MALA IN SE and MALA PROHIBITA

PEOPLE v MARIACOS, G.R. No. 188611, 16 June 2010

FACTS
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at
the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police,
and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of
Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance
operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent
of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been
loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with
an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking
and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the
bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but one of the women got away.

When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani
Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still
at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor,
requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first,
accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only
be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant
and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few
moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were
brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared.
It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags
which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that
she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.

RTC convicted accused-appellant.

CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but
to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him(Lao-ang).

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant’s contention is with merit

HELD: NO

This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana
is not necessary.

Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum
prohibitum, as in this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal
authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their
violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."30 There is
no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there
should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31 The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.32

Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the
disputable presumption33 that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34 Appellant
failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had
prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely
asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the
packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang
ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have
ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey
without knowing where they were taking the bags.

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v AGUILAR, G.R. Nos. 120622-23, 10 July 1998

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Noel Aguilar y Amistuso was charged with murder in two informations for the
death of HELEN A. REVILLA and ANGELAIDA PASCUA Y RANA.

At around 3:00 o'clock to 6:00 o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1994, accused-appellant
and two companions were having a drinking spree at the Virgo Pubhouse located along
MacArthur Highway, Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila. Two female receptionists, namely Helen
Revilla and Angelaida Pascua, attended to and entertained the three.

At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning, accused-appellant paid the bill amounting to P587.00.
Helen then told Dagalla, a waiter, that she would be leaving the place to sleep.

A few moments later, Roberto Laxa, a taxi driver waiting for passengers in front of the nearby
Victoria Court, saw Helen, Angelaida and a male companion proceeding to the then Lampara
Hotel (now Diwata Hotel) which is 15 to 20 meters away from Virgo Pubhouse. Shortly
thereafter, he saw Angelaida come out of the hotel and board a jeep going to Valenzuela only to
return thereto after a short while.

Wanting to retrieve his "Ray-ban" glasses from Angelaida which he entrusted to her as security
for a loan, Laxa waited for her and Helen to come out of the hotel. While waiting, Laxa went
inside the Lampara Hotel and talked to some hotel employees at the counter, particularly to
roomboys Inigo Malapitan, Jun Eusebio and Rodolfo Barreto, who guided Helen, Angelaida and
their male companion to their room. Laxa learned that the trio checked-in at room 239 located at
the lower portion of the hotel along a sloping parcel of land.

A short while later, the women's male companion came out of the room and hurried past the
counter towards MacArthur Highway. He appeared to be pale making Laxa wonder why Helen
and Angelaida were left behind. Roomboy Inigo Malapitan went to room 239 to start cleaning
the same only to immediately come out of it shouting about the bloodied bodies of Helen and
Angelaida lying on the floor. Barreto tried to chase the man but he was no longer to be found.

Accused-appellant had a different version of the incident. He alleged that he and his two
companions started their drinking session in Pasay City but afterwards went to Malabon where
they could get women with whom they can have sex.
He confirmed that they drank at the Virgo Pubhouse from 3:00 o'clock to 6:00 o'clock in the
morning. Further, he claimed that being too drunk, receptionists Helen and Angelaida
volunteered to bring him to their sleeping quarters. It turned out that he was taken to a motel
where he found himself lying on a bed.

He was allegedly awakened by the entry of someone into the room and by what he felt was a
sharp pointed object pressed against the right side of his body, near the armpit. Afterwards,
someone went on top of him while another person tried to get his wallet containing P4,000.00 in
cash.

Fearful for his life, accused-appellant fought back and was able to wrest possession of the
sharp pointed instrument which he swung to his left and to his right, forward, downward and
upward, in the course of which, he must have hit the persons who tried to kill and divest him of
his wallet. Still dazed, Aguilar turned on the lights and got scared with what he saw. As it turned
out, those persons who attempted to kill and rob him of his money were Helen and Angelaida
and who, resultantly, sustained stab wounds at the back and other portions of their bodies
because of his struggle. Thus, accused-appellant hurriedly left the place and it was at this point
that he noted that he sustained a wound on his left hand, between the index finger and the
thumb.

ISSUE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS MISTAKEN IMPRESSION, THAT APPELLANT
WAS ARMED WITH A SHARP INSTRUMENT, WITH WHICH HE STABBED HELEN FIRST
WHEN HE FOUND HIS WALLET CONTAINING P4,000.00 MISSING, AND THEN
ANGELAIDA, WHO JUST ENTERED THE ROOM AND IN NOT FINDING TRUE THE
UNCONTESTED TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT, THAT HE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE,
UNDER AN IMPULSE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF BEING KILLED.

HELD:
This Court is not persuaded that accused-appellant was only acting in self-defense when he
killed the victims. Where an accused charged with the killing of a person admits having caused
that death but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon him
to prove by clear and convincing evidence the positiveness of that justifying circumstance;
otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. 6 To successfully interpose self-defense, accused-appellant must clearly and
convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person defending
himself must not have provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.

Although all three elements must concur, self-defense must rest on proof of unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression, in turn, presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or an imminent danger therof, and not merely an intimidating attitude. There
must exist a real and not just imagined danger to the life or personal safety of the person
claiming self-defense.

Accused-appellant failed in his attempt to show the element of unlawful aggression. That one of
the victims supposedly went on top of him and poked a sharp pointed instrument near his armpit
while another tried to get his wallet is nothing but a self-serving statement which did not, in any
way, meet the required quantum of proof for unlawful aggression.

Neither did accused-appellant establish the reasonableness of the means employed to prevent
or repel the so-called "attack." Helen and Angelaida suffered multiple stab wounds while
accused-appellant did not even have a single wound to present before the lower court. That he
had a wound on his forefinger can hardly be compared to the extent of wounds inflicted upon his
victims. Besides, his allegation that he had a wound on one of his fingers is again self-serving
as he did not present a medical certificate to corroborate his testimony.

For failure to prove unlawful aggression and the reasonableness and necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack, accused-appellant's plea of self-defense must fail.

PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE and the OFFENDED PARTY

People vs. Dela Cerna, G.R. Nos. 136899-904, 9 October 2002

FACTS
Six separate complaints were filed on May 16, 1997 against accused-appellant charging him
with rape committed on January 15, 1989, December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August 25,
1996, February 10, 1997 and March 5, 1997.

On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private complainant to prove that she
voluntarily executed an affidavit of desistance. Private complainant explained that she decided
to forgive her father for the sake of her mother and her younger siblings who experienced pain
and difficulty in sustaining their daily needs as their whole family was dependent upon their
father for support.

The affidavit of desistance, dated July 3, 1998, was made in the vernacular and was offered in
evidence for the defense. Pertinent portions thereof stated that "complainant was no longer
interested in pursuing the cases against her father; the complaints filed with the Prosecutor's
Office and in Court were not her voluntary acts as she was only influenced and forced by the
people who came to support and intercede in her action; the testimony she made in court on
March 25, 1998 was not of her own free will as she was only forced to do so; there were false
statements she made during the hearing of the case; she had truly forgiven her father; she
wanted harmony and happiness; nobody influenced her to execute the said affidavit of
desistance to end the cases she filed against her father x x x."
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Ernesto
dela Cerna guilty of six counts of rape.

Accused-appellant assails said decision.

Accused-appellant mainly relies on the affidavit of desistance executed by private complainant,

claiming that said affidavit created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

ISSUE: WON the affidavit will change the outcome of accused-appellant’s case?

HELD: NO

An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal or

administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her
complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the
court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite
incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the accused-appellant arrested
by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of
a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and
recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case.

A careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance in this case reveals that private complainant
never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any
exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape. Plainly, all the affidavit really stated was
that she had decided to withdraw the complaints as she had already forgiven her father and she
wanted peace and happiness for her family. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces
complainant's testimony that accused-appellant raped her on several occasions.

Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irene's affidavit of desistance. Such an affidavit, by and

of itself, does not mean that what she previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit
itself are true. On the contrary, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can all too easily be secured from poor
and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or monetary consideration. Thus, there is
always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there will never be an end to criminal
litigation. It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimony solemnly taken before courts
of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for one reason
or another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and put the investigation of crimes at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of RA
8353, "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified the
crime of rape as a crime against persons. Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and
treat the acts of rape herein committed as private crimes. Thus, their institution, prosecution and
extinction should still be governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The aforequoted article provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. For the
crimes of adultery and concubinage, the pardon extended by the offended spouse results in the
extinction of the liability of the offender. On the other hand, in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, two modes are recognized for extinguishing criminal liability - pardon and
marriage. In all cases, however, the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal
action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability.

It must be stressed that private complainant in this case filed her complaint on May 16, 1997
and even testified against accused-appellant on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she
executed her affidavit of desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the pardon extended by the
victim to her father was made after the institution of the criminal action. Consequently, it cannot
be a ground to dismiss the action in these cases. The reason for this rule is that the true
aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense
of morality, decency and justice has been outraged. In such a case, the offended party becomes
merely a complaining witness. The complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute
the guilty parties in the name of the People of the Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. Hence, once filed, control of the
prosecution is removed from the offended party's hands and any change of heart by the victim
will not affect the state's right to vindicate the atrocity committed against itself.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN RAPE CASES

PEOPLE v MACAPANPAN, G.A. No. 133003, 9 April 2003

FACTS:
Pauline Pacurib was allegedly molested and raped during a blow-out she hosted for having
been promoted in her job at the local rural bank. Indicted for the felony were Lawrence
Macapanpan y De Guzman and Airoll Aclan y Mendoza in an Information. Upon arraignment,
the two accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.8 The case then proceeded to trial.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna, Branch 33, found both accused guilty as
charged and accordingly rendered judgment against them

Both accused appealed.

The prosecution's evidence sought to establish that the complainant was molested and ravished
while she was drunk during a blow-out she hosted at the hangout of her friends.
The defense's version, on the other hand, is a sordid narrative of fatal attraction and unrequited
love. It paints a picture of a licentious woman obsessed, scorned and spurned, whose
unreciprocated affection turned into vindictive hate which spurred her to file the instant case out
of spite.

ISSUE: WON COMPLAINT IS MERITORIOUS

HELD: NO
In a litany of cases, we have held that in reviewing charges of rape, we are guided by the
settled principles that: (a) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; while the
commission of the crime may not be easy to prove, it becomes even more difficult for the
person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are normally involved, the testimony of the complainant must
always be scrutinized with great caution; (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and can not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single
most important issue.

In the case at bar, while there were several persons present at the time of the alleged rape, the
court a quo relied heavily, if not entirely, on her testimony. A review, however, of the records of
the case will show that the testimony of the complaining witness is flawed with serious
inconsistencies, contradictions and incredulous statements.

The Court found,

First, the narration of the manner in which accused-appellant Macapanpan
allegedly ravished complainant strains credulity. She was allegedly raped in a standing
position by Macapanpan while she was being held from behind by Airoll Aclan. She
declared that at the time of the alleged rape she was very dizzy from the gin she drank,
and continuously sagged to the ground. It must be noted in this regard that private
complainant, Lawrence Macapanpan and Airoll Aclan are almost the same height, and
on account of her alleged intoxication she presented a dead weight to Airoll Aclan who
was merely a stripling of sixteen years at the time.

Attempting penile penetration, much less consummating the sexual act under
such circumstances, would be next to impossible considering complainant's drunken
state as a result of which she kept falling to the ground and had to be held up. Indeed,
the paucity of complainant's claim that accused-appellant Macapanpan had carnal
knowledge of her is best demonstrated by no less than her own narrative, where she
declared that both accused-appellants had difficulty in perpetrating the act because
Aclan had a hard time spreading her thighs in that position

Second, complainant alleges that she got the "kiss mark" or hematoma on her
neck from Airoll Aclan who supposedly held her from behind. This claim is, however,
 belied by prosecution witness Necy Adarlo who owned up to inflicting the hematoma
because she was "nanggigil" at complainant

Third, most damning of all to complainant's claims of alleged rape was Adarlo's
assertion that Macapanpan and Airoll Aclan never sexually assaulted complainant on
that fateful night

Fourth, while it has been held that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape
can be committed in the unlikeliest of places, this rule finds no application in this case
where the alleged rape occurred in a closely-confined room measuring 3.14 by 3.14
square meters occupied by twelve (12) persons, most of whom were awake. Thus, any
of these persons would have noticed anything untoward from the time private
complainant arrived up to the time she left the next day. While these occupants differ as
to small details in their narration of what transpired on February 9, 1996, their
testimonies agree on the material point that no such event happened other than that
incident where private complainant got hysterical after a couple of shots of gin and had
to be slapped by Jingle Kaharian to pacify her.

Fifth, it has been shown that unfounded charges of rape have frequently been
proffered by women actuated by sinister, ulterior or undisclosed motives. In the case at
bar, it appears that private complainant's failure to satisfactorily explain to her parents
the presence of the hematoma on her neck incurred the ire of her mother. Hence,
although she intended to withdraw the complaint she had filed, she could not do so
because "napasubo na sila." Particularly revealing in this regard is the testimony of
Francisco "Kokoy" Vito

Sixth, the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault
is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. In the
case at bar, the actuations of complainant after the alleged rape is totally
uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human behavior for
complainant to willingly go with Necy Adarlo, Jingle Kaharian and Ise Aclan to the
birthday party of one of her supposed abusers two days after the alleged sexual assault.

Seventh, by the same token, it also is out of the ordinary for accused-appellant
Macapanpan to remain in the hut up to the next day instead of immediately leaving to
avoid reprisal for the rape he allegedly committed. As held in People v. Licayan, the
unexplained flight of the accused may as a general rule be taken as evidence of his guilt.
The case at bar involves the converse situation. Instead of fleeing, accused-appellant
was the last person to leave the hut with Jay Salem, thirty minutes after complainant and
Necy Adarlo left at 5:00 a.m.

To reiterate, the testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be
received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be
wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes
from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after
the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish
and the humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear
in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

PEOPLE v MARIACOS, G.R. No. 188611, 16 June 2010

FACTS
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at
the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police,
and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of
Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance
operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent
of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been
loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with
an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking
and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the
bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but one of the women got away.

When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani
Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still
at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor,
requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first,
accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only
be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant
and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few
moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were
brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared.
It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags
which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that
she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.

RTC convicted accused-appellant.

CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used
against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was
flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

ISSUE: WON HER CONTENTION IS WITH MERIT

HELD: NO

In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle
to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the

requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure
must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of
probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
the person arrested.

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances

sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity.

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the
search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to
obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to
make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a
warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this
case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

RA 9262 PUNISHABLE ACTS

RUSTAN ANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010

FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and
they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards
that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke
up with him.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS)
a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure
(Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of
the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot
he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner.

RTC found petitioner guilty which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

HELD: YES

Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form
of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous
precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing
only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional
or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish
such that she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-
7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on
them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that
Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that
she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures
from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card.
There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the
card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was
too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent
the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.