this cohesiveness.
The details and the needs of the evolving infrastructure
for grid management are unclear, and all parties are under-
standably averse to investments that may not be promptly
and directly beneficial. Some utilities are concerned that
transmission investments may be of greater benefit to their
competitors than to themselves. In the near term, relief of
congestion may actually harm their businesses. As a result of
such forces, many promising technologies are stranded at
various points in route from concept to practical use. In-
cluded are large-scale devices for routing power flow on the
grid, advanced information systems to observe and assess
grid behavior, real-time operating tools for enhanced man-
agement of grid assets, and new system planning methods
that are robust in relation to the many uncertainties that are
present or are emerging in the new power system.
Another important issue is that some technologies that
would enable healthy and reliable energy commerce are not
perceived as profitable enough to attract the interest of com-
mercial developers. Special means are needed to develop
and deploy these technologies for the public good. Involve-
ment by the federal utilities and national laboratories may be
necessary for timely progress in this area, as well as a broad-
ening of some activities of EPRI or similar umbrella organi-
zations focused on energy R&D along with development of
better mechanisms to spur entrepreneurial innovation.
260 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

NEW DEMANDS ON THE TRANSMISSION GRID

The core objective underlying electricity industry re-

structuring is to provide consumers with a richer menu of
potential energy providers while maintaining reliable deliv-
ery. Restructuring envisions the transmission grid as flexible,
reliable, and open to all exchanges no matter where the sup-
pliers and consumers of energy are located.
However, neither the existing transmission grid nor its
current management infrastructure can fully support such
diverse and open exchange. Transactions that are highly
desirable from a market standpoint may be quite different
from the transactions for which the transmission grid was
designed and may stress the limits of safe operation. The
risks they pose may not be recognized in time to avert major
system emergencies, and, when emergencies occur, they may
be of unexpected types that are difficult to manage without
loss of customer load.
The transmission system was originally constructed to
meet the needs of vertically integrated utilities, moving
power from a local utility’s generation to its customers. In-
terconnections between utilities were primarily to reduce
operating costs and enhance reliability. That is, if a utility
unexpectedly lost a generator, it could temporarily rely on its
neighboring utilities, reducing the costs associated with hav-
ing sufficient reserve generation readily available. The grid
was not designed to accommodate large, long-distance
transfers of electric power.
One of the key problems in managing long-distance
power transfers is an effect known as “loop flow.” Loop flow
arises because of the transmission system’s uncontrollable
nature. As power moves from seller to buyer, it does not
follow any prearranged “contract path.” Rather, power
spreads (or loops) throughout the network. As an example,
Appendices 261

Figure 3 shows how a transmission of power from a utility

in Wisconsin to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) would
affect lines through a large portion of the Eastern Intercon-
nection. A color contour shows the percentage of the transfer
that would flow on each line; lines carrying at least two
percent of the transfer are contoured. As this figure makes
clear, a single transaction can significantly impact the flows
on hundreds of different lines.
The problem with loop flow is that, as hundreds or
thousands of simultaneous transactions are imposed upon
the transmission system, mutual interference develops, pro-
ducing congestion. Mitigating congestion is technically diffi-
cult, and very complex problems emerge when paths are
long enough to span several regions that have not had to
coordinate such operations in the past. These problems in-
clude (but are not limited to) the lack of: effective proce-
dures, operating experience, computer models, and
integrated data resources. The sheer volume of data and in-
formation concerning system conditions, transactions, and
events is overwhelming the existing grid management’s
technology infrastructure.
Increasing the transfer capacity of the NTG will require
combined application of hardware and information tech-
nologies. On the hardware side, many technologies can be
developed, refined, or simply installed to directly reinforce
current transmission capabilities. These technologies range
from passive reinforcements (such as new AC lines built on
new rights of way or better use of existing AC rights of way
by means of innovative device configurations and materials)
to super-conducting equipment to large-scale devices for
routing grid power flow. High-voltage direct current
(HVDC) and FACTS technologies appear especially attrac-
tive for flow control. Effectively deployed and operated,
such technologies can be of great value in extending grid
 262
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 3: Loop Flow of Power Transfer from Wisconsin to TVA
Appendices 263

capabilities and minimizing the need for construction of new

transmission.
The strategic imperative, however, is to develop better
information resources for all aspects of grid management—
planning, development, and operation. Technologies such as
large-scale FACTS generally require the support of a wide-
area measurement system (WAMS), which currently exists
only as a prototype. Without a WAMS, a FACTS or any
major control system technology cannot be adjusted to de-
liver its full value and, in extreme cases, may interact ad-
versely with other equipment. FACTS technology can
provide transmission “muscle” but not necessarily the “intel-
ligence” for applying it.
An example of the information that a WAMS can pro-
vide is shown in Figure 4. Review of data collected on the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) WAMS system fol-
lowing a grid disturbance on August 10, 1996, suggests that
the information that system behavior was abnormal and that
the power system was unusually vulnerable was buried
within the measurements streaming into and stored at the
control center. Had better tools been available at the time,
this information might have given system operators approxi-
mately six minutes’ warning of the event that triggered the
system breakup (PNNL 1999).
Better information is key to better grid management
decisions. The next subsection addresses the kinds of infor-
mation gaps in current grid management.

Information Gaps in Grid Management

As the grid is operated closer to safe limits, knowing
exactly where those limits are and how much operating
margin remains becomes increasingly important. Both limits
and margins must be estimated through computer modeling
and combined with operating experience that the models
 264
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 4. Possible warning signs of the Western Systems breakup of August 10,
1996 – an example of information available from WAMS
Appendices 265

might not and often cannot reflect.

The “edge” of safe operation is defined by numerous
aspects of system behavior and is strongly dependent on
system operating conditions. Some of these conditions are
not well known to system operators, and even those that are
known may change abruptly. Important conditions include
network loading, operating status and behavior of critical
transmission elements, behavior of electrical loads, operating
status and behavior of major control systems, and interac-
tions between the grid and the generators connected to it.
Full performance of the transmission grid requires that gen-
erators provide adequate voltage support plus a variety of
dynamic support functions that maintain power quality
during normal conditions and assist the system during dis-
turbances.
All of these conditions have become more difficult to
anticipate, model, and measure directly. Industry restructur-
ing has exacerbated these difficulties by requiring that trans-
mission facilities be managed with a minimum of
information concerning generation assets. To borrow a
phrase from EPRI (2001), this is one of many areas where
there is a “critical interactive role” between “technology and
policy.” Many cases in recent years have revealed that the
“edge” of safe grid operation is much closer than planning
models had suggested. The Western System breakups of
1996 are especially notable in this respect (see Figure 5), but
there have been less conspicuous warnings before and since
(PNNL 1999). Uncertainties regarding actual system capabil-
ity is a known problem of long-standing, and it has counter-
parts throughout the NTG.
Developing and maintaining realistic models for power
system behavior is technically and institutionally difficult,
and it requires higher-level planning technology than has
previously been available. An infusion of enhanced planning
 266
Transmission Line Reliability and Security
Figure 5. Modeling failure for Western System breakup of August 10, 1996. (MW
on California-Oregon Interconnection)
Appendices 267

technology—plus knowledgeable staff to mentor its devel-

opment and use—is necessary to support timely, appropri-
ate, and cost effective responses to system needs. Better
planning resources are the key to better operation of existing
facilities, to timely anticipation of system problems, and to
full realization of the value offered by technology enhance-
ments at all levels of the power system.

Challenges and Opportunities in Network Control

As noted earlier, the existing AC transmission system
cannot be directly controlled; electric flow spreads through
the network as dictated by the impedance of the system
components. For a given set of generator voltages and sys-
tem loads, the power-flow pattern in an electrical network is
determined by network parameters. Control of network pa-
rameters in an AC system is usually quite limited, so sched-
uling of generators is the primary means for adjusting power
flow for best use of network capacity. When generator sched-
uling fails, the only alternative is load control, either through
voltage reductions or suspension of service. Load control can
be necessary even when some lines are not loaded to full
capacity.
A preferred solution would be a higher degree of control
over power flow than is currently possible, which would,
permit more effective use of transmission resources. Conven-
tional devices for power-flow control include series capaci-
tors to reduce line impedance, phase shifters, and fixed
shunt devices that are attached to the ends of a line to adjust
voltages. All of these devices employ mechanical switches,
which are relatively inexpensive and proven but also slow to
operate and vulnerable to wear, which means that it is not
desirable to operate them frequently and/or use a wide
range of settings; in short, mechanically switched devices are
not very flexible controllers. Nonetheless, they are still the
268 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

primary means used for stepped control of high power

flows.
HVDC transmission equipment offers a much greater
degree of control. If the support of the surrounding AC sys-
tem is sufficient, the power flowing on an HVDC line can be
controlled accurately and rapidly by means of signals ap-
plied to the converter equipment that changes AC power to
DC and then back to AC. In special conditions, HVDC con-
trol may also be used to modify AC voltages at one or more
converters. This flexibility derives from the use of solid-state
electronic switches, which are usually thyristors or gate turn-
off (GTO) devices.
Although HVDC control can influence overall power
flow, it can rarely provide full control of the power flowing
on particular AC transmission lines. However, conventional
power-flow controllers that are upgraded to use electronic
rather than mechanical switches can achieve this control.
This upgrade opens the way to a broad and growing class of
new controller technology known as FACTS. Many engi-
neers regard HVDC technology as a subset of FACTS tech-
nology.
Increasingly, load itself is becoming a fast-acting trans-
mission control device. Some degree of load control has been
available for decades through interruptible rates, time-of-
day rates, and demand-side management programs. A new
possibility is use of real-time price feedback to loads in order
to rapidly tailor the flow of power on the transmission grid,
perhaps encouraging demand in one location while inhibit-
ing it elsewhere. Advances in communication that can rap-
idly convey changing electricity prices to industrial and
commercial users facilitate this control.
Short-term energy storage can aid in power flow con-
trol. Recent work shows that even a small amount of storage
can significantly enhance the performance of some FACTS
Appendices 269

devices, and past research has shown that controllable stor-

age devices have many applications in control of power
quality and system dynamics (De Steese and Dagle 1997).
These applications are addressed in later sections of this
paper.
It should be noted that FACTS technology is still not
entirely mature even though it is based on concepts that are
two decades old. As has been the case with several other
promising technologies, FACTS has not been utilized by the
electricity industry at the rate that its apparent technical
merits would justify. A number of lessons can be drawn from
this. One is that innovative technologies compete against
technologies that are already in place and are better under-
stood. Many utilities view FACTS as not cost effective be-
cause of their high installation price; traditional, passive AC
devices are perceived to have a cost advantage. Furthermore,
though controller-based options for grid reinforcement are
attractive, they are not well understood, and operating expe-
rience with another innovative technology, HVDC systems,
suggests that use of new control devices may result in sig-
nificant and unforeseen interactions with other equipment.
Although these problems can be largely addressed with
WAMS, their costs are unclear, and the consequences of con-
troller malfunctions can be very serious. Some legal opinion
holds that the liabilities from such malfunctions will be sub-
stantially greater than those faced by utilities before industry
restructuring (Fleishman 1997, Roman 1999). Such consider-
ations weigh on the side of grid reinforcement through less
technically demanding means even though the return on
investment may also be smaller.
Very few utilities are in a position to break this impasse
as the management functions for which high-level technolo-
gies like FACTS are of primary relevance are passing from
the utilities to a newly evolving infrastructure based upon
270 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), Independent

System Operators (ISOs), and other entities. This transition is
far from complete in most areas of the U.S., and as yet there
is no “design template” for the nature and the technology
needs of this new infrastructure.

THE EVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE FOR

TRANSMISSION MANAGEMENT

The movement of operation and planning responsibili-

ties from their place in the vertically integrated utility struc-
ture to the evolving new and restructured organizations has
greatly weakened the essential dialogue between technology
developers and users. Although this paper focuses on ad-
vanced transmission technologies, these technologies cannot
be adequately discussed outside the context of the institu-
tional framework within which they will be used. Develop-
ment of advanced technology must be closely linked to its
actual deployment for operational use. Together, these activi-
ties should reflect, serve, and keep pace with the evolving
infrastructure needs of transmission organizations. Frame-
works that discourage technology deployment will eventu-
ally inhibit its development. Unfortunately, the current
uncertainty has produced exactly this effect.
To simplify our discussion, we assume that primary
responsibility for grid management is assigned to an RTO.
The following unknowns are of special concern:

• definition of RTO functions and resources,

• relationship between RTO and control areas,

• access to and sharing of operational information, and

Appendices 271

• timeline for deployment of the supporting infrastruc-

ture for RTO operations.

Uncertainties about the evolving institutional frame-

work for transmission management impede timely develop-
ment and deployment of requisite technology. Key
unknowns include:

• what functionalities require technical support and

where they will be located within the overall infrastruc-
ture;

• what level of technological sophistication can be ratio-

nalized, accommodated, and supported at specific loca-
tions within the grid management infrastructure;

• how to accommodate the risks associated with opera-

tional use of prototypes;

• what extensions or refinements may be needed before

particular technologies can provide full value in power
system environments; and

• what the role will be of the RTO and other grid manage-
ment entities in the overall R&D infrastructure serving
power transmission needs.

Resolving these uncertainties in a timely manner may

require that national energy policy address the infrastructure
of transmission management. For the immediate future, the
best course may be for policy makers to seek counsel from
entities that are still involved in higher levels of grid man-
agement.
272 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES TO A NEW

GENERATION OF TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGY

Many technologies, some surprising, are applicable to

large power systems. Some hardware whose application to
power systems may not be obvious at first include: acousti-
cal radar to locate buried objects, radiation sensors to detect
incipient failure in connectors or insulators, robotic vehicles
(including unmanned aircraft) to examine the condition of
transmission lines, specialized devices to mitigate the wave-
form pollution associated with some lighting technologies,
the NASA Advanced Composition Explorer satellite (located
more than one million miles from earth) to provide early
warning of geomagnetic storms, and intruder alarms at un-
manned facilities. Life sciences applications include study of:
the biological effects of electromagnetic fields, the environ-
mental impacts of a proposed transmission line on forest
cover and wildlife, the function of naturally occurring mi-
crobes that can safely digest toxic spills, and the social/bio-
logical factors involved in management of large river
systems. We can add to this a vast array of applications in
materials science, advanced hardware and fuels, information
systems, mathematical modeling and analysis, process auto-
mation, risk management, and decision support systems.
This paper’s purpose is not to inventory the possible
technology options. Recent studies by EPRI (EPRI 1997, EPRI
2001) present massive inventories with projections of likely
merits, and a long series of DOE studies examines the sub-
ject from the perspective of national needs (DOE 1980-2000).
The opportunities have not changed much in a decade, but
the needs have become much more acute.
The subsections below list the strategic challenges that
can be addressed through enhanced technology. Each chal-
lenge is stated as a functionality that will improve the overall
Appendices 273

performance of the NTG. Candidate technologies to meet

each challenge are briefly discussed, and their current state
of development is noted. An extensive, partial listing of new
equipment technologies that could be applied to the NTG is
given in Appendix A.

Technology Challenge #1:

Broader Coordination of Grid Management
DOE’s National Power Grid Study of 1980 notes that
“Coordinated power system planning, development and
operation results in reduction in fixed costs, reduction in
operating costs, lower risks, and better utilization of natural
resources.” The report also lists impediments to full realiza-
tion. The issues raised then have been rearticulated many
times since; they are persistent, basic forces in the develop-
ment of large power systems.
What has changed is the context within which these
forces operate. There is now an artificial information barrier
between generation and transmission, and coordination
across that barrier is indirect (e.g., based upon market sig-
nals). However, direct coordination across broad geographi-
cal areas has become much more feasible from a technical
standpoint and is directly consistent with the objectives of
industry restructuring and the effective functioning of the
national transmission grid.
A recent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) directive assigning ultimate responsibility for grid
management to a few “mega-RTOs” is a step toward the
institutional framework needed for truly wide area manage-
ment of the NTG. Although the details of this framework are
still to be worked out, information technologies will be key
to the infrastructure. Integrated computer models must
quickly and accurately support power-flow calculation, risk
assessment, and emergency management across broad areas
274 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

of North America where such activities are now performed

piecemeal. Modeling studies must be reinforced by mea-
sured information, which is also needed to assure the valid-
ity of the models. Great volumes of operational data must be
integrated and sifted for indications of hidden problems or
to facilitate general grid management decisions. High capac-
ity data links are needed among control centers and RTOs.
High capacity information links of a different kind are
needed to achieve “virtual work team” collaboration among
supporting staff who may be located at widely separated
locations and institutions. All of these improvements must
be made with close attention to the overall security of the
information process and facilities.
One approach to real-time operational system data
would be to continue the current utility strategy of treating
practically all such data as proprietary. Currently, only a
small group of (often overworked) utility employees has
access to system operational data. Although the reasons that
utilities would like to keep the details of their operations
hidden from public scrutiny are clear, a significant lesson
from the recent electricity crisis in California is that when the
grid fails, the public pays the price. Furthermore, the shared
nature of the transmission grid and the fact that problems in
one area can rapidly propagate throughout the entire grid
make the electricity industry unique. The data that are pub-
lic by federal mandate, such as FERC Form 715 filings, are
helpful, but errors, such as base-case-limit violations, restrict
the usefulness of these data. The release of highly processed
information, such as the posting of available transmission
capacity (ATC) or Locational Marginal Price (LMP) data on
the Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS), is
also helpful, but the calculations are impossible to verify or
extend if the raw source data are not available.
An alternative approach would be public posting of
Appendices 275

near-real-time operational data. FERC did not prohibit ac-

cess by generators to transmission data; rather, it required
that such access be non-discriminatory. Freeing the data
might free the industry’s entrepreneurial spirit. As a result of
restructuring, the number of players interested in knowing
the operational state of the grid has skyrocketed from a
handful of vertically integrated utilities to hundreds of mar-
keters, independent generators, regulators, and consultants.
Currently, generation companies are making investment de-
cisions about new plants, which cost hundreds of millions of
dollars, based on very limited information about actual grid
operation. This situation is almost guaranteed to produce
some disastrous choices. New transmission lines may be
needed, but how can governmental agencies and the public
make informed decisions when information about actual
grid operation is unavailable? New transmission technolo-
gies are being developed, but how can their manufacturers
make informed business decisions about which technologies
to pursue when they have limited means to determine need?
If data were available, third parties might quickly de-
velop innovative informational products to meet the
industry’s needs. Third parties interested in selling to a
market much larger than the traditional utility EMS market
could develop many of the tool sets needed for analyzing
large RTOs. Even with the limited data available today, third
parties are offering some innovative grid analysis and visu-
alization products. Increased availability of data might also
allow for more effective independent oversight of grid op-
eration. Currently, there is little oversight. Federal and state
regulatory agencies do not have the tools or the data to ef-
fectively oversee grid activities, and because there is no ac-
cess to these data, there is little incentive for third parties to
develop the requisite tools.
Useful data might include transmission device status
276 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

information, real and reactive power flows for transmission

facilities, voltages and frequencies at key points within the
transmission network, along with more processed data such
as ATC and LMP information. Given the current low cost of
computer storage and the availability of high-speed data
communication, dissemination of these data should be
simple. For example, the posting of hourly snapshots of
5,000 flow values and 2,000 status values would require less
than one megabyte of storage per day. Immediate public
release of some data, such as generator offers, would not be
appropriate.
As a result of increased concern about possible terrorist
activity, public access to transmission system information
has actually become substantially more restricted. For ex-
ample, on October 11, 2001 FERC restricted public access to
a substantial amount of energy facility data, including the
FERC Form 715 data. This is unfortunate and, for the most
part, unnecessary. Public access to a large amount of addi-
tional information is possible without jeopardizing either the
physical security of the transmission system or legitimate
proprietary concerns of grid participants. Without such data
it will become increasingly difficult for market participants
to effectively utilize the NTG. As a minimum, there is a need
for an industry-wide discussion on what data can legiti-
mately be made public and what data must remain propri-
etary, and on the best mechanism for the release of this data.
Regardless of whether data remain proprietary within
RTOs or enter the public domain, key technologies for broad
data coordination are digital communications, high-perfor-
mance computing, computer mathematics, data manage-
ment and mining, collaboration networks, information
security, and operations analysis. Discussion of these sub-
jects and partial templates for the needed R&D can be found
in reports issued by the DOE and EPRI as part of the ongo-
Appendices 277

ing WAMS effort (DOE 1999). Much R&D for data coordina-
tion would draw upon and directly reinforce the evolving
Reliability Information Network by which Regional Security
Coordinators share grid information in near real time.

Technology Challenge #2:

Knowing the Limits of Safe Operation
Full use of transmission capacity means that the system
will be loaded close to the “edge” of safe operation. In recent
years, many cases have revealed this edge to be much closer
than had been expected. Less dramatic yet of equal or
greater importance are the many undocumented situations
in which grid capacity has been significantly underutilized
because lack of knowledge about real system limits resulted
in overly conservative operation. Safe operating limits are
defined by a multiplicity of system conditions that have
become more difficult to anticipate, model, and measure
directly.
Electrical conditions on the transmission system may
not be fully known, and even if they were, their full impli-
cations might not be. It is not possible to anticipate and
study all possible conditions, and the computer models used
in studies are sometimes sufficiently unrealistic that they
produce misleading results. Partial remedies would be to
augment modeling results with measured data and to cali-
brate models against observed system behavior.
The challenge here is partly technical and partly institu-
tional. On the technical side, the determination of safe oper-
ating ranges requires a variety of different inputs that are
associated with a variety of different time frames, all of
which are dependent on the accuracy of the underlying
models and of the data provided to those models. The long-
est planning time frame is associated with operational limits
set by planners weeks or months ahead. These usually in-
278 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

clude transient stability limitations, oscillatory stability limi-

tations, and voltage stability limitations and are conditional
on long-term forecasts of customer demand and overall
power system resources. Because assumed conditions are
seldom the same as actual operating conditions, the limits
are intended to be sufficiently conservative that modest dif-
ferences between predicted and actual operating conditions
can be accommodated through later planning adjustments.
These adjustments take place in a shorter time frame that
supports planning for several hours to several days in ad-
vance. This shorter time frame permits more precise fore-
casts of pending system conditions, but it restricts the
opportunity for in-depth analysis and the range of opera-
tional alternatives that can be considered. The planning and
decision tools used in this time frame, though sometimes ad
hoc, often provide market-critical information such as ATC
to be communicated to market participants via the OASIS.
Finally, in near-real time, system operators use the EMS to
observe and assess the actual status of the power system.
On-line tools, such as real-time power flow and contingency
analysis, provide guidance for managing situations in which
real-time conditions are substantially different from what
was planned.
Ideally, the planning process insures that maximum
transmission capability is available to the power market
while system reliability is maintained. The challenge is that
errors may arise at any point in the process. One problem, as
noted above, is that the electrical conditions and their impli-
cations may not be fully known. The system must be ob-
served in such a way that system operators receive timely
and complete information. Complicating observation of the
system is what is known as the issue of “seams” between
areas of the grid. Currently in the U.S. there are approxi-
mately 140 different utility control areas and 20 higher-level
Appendices 279

security coordinators, each trying to monitor its portion of

the grid. As EPRI (2001) notes, “each control entity is like its
own sovereign nation as far as market and data practices go,
and coordinating power transfers that extend beyond the
borders of an entity entails complex technical tradeoff analy-
ses consistent with how the grid actually responds to inter-
regional power flows.” Power flows easily between control
areas, and, as illustrated by the example in Figure 3, the
transactions and control actions in one or two areas can have
grid-wide implications.
Another source of error in the planning process is that
assumed conditions may differ widely from real-time condi-
tions. If the planning limits are too high, or if some market-
driven transfers become too heavy, the system may be in
danger of widespread, cascading outages. In these circum-
stances, some market activities would have to be curtailed
through actions such as TLR (transmission loading relief).
Alternatively, planning limits may be too low or ATC results
too conservative. In these cases, the transmission grid may
be underutilized, with the market sending erroneous signals
to adjust more generation or transmission than needed. One
example is transmission line thermal limits, which in many
markets are the limiting constraints on ATC. The amount of
power that can be transferred along a line is highly depen-
dent on ambient weather conditions. Yet fixed limits are
used in most cases (sometimes these limits differ in winter
and summer). Better estimation of these limits, perhaps
coupled with real-time measurement of conductor tempera-
ture or sag, could result in a significant increase in ATC. The
seams issue arises here as well because each security coordi-
nator is simultaneously performing studies to determine
transmission capability, usually without detailed knowledge
of what its neighbors are doing.
A third source of error is flawed conceptual formulation
280 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

of the models that are used to predict power system behav-

ior under highly stressed conditions. A common theme in
the post-mortem analyses of major system disturbances is
that the models did not correctly predict or replicate actual
system behavior. One recent example is the near-voltage-
collapse in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland connec-
tion (PJM) during July 1999 (DOE 2000). Effective
intervention by PJM operators averted a loss of load, in large
part as a result of EMS technology that afforded unusually
good real-time observation of grid voltages. Later analysis
revealed substantial optimism in the assumed capabilities of
many PJM generators to support system voltages (through
reactive power generation) while producing specific levels of
real power (megawatts). These findings parallel utility expe-
rience around the world: the actual capability and behavior
of a thermal power plant may be radically different from
that indicated by generator models or nameplates. This
seems especially true of gas-fired turbines, which constitute
almost all new plant construction. (It has been reported that
some operators outside the U.S. take their plants to maxi-
mum output every hour, just to establish capability limits.)
The emerging picture is that reserve generation capability
for emergency use is much smaller than previously believed,
and that financial considerations may encourage plant op-
erations changes that compound the problem in ways that
system planners are just now starting to recognize. This is
one of several issues that the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) has been monitoring through its Transmission Reli-
ability Program.
A related issue associated with the NTG study is the
need for better computer modeling of the interrelationships
between electricity markets and the NTG. An accurate as-
sessment of the cost impact of the NTG bottlenecks on mar-
ket operation requires detailed, time-varying analysis (e.g.,
Appendices 281

hour by hour) of an entire interconnected system. Since in

some portions of the NTG the constraints are due to reac-
tive/voltage problems, traditional, linear transportation-
based models are not adequate. Such analysis could prove
crucial to determining the optimal locations for expanded
transmission capacity. Previously, such detailed analysis had
been computationally prohibitive. However, faster computer
processors and greater availability of parallel processing are
rapidly removing these barriers. Development of the neces-
sary computer models and algorithms for this analysis has
also been hindered by lack of availability of the interconnect-
wide data needed to perform such an analysis.
From a technical viewpoint, the immediate solution is to
continue the incremental changes that have been taking
place. These include developing enhanced real-time systems
for measurement-based information, improved tools for sys-
tem analysis and visualization, improved data communica-
tion between control centers and security coordinators,
increased utilization of improved computer technology to
move system limit calculations closer to real time, and in-
creased feedback of system operational data to system plan-
ners to improve the calibration of models against observed
system behavior. There is a significant need to improve our
understanding of the fundamental behavior of the power
system and the conditions or events that lead to system fail-
ure. Improved models are an essential element of this effort.
Proactive federal involvement in the development of inter-
connect-wide models and tools could be quite helpful.
The solutions noted above neglect relevant institutional
issues. Simply stated, in most markets there is a fundamental
dichotomy between the commercial participants and the
transmission managers who make the market possible. Un-
like the commercial participants, the managers have no clear
“pay for performance” mechanism for recovering their fi-
282 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

nancial investments. The absence of such a mechanism has

fostered a spiraling decline in staffing, priority, and overall
resources given to system planning. Calibration of planning
models and direct assessment of power system behavior
should be integral to the planning process. The industry has
a growing wealth of data to support this conclusion, not only
from its EMS facilities but also from a host of sources includ-
ing integrated phasor measurement systems and substation-
based data recorders. Unfortunately, most of the utility staff
with access to these data are too burdened by day-to-day
tasks to use the data or the tools required to analyze the
data. Repeated staff reductions have meant that this complex
task has almost vanished from utility organizational charts.
As highlighted in EPRI (2001), the linkages among markets,
technology, and policy are fundamental and must be under-
stood and adjusted to best effect.
Key technologies for this understanding are essentially
the same as those noted for Technology Challenge #1. Spe-
cial requirements include mathematical systems theory, sig-
nal analysis, operations analysis, and probabilistic
methodology.

Technology Challenge #3:

Extending the Controllability of Network Flow
A higher degree of power flow control than is currently
possible is a very attractive means to improve utilization of
transmission resources. Conventional power-flow control
devices include series capacitors to reduce line impedance,
phase shifters, and shunt devices that are attached to the
ends of a line to adjust voltages. A far higher degree of con-
trol is provided by HVDC transmission equipment and
FACTS technology. The so-called NGH (a device, in which
power electronics facilitate safe application of a conventional
series capacitor) appears to be a precursor to FACTS technol-
Appendices 283

ogy.
Devices that improve flow control can be used individu-
ally or in combination to directly regulate power routing on
the grid and to relieve dynamic problems that may limit grid
utilization. Control of this sort is a very attractive alternative
to the construction of new or stronger lines. This is not the
whole story, however, because power system controls are
subject to errors in the control law on which they are based
or the models from which the control law is developed. (This
is in contrast to the functional reliability of a new transmis-
sion line or power plant, which is almost synonymous with
its hardware reliability.) Because of this vulnerability, the
overall reliability of large-scale control systems cannot be
assessed or assured by the straightforward and proven
methods that are used in construction-based reinforcements
to the grid. How, then, should the choice be made between
controls and construction of new transmission capacity?
A full demonstration of controller reliability is rarely
possible. It is always necessary to trade controller benefits
against the risks associated with closing a high-power con-
trol loop around system dynamics that are not fully ob-
served and not fully understood. Controller reliability must
be assessed broadly, incorporating engineering judgment
and sound practice. Uncertainty should be mitigated where
possible, but this is often a slow and technically difficult
process (Hauer & Hunt 1996). Whatever uncertainty cannot
be mitigated should be accommodated in controller design
and operation. All of these measures require that wide-area
control systems be supported by wide-area information sys-
tems, and that the grid management infrastructure include
an appropriate degree of technical expertise in control engi-
neering (Hauer & Taylor 1998).
Wide-area control, whether using FACTS or less ad-
vanced technologies, offers many benefits to the next-gen-
284 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

eration national transmission grid. A recent FACTS installa-

tion in Brazil is especially noteworthy; it links two regional
systems with an AC line plus two thyristor-controlled series
capacitor (TCSC) units. Prior to this, a DC line would have
been the inevitable and more expensive choice.
Here in the U.S., the installation by the New York Power
Authority of a Convertible Static Compensator (CSC) FACTS
device has increased the power transfers on the Utica-Al-
bany power corridor by 60 MW in its initial phase, with a
projected increase to 240 MW when Phase Two is completed
in 2002. However, it is important to place these numbers in
context. Overall, the peak electricity demand in New York
State is approximately 30,000 MW, with approximately half
the demand in upstate New York and the remainder in New
York City and Long Island. The current import capability
from the upstate region to the city and Long Island is ap-
proximately 4,500 MW, with another 2,000 MW coming from
PJM. Therefore, the increase from the CSC device is approxi-
mately five percent of the current capacity, and about 1.5% of
the peak New York City/Long Island load.
A proposal that complements the use of FACTS devices
to achieve better network control is to break up the current
Eastern and Western Interconnections into smaller, more
manageable synchronous interconnections. These smaller
interconnections (which could correspond to existing re-
gional reliability councils) would be joined by HVDC ties;
the size of the ties would match existing transmission trans-
fer capabilities (De Steese and Dagle 1997). The use of HVDC
between the interconnections would permit complete control
of power flows between interconnections, completely elimi-
nating long-distance loop flow. Loop flow would still be an
issue within the interconnections, but their smaller size
would make this flow easier to manage. Of course, such
wide-scale dismantling of the Eastern and Western Intercon-
Appendices 285

nections would require major investment in new HVDC

lines and could present a host of new, unforeseen technical
problems.
A key challenge to the use of advanced technology to
achieve better network control is that it is a “high tech”
option entering the business environment for utilities, ISOs,
and other grid managers, which today favors “low tech”
investments. Advanced control technology is often charac-
terized by high initial costs and ongoing maintenance and
operation costs. In addition, use of HVDC or FACTS devices
can result in higher power losses, with typical converter
losses of one or two percent of flow. For most utilities, cost-
benefit analysis currently favors doing nothing, letting new
generation take care of the need, or investing in familiar
passive AC devices. Outstanding issues to be addressed be-
fore advanced technologies can compete in such an environ-
ment include the need for operational experience,
quantification of benefits, and resolution of impediments to
reliable control in high-performance applications.
High-performance hardware for wide-area control is
ready for use; conventional technologies have served local
and regional needs for many years. Full use of wide-area
control demands an improved infrastructure for wide-area
information. WAMS, the information counterpart to FACTS
control, is expressly designed to provide this infrastructure.

Technology Challenge #4:

Dealing with Operational Uncertainty
Providing reliable and economical electric power calls
for two parallel efforts related to uncertainty. The first is to
reduce uncertainty by means of information that is better
and more timely than what is currently available. The sec-
ond is to accommodate the residual uncertainty through the
use of appropriate decision tools.
286 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

In 1996, two massive breakups of the western power

system demonstrated the need for improved resources to
deal with the unexpected. As noted above, data collected in
real time at BPA’s Dittmer control center contained subtle
but definite indications of oscillatory instability for several
minutes prior to the actual breakup on August 10. BPA op-
erators also reported that hints of weak voltage support may
have been present for much longer. Had there been means
for converting these hints to unambiguous operator alerts,
that breakup might have been avoided entirely.
Contradicting actual system behavior, later studies per-
formed with standard WSCC models (adjusted to the condi-
tions and events leading to the breakup) indicated that the
system had excellent dynamic stability. Enhanced models,
internally adjusted to match observed system behavior, are
outwardly more realistic but still suspect. Modeling errors
are one of many uncertainties that improved resources for
grid management must accommodate.
Even if suitable planning models had been available,
operating conditions preceding the August 10 breakup were
far from nominal and had not been examined in system re-
liability studies. These studies are generally performed
weeks to months in advance, and planners cannot anticipate
all combinations of seemingly minor outages that may be
part of the operation of a large power system. Planning
uncertainty and its attendant risks can be mitigated in part
if system capacity studies are performed with a much
shorter forecasting horizon and based on reasonable ex-
trapolations of current operating conditions. This approach
calls for much broader real-time access to those conditions
than any one regional control center now provides. The req-
uisite computer tools are directly consistent with the frame-
work envisioned for dynamic security assessment (DSA),
however. This is also true of the measurement-based opera-
Appendices 287

tor alerts mentioned earlier although the mathematics

needed is quite different.
The combinatorial problem for longer-term planning
remains especially formidable. The number of likely contin-
gency patterns, already huge, is becoming even larger as the
market seeks energy transactions across longer distances.
Future practices may also represent model errors as contin-
gencies. Even without this change, direct examination of
each individual contingency pattern is not feasible. Contin-
gency evaluation is a further challenge. Never a simple
matter, it must now reflect new linkages between system
reliability and market economics. Decisions must be ren-
dered more rapidly than before despite increased uncer-
tainty and sometimes increased risk.
Reducing and accommodating these uncertainties re-
quires a broad, multi-faceted effort. Requisite technologies
include:

• Improved real-time tools to examine power system sig-

nals for warnings of dangerous behavior. The more rap-
idly that operator intervention is initiated, the more
likely that a blackout can be averted.

• Improved visualization, giving operators a bird’s-eye

view of the power system.

• Mathematical criteria, tools, and procedures for reduc-

ing and/or characterizing errors in power system mod-
els.

• Characterizations and probabilistic models for uncer-

tainties in power-system resources and operating condi-
tions.
288 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Probabilistic models, tools, and methodologies for col-

lective examination of contingencies that are now con-
sidered individually.

• Cost models for quantifying the overall impact of con-

tingencies and ranking them accordingly. It is essential
that these models be realistic and suitable for use as
standards for planning and operation of the overall
transmission grid.

• Risk management tools, based on the above probabilis-

tic models of contingencies and their costs, that “opti-
mize” use of the electricity system while maintaining
requisite levels of reliability.

Development of the technology noted above can likely

be expedited through technology transfers from outside the
power industry. Even so, there are special and difficult prob-
lems. The knowledge base for actual power system behavior,
required both to define the subject technologies and obtain
best value from their use, is not well evolved. The knowl-
edge base and the technologies should develop together, in
or close to a practical utility environment.
Furthermore, probabilistic planning is not just a smooth
extrapolation of current practices. It requires new skills and
practices. These practices must be developed, evaluated
against those now in use, and then approved for use at the
RTO level. These matters should be addressed at the earliest
possible stage of technology development.

Technology Challenge #5: A Grid that Heals Itself

The interconnection of large power systems into still
larger ones greatly increases the possibilities for widespread
failure. Grid managers go to great lengths to anticipate and
Appendices 289

avoid such failure. However, at some level of complexity,

anticipation and avoidance become too difficult or expen-
sive.
A variety of lessons can be extracted from the 1996
breakups of the western power system. One of these lessons
is that when prevention of system breakups becomes im-
practical, it is time to focus on minimizing the consequences.
A triage approach has long been characteristic of grid opera-
tions; the operation of individual relays is a good example of
removal of a small portion of the system to save the whole.
On a broader basis, the use of under-frequency load shed-
ding has been a very effective means of saving the grid from
frequency decay at a cost of perhaps five or 10 percent of
total load. Limited self-healing is also found in the use of
automatic circuit-break reclosing after events such as the loss
of a line from a lightning strike.
What is new since 1996 is a shift in emphasis from ag-
gressive use of preventive control, accepting possible loss of
some load, to consideration of “dynamic islanding” strate-
gies that accommodate an occasional breakup while mini-
mizing its impacts and assuring smooth restoration of
electricity services. Dynamic islanding would involve:

• Emergency, possibly localized, controls that separate the

power system into either predefined islands or dynami-
cally defined islands as dictated by conditions that are
sensed locally.

• Islanding options designed for minimal loss of service,

given proper control assistance.

• Islanding and restoration as a continuous smooth pro-

cess controlled by FACTS, HVDC, or automatic genera-
tion control.
290 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

• Conversion of some AC lines to DC. This change is

particularly attractive for lines that would otherwise
become stranded assets under the pressure of new gen-
eration installed close to major loads.

Avoiding just one catastrophic event would likely pay-

back much of the investment cost of FACTS technology and
the associated infrastructure. But there are both technical
and institutional concerns. From a technical point of view,
developing even limited islanding capability, let alone grid
self-healing, is an immense challenge. During islanding, the
two new islands will be simultaneously presented with a
combination of potentially large initial generation/load im-
balances and changes in line flows as existing tie flows are
eliminated. Frequency regulation characteristics will also
change due to the changes in total inertia. Although a dy-
namic islanding scheme has been implemented on the
WSCC system, its use on the Eastern system would be much
more involved because of the higher density of tie lines.
From an institutional point of view, incentives would be
needed to encourage the development of islanding schemes.
It appears that only an ISO or RTO would in a strong busi-
ness position to assume the costs given the geographical area
involved.

Technology Challenge #6: More Power in Less Space

There are many reasons to seek power system equip-
ment that requires a minimum of space. New rights of way
for transmission lines are environmentally intrusive, difficult
to route, and subject to a very slow approval process as local
authorities are increasingly reluctant to approve projects that
do not address local need. These problems tend to be less
severe for underground transmission cables, but new routes
or added space for underground cables may be impossible in
Appendices 291

highly urbanized environments like Chicago or New York

City; costs inhibit the use of underground cables in less ur-
ban areas. Substations, generators, and transformers all ben-
efit from having a smaller “footprint,” especially if the
equipment itself is smaller and more portable.
So how can we fit more power into a given space, or
into even less space? Conventional solutions include
“reconductoring” lines to carry more current at the same
voltage, revising lines to operate at higher voltage (if pos-
sible), and converting AC lines to DC. The use of composite
materials is a promising approach for reconductoring. Tradi-
tionally, overhead transmission lines have been constructed
using aluminum conductors steel reinforced (ACSR) consist-
ing of stranded aluminum about a stranded steel core. The
aluminum carries the current, and the steel provides me-
chanical support. The limiting constraint for such lines is sag
resulting from heating. A new approach for increasing con-
ductor current capacity without increasing weight is to re-
place the steel core with a composite material, such as
glass-fiber. Because the tensile strength of the glass is up to
250 percent of the strength of steel, the composite conductors
are lighter and stronger and could have higher current ca-
pacity. Reduction in sag allows tighter spacing of conduc-
tors, which reduces magnetic fields and might mean that
new conductors could be added in existing rights of way.
A complementary approach to increasing the available
capacity of existing AC lines is to dynamically determine the
actual conductor limits. The thermal capacity of an overhead
line is highly dependent on ambient conditions; there is
more power-transfer capacity when the line is being oper-
ated in cold, windy conditions than when it is operating in
hot, calm weather. Approaches to dynamically determining
conductor limits include either direct measure of conductor
temperatures or use of a differential global positioning sys-
292 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

tem (GPS) to directly measure the sag of critical spans.

For higher-voltage lines, limits are usually based on
“loadability” constraints rather than thermal limits. The
loadability of a line that cannot be operated close to its ther-
mal limit can often be improved by compensating devices or
full FACTS control. Another promising though relatively
conventional technology is compact transmission lines that
are reconfigured to carry more power (at the expense of in-
creased losses).
An alternative to overhead lines is buried cables. Several
different cable designs can be used; oil-impregnated paper-
insulated pipes are the most common. A key advantage of
underground cables is that they usually face little public
opposition. Also, the closer spacing of the conductors results
in greatly reduced electromagnetic fields (EMFs) because of
phase cancellation. Finally, underground cables are not sub-
ject to weather and thus may be more reliable than
aboveground lines. The key disadvantage of buried cables is
cost. With cost ratios of up to ten times for rural high-voltage
lines, it is nearly always more economical to build overhead
lines unless one is in an urban area. Also, the length of AC
cables is limited by their relatively high capacitance; uncom-
pensated cables may be limited to perhaps 25 miles. Finally,
over the long term, underground cables may not be as reli-
able as overhead lines because it takes substantially longer to
locate and correct problems with buried lines.
Truly strategic improvements in compactness call for
new technologies like supercapacitors, transformerless
HVDC, and cryogenically enhanced devices. Cryogenic op-
eration (i.e., operation at unusually low temperatures, which
may or may not be low enough to achieve superconductiv-
ity) reduces or eliminates resistance in an electrical device
and thereby allows a several-fold in increase in its power-
handling capacity. This benefit can be exploited either as
Appendices 293

increased capacity within given size and weight constraints

or as equivalent performance in a much smaller and lighter
package. However, cryogenic devices also have disadvan-
tages. For example, some super-conducting devices operate
with extremely high currents and thus radiate very intense
magnetic fields. As a general rule, the introduction of cryo-
genic cooling adds complexity to a device, so a utility using
cryogenic devices would have to hire employees with the
specific skills to maintain these devices. Cryogenic devices
also generally require long cool-down times, up to a week or
more for some such as super-conducting magnetic energy
storage (SMES) and large transformers. Certain maintenance
and repair procedures may require warming the devices up
to ambient temperature, which takes a similar amount of
time. This characteristic may be an unacceptable operational
constraint.
Cryogenic devices now include cables, transformers,
current limiters, switches, generators, and energy storage
devices (SMES). These devices are at stages of development
ranging from working prototypes to a few commercially
successful products. The underlying base technologies are
the subject of active research, and the technical feasibility of
cryogenics in general is increasing steadily. As with FACTS,
the chief impediment to practical deployment is the initial
investment.
Another partial solution to current difficulties with ob-
taining new rights of way is to utilize non-traditional trans-
mission paths, such as submarine cables. One such project
currently under consideration, known as the Neptune
Project, seeks initially to connect 345-kV substations in
Brooklyn and Long Island NY with a 345- kV substation in
northern New Jersey via two 600-MW HVDC cables buried
in trenches on the Atlantic Ocean floor. Subsequent phases
seek to link New York City with a substation in New
294 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Brunswick, Canada using a 1,200-MW submarine HVDC;

cables added later would join Boston and other New En-
gland locations. Another project under consideration seeks
to link Ontario, Canada to either Ohio or Pennsylvania using
several HVDC cables under Lake Erie. Given the large num-
ber of urban load centers located on the oceans or Great
Lakes, the commercial success of one such submarine HVDC
project could lead to many more. The advantage of such an
installation is that no eminent domain authority is needed to
obtain the water rights of way, and the relatively small land-
based converter stations that are required can be located to
bring power directly into urban load centers. Due consider-
ation must be given to avoid harming the aquatic environ-
ment, with the cables routed to avoid active fishing and
sensitive environmental areas.

Technology Challenge #7:

Assessing New Technologies Using Life-Cycle Analysis
Investments in new technologies can be both necessary
and dangerous. Investments in the wrong technologies can
lead to disaster. Timely new ways to reduce costs and im-
prove performance are essential to business survival. Utili-
ties tend to be very cautious in investing in new technology.
One reason for their caution is that the actual merits of
any new technology can be difficult to estimate in advance.
New or advanced technologies are very likely to have hidden
costs (and may also have hidden benefits). Some technologies
are “fragile,” requiring significant engineering design or un-
foreseen maintenance. Others are “intrusive” in that their use
calls for major changes in associated technologies and meth-
ods. Still others produce long-term environmental problems,
such as the disposal of hazardous materials used in their con-
struction. And some technologies might fail in a catastrophic
manner that endangers human health and safety.
Appendices 295

All utilities are well aware of these possibilities, but few

individual utilities have the resources to assess them. Suitable
resources can be assembled on a collaborative basis, but a
suitable assessment methodology must also be developed.
Full assessment of new technologies calls for a life-cycle
analysis that considers all costs and all benefits, with suitable
consideration of regulatory constraints and other external or
uncertain factors. To be inclusive, life-cycle analysis should
start with production of the technology and consider impacts
upon the economy, health and safety, the natural environ-
ment, and other elements of the public good. The analysis
continues from this point through all expected uses of the
product to its eventual recycling or disposal by other means.
The electric power industry seldom makes equipment
acquisitions using such thorough analysis. The industry will
also argue, reasonably, that it cannot afford in-depth consid-
eration of all aspects of the public good in everyday business
decisions. However, the norm for much equipment procure-
ment is to accept the minimum bid. This practice has already
populated the national grid with a large amount of energy-
inefficient equipment. The practice of life cycle cost optimi-
zation should at least consider the full range of tradeoffs,
comparing benefits with the total cost of ownership for the
life of the equipment. Life-cycle costs include acquisition
costs as well as costs of capital, energy, operations, mainte-
nance, and disposal.

Technology Challenge #8: The Intelligent Energy System

Information is the crosscutting issue in all transmission
grid technology challenges. WAMS and FACTS share an
underlying vision of an Intelligent Energy System (IES) in
which “intelligent” planning, design, control, and operation
of system assets are the primary means for meeting energy
demands. An IES might well involve coordinated operation
296 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

of the electrical and gas energy systems, with the gas system
providing virtual storage for electrical energy. The IES
would certainly draw upon FACTS technology for the rout-
ing of electrical power and upon dispersed assets such as
distributed generation, energy conservation, direct or indi-
rect load control, and renewable energy sources. WAMS is a
critical element in the information infrastructure needed to
make the IES possible and to insure power system reliability.
The vision of an IES extends beyond FACTS and per-
haps beyond WAMS. Additional elements include protective
relay systems that “adapt” to widely variable power flows,
diagnostic tools to reduce human error during system main-
tenance, enhanced information tools for emergency manage-
ment, and “intelligent” data miners that sift operating
records for evidence of needed maintenance. Some specific
examples, extracted from much more detailed treatments in
PNNL (1999), are presented below.

Protective Controls—Relay Coordination

Containing a sizable disturbance usually requires ap-
propriate action by several relays. Communication among
the relays is often indirect, through the power system itself.
Effectively designed direct communication among relays
would make coordination more reliable from the hardware
perspective. Relays, like transducers and feedback control-
lers, are signal-processing devices that have their own dy-
namics and modes of failure. Some relays sense conditions
(like phase imbalance or boiler pressure) that power-system
planners cannot readily model. At present, there are few
engineering tools for coordinating wide-area relay systems.
Large power systems are sometimes operated in ways
that were not foreseen when relay settings were established.
It is not at all apparent that fixed relay settings can accom-
modate the increasingly busy market or, even more difficult,
Appendices 297

the islanding that has been seen recently in North America.

It may be that relay-based controls, like feedback controls,
will need some form of parameter scheduling to cope with
such variability. The required communications could be
highly vulnerable from a security standpoint, however, so
precautions against the growing threat of “cyber attack”
would be needed.
Several recent grid events suggest that there are still
questions to be resolved regarding the basic strategy or eco-
nomics of bus protective systems (PNNL 1999). In the west-
ern system breakup of December 14, 1994, it appears that
“bus geometry” forced an otherwise unnecessary line trip at
the Borah substation in Idaho and led directly to the system
breakup. Bus geometry was also a factor when all transmis-
sion to San Francisco was lost on December 8, 1998. Follow-
ing routine maintenance at the San Mateo substation, a
breaker was closed while protective grounds were still at-
tached. The resulting fault tripped all lines to the San Mateo
bus because a differential relay system had not been fully
restored to service. An appropriate diagnostic tool would
have indicated this condition and warned that the grounds
had not been removed.

Emergency Management—the Northeast Ice Storm of 1998

Emergency management resources of the Northeast
Power Coordinating Council were severely tested when a
series of exceptionally severe ice storms struck large areas in
New York, New England, Ontario, Quebec, and the Mari-
time provinces between January 5 and 10, 1998. The worst
freezing rains ever recorded in that region deposited ice up
to three inches thick. Resulting damage to transmission and
distribution was severe (more than 770 towers collapsed).
The event resulted in some valuable lessons regarding
system restoration. Emergency preparedness, cooperative
298 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

arrangements among utilities and with civil authorities, inte-

grated access to detailed outage information, and an innova-
tive approach to field repairs were all found to be
particularly valuable. The disturbance report mentions that
information from remotely accessible, microprocessor-based
fault locator relays was instrumental in quickly identifying
and locating problems. Implied in the report is that the res-
toration strategy amounted to what mathematicians call a
“stochastic game,” in which some risks were taken in order
to make maximum service improvements in the least time—
and with imperfect information about system capability.

Technology Challenge #9:

Physical and Cyber Security of the Transmission Grid
Given the recent increased awareness of the possibility of
terrorist activity, it seems especially pressing to address the
physical security of the NTG. (This paper focuses on the
transmission system only and does not address the physical
security of individual generation stations.) We consider trans-
mission security in relation to the risk of physical destruction
of system elements and concerns about cyber security.
In relation to concerns about physical destruction, the
blessing and the curse of the transmission grid is its im-
mense size. In the U.S. there are currently more than 150,000
miles of transmission lines that are 230 kV or higher, and
there are many tens of thousands more miles at lower volt-
age levels. In both the Eastern and Western Interconnects,
there are tens of thousands of individual transmission lines
and many thousands of individual high-voltage transform-
ers. The curse is that such a system is impossible to “secure”;
there is no effective means to prevent a determined group of
individuals from destroying a portion of the grid. But the
blessing is that they could destroy only a minuscule portion.
In addition, any destruction aimed of individual towers
Appendices 299

would have temporary effects. Given the regular occurrences

of tornadoes, hurricanes, ice storms, and earthquakes, the
transmission system has been designed to take its share of
individual hits and continue to function. And the utility in-
dustry is quite adept at quickly repairing the damage done
from such natural occurrences. It would be very difficult for
even a large, well-organized group to duplicate the physical
damage done by even a moderate ice storm.
The issue is whether a major disruption could be caused
if various key grid facilities, such as electric substations or
rights of way with many individual circuits, were selectively
targeted. The answer is “yes” if enough key facilities were
destroyed. But the impacts would likely be temporary be-
cause transmission lines could relatively quickly be rerouted
around most substations. Some equipment (e.g., transform-
ers) would be vulnerable and difficult to replace. The de-
struction of multiple transmission stations by a
knowledgeable saboteur with a highly organized attack
could result in substantial damage and long-term blackouts.
Another concern is security of information systems or
cyber security. The increasing reliance of the electric power
industry on communications and control systems together
with the remarkable advance of electronic intrusion tech-
nologies and techniques make the restructuring utility in-
dustry particularly vulnerable to disruptions resulting from
inadequate safeguards and security capabilities. More points
of entry into command and control systems will become
available to potentially hostile individuals or organizations.
Many of these entry points will differ from the points of
access previously established to serve a vertically integrated
utility industry. The advent of real-time power dispatching
coupled with competition in retail power markets and many
other challenges of operating in a restructured industry
environment will greatly reduce the safety margins currently
300 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

maintained by electric utilities. The utility system of the fu-

ture could become much more vulnerable to corruption by
skilled electronic intrusion from both inside and outside. A
primary, emerging need in the utility industry is for develop-
ment of new guidelines, policies, and standards for the selec-
tion and implementation of cost-effective security measures
(EPRI 1996).
The protection of critical civilian infrastructure has been
a national focus since the mid-1990s with the formation of
the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection (PCCIP) in July 1996 and the Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63) on Critical Infrastructure Protection
issued in May 1998. DOE is responsible for the electric
power sector and the natural gas and oil production and
storage sectors and has formally designated NERC and the
National Petroleum Council (NPC) as liaison organizations.
In April 2001, NERC published a white paper: Approach to
Action for the Electricity Sector that outlines the electric
power industry’s plans for security against physical and
cyber attack.
For lack of a clear “business case,” new technology in-
vestments often involve more financial risk than any single
utility (or new ISO) can accept. Motivating these investments
will require some combination of definitive national policy
along with market models for investment planning.

MEETING THE TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES

Institutional Issues
A formidable number of institutional issues hinder
timely identification, development, and introduction of new
technologies. Today’s utilities are understandably reluctant
to fund R&D that is not promptly and directly beneficial to
Appendices 301

them. Likewise, utility suppliers will not fund new transmis-

sion technology research if there is not a reasonable likeli-
hood of an adequate return on the investment. Contrary to
the premises under which EPRI was established separately
from the DOE national laboratories, it is now difficult for
EPRI to act as the coordinating umbrella organization for
long-term R&D in the public interest. Much of the work
produced by EPRI is essentially unavailable to the many
nonmembers. The following “out-of-the-box” solutions
should be considered:

• Apply a user fee to all institutions that engage in energy

business. This fund would be used exclusively for en-
ergy R&D in the public interest, and all R&D results
would be fully available to all energy business institu-
tions.

• With suitable oversight provisions, disperse the above

R&D fund through a DOE entity or a new public-service
arm of EPRI (all institutions that engage in energy busi-
ness would be members). It might be preferable to coor-
dinate and consolidate these activities through a new
umbrella organization for energy R&D.

• Engage industry experts in mentoring R&D and in-the-

field assessments that are needed to close the gap be-
tween the development of new technology and its
actual deployment for operational use.

Effective Utilization of Federal Resources

The federal government is very involved in the national
grid through the federal utilities, including the TVA, the
Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), various elements
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and of the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, as well as other entities. Collectively, the
302 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

federal utilities operate “backbone” facilities for a large por-

tion of the North American power system.
The federal government is also the ultimate steward for
the staff skills, knowledge, and operational infrastructure of
the federal utilities. These utilities are unique national re-
sources of great value. They are immediately available to
reinforce energy reliability in the public interest, a role in
which they have long been a mainstay. Consideration should
be given to the following ways to better utilize this resource:

• Fully engage the federal utilities as advisors and/or

researchers in ongoing federal efforts to meet national
energy needs.

• Draw on the federal utilities for field testing and opera-

tional assessment of new or prototype technologies.
Give special attention to critical enabling technologies
that have not drawn sufficient commercial interest to
assure their timely evaluation and refinement.

• Identify critical resources provided by the federal utili-

ties and integrate these resources into the national labo-
ratory system. Support could be provided through a
consortium arrangement among the national laborato-
ries and federal utilities.

• Take immediate steps to establish a productive dialogue

among all members of the proposed consortium and
safely archive their collective institutional knowledge
for future use.

Effective Utilization of Academic Resources

The electricity industry may be underutilizing the R&D
potential of American universities. However, a contrary
Appendices 303

view holds that industry needs are primarily in development

and that universities lack both the mission and staff continu-
ity to proceed past the initial research phase. The proper
relationship between university and industry has not been
determined and should not be regarded as fixed. What is
clear is that the dialogue between universities and the elec-
tricity industry is weaker than is the university-industry re-
lationship in most other industries and that few universities
have the direct industry involvement or the “institutional
culture” that is needed for practical technology development
in this area. Changing this situation might lead to a univer-
sity system closer to the European model, in which many
academics are part-time industry employees. Fundamental
changes in the relationship between university and industry
have many ramifications, and an open discussion of the
matter would be timely.
One bright spot is the growing trend toward coopera-
tive university/industry research centers. These centers seek
to bridge university-industry gaps by directly involving in-
dustry in university research projects. This partnership helps
projects maintain a degree of focus on problems currently
facing the industry. The challenge for the universities in-
volved in such centers is to demonstrate to their industrial
members that membership fees represent money well spent.
In addition, there are growing numbers of faculty mem-
bers involved in start-up companies in the power area. Uni-
versities nationwide are seeing a need to foster economic
development in their local regions and states and to facilitate
the transfer of university expertise and research to industry.
Although a number of mechanisms exist to meet these goals,
encouraging faculty with innovative ideas to form start-up
companies is particularly promising as much of the
country’s innovation arises from entrepreneurial activity by
small companies.
304 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

Sustainable solutions require balances between genera-

tion, transmission, and demand; planning and operations;
profit and risk; the roles of public and private institutions;
and market forces and the public interest. The strategic need
is not just for advanced technology in the laboratory but also
for an infusion of improved technology at work in the power
system. The chief impediments to this are institutional; they
can be resolved through a proactive national consensus re-
garding institutional roles. Until this consensus is achieved,
the lack of linkage between technology and policy may be a
disruptive force in continued development of the national
transmission grid and the broad infrastructures that it serves.
Listed below are several specific recommendations to
address national transmission grid issues by creating a
framework to accelerate the development and deployment
of appropriate advanced technologies.

• Establish incentives for both private and public sector

investment in RD&D. While federally funded basic re-
search is important, ultimately it is the commercial sec-
tor that should move technology from the research lab
to the marketplace. There is a need to accelerate the
transition process within the electricity industry to re-
duce uncertainties regarding the future structure of gen-
eration and transmission markets since such
uncertainties greatly impede investment in RD&D.

• Develop performance metrics for the national transmis-

sion grid where performance measures can be used to
determine minimum planning and operational stan-
dards. These outcome- based measures would be consis-
Appendices 305

tent with the goals of the national transmission grid

where issues such as serving the public good, promot-
ing the economy, and ensuring national security can be
balanced against the profit motivation associated with
individual companies engaged in the electricity sector.
Such a framework provides an incentive for private and
public funding to research, develop, and deploy ad-
vanced technology because the linkage between en-
hanced performance associated with advanced
technologies can be mapped to specific goals, with
emphasis upon those technologies that cost effectively
address poor performance according to these estab-
lished measures.

• Apply a user fee to all institutions that engage in energy

business. This fund will be used for energy R&D that is
performed in the public interest, and all R&D results
will be available to all institutions that engage in energy
business.

• Stimulate the research, development, testing, and de-

ployment of cost-effective technologies that allow
greater capacity in existing right-of-ways. This includes
passive reinforcement (e.g., advanced conductors and
transmission configurations), active reinforcements (e.g.,
FACTS, HVDC, energy storage, and non-transmission
technologies), and advanced information resources and
controls that facilitate best use of transmission resources
while ensuring system reliability.

• Promote programs that provide opportunities for en-

ergy consumers to manage their distributed energy re-
sources (generation, storage, and load) in response to
competitive market forces, including increased price vis-
306 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ibility, demand-side participation in energy and ancil-

lary services markets, and removal of technical and in-
stitutional barriers to distributed energy resources.

• Provide a forum for an industry-wide discussion to

reach consensus on information access and dissemina-
tion issues. Certain information on system operations
should be made broadly available to encourage markets
to function, yet other information may be proprietary or
sensitive.

• Establish security standards (both physical and cyber)

for protecting the national transmission grid from at-
tacks of malicious intent. Such standards should be de-
rived from ongoing research in recognition of the
evolving threat against the National critical civilian in-
frastructures.

• Draw upon the Federal utilities as a uniquely available

and competent technical platform for inclusion in an
expanded national RD&D infrastructure. Identify re-
sources (facilities, staff, software, etc.) that do or could
provide essential support to planning, development,
and operation of the North America power system.

• Engage industry experts in the mentoring of R&D ef-

forts and in the field assessments (demonstration
projects) that are needed to close the gap between the
development of new technology and its actual deploy-
ment for operational use. Give special attention to “criti-
cal path” enabling technologies that have not drawn
sufficient commercial interest to assure their timely
evaluation and refinement.
Appendices 307

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Internet at http://vm1.hqadmin.doe.gov:80/seab/
U.S. Department of Energy. 1980. The National Power Grid Study. U.S.
Department of Energy Report DOE/ER-0056/3. January.
U.S. Department of Energy, undated. National Energy Strategy: Powerful
Ideas for America. DOE/A-082P, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 2001. Docket PL02-1-000,
October 11.
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. 1990. Physical Vulnerability of Elec-
tric Systems to Natural Disasters and Sabotage. Office of Technology
Assessment Report. Government Printing Office 052-003-01197-2.
Appendices 309

APPENDIX A: LIST OF NEW TECHNOLOGY EQUIP-

MENT TO REINFORCE THE TRANSMISSION GRID

The transmission system of the future must not only

have increased capacity to support the market demand for
energy transactions, it must also be flexible to adapt to alter-
ations in energy-delivery patterns. These patterns change at
various time scales: hourly, daily, weekly, and seasonally.
The transmission system must also adapt to delivery pat-
terns dictated by the evolving geographical distribution of
load and generation. As generation planning and dispatch
decision making are placed in the hands of organizations
other than utilities, new technologies that afford transmis-
sion planners a wider range of alternatives for deployment
of power become more attractive.
This appendix lists some of the newer hardware tech-
nologies that are being researched and deployed to reinforce
grid operations. The range of potential technologies is enor-
mous. This appendix is limited to the hardware technologies
that are most directly applicable to grid operations; the list
presented is not exhaustive. Software technologies are dis-
cussed in the body of the paper and are not addressed here.
The appendix organizes hardware technologies into the
following categories:

• Passive reinforcing equipment,

• Active reinforcing equipment, and

• Real-time monitoring equipment.

Within each category, we list the relevant technologies

and summarize the primary objective, benefits, barriers to
deployment, and commercial status of each.
310 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Passive Reinforcing Equipment

This section discusses the potential impacts of new tech-
nologies associated with AC transmission lines and related
equipment (transformers, capacitors, switch gear, etc.). This
category includes the increased value (capacity per unit cost
of installation, operation, and maintenance) obtained
through new conductor materials and transmission line con-
figurations as well as the flexibility gained to reconfigure the
transmission system through greater modularity of transmis-
sion equipment.
Passive AC devices constitute by far the majority of the
existing network. Though new lines will certainly be needed
to reinforce the grid, the siting of these lines will continue to
be a major challenge. Getting the most out of existing rights
of way minimizes the need for new lines and rights of way
and can minimize the societal concerns associated with vi-
sual pollution and high-energy EMFs.

Conductors
Advances in conductor technology fall into the areas of
composite materials, and high-temperature superconduc-
tors.

High-Temperature Super-Conducting (HTSC) Technology:

The conductors in HTSC devices operate at extremely
low resistances. They require refrigeration (generally
liquid nitrogen) to super-cool ceramic superconducting
material.
Objective: Transmit more power in existing or smaller rights
of way. Used for transmission lines, transformers, reac-
tors, capacitors, and current limiters.
Benefits: Cable occupies less space (AC transmission lines
bundle three phase together; transformers and other
equipment occupy smaller footprint for same level of
Appendices 311

capacity). Cables can be buried to reduce exposure to

EMFs and counteract visual pollution issues. Transform-
ers can reduce or eliminate cooling oils that, if spilled,
can damage the environment. The HTSC itself can have
a long lifetime, sharing the properties noted for surface
cables below.
Barriers: Maintenance costs are high (refrigeration equipment
is required and this demands trained technicians with
new skills; the complexity of system can result in a
larger number of failure scenarios than for current
equipment; power surges can quench (terminate super-
conducting properties) equipment requiring more ad-
vanced protection schemes).
Commercial Status: A demonstration project is under way at
Detroit Edison’s Frisbie substation. Four-hundred- foot
cables are being installed in the substation. Self-con-
tained devices, such as current limiters, may be added
to address areas where space is at a premium and to
simplify cooling.
Below-Surface Cables: The state of the art in underground
cables includes fluid-filled polypropylene paper lami-
nate (PPL) and extruded dielectric polyethylene (XLPE)
cables. Other approaches, such as gas-insulated trans-
mission lines (GIL), are being researched and hold
promise for future applications.
Objective: Transmit power in areas where overhead transmis-
sion is impractical or unpopular.
Benefits: The benefits compared with overhead transmission
lines include protection of cable from weather, generally
longer lifetimes, and reduced maintenance. These cables
address environmental issues associated with EMFs and
visual pollution associated with transmission lines.
Barriers: Drawbacks include costs that are five to 10 times
those of overhead transmission and challenges in repair-
312 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ing and replacing these cables when problems arise.

Nonetheless, these cables represent have made great
technical advances; the typical cost ratio a decade ago
was 20 to one.
Commercial Status: PPL cable technology is more mature than
XLPE. EHV (extra high voltage) VAC and HVDC appli-
cations exist throughout the world. XLPE is gaining
quickly and has advantages: low dielectric losses,
simple maintenance, no insulating fluid to affect the
environment in the event of system failure, and ever-
smaller insulation thicknesses. GILs feature a relatively
large-diameter tubular conductor sized for the gas insu-
lation surrounded by a solid metal sleeve. This configu-
ration translates to lower resistive and capacitive losses,
no external EMFs, good cooling properties, and reduced
total life-cycle costs compared with other types of
cables. This type of transmission line is installed in seg-
ments joined with orbital welders and run through tun-
nels. This line is less flexible than the PPL or XLPE
cables and is, thus far, experimental and significantly
more expensive than those two alternatives.
Underwater application of electric cable technology
has a long history. Installations are numerous between
mainland Europe, Scandinavia, and Great Britain. This
technology is also well suited to the electricity systems
linking islands and peninsulas, such as in Southeast
Asia. The Neptune Project consists of a network of un-
derwater cables proposed to link Maine and Canada
Maritime generation with the rest of New England,
New York, and the mid-Atlantic areas.
Advanced Composite Conductors: Usually, transmission
lines contain steel-core cables that support strands of
aluminum wires, which are the primary conductors of
electricity. New cores developed from composite materi-
Appendices 313

als are proposed to replace the steel core.

Objective: Allow more power through new or existing trans-
mission rights of way.
Benefits: A new core consisting of composite fiber materials
shows promise as stronger than steel-core aluminum
conductors while 50 percent lighter in weight with up to
2.5 times less sag. The reduced weight and higher
strength equate to greater current carrying capability as
more current-carrying aluminum can be added to the
line. This fact along with manufacturing advances, such
as trapezoidal shaping of the aluminum strands, can
reduce resistance by 10 percent, enable more compact
designs with up to 50 percent reduction in magnetic
fields, and reduce ice buildup compared to standard
wire conductors. This technology can be integrated in
the field by most existing reconductoring equipment.
Barriers: More experience is needed with the new composite
cores to reduce total life-cycle costs.
Commercial Status: Research projects and test systems are in
progress.

Transmission Line Configurations

Advances are being made in the configuration of trans-
mission lines. New design processes coupled with powerful
computer programs can optimize the height, strength, and
positioning of transmission towers, insulators, and associ-
ated equipment in order to meet engineering standards ap-
propriate for the conductor (e.g., distance from ground and
tension for a given set of weather parameters).

Tower Design Tools: A set of tools is being perfected to ana-

lyze upgrades to existing transmission facilities or the
installation of new facilities to increase their power-
transfer capacity and reduce maintenance.
314 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Objective: Ease of use and greater application of visualization

techniques make the process more efficient and accurate
when compared to traditional tools. Traditionally, lines
have been rated conservatively. Careful analysis can
discover the unused potential of existing facilities. Visu-
alization tools can show the public the anticipated vi-
sual impact of a project prior to commencement.
Benefits: Avoids new right-of-way issues. The cost of upgrad-
ing the thermal rating has been estimated at approxi-
mately $7,000 per circuit mile, but reconductoring a
230-kV circuit costs on the order of $120,000 per mile
compared with $230,000 per mile for a new steel-pole
circuit (Lionberger and Duke 2001).
Barriers: This technology is making good inroads.
Commercial Status: Several companies offer commercial prod-
ucts and services.
Six-Phase and 12-Phase Transmission Line Configurations:
The use of more than three phases for electric power
transmission has been studied for many years. Using six
or even 12 phases allows for greater power transfer ca-
pability within a particular right of way, and reduced
EMFs because of greater phase cancellation. The key
technical challenge is the cost and complexity of inte-
grating such high-phase-order lines into the existing
three-phase grid.

Modular Equipment
One way to gain flexibility for changing market and
operational situations is to develop standards for the manu-
facture and integration of modular equipment.
Objective: Develop substation designs and specifications for
equipment manufacturers to meet that facilitate the
movement and reconfiguration of equipment in a sub-
station to meet changing needs.
Appendices 315

Benefits: Reduces overall the time and expense for transmis-

sion systems to adapt to the changing economic and
reliability landscape.
Barriers: Requires transmission planners and substation de-
signers to consider a broad range of operating scenarios.
Also, developing industry standards can take a signifi-
cant period, and manufacturers would need to offer
conforming products.
Commercial Status: Utilities have looked for a certain amount
of standardization and flexibility in this area for some
time; however, further work remains to be done. Na-
tional Grid (UK) has configured a number of voltage-
support devices that use modular construction methods.
As the system evolves, the equipment can be moved to
locations where support is needed (PA Consulting
Group 2001).
Universal Transformer: A single, standardized design ca-
pable of handling multiple voltage transformations in
the mid ranges of 161/230/345/500 kV on a switch-se-
lectable basis. Added features might be high portability,
to facilitate emergency deployment from a “strategic
reserve” of such transformers, plus the accommodation
of high phase order transmission lines.

Exotic Transmission Alternatives

The following technical approaches have been pro-
posed to reduce losses, increase capacity, and/or address
situations where traditional energy transport mechanisms
have shortcomings. In all cases, test configurations have
been developed, but commercial implementations have yet
to emerge.

Power Beaming (Wireless Power Transmission): Power

beaming involves the wireless transmission of electric
316 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

energy by means of either laser or microwave radiation.

Near-term applications include transmission of electric
energy for space applications (e.g., to orbiting satellites)
from either a terrestrial- or space-based power genera-
tion platform. Other applications that have been studied
include supporting human space exploration (e.g., lunar
or Mars missions). Future applications might involve
the beaming of energy from orbiting or even lunar-
based solar power generators to terrestrial receivers, but
to date the economics of such a system have remained
elusive; proponents of such systems believe that they
can be competitive within 15 to 25 years.
Ultra-High Voltage Levels: Because power is equal to the
product of voltage times current, a highly effective ap-
proach to increasing the amount of power transmitted
on a transmission line is to increase its operating volt-
age. Since 1969, the highest transmission voltage levels
in North America have been 765 kV, (voltage levels up
to 1,000 kV are in service elsewhere). Difficulties with
utilizing higher voltages include the need for larger
towers and larger rights of way to get the necessary
phase separation, the ionization of air near the surface
of the conductors because of high electric fields, the
high reactive power generation of the lines, and public
concerns about EMFs.

Active Reinforcing Equipment

Transmission System Devices
Implemented throughout the system, these devices in-
clude capacitors, phase shifters, static-var compensators
(SVCs), thyristor-controlled series capacitors (TCSC), thyris-
tor-controlled dynamic brakes, and other similar devices.
Used to adjust system impedance, these devices can increase
the transmission system’s transfer capacity, support bus volt-
Appendices 317

ages by providing reactive power, or enhance dynamic or

transient stability.

HVDC: With active control of real and reactive power trans-

fer, HVDC can be modulated to damp oscillations or
provide power-flow dispatch independent of voltage
magnitudes or angles (unlike conventional AC trans-
mission).
Objective: HVDC is used for long-distance power transport,
linking asynchronous control areas, and real-time con-
trol of power flow.
Benefits: Stable transport of power over long distances where
AC transmission lines need series compensation that
can lead to stability problems. HVDC can run indepen-
dent of system frequency and can control the amount of
power sent through the line. This latter benefit is the
same as for FACTS devices discussed below.
Barriers: Drawbacks include the high cost of converter equip-
ment and the need for specially trained technicians to
maintain the devices.
Commercial Status: Many long-distance HVDC links are in
place around the world. Back-to-back converters link
Texas, WSCC, and the Eastern Interconnection in the
US. More installations are being planned.
FACTS Compensators: Flexible AC Transmission System
(FACTS) devices use power electronics to adjust the
apparent impedance of the system. Capacitor banks are
applied at loads and substations to provide capacitive
reactive power to offset the inductive reactive power
typical of most power system loads and transmission
lines. With long inter-tie transmission lines, series ca-
pacitors are used to reduce the effective impedance of
the line. By adding thyristors to both of these types of
capacitors, actively controlled reactive power is avail-
318 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

able using SVCs and TCSC devices, which are shunt-

and series-controlled capacitors, respectively. The thy-
ristors are used to adjust the total impedance of the
device by switching individual modules. Unified
power-flow controllers (UPFCs) also fall into this cat-
egory.
Objective: FACTS devices are designed to control the flow of
power through the transmission grid.
Benefits: These devices can increase the transfer capacity of
the transmission system, support bus voltages by F-38
National Transmission Grid Study providing reactive
power, or be used to enhance dynamic or transient sta-
bility.
Barriers: As with HVDC, the power electronics are expensive
and specially trained technicians are needed to maintain
them. In addition, experience is needed to fully under-
stand the coordinated control strategy of these devices
as they penetrate the system.
Commercial Status: As mentioned above, the viability of
HVDC systems has already been demonstrated. Ameri-
can Electric Power (AEP) has installed a FACTS device
in its system, and a new device was recently commis-
sioned by the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to
regulate flows in the northeast.
FACTS Phase-Shifting Transformers: Phase shifters are trans-
formers configured to change the phase angle between
buses; they are particularly useful for controlling the
power flow on the transmission network. Adding thy-
ristor control to the various tap settings of the phase-
shifting transformer permits continuous control of the
effective phase angle (and thus control of power flow).
Objective: Adjust power flow in the system.
Benefits: The key advantage of adding power electronics to
what is currently a non-electronic technology is faster
Appendices 319

response time (less then one second vs. about one

minute). However, traditional phase shifters still permit
redirection of flows and thereby increase transmission
system capacity.
Barriers: Traditional phase shifters are deployed today. The
addition of the power electronics to these devices is rela-
tively straightforward but increases expense and in-
volves barriers similar to those noted for FACTS
compensators.
Commercial Status: Tap-changing phase shifters are available
today. Use of thyristor controls is emerging.
FACTS Dynamic Brakes: A dynamic brake is used to rapidly
extract energy from a system by inserting a shunt resis-
tance into the network. Adding thyristor controls to the
brake permits addition of control functions, such as on-
line damping of unstable oscillations.
Objective: Dynamic brakes enhance power system stability.
Benefits: This device can damp unstable oscillations trig-
gered by equipment outages or system configuration
changes.
Barriers: In addition the power electronics issues mentioned
earlier, siting a dynamic brake and tuning the device in
response to specific contingencies requires careful study.
Commercial Status: BPA has installed a dynamic brake on
their system.

Energy-Storage Devices
The traditional function of an energy-storage device is
to save production costs by holding cheaply generated off-
peak energy that can be dispatched during peak-consump-
tion periods. By virtue of its attributes, energy storage can
also provide effective power system control with modest
incremental investment. Different dispatch modes can be
superimposed on the daily cycle of energy storage, with
320 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

additional capacity reserved for the express purpose of pro-

viding these control functions.

Batteries: Batteries use converters to transform the DC in the

storage device to the AC of the power grid. Converters
also operate in the opposite direction to recharge the
batteries.
Objective: Store energy generated in off-peak hours to be
used for emergencies or on-peak needs.
Benefits: Battery converters use thyristors that, by the virtue
of their ability to rapidly change the power exchange,
can be utilized for a variety of real-time control applica-
tions ranging from enhancing transient to precondition-
ing the area control error for automatic generator
control enhancement. During their operational lifetime,
batteries have a small impact on the environment. For
distributed resources, batteries do not need to be as
large as for large-scale generation, and they become
important components for regulating micro-grid power
and allowing interconnection with the rest of the sys-
tem.
Barriers: The expense of manufacturing and maintaining bat-
teries has limited their impact in the industry.
Commercial Status: Several materials are used to manufacture
batteries though large arrays of lead-acid batteries con-
tinue to be the most popular for utility installations.
Interest is also growing in so-called “flow batteries” that
charge and discharge a working fluid exchanged be-
tween two tanks. The emergence of the distributed en-
ergy business has increased the interest in deploying
batteries for regional energy storage. One of the early
battery installations that demonstrated grid benefit was
a joint project between EPRI and Southern California
Edison at the Chino substation in southern California.
Appendices 321

Super-conducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES): SMES

uses cryogenic technology to store energy by circulating
current in a super-conducting coil.
Objective: Store energy generated in off-peak hours to be
used for emergencies or on-peak needs.
Benefits: The benefits are similar to those for batteries. SMES
devices are efficient because of their super-conductive
properties. They are also very compact for the amount
of energy stored.
Barriers: As with the super-conducting equipment mentioned
in the passive equipment section above, SMES entails
costs for the cooling system, the special protection
needed in the event the super-conducting device
quenches, and the specialized skills required to main-
tain the device.
Commercial Status: Several SMES units have been commis-
sioned in North America. They have been deployed at
Owens Corning to protect plant processes, and at Wis-
consin Public Service to address low-voltage and grid
instability issues.
Pumped Hydro and Compressed-Air Storage: Pumped hydro
consists of large ponds with turbines that can be run in
either pump or generation modes. During periods of
light load (e.g., night) excess, inexpensive capacity
drives the pumps to fill the upper pond. During heavy
load periods, the water generates electricity into the
grid. Compressed air storage uses the same principle
except that large, natural underground vaults are used
to store air under pressure during light-load periods.
Objective: This technology helps shave peak and can help in
light-load, high-voltage situations.
Benefits: These storage systems behave like conventional
generation and have the benefit of producing additional
generation sources that can be dispatched to meet vari-
322 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

ous energy and power needs of the system. Air emission

issues can be mitigated when base generation is used in
off-peak periods as an alternative to potentially high-
polluting peaking units during high use periods.
Barriers: Pumped hydro, like any hydro generation project,
requires significant space and has corresponding eco-
logical impact. The loss of efficiency between pumping
and generation as well as the installation and mainte-
nance costs must be outweighed by the benefits.
Commercial Status: Pumped hydro projects are sprinkled
across North America. A compressed-air storage plant
was built in Alabama, and a proposed facility in Ohio
may become the world’s largest.
Flywheels: Flywheels spin at high velocity to store energy.
As with pumped hydro or compressed-air storage, the
flywheel is connected to a motor that either accelerates
the flywheel to store energy or draws energy to generate
electricity. The flywheel rotors are specially designed to
significantly reduce losses. Super conductivity technol-
ogy has also been deployed to increase efficiency.
Objective: Shave peak energy demand and help in light-load,
high-voltage situations. As a distributed resource, fly-
wheels enhance power quality and reliability.
Benefits: Flywheel technology has reached low-loss, high-ef-
ficiency levels using rotors made of composite materials
running in vacuum spaces. Emissions are not an issue
for flywheels, except those related to the energy ex-
pended to accelerate and maintain the flywheel system.
Barriers: The use of super-conductivity technology faces the
same Barriers as noted above under super-conducting
cables and SMES. High-energy-storage flywheels re-
quire significant space and the high-speed spinning
mass can be dangerous if the equipment fails.
Commercial Status: Flywheel systems coupled with batteries
Appendices 323

are making inroads for small systems (e.g., computer

UPS, local loads, electric vehicles). Flywheels rated in
the 100 to 200 kW range are proposed for development
in the near term.

Controllable Load
Fast-acting load control is an important element in ac-
tive measures for enhancing the transmission grid. Auto-
matic load shedding (under-frequency, under-voltage),
operator-initiated interruptible load, demand-side manage-
ment programs, voltage reduction, and other load-curtail-
ment strategies have long been an integral part of coping
with unforeseen contingencies as a last resort, and/or as a
means of assisting the system during high stress, overloaded
conditions. Future advances in load-control technology will
leverage the advent of real-time pricing, enabling consumers
to “back off ” their loads (either automatically through grid-
friendly appliances or through manual intervention) when
the price is right.

Price-Responsive Load: The electricity industry has been

characterized by relatively long-term contracts for elec-
tricity use. As the industry restructures to be more mar-
ket-driven, adjusting demand based on market signals
will become an important tool for grid operators.
Objective: Inform energy users of system conditions though
price signals that nudge consumption into positions that
make the system more reliable and economic.
Benefits: The approach reduces the need for new transmis-
sion and siting of new generation. Providing incentives
to change load in appropriate regions of the system can
stabilize energy markets and enhance system reliability.
Shifting load from peak periods to less polluting off-
peak periods can reduce emissions.
324 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Barriers: The vast number of loads in the system make com-

munication and coordination difficult. Also, using eco-
nomic signals in real time or near-real time to affect
demand usage has not been part of the control structure
that has been used by the industry for decades. A com-
mon vision and interface standards are needed to coor-
dinate the information exchange required.
Commercial Status: Demand-management programs have
been implemented in various areas of the country. These
have relied on centralized control. With the advent of
the Internet and new distributed information technol-
ogy approaches, firms are emerging to take advantage
of this technology with a more distributed control strat-
egy.
Intelligent Building Systems: Energy can be saved through
increasing the efficient operation of buildings and facto-
ries. Coordinated utilization of cooling, heating, and
electricity in these establishments can significantly re-
duce energy consumption. Operated in a system that
supports price-responsive load, intelligent building sys-
tems can benefit system operations. Note: these systems
may have their own, local generation. Such systems
have the option of selling power to the grid as well as
buying power.
Objective: Reduce energy costs and provide energy manage-
ment resources to stabilize energy markets and enhance
system reliability.
Benefits: Such systems optimize energy consumption for the
building operators and may provide system operators
with energy by reducing load or increasing local genera-
tion based on market conditions.
Barriers: These systems require a greater number of sensors
and more complex control schemes than are common
today. Should energy market access become available at
Appendices 325

the building level, the price incentives would increase.

Commercial Status: Pilot projects have been implemented
throughout the country.

Generation
Devices that are designed to improve the efficiency or
interface of generation resources can be used for power sys-
tem control. Advanced converter concepts will play an in-
creasing role, providing power conversion between DC and
AC power, for resources such as wind, solar, and any non-
synchronous generation. Converter concepts such as pulse
width modulation and step-wave inverters would be par-
ticularly useful for incorporating DC sources into the grid or
providing an asynchronous generation interface. Asynchro-
nous generation has been proposed for increasing the effi-
ciency of hydroelectric generation, which would also have
the advantage of providing control functions such as the
ability to modify the effective inertia of generators.

Distributed Generation (DG): Fuel cells, micro-turbines, die-

sel generators, and other technologies are being inte-
grated using power electronics. As these distributed
resources increase in number, they can become a signifi-
cant resource for reliable system operations. Their vast
numbers and teaming with local load put them in a
similar category to the controllable load discussed
above.
Objective: Address local demand cost-effectively.
Benefits: DG is generally easier to site, entails smaller indi-
vidual financial outlay, and can be more rapidly instal-
lation than large-scale generation. DG can supply local
load or sell into the system and offers owners self-deter-
mination. Recovery and use of waste heat from some
DG greatly increases energy efficiency.
326 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Barriers: Volatility of fuel costs and dependence on the fuel

delivery infrastructure creates financial and reliability
risks. DG units require maintenance and operations ex-
pertise, and utilities can set up discouraging rules for
interconnection. System operators have so far had diffi-
culty coordinating the impact of DG.
Commercial Status: Deployment of DG units continues to in-
crease. As with controllable load, system operations are
recognizing the potential positive implications of DG to
stabilize market prices and enhance system reliability
though this requires a different way of thinking from
the traditional, hierarchical control paradigm.

Real-time Monitoring
This section discusses the impact of new hardware tech-
nology on the capacity to sense in real time the loading and
limits of individual system devices as well as the overall
state of the system. The capability of the electricity grid is
restricted through a combination of the limits on individual
devices and the composite loadability of the system. Improv-
ing monitoring to determine these limits in real time and to
measure the system state directly can increase grid capabil-
ity.

Power-System Device Sensors

The operation of most of the individual devices in a
power system (such as transmission lines, cables, transform-
ers, and circuit breakers) is limited by each device’s thermal
characteristics. In short, trying to put too much power
through a device will cause it to heat excessively and even-
tually fail. Because the limits are thermal, their actual values
are highly dependent upon each device’s heat dissipation,
which is related to ambient conditions. The actual flow of
power through most power-system devices is already ad-
Appendices 327

equately measured. The need is for improved sensors to

dynamically determine the limits by directly or indirectly
measuring temperature.

Direct Measurement of Conductor Sag: For overhead trans-

mission lines the ultimate limiting factor is usually con-
ductor sag. As wires heat, they expand, causing the line
to sag. Too much sag will eventually result in a short
circuit because of arcing from the line to whatever is
underneath.
Objective: Dynamically determine line capacity by directly
measuring the sag on critical line segments.
Benefits: Dynamically determined line ratings allow for in-
creased power capacity under most operating condi-
tions.
Barriers: Requires continuous monitoring of critical spans.
Cost depends on the number of critical spans that must
be monitored, the cost of the associated sensor technol-
ogy, and ongoing cost of communication.
Commercial Status: Pre-commercial units are currently being
tested. Approaches include either video or the use of
differential GPS. EPRI currently is testing a video-based
“sagometer.” An alternative is to use differential GPS to
directly measure sag. Differential GPS has been demon-
strated to be accurate significantly below half a meter.
Indirect Measurement of Conductor Sag: Transmission line
sag can also be estimated by physically measuring the
conductor temperature using an instrument directly
mounted on the line and/or a second instrument that
measures conductor tension at the insulator supports.
Objective: Dynamically determine the line capacity.
Benefits: Dynamically determined line ratings allow for in-
creased power capacity under most operating condi-
tions.
328 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Barriers: Requires continuous monitoring of critical spans.

Cost depends upon the number of critical spans that
must be monitored, the cost of the associated sensor
technology, and ongoing costs of communication.
Commercial Status: Commercial units are available.
Indirect Measurement of Transformer Coil Temperature:
Similar to transmission line operation, transformer op-
eration is limited by thermal constraints. However,
transformers constraints are localized hot spots on the
windings that result in breakdown of insulation.
Objective: Dynamically determine transformer capacity. Ben-
efits: Dynamically determined transformer ratings allow
for increased power capacity under most operating con-
ditions.
Barriers: The simple use of oil temperature measurements is
usually considered to be unreliable.
Commercial Status: Sophisticated monitoring tools are now
commercially available that combine several different
temperature and current measurements to dynamically
determine temperature hot spots.
Underground/Submarine Cable Monitoring/Diagnostics:
The below-surface cable systems described above re-
quire real-time monitoring to maximize their use and
warn of potential failure.
Objective: Incorporate real-time sensing equipment to detect
potentially hazardous operating situations as well as
dynamic limits for safe flow of energy.
Benefits: Monitoring equipment maximizes the use of the
transmission asset, mitigates the risk of failure and the
ensuing expense of repair, and supports preventive
maintenance procedures. The basic sensing and moni-
toring technology is available today.
Barriers: The level of sophistication of the sensing and moni-
toring equipment adds to the cost of the cable system.
Appendices 329

The use of dynamic limits must also be integrated into

system operation procedures and the associated tools of
existing control facilities.
Commercial Status: Newer cable systems are being designed
with monitoring/diagnostics in mind. Cable tempera-
ture, dynamic thermal rating calculations, partial dis-
charge detection, moisture ingress, cable damage,
hydraulic condition (as appropriate), and loss detection
are some of the sensing functions being put in place.
Multifunctional cables are also being designed and de-
ployed (particularly submarine cables) that include
communications capabilities. Monitoring is being inte-
grated directly into the manufacturing process of these
cables.

Direct System-State Sensors

In some situations, transmission capability is not limited
by individual devices but rather by region-wide dynamic
loadability constraints. These include transient stability limi-
tations, oscillatory stability limitations, and voltage stability
limitations. Because the time frame associated with these
phenomena is much shorter than that associated with ther-
mal overloads, predicting, detecting and responding to these
events requires much faster real-time state sensors than for
thermal conditions. The system state is characterized ulti-
mately by the voltage magnitudes and angles at all the sys-
tem buses. The goal of these sensors is to provide these data
at a high sampling rate.

Power-System Monitors
Objective: Collect essential signals (key power flows, bus
voltages, alarms, etc.) from local monitors available to
site operators, selectively forwarding to the control cen-
ter or to system analysts.
330 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

Benefits: Provides regional surveillance over important parts

of the control system to verify system performance in
real time.
Barriers: Existing SCADA and Energy Management Systems
provide low-speed data access for the utility’s infra-
structure. Building a network of high-speed data moni-
tors with intra-regional breadth requires collaboration
among utilities within the interconnected power system.
Commercial Status: BPA has developed a network of dynamic
monitors collecting high-speed data, first with the
power system analysis monitor (PSAM), and later with
the portable power system monitor (PPSM), both early
examples of WAMS products.

Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)

Objective: PMUs are synchronized digital transducers that
can stream data, in real time, to phasor data concentra-
tor (PDC) units. The general functions and topology for
this network resemble those for dynamic monitor net-
works. Data quality for phasor technology appears to be
very high, and secondary processing of the acquired
phasors can provide a broad range of signal types.
Benefits: Phasor networks have best value in applications
that are mission critical and that involve truly wide-area
measurements.
Barriers: Establishing PMU networks is straightforward and
has already been done. The primary impediment is cost
and assuring value for the investment (making best use
of the data collected).
Commercial Status: PMU networks have been deployed at
several utilities across the country.
Index 331

Index

A C
a-c circuits 49 cables 35
AC transmission system 267 capacitive reactance 9, 13, 47
access roads 20 capacitive reactors 13
active reinforcing equipment 316 capacitors 37
advanced composite conductors capital and operating costs 138
312 cascading 7, 41, 53
air switches 43 circuit breakers 3, 6, 7, 13, 29, 37,
Alliance RTO 121 40, 41, 53, 57
alternating current 47 circuits 1, 3, 6, 8, 37, 39, 40, 41,
(AC) network 105 53, 54, 57
circuits 13 circulating currents 49
alternating magnetic 47 closed loop 6
angle type towers 22 code clearances 26
arrester 17 compact transmission lines 292
automation 3 conductors 13, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27,
33, 34, 47, 310
B congestion 134, 135, 136, 137
backup 1 costs 133
barbed wire 20, 29 controllable load 323
fencing 26, 43 controller reliability 283
strands 25 cooperative agreement 199
batteries 54, 320 copper 35
blackout 7, 41, 53, 54 clad steel 35
bolometers 54 corner type towers 22
Bonneville Power Administration counterpoise 18, 26, 47
116, 117 creeping distance 32
breakers 7, 8, 37 criteria 37, 53
bucket vehicle 25 Cross Sound Connector 174
bulk-power system 125 cryogenic devices 293
buried cables 292
buses 29, 37, 39, 40, 41 D
bushings 29 d-c circuit 47, 49

331
332 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

dancing 25, 27 fiberglass insulation 69

dead end 22, 24, 26 flashover 17, 25, 29
type towers 24 flexible AC transmission system
deintegration 108 (FACTS) 142
deregulation 1 flywheel 322
direct current 47 functional tests 203
direct measurement of conductor
sag 327
G
direct system-state sensors 329
gas accessories 35
disconnecting switches 29
generating stations 7
disconnects 53
generation 1, 3, 252
discovery 168
generation siting 187
discs 29
generation sources 1
distributed generation (DG) 325
generators 3, 7, 40
due process 167
grid 41
coordinate map 84
E
coordinate number 86, 87, 90
Earth’s curvature 83
coordinate system 79, 85, 88,
economics 1, 26, 57
93
test 203
management 263, 273
economy 54
GridFlorida (2000) Planning
Electric Reliability Council of
Protocol 119
Texas (ERCOT) 110
ground 15, 17, 18, 25
electrical 53
ground rods 26
electricity grid 160
ground wires 12, 15, 26, 35, 47
electricity trade 180, 181
grounded 25
electromagnetic 9
grounds 26, 47, 49
field 9
electrostatic fields 9, 47
energy-storage devices 319 H
helicopters 20, 54
F high-temperature super-conduct-
FACTS compensators 317 ing (HTSC) technology 310
FACTS dynamic brakes 319 high-temperature super-conduct-
FACTS phase-shifting transform- ing cable 142
ers 318 high-voltage DC (HVDC) 143,
federal land management 224 208, 242, 317
fences 20, 29, 54 hollow type conductors 15
fiber optic 8 hot spot 34, 54
Index 333

I MAPP 111
ice 26 mechanical 54
independent regional entity 199 merchant transmission 144, 150
independent system operators mesh 53
(ISOs) 106, 109 metering 37
indirect measurement of trans- Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
former coil temperature 328 (MAPP) 110
inductive 13, 47 modular equipment 314
reactance 9 mutual reactance 10
reactors 12
insulated bucket vehicles 27, 54 N
insulation 47 National Electric Safety Code 20
insulators 17, 22, 24, 29, 32, 34 National Environmental Policy
intelligent building systems 324 Act (NEPA) 197
intelligent energy system (IES) National Grid USA 113
295 national transmission grid (NTG)
interstate compact 198 249, 255
inverters 49 network 53
ISO New England 111, 112 New England Transmission
isolating switches 6, 37 Owners 122
non-transmission alternatives 165
L
leased 8 O
life-cycle analysis 295 oil accessories 35
lighting arrester 15 open loop 6, 53
lightning 26, 43 circuit 8, 40
arresters 15, 26, 33, 54
protection 15, 43 P
live line 54 passive reinforcing equipment 310
load 252 peak supply 1
local generation 1 phase 12
long leaf yellow pine 26 phasor measurement units
loop 6, 7, 8 (PMUs) 330
circuits 37 pilot wire 8
flow 260, 261, 284 plastic(s) 29, 32
systems 3 insulators 29
polymers 29, 59, 62, 66, 68, 73
M porcelain 29, 59
magnetic fields 49 insulators 29, 68
334 Transmission Line Reliability and Security

posts 29 sensing 54
power beaming (wireless power shield wire 15, 17
transmission) 315 shoes 34
power factor 9, 13, 37 shunt reactor 13
power-flow control devices 282 six-phase and 12-phase transmis-
power-system device sensors 326 sion line configuration 314
power-system monitors 329 skin effect 13
price-responsive load 323 solid type insulation 35
pumped hydro and compressed- spans 22, 24, 25, 26
air storage 321 stability 7, 8
state-based siting 208
R process 205
reactance 9, 10, 13 steel 35
reactors 37, 40, 47 steel towers 26
real-time monitoring 326 structures 26
real-time operational system data substation 37, 53
274 super-conducting magnetic
reconductoring 291 energy storage (SMES) 142,
rectifiers 49 321
redundant relaying 8 suspension tower 22, 24, 25
regional transmission organiza- system operator 41
tion (RTO) 98
regional-scale transmission T
planning 236 tangent type towers 22
relaying 6, 8, 37, 53, 57 telephone wire 8
relays 7, 18, 296 Tennessee Valley Authority 117
reliability 1, 3, 39, 40, 41, 54, 121, three-phase circuit 12
130, 131, 140, 141, 146 thyrite 49
right of way 20 tower 26, 35
ring bus 41 tower design tools 313
RTO 99, 123, 138, 146, 149, 150, towers 20, 21, 22, 25, 35
270 transfer capacity 253, 257, 261
RTO West Planning 120 transformers 29, 37, 39, 40, 41
transmission 35, 252
S capacity 98
safety 18, 26, 32, 43, 49 circuit 10
sag 20, 26 grid 183, 260
sectionalizing switches 3 investments 138, 139
security 1, 3, 298, 299 line 1, 8, 10, 13, 19, 20, 25,
Index 335

26, 35, 47, 131, 132, 141 underground/submarine cable

line configurations 313 monitoring/diagnostics 328
planning 102, 103, 104, 105, US and metric relationships 95
107, 119, 147, 148, 191
pricing 232 V
siting 160, 161, 162, 167, 170, vertically integrated utilities 130
171, 175, 178, 187, 202, 210,
213, 222 W
siting and permitting 158, western cedar 26
159 Western Governors’ Association
siting process 239 115
sources 1 wide-area measurement system
system 1, 7 (WAMS) 263
systems 1, 3, 8 wind 26, 27
transpositions 12 wireless 8
wood pole 26, 35
U lines 26, 35
ultra-high voltage levels 316 structures 25
underground 29 wood structures 26
underground cable 35, 43