Capitol Wireless VS. Provincial Treasurer

7/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 791

G.R. No. 180110. May 30, 2016.*

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, THE
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER and ASSESSOR OF
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, respondents.
Taxation; Real Property Taxation; In disputes involving real

property taxation, the general rule is to require the taxpayer to first
avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest
before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the
assessment itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal
authority.—In disputes involving real property taxation, the
general rule is to require the taxpayer to first avail of
administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest before
allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the
assessment itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal
authority. For example, prior resort to administrative action is
required when among the issues raised is an allegedly erroneous
assessment, like when the reasonableness of the amount is
challenged, while direct court action is permitted when only the
legality, power, validity or authority of the assessment itself is in
question. Stated differently, the general rule of a prerequisite
recourse to administrative remedies applies when questions of
fact are raised, but the exception of direct court action is allowed
when purely questions of law are involved.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Questions of Fact; It has been
held that “a bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is
merely a legal conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and such a
legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life,
has no standing in any court where issues must be presented and
determined by facts in ordinary and concise language.”—Capwire
argues and makes claims on mere assumptions of certain facts as
if they have been already admitted or established, when they
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017324472bbdbb30f4c4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/26
have not, since no evidence of such have yet been presented in the
proper agencies and even in the current petition. As such, it
remains unsettled whether
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.

273
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 273

Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas
Capwire is a mere co-owner, not full owner, of the subject

submarine cable and, if the former, as to what extent; whether all
or certain portions of the cable are indeed submerged in water;
and whether the waters wherein the cable/s is/are laid are
entirely outside of Philippine territorial or inland waters, i.e., in
international waters. More simply, Capwire argues based on mere
legal conclusions, culminating on its claim of illegality of
respondents’ acts, but the conclusions are yet unsupported by
facts that should have been threshed out quasi-judicially before
the administrative agencies. It has been held that “a bare
characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal
conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and such a legal conclusion
unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life, has no standing
in any court where issues must be presented and determined by
facts in ordinary and concise language.” Therefore, Capwire’s
resort to judicial action, premised on its legal conclusion that its
cables (the equipment being taxed) lie entirely on international
waters, without first administratively substantiating such a
factual premise, is improper and was rightly denied. Its
proposition that the cables lie entirely beyond Philippine
territory, and therefore, outside of Philippine sovereignty, is a fact
that is not subject to judicial notice since, on the contrary, and as
will be explained later, it is in fact certain that portions of the
cable would definitely lie within Philippine waters. Jurisprudence
on the Local Government Code is clear that facts such as these
must be threshed out administratively, as the courts in these
types of cases step in at the first instance only when pure
questions of law are involved.
Civil Law; Property; Real Properties; Machineries; Both
electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are
not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or
landing stations, but both may be classified under the term

“machinery” as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code
for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the
owner’s business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works
that are on real estate.—Submarine or undersea communications
cables are akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has
recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and
City Treasurer of Lucena City, 765 SCRA 52 (2015), as “no longer
exempted from real property tax” and may qualify as “machinery”
subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. To
the extent that the equipment’s location is determinable to be
within the taxing author-

275
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 275

ity’s jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish

between submarine cables used for communications and aerial or
underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that
both pieces of property do not merit a different treatment in the
aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and
communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly
adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing
stations, but both may be classified under the term “machinery”
as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the
simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that
are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be
classified as such, as “waters” is classified as an immovable under
Article 415(8) of the Code. A classic example is a boathouse which,
by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if
it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it floats
on waters which is immovable, is considered real property.
Besides, the Court has already held that “it is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of
taxation which on general principle might be considered personal
property.”
Same; Same; Same; Absent any showing from Capwire of any
express grant of an exemption for its lines and cables from real
property taxation, then this interpretation applies and Capwire’s
submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.—Thus,
absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an
exemption for its lines and cables from real property taxation,
then this interpretation applies and Capwire’s submarine cable
may be held subject to real property tax. Having determined that
Capwire is liable, and public respondents have the right to impose
a real property tax on its submarine cable, the issue that is
unresolved is how much of such cable is taxable based on the
extent of Capwire’s ownership or co-ownership of it and the length
that is laid within respondents’ taxing jurisdiction. The matter,
however, requires a factual determination that is best performed
by the Local and Central Boards of Assessment Appeals, a remedy
which the petitioner did not avail of.
Taxation; Property; Real Properties; Constitutional Law;
National Territory; United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea; Under Part VI, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Philippines clearly has
jurisdiction

275
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 275

with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in

support of other installations and structures under its jurisdiction.
—As the Court takes judicial notice that Nasugbu is a coastal
town and the surrounding sea falls within what the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would
define as the country’s territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical
miles outward from the nearest baseline, under Part II, Sections 1
and 2) over which the country has sovereignty, including the
seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of the
submarine cable system lies within Philippine territory and thus
falls within the jurisdiction of the said local taxing authorities. It
easily belies Capwire’s contention that the cable system is
entirely in international waters. And even if such portion does not
lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial sea but
further inward, in Prof. Magallona v. Hon. Ermita, et al., 655
SCRA 476 (2011), this Court held that “whether referred to as
Philippine ‘internal waters’ under Article I of the Constitution or
as ‘archipelagic waters’ under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2,
4), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air space over it
and the submarine areas underneath.” Further, under Part VI,
Article 79 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly has jurisdiction
with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in

support of other installations and structures under its
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction or authority over such
part of the subject submarine cable system lying within Philippine
jurisdiction includes the authority to tax the same, for taxation is
one (1) of the three (3) basic and necessary attributes of
sovereignty, and such authority has been delegated by the national
legislature to the local governments with respect to real property
taxation.—As far as local government units are concerned, the
areas described above are to be considered subsumed under the
term “municipal waters” which, under the Local Government
Code, includes “not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and
not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber
lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine waters
included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general
coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers
from it.” Although the term “municipal waters” appears in the
Code in the

276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a

fee by local governments, its inclusion in the Code’s Book II which
covers local taxation means that it may also apply as guide in
determining the territorial extent of the local authorities’ power to
levy real property taxation. Thus, the jurisdiction or authority
over such part of the subject submarine cable system lying within
Philippine jurisdiction includes the authority to tax the same, for
taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes of
sovereignty, and such authority has been delegated by the
national legislature to the local governments with respect to real
property taxation.
Same; Local Taxation; Real Property Taxation; Tax
Exemptions; Under the Local Government Code (LGC), every
person by whom or for whom real property is declared, who shall
claim tax exemption for such property from real property taxation
“shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within
thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property
sufficient documentary evidence in support of such claim.”—A way
for Capwire to claim that its cable system is not covered by such
authority is by showing a domestic enactment or even contract, or
an international agreement or treaty exempting the same from
real property taxation. It failed to do so, however, despite the fact
that the burden of proving exemption from local taxation is upon
whom the subject real property is declared. Under the Local
Government Code, every person by or for whom real property is
declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property from
real property taxation “shall file with the provincial, city or
municipal assessor within thirty (30) days from the date of the
declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in
support of such claim.” Capwire omitted to do so. And even under
Capwire’s legislative franchise, R.A. No. 4387, which amended
R.A. No. 2037, where it may be derived that there was a grant of
real property tax exemption for properties that are part of its
franchise, or directly meet the needs of its business, such had
been expressly withdrawn by the Local Government Code, which
took effect on January 1, 1992, Sections 193 and 234.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

277
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 277

De La Cuesta, De Las Alas & Tantuico for petitioner.

Dennis C. Macatangay for respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision1 dated May 30,
2007 and Resolution2 dated October 8, 2007 in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 82264, which both denied the appeal of petitioner
against the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Below are the facts of the case.
Petitioner Capitol Wireless, Inc. (Capwire) is a
Philippine corporation in the business of providing
international telecommunications services.3 As such
provider, Capwire has signed agreements with other local

and foreign telecommunications companies covering an
international network of submarine cable systems such as
the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN) (which
connects Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia and the
Philippines); the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable
Network System (BMP-CNS), the Philippines-Italy (SEA-
ME-WE-3-CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS)
systems.4
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with

Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 9-16.
Despite being impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals is now
being excluded as respondent by this Court per Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with
Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
concurring; id., at pp. 18-19.
3 Id., at p. 27.
4 Id., at pp. 27-30.

278

The agreements provide for co-ownership and other

rights among the parties over the network.5
Petitioner Capwire claims that it is co-owner only of the
so-called “Wet Segment” of the APCN, while the landing
stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located in
Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly owned by the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Corporation (PLDT).6 Moreover,
it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international,
and not Philippine, waters.7
Capwire claims that as co-owner, it does not own any
particular physical part of the cable system but, consistent
with its financial contributions, it owns the right to use a
certain capacity of the said system.8 This property right is
allegedly reported in its financial books as “Indefeasible
Rights in Cable Systems.”9
However, for loan restructuring purposes, Capwire

claims that “it was required to register the value of its
right,” hence, it engaged an appraiser to “assess the market
value of the international submarine cable system and the
cost to Capwire.”10 On May 15, 2000, Capwire submitted a
Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties at the
Provincial Treasurer’s Office, Batangas City, Batangas
Province, for the Wet Segment of the system, stating:
_______________
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 30.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id., at pp. 30-31.
10 Id., at p. 31.

279
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 279

Capwire claims that it also reported that the system

“interconnects at the PLDT Landing Station in Nasugbu,
Batangas,” which is covered by a transfer certificate of title
and tax declarations in the name of PLDT.11
As a result, the respondent Provincial Assessor of
Batangas (Provincial Assessor) issued the following
Assessments of Real Property (ARP) against Capwire:
In essence, the Provincial Assessor had determined that

the submarine cable systems described in Capwire’s Sworn
Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real

property, a determination that was contested by Capwire
in an exchange of letters between the company and the
public respondent.12 The reason cited by Capwire is that
the cable system lies outside of Philippine territory, i.e., on
international waters.13
On February 7, 2003 and March 4, 2003, Capwire
received a Warrant of Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale,
respectively, from the respondent Provincial Treasurer of
Batangas (Provincial Treasurer).14
On March 10, 2003, Capwire filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of Warrant of Levy,
Notice of Auc-
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 31-32.

12 Id., at pp. 32, 181-192.
13 Id., at pp. 32, 182.
14 Id., at pp. 32, 78-81.

280

tion Sale and/or Auction Sale with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Batangas City.15
Alter the filing of the public respondents’ Comment,16 on
May 5, 2003, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the
petition for failure of the petitioner Capwire to follow the
requisite of payment under protest as well as failure to
appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA),
as provided for in Sections 206 and 226 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.17
Capwire filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 but the
same was likewise dismissed by the RTC in an Order19
dated August 26, 2003. It then filed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals.20
On May 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision dismissing the appeal filed by Capwire and
affirming the order of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the CA’s decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed

Orders dated May 5, 2003 and August 26, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch II of Batangas City, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.21
The appellate court held that the trial court correctly

dismissed Capwire’s petition because of the latter’s failure
to comply with the requirements set in Sections 226 and
229 of the Local Government Code, that is, by not availing
of remedies before administrative bodies like the LBAA
and the Cen-
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 32, 64-77.

16 Id., at pp. 33, 193-199.
17 Id., at pp. 33, 200-203.
18 Id., at pp. 204-212.
19 Id., at pp. 223-228.
20 Id., at pp. 229-255.
21 Id., at p. 34.

281
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 281

tral Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).22 Although

Capwire claims that it saw no need to undergo
administrative proceedings because its petition raises
purely legal questions, the appellate court did not share
this view and noted that the case raises questions of fact,
such as the extent to which parts of the submarine cable
system lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing
authorities, the public respondents.23 Further, the CA
noted that Capwire failed to pay the tax assessed against it
under protest, another strict requirement under Section
252 of the Local Government Code.24
Hence, the instant petition for review of Capwire.
Petitioner Capwire asserts that recourse to the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals, or payment of the tax under
protest, is inapplicable to the case at bar since there is no
question of fact involved, or that the question involved is
not the reasonableness of the amount assessed but, rather,
the authority and power of the assessor to impose the tax

and of the treasurer to collect it.25 It contends that there is
only a pure question of law since the issue is whether its
submarine cable system, which it claims lies in
international waters, is taxable.26 Capwire holds the
position that the cable system is not subject to tax.27
Respondents assessors and treasurers of the Province of
Batangas and Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas disagree
with Capwire and insist that the case presents questions of
fact such as the extent and portion of the submarine cable
system that lies within the jurisdiction of the said local
governments, as well as the nature of the so-called
indefeasible
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 13-14.

23 Id., at p. 14.
24 Id., at p. 15.
25 Id., at pp. 35-36.
26 Id., at pp. 37-38.
27 Id.

282

rights as property of Capwire.28 Such questions are

allegedly resolvable only before administrative agencies
like the Local Board of Assessment Appeals.29
The Court confronts the following issues: Is the case
cognizable by the administrative agencies and covered by
the requirements in Sections 226 and 229 of the Local
Government Code which makes the dismissal of Capwire’s
petition by the RTC proper? May submarine
communications cables be classified as taxable real
property by the local governments?
The petition is denied. No error attended the ruling of
the appellate court that the case involves factual questions
that should have been resolved before the appropriate
administrative bodies.
In disputes involving real property taxation, the general
rule is to require the taxpayer to first avail of
administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest
before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when

the assessment itself is alleged to be illegal or is made
without legal authority.30 For example, prior resort to
administrative action is required when among the issues
raised is an allegedly erroneous assessment, like when the
reasonableness of the amount is challenged, while direct
court action is permitted when only the legality, power,
validity or authority of the assessment itself is in
question.31 Stated differently, the general rule of a
prerequisite recourse to administrative remedies applies
when questions of fact are raised, but the exception of
direct
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 277-278.

29 Id., at p. 278.
30 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, G.R. No.
184203, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 524; Camp John Hay Development
Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 169234,
October 2, 2013, 706 SCRA 547; National Power Corporation v. Province of
Quezon and Municipality of Pagbilao, 624 Phil. 738; 611 SCRA 71 (2010).
31 Id.

283
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 283

court action is allowed when purely questions of law are

involved.32
This Court has previously and rather succinctly
discussed the difference between a question of fact and a
question of law. In Cosmos Bottling Corporation v.
Nagrama, Jr.,33 it held:

The Court has made numerous dichotomies
between questions of law and fact. A reading of these
dichotomies shows that labels attached to law and
fact are descriptive rather than definitive. We are not
alone in Our difficult task of clearly distinguishing
questions of feet from questions of law. The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that: “we [do not] yet
know of any other rule or principle that will
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal

conclusion.”
In Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., the
Court ruled:
There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.
We shall label this the doubt dichotomy.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court
ruled:
x x x A question of law exists when the doubt
or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;
or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being
_______________
32 National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas,

G.R. No. 192300, November 24, 2014, 741 SCRA 505, quoting Ty v.
Trampe, 321 Phil. 81, 88; 250 SCRA 500, 505 (1995).
33 571 Phil. 281; 547 SCRA 571 (2008).

284

admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists

when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.
For the sake of brevity, We shall label this the law
application and calibration dichotomy.
In contrast, the dynamic legal scholarship in the

United States has birthed many commentaries on the
question of law and question of fact dichotomy. As
early as 1944, the law was described as growing
downward toward “roots of fact” which grew upward
to meet it. In 1950, the late Professor Louis Jaffe saw
fact and law as a spectrum, with one shade blending
imperceptibly into the other. Others have defined
questions of law as those that deal with the general
body of legal principles; questions of fact deal with
“all other phenomena x x x.” Kenneth Gulp Davis also
weighed in and noted that the difference between fact
and law has been characterized as that between
“ought” questions and “is” questions.34

Guided by the quoted pronouncement, the Court sustains
the CA’s finding that petitioner’s case is one replete with
questions of fact instead of pure questions of law, which
renders its filing in a judicial forum improper because it is
instead cognizable by local administrative bodies like the
Board of Assessment Appeals, which are the proper venues
for trying these factual issues. Verily, what is alleged by
Capwire in its petition as “the crux of the controversy,” that
is, “whether or not an indefeasible right over a submarine
cable system that lies in international waters can be
subject to real property tax
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 295-297; pp. 582-583. (Citations omitted)

285
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 285

in the Philippines,”35 is not the genuine issue that the case

presents — as it is already obvious and fundamental that
real property that lies outside of Philippine territorial
jurisdiction cannot be subjected to its domestic and
sovereign power of real property taxation — but, rather,
such factual issues as the extent and status of Capwire’s
ownership of the system, the actual length of the cable/s
that lie in Philippine territory, and the corresponding
assessment and taxes due on the same, because the public
respondents imposed and collected the assailed real

property tax on the finding that at least a portion or some
portions of the submarine cable system that Capwire owns
or co-owns lies inside Philippine territory. Capwire’s
disagreement with such findings of the administrative
bodies presents little to no legal question that only the
courts may directly resolve.
Instead, Capwire argues and makes claims on mere
assumptions of certain facts as if they have been already
admitted or established, when they have not, since no
evidence of such have yet been presented in the proper
agencies and even in the current petition. As such, it
remains unsettled whether Capwire is a mere co-owner,
not full owner, of the subject submarine cable and, if the
former, as to what extent; whether all or certain portions of
the cable are indeed submerged in water; and whether the
waters wherein the cable/s is/are laid are entirely outside of
Philippine territorial or inland waters, i.e., in international
waters. More simply, Capwire argues based on mere legal
conclusions, culminating on its claim of illegality of
respondents’ acts, but the conclusions are yet unsupported
by facts that should have been threshed out quasi-judicially
before the administrative agencies. It has been held that “a
bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is
merely a legal conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and
such a legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which
could give it life, has no standing in any court where issues
_______________
35 Rollo, p. 37.

286

must be presented and determined by facts in ordinary

and concise language.”36 Therefore, Capwire’s resort to
judicial action, premised on its legal conclusion that its
cables (the equipment being taxed) lie entirely on
international waters, without first administratively
substantiating such a factual premise, is improper and was
rightly denied. Its proposition that the cables lie entirely
beyond Philippine territory, and therefore, outside of
Philippine sovereignty, is a fact that is not subject to

judicial notice since, on the contrary, and as will be
explained later, it is in fact certain that portions of the
cable would definitely lie within Philippine waters.
Jurisprudence on the Local Government Code is clear that
facts such as these must be threshed out administratively,
as the courts in these types of cases step in at the first
instance only when pure questions of law are involved.
Nonetheless, We proceed to decide on whether
submarine wires or cables used for communications may be
taxed like other real estate.
We hold in the affirmative.
Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin
to electric transmission lines which this Court has recently
declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and
City Treasurer of Lucena City,37 as “no longer exempted
from real property tax” and may qualify as “machinery”
subject to real property tax under the Local Government
Code. To the extent that the equipment’s location is
determinable to be within the taxing authority’s
jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish
between submarine cables used for communications and
aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric
transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a
different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation.
_______________
36 Petty v. Dayton Musicians’ Association, 153 NE2d 218, affirmed 153

NE2d 223, quoted in De Dios v. Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., 154 Phil.
311, 317-322; 55 SCRA 349, 355 (1974).
37 G.R. No. 166102, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 52.

287
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 287

Both electric lines and communications cables, in the

strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass
through posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be
classified under the term “machinery” as real property
under Article 415(5)38 of the Civil Code for the simple
reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works
that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of

water may be classified as such, as “waters” is classified as
an immovable under Article 415(8)39 of the Code. A classic
example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel
and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the
shore and used as a residence, and since it floats on waters
which is immovable, is considered real property.40 Besides,
the Court has already held that “it is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
_______________
38 Civil Code, Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

x x x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works.
According to Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City
Treasurer of Lucena City, supra note 37, the requirements for the
machinery to 1) be placed in the tenement by the owner of the tenement;
and 2) that they be destined for use in the industry or work of the
tenement are not required by the Local Government Code for the
machinery to be classified as real property for purposes of taxation as such
real property. All that is needed is for the machinery to tend to directly
meet the needs of the owner’s industry or works.
39 Civil Code, Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
x x x x
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant.
40 Paras, Edgardo L., Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (16th
ed., 2008), Vol. II, pp. 28-29.

288

purposes of taxation which on general principle might be

considered personal property.”41
Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express
grant of an exemption for its lines and cables from real
property taxation, then this interpretation applies and
Capwire’s submarine cable may be held subject to real
property tax.
Having determined that Capwire is liable, and public

respondents have the right to impose a real property tax on
its submarine cable, the issue that is unresolved is how
much of such cable is taxable based on the extent of
Capwire’s ownership or co-ownership of it and the length
that is laid within respondents’ taxing jurisdiction. The
matter, however, requires a factual determination that is
best performed by the Local and Central Boards of
Assessment Appeals, a remedy which the petitioner did not
avail of.
At any rate, given the importance of the issue, it is
proper to lay down the other legal bases for the local taxing
authorities’ power to tax portions of the submarine cables
of petitioner. It is not in dispute that the submarine cable
system’s Landing Station in Nasugbu, Batangas is owned
by PLDT and not by Capwire. Obviously, Capwire is not
liable for the real property tax on this Landing Station.
Nonetheless, Capwire admits that it co-owns the
submarine cable system that is subject of the tax assessed
and being collected by public respondents. As the Court
takes judicial notice that Nasugbu is a coastal town and
the surrounding sea falls within what the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would define
as the country’s territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical
miles outward from the nearest baseline, under Part II,
Sections 1 and 2) over which the country has
_______________
41 Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633 (1923),
cited in Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 199
Phil. 487, 492; 114 SCRA 296, 302 (1982) and Manila Electric Company v.
City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, supra note 37.

289
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 289

sovereignty, including the seabed and subsoil, it follows

that indeed a portion of the submarine cable system lies
within Philippine territory and thus falls within the
jurisdiction of the said local taxing authorities.42 It easily
belies Capwire’s contention that the cable system is
entirely in international waters. And even if such portion
does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial

sea but further inward, in Prof. Magallona v. Hon. Ermita,
et al.,43 this Court held that “whether referred to as
Philippine ‘internal waters’ under Article I of the
Constitution44 or as ‘archipelagic waters’
_______________
42 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

PART II. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Section 1. General Provisions
Article 2. Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space
over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil:
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its
land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an
archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised
subject to this Convention and to other rules of international
law.
Section 2. Limits of the Territorial Sea
Article 3. Breadth of the territorial sea.
Every State has the right to establish the breadth
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined
in accordance with this Convention.
43 671 Phil. 244, 266-267; 655 SCRA 476, 498 (2011).
44 Constitution, Art. I. National Territory.—The national territory
comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of

290

under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2, 4),45 the

Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath.” Further,

under Part VI, Article 7946 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines
clearly has jurisdiction with respect to cables laid in its
territory that are utilized in support of other installations
and structures under its jurisdiction.
_______________
the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part

of the internal waters of the Philippines.
45 Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.—
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with Article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
x x x x
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in
this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the
archipelagic state of its sovereignty over such waters and their air
space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
46 Article 79. Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf.—
x x x x
4. Nothing in this Part (i.e., Part VI, Continental Shell) affects
the right of the coastal State to establish conditions for cables or
pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdiction
over cables and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the
exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or
the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures
under its jurisdiction.

291
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 291

And as far as local government units are concerned, the

areas described above are to be considered subsumed under
the term “municipal waters” which, under the Local
Government Code, includes “not only streams, lakes, and
tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject

of private ownership and not comprised within the national
parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery
reserves, but also marine waters included between two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from
points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city
touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the
general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it.”47
Although the term “municipal waters” appears in the Code
in the context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries
privileges for a fee by local governments,48 its inclusion in
the Code’s Book II which covers local
_______________
47 Local Government Code, Book II, Chapter 1, Sec. 131(r) “Municipal

Waters” includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not
comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where
the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and
a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers
from it. Where two (2) municipalities are so situated on the opposite
shores that there is less than fifteen (15) kilometers of marine waters
between them, the third line shall be equally distant from opposite shores
of their respective municipalities.
48 Id., Sec. 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources.—
The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair
market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand,
gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from
the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters
within its territorial jurisdiction.

292

taxation means that it may also apply as guide in

determining the territorial extent of the local authorities’
power to levy real property taxation.
Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over such part of the
subject submarine cable system lying within Philippine
jurisdiction includes the authority to tax the same, for

taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes
of sovereignty,49 and such authority has been delegated by
the national legislature to the local governments with
respect to real property taxation.50
As earlier stated, a way for Capwire to claim that its
cable system is not covered by such authority is by showing
a domestic enactment or even contract, or an international
agreement or treaty exempting the same from real property
taxation. It failed to do so, however, despite the fact that
the burden of proving exemption from local taxation is
upon whom the subject real property is declared.51 Under
the Local Government Code, every person by or for whom
real property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption for
such property
_______________
The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be
issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
x x x x
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.—(a) Municipalities
shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor in
accordance with the provisions of this Section. x x x
49 Compagnie Financiere Sucres et Denrees v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 531 Phil. 264, 267; 499 SCRA 664, 667 (2006);
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., 462 Phil. 96, 127;
416 SCRA 436, 457 (2003).
50 Local Government Code, Title II; The City Government of Quezon
City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc., 519 Phil. 159, 174; 484 SCRA
169, 184 (2006).
51 Camp John Hay Development Corporation v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, supra note 30, citing the Local Government Code,
Section 206.

293
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 293

from real property taxation “shall file with the

provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty (30)
days from the date of the declaration of real property
sufficient documentary evidence in support of such

claim.”52 Capwire omitted to do so. And even under
Capwire’s legislative franchise, R.A. No. 4387, which
amended R.A. No. 2037, where it may be derived that there
was a grant of real property tax exemption for properties
that are part of its franchise, or directly meet the needs of
its business,53 such had been expressly withdrawn by the
Local Government Code, which took effect on January 1,
1992, Sections 193 and 234 of which provide:54

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption
Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered
under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and
_______________
52 Local Government Code, Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real

Properly from Taxation.—Every person by or for whom real property is
declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property under this Title
shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty (30)
days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient
documentary evidence in support of such claim including corporate
charters, title of ownership, articles of incorporation, bylaws, contracts,
affidavits, certifications and mortgage deeds, and similar documents.
53 Sec. 5. The same Act is further amended by adding between
Sections thirteen and fourteen thereof a new section which shall read as
follows:
Sec. 13-A. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on
its real estate, buildings, and personal property, exclusive of this
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereinafter may be
required by law to pay.
54 See Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of
Lucena City, supra note 37.

294

nonprofit hospitals and educational

institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.
x x x x
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.
—
The following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use
thereof has been granted, for consideration of
otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches,
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, nonprofit or religious cemeteries and
all lands, buildings, and improvements actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are
actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned or
-controlled corporations engaged in the supply
and distribution of water and/or generation and
transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly
registered cooperatives as provided for under
R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for
pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption
from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned or -controlled corporations
are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code.55
_______________
55 Emphasis supplied.

295
VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 295
Such express withdrawal had been previously held

effective upon exemptions bestowed by legislative
franchises granted prior to the effectivity of the Local
Government Code.56 Capwire fails to allege or provide any
other privilege or exemption that were granted to it by the
legislature after the enactment of the Local Government
Code. Therefore, the presumption stays that it enjoys no
such privilege or exemption. Tax exemptions are strictly
construed against the taxpayer because taxes are
considered the lifeblood of the nation.57
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated May 30, 2007 and Resolution dated
October 8, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez and Mendoza,** JJ.,

concur.
Jardeleza, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Section 142 of the Local Government Code

grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and
charges not otherwise levied by provinces. (Smart
Communications, Inc. vs. Municipality of Malvar,
Batangas, 716 SCRA 677 [2014])
Section 252(c) of the Local Government Code of the
Philippines is very clear that “[i]n the event that the
protest is
finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or
portion
_______________
56 Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of

Lucena City, supra note 37.
57 City of Manila v. Colet, G.R. No. 120051, December 10, 2014, 744
SCRA 265.
** Designated additional member, in lieu of Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Raffle dated May 23, 2016.

296

of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant,

or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax
liability.” (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. City of
Manila, 721 SCRA 1 [2014])

——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Capitol Wireless VS. Provincial Treasurer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Capitol Wireless VS. Provincial Treasurer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Capitol Wireless VS. Provincial Treasurer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

7/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 791

G.R. No. 180110. May 30, 2016.*

Taxation; Real Property Taxation; In disputes involving real

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 273

Capwire is a mere co-owner, not full owner, of the subject

landing stations, but both may be classified under the term

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 275

ity’s jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 275

with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in

with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 277

De La Cuesta, De Las Alas & Tantuico for petitioner.

provider, Capwire has signed agreements with other local

1 Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The agreements provide for co-ownership and other

However, for loan restructuring purposes, Capwire

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 279

Capwire claims that it also reported that the system

In essence, the Provincial Assessor had determined that

Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real

11 Id., at pp. 31-32.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion Sale and/or Auction Sale with the Regional Trial

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed

The appellate court held that the trial court correctly

15 Id., at pp. 32, 64-77.

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 281

tral Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).22 Although

the authority and power of the assessor to impose the tax

22 Id., at pp. 13-14.

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

rights as property of Capwire.28 Such questions are

before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when

28 Id., at pp. 277-278.

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 283

court action is allowed when purely questions of law are

unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal

32 National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas,

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists

In contrast, the dynamic legal scholarship in the

34 Id., at pp. 295-297; pp. 582-583. (Citations omitted)

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 285

in the Philippines,”35 is not the genuine issue that the case

respondents imposed and collected the assailed real

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

must be presented and determined by facts in ordinary

Philippine sovereignty, is a fact that is not subject to

36 Petty v. Dayton Musicians’ Association, 153 NE2d 218, affirmed 153

VOL. 791, MAY 30, 2016 287

Both electric lines and communications cables, in the

that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of

38 Civil Code, Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED